[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 151 (Tuesday, September 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14308-S14309]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          U.S.-SINO RELATIONS

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, last Friday I had the opportunity to speak 
before the Washington chapter of the Asia Society on the subject of 
U.S.-Sino relations. I would like to share that speech with my 
colleagues, and ask unanimous consent that the text be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                       Towards a New China Policy

       I'm very pleased to be here this morning to inaugurate the 
     Asia Society's new forum series featuring members of Congress 
     with responsibility for Asian policy issues. I'm also pleased 
     to see Ambassador Nathan of Singapore, the new Sri Lankan 
     ambassador, and Minister Zhang Keyuan from the Chinese 
     embassy are here with us today.
       The Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which I chair, has 
     jurisdiction over Asia from Burma and Mongolia east to the 
     shores of California. As you are all well aware, this area is 
     probably the most dynamic in the world right now. With China, 
     Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Vietnam, it is the 
     economic engine that will drive the world economy into the 
     21st Century and beyond.
       Among all these established and developing economies, with 
     1.2 billion people, a GDP equivalent around $2.73 trillion, a 
     national product real growth rate last year of 13.4 percent, 
     it is clear that the chief economic and political ``tiger'' 
     that will dominate Asia in the years to come is the People's 
     Republic of China. As such, the dynamics of our bilateral 
     relationship will become even more important--both for us and 
     the other countries in the region--in the years ahead. The 
     U.S.-Sino relationship is a major focus of the work of the 
     subcommittee. Of the six substantive hearings the 
     subcommittee has held this year, four have concerned the PRC; 
     we are planning at least three more before the close of the 
     year. It is that relationship which I have been asked to 
     address this morning.
       It will come as no surprise to those of you here this 
     morning that the US-Sino relationship is not presently at its 
     best. Since the administration's decision to admit Taiwan's 
     President Lee for a private visit, we have seen the most 
     serious deterioration of relations since the Tiananmen 
     Massacre. I won't engage in a step-by-step analysis of each 
     of the incidents which have afflicted our relationship in the 
     past year for two main reasons. First, I believe that you are 
     all intimately familiar with them and their recitation would 
     be redundant. More importantly, 

[[Page S 14309]]
     however, I believe that the problem is much more fundamental than those 
     issues.
       The core problem in U.S.-Sino relations is that we lack a 
     coherent and clearly articulated foreign policy. 
     Unfortunately, the phrase ``Clinton foreign policy'' is an 
     oxymoron. Instead, of having clear proactive policy goals, 
     and making them and our strong commitment to them known to 
     the countries concerned, this administration drifts from 
     reaction to reaction. The pitfalls of this kind of reactive 
     policy are clearly apparent in what's been going on in 
     Bosnia; and they are clearly apparent in our relationship 
     with the PRC.
       In my view, for there to be a viable foreign policy 
     between, say, country A and country B, you should be able to 
     ask officials from A what its policy towards B is, ask B what 
     A's policy towards B is, and get pretty close to the same 
     answer from each. According to the Chinese, however, our 
     policy towards them is one of containment. According to our 
     State Department, it is one of ``constructive engagement.'' 
     You can see the problem here--there is a very large 
     conceptual gap between these two.
       ``Constructive engagement'' seems to me, and others I have 
     spoken with, to be a bit vague. The administration describes 
     it this way. Say there are 1,000 different individual issue 
     strands that make up our over-all bilateral relationship. On 
     some of the issues we're in complete agreement, others in 
     partial agreement, and others in complete disagreement. So, 
     we'll work on those areas where we might expect some 
     progress, and not press those where we conflict. The 
     administration calls this a policy. In my view, though, this 
     is no policy at all, but 1,000 separate conflicting little 
     policies. From what I hear from the Chinese, both officially 
     and unofficially, they find it rather confusing as well.
       This confusion is made worse by the domestic climate in 
     each respective country. First, in the United States, there 
     are the complications caused by the fact that nature, and the 
     Congress, abhor a vacuum. When Congress perceives a lack of 
     leadership on the foreign policy stage, it has traditionally 
     been quick to step in and supply its own. This often leads to 
     conflicting policies between the two branches and sends 
     confusing signals abroad. A clear example is the visit of 
     President Lee. The administration stated categorically that 
     it would not issue a visa for Lee to pay a private visit to 
     the United States. Both houses of Congress, on the other 
     hand, made clear by overwhelming votes that he should be 
     admitted.
       In the P.R.C., the ongoing jockeying for power in the soon-
     to-be-post-Deng-Xiaoping era has also accentuated the 
     problems in the bilateral relationship. In times of political 
     flux in China, one of the tried and true ways of establishing 
     one's conservative communist bona fides is to be stridently 
     xenophobic. To be seen as coddling the United States, or 
     giving in to its ``demands,'' can thus be the functional 
     equivalent of political suicide. As a result, during periods 
     of transition such as this Chinese reaction to incidents it 
     considers provocations is often overblown for domestic 
     consumption. I hate to keep coming back to Taiwan as an 
     example, but I strongly believe the PRC's overreaction to our 
     admitting President Lee--for an unofficial visit well within 
     the parameters of the three joint communiques--is a direct 
     result of its leadership courting the political support of 
     the conservatives in the PLA.
       So, ladies and gentlemen, given all these problems I 
     believe that the time has come to reevaluate and restructure 
     our China policy, and that reevaluation needs to start with 
     the very core premise upon which it is built. I'm sure if 
     you've ever listened to administration or PRC officials, read 
     the Congressional Record or the People's Daily, or spoken 
     with a variety of public policy figures, you have heard the 
     oft-repeated statement that our two countries need to be good 
     friends, or need to return to being good friends, or 
     shouldn't let present frictions stand in the way of what 
     should be our close friendship.
       I would love for the U.S. to be close friends with China, 
     but expecting us to be close friends at this point in history 
     overlooks a fundamental problem: the PRC is a totalitarian 
     state, a communist dictatorship; the United States is a 
     democracy. Almost by definition, a close friendship between 
     two such diametrically opposed systems is impossible. 
     Friendships are based on shared aspirations, shared goals, 
     shared dreams; but our most fundamental views of politics and 
     human freedoms are poles apart. This is not a pessimistic 
     view, or the view based on some anti-China bias, or a 
     Republican view, or a conservative view; it is a reality. The 
     Chinese are rightly fond of their proverbs, and I would 
     invoke one here to illustrate my point: ``Hu lu bu tong 
     xong''--``Tigers and deer do not walk together.'' To delude 
     ourselves into thinking that as countries we will be anything 
     near close friends is just that, a delusion.
       I think both we and the Chinese government have to 
     recognize that there are certain fundamental issues upon 
     which, under our present political systems, we will never 
     agree and which realistically preclude the kind of 
     relationship we have with other countries in the region such 
     as Japan. Having said that, however, I would note it does not 
     mean that we can't establish a constructive working 
     relationship with them based on areas where we have shared 
     interests. I think that it's the difference between the 
     friendship among close personal friends and a friendship 
     based on, say, a business relationship. For example, it's the 
     difference between my friendship with fellow Wyoming Senator 
     Al Simpson and my friendship with Chinese Ambassador Li 
     Daoyu. I grew up in Wyoming with Al, went to the same high 
     school; the two of us have shared experiences and ideals that 
     have made us the best of friends. Ambassador Li and I have a 
     different friendship. I enjoy our meetings, I find our 
     contacts helpful and informative, but our friendship is 
     primarily business-based; there is not that closeness, nor 
     would we either of us expect that there would be.
       What our two countries need to do, then, is start over from 
     that point, and work to reshape the very nature of our 
     bilateral relationship. We need to build that relationship 
     around a core of mutual respect and our shared goals. We need 
     to state what the parameters of the policy are, and then we 
     need to stick to them. In that way there are no surprises, no 
     unmet expectations, no confusion on either side.
       The most obvious area where we share interests is in the 
     economic sphere. It is a symbiotic relationship; we have the 
     technological know-how and the products, they have the desire 
     to expand their economy and the almost unlimited market. This 
     is probably our most stable and dependable commonality, 
     problems with the rule of law and intellectual property 
     rights aside. This stability is illustrated by the fact that 
     during the recent downturn in our relationship, our economic 
     ties remain relatively unscathed. Consequently, trade would 
     probably be a good place to start to restructure the basis of 
     the relationship. Secondly, we both have a general interest 
     in maintaining a stable Asia. Instability endangers markets, 
     endangers both our national security interests, and alienates 
     and endangers our relationships with other countries in the 
     region. This provides another base from which to build.
       There will continue to be areas of real disagreement 
     between us. But I believe that by mutually redefining our 
     relationship (and I do not mean here, for the benefit of the 
     Chinese government, in any way redefining our commitment to 
     the three communiques or the ``one China'' policy) we can 
     perhaps minimize the effect those disagreements have on our 
     bilateral relationship. I think that by being a bit more 
     realistic about what kind of friendship we can have, we will 
     somewhat lower our mutual expectations. When expectations in 
     a relationship are lowered, blows to that relationship tend 
     to have less of a disruptive impact.
       Let me note in closing that I am not an Asia expert. Many 
     of you in this room this morning have been pursuing Asian 
     affairs for decades. I do not pretend to know all the nuances 
     and eddies and currents of this part of the world. But let me 
     quote once again a Chinese proverb: ``Dang ju zhe mi, pang 
     guan zhe qing''-- ``Observers can see a chess game more 
     clearly than the players.'' Perhaps it is time for a fresh 
     approach.

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