[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 154 (Friday, September 29, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1879-E1881]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




[[Page E 1879]]


         AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL REPORT POSES QUESTIONS

                                 ______


                          HON. MARK E. SOUDER

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 29, 1995

  Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, the DOD appropriations bill emerged from 
conference with significantly more money added for certain items above 
the House recommended level. One important addition is $100 million 
more than the Nunn-Lugar program.
  The Nunn-Lugar or Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been 
accused of permitting the Russians to replace obsolete missile systems 
with more modern and more threatening ones, in fact, facilitating the 
upgrading of Russian strategic forces.
  Yesterday in the Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee, we 
passed out a budget reconciliation package which reduced spending by 
more than $10 billion. Some of those savings were made by eliminating 
the out-of-school interest subsidy that students receive on their 
loans, during a so-called grace period. While we are reducing benefits 
to students in America, with the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States 
is actually encouraging Russian students to study nuclear physics 
because we will pay them salaries to work at the International Science 
and Technology Center in Moscow they graduate. The center receives $21 
million in Nunn-Lugar aid. Scientists involved in nuclear weapons 
testing and nerve agent research are said to have received Nunn-Lugar 
grants. When the General Accounting Office examined the Nunn-Lugar 
program, it was this center that ``raised the most concerns among GAO 
investigators.''
  I am enclosing a series of reports from the American Foreign Policy 
Council which poses more questions about the legitimacy of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program:

                     Russia Test-Launched New ICBM

       Yesterday morning, the Russian government test-launched a 
     new-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The 
     launch is the most visible sign of Moscow's ongoing strategic 
     ongoing strategic nuclear modernization program, as the House 
     prepares to vote on the 1996 defense authorization and 
     appropriations bills.
       Reuters reported from Moscow that the ICBM was launched 
     from the Plesetsk cosmodrome 600 miles north of the Russian 
     capital.
       Russian Military Space Forces spokesman Ivan Safronov says 
     that the missile is a three-stage TOPOL-M, a variant of the 
     SS-25. According to Safronov, the TOPOL-M will be based on 
     mobile launchers and in silos.
       He stated that 90 of the 154 SS-18 ICBM silos in Russia 
     will be converted to house the TOPOL-M. The SS-18s are being 
     dismantled with United States aid under the ``Cooperative 
     Threat Reduction'' or Nunn-Lugar program. The TOPOL-M cannot 
     be deployed, if Russia is to remain within START limits, 
     until the SS-18s and other ICBMs are dismantled. Therefore, 
     this aspect of Nunn-Lugar funding will help make deployment 
     of the TOPOL-M possible.
       To date, Congress has failed to conduct significant 
     oversight of the Nunn-Lugar program, and how portions of it 
     are being used to benefit Russian military modernization. The 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (PL 103-160), Section 
     1203(d)(2) contains a restriction that Nunn-Lugar recipients 
     ``forego * * * the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass 
     destruction.''
       The launch underscores the need to revisit Nunn-Lugar, and 
     to deploy a national ballistic missile defense system by 
     2003.
       According to Safronov, once the SS-18s and other aging 
     systems are dismantled, they will be replaced with 
     ultramodern missiles. He told Reuters: ``Russia hopes to 
     replace all its outdated missiles in the coming years.''
                                                                    ____


     Amendment Would Tie Nunn-Lugar to Moscow's Biological Weapons 
                               Compliance

       Problem. The Russian military maintains a clandestine 
     biological weapons program in violation of its international 
     agreements. U.S. assistance to dismantle obsolete Russian 
     weapons, build housing for officers, ``convert'' portions of 
     military plants for civilian purposes, and other aid under 
     the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program frees 
     up Defense Ministry funds to finance the biological weapons 
     program. To date, the U.S. has offered Moscow little 
     incentive to account fully for--let alone abandon--its germ 
     warfare research and development.
       Solution. Congress can provide Moscow that incentive by 
     conditioning all Nunn-Lugar funding for Russia on biological 
     weapons research, development, and production.
       An amendment to H.R. 1530 is being offered by Rep. Robert 
     K. Dornan (R-CA) to offer that incentive. The amendment is a 
     measured, constructive approach that maintains full Nunn-
     Lugar funding. The amendment reads:
       ``Sec. 1108. Limitation on Cooperative Threat Reduction 
     Program Relating to Offensive Biological Weapons Program in 
     Russia.
       ``None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction 
     programs may be obligated or expended for programs or 
     activities with Russia unless and until the President submits 
     to Congress a certification in writing that Russia has 
     terminated its offensive biological weapons program.''.
       Congress's original intent for the Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction Program was to help former Soviet republics to 
     dismantle weapons of mass destruction that could be used 
     against the United States and its allies, or that could 
     proliferate to rogue regimes.
       The Clinton administration has acknowledged that Moscow 
     continues a substantial covert biological weapons program, 
     and that Russia is not in compliance with the 1972 Biological 
     Weapons Convention. The Dornan amendment offers the most 
     substantive step yet toward helping Russia abandon germ 
     warfare and comply with its international commitments. Rep. 
     Dornan is currently seeking cosponsors, according to 
     legislative director Bill Fallon.
       What will hearings reveal? There has been no effective 
     oversight of the Nunn-Lugar program. A new GAO report states 
     that Nunn-Lugar assistance already is being diverted to 
     finance Russian development of new weapons of mass 
     destruction. Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), Chairman of the 
     Subcommittee on Military Research and Development of the 
     National Security Committee, has called for hearings.
                                                                    ____


         GAO: Russia Uses Nunn-Lugar Aid To Develop New Weapons

       American aid to Russia is being used to pay scientists who 
     continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and dual-use 
     technologies, Moscow and Kiev have blocked U.S. audits of the 
     aid, and the Clinton administration is four months late in 
     making an accounting to Congress.
       These fundamental problems with aid under the Cooperative 
     Threat Reduction Act (P.L. 103-160), or ``Nunn-Lugar'' 
     program) are revealed in a draft General Accounting Office 
     (GAO) report made public by Bill Gertz in today's Washington 
     Times. The report and article make the following points:
       Nunn-Lugar has done little to reduce the proliferation 
     threat or improve nuclear weapons controls in Russia.
       Moscow is using Nunn-Lugar conversion funds to ``reactivate 
     dormant weapons facilities.''
       The International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, 
     receiving $21 million in Nunn-Lugar aid, ``raised the most 
     concerns among the GAO investigators.''
       U.S. officials monitored the Center ``only 
     intermittently,'' and not quarterly.
       U.S. officials told the GAO that the Center ``is intended 
     to help prevent proliferation . . . rather than preclude 
     scientists from working on Russian weapons of mass 
     destruction,'' even though the Center bars funding for such 
     work.
       The Center is ``creating dual-use items'' that can be used 
     in Russian military modernization.
       Nunn-Lugar pays nuclear scientists to prevent them from 
     emigrating, but they ``may spend part of their time working 
     on Russian weapons of mass destruction,'' according to the 
     report.
       Scientists involved in nuclear weapons testing and nerve 
     agent research received Nunn-Lugar grants.
       The U.S. has made no audits of Nunn-Lugar funding in Russia 
     or Ukraine, because Moscow and Kiev have objected to such 
     audits, the GAO said.
       The Clinton administration is four months late in providing 
     Congress with an accounting for Nunn-Lugar funds spent, which 
     is required by law.
       The State Department will assume funding of the Center from 
     the Department of Defense next year, and hopes to spend 
     another $90 million over seven years.
                                                                    ____


 Russia Fails To Meet All Six Conditions To Receive Nunn-Lugar Funding

       The Russian government is violating all six congressional 
     restrictions in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (PL 103-
     160) that authorizes U.S. aid for the ``demilitarization of 
     the former Soviet Union.'' PL 103-160 contains a loophole 
     that allows aid without the recipient meeting the six 
     commitments, if the president deems such aid to be in the 
     ``national interest.'' However, Congress has not yet assessed 
     whether aid in these circumstances remains in the national 
     interest. The six PL 103-160 commitments are:
       Section 1203(d)(1): ``Making substantial investment of its 
     resources for dismantling or destroying its weapons of mass 
     destruction. . . .'' Russia is dismantling nuclear warheads 
     on its own, but is replacing many with modern ones. The U.S. 
     agreed to pay for Russia to design its own $15 million 
     fissile material storage facility, but DoD reported, ``The 
     project has been hampered by problems with the Russians not 
     paying their designers to meet the Russian commitment to this 
     effort.'' The GAO states, ``Russia is likely to place a low 
     priority on paying the high cost of [destroying its declared 
     40,000 metric ton chemical weapons stockpile].''
       Section 1203(d)(2): ``Foregoing any military modernization 
     program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and 
     foregoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass 
     destruction.'' The CIA expects Russia to ``flight test and 
     deploy there new ballistic missiles--a road-mobile ICBM, a 
     silo-based ICBM, and an SLBM--during this decade . . . [and] 
     a new ballistic missile submarine after 

[[Page E 1880]]
     the turn of the century.'' The United States presents no offensive 
     threat to the Russian Federation, and therefore the strategic 
     modernization program is not within Russia's ``legitimate 
     defense requirements.'' Obsolete weapons being destroyed with 
     the help of PL 103-160 will be replaced with modern systems. 
     Russia maintains large covert programs to develop new 
     generations of chemical and biological weapons.
       Section 1203(d)(3): ``Foregoing any use in new nuclear 
     weapons of fissionable or other components of destroyed 
     nuclear weapons.'' According to the GAO, the Administration 
     has failed to get Russia to agree to ``specific transparency 
     measures that would help ensure that stored materials are 
     derived from dismantled weapons, safe from unauthorized use, 
     and not used in new weapons.'' Therefore, the U.S. must 
     assume that Russia will recycle warhead components in its 
     strategic modernization program.
       Section 1203(d)(4): ``Facilitating United States 
     verification of any weapons destruction carried out under 
     this title . . .'' Russia has thrown up numerous obstacles to 
     U.S. verification of weapons destruction, and the U.S. has no 
     means to inspect or account for destruction of any Russian 
     nuclear warheads. Moscow has not permitted substantial U.S. 
     inspection of its chemical weapons program; likewise, Moscow 
     has stonewalled on U.S. inspection of its biological weapons 
     facilities, though Kremlin officials made a token 
     ``concession'' at the May 10 summit that allows U.S. 
     inspections of a ``handful'' of biological weapons facilities 
     in three months.
       Section 1203(d)(5): ``Complying with all relevant arms 
     control agreements.'' Russia is currently in violation of the 
     Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, STRT I, and the Vienna Confidence Building 
     Measures Agreement, and may be in violation of the ABM Treaty 
     (with S-500s).
       Section 1203(d)(6): ``Observing internationally recognized 
     human rights, including the protection of minorities.'' The 
     35,000 dead in Chechnya, widespread persecution of various 
     ethnic groups (particularly Chechens, Georgians and Azeris), 
     renewed domestic political murders, legal and administrative 
     mechanisms for dictatorial rule, sharp restrictions and 
     intimidation of journalists and widespread police abuses 
     indicate widespread human rights violations.
                                                                    ____


    GAO and U.S. Embassy Say That Military Conversion Aid Will Help 
        Modernize Russian Armed Forces and Promote Proliferation

       Congress thinks American military conversion assistance to 
     Russia is helping to put Soviet-built military plants out of 
     the war business--thus reducing threats to the United 
     States--and to bring them into the consumer production 
     business, thus helping build a market economy.
       The General Accounting Office (GAO) and a cable from the 
     U.S. Embassy in Moscow report evidence to the contrary.
       Rather than break up high-tech military design bureaus to 
     make sure they will never again develop weapons, the Russian 
     government's strategy is to channel Western aid ``to a small 
     number of key technology-rich research and design 
     institutes,'' according to the July 8, 1994 cable. Most of 
     these institutes will remain state-owned. Few are going out 
     of the military business.
       A 1995 GAO report states, ``These parent companies 
     [designated for U.S.-funded conversion aid] would still 
     produce some defense equipment * * * raising the possibility 
     that U.S. aid could benefit the parent defense companies if 
     safeguards are not put in place.'' (GAO/NSIAD/95-7)
       ``Many of the companies selected for conversion will 
     continue to produce weapons. Profits and technology from the 
     newly privatized firms could be returned to the parent 
     defense enterprises. Furthermore, many Russian officials 
     remain interested in preserving a sizable defense industry to 
     earn hard currency by exporting arms,'' the GAO report adds.
       ``Russia's * * * military leaders are anxious to learn 
     about the management and manufacturing methods of the West,'' 
     observes the embassy cable, adding. ``The Russian military is 
     attempting to regain military potency with dwindling 
     financial resources.''
       To compensate for its huge personnel reductions, the 
     Russian military is going high-tech, and needs Western aid. 
     According to the embassy cable, ``With this change, the 
     Russian military is shifting strategies and doctrine. First, 
     the military is deferring new production to focus on systems 
     upgrade and research. Second, the military is shifting from 
     military-only research to dual-use technology research that 
     will benefit the Russian economy. Third, the Defense Ministry 
     is seeking to guide the creation of 30 defense-industrial-
     financial conglomerates that would produce both military and 
     civilian high-tech equipment. Finally, the military is 
     broadening beyond an emphasis on weapons procurement to 
     improve weapon maintenance, improved information processing, 
     and better battle management.''
       This helps explain why hard-line Russian military leaders 
     are so intent on expanding Nunn-Lugar funding to pay for 
     ``conversion,'' and why they are so supportive of the U.S. 
     Commerce Department's efforts to promote American investment 
     and technology transfer to such enterprises.
                                                                    ____


            Six Reasons To Reconsider the Nunn-Lugar Program

       Congress is on the verge of providing the Clinton 
     administration with desperately needed political cover for 
     its mishandling of the Nunn-Lugar program in the former 
     Soviet Union. Lack of congressional oversight has permitted 
     hard-line elements in Russia to manipulate the Clinton 
     administration and abuse the program in ways that are not 
     only wasteful, but harmful to American national security. 
     Nunn-Lugar is being used mainly to destroy obsolete weapons 
     that Moscow will replace with high-tech arms currently under 
     development. Nunn-Lugar funds have been diverted to fund some 
     of this development.
       1. Russia is in violation of most if not all six conditions 
     set by Congress in the original Nunn-Lugar (Cooperative 
     Threat Reduction) legislation (PL 103-160). (For a discussion 
     of each point, see Foreign Aid Advisory No. 5, ``Russia Fails 
     to Meet All Six Conditions to Receive Nunn-Lugar Funding,'' 
     May 19, 1995.)
       2. Moscow needs Nunn-Lugar funding to enable deployment of 
     new generation ICBM. When Russia test-launched a new-
     generation TOPOL-M ICBM on September 5, 1995, military 
     spokesman Ivan Safronov told Reuters that 90 of the existing 
     154 SS-18 ICBM silos in Russia will be convered to house the 
     new TOPOL-M. In other words, the TOPOL-Ms cannot be deployed 
     until Nunn-Lugar helps dismantle the obsolete SS-18s. 
     Safronov added, ``Russia hopes to replace all its outdated 
     missiles in the coming years.''
       3. Russia continues clandestine production of chemical and 
     biological weapons. Russia maintains large covert programs to 
     develop new generations of chemical and biological weapons. 
     Dissident chemical weapons scientist Vil Mirzayanov revealed 
     an entire new class of binary chemical weapons under 
     development, which Moscow refuses to acknowledge. The Clinton 
     administration acknowledges that Russia is continuing with 
     its substantial clandestine germ warfare program.
       4. Nunn-Lugar aid has been diverted to fund development of 
     weapons of mass destruction. The GAO released a June report 
     that found that the International Science and Technology 
     Center in Moscow, receiving $21 million in Nunn-Lugar aid, 
     ``raised the most concerns among the GAO investigators.'' The 
     report says that the Center is ``creating dual-use items'' 
     that can be used in Russian military modernization. The 
     report adds that Nunn-Lugar pays nuclear scientists to 
     prevent them from emigrating, but they ``may spend part of 
     their time working on Russian weapons of mass destruction.'' 
     Scientists involved in ongoing nuclear weapons testing and 
     nerve agent research received Nunn-Lugar grants, GAO said.
       5. Nunn-Lugar aid may promote weapons proliferation. A 1994 
     GAO report raises the possibility that U.S. aid may 
     unwittingly promote weapons proliferation: ``Many of the 
     [Russian] companies selected for conversion will continue to 
     produce weapons. Profits and technology from the newly 
     privatized firms could be returned to the parent defense 
     enterprises. Furthermore, many Russian officials remain 
     interested in preserving a sizable defense industry to earn 
     hard currency by exporting arms.''
       6. Nunn-Lugar aid is helping Russian plants that continue 
     to manufacture high-tech weapons. The 1994 GAO report states 
     that Moscow is using Nunn-Lugar conversion funds to 
     ``reactivate dormant weapons facilities.'' It adds, ``These 
     [Russian] parent companies [designated for U.S.-funded 
     conversion aid] would still produce some defense equipment . 
     . . raising the possibility that U.S. aid could benefit the 
     parent defense companies if safeguards are not put in 
     place.'' Commerce Department publications acknowledge that 
     related aid programs go directly to Russian military 
     enterprises that continue to produce modern tanks, armor, 
     military electronics, military aircraft, anti-ship weapons, 
     cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 
     submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as 
     antiaircraft systems designed to shoot down American 
     ``stealth'' aircraft.
                                                                    ____


      Why Is the U.S Aiding Russia's High-Tech Military Industry?

       Russia's high-tech military industry is the backbone of a 
     planned large-scale modernization program that Defense 
     Minister Pavel Grachev says will compensate for troop 
     reductions and compete with American firms on the 
     international arms market.
       Last week, a top Russian officer, Col. Gen. Yevgeny Maslin, 
     lobbied senators to maintain funding for ``conversion'' of 
     Russian military plants. At the same time, he defended 
     Moscow's strategic nuclear modernization program. The CIA and 
     DIA report that Russia is readying to test-launch a new 
     generation silo-based ICBM, a mobile ICBM, and SLBM, and is 
     developing a new ballistic-missile submarine to go on-line 
     within the next decade.
       The U.S. government, in trying to help Russian ``reform,'' 
     has been promoting and subsidizing the transfer of American 
     technology and capable to many of Russia's most advanced 
     military design bureaus and plants. Rather than abandoning 
     military production for consumer products, these plants form 
     the core of Russia's conventional and nuclear military 
     modernization. To remain predominant in the military-
     industrial complex, they need Western technology and 
     investment. 

[[Page E 1881]]

       The Clinton Administration, with bipartisan congressional 
     support, has been providing just that. The Bureau of Export 
     Administration of the Department of Commerce, the Defense 
     Enterprise Fund, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
     Program, and other government programs and entities are 
     promoting Russian firms that are not abandoning military 
     production, but have merely opened civilian production lines 
     to attract American support. The Commerce Department bulletin 
     BISNIS Search for Partners (December 9, 1994) describes some 
     of the firms.
       ``the principal designer and producer of Russian shipborne 
     air defense missile systems''; ``designs and produces sensor/
     guidance systems for airborne weapons''; a major producer of 
     electronic components for space and military use''; 
     ``responsible for design and development of land-based, road-
     mobile solid-propellant missiles''; ``global positioning 
     system work with . . . MiG aircraft''; ``developed guidance, 
     navigation, and flight control systems for ballistic 
     missiles''; ``a leading developer of space satellite systems, 
     sea and land-based cruise missile systems, and 
     intercontinental ballistic missile systems''; ``designs and 
     develops tactical medium-range surface-to-air missile systems 
     and weapons guidance systems for fighter aircraft''; 
     ``probably the world's leading producer of VHF air 
     surveillance and surface-to-air missile target acquisition 
     radars, which have counter-stealth features''; ``a leading 
     center for the design of launchers and ground support 
     equipment for missiles and aircraft''; ``a leader in the 
     development and production of electronic control systems for 
     missile complexes''; ``a developer of submarine-launched 
     ballistic missiles. . . .''


                           points to consider

       Is Congress serving the nation by helping an increasingly 
     hostile and unstable Russia to modernize its decaying war 
     machine? Current policy is inadvertently exacerbating the 
     following problems:
       Strengthening the un-reformed military-industrial complex 
     with the means to expand its political base in Russia; 
     Proliferation of high-tech weapons to rogue regimes; Threats 
     of a revitalized, high-tech military against Russia's 
     neighbors; New threats to the United States, particularly 
     through proliferation and strategic nuclear modernization.
                                                                    ____


      List of Arms Control Agreements Russia Is Currently Breaking

       The debate about ballistic missile defense is mainly 
     between those who place their faith in arms control 
     agreements with Russia, and those who place their faith in 
     U.S.-controlled defensive systems to knock out ballistic 
     missiles fired at the United States or its allies.
       The Russian parliament will demand that the U.S. comply 
     ``unconditionally'' with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
     treaty if Russia is to ratify START II--i.e., no ballistic 
     missile defense. However, Moscow is systematically breaking 
     current commitments and the U.S. is not demanding 
     ``unconditional'' compliance. The following list drawn from 
     open sources shows Russia's track record.
       Biological Weapons Convention. Russia maintains a 
     substantial covert biological weapons program in violation of 
     the 1972 convention, according to the Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) recent annual report to Congress. 
     Russian defectors and public officials, as well as the CIA, 
     confirm the report.
       Chemical weapons agreements. Russia is reported not to be 
     complying with a 1989 bilateral chemical weapons accord with 
     the U.S., and with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
     Although the Convention has not been ratified by the U.S. or 
     Russia, both sides have come to an understanding that they 
     will abide by it and allow mutual inspections. As of 1995, 
     Russia continued to conceal chemical weapons facilities from 
     U.S. inspectors.
       Missile Technology Control Regime. Russia violated the 1990 
     Missile Technology Control Regime by seeking to sell SS-25 
     ICBM technology to Libya, and by successfully selling SS-25 
     technology to Brazil. The administration declined to impose 
     sanctions because Russia ``promised to stop.''
       START I. Moscow conducted a mock nuclear attack on the 
     United States in 1993, failing to give the U.S. advance 
     notification as required by the treaty. Russia conducted a 
     mock SS-25 ICBM, air-launched cruise missile, and submarine-
     launched ballistic missile attack on the United States on 
     June 22, 1994, but ACDA will neither confirm nor deny whether 
     Russia gave the required advance notice. In 1995, Russia used 
     SS-25s as space launchers without properly notifying the U.S. 
     in advance. Questions remain about encryption of SS-19 ICBM 
     flight tests, whose telemetry should be decipherable so the 
     U.S. can determine the warhead load.
       START II. The new ACDA annual report states that Moscow 
     intentionally tried to conceal technical characteristics of 
     the SS-N-20 SLBM in tests in 1991 and 1995. The 
     administration failed to pursue the violation.
       Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moscow has 
     broken the CFE treaty by waging the war in Chechnya, and has 
     stated its intention to violate the CFE treaty further, not 
     only by maintaining disallowed troop and armor concentrations 
     in the northern Caucasus, but by creating a new 58th Army to 
     be based in Chechnya.
       Agreements on transparency of fissile material storage and 
     weapons dismantling. The July 1995 ACDA report finds that 
     Russia is not making good on its agreements with the U.S. to 
     make all fissile material storage facilities and weapons 
     dismantling processes transparent to U.S. inspectors.

                          ____________________