[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 154 (Friday, September 29, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14782-S14797]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FISCAL YEAR 1996

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 164, S. 922, the 
intelligence authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 922) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
     1996 for intelligence and intelligence related activities of 
     the United States Government.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate 
consideration of the bill?
  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, 
which had been reported from the Committee on Armed Services, with an 
amendment to insert the part printed in italics on page 3, so as to 
make the bill read:

                                 S. 922

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
     Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1996''.
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
     1996 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities of the following elements of the United 
     States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1996, 
     for the conduct of the elements listed in such section, are 
     those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared by the Committee of Conference to accompany (  ) of 
     the One Hundred and Fourth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the Executive Branch.
       (c) Scope of Schedule.--The Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in subsections (a) and (b) is only the Schedule 
     of Authorizations for the National Foreign Intelligence 
     Program (NFIP).

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1996 under section 102 of this Act when the Director 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4)), exceed 2 
     percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under 
     such section for such element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall notify the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate prior to 
     exercising the authority granted by this section.
     
[[Page S 14783]]


     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--(1) There is 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence 
     for fiscal year 1996 the sum of $98,283,000.
       (2) Funds made available under paragraph (1) for the 
     Advanced Research and Development Committee and the 
     Environmental Task Force shall remain available until 
     September 30, 1997.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The Community Management 
     Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 
     247 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1996. Such 
     personnel of the Community Management Staff may be permanent 
     employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During the fiscal year 1996, any 
     officer or employee of the United States or any member of the 
     Armed Forces who is detailed to the Community Management 
     Staff from another element of the United States Government 
     shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any 
     such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1996 the sum of $213,900,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS TO INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.401 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title:
 ``TITLE VIII--APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     ``SEC. 801. DELAY OF SANCTIONS.

       ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President 
     may delay the imposition of a sanction related to the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery 
     systems, or advanced conventional weapons when he determines 
     that to proceed without delay would seriously risk the 
     compromise of a sensitive intelligence source or method or an 
     ongoing criminal investigation. The President shall terminate 
     any such delay as soon as it is no longer necessary to that 
     purpose.

     ``SEC. 802. REPORTS.

       ``Whenever the President makes the determination required 
     pursuant to section 801, the President shall promptly report 
     to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives the rationale and circumstances that led the 
     President to exercise the authority under section 801 with 
     respect to an intelligence source or method, and to the 
     Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives the rationale and circumstances that led the 
     President to exercise the authority under section 801 with 
     respect to an ongoing criminal investigation. Such report 
     shall include a description of the efforts being made to 
     implement the sanctions as soon as possible and an estimate 
     of the date on which the sanctions will become effective.''.

     SEC. 304. THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN FORFEITURE.

       (a) In General.--Section 8432(g) of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     contributions made by the Government for the benefit of an 
     employee under subsection (c), and all earnings attributable 
     to such contributions, shall be forfeited if the employee's 
     annuity, or that of a survivor or beneficiary, is forfeited 
     pursuant to subchapter II of chapter 83 of this title.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to offenses upon which the requisite annuity 
     forfeitures are based occurring on or after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 305. AUTHORITY TO RESTORE SPOUSAL PENSION BENEFITS TO 
                   SPOUSES WHO COOPERATE IN CRIMINAL 
                   INVESTIGATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS FOR NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY OFFENSES.

       Section 8312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     spouse of an employee whose annuity or retired pay is 
     forfeited under this section or section 8313 after the 
     enactment of this subsection shall be eligible for spousal 
     pension benefits if the Attorney General determines that the 
     spouse fully cooperated with Federal authorities in the 
     conduct of a criminal investigation and subsequent 
     prosecution of the employee.''.

     SEC. 306. AMENDMENT TO THE HATCH ACT REFORM AMENDMENTS OF 
                   1993.

       Section 7325 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding after ``section 7323(a)'' the following: ``and 
     paragraph (2) of section 7323(b)''.

     SEC. 307. REPORT ON PERSONNEL POLICIES.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than three months after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall submit to the intelligence committees of 
     Congress a report describing personnel procedures, and 
     recommending necessary legislation, to provide for mandatory 
     retirement for expiration of time in class, comparable to the 
     applicable provisions of section 607 of the Foreign Service 
     Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4007), and termination based on 
     relative performance, comparable to section 608 of the 
     Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4008), for all 
     civilian employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
     and the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
     and Marine Corps.
       (b) Coordination.--The preparation of the report required 
     by subsection (a) shall be coordinated as appropriate with 
     elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4)).
       (c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     ``intelligence committees of Congress'' means the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 308. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     used to provide assistance to a foreign country for 
     counterterrorism efforts if--
       (1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of 
     protecting the property of the United States Government or 
     the life and property of any United States citizen, or 
     furthering the apprehension of any individual involved in any 
     act of terrorism against such property or persons; and
       (2) the appropriate committees of Congress are notified not 
     later than 15 days prior to the provision of such assistance.
       (b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF THE CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.

       Section 2(f) of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act is 
     amended by striking out ``September 30, 1997'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``September 30, 1999''.

     SEC. 402. VOLUNTEER SERVICE PROGRAM.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 20. VOLUNTEER SERVICE PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to establish 
     and maintain a program during fiscal years 1996 through 2001 
     to utilize the services contributed by not more than 50 
     retired annuitants who serve without compensation as 
     volunteers in aid of the review by the Central Intelligence 
     Agency for declassification or downgrading of classified 
     information under applicable Executive Orders covering the 
     classification and declassification of national security 
     information and Public Law 102-526.
       ``(b) The Agency is authorized to use sums made available 
     to the Agency by appropriations or otherwise for paying the 
     costs incidental to the utilization of services contributed 
     by individuals who serve without compensation as volunteers 
     in aid of the review by the Agency of classified information, 
     including, but not limited to, the costs of training, 
     transportation, lodging, subsistence, equipment, and 
     supplies. Agency officials may authorize either direct 
     procurement of, or reimbursement for, expenses incidental to 
     the effective use of volunteers, except that provision for 
     such expenses or services shall be in accordance with 
     volunteer agreements made with such individuals and that such 
     sums may not exceed $100,000.
       ``(c) Notwithstanding the provision of any other law, 
     individuals who volunteer to provide services to the Agency 
     under this section shall be covered by and subject to the 
     provisions of--
       ``(1) the Federal Employees Compensation Act; and
       ``(2) chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code,
     as if they were employees or special Government employees 
     depending upon the days of expected service at the time they 
     begin their volunteer service.''.

     SEC. 403. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Reports by the Inspector General.--Section 17(b)(5) of 
     the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United 
     States Code, the Inspector General 

[[Page S 14784]]
     shall report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or 
     complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
     violations of Federal criminal law that involve a program or 
     operation of the Agency, consistent with such guidelines as 
     may be issued by the Attorney General pursuant to paragraph 
     (2). A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the 
     Director.''.
       (b) Exception to Nondisclosure Requirement.--Section 
     17(e)(3)(A) of such Act is amended by inserting after 
     ``investigation'' the following: ``or the disclosure is made 
     to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for 
     determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken''.

     SEC. 404. REPORT ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS.

       (a) Annual Report.--Section 502 of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (2) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) annually submit to the intelligence committees a 
     report describing all liaison relationships for the preceding 
     year, including--
       ``(A) the names of the governments and entities;
       ``(B) the purpose of each relationship;
       ``(C) the resources dedicated (including personnel, funds, 
     and materiel);
       ``(D) a description of the intelligence provided and 
     received, including any reports on human rights violations; 
     and
       ``(E) any significant changes anticipated.''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 606 of such Act is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(11) The term `liaison' means any governmental entity or 
     individual with whom an intelligence agency has established a 
     relationship for the purpose of obtaining information.''.
         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. COMPARABLE OVERSEAS BENEFITS AND ALLOWANCES FOR 
                   CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 
                   DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Title 10.--Title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 1605(a), by striking ``and'' after ``Defense 
     Attache Offices'' and inserting ``or''; and
       (2) in section 1605(a), by inserting ``, and Defense 
     Intelligence Agency employees assigned to duty outside the 
     United States,'' after ``outside the United States,''.
       (b) Title 37.--Title 37, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 431(a), by striking ``and'' after ``Defense 
     Attache Offices'' and inserting ``or''; and
       (2) in section 431(a), by inserting ``, and members of the 
     armed forces assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency and 
     engaged in intelligence related duties outside the United 
     States,'' after ``outside the United States''.

     SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
                   NECESSARY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR AUTHORIZED 
                   INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``1995'' and inserting ``2001''.

     SEC. 503. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS' CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE 
                   PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: ACQUISITION OF 
                   CRITICAL SKILLS.

       (a) Establishment of Training Program.--Chapter 81 of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     thereof the following new section:

     ``Sec. 1599. Financial assistance to certain employees in 
       acquisition of critical skills

       ``(a) Training Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     establish an undergraduate training program with respect to 
     civilian employees in the Military Departments' Civilian 
     Intelligence Personnel Management System that is similar in 
     purpose, conditions, content, and administration to the 
     program which the Secretary of Defense established under 
     section 16 of the National Security Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 
     402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security 
     Agency.
       ``(b) Funding of Training Program.--Any payments made by 
     the Secretary to carry out the program required to be 
     established by subsection (a) may be made in any fiscal year 
     only to the extent that appropriated funds are available for 
     that purpose.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of that chapter is amended by adding at the end 
     thereof the following:

``Sec. 1599. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition 
              of critical skills.''.
               TITLE VI--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

     SEC. 601. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER REPORTS TO 
                   FBI FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

       (a) In General.--The Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 
     1681 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 623, the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 624. Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence 
       purposes

       ``(a) Identity of Financial Institutions.--Notwithstanding 
     section 604 or any other provision of this title, a consumer 
     reporting agency shall furnish to the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation the names and addresses of all financial 
     institutions (as that term is defined in section 1101 of the 
     Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978) at which a consumer 
     maintains or has maintained an account, to the extent that 
     information is in the files of the agency, when presented 
     with a written request for that information, signed by the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the 
     Director's designee, which certifies compliance with this 
     section. The Director or the Director's designee may make 
     such a certification only if the Director or the Director's 
     designee has determined in writing that--
       ``(1) such information is necessary for the conduct of an 
     authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and
       ``(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the consumer--
       ``(A) is a foreign power (as defined in section 101 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) or a person 
     who is not a United States person (as defined in such section 
     101) and is an official of a foreign power; or
       ``(B) is an agent of a foreign power and is engaging or has 
     engaged in an act of international terrorism (as that term is 
     defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978) or clandestine intelligence 
     activities that involve or may involve a violation of 
     criminal statutes of the United States.
       ``(b) Identifying Information.--Notwithstanding the 
     provisions of section 604 or any other provision of this 
     title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish identifying 
     information respecting a consumer, limited to name, address, 
     former addresses, places of employment, or former places of 
     employment, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when 
     presented with a written request, signed by the Director or 
     the Director's designee, which certifies compliance with this 
     subsection. The Director or the Director's designee may make 
     such a certification only if the Director or the Director's 
     designee has determined in writing that--
       ``(1) such information is necessary to the conduct of an 
     authorized counterintelligence investigation; and
       ``(2) there is information giving reason to believe that 
     the consumer has been, or is about to be, in contact with a 
     foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (as defined in 
     section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978).
       ``(c) Court Order for Disclosure of Consumer Reports.--
     Notwithstanding section 604 or any other provision of this 
     title, if requested in writing by the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director, a 
     court may issue an order ex parte directing a consumer 
     reporting agency to furnish a consumer report to the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, upon a showing in camera that--
       ``(1) the consumer report is necessary for the conduct of 
     an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and
       ``(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the consumer whose consumer report is 
     sought--
       ``(A) is an agent of a foreign power, and
       ``(B) is engaging or has engaged in an act of international 
     terrorism (as that term is defined in section 101(c) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) or clandestine 
     intelligence activities that involve or may involve a 
     violation of criminal statutes of the United States.

     The terms of an order issued under this subsection shall not 
     disclose that the order is issued for purposes of a 
     counterintelligence investigation.
       ``(d) Confidentiality.--No consumer reporting agency or 
     officer, employee, or agent of a consumer reporting agency 
     shall disclose to any person, other than those officers, 
     employees, or agents of a consumer reporting agency necessary 
     to fulfill the requirement to disclose information to the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section, that the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained the 
     identity of financial institutions or a consumer report 
     respecting any consumer under subsection (a), (b), or (c), 
     and no consumer reporting agency or officer, employee, or 
     agent of a consumer reporting agency shall include in any 
     consumer report any information that would indicate that the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained such 
     information or a consumer report.
       ``(e) Payment of Fees.--The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, pay to 
     the consumer reporting agency assembling or providing report 
     or information in accordance with procedures established 
     under this section a fee for reimbursement for such costs as 
     are reasonably necessary and which have been directly 
     incurred in searching, reproducing, or transporting books, 
     papers, records, or other data required or requested to be 
     produced under this section.
       ``(f) Limit on Dissemination.--The Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation may not disseminate information obtained 
     pursuant to this section outside of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, except to other Federal agencies as may be 
     necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign 
     counterintelligence investigation, or, where the information 
     concerns a person subject to the uniform Code of Military 
     Justice, to appropriate investigative authorities within the 
     military department concerned as may be necessary for the 
     conduct of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation.

[[Page S 14785]]

       ``(g) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to prohibit information from being furnished by 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a subpoena or 
     court order, in connection with a judicial or administrative 
     proceeding to enforce the provisions of this Act. Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to authorize or permit the 
     withholding of information from the Congress.
       ``(h) Reports to Congress.--On a semiannual basis, the 
     Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking, 
     Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate concerning 
     all requests made pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c).
       ``(i) Damages.--Any agency or department of the United 
     States obtaining or disclosing any consumer reports, records, 
     or information contained therein in violation of this section 
     is liable to the consumer to whom such consumer reports, 
     records, or information relate in an amount equal to the sum 
     of--
       ``(1) $100, without regard to the volume of consumer 
     reports, records, or information involved;
       ``(2) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a 
     result of the disclosure;
       ``(3) if the violation is found to have been willful or 
     intentional, such punitive damages as a court may allow; and
       ``(4) in the case of any successful action to enforce 
     liability under this subsection, the costs of the action, 
     together with reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the 
     court.
       ``(j) Disciplinary Actions for Violations.--If a court 
     determines that any agency or department of the United States 
     has violated any provision of this section and the court 
     finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise 
     questions of whether or not an officer or employee of the 
     agency or department acted willfully or intentionally with 
     respect to the violation, the agency or department shall 
     promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not 
     disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or 
     employee who was responsible for the violation.
       ``(k) Good-Faith Exception.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this title, any consumer reporting agency or 
     agent or employee thereof making disclosure of consumer 
     reports or identifying information pursuant to this 
     subsection in good-faith reliance upon a certification of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to provisions of 
     this section shall not be liable to any person for such 
     disclosure under this title, the constitution of any State, 
     or any law or regulation of any State or any political 
     subdivision of any State.
       ``(l) Limitation of Remedies.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this title, the remedies and sanctions set forth 
     in this section shall be the only judicial remedies and 
     sanctions for violation of this section.
       ``(m) Injunctive Relief.--In addition to any other remedy 
     contained in this section, injunctive relief shall be 
     available to require compliance with the procedures of this 
     section. In the event of any successful action under this 
     subsection, costs together with reasonable attorney fees, as 
     determined by the court, may be recovered.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et 
     seq.) is amended by adding after the item relating to section 
     624 the following:

``624. Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence purposes.''.
                    TITLE VII--TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS

     SEC. 701. CLARIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO PAY FOR DIRECTOR OR 
                   DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   APPOINTED FROM COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE 
                   ARMED FORCES.

       Section 102(c)(3)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 403(c)(3)(C)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``A'' before ``commissioned'' and inserting 
     ``An active duty'';
       (2) by striking out ``(including retired pay)'';
       (3) by inserting ``an active duty'' after ``payable to''; 
     and
       (4) by striking ``a'' before ``commissioned''.

     SEC. 702. CHANGE OF OFFICE DESIGNATION IN CIA INFORMATION 
                   ACT.

       Section 701(b)(3) of the CIA Information Act of 1984 (50 
     U.S.C. 431(b)(3)) is amended by striking ``Office of 
     Security'' and inserting ``Office of Personnel Security''.


              Amendment No. 2880 To The Committee Amendment

  (Purpose: To exclude from the Schedule of Authorizations the Joint 
                    Military Intelligence Programs)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk to the 
committee amendment and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Specter 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2880 to the committee reported 
     amendment.

  The amendment is as follows:

       In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the 
     Committee amendment to page 3, lines 18 though 21 of the 
     bill, insert the following:
       (c) Scope of Schedule.--For fiscal year 1996, the Schedule 
     of Authorizations referred to in subsections (a) and (b) does 
     not include the Schedule of Authorizations for the Joint 
     Military Intelligence Programs (JMIP).

  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2880) was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the committee amendment, as 
amended, is agreed to.
  The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


            Amendments Nos. 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884, En Bloc.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I send four amendments to the desk and ask 
they be considered en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats] proposes en bloc 
     amendments Nos. 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884.

  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 2881

    (Purpose: To reduce the total amount of funds authorized to be 
   appropriated for the National Reconnaissance Office of offset the 
           availability of certain prior year appropriations)

       On page 11, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 309. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED 
                   FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE FOR 
                   FISCAL YEAR 1996.

       The total amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1996 for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) shall 
     be reduced by an amount equal to the amount by which 
     appropriations for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 
     1996 are reduced to reflect the availability of funds 
     appropriated prior to fiscal year 1996 that have accumulated 
     in the carry forward accounts for that Office.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, At this time, I join with my colleagues 
in offering two amendments to address concerns about financial 
practices and management at the National Reconnaissance Office. The 
first amendment will reduce the amount authorized to be appropriated 
for the National Reconnaissance Office in order to eliminate excess 
carry-forward funds in fiscal year 1996. As the Members are aware, the 
Conference Committee on the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
1996 recently reduced the NRO appropriation in an amount equal to the 
excess funds accumulated in the carry-forward accounts. The amendment 
ensures that the cut in Fiscal Year 1996 appropriations for NRO is also 
reflected in the authorization. The second amendment is designed to 
prospectively address the NRO carry-forward accounts and financial 
management generally by imposing a statutory cap of 1 month on carry-
forward accounts (in line with DOD general policy); requiring a joint 
review by the Inspectors General for CIA and DOD of NRO's financial 
management to evaluate the effectiveness of policies and internal 
controls over the NRO budget; and requiring the President to report no 
later than January 30, 1996 on a proposal to subject the budget of the 
intelligence community to greater executive branch oversight, including 
the possibility of a statutory financial control officer and greater 
OMB review of the NRO budget. The President shall also report on the 
impact, if any, on national security brought about by reduction in the 
carry forward accounts at NRO.
  These amendments addresses an issue that the committee first 
identified in 1992 but which has received a good deal of press 
attention in the past several days and has raised questions about the 
National Reconnaissance Office's financial management practices. It has 
been alleged that the NRO has accumulated more than $1 billion in 
unspent funds without informing the Pentagon, CIA, or Congress. It has 
been further alleged that this is one more example of how intelligence 
agencies sometimes use their secret status to avoid accountability. 
These are serious charges which the committee has been looking into, 
most recently with a closed hearing on Wednesday, September 27, at 
which we questioned Mr. George Tenet and Mr. Keith Hall from the Office 
of the Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. Jeff Harris and Mr. 
Jimmie Hill, the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO.
  As I have noted, the Intelligence Committee first identified this 
issue in 1992 when it determined that NRO had accumulated an unusually 
large sum of 

[[Page S 14786]]
funds in some of its forward-funding accounts. Some forward funding, 
generally up to 1 month, is normal for NRO research and development 
accounts to cover unforseen overruns on contracts and bridge any gaps 
in fiscal year funding that may result from a delay in appropriations. 
NRO assured the Committee in 1992 that the excessive funds that had 
accumulated would be eliminated within 4 years. We now understand that 
this obligation was not fulfilled. Hence, our amendment reduces the 
funds in conformance with the appropriations bill.

  Let me emphasize, however, that while public attention has focused on 
one element of those practices--those that involve the carry-forward 
accounts in the National Reconnaissance Office, a broader inquiry is 
being undertaken by the Intelligence Committee and is reflected in the 
second amendment related to the NRO. It is important to determine if 
the NRO's past financial management practices in this area have been as 
tight as they should have been. While the NRO sits in the Department of 
Defense, it is a critical element of the national intelligence 
community. Thus, it is also essential that we gain an understanding of 
any management practices which need to be changed in order to 
strengthen the role of the Director of Central Intelligence so that he 
can manage more completely the intelligence community. These are some 
of the issues the Intelligence Committee will be examining in the 
coming months as it reviews the intelligence community's role in the 
post-cold-war world and how that community should be restructured or 
refocused to meet the challenges of this changed environment.
  Mr. President, acknowledging that this is just one step in a broader 
effort to address legitimate public concerns about the NRO and the 
intelligence community as a whole, I urge adoption of these amendments.


                           amendment no. 2882

 (Purpose: To provide for improvements in the financial management of 
  the National Reconnaissance Office) At the appropriate place in the 
                bill, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 310. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 
                   OFFICE.

       (a) Limitation.--No funds are authorized to be carried over 
     into FY 1997 or subsequent years for the programs, projects, 
     and activities of the National Reconnaissance Office in 
     excess of the amount necessary to provide for the ongoing 
     mission of the NRO for one month.''
       (b) Management Review.--(1) The Inspector General for the 
     Central Intelligence Agency and the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Defense shall jointly undertake a comprehensive 
     review of the financial management of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office to evaluate the effectiveness of 
     policies and internal controls over the budget of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, including the use of forward 
     funding, to ensure that National Reconnaissance Office funds 
     are used in accordance with the policies of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence and the Department of Defense, the 
     guidelines of the National Reconnaissance Office, and 
     congressional direction.
       (2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall--
       (A) determine the quality of the development and 
     implementation of the budget process within the National 
     Reconnaissance Office at both the comptroller and directorate 
     level;
       (B) assess the advantages and disadvantages of the use of 
     incremental versus full funding for contracts entered into by 
     the National Reconnaissance Office;
       (C) assess the advantages and disadvantages of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office's use of forward funding;
       (D) determine how the National Reconnaissance Office 
     defines, identifies, and justifies forward funding 
     requirements;
       (E) determine how the National Reconnaissance Office tracks 
     and manages forward funding;
       (F) determine how the National Reconnaissance Office plans 
     to comply with congressional direction regarding forward 
     funding;
       (G) determine whether or not a contract entered into by the 
     National Reconnaissance Office has ever encountered a 
     contingency which required the utilization of more than 30 
     days of forward funding;
       (H) consider the proposal by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence for the establishment of a position of a Chief 
     Financial Officer, and assess how the functions to be 
     performed by that officer would enhance the financial 
     management of the National Reconnaissance Office; and
       (I) make recommendations, as appropriate, to improve 
     control and management of the budget process of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office.
       (3) The President shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     committees of the Congress setting forth the findings of the 
     review required by paragraph (1) not later than 90 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act, with an interim report 
     provided to those committees not later than 45 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act.
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than January 30, 1996, the 
     President shall submit a report to the appropriate committees 
     of the Congress on a proposal to subject the budget of the 
     intelligence community to greater oversight by the Executive 
     branch of Government.
       (2) Such report shall include--interalia
       (A) consideration of establishing by statute a financial 
     control officer for the National Reconnaissance Office, other 
     elements of the intelligence community, and for the 
     intelligence community as a whole; and
       (B) recommendations for procedures to be used by the Office 
     of Management and Budget for review of the budget of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given to the term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise to express deep concerns regarding 
an example of financial mismanagement and waste within the intelligence 
community. I offered an amendment to the fiscal year 1996 Intelligence 
Authorization bill that has been accepted by the full Intelligence 
Committee and by the Senate. This amendment is intended to put a stop 
to the rampant mismanagement of funding at the National Reconnaissance 
Office.
  Mr. President, there is a disturbing sense of deja vu as I stand here 
on the floor today. One year ago, I was shocked to learn that the 
National Reconnaissance Office was constructing a massive headquarters 
facility out near Dulles Airport in Virginia. Not only did this 
facility include floor space far in excess of what was necessary, but 
the record showed a disturbing lack of candor in informing the 
congressional oversight committees regarding the scope and expense of 
this project.
  Last week, the public was informed of another example of gross 
financial mismanagement by the NRO. As the papers reported, the NRO has 
accumulated more than $1.5 billion in unspent appropriations. In this 
time of severe budgetary constraints, when we are cutting Medicare, 
Medicaid, veterans' benefits, student loan assistance, it is 
inexcusable that an agency can be hoarding well over a billion dollars.
  My amendment includes a number of provisions to ensure this situation 
is resolved and does not occur again.
  First, my amendment directs that the NRO may not carry over more than 
1 month in funds into a subsequent fiscal year.
  Second, my amendment requires the Department of Defense and Central 
Intelligence Agency inspectors general to undertake a comprehensive NRO 
financial management review. This review will not only cover the issue 
of carry-forward funding, but will also examine the overall 
effectiveness of policies and internal controls over the NRO budget. 
The amendment also requires that the IG report is unclassified, and can 
be released to the public.
  Finally, my amendment directs the President to report to the 
Intelligence Committees early next year on a proposal to subject the 
budget of the intelligence community to greater executive branch 
oversight. The report must include procedures to allow the Office of 
Management and Budget to have full review of the NRO budget.
  I recently received a call from Director of Central Intelligence Dr. 
John Deutch on this issue. I was pleased by Dr. Deutch's comments in 
which he agreed that stronger financial controls over the NRO are 
necessary. Dr. Deutch also stated that he was not aware of the size of 
this carry-forward account either in his previous position as Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, or in his current position.
  It is unfortunate that this amendment is necessary. But these latest 
revelations do great damage to the public's trust, and to the 
credibility of the NRO and the Intelligence Community as a whole. The 
NRO seems to be an agency that is out of control, with no intention of 
correcting its ways. Hopefully, opening the NRO budget to increased 
scrutiny will help restore confidence in the ability of the NRO to 
accomplish its important mission.
  Thank you, and I yield the floor.
  
[[Page S 14787]]



                           amendment no. 2883

(Purpose: To enhance the capabilities of certain intelligence stations, 
and to extend the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay 
                                  Act)

       On page 11, strike lines 17 through 21 and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.

       (a) Extension of Authority.--Section 2(f) of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 
     403-4(f)) is amended by striking ``September 30, 1997'' and 
     inserting ``September 30, 1999''.
       (b) Remittance of Funds.--Section 2 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 
     403-4) is amended by inserting at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(i) Remittance of Funds.--The Director shall remit to the 
     Office of Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of 
     the United States to the credit of the Civil Service 
     Retirement and Disability Fund (in addition to any other 
     payments which the Director is required to make under 
     subchapter III of chapter 83 and subchapter II of chapter 84 
     of title 5, United States Code), an amount equal to 15 
     percent of the final basic pay of each employee who, in 
     fiscal year 1998 or fiscal year 1999, retires voluntarily 
     under section 8336, 8412, or 8414 of such title or resigns 
     and to whom a voluntary separation incentive payment has been 
     or is to be paid under this section.''.
       At the end of title V of the bill, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 504. ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE 
                   STATIONS.

       (a) Authority.--(1) In addition to funds otherwise 
     available for such purpose, the Secretary of the Army is 
     authorized to transfer or reprogram funds for the enhancement 
     of the capabilities of the Bad Aibling Station and the 
     Menwith Hill Station, including improvements of facility 
     infrastructure and quality of life programs at both 
     installations.
       (2) The authority of paragraph (1) may be exercised 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law.
       (b) Funding.--Funds available for the Army for operations 
     and maintenance for any fiscal year shall be available to 
     carry out subsection (a).
       (c) Congressional Notification.--Whenever the Secretary of 
     the Army determines that an amount to be transferred or 
     reprogrammed under this section would cause the total amounts 
     transferred or reprogrammed in that fiscal year to exceed 
     $1,000,000, the Secretary shall notify in advance the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, 
     and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     National Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives and provide a justification for the 
     increased expenditure.
       (d) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section may be 
     construed to modify or obviate existing law or practice with 
     regard to the transfer or reprogramming of substantial sums 
     of money from the Department of the Army to the Bad Aibling 
     or Menwith Hill Stations.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I offer this amendment along with the 
vice chairman to address two issues that arose after the committee 
markup of this bill. The first provision of the amendment is intended 
to assist the Department of the Army as it assumes Executive Agent 
responsibility for the Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill stations.
  Specifically, this provision would permit the Department of the Army 
to use up to $2 million of appropriated O&M funds per annum, at Menwith 
Hill and Bad Aibling, to rectify infrastructure and quality of life 
problems. The amendment make clear that it would in no way obviate or 
modify current law or practice with regard to reprogramming amounts in 
excess of $2 million,
  At the present time, the Army is prohibited by 31 U.S.C. section 
1301, from using appropriated funds to support an NSA installation, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Army has become the Executive Agent 
for these field sites. Although the Director of Central Intelligence 
could use his special authorities under section 104(d) of the National 
Security Act of 1947, the procedures available under that law are 
extremely time consuming and were not intended to accommodate 
relatively minor transfers of funds.
  A good example of the problems that this amendment is intended to 
rectify is contained in a memorandum prepared by a joint NSA/Army 
inspection team entitled. ``DoD Child Development Program Inspection 
Report'' dated June 23, 1995. The memo, which describes the childcare 
facility at Menwith Hill station states:

       The Child Development Center (CDC), originally constructed 
     as a office building, is a 35 year old dilapidated structure 
     with major health and safety violations. The CDC capacity of 
     89 children cannot accommodate the increasing demands for 
     child care. The current station population includes 289 
     children ages four and under. As a result of the conversion 
     from a civilian to a military facility, the demographics are 
     changing to younger, junior enlisted personnel with many 
     single parents who will rely on based-provided child care. 
     There are no similar facilities available on the economy . . 
     . Six major deficiencies, those that severely affect health, 
     safety, and the well-being of staff were identified in this 
     inspection. All five categories relating to health and safety 
     were in major violation.

  Last fall, two members of the committee staff visited the Menwith 
Hill Station and toured its Child Development Center. Their views are 
fully consistent with the findings described in this memo. The staff 
can also attest to the fact that there are many other maintenance and 
qualify of life issues at these two facilities, particularly Menwith 
Hill, that need to be urgently addressed.
  My colleagues should understand that this legislation was requested 
by the Department of the Army and enjoys the full support of the 
Director of the National Security Agency. It is also worth noting that 
the Department of the Army has consulted with the Senate Appropriations 
and Armed Services Committees and encountered no objections.
  I ask unanimous consent that a letter from Admiral McConnel 
requesting this legislation, and the memorandum I quoted from earlier, 
be included in the Record at this point.
  The second provision in this amendment is designed to offset the 
direct spending cost of the extension of the authority provided for in 
the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act as provided in section 402 of our 
bill. Specifically, it establishes procedures to conform with the pay-
as-you-go provision, section 252, of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act, by requiring the Director of Central Intelligence 
to remit to the Treasury an amount equal to 15 percent of the final 
basic pay of each employee who, in fiscal year 1998 or fiscal year 
1999, retires voluntarily or who resigns and to whom a voluntary 
separation incentive payment has been or is to be paid.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of this amendment.


                           amendment no. 2884

(Purpose: To require a description and analysis of voluntary separation 
 incentive proposals in the report required by the legislation and for 
                            other purposes)

       On page 10, line 7, after ``(22 U.S.C. 4008),'' insert 
     ``and to provide for other personnel review systems,''.
       On page 10, at the end of line 10 add the following new 
     sentence: ``The report shall also contain a description and 
     analysis of voluntary separation incentive proposals, 
     including a waiver of the two-percent penalty reduction for 
     early retirement.''

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on June 14, 1995, my distinguished 
colleague and vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence 
[SSCI], Senator Kerrey, and I filed a bill which authorizes 
appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for the intelligence activities and 
programs of the United States Government. The Select Committee on 
Intelligence approved the bill by a unanimous vote on May 24, 1995, and 
ordered that it be favorably reported. The bill was subsequently 
referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC] for up to 30 
days, as it has been every year. The Armed Services Committee reported 
the bill at the end of the 30-day period, on August 4, 1995, with one 
amendment.
  This bill would: Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for 
first, the intelligence activities and programs of the United States 
Government; second, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System; and third, the Community Management Account of the 
Director of Central Intelligence; authorize the personnel ceilings as 
of September 30, 1996, for the intelligence activities of the United 
States and for the Community Management Account of the Director of 
Central Intelligence; authorize the Director of Central Intelligence, 
with Office of Management and Budget approval, to exceed the personnel 
ceilings by up to 2 percent; permit the President to delay the 
imposition of sanctions related to proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction when necessary to protect an intelligence source or method 
or an ongoing criminal investigation; provide for forfeiture of the 
U.S. Government contribution to 

[[Page S 14788]]
the Thrift Savings Plan under the Federal Employees Retirement System 
[FERS], along with interest, if an employee is convicted of national 
security offenses; restore spousal benefits to the spouse of an 
employee so convicted if the spouse cooperates in the investigation and 
prosecution; allow employees of the excepted services to take an active 
part in certain local elections; amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to 
permit the Federal Bureau of Investigation to obtain consumer credit 
reports necessary to foreign counterintelligence investigations under 
certain circumstances and subject to appropriate controls on the use of 
such reports; and make certain other changes of technical nature to 
existing law governing intelligence agencies.
  As it does annually, the committee conducted a detailed review of the 
administration's budget request for the National Foreign Intelligence 
Program [NFIP] for fiscal year 1996. The committee also reviewed the 
administration's fiscal year 1996 request for a new intelligence budget 
category, called the Joint Military Intelligence Program [JMIP]. The 
committee's review included a series of briefings and hearings with the 
Director of Central Intelligence [DCI], the Acting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and other senior 
officials from the Intelligence Community, numerous staff briefings, 
review of budget justification materials and numerous written responses 
provided by the Intelligence Community to specific questions posed by 
the committee.
  In addition to its annual review of the administration's budget 
request, the committee performs continuing oversight of various 
intelligence activities and programs, to include the conduct of audits 
and reviews by the committee's audit staff. These inquires frequently 
lead to actions initiated by the committee with respect to the budget 
of the activity or program concerned.
  The Intelligence Committee's consideration of the authorization bill 
this year coincides with a major review effort by this committee, its 
House counterpart, and a Presidential Commission mandated by Congress 
last year. This review is aimed at examining how changes in the world, 
particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union, should be reflected in 
the roles and missions of the intelligence community. A major part of 
this examination will include determining how the intelligence 
community might better be organized to accomplish those changing roles 
and missions.
  While this review by the committee in not likely to conclude until 
early next year, one of the issues already emerging is the need for 
stronger, more coherent management of the intelligence community. The 
nominal head of the community, the DCI, must become the de facto head 
of the community--with the authority to make adjustments and trade-offs 
between its disparate elements. One example of a problem resulting, in 
part, from the lack of unified management is the disconnect between the 
vast amounts of intelligence we are now capable of collecting and our 
capacity for analyzing and disseminating that intelligence in a way 
that is useful for decisonmakers. We cannot afford to continue spending 
money in one area without ensuring that its objectives are not 
frustrated by inadequate funding in another. Yet, it is difficult to 
strike the necessary balance if you do not have the authority to move 
funding from one area to another.
  The same principle is at work in congressional oversight, where a 
comprehensive and coherent review of intelligence programs is 
essential. When the SSCI was established in 1976, the Senate, in Senate 
Resolution 400, chose to give the committee jurisdiction over all 
intelligence activities, including those of the Department of Defense. 
``Intelligence activities'' are defined very broadly in the charter 
legislation, but expressly exclude ``tactical foreign military 
intelligence serving no national policymaking function.'' Over the 
years, this has been interpreted to mean that programs and activities 
funded in the [TIARA]--which stands for tactical intelligence and 
related activities--budget category have been authorized by the Armed 
Services Committee in the Defense authorization bill, with the SSCI 
providing recommendations in a letter to the SASC. All activities 
funded in the NFIP, or National Foreign Intelligence Program, have been 
authorized by the Intelligence Committee in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act, which is automatically referred sequentially to the 
Armed Services Committee before going to the floor.

  Traditionally, this breakdown between the strictly tactical 
activities supporting the battlefield commander--which are logically 
subject to Armed Services oversight--and activities serving some 
broader national policymaking function--over which integrated oversight 
by the Intelligence Committee is essential--has worked well and our two 
committees have cooperated very closely. Today, however, I believe both 
committees recognizes that it is increasingly difficult to classify 
intelligence systems as either strictly national or strictly tactical. 
The same images of Bosnia taken by aerial reconnaissance can be used 
simultaneously by Admiral Smith to protect our pilots, by Assistant 
Secretary of State Holbrooke to show his interlocutors the true 
situation on the ground, and by the President's National Security 
Advisor to determine if a change in policy is indicated. U-2 
photography of Iraq helps the commanders of our joint task forces 
enforce the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. Ambassador 
Madeleine Albright uses the same images to great effect in convincing 
other countries on the United Nations Security Council to keep in force 
the sanctions against Iraq.
  Budget politics has also contributed to the blurring of the two 
budget categories. Over the last 5 years the executive branch has moved 
programs from the national portion of the budget into the tactical, at 
least in part to get out from under a perceived spending ``ceiling'' on 
the national budget. When the administration created the new JMIP 
budget category this year, a number of these formerly NFIP programs 
were included.
  The committees acknowledge that a number of the programs in this new 
budget category serve important national policymaking functions and 
previously have been authorized by this committee--programs like the U-
2 spyplane and unmanned aerial vehicles such as those that have 
provided important intelligence on Bosnia to the decisionmakers at 
State and in the White House. However, this new budget category also 
contains some programs that are tactical in nature and would normally 
have been within the sole jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee.

  When considering how to approach this new budget category for fiscal 
year 1996, the Intelligence Committee turned to Senate Resolution 400. 
We determined that the national policymaking-related activities in JMIP 
meant that it did not fit that statue's definition for items excluded 
from committee jurisdiction. Thus, the SSCI used the expertise 
developed from day-to-day oversight of all intelligence activities to 
formulate authorization recommendations for all of the activities in 
this program. When the SASC received our bill on sequential, as it 
routinely does, that committee disagreed with our assertion of 
authorization jurisdiction.
  The Armed Services Committee took the position that the Intelligence 
Committee had no oversight interest in the JMIP programs and voted to 
offer an amendment to the Intelligence authorization bill to strip it 
of all JMIP authorization.
  After extensive discussion, we have arrived at a compromise that will 
allow the Intelligence authorization bill to move forward, recognize 
the national interest served by the oversight of each of the 
committees--SSCI and SASC--and set up a mechanism for addressing these 
issues in the coming year. In order to resolve the disagreement for 
this year and bring this bill before the Senate in a timely fashion, we 
have agreed that the Armed Services Committee will authorize and 
conference JMIP for fiscal year 1996. The Intelligence Committee has 
provided its JMIP recommendations to the Armed Services Committee, and 
I think the two committees concur on the details of almost every JMIP 
activity for this year.

[[Page S 14789]]

  At the same time, the chairmen and ranking members of the two 
committees agree that this action does not reflect a determination that 
Senate Resolution 400 does not provide authorizing jurisdiction for the 
Intelligence Committee over JMIP. It is, rather, a compromise to allow 
this bill, this year, to go to the floor.
  Left unresolved, then, it how the Senate should conduct oversight and 
authorization of the Intelligence Community in today's changing world. 
As I have previously noted, there have been significant changes over 
the years that have been reflected in the way intelligence activities 
are budgeted. In the coming years, we see even greater change. Our 
committee, the House Intelligence Committee, and the Brown Commission 
on Intelligence Roles and Capabilities, are examining what changes 
should be made in the intelligence community in the post-cold-war 
world. Together, these efforts comprise the greatest opportunity to 
improve U.S. intelligence since 1947. Budget categories, and many other 
familiar features of today's intelligence landscape, are likely to 
change still further. To make sure that the Senate's authorization 
process appropriately reflects the changes that have already occurred 
and that may be coming, Senator Kerrey and I, together with Chairman 
Thurmond and Senator Nunn, have directed our staffs to form a working 
group to recommend to the two committees how authorization 
responsibilities should apply to specific categories or activities.
  Mr. President, we will be prepared for the future, and I think the 
Senate and the country will be the beneficiaries of our collaboration. 
I am most grateful for the vast knowledge and the attitude of 
constructive cooperation which the President pro tempore and Senator 
Nunn brought to this problem.
  Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to describe a bill which has not 
attracted much attention this year, the intelligence authorization bill 
for fiscal year 1996. This year the intelligence bill is not the venue 
for controversies over the foreign policy issues or levels of national 
security spending, but it is an important piece of legislation 
nonetheless.
  Much has been written about the Presidential Commission and 
congressional and private sector studies underway to redefine and 
reorganize the intelligence community. Few have noted that no matter 
what the outcome of all this discussion, the actual intelligence 
community, with its real and serious continuing requirements to keep 
our leaders informed and our military warned, must be budgeted and 
guided to do its job.
  This bill provides the budget authorization and the priorities our 
intelligence professionals need for the year ahead.
  The bill attempts to fix the imbalance between collection, which we 
have a great deal of, and processing, where we see shortfalls.
  The bill supports efforts to track the transnational targets, threats 
like terrorism, weapons proliferation, and narcotrafficking, which are 
directed against us from many countries.
  The bill acknowledges the indispensable role of intelligence in 
monitoring the arms control treaties we entered into, and it funds the 
systems which provide that intelligence.
  The bill supports innovative technologies and the leveraging of 
private sector achievements and market requirements for the benefit of 
intelligence.
  The bill supports research and development for the agencies whose 
mission depends on technology, and it addresses the growing imbalance 
between rising personnel costs and the shrinking availability of 
research funds.
  The intelligence authorization bill also closes some of the remaining 
loopholes noted in the aftermath of the Ames case. The Intelligence 
Committee wants to make sure Americans who commit espionage forfeit all 
the financial gains from their espionage and from their pretense of 
being loyal American officials. Consequently the bill would require 
forfeiture of a convicted spy's Thrift Savings Account, if the spy were 
a civil servant. The bill also provides for the innocent spouse of a 
convicted spy to keep some of his or her assets, provided he or she 
cooperates with the authorities regarding the espionage case. Access to 
personal financial data was a problem in the Ames case, so the bill 
would permit FBI to have access to consumer credit reports on a 
suspected spy earlier in the investigative process.
  CIA has been criticized for retaining Ames in the clandestine service 
long after his mediocrity was apparent. Although the great majority of 
intelligence personnel I meet are clearly talented people making a 
contribution to their country, the intelligence community's retention 
of the few people whose performance would get them fired in the private 
sector is a problem we need to fix. Consequently the bill asks the 
Director of Central Intelligence to implement an up-or-out policy 
across the intelligence community, similar to the policies of the State 
Department and the military. Such a provision would be one of the few 
positive outcomes of the Ames case. Not only would it strengthen 
personnel quality, it would also help the intelligence agencies manage 
their retention and overstrength problems.
  The bill supports counterintelligence programs because America has 
secrets worth protecting, and those secrets are threatened by foreign 
intelligence services and Americans who would sell those secrets to 
them. As former DCI Woolsey explained to the committee in our first 
hearing of this Congress, no one can guarantee that Ames was the last 
of his breed. Given human nature and the size of the intelligence 
community, it is likely we will see more espionage cases. We don't need 
witch hunts. We do need vigilance and deterrence.
  Many people presumed that the end of the cold war meant the end of 
spying and secrecy, and the Ames case led them to ask why the material 
being protected mattered any more. Of course, the costs of Ames' 
treachery in human lives alone is enough to justify his sentence. A 
life sentence for what he did is merciful, in my view. But there are 
additional reasons why our secrets are important, and must be 
protected.
  Simply put, our ability to monitor and predict threats to this 
country is essential to saving the lives of Americans. Whether 
intelligence brings the warning of a strategic attack or accidental 
missile launch, or an impending terrorist attack, or the decision of 
some foreign leader to develop a clandestine program of biological 
weapons, our national lives and our individual lives hinge, in part, on 
the capabilities of the intelligence community. I urge my colleagues to 
support the intelligence authorization bill.
  We buy many expensive things in the name of national security which 
are never used in combat. We buy some things the Pentagon doesn't even 
want. Their defenders justify them with theories. The contributions of 
intelligence are not theoretical. I can take any Member to CIA or the 
NSA or the NRO or over to the Joint Intelligence Center at the Pentagon 
and demonstrate how intelligence is being used today to inform and 
support U.S. policy and U.S. military operations.
  We read in the September 27 Washington Post how crucial intelligence 
is to NATO operations over Bosnia, and how the intelligence is getting 
to the warfighter so much faster than in the gulf war. The gulf war 
itself was a triumph of dominant battlefield awareness, to use the 
current catchphrase. General Schwartzkopf knew vastly more about the 
enemy and the situation than the Iraqis did about us, and we all saw on 
television the fruits of that superior intelligence. With these events 
so fresh on our consciousness it is easy to forget that as essential as 
it is to support the military with intelligence, the priority customer 
for intelligence in peacetime must be the President and the 
policymakers around him.
  Who, more than the President, needs a clear understanding of our 
vulnerabilities and our opportunities? With the best intelligence, the 
President can shape a policy that addresses the weaknesses of our 
adversaries and the requirements of our allies. Intelligence is the key 
to effective policy, and effective policy ought to achieve its goal, 
most of the time, without the need to employ our Armed Forces in 
combat. In my view, preventing the war, getting what we want without 
the war, is far better than having the war. 

[[Page S 14790]]
You can't do that without dominant knowledge.
  Once the President has formed the policy, intelligence can also help 
in its execution. To keep the U.N. Security Council solid in keeping 
sanctions against Iraq, Ambassador Albright last year showed U-2 
photographs of Saddam Hussein's new palaces and continuing weapons 
programs to ten of her foreign colleagues on the Security Council. 
Similar images of the killing fields of Bosnia are pinpointing the 
atrocities there and will be useful as evidence in war crimes trials. 
United States showed the world North Korea's true purposes at the 
nuclear facility at Yong Byon.
  As these and many other daily cases show, intelligence is a national 
asset. It plays a national role every day, whether or not our military 
is engaged somewhere. There used to be a clear distinction between 
national and tactical intelligence, but the line is blurred today. 
Increasingly, the same agencies and collection systems that produce 
intelligence for the national policymaker also support the military, 
even at the tactical level. The same U-2 mission can bring back 
information on a Bosnian Serb air defense mission, intelligence for the 
local NATO, and simultaneously take pictures of refugee flows or mass 
graves that our policymakers and diplomats can use in their negotiating 
efforts. This growing dual capability of intelligence is often 
overlooked by those who associate intelligence exclusively with 
military operations.
  The annual authorization process is a time to ask how our 
intelligence efforts can maximize their contribution to the nation. 
There are new directions I believe intelligence must take.
  First, intelligence must get closer to its customers. The age of 
ivory-tower analysis is over. Intelligence managers have been much more 
responsive to customers in recent years, but more must be done. I would 
even consider physically moving teams of analysts right into the 
customers' offices. The intelligence community must also make maximum 
use of computer-based interactive communication with its customers. The 
analysts need to get into the customers' heads, so to speak. The 
challenge is to do so without taking on the policy biases of the 
customer, because the intelligence must not only be useful and 
responsive to the customer, it must also be absolutely honest. When the 
President's policy isn't working, or the efforts of the customer's 
organization are backfiring, the analyst must tell it like it is. Not 
all the bravery in national security takes place on the battlefield.

  Second, intelligence should be predictive, even risking that its 
predictions could occasionally be wrong. It should look to the margins 
of likely future events and trends and analyze the less likely events 
which would most endanger U.S. interests. As the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso demonstrated, the less likely events nonetheless sometimes 
happen, and they can have a deep impact on Americans.
  Third, intelligence must adapt to a world which has not only seen the 
end of Communism, but which is best suited for small, fast-moving, 
entrepreneurial organizations, a world which puts its greatest premium 
on knowledge, and a world in which the market, not the government, 
drives the improvement of technology. This new world brings Director 
Deutch many new tasks. He must develop his human collectors, planning 
ten or more years in advance for their peak usefulness, in the same way 
we acquire satellites. He must modify the personnel management culture 
that periodically moves people for its own internal bureaucratic 
purposes. Similarly, the managers of military intelligence personnel 
must find a place in their services for the handful of military 
personnel who have mastered foreign languages and cultures. We cannot 
have a first class HUMINT service without nurturing the people who 
serve in it, both civilian and military.
  The explosion of commercial technology presents big potential 
advantages to the intelligence community, and it fundamentally 
challenges traditional methods of procurement. The traditional way to 
procure intelligence technology is for the government to pay for the 
research, development, and testing, as well as for the finished 
product. Consequently, the collection systems and processing and 
dissemination equipment for the Intelligence community cost the 
Government a lot of money. The unit cost is also high because the 
intelligence community buys relatively few of the finished items.
  The Government tends to buy hundreds of something unique and pays 
millions for each one. The commercial world buys millions of something 
broadly available and pays hundreds for each one. The challenge is to 
find commercial applications for intelligence equipment, and thus 
reduce the government's acquisition cost. The Intelligence Committee 
has supported this approach for several years, starting with permitting 
U.S. Companies to offer one-meter space imagery and imaging systems to 
the commercial market. Another trailblazing effort is ongoing at David 
Sarnoff Laboratories in Princeton, NJ, where researchers have created 
image analysis equipment which simultaneously answers the needs of 
intelligence analysts looking for evidence of weapons on the ground and 
the needs of radiologists looking for evidence of tumors in mammograms. 
In both uses, this equipment saves lives. It also provides a model for 
the intelligence community on how to procure the latest equipment more 
cheaply.
  I have spoken about how our intelligence capability should adapt 
itself to the world of today. Under the leadership of one of the most 
capable executives and scientists in the country, this adaptation will 
proceed swiftly. I only wish the authority of the DCI over other 
agencies were stronger, so they could get the benefit of strong, 
centralized leadership. That is an issue for another day. My point 
today is the central, day-to-day importance of intelligence. The lives 
of individuals and at times our national life depends on its 
excellence, it is an essential function of government, and we are not 
about to block grant it to the states. That is why the intelligence 
authorization bill is an important piece of legislation.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Pennsylvania. Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee and the 
Intelligence Committee have worked closely together over the past 
nineteen years, and that cooperation is going to grow even closer in 
the years ahead. The Armed Services Committee greatly appreciates the 
advice of the Intelligence Committee regarding tactical intelligence 
programs.
  I agree with the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee 
that the creation of the JMIP budget category is a sign of the times. 
All the programs in JMIP have been previously found in the tactical 
category, but several were recently in the national category and others 
have clear national, as well as tactical, application. In fact, there 
are very few intelligence activities today that do not have potential 
benefit for both the policymaker and the tactical military commander. 
For that reason, the Intelligence Committee sought to have a formal 
role in authorizing and overseeing JMIP.
  I believe that the Committee on Armed Services should be the 
committee of jurisdiction for JMIP for fiscal year 1996. The Armed 
Services Committee benefited this year from the Intelligence 
Committee's work on JMIP, and in almost every case we agreed with the 
Intelligence Committee. Our close working relationship has resulted in 
general agreement on the JMIP issues and an efficient allocation of the 
work to be done.
  However, I also agree that this decision to allow JMIP to be 
authorized in the Defense Authorization bill rather than the 
Intelligence Authorization bill this year does not reflect a judgment 
on the scope of authority provided to the Intelligence Committee by 
Senate Resolution 400.
  There is great change on the horizon for intelligence. Major 
reorganization may occur next year, and our legislative process must 
keep pace with it. My colleagues on the Committee on Armed Services and 
I look forward to working with the Intelligence Committee to determine 
the best way for the Senate to authorize and oversee the JMIP next 
year, as well as any new categories of intelligence programs that may 
come out of the newly reorganized intelligence community.
  Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator 

[[Page S 14791]]
  from Nebraska for their cooperation, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to endorse the views of my Chairman 
and Chairman Thurmond. Continued close collaboration between the 
Intelligence Committee and the Armed Service Committee can only result 
in the best possible intelligence for the military, together with 
greater efficiency.
  Although the two committees disagree on this jurisdictional issue, in 
fact the cooperative process worked quite well this year on JMIP. The 
Intelligence Committee studied the individual JMIP programs in the 
context of all intelligence activities and the Armed Services Committee 
looked at them in terms of the military's requirements. On the 
substance, the two committees are, as usual, in broad agreement. We 
disagree on one program. I think the merits of that argument are on the 
side of the Intelligence Committee, but I agree that the Armed Services 
Committee should have the last word on authorizing programs whose 
normal function is support to tactical operations.
  We have worked out a good solution for this year on JMIP, Next year's 
possible reorganization of the Intelligence Community could produce a 
whole new aggregation of intelligence programs. So I look forward to 
joining in a working group with the Armed Services Committee to 
determine how the Senate should authorize and oversee these programs so 
the needs of the policymaker and the tactical commander are fully 
addressed in the coming years. The Intelligence Committee has great 
experience and expertise in monitoring all the country's intelligence 
activities, and we offer them freely to the Senate without concern for 
turf or pride of authorship.
  Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nebraska. The 
Senator from Pennsylvania was quite right when he said that the 
creation of this new joint military budget account was a sign of the 
times. The old accounting categories are becoming blurred by the 
versatility of intelligence systems today. The creation of JMIP put a 
strain on the relationship between the two committees, but I think we 
have fixed it for this year in a satisfactory way. Next year may bring 
additional change, and we are creating an inter-committee working group 
to determine how we adapt our procedures to the changed circumstances. 
I understand, and I believe my Intelligence Committee colleagues 
understand, that each committee has a distinct and complementary role 
in authorizing these programs. We will do a far better job working 
together than separately.
  Let me explain the Armed Services Committee's concerns about these 
programs. There have been occasions in the past when the Intelligence 
Committee and the Armed Services Committee disagreed about systems to 
support the military which we and the military thought were extremely 
important. One of these was Joint STARS, a program that made a great 
contribution during the gulf war and is now a mainstay of tactical 
intelligence. We had sole authorization over the budget category of 
which Joint STARS had a part. If our Committee had not supported it 
strongly, our military, might not have this system today. So we take 
our responsibilities regarding intelligence support to the military 
very seriously. The chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee are no less serious, and we have six crossover Members to 
insure that our common efforts keep on track. I am, therefore, 
confident that our close relation will continue, to the country's 
benefit.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, while I believe this bill is the best that 
can be achieved during this period of tight budgets and a changing 
world, there is one part of it that makes me uneasy. All of us were 
presented earlier this week with media stories that the National 
Reconnaissance Office once again has secretly kept large sums of money 
stashed away. Supposedly, DOD, CIA, and the Congress didn't know 
anything about $1 billion that had been ``hoarded'' away in carry-
forward accounts.
  The committee has already held a hearing on this subject. Based on 
the information presented and on the tough questions asked by committee 
members, several things are quite clear.
  One, this is not a secret ``slush'' fund that no one knew anything 
about. In fact, these were funds maintained in accordance with the 
appropriate DOD manual. Moreover, DOD has known about the account since 
at least 1989 when the DOD Inspector General audited the NRO and agreed 
with the NRO's proposal on the size and method of accounting for these 
funds.
  Second, the Committee has been overseeing and not overlooking the 
NRO's budget. We are all very much aware of the debate about the NRO in 
which the previous Director of Central Intelligence and the Congress 
were engaged. I say we are aware of it because even though the NRO's 
activities are highly classified--and they should be for good reasons--
the news media carried the stories about the intensity of the debate 
between the Committee and the DIC. That debate has ended because we 
have a new DCI, and the Committee is moving ahead with its close 
scrutiny of the NRO.
  Third, the manager's amendment to the bill conforms our authorization 
level for the NRO's carry-forward accounts to the amount of the 
reductions in these accounts legislated by the Defense appropriations 
conference bill. The committee has done this so we can move ahead to a 
conference with our House counterparts. But, Mr. President, I want 
everyone to understand the implications of what is happening here.
  In the opinion of the Director of the Intelligence Community 
Management Staff, the cuts being taken against these accounts could 
have far-reaching effects on the country's ability to collect extremely 
valuable information involving our most vital interests. The National 
Reconnaissance Office collects sensitive information better than anyone 
else, anywhere else in the world. Let me repeat that: no one, 
anywhere--the Russians, the French, the Germans, the Japanese, even 
DOD--is better at this business than the NRO.
  If any of my colleagues believes I may be exaggerating about the 
importance and usefulness of this information, let me make a standing 
invitation to those of my colleagues who might have doubts. You can 
pick any day of any week, and we will go together to find out what the 
NRO has collected, and is collecting on that day. I can guarantee you, 
you will walk away from the experience with a far better appreciation 
of just how good our satellite systems are, and with a better 
understanding that the NRO's contributions are vital to our military 
and foreign policy successes.
  This year, when the NRO presented its Future Years Defense Plan to 
the Congress, it gave us a very aggressive plan. It provides for big 
savings by consolidating operations. It restructures our satellite 
constellations, moving them away from a Cold War focus and instead 
directing them against future problems. In order to execute that plan, 
the NRO says it needs all of the money contained in its request. The 
size of the cut contained in the Defense appropriations conference bill 
and mirrored in the manager's amendment offered with the Intelligence 
Authorization Bill probably means the plan cannot be executed unless 
the money is restored. So I just want my colleagues to know that if the 
NRO is correct, next year important satellite programs will be cut and 
others will be pushed far out into the future if a substantial amount 
of this money is not restored.
  It is very difficult to discuss--in an unclassified statement on the 
floor of the Senate--the enormous problem this cut could create. I 
could tell my colleagues that as result of these cuts, when they, or 
their successors, get a classified briefing in S-407 five years from 
now, there may not be any satellite images available to help explain 
the situation. But I don't know for certain if this is true. 
Nevertheless, I want to alert my colleagues to the potential 
repercussion this cut could have, if the money is not restored in 
subsequent years of the NRO's Future Years Defense Plan.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to support the 
fiscal year 1996 intelligence authorization bill. Although most of the 
programs authorized by this bill remain classified, there are a number 
of general points that are worth noting as the 

[[Page S 14792]]
Senate considers this important legislation.
  First, the time has long since passed when the intelligence budget 
escaped serious scrutiny within Congress or the executive branch. Let 
me briefly outline the current process:
  Prior to its submission to Congress, the intelligence budget is 
reviewed by the DCI's Community Management Staff, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget.
  The intelligence budget is then reviewed by no less than six 
congressional committees. It is available to all 535 members of 
Congress, and indeed, every year the Senate Intelligence Committee 
sends a written invitation to each member of the Senate inviting them 
to review the President's request and the committee's recommendations. 
To the best of my knowledge, this degree of access is not available to 
members of the British or French Parliaments, the Israeli Knesset, or 
representatives of the world's other great democracies. Every Senator 
has the right to review the classified annex accompanying this bill 
prior to voting on it.
  In addition to the scrutiny provided by the House and Senate 
Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees, GAO has 
personnel who routinely audit a variety of intelligence programs.
  The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [PFIAB] also has 
access to budget and operational information as does the 
congressionally mandated Presidential Commission on Intelligence Roles 
and Missions.
  The CIA has a statutory IG with broad powers to investigate 
programmatic issues as well as alleged improprieties.
  In short, the intelligence community's black budget is subjected to 
careful scrutiny each and every year.
  Some may say, if that is all true, how could the NRO secretly hoard 
over $1 billion without Congress, DOD, or the DCI being aware of these 
funds? The fact is that the DOD IG became aware of the NRO's policy 
with regard to carry forward accounts in 1989. Further, in 1992 the 
audit staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee uncovered the NRO 3-
month carry-forward policy and learned that this policy was a response 
to increased technical risks associated with launch problems that 
developed in the mid-eighties. The committee was assured that the 3-
month carry-forward policy would be reduced to a 1-month margin by 
1996. That did not occur in a timely fashion as promised, and the 
Congress has intervened to remedy the problem. So I would submit to my 
colleagues that although the oversight process continues to evolve and 
improve, it was that very process which brought the NRO carry-forward 
accounts to light.
  I think we all need to be clear about the NRO issue. There is no 
evidence that funds were misspent or laws broken. Every dollar was duly 
authorized and appropriated and every dollar that is taken out of the 
NRO's so-called carry forward accounts this year will need to be 
restored in future budgets. The NRO was excessively conservative in its 
planning and budgeting, which has not increased the overall acquisition 
costs for satellites, but has reduced the funds available in the near 
term for other important intelligence programs. That problem has been 
brought to light and is being rectified.
  Because there are a number of misperceptions about the NRO funding 
issue, as well as other aspects of the intelligence budget, I would 
like to briefly comment on what we are authorizing in this bill and why 
it is still necessary, notwithstanding the end of the cold war, to 
devote considerable resources to intelligence programs.
  We are not buying a crystal ball that will bring future events 
clearly into focus. No matter how much we spend on intelligence, there 
will never be a foolproof method for predicting the future of Bosnia, 
Russia, or the Middle East. There are no documents we can acquire, 
photographs we can take, or sources we can recruit that will foretell 
the future of these turbulent regions.
  As my colleagues may know, the intelligence community was not able to 
predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with certainty. It is quite 
possible that Saddam Hussein himself did not decide to proceed with the 
invasion until the final hours--therefore no matter what access the 
United States had had in Baghdad the invasion of Kuwait could not have 
been confidently predicted in advance. What United States intelligence 
could and did do, however, was provide substantial detail on the Iraqi 
troop buildup along the Kuwaiti border in the weeks prior to the 
invasion. Developing a policy in response to the buildup then became a 
matter for the President and Congress. Then, after the invasion, the 
intelligence community provided General Schwarzkopf with the 
information needed to decisively defeat Iraq with a minimum of allied 
casualties. That is the primary rationale for the programs authorized 
in this bill--to provide critical information to policymakers and if 
diplomacy fails, to fight and prevail with a minimum of casualties.
  As a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services 
Committees, I am keenly aware of the vital linkage between intelligence 
programs and military operations. Roughly 85 percent of the 
intelligence budget is executed by the military services or defense 
department agencies such as the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], 
the National Security Agency [NSA], and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
[DIA]. These agencies, which are designated Combat Support Agencies 
pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, provide intelligence and warning 
in peacetime and direct combat support in wartime. The Defense 
Department is by far the Nation's leading consumer of intelligence 
information and most of the programs authorized by this bill have been 
developed in response to military requirements. Many of the systems 
that support the U.S. military, however, are also used on a daily basis 
to monitor arms control agreements, detect and track illegal narcotics, 
monitor the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and monitor 
terrorist organizations. To a large extent, the intelligence produced 
on these topics is a dividend made possible in peacetime by an 
intelligence system geared for the wartime requirements of the U.S. 
military.
  My colleagues should also appreciate the fact that the dependence of 
the U.S. military on sophisticated intelligence systems is increasing. 
As the U.S. military force structure shrinks, the Pentagon has 
consciously decided to compensate for smaller numbers of men and 
equipment by placing increased reliance on sophisticated intelligence 
and communications systems. Precision guided munitions require precise 
targeting information; smaller numbers of more advanced ships and 
planes need to be allocated against the highest priority targets; and 
as the force structure shrinks each of our remaining military assets 
becomes more valuable and its potential loss more costly to the 
military. Further, in many of the politically sensitive conflicts 
underway in the world today, an option that involves substantial, so-
called collateral damage is not a politically viable option for the 
President. For all of these reasons, the Department of Defense needs 
and expects voluminous amounts of precise intelligence information to 
support military operations. In sum, intelligence is a force multiplier 
that permits the U.S. military to do more with less.
  In conclusion, all Senators should understand that the Armed Forces 
are the primary advocates for the programs in this bill, and the 
overwhelming majority of the funds this bill authorizes will be 
executed by the Department of Defense. I should also point out that the 
DCI has publicly stated that his top priority is support to the U.S. 
military. As a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, he certainly 
understands the importance of this mission, and I know he is dedicated 
to providing the best support possible to our men and women in uniform.
  The world we live in is turbulent and dangerous. The proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons concerns us all. Terrorism is 
a continuing threat--one that could become far more dangerous in the 
future given the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence is 
contributing to recent arrests that have severely damaged the Cali 
cartel. As the Ames case demonstrates, counterintelligence operations 
remain critical to U.S. national security. And without national 
intelligence systems, it would be difficult to enter into verifiable 
arms control 

[[Page S 14793]]
agreements. Yet, even if none of these requirements for intelligence 
collection existed, the great majority of the spending in this bill 
would still be necessary to support our men and women in uniform.
  For all of these reasons, I believe that intelligence activities 
remain vital to U.S. national security and this legislation deserves 
the support of every member of the Senate.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for the 
fiscal year 1996 intelligence authorization bill.
  As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, as well as the 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I have been involved in reviewing 
U.S. intelligence requirements and programs. While most of the programs 
authorized by this legislation are classified, there is much that can 
be said in general terms about the importance of this measure.
  My colleagues should understand that although the end of the cold war 
has lessened the threat to the United States, it has not reduced the 
demands for information imposed on the Intelligence Community by its 
many consumers. We live in an era described as the ``age of 
information,'' and that applies to the public sector no less than the 
private sector. In fact, the instability and turbulence unleashed by 
the collapse of the Soviet empire has led to increased requests for 
information on a wide variety of new topics, countries, and conflicts.
  For example, in recent years the U.S. has become involved in 
conflicts in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. In each case, the 
Defense Department has depended on the Intelligence Community for the 
information necessary to perform assigned military missions with a 
minimum of risk to U.S. personnel. These operations, including the 
ongoing U.S. military involvement in Bosnia, should demonstrate beyond 
any doubt that the demise of the Soviet Union has not lead to reduced 
requirements for intelligence information, either to support the U.S. 
military, or to support civilian policymakers engaged in arms control, 
counternarcotics, political or economic negotiations, monitoring 
international embargoes, or the routine conduct of foreign policy.
  Ironically, our national security is becoming more dependent on 
intelligence collection, rather than less dependent, in the post cold 
war era. This is primarily the result of a reduced military force 
structure that is increasingly dependent on superior intelligence to 
compensate for smaller numbers. For example, the U.S. Army has shrunk 
from 18 Active Duty Divisions in the mid-eighties to only 10 today. The 
U.S. Army is now the eighth largest in the world, and it is stretched 
thin at many points, as in South Korea, where 37,000 U.S. military 
personnel and 500,000 South Korean soldiers are confronted by a North 
Korean Army that is twice as large.
  The U.S. Navy and Air Force are engaged in similar reductions. The 
Air Force now has 20 active and reserve fighter wings, down from the 38 
fighter wings available during the Reagan Administration. Similarly, 
the Navy has long since abandoned the goal of a 600 ship fleet and is 
now planning for a force some 30% smaller. With this reduced force 
structure, the U.S. can still prevail, even against much larger 
adversaries fighting close to their own shores, but only if the U.S. 
maintains superior personnel, weapons systems, and intelligence and 
communications capabilities. The public and my colleagues should be 
aware that the overwhelming majority of the funds authorized in this 
bill directly support, and indeed are executed by, the Department of 
Defense. There is simply no way to make substantial, additional 
reductions in intelligence programs without harming U.S. military 
readiness and capabilities.
  In addition to the critical support that the Intelligence Community 
provides the Department of Defense, there are numerous missions 
performed by the Intelligence Community that are critical to the 
conduct of U.S. foreign policies. The Intelligence Community makes it 
possible to verify arms control agreements; it monitors the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; it provides unique 
information regarding the intentions of foreign governments; it tracks 
international terrorism across the globe; and our intelligence 
agencies operate on a global basis to penetrate the international drug 
cartels. Many of these missions involve great difficulty and often 
danger, but there is no substitute for the painstaking work the 
Intelligence Community quietly performs in many distant lands.

  I believe that the contributions made by the Intelligence Community 
to the war on drugs merit special consideration and increased support. 
During the confirmation hearings for DCI John Deutch, I expressed my 
sentiments to the nominee and asked him to consider the evidence 
presented by William Bennett and John Walters in their article of 
February 9, 1995, entitled, ``Why aren't we attacking the supply of 
drugs?'' The article points out that after the Bush Administration 
deployed U.S. military forces to help detect and interdict drug 
shipments in 1989, the price of cocaine increased by some 30% within a 
year's time, and the number of hospital admissions for cocaine 
overdoses declined by a roughly similar amount. The DCI responded to my 
questions on the counternarcotics issues by saying, ``And I must say, 
Senator, just so there is no misunderstanding, I agree with your point, 
that here is a place that deserves more resources generally by the 
Intelligence Community, not less.''
  After the nomination hearings, I wrote the DCI on this issue, and 
supported increased expenditures for counternarcotics activities during 
the committee's budget deliberations. I am pleased to say that the 
Intelligence Authorization bill contains additional funds for 
counternarcotics programs that were not in the Administration's 
request. I am also delighted by the progress that has been made over 
the last few months in apprehending the leaders of the Cali cartel. 
U.S. intelligence agencies have contributed to this success and 
already, once again, the newspapers are reporting an increase in the 
street price of cocaine. The evidence again clearly suggests that 
aggressive efforts to attack drug production and transportation can be 
effective. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, and the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee, I will continue to press for increased 
counternarcotics efforts by the Defense Department and the Intelligence 
Community.
  Finally, I would like to acknowledge the far-reaching changes being 
implemented within the Intelligence Community because too often the 
public only hears the bad news. The Intelligence Community has 
tightened its belt in terms of both budget and personnel. Substantial 
changes are being made in the way that the CIA operates overseas; in 
hiring and promotion practices, and in the way that the CIA interacts 
with its oversight committees. This Intelligence Community is not 
treading water--DCI John Deutch is implementing profound changes that 
will increase efficiency, improve intelligence support to consumers, 
and rectify the problems recently brought to light in Guatemala and the 
Ames case. Further, although there was no illegality or impropriety 
involved, he is working to ensure that the National Reconnaissance 
Office [NRO] is not overly conservative in estimating costs and risks, 
leading to excess funds in carry-forward accounts. We are most 
fortunate, in my view, to have a Director of Central Intelligence who 
is intimately familiar with military requirements for intelligence as 
well as the many technical matters which are so critical to modern 
intelligence collection. I believe that Director Deutch and his team 
will continue to aggressively implement the changes necessary to assure 
accountability and restore public confidence in the CIA.
  In conclusion, I believe that the Intelligence Community is moving 
rapidly to keep pace with new missions and new technologies. I also 
believe that the programs authorized by this bill are vital to the 
security of the United States and deserve the support of every Senator.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a statement 
recently made by the DCI addressing the future of the Intelligence 
Community, together with my correspondence with him and a relevant 
newspaper article on counternarcotics issues, be printed in the Record.

[[Page S 14794]]

  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                      Washington, DC, May 1, 1995.
     Hon. John M. Deutch,
     Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, The 
         Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Deutch: As you know, I am delighted that the 
     President has nominated you to be the next Director of 
     Central Intelligence. You bring a great deal of energy and 
     integrity to the position, as well as a nearly unique blend 
     of scientific and governmental experience. I look forward to 
     working with you on intelligence issues in the years ahead.
       During the course of your confirmation hearings last week, 
     you may recall that I raised the issue of illegal narcotics 
     during both the open and closed sessions. Due to the format 
     of the hearings, however, and the limited amount of time 
     available, I do not feel as though I was able to obtain all 
     the information I sought. Due to the critical importance I 
     attach to this matter, I would therefore like to pursue this 
     issue somewhat further.
       Specifically: Would you agree that the experience of the 
     early 1900's indicates that increased spending on 
     interdiction, eradication, and disruption of narcotics 
     organizations can substantially reduce drug use in this 
     country? The information in the article I entered into the 
     record during the open hearing, which I have attached, 
     suggests that we have not reached the point of diminishing 
     marginal returns with regard to intelligence and defense 
     programs intended to reduce the supply of illegal narcotics 
     in the United States. If confirmed, will you task the Crime 
     and Narcotics Center, or other appropriate office, to conduct 
     an assessment of this issue and make the results available to 
     the Committee prior to the August recess?
       Does DoD have a threat assessment with regard to illegal 
     narcotics? Despite the rhetoric we often hear, it seems as 
     though drug smuggling is still treated primarily as an issue 
     for law enforcement rather than a national security matter. 
     As you know, threat assessments drive force structure and 
     planning within the Department of Defense. If there is a DoD 
     threat assessment that I am not aware of? I would appreciate 
     a copy of the report as well as any supporting documentation 
     which explains how the threat assessment has been converted 
     into programmatics. Again, if a threat assessment is not 
     available, I would like to ask that you task the DCI's Crime 
     and Narcotics Center, or the Department of Defense if 
     appropriate, to produce such an assessment prior to the 
     conferences on the Defense and Intelligence Authorization 
     bills this fall.
       I know that you will face many challenges as the next 
     Director of Central Intelligence. There are many threats 
     facing our country in the uncertain world in which we live. 
     It is worth noting, however, that as horrific as terrorism 
     is, the number of Americans who die or suffer mental or 
     physical damage from illegal narcotics is far greater. I 
     believe that there is much more that can and should be done 
     to staunch the massive flow of illegal narcotics into the 
     United States.
       I appreciate your consideration of this request. Again, I 
     look forward to working with you in the years ahead.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Connie Mack,
     U.S. Senator.
                                                                    ____


     The Future of U.S. Intelligence--Charting a Course for Change

           (By John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence)

       Thank you very much for that introduction.
       There are two challenges facing the Intelligence Community 
     today:
       First, we must be effective. We must deploy our 
     considerable resources against the most pressing security 
     threats of the post-Cold War era.
       Second, we must be accountable. We must carry out our 
     intelligence operations in an efficient and responsible 
     manner. At the same time we must maintain an effective 
     espionage service.
       When President Clinton asked me to be the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, he instructed me to make whatever 
     changes were necessary to assure that our nation has the best 
     intelligence service in the world and that we carry out our 
     duties with integrity.
       Today I will outline five broad changes underway to make 
     the Intelligence Community--and the CIA in particular--more 
     effective and more accountable. They are not quick fixes. 
     They do not involve massive new legislation or 
     reorganization. These are measures that lay a foundation for 
     fundamental change in the way we do our business. They will 
     strengthen our intelligence capability, they will not tear it 
     down. There are many things that the Intelligence Community 
     does well. We intend to build on these strengths, but we are 
     determined to address the problems that have damaged the 
     reputation and diminished the effectiveness of the 
     Intelligence Community.
       These changes are going to require a great deal of work on 
     the part of members of the Community and extensive 
     consultation with the policy makers and military commanders 
     who use our intelligence on a day-to-day basis. I look 
     forward to working with these changes with Members of 
     Congress and others who have the responsibility to review our 
     nation's intelligence programs.
       I also want to public to understand what we are doing so 
     that they will have confidence that our intelligence 
     activities are carried out in a manner consistent with this 
     nation's interests and values. Accordingly, our process of 
     reform and change will be open for discussion.
       Our success in strengthening the Intelligence Community is 
     of critical importance to all Americans. The nation faces a 
     multitude of challenges that will test our leadership and 
     influence in post-Cold War world: The proliferation of 
     chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass 
     destruction; the activities of hostile countries like Iran, 
     Iraq, and North Korea; the growing threat of international 
     crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking; and we must 
     maintain the economic security of our nation
       We must also keep an eye on the larger, longer term 
     developments. Will an emergent China redraw the political and 
     economic landscape of Asia? Will Russia abandon its steps 
     toward democracy and return to authoritarian rule?
       When President Clinton visited CIA in July he spoke to the 
     importance of intelligence in addressing these challenges and 
     these questions. President Clinton said: ``The intelligence I 
     receive informs just about every foreign policy decision we 
     make. It's easy to take it for granted. But we couldn't do 
     without it. Unique intelligence makes it less likely that our 
     forces will be sent into battle, less likely that American 
     lives will have to be put at risk. It gives us the chance to 
     prevent crises rather than forcing us to manage them.''


                           1. customer focus

       Customer focus is the first change I want to discuss.
       Our primary mission in intelligence is to provide the 
     President and other senior leaders with the information they 
     need to make and implement foreign policy.
       When the Intelligence Community focuses closely on what 
     intelligence customers need, when we make the policy makers 
     deadlines and requirements our own, we provide superb 
     support. That means getting the right information to the 
     right person at the right time--that goal hasn't changed. But 
     we are changing significantly the way we get the job 
     accomplished.
       Interagency intelligence teams have been particularly 
     effective in providing critical, round-the-clock support, 
     from detailed maps of remote areas to human intelligence and 
     amazingly vivid pictures taken from space. For example, both 
     policy makers and military commanders give high marks to 
     Intelligence Community support to humanitarian and 
     peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia.
       Permanent interdisciplinary centers that bring together 
     collectors and analysts from the CIA and other intelligence 
     agencies have also been the most successful approach to the 
     complex transnational issues of weapons proliferation, 
     terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trafficking.
       Making sure that our information is the most thorough, most 
     objective available on a day-to-day basis requires discipline 
     on our part, and it requires close and continuous contact 
     with our intelligence customers.
       Here I would note that giving policy makers the information 
     that they need is not the same as giving them the 
     intelligence judgments that they would like to see. If we 
     want our products to be used, we also have to maintain an 
     unassailable reputation for objectivity. Any effort to tailor 
     our analysis to policy would quickly destroy our credibility.
       Closer contact with our customers begins, but does not end, 
     with the DCI. I am meeting more often with our key 
     intelligence consumers--at least once a week with the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
     National Security Advisor, and, at least monthly with the 
     Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and those 
     officials involved with economic security and trade. And, of 
     course, I meet with the President and Vice President whenever 
     necessary.
       This contact and awareness of consumer needs must extend to 
     all working levels of the Intelligence Community. 
     Accordingly, we are assigning more intelligence officers on 
     rotation to policymaking offices and to work on site with 
     military units.
       At a time of tight budgets and a proliferation of 
     intelligence challenges, we cannot afford to collect for the 
     sake of collection or pursue every promising technology. 
     Guided by customer needs, the Intelligence Community must 
     exercise discipline in pursuing only those systems that offer 
     significant promise for meeting customer needs better and 
     more cheaply.
       For example, we will not only buy expensive new satellites 
     unless there is a significant demand from our national 
     security customers. I have already taken several steps to 
     improve efficiency in the management of our satellite 
     systems.
       Defense Secretary Bill Perry and I are putting into place a 
     new decisionmaking process--the new Joint Space Management 
     Board--to assure that both intelligence and military 
     satellite acquisition decisions are made efficiently and meet 
     user needs.
       We are also moving toward consolidating the eight agencies 
     now involved in imagery 

[[Page S 14795]]
     intelligence into a single National Imagery Agency, organized to serve 
     better the joint military commander in wartime and top policy 
     makers in peacetime. The new National Imagery Agency will put 
     together all aspects of collection, analysis, and 
     distribution of imagery. The goal will be to provide the 
     military commander near real time, all source intelligence 
     that will give our forces a unique ``dominant battlefield 
     awareness.''
       Both these management initiatives will provide better 
     service to our customers and will save money.


               2. human intelligence: assuring integrity

       The second area I would like to discuss is major change in 
     the CIA's Directorate of Operations, or DO. The DO manages 
     our spies. Even in this day of highly sophisticated 
     satellites and technical collection systems, there are some 
     types of information that can only be collected by people.
       Espionage is the core mission of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency. Despite set backs, we must continue to take risks 
     that result in the collection of information that is 
     available by no other means. If we do not take such risks 
     because we are afraid to fail or we are afraid of 
     controversy, then we will fail as an intelligence service in 
     protecting the national security interests of the United 
     States. Therefore we shall not slacken our efforts to recruit 
     informants in hostile governments, terrorist groups or drug 
     trafficking organizations.
       Let me be clear, we will continue to need to work with 
     unsavory people. We will actively seek out any individual who 
     can provide important intelligence from within a terrorist 
     cell or a factory supplying arms to a rogue state. Why are we 
     doing this? Because such human intelligence can save American 
     lives or avert conflict.
       What will be different is that we will not do these things 
     blindly, without thorough vetting and established procedures 
     for accoutability. We will not fool ourselves or fool our 
     customers about the risks we have taken.
       The new Deputy Director for Operations has ordered a 
     complete ``scrub'' of all DO ``assets,'' as the Intelligence 
     Community refers to human agents. This is a rigorous 
     evaluation of each one of the agents that we recruit to give 
     us information. If the information these assets provide is no 
     longer relevant, if we can get the same information 
     elsewhere, if questions of human rights violations or 
     criminal involvement outweigh the value of the information to 
     our national interest, then we will end the relationship with 
     the asset.
       We are developing new guidelines to ensure that concerns 
     about human rights and criminal activity are taken into 
     account in recruiting, evaluating and managing assets. The 
     guidelines will also include mandatory steps to provide 
     accurate and timely information to Congressional Oversight 
     Committees and law enforcement agencies.
       Thus these new guidelines will allow us to make informed 
     decisions on asset recruitment and retention; this does not 
     mean that we will slacken our efforts to recruit informants 
     in hostile governments, terrorist organizations, or 
     international crime and drug trafficking organizations. To do 
     so would be to deny our government information that leads to 
     actions that better protect our citizens and their interests.
       I would like to say a word about covert action--those 
     activities CIA undertakes to influence events overseas that 
     are intended not to be attributable to this country. Since 
     the public controversies of the eighties over Iran-Contra and 
     activities in Central America, we have greatly reduced our 
     capability to engage in covert action. I believe that the US 
     needs to maintain, and perhaps even expand, covert action as 
     a policy tool. But here again, we will not undertake covert 
     action to support policy objectives, unless it is approved at 
     the highest level of government and only if the President 
     authorizes such action after a scrupulous review process, 
     including timely notification of the appropriate 
     Congressional oversight bodies.
       Finally, the Ames case has taught us that counter 
     intelligence--guarding against penetration of our 
     intelligence or national security agencies by agents of a 
     foreign government--requires constant vigilance. I recently 
     created the position of Associate Deputy Director of 
     Operations for Counterintelligence to assure permanent, high 
     level attention to counter intelligence issues.


                  3. law enforcement and intelligence

       The third area of change is to greatly increase our 
     cooperation with the law enforcement community. In the past, 
     we used the borders of the United States as a convenient 
     dividing line between the responsibilities of intelligence 
     agencies and law enforcement agencies. The CIA 
     handled everything that involved foreign intelligence 
     outside the US. The FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
     handled law enforcement within the US. Unfortunately 
     international criminals, drug traffickers, and terrorists 
     do not respect these neat distinctions that were 
     introduced over a half century ago.
       Cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement can 
     produce fantastic success--the arrest of the leaders of the 
     Cali drug cartel in recent months is a tremendous example--
     but this cooperation has yet to be as effective, extensive, 
     and routine as it needs to be.
       President Clinton and Vice President Gore are not 
     satisfied, and correctly so, that we have in place the 
     interagency mechanisms that we need to address these threats 
     adequately. We cannot waste any more time worrying about 
     bureaucratic rivalries that go back to the days of J. Edgar 
     Hoover and Allen Dulles.
       It's time for a fresh approach: a new division of 
     responsibility that realistically reflects the pattern of 
     international activity that exists today in terrorism, crime 
     and drugs. The Intelligence Community must learn that in 
     these areas, the law enforcement community--the FBI, the Drug 
     Enforcement Agency, and US Customs--is the customer for 
     intelligence, just as the Department of State and Defense are 
     the customer for intelligence in the national security arena.
       And the law enforcement community must accept that it is 
     not necessary or efficient to establish an elaborate new and 
     separate foreign collection system for intelligence.
       Intelligence and law enforcement professionals need to 
     develop new procedures that will result in more effective 
     cooperation. For example, intelligence and law enforcement 
     must modify some of their most strongly held beliefs about 
     not sharing information about their sources with each other.
       This does not mean that intelligence agencies will spy on 
     US citizens. Our collection activities will not infringe on 
     the rights of US citizens. Nor will CIA or other intelligence 
     agencies take on any law enforcement duties. Attorney General 
     Reno and I are simply seeking to build a new relationship 
     between intelligence and law enforcement that will improve 
     the country's performance in curbing international crime, 
     drugs, and terrorism.


    4. carrying out intelligence operations in an efficient fashion

       The fourth change that I want to address is the initiation 
     of an integrated approach to resource planning and 
     programming for all the agencies of the Intelligence 
     Community.
       In this era of tight budgets, the Intelligence Community 
     has to undergo serious reexamination of its needs and its 
     resources and, indeed, downsizing has been going on for some 
     time--for example, since 1990, the number of people in the 
     Intelligence Community has been reduced by 17% and an 
     additional 10% reduction is planned by the end of the 
     century.
       However, up to the present, the Intelligence Community has 
     been relatively free from the systematic planning, 
     programming, and budgeting process that is the hallmark of 
     efficient government.
       The reason for this absence of management scrutiny is not 
     because the intelligence budget is ``secret.'' The reason is 
     that intelligence activities are carried out by different 
     agencies--NSA, DIA, CIA--and are carried out under separate 
     budgets. There is no mechanism to compare the budgets of the 
     various intelligence agencies and assess how they contribute 
     to the missions of U.S. intelligence. The present system does 
     not permit resource-saving tradeoff analysis: for example, 
     the possibility of substituting satellites for aircraft 
     imagery or signals collection, or assigning intelligence 
     analysis responsibilities among the different agencies, 
     considering the capabilities of the entire community.
       It is the responsibility of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence to review the nation's intelligence budget as a 
     whole and justify it to Congress. As the system now stands, 
     the DCI does not have the tools to do this job properly.
       In preparing the FY97 budget, I am insisting that all 
     agencies present their intelligence budgets in a manner that 
     will allow us to make more informed hard decisions on 
     resource allocation.
       Simply put, the problem is to make a ``symphony'' from the 
     diverse instruments represented by the various agencies. We 
     need to assure that all elements of the community work in 
     harmony. A mission oriented Intelligence Community multi-year 
     program period will identify the resources needed to carry 
     out our activities and assess the value of individual 
     programs. An added benefit of this approach is that it will 
     provide a clear description of what the Intelligence 
     Community is doing and what is the value to both President 
     Clinton and to the Congress.


                 5. improving the quality of the people

       The most important element of success in the Intelligence 
     Community is the quality of its people. Historically, we have 
     attracted outstanding and highly motivated individuals. 
     Unfortunately, some parts of the Intelligence Community are 
     in danger of losing the ability to attract and retain the 
     best people. This is particularly true of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and its Directorate of Operations. The 
     fifth and last change I will discuss today is a new 
     approach to personnel management.
       We must replace CIA's personnel system with one that is 
     better suited to the special nature of the work its employees 
     must perform. We must reexamine the use of the polygraph in 
     hiring and create a system that encourages employees to gain 
     wider experience within the agency and discourages the 
     development of barriers between the different directorates 
     and cultures within CIA.
       I have assigned CIA's Executive Director the task of 
     reviewing past studies and designing a new system that will 
     allow individuals to advance according to their 
     accomplishments without regard to gender or race, a system 
     that will be perceived as fair by employees throughout CIA. 
     As intelligence officers, it is our job to understand and be 
     able to operate in widely different cultures. A diverse 
     workforce is absolutely essential to our ability to be an 
     effective intelligence Agency in the next century.

[[Page S 14796]]

       This same emphasis on personnel management must extend to 
     all other agencies of the Intelligence Community. All 
     agencies need to recruit top people; all need career 
     development programs; and all need to welcome diversity in 
     the workplace. We need health promotion opportunities that 
     are comparable across the Intelligence Community, and we need 
     a retirement system that upholds the contract we have made 
     with the good people who have dedicated their careers to our 
     national security.
       We will need to seek new authority to allow more flexible 
     management of the very special Intelligence Community work 
     force to assure, in a time of downsizing, that there is a 
     reasonable prospect for advancement and provisions for early 
     retirement within the Community.


                          concluding remarks.

       I have presented five fundamental changes that are 
     necessary to improve the performance of the Intelligence 
     Community: a significantly sharper focus on the needs of the 
     intelligence customer; more selective and effective human 
     intelligence; a new cooperative relationship between law 
     enforcement and the Intelligence Community; a more efficient 
     system for allocating the resources of the Intelligence 
     Community; and revitalizing the personnel system to better 
     serve all of the employees of the Intelligence Community.
       These changes will enable the Intelligence Community to 
     efficiently and effectively address the intelligence 
     challenges of the post-Cold War era. I will devote my energy 
     and my influence to assuring that each of these changes is 
     made--thoroughly and promptly.
       I hope that the media, Congress, and public opinion will 
     give the Intelligence Community a chance to demonstrate what 
     it can do. In a democracy, all the failures become public, 
     the successes do not. It takes good will along with vigilant 
     skepticism to give the intelligence enterprise a fair shake--
     to balance accounts about past excesses with reporting that 
     assesses current accomplishments. Thank you very much.
                                                                    ____


                       [From the New York Times]

        Columbia Arrests Raise Price of Cocaine in New York City

                          (By Clifford Brauss)

       Only a few months after the Colombian Government began 
     arresting the top leaders of the Cali drug cartel, law 
     enforcement officials said the supply and potency of cocaine 
     in New York City is dwindling, forcing wholesale and street 
     prices to soar.
       In what officials described as the most precipitous shift 
     in almost six years, the wholesale price of cocaine has 
     increased nearly 50 percent since May, while retail prices 
     have gone up 30 percent. Similar increases, they said, are 
     evident in other big Eastern cities dependent on New York-
     based Cali operatives for supplies.
       In addition, they said, recent seizures and intelligence 
     indicate that the size and number of shipments of cocaine 
     into the New York area have declined. Only four months ago, 
     Federal agents say, shipments weighing 1,000 pounds or more 
     were coming into the city in trucks, ships and airplanes; 
     now, they typically weigh less than 200 pounds.
       The shifts are also evident in the city's drug markets. 
     Drug dealers in Washington Square Park said this week that 
     the same gram of cocaine that sold for $50 in May now goes 
     for $80, an increase that they said was beginning to drive 
     away younger buyers who come to Greenwich Village from New 
     Jersey.
       ``I've been around 39 years,'' said one Washington Square 
     dealer, whispering as he gave knowing glances to prospective 
     buyers walking through the park. ``So I know when they bust 
     the big guys in Colombia, that's when the coke goes up.''
       Law enforcement authorities cautioned that the shifts in 
     supply and price might be temporary, evidence of another 
     periodic realignment of international trafficking networks 
     with little long-lasting importance. But they said that the 
     declining sizes of cocaine shipments and five recent fatal 
     shootings between competing drug gangs in Queens appeared to 
     be strong signs that the world's richest drug trafficking 
     organization is at least going through a painful period of 
     adjustment.
       ```Maybe it's only a breather that is benefiting the 
     community,'' said Peter A. Crusco, chief of narcotics 
     investigations in the Queens District Attorney's office ``But 
     relatively little is coming in. The big-level people are not 
     risking moving the cocaine.''
       Officials say cocaine buyers can still find the drug in 
     neighborhoods across the city, but New York police officials 
     say laboratory tests show that dealers are now mixing their 
     small bags and tins of cocaine power with 30 percent more 
     sugar or baking power to stretch supplies.
       On the other hand, officials say supplies and prices of 
     crack--the cocaine-based drug of choice among many poor 
     users--have not been affected, because its purity is low to 
     begin with and abusers need little to become intoxicated.
       Though they are encouraged by the tightened supply of 
     cocaine, some police officials expressed concern that 
     shortages of cocaine could eventually increase demand for 
     heroin, which is already gaining in popularity and is mostly 
     distributed by organized crime groups that compete with the 
     Cali cartel.
       They also worry that if drug profits continue to be 
     stretched, street gangs competing for customers, territory 
     and supplies could turn more violent, much as they did when 
     crack first became popular in the late 1980's.
       Investigators said information collected through wiretaps 
     and informers indicate that supplies of cocaine are being 
     held up in Colombia and Mexico, where they are stockpiled 
     before moving across the border, because the leaders who once 
     personally supervised their release are in jail or on the 
     run.
       Middle-level traffickers, the wiretaps and informers 
     indicated are holding back shipments, in part because they 
     feared that the captured leaders might be trading information 
     about cartel operations in exchange for more lenient 
     treatment.
       ``The one person who moved the cocaine between Colombia and 
     Mexico, Miguel Angel Rodriguez Orejuela, is out of commission 
     for at least the moment,'' said a senior Drug Enforcement 
     Administration official who spoke on condition that he not be 
     named. ``One can logically surmise that right now there is a 
     quandary, a state of confusion, and problems with people 
     hooking up with the traffickers both in Colombia and 
     Mexico.''
       The most striking effect of the arrests in Colombia have so 
     far been at the wholesale level of the drug trade, officials 
     said. Responding to the decreased supplies, several law 
     enforcement officials said top cocaine dealers have increased 
     their prices to their largest distributors to an average of 
     $26,000 per kilogram, from $18,000 only four months ago.
       In Detroit, the Drug Enforcement Administration has 
     reported an increase in wholesale prices from $22,000 to 
     $32,000 per kilogram in the last two months alone.
       A bodega owner in Washington Heights with broad knowledge 
     of the cocaine trade in New York said the recent increase had 
     forced middle-level dealers to drop some street sellers, 
     shave profits, dilute their inventory and hoard supplies in 
     case the current shortages continued.
       ``A lot of people are just holding onto their good stuff 
     for when prices really go up,'' he said.
       The last time cocaine prices in New York rose so much and 
     so fast was in late 1989, when a shooting war broke out 
     between the Medellin cartel and the Colombian Government. The 
     Medellin group never recovered, but within months the Cali 
     cartel picked up the trafficking slack, and prices returned 
     to normal levels.
       State Department and law enforcement officials said that 
     Mexican trafficking groups and smaller Colombian cartels 
     operating on Colombia's northern coast are now jockeying for 
     new markets. Mexican traffickers have already taken control 
     of much of the cocaine market in the Southwest, they said, 
     and wholesale prices there have not risen as sharply as in 
     New York.
       But Thomas A. Constantine, the head of the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration, said in a recent interview that there was no 
     cartel waiting in the wings that could match the Cali group's 
     financial resources, political clout in Colombia, and 
     international trafficking connections.
       ``Nobody out there even compares,'' he said, saying that 
     the Cali group had already surpassed the Medellin cartel in 
     sophistication and resources at the time of the Medellin 
     group's downfall.
       But Mr. Constantine and other officials cautioned that it 
     was too soon to tell how harshly the Colombian authorities 
     would punish the six top Cali leaders they captured this 
     year. United States officials noted that the cartel leaders 
     were able to negotiate some of the terms of their surrender, 
     and none have suffered confiscations of ill-gotten gains like 
     their mountainside mansions or fleets of yachts.
       In addition, the United States officials say, the cartel 
     leaders are still able to communicate with their lieutenants 
     sporadically through family members who visit them in jail 
     and by paying off guards. But perhaps because their telephone 
     conversations are being monitored the officials say, they 
     have not directed their underlings to release huge loads of 
     cocaine warehoused in Colombia and Mexico.
       Whatever the long-term impact, law-enforcement officials 
     say, the latest price rises demonstrate that the cartel's top 
     leaders direct the most minute details of their cocaine 
     wholesale operations in the New York area. Recent captures of 
     cartel records include items like personnel evaluations and 
     Con Edison bills.
       ``We have done investigations involving wiretaps,'' said 
     Robert H. Silbering, the Special Assistant District Attorney 
     in charge of citywide narcotics cases, ``that show a direct 
     link from the streets of New York to the estates of Cali.''
                                                                    ____

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the amendments be 
agreed to en bloc, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table en 
bloc, the bill be then deemed read a third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  So the bill was deemed read a third time.
  Mr. COATS. Further, that the Intelligence Committee be immediately 
discharged from further consideration of H.R. 1655, the Senate proceed 
immediately to its consideration, that all after the enacting clause be 
stricken, the text of S. 922 as amended be inserted, H.R. 1655 then be 
deemed read a 

[[Page S 14797]]
third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  So the bill (H.R. 1655), as amended, was deemed read a third time and 
passed.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move the Senate insist on its amendment, 
request a conference with the House, and that the Chair be authorized 
to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.
  The motion was agreed to, and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. 
Specter, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Shelby, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Inhofe, Mrs. 
Hutchison, Mr. Mack, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Bryan, Mr. 
Graham, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Robb, and, from the 
Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Thurmond and Mr. Nunn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

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