[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 151 (Tuesday, September 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14312-S14318]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself and Ms. Moseley-Braun):
  S. 1273. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a 
credit for interest paid on education loans; to the Committee on 
Finance.


              the higher education investment act of 1995

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today I am introducing 
legislation on behalf of myself and my able colleague from Illinois, 
Senator Moseley-Braun. We call it the Higher Education Investment Act 
of 1995. We hope that this bill will launch an individual income tax 
credit for interest paid by young people on their student loans.
  Our own young people are the ones who truly must balance the Federal 
budget for the long run. I believe that if we on Capitol Hill want to 
do our part to balance the Federal budget for the long run, then we 
must aid human investment in one of its highest forms: knowledge gained 
through education. As the U.S. Senate, with an obligation toward the 
national economy, we must underwrite higher education as an economic 
investment toward future Federal tax revenues. This bill is the 
workable legislative vehicle.
  As a practical matter of income tax credits, the Higher Education 
Investment Act of 1995 provides targeted taxpayers with a credit for up 
to 20 percent of the interest paid during the first 5 years in which 
payments are required on qualified educational loans. A student 
taxpayer may utilize both this credit and the standard deduction. Thus, 
a young person, or young married couple, can utilize this credit 
regardless of whether they are fortunate enough to have the money to 
begin buying a home and enjoying its related tax benefits. In fact, we 
intend this bill to aid young people, who are just starting out in 
life, in their effort to retain enough cash so that they too can have a 
chance at beginning the good life that many of us from older 
generations have enjoyed.
  As a Congress, we have been decades in saddling the next generation 
with the burden of paying off our national debt. At a minimum, we 
should allow its members a mechanism to leverage themselves to 
accomplish their enormous task. To earn the necessary cash flow to 
succeed, and to not slip into a lower standard of living that we 
currently enjoy, the members of the next generation must arm themselves 
both with knowledge and income potential. During the past decade, 
tuition and fees at both public and private colleges and universities 
have increased at rates far exceeding inflation. During the same decade 
we in Congress eliminated the interest deduction for student loans. 
Thus, we require the next generation to not only borrow more than we 
borrowed, we force them pay more than we paid. All of us must find it 
ironic that, in their efforts to settle up on our open account, which 
is full of our excesses, we have denied them the same tax benefitted 
education that we enjoyed.
  The social cost is enormous. Large volumes of student loan debt steer 
students away from socially useful though low paying careers such as 
teaching, research, or public service. It curbs entrepreneurial action 
because entrepreneurial ventures involve risk, and large, fixed, 
monthly student loan repayment obligations do not lend themselves to a 
young person's appetite for 

[[Page S 14313]]
risk. Without this student loan interest credit, which is consistent 
with a progressive tax code, we will fail to invest in our most long 
lived and productive assets: the minds of our electorate.
  Therefore, Mr. President, we challenge our colleagues to once again 
underwrite knowledge by first underwriting and co-sponsoring this bill.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include the bill in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1273

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Higher Education Investment 
     Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 2. CREDIT FOR INTEREST ON EDUCATION LOANS.

       (a) In General.--Subpart A of part IV of subchapter A of 
     chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
     nonrefundable personal credits) is amended by inserting after 
     section 22 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 23. INTEREST ON EDUCATION LOANS.

       ``(a) Allowance of Credit.--In the case of an individual, 
     there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by 
     this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to 20 
     percent of the interest paid by the taxpayer during the 
     taxable year on any qualified education loan.
       ``(b) Maximum Credit.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     credit allowed by subsection (a) for the taxable year shall 
     not exceed $500 ($1,000 in the case of 2 or more individuals 
     with qualified higher education expenses paid by any 
     qualified education loan).
       ``(2) Limitation based on modified adjusted gross income.--
       ``(A) In general.--If the modified adjusted gross income of 
     the taxpayer for the taxable year exceeds $40,000 ($60,000 in 
     the case of a joint return), the amount which would (but for 
     this paragraph) be allowable as a credit under this section 
     shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount which 
     bears the same ratio to the amount which would be so 
     allowable as such excess bears to $15,000.
       ``(B) Modified adjusted gross income.--The term `modified 
     adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross income 
     determined--
       ``(i) without regard to sections 135, 911, 931, and 933, 
     and
       ``(ii) after application of sections 86, 219, and 469.
       ``(C) Inflation adjustment.--In the case of any taxable 
     year beginning after 1996, the $40,000 and $60,000 amounts 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be increased by an 
     amount equal to--
       ``(i) such dollar amount, multiplied by
       ``(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under 
     section (1)(f)(3) for the calendar year in which the taxable 
     year begins, except that subparagraph (B) of subsection 
     (1)(f)(3) shall be applied by substituting `1995' for `1992'.
       ``(D) Rounding.--If any amount as adjusted under 
     subparagraph (C) is not a multiple of $50, such amount shall 
     be rounded to the nearest multiple of $50 (or, if such amount 
     is a multiple of $25, such amount shall be rounded to the 
     next highest multiple of $50).
       ``(c) Limitation on Taxpayers Eligible for Credit.--No 
     credit shall be allowed by this section to an individual for 
     the taxable year if a deduction under section 151 with 
     respect to such individual is allowed to another taxpayer for 
     the taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which such 
     individual's taxable year begins.
       ``(d) Limit on Period Credit Allowed.--
       ``(1) Taxpayer and taxpayer's spouse.--Except as provided 
     in paragraph (2), a credit shall be allowed under this 
     section only with respect to interest paid on any qualified 
     education loan during the first 60 months (whether or not 
     consecutive) in which interest payments are required. For 
     purposes of this paragraph, any loan and all refinancings of 
     such loan shall be treated as 1 loan.
       ``(2) Dependent.--If the qualified education loan was used 
     to pay education expenses of an individual other than the 
     taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse, a credit shall be allowed 
     under this section for any taxable year with respect to such 
     loan only if--
       ``(A) a deduction under section 151 with respect to such 
     individual is allowed to the taxpayer for such taxable year, 
     and
       ``(B) such individual is at least a half-time student with 
     respect to such taxable year.
       ``(e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) Qualified education loan.--The term `qualified 
     education loan' means any indebtedness incurred to pay 
     qualified higher education expenses--
       ``(A) which are incurred on behalf of the taxpayer, the 
     taxpayer's spouse, or a dependent of the taxpayer,
       ``(B) which are paid or incurred within a reasonable period 
     of time before or after the indebtedness is incurred, and
       ``(C) which are attributable to education furnished during 
     a period during which the recipient was at least a half-time 
     student.

     Such term includes indebtedness used to refinance 
     indebtedness which qualifies as a qualified education loan. 
     The term `qualified education loan' shall not include any 
     indebtedness owed to a person who is related (within the 
     meaning of section 267(b) or 707(b)(1)) to the taxpayer.
       ``(2) Qualified higher education expenses.--The term 
     `qualified higher education expenses' means the cost of 
     attendance (as defined in section 472 of the Higher Education 
     Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1087ll, as in effect on the day before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act) of the taxpayer, the 
     taxpayer's spouse, or a dependent of the taxpayer at an 
     eligible educational institution. For purposes of the 
     preceding sentence, the term `eligible educational 
     institution' has the same meaning given such term by section 
     135(c)(3), except that such term shall also include an 
     institution conducting an internship or residency program 
     leading to a degree or certificate awarded by an institution 
     of higher education, a hospital, or a health care facility 
     which offers postgraduate training.
       ``(3) Half-time student.--The term `half-time student' 
     means any individual who would be a student as defined in 
     section 151(c)(4) if `half-time' were substituted for `full-
     time' each place it appears in such section.
       ``(4) Dependent.--The term `dependent' has the meaning 
     given such term by section 152.
       ``(f) Special Rules.--
       ``(1) Denial of double benefit.--No credit shall be allowed 
     under this section for any amount for which a deduction is 
     allowable under any other provision of this chapter.
       ``(2) Married couples must file joint return.--If the 
     taxpayer is married at the close of the taxable year, the 
     credit shall be allowed under subsection (a) only if the 
     taxpayer and the taxpayer's spouse file a joint return for 
     the taxable year.
       ``(3) Marital status.--Marital status shall be determined 
     in accordance with section 7703.''
       (b) Reporting Requirement.--
       (1) In general.--Subpart B of part III of subchapter A of 
     chapter 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to 
     information concerning transactions with other persons) is 
     amended by inserting after section 6050P the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 6050Q. RETURNS RELATING TO EDUCATION LOAN INTEREST 
                   RECEIVED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS FROM INDIVIDUALS.

       ``(a) Education Loan Interest of $600 or More.--Any 
     person--
       ``(1) who is engaged in a trade or business, and
       ``(2) who, in the course of such trade or business, 
     receives from any individual interest aggregating $600 or 
     more for any calendar year on any qualified education loan,

     shall make the return described in subsection (b) with 
     respect to each individual from whom such interest was 
     received at such time as the Secretary may by regulations 
     prescribe.
       ``(b) Form and Manner of Returns.--A return is described in 
     this subsection if such return--
       ``(1) is in such form as the Secretary may prescribe,
       ``(2) contains--
       ``(A) the name and address of the individual from whom the 
     interest described in subsection (a)(2) was received,
       ``(B) the amount of such interest received for the calendar 
     year, and
       ``(C) such other information as the Secretary may 
     prescribe.
       ``(c) Application to Governmental Units.--For purposes of 
     subsection (a):
       ``(1) Treated as persons.--The term `person' includes any 
     governmental unit (and any agency or instrumentality 
     thereof).
       ``(2) Special rules.--In the case of a governmental unit or 
     any agency or instrumentality thereof--
       ``(A) subsection (a) shall be applied without regard to the 
     trade or business requirement contained therein, and
       ``(B) any return required under subsection (a) shall be 
     made by the officer or employee appropriately designated for 
     the purpose of making such return.
       ``(d) Statements To Be Furnished to Individuals With 
     Respect to Whom Information is Required.--Every person 
     required to make a return under subsection (a) shall furnish 
     to each individual whose name is required to be set forth in 
     such return a written statement showing--
       ``(1) the name and address of the person required to make 
     such return, and
       ``(2) the aggregate amount of interest described in 
     subsection (a)(2) received by the person required to make 
     such return from the individual to whom the statement is 
     required to be furnished.

     The written statement required under the preceding sentence 
     shall be furnished on or before January 31 of the year 
     following the calendar year for which the return under 
     subsection (a) was required to be made.
       ``(e) Qualified Education Loan Defined.--For purposes of 
     this section, except as provided in regulations prescribed by 
     the Secretary, the term `qualified education loan' has the 
     meaning given such term by section 23(e)(1).
       ``(f) Returns Which Would be Required To Be Made by 2 or 
     More Persons.--Except to the extent provided in regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary, in the case of interest received 
     by any person on behalf of another person, only the person 
     first receiving such interest shall be required to make the 
     return under subsection (a).''
       (c) Clerical Amendments.--
       (1) The table of sections for subpart A of part IV of 
     subchapter A of chapter 1 of the 

[[Page S 14314]]
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 22 the following new item:

``Sec. 23. Interest on education loans.''

       (2) The table of sections for subpart B of part III of 
     subchapter A of chapter 61 of such Code is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 6050P the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 6050Q. Returns relating to education loan interest received in 
              trade or business from individuals.''

       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to any qualified education loan (as defined in 
     section 23(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
     added by this section) incurred on, before, or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, but only with respect to any 
     loan interest payment due after December 31, 1995, and before 
     the termination of the period described in section 23(d)(1) 
     of such Code.
                                 ______

      By Mr. LOTT (for himself, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Nickles, and Mr. 
        Inhofe):
  S. 1274. A bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to improve 
management of remediation waste, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works.


        the remediation waste management improvement act of 1995

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, since the beginning of this year, 
administration officials have said they both need and want more 
regulatory flexibility to continue achieving environmental clean up 
goals through the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA].
  I want to share with my colleagues several quotes. They are useful to 
set the stage for my legislation.
  President Clinton, this past January in his State of the Union 
Address, said that: ``* * * we need common sense and fairness * * * and 
we [can] still clean up toxic waste dumps. And we ought to do it.''
  President Clinton even declared on March 16th that he needs 
legislative reforms to: ``* * * fix provisions of RCRA * * * [to avoid] 
high costs and marginal environmental benefit.''
  Vice-President Gore, this spring, promised that: ``* * * 
environmental protection * * * will protect more and cost less * * *'' 
in his Reinventing Government brochure.
  EPA Administrator Browner, this spring, testified to our Senate's 
Environment and Public Works Committee that: ``* * * reform efforts are 
so crucial; we must meet these challenges with commonsense cost-
effective measures.''
  EPA's Head of the Office of Solid Waste, Mr. Shapiro, this summer, 
testified to the House's Commerce Subcommittee that: ``* * * we have 
learned [to] rely on * * * our State partners, and we have learned that 
flexibility is vital to our success.''
  EPA, this spring, reaffirmed its commitment to permanently implement 
the regulatory status of petroleum contaminated media under the 
Underground Storage Tank Program to avoid `` * * * delays in 
remediation action and increases in remediation costs.''
  EPA's briefing document, this summer, reported that DOD wanted cost 
to be factored into level of cleanups, and even OMB advocated a one-
regulator cleanup approach.
  The Reinventing Government brochure went on to assure that by July 15 
of this year a package of rifle shot reforms would be delivered to 
Congress.
  The administration was sending out a loud and consistent theme:
  First, RCRA reforms are desired;
  Second, RCRA reforms are needed this year; and
  Third, RCRA reforms must be legislative.
  I heard the administration's message.
  Let's also recognize that Americans clearly are fed up with 
ineffective environmental programs that do little for clean-up, but 
lots for lawyers. They do not want their hard-earned tax dollars being 
wasted.
  Thoughtful citizens are exhausted by excessive, prescriptive 
regulations that exaggerate risks which too often are based upon 
emotion rather than scientific evidence. Buzzword phrases like 
``rational rules,'' ``reasonably expected scenarios,'' ``stop Federal 
mandates,'' and ``one-size does not fit-all'' are typical and part of 
everyday, commonplace dialogue from Hernando to Excatawpa, MS.
  I heard the Public's message too.
  Before I go any further, I want to be up-front about my goals for 
this legislation: First, make RCRA work faster and cheaper; Second, 
remove regulations that are counterproductive to cleanups; Third, 
streamline agency decisionmaking; and Fourth, give states authority to 
make decisions.
  Now, I want to explain why my environmental policy reform bill just 
concentrates on RCRA:
  True, it is a program that does not have an attention getting name, 
like Superfund. Some would even say it is a program with an 
unpronounceable name.
  True, it is a program which perhaps many Americans are not aware of. 
But it is far more widespread then Superfund.
  My colleagues need to hear a few numbers to understand why Congress 
needs to deal with RCRA:
  There are five times as many RCRA sites as there are Superfund sites. 
In Mississippi there are just two Superfund sites, but there are over 
40 RCRA Corrective Action Sites.
  And, a respected study conducted 4 years ago reported that roughly 
$240 billion will be spent on RCRA remediation. As a reference point 
that is nearly $100 billion more than will be spent on the notorious 
Superfund.
  RCRA is a big, albeit invisible, and expensive program that the 
administration wants to reform.
  Well, so do I.
  I have responded with a sensible, responsive and responsible 
legislative solution. It is not a comprehensive across-the-board 
reform, rather it is surgical approach which targets just a few 
specific problem areas. The administration calls it rifle-shot 
legislative fixes.
  My legislative solution has two basic straight-forward features which 
will save billions and remediate quicker all without inhibiting or 
lessening environmental protection:
  First, it replaces inappropriate RCRA requirements originally 
designed to minimize the amount of routinely generated hazardous waste 
with a remediation action plan concept which will maximize site cleanup 
by empowering state regulators to make common sense cleanup decisions, 
and to give them authority to enforce these decisions.
  Second, it codifies the regulatory status of cleanup materials 
ensuring the continuation of the highly successful Underground Storage 
Tank Corrective Action Program.
  I believe it makes sense to focus this environmental reform effort to 
an incremental method. We need to go step-by-step making directed 
changes and then pausing to examine the consequences before returning 
with additional legislation.
  That is why my bill deals with only two issues. It avoids 
Washington's Christmas tree mentality of loading up on numerous 
disconnected changes. It also sidesteps policy matters which are more 
appropriately handled through the upcoming Superfund reauthorization.
  My legislative solution will merely tailor RCRA's regulatory process 
to site-specific remediation to ensure common sense, enforceable 
cleanup occur. I urge my colleagues to examine my proposal.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1274

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. REMEDIATION WASTE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT.

       (a) Definitions.--Section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 6903) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(42) Compliance authority.--The term `compliance 
     authority' means the authority to issue, enter into, approve, 
     enforce, and ensure compliance with a remedial action plan.
       ``(43) Nonprogram state.--The term `nonprogram State' means 
     a State other than a program State.
       ``(44) Originating state.--The term `originating State' 
     means a State in which remediation waste is generated under a 
     remedial action plan.
       ``(45) Program state.--The term `program State' means a 
     State that has a State remediation waste management program 
     authorized under section 3006(i).
       ``(46) Remedial action plan.--The term `remedial action 
     plan' means a document or portion of a document (including 
     but not limited to, an order, permit, or agreement) that--

[[Page S 14315]]

       ``(A) is issued, entered into, or approved by the 
     Administrator or a program State;
       ``(B) ensures that the management of the remediation waste 
     is performed in a manner that is protective of human health 
     and the environment by specifying--
       ``(i) the remediation waste that is the subject of the 
     document;
       ``(ii) the manner in which the remediation waste will be 
     managed;
       ``(iii) the methods of remediation; and
       ``(iv) the schedule for implementation; and
       ``(C) has been the subject of appropriate public notice and 
     comment; and
       ``(D) provides for the exercise of compliance authority in 
     accordance with section 3001(j)(1) and, in the case of a plan 
     over any portion of which any other entity (a State or the 
     Administrator) other than the entity that issued or entered 
     into the plan is to exercise compliance authority, has the 
     concurrence of the other entity for the portion of the plan 
     for which the other entity has compliance authority, except 
     that nothing in this subparagraph applies to remediation 
     waste that is managed in accordance with subtitle C.
       ``(47) Remediation waste.--The term `remediation waste' 
     means a solid waste or any medium (including ground water, 
     surface water, soil, and sediment) generated during 
     implementation of a remedial action plan that--
       ``(A) is, or is derived from, a listed hazardous waste;
       ``(B) contains or is mixed with a listed hazardous waste; 
     or
       ``(C) exhibits a characteristic of a hazardous waste.''.
       (b) Identification and Listing.--Section 3001 of the Solid 
     Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6921) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(j) Remediation Waste.--
       ``(1) Compliance authority.--
       ``(A) Program states.--Except as provided in section 3008, 
     a program State shall exercise compliance authority with 
     respect to a remedial action plan insofar as the remedial 
     action plan describes the management of remediation waste in 
     the program State.
       ``(B) Nonprogram states.--The Administrator shall exercise 
     compliance authority with respect to a remedial action plan 
     insofar as the remedial action plan describes the management 
     of remediation waste in a nonprogram State.
       ``(C) Remediation waste managed interstate.--With respect 
     to the management of remediation waste under a remedial 
     action plan that provides that part of the management will be 
     performed in another State other than the originating State--
       ``(i) if the other State is a program State, the program 
     State shall exercise compliance authority with respect to the 
     portions of the remedial action plan describing the 
     management of remediation waste in the other State; or
       ``(ii) if the other State is a nonprogram State, the 
     Administrator shall exercise compliance authority with 
     respect to the portions of the remedial action plan 
     describing the management of remediation waste in the other 
     State.
       ``(2) Conditional exclusion.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this subtitle, remediation waste that is managed 
     under a remedial action plan shall not to be a hazardous 
     waste for purposes of this subtitle.''.
       (c) Authorized State Hazardous Waste Remediation 
     Programs.--Section 3006 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 
     U.S.C. 6926) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Authorized State Remediation Waste Management 
     Programs.--
       ``(1) States with authorized hazardous waste programs.--
       ``(A) Certification.--A State that has a hazardous waste 
     program authorized under subsection (b) may submit to the 
     Administrator a certification, supported by such 
     documentation as the State considers to be appropriate, 
     demonstrating that the State has--
       ``(i) statutory and regulatory authority (including 
     appropriate enforcement authority) to control the management 
     of remediation waste from generation to final disposal in a 
     manner that is protective of human health and the 
     environment;
       ``(ii) resources in place to administer and enforce the 
     authorities; and
       ``(iii) procedures to ensure public notice and opportunity 
     for comment on remedial action plans submitted to the State.
       ``(B) Interim authorization.--Subject to subparagraph 
     (C)(iii), beginning 60 days after submission of a 
     certification under subparagraph (A), the State may proceed 
     to carry out the remediation waste management program of the 
     State until the Administrator issues a final determination 
     under subparagraph (C).
       ``(C) Determination.--
       ``(i) In general.--Not later than 18 months after the date 
     on which a State submits to the Administrator a certification 
     under subparagraph (A), after public notice and opportunity 
     for comment, the Administrator shall issue to the State and 
     publish in the Federal Register a determination that--

       ``(I) the certification meets all of the criteria stated in 
     subparagraph (A), and the State has final authorization to 
     carry out the remediation waste management program of the 
     State; or
       ``(II) the certification fails to meet 1 or more of the 
     criteria stated in subparagraph (A), stating with 
     particularity the elements of the State program that are 
     considered to be deficient, and that the deficiency would be 
     likely to result in a State remediation waste management 
     program that is not protective of human health and the 
     environment.

       ``(ii) Default.--

       ``(I) In general.--Except as provided in subclause (II), if 
     the Administrator does not issue a determination under clause 
     (i) within 18 months after the date on which a State submits 
     to the Administrator a certification under subparagraph (A), 
     the certification shall be considered to meet all of the 
     criteria stated in subparagraph (A), and the State shall have 
     final authorization to carry out the remediation waste 
     management program of the State.
       ``(II) Withdrawal of authorization.--If the Administrator 
     subsequently withdraws authorization for a State remediation 
     waste program in accordance with subsection (e), the 
     Administrator shall ensure completion of any ongoing remedial 
     action plan.

       ``(iii) Preliminary determination.--If the Administrator 
     determines that--

       ``(I) on preliminary review, it appears that it will likely 
     be determined after notice and comment that a certification 
     fails to meet 1 or more of the criteria stated in 
     subparagraph (A); and
       ``(II) injury to human health or the environment would 
     likely result from interim implementation of the State 
     remediation waste management program under subparagraph (B),

     the Administrator may issue a preliminary determination to 
     the State, and the State shall not have interim authorization 
     under subparagraph (B).
       ``(2) States without authorized hazardous waste programs.--
       ``(A) Certification.--A State that does not have a 
     hazardous waste program authorized under subsection (b) may 
     submit to the Administrator a certification, supported by 
     such documentation as the State considers to be appropriate, 
     demonstrating that the State has--
       ``(i) statutory and regulatory authority (including 
     appropriate enforcement authority) to control the management 
     of remediation waste from generation to final disposal in a 
     manner that is protective of human health and the 
     environment;
       ``(ii) resources in place to administer and enforce the 
     authorities; and
       ``(iii) procedures to ensure public notice and opportunity 
     for comment on remedial action plans submitted to the State.
       ``(B) Interim authorization.--Beginning 1 year after a 
     certification under subparagraph (A), the State may proceed 
     to carry out the remediation waste management program of the 
     State until the Administrator issues a determination under 
     subparagraph (C).
       ``(C) Determination.--
       ``(i) In general.--Not later than 2 years after the date on 
     which a State submits to the Administrator a certification 
     under subparagraph (A), after public notice and opportunity 
     for comment, the Administrator shall issue to the State and 
     publish in the Federal Register a determination that--

       ``(I) the certification meets all of the criteria stated in 
     subparagraph (A), and the State has final authorization to 
     carry out the remediation waste management program of the 
     State; or
       ``(II) the certification fails to meet 1 or more of the 
     criteria stated in subparagraph (A), stating with 
     particularity the elements of the State program that are 
     considered to be deficient.

       ``(ii) Default.--

       ``(I) In general.--Except as provided in subclause (II), if 
     the Administrator does not issue a determination under clause 
     (i) within 2 years after the date on which a State submits to 
     the Administrator a certification under subparagraph (A), the 
     certification shall be considered to meet all of the criteria 
     stated in subparagraph (A), and the State shall have final 
     authorization to carry out the remediation waste management 
     program of the State.
       ``(II) Withdrawal of authority.--If the Administrator 
     subsequently withdraws authorization for a State remediation 
     waste management program in accordance with subsection (e), 
     the Administrator shall ensure completion of any ongoing 
     remedial action plan.''.

       (d) Enforcement.--Section 3008(a) of the Solid Waste 
     Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6928(a))) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
       (B) by inserting after ``subtitle'' the following: ``or any 
     requirement contained in a remedial action plan issued or 
     entered into by the Administrator or with respect to which 
     the Administrator exercises compliance authority under 
     section 3001(j)'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) Remediation waste.--
       ``(A) Notice of violation.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section, if, on the basis of any 
     information, the Administrator determines that a person has 
     violated or is in violation of any requirement for the 
     management of remediation waste contained in a remedial 
     action plan implemented under a State remediation waste 
     management program authorized under section 3006(i), the 
     Administrator shall provide notice to the State in which the 
     violation occurred or is occurring prior to commencing any 
     action to 

[[Page S 14316]]
     require compliance with the requirements of the remedial action plan.
       ``(B) Compliance order.--If, after the 30th day after the 
     Administrator issues a notice of violation under subparagraph 
     (A), a State has not taken appropriate action to require 
     compliance with requirements of the remedial action plan, the 
     Administrator may issue an order or commence an action under 
     paragraph (1) to enforce the remediation waste management 
     requirements of the remedial action plan.''.
       (e) Release, Detection, Prevention, and Correction.--
     Section 9003 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 
     6991b) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Petroleum-Contaminated Media and Debris.--Petroleum-
     contaminated media and debris that fail the test for toxicity 
     characteristics due to organics issued by the Administrator 
     under section 3001, and are subject to corrective action 
     under this section, shall not be considered to be hazardous 
     waste for purposes of subtitle C.''.
                                 ______

      By Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Specter, Mr. Kyl, and 
        Mrs. Hutchison):
  S. 1275. A bill to provide for appropriate remedies for prison 
condition lawsuits, to discourage frivolous and abusive prison 
lawsuits, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


              the prison conditions litigation reform act

 Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I introduce legislation that I 
believe is essential if we are to restore public confidence in 
government's ability to protect the public safety. Moreover, it will 
accomplish this purpose not by spending more taxpayer money but by 
saving it.
  This legislation removes enormous obstacles the Federal Government 
has placed in the path of States' and localities' ability to protect 
their residents. I would like to highlight three of these obstacles and 
explain what we are going to do to remove them.
  First, in many jurisdictions including my own State of Michigan, 
judicial orders entered under Federal law raise the costs of running 
prisons far beyond what is necessary. These orders also thereby 
undermine the legitimacy and punitive and deterrent effect of prison 
sentences.
  Second, in other jurisdictions, judicial orders entered under Federal 
law actually result in the release of dangerous criminals from prisons.
  Third, these orders are complemented by a veritable torrent of 
prisoner lawsuits. Although these suits are found non-meritorious the 
vast majority of the time (over 99 percent, for example, in the ninth 
circuit), they occupy an enormous amount of State and local time and 
resources; time and resources that would be better spent incarcerating 
more dangerous offenders.
  Let me start with the problems in my own State of Michigan.
  Under a series of judicial decrees resulting from Justice Department 
suits against the Michigan Department of Corrections, the Federal 
courts now monitor our State prisons to determine:
  1. How warm the food is.
  2. How bright the lights are.
  3. Whether there are electrical outlets in each cell.
  4. Whether windows are inspected and up to code.
  5. Whether prisoners' hair is cut only by licensed barbers.
  6. And whether air and water temperatures are comfortable.
  Elsewhere, American citizens are put at risk every day by court 
decrees. I have in mind particularly decrees that cure prison crowding 
by declaring that we must free dangerous criminals before they have 
served their time, or not incarcerate certain criminals at all because 
prisons are too crowded.
  The most egregious example is the city of Philadelphia. For the past 
8 years, a Federal judge has been overseeing what has become a program 
of wholesale releases of up to 600 criminal defendants per week to keep 
the prison population down to what she considers an appropriate level.
  Under this order, there are no individualized bail hearings on a 
defendant's criminal history before deciding whether to release the 
defendant before trial. Instead, the only consideration is what the 
defendant is charged with the day of his or her arrest.
  No matter what the defendant has done before, even, for example, if 
he or she was previously convicted of murder, if the charge giving rise 
to the arrest is a non-violent crime, the defendant may not be held 
pretrial. Moreover, the so-called non-violent crimes include stalking, 
carjacking, robbery with a baseball bat, burglary, drug dealing, 
vehicular homicide, manslaughter, terroristic threats, and gun charges.
  As a result Philadelphia, which before the cap had about 18,000 
outstanding bench warrants, now has almost 50,000. In reality, though, 
no one is out looking for these fugitives. Why look? If they were 
found, they would just be released back onto the streets under the 
prison cap.
  In the meantime thousands of defendants who were out on the streets 
because of the cap have been rearrested for new crimes, including 79 
murders, 959 robberies, 2,215 drug dealing charges, 701 burglaries, 
2,748 thefts, 90 rapes, and 1113 assaults.
  Looking at the same material from another vantage point: In 1993 and 
1994, over 27,000 new bench warrants for misdemeanor and felony charges 
were issued for defendants released under the cap. That's 63 percent of 
all new bench warrants in 1993 and 74 percent of all new bench warrants 
for the first 6 months of 1994.
  Failure to appear rates for crimes covered by the cap are all around 
70 percent, as opposed to, for example, non-covered crimes like 
aggravated assault, where the rate is just 3 percent. The Philadelphia 
fugitive rate for defendants charged with drug dealing is 76 percent, 
three times the national rate.
  Over 100 persons in Philadelphia have been killed by criminals set 
free under the prison cap. Moreover, the citizenry has understandably 
lost confidence in the criminal justice system's ability to protect 
them. And the criminals, on the other hand, have every reason to 
believe that the system can't do anything about them.

  All of this would be bad enough if it were the result of a court 
order to correct serious constitutional violations committed by the 
Philadelphia corrections system. But it is not.
  Indeed, a different Federal judge recently found that conditions in 
Philadelphia's oldest and most decrepit facility--Holmesburg Prison--
met constitutional standards.
  These murderous early releases are the result of a consent decree 
entered into by the prior mayoral administration from which the current 
administration has been unable to extricate itself.
  Finally, in addition to massive judicial interventions in State 
prison systems, we also have frivolous inmate litigation brought under 
Federal law; this litigation also ties up enormous resources. Thirty-
three States have estimated that Federal inmate suits cost them at 
least $54.5 million annually. The National Association of Attorneys 
General have extrapolated that number to conclude that nationwide the 
costs are at least $81.3 million. Since, according to their 
information, more than 95 percent of these suits are dismissed without 
the inmate receiving anything, the vast majority of the $81.3 million 
being spent is attributable to non-meritorious cases.
  Mr. President, in my opinion this is all wrong. People deserve to 
keep their tax dollars or have them spent on projects they approve. 
They deserve better than to have their money spent, on keeping 
prisoners in conditions some Federal judge feels are desirable 
(although not required by any provision of the Constitution or any 
law). And they certainly don't need it spent on defending against 
frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
  And convicted criminals, while they must be accorded their 
constitution rights, deserve to be punished. I think virtually 
everybody believes that while these people are in jail they should not 
be tortured, but they also should not have all the rights and 
privileges the rest of us enjoy, and that their lives should, on the 
whole, be describable by the old concept known as hard time.
  The legislation I am introducing today will return sanity and State 
control to our prison systems. It will do so by limiting judicial 
remedies in prison cases and by limiting frivolous prisoner litigation.
  First, we must curtail interference by the Federal courts themselves 
in the orderly administration of our prisons. This is not to say that 
we will have no court relief available for prisoner suits, only that we 
will try to retain it for cases where it is needed while curtailing its 
destructive use.

[[Page S 14317]]

  Most fundamentally, the proposed bill forbids courts from entering 
orders for prospective relief (such as regulating food temperatures) 
unless the order is necessary to correct violations of individual 
plaintiffs' Federal rights.
  It also requires that the relief be narrowly drawn and be the least 
intrusive means of protecting the federal rights. And it directs courts 
to give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or 
the operation of the criminal justice system caused by the relief.
  No longer will prison administration be turned over to Federal judges 
for the slightest reason. Instead, the States will be able to run 
prisons as they see fit unless there is a constitutional violation, in 
which case a narrowly tailored order to correct the violation may be 
entered.
  The bill also will make it more difficult for judges to release 
dangerous criminals back into the population, or to prevent the 
authorities from incarcerating them in the first place.
  To accomplish this, the legislation forbids courts from entering 
release orders except under very limited circumstances. The court first 
must have entered an order for less intrusive relief, which must be 
shown to have failed to cure the violation of Federal rights. If a 
Federal court reaches this conclusion, it must refer the question of 
whether or not to issue a release order to a three judge district 
court.
  This court must find by clear and convincing evidence that crowding 
is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right and that no 
other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right. Then the 
court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crowding 
had deprived particular plaintiffs of at least one essential, 
identifiable human need, and that prison officials have either 
deliberately subjected the plaintiffs to this deprivation or have been 
deliberately indifferent to it.
  As important, this legislation provides that any prospective relief 
order may be terminated on the motion of either party 2 years after the 
later of the grant of relief or the enactment of the bill. The court 
shall grant the termination unless it finds that the original 
prerequisites for granting it are present at that time.

  No longer, then, will we have consent decrees, such as those in 
Michigan under which judges control the prisons literally for decades.
  Finally, the bill contains several measures to reduce frivolous 
inmate litigation. The bill limits attorney's fee awards. In addition, 
prisoners no longer will be reimbursed for attorney's fees unless they 
prove an actual statutory violation.
  No longer will courts award attorney's fees simply because the prison 
has changed pre-existing conditions. Only if those conditions violated 
a prisoner's rights will fees be awarded.
  Prisoners who succeed in proving a statutory violation will be 
reimbursed only for fees directly and reasonably incurred in proving 
that violation.
  In addition, attorney's fees must be proportionally related to the 
court ordered relief. No longer will attorneys be allowed to charge 
massive amounts to the State for the service of correcting minimal 
violations.
  And no longer will attorneys be allowed to charge very high fees for 
their time. The fee must be calculated at an hourly rate no higher than 
that set for court appointed counsel. And up to 25 percent of any 
monetary award the court orders the plaintiff wins will go toward 
payment of the prisoner's attorney's fees.
  The bill also prohibits prisoners who have filed three frivolous or 
obviously nonmeritorious in forma pauperis civil actions from filing 
any more unless they are in imminent danger of severe bodily harm.
  Also, to keep prisoners from using lawsuits as an excuse to get out 
of jail for a time, pretrial hearings generally will be conducted by 
telephone, so that the prisoner stays in prison.
  Mr. President, these reforms will decrease the number of frivolous 
claims filed by prisoners. They will decrease prisoners' incentives to 
file suits over how bright their lights are. At the same time, they 
will discourage judges from seeking to take control over our prison 
systems, and to micromanage them, right down to the brightness of their 
lights.
  This is a far-reaching bill, Mr. President. One aimed at solving a 
complex, costly, and dangerous problem. Its several provisions will 
discourage frivolous lawsuits and promote State control over State 
prison systems. At the same time, this legislation will help protect 
convicted criminals' constitutional rights without releasing them to 
prey on an innocent public or keeping them in conditions so comfortable 
that they lose their deterrent effect.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1275

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Prison Conditions Litigation 
     Reform Act''.

     SEC. 2. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES FOR PRISON CONDITIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 3626 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to prison 
       conditions

       ``(a) Requirements for Relief.--
       ``(1) Prospective relief.--Prospective relief in any civil 
     action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no 
     further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
     Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The 
     court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief 
     unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, 
     extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of 
     the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary 
     to correct the violation. In determining the intrusiveness of 
     the relief, the court shall give substantial weight to any 
     adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a 
     criminal justice system caused by the relief.
       ``(2) Preliminary injunctive relief.--In any civil action 
     with respect to prison conditions, to the extent otherwise 
     authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary 
     restraining order or an order for preliminary injunctive 
     relief. Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically 
     expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless 
     the court makes the order final before the expiration of the 
     90-day period.
       ``(3) Prisoner release order.--(A) In any civil action with 
     respect to prison conditions, no prisoner release order shall 
     be entered unless--
       ``(i) a court has previously entered an order for less 
     intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of 
     the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner 
     release order; and
       ``(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to 
     comply with the previous court orders.
       ``(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to 
     prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered 
     only by a three-judge court in accordance with section 2284 
     of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E) have 
     been met.
       ``(C) A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal 
     court shall file with any request for such relief, a request 
     for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to 
     demonstrate that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have 
     been met.
       ``(D) If the requirements under subparagraph (A) have been 
     met, a Federal judge before whom a civil action with respect 
     to prison conditions is pending who believes that a prison 
     release order should be considered may sua sponte request the 
     convening of a three-judge court to determine whether a 
     prisoner release order should be entered.
       ``(E) The court shall enter a prisoner release order only 
     if the court finds--
       ``(i) by clear and convincing evidence--
       ``(I) that crowding is the primary cause of the violation 
     of a Federal right; and
       ``(II) that no other relief will remedy the violation of 
     the Federal right; and
       ``(ii) by a preponderance of the evidence--
       ``(I) that crowding has deprived a particular plaintiff or 
     plaintiffs of at least one essential, identifiable human 
     need; and
       ``(II) that prison officials have acted with obduracy and 
     wantonness in depriving a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs 
     of at least one essential, identifiable human need.
       ``(F) Any State or local official or unit of government 
     whose jurisdiction or function includes the prosecution or 
     custody of persons who may be released from, or not admitted 
     to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order shall 
     have standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in 
     effect of such relief, and shall have the right to intervene 
     in any proceeding relating to such relief.
       ``(b) Termination of Relief.--
       ``(1) Termination of prospective relief.--(A) In any civil 
     action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective 
     relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the 
     motion of any party--
       ``(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved 
     the prospective relief;
       ``(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order 
     denying termination of prospective relief under this 
     paragraph; or

[[Page S 14318]]

       ``(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the 
     date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 2 
     years after such date of enactment.
       ``(B) Nothing in this section shall prevent the parties 
     from agreeing to terminate or modify relief before the relief 
     is terminated under subparagraph (A).
       ``(2) Immediate termination of prospective relief.--In any 
     civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant 
     or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termination 
     of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or 
     granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the 
     relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary 
     to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 
     least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation.
       ``(3) Limitation.--Prospective relief shall not terminate 
     if the court makes written findings based on the record that 
     prospective relief remains necessary to correct the violation 
     of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to 
     correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the 
     prospective relief is the least intrusive means to correct 
     the violation.
       ``(4) Termination or modification.--Nothing in this section 
     shall prevent any party from seeking modification or 
     termination before the relief is terminable under paragraph 
     (1) or (2), to the extent that modification or termination 
     would otherwise be legally permissible.
       ``(c) Settlements.--
       ``(1) Consent decrees.--In any civil action with respect to 
     prison conditions, the court shall not enter or approve a 
     consent decree unless it complies with the limitations on 
     relief set forth in subsection (a).
       ``(2) Private settlement agreements.--(A) Nothing in this 
     section shall preclude parties from entering into a private 
     settlement agreement that does not comply with the 
     limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a), if the 
     terms of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement 
     other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the 
     agreement settled.
       ``(B) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party 
     claiming that a private settlement agreement has been 
     breached from seeking in State court any remedy for breach of 
     contract available under State law.
       ``(d) State Law Remedies.--The limitations on remedies in 
     this section shall not apply to relief entered by a State 
     court based solely upon claims arising under State law.
       ``(e) Procedure for Motions Affecting Prospective Relief.--
       ``(1) Generally.--The court shall promptly rule on any 
     motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil 
     action with respect to prison conditions.
       ``(2) Automatic stay.--Any prospective relief subject to a 
     pending motion shall be automatically stayed during the 
     period--
       ``(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is 
     filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or 
     (2) of subsection (b); or
       ``(ii) beginning on the 180th day after such motion is 
     filed, in the case of a motion made under subsection (b)(3); 
     and
       ``(B) ending on the date the court enters a final order 
     ruling on the motion.
       ``(f) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       ``(1) the term `consent decree' means any relief entered by 
     the court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent 
     or acquiescence of the parties;
       ``(2) the term `civil action with respect to prison 
     conditions' means any civil proceeding arising under Federal 
     law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the 
     effects of actions by government officials on the lives of 
     persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas 
     corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of 
     confinement in prison;
       ``(3) the term `prisoner' means any person incarcerated or 
     detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, 
     sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 
     criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, 
     probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program;
       ``(4) the term `prisoner release order' includes any order, 
     including a temporary restraining order or preliminary 
     injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing 
     or limiting the prison population, or that directs the 
     release from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison;
       ``(5) the term `prison' means any Federal, State, or local 
     facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults 
     accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 
     delinquent for, violations of criminal law;
       ``(6) the term `prospective relief' means all relief other 
     than monetary damages; and
       ``(7) the term `relief' means all relief in any form that 
     may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent 
     decrees and settlement agreements (except a settlement 
     agreement the breach of which is not subject to any court 
     enforcement other than reinstatement of the civil proceeding 
     that such agreement settled).''.
       (b) Application of Amendment.--
       (1) In general.--Section 3626 of title 18, United States 
     Code, as amended by this section, shall apply with respect to 
     all relief (as defined in such section) whether such relief 
     was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Technical amendment.--Subsections (b) and (d) of 
     section 20409 of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
     Enforcement Act of 1994 are repealed.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter C of chapter 229 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:

``3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions.''.

     SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED 
                   PERSONS ACT.

       Section 7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsections:
       ``(f) Attorney's Fees.--(1) In any action brought by a 
     prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other 
     correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are 
     authorized under section 2 of the Revised Statutes of the 
     United States (42 U.S.C. 1988), such fees shall be awarded 
     only if--
       ``(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
     proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights 
     protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded 
     under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and
       ``(B) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to 
     the court ordered relief for the violation.
       ``(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action 
     described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to 
     exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of 
     attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award 
     of attorney's fees is greater than 25 percent of the 
     judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
       ``(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in 
     paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 
     the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18, 
     United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel.
       ``(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner 
     from entering into an agreement to pay an attorney's fee in 
     an amount greater than the amount authorized under this 
     subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than 
     by the defendant pursuant to section 2 of the Revised 
     Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1988).
       ``(g) Telephone Hearings.--To the extent practicable, in 
     any action brought in Federal court pursuant to section 1979 
     of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) 
     by a prisoner crime confined in any jail, prison, or other 
     correctional facility, pretrial proceedings in which the 
     prisoner's participation is required or permitted shall be 
     conducted by telephone without removing the prisoner from the 
     facility in which the prisoner is confined. Any State may 
     adopt a similar requirement regarding hearings in such 
     actions in that State's courts.
       ``(h) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any 
     facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 
     adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 
     terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, 
     or diversionary program.''.

     SEC. 4. SUCCESSIVE CLAIMS IN PROCEEDINGS IN FORMA PAUPERIS.

       Section 1915 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f)(1) In no event shall a prisoner in any prison bring a 
     civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or 
     proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
     more prior occasions, brought an action or appeal in a court 
     of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that 
     it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 
     which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 
     imminent danger of serious bodily harm.
       ``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `prisoner' means 
     any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is 
     accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 
     delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and 
     conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 
     diversionary program.''.

                          ____________________