[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 151 (Tuesday, September 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14271-S14272]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          CONSULTING CONGRESS

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, yesterday, together with some of my 
colleagues, I sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to consult 
with the Congress on the nature of the commitments his administration 
has made to our NATO allies and the Bosnians with respect to United 
States involvement in a potential peace enforcement operation in 
Bosnia. The letter included a number of specific questions about such 
an operation and the wisdom of the administration's present approach.
  Much to my surprise, administration spokesmen protested this letter 
claiming that there have been numerous consultations on this matter.
  Despite White House claims, the fact is that the Clinton 
administration has not consulted the Congress on sending United States 
ground forces to Bosnia since 1993--when consultations were held on 
possible enforcement of the Vance-Owen plan.
  What was Congress' reaction then? As part of the fiscal year 1994 
Defense Appropriations bill we passed an amendment, 99 to 1. The 
Mitchell-Dole amendment--which reads as follows, and I quote:

       It is the sense of the Congress that none of the funds 
     appropriated or otherwise made available by this act should 
     be available for the purposes of deploying United States 
     Armed Forces to participate in the implementation of a peace 
     settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, unless previously 
     authorized by the Congress.

  A subsequent provision addressed consultation on U.S. participation 
in any peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and opposed it 
unless, and I quote:

       The President initiates consultations with the bipartisan 
     leadership of Congress...

  This was followed by directions for such consultation, including 
discussion of the goals of the operation, U.S. interests, the costs, 
funding strategy, extent of U.S. involvement, and the expected duration 
and scope of the operation.
  Well, it is more than 2 years later--more than 2 years later--and a 
great deal has changed. The situation on the ground is not what it was 
and the peace settlement being negotiated is also not what it was. 
While we are aware that the administration continues to repeat its 
commitment to send U.S. troops to participate in a settlement force, we 
in the Congress do not know what that means in concrete terms. And we 
believe we have a right to know.
  About 2\1/2\ weeks ago, the administration sent a high level team, 
led by Deputy Secretary of Defense White, to brief Senators on the NATO 
air campaign. At that time, questions were raised about administration 
plans to participate in a peace enforcement operation. Unfortunately, 
these officials did not answer any of these questions, claiming that 
the planning process was not finished.
  Mr. President, the point of consultations is to have input before 
there is a finished plan, before the Congress is handed a fait 
accompli. We do not want to be told after the fact that is a briefing, 
not a consultation. And we have had plenty of those where we are 
informed. We are not consulted; we are told. Lists of administration 
briefings and returned phone calls don't add up to consultation.

  Today administration officials and members of the contact group 
concluded a second round of negotiations with the Bosnian, Croatian, 
and Serbian Foreign Ministers on principles for a peace settlement. 
There is little doubt in my mind that whether the Bosnian Government 
continues participating in these talks and finally agrees to sign a 
settlement will depend significantly on whether or not the United 
States sends troops to enforce it.
  Let us face it, the so-called agreed principles are vague, except in 
that they partition Bosnia into two entities. As such, the Bosnians are 
bound to rely on United States guarantees where there are differences 
with the Serbs, which are inevitable on matters of Bosnia's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Because the administration and allied 
approach has left the Bosnians without the means to secure their own 
peace, they will depend on those troops sent to enforce a settlement to 
defend their sovereignty.
  Mr. President, we are still waiting to hear the administration's plan 
on lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, a question that remains relevant 
now, as well as central to any exit strategy for American forces. I 
cannot conceive of supporting a plan that sends United States troops 
into Bosnia, while leaving the Bosnians unable to defend against future 
aggression.
  We must know what the administration is telling the Bosnians, the 
Serbs, and our NATO allies, what promises and what threats, are being 
made. We also need to know what commitments are being made to the 
Russians with respect to their participation. In particular what is the 
administration response to Russian demands to share command with NATO 
in an enforcement operation? Will U.S. forces be under unified NATO 
command at all times?
  The bottom line is that U.S. credibility depends on the United States 
keeping its word, meaning what it says. NATO credibility is also on the 
line. Why has there been no response to Bosnian Serb violations of the 
NATO no-fly zone reported today and last week?
  No doubt about it, there is a lot at stake here--United States and 
NATO credibility, as well as the future of Bosnia.

[[Page S 14272]]

  It cannot escape the administration that the Congress has repudiated 
its approach toward Bosnia for the past 2 years. An overwhelming 
bipartisan majority has opposed the arms embargo, and Congress has 
voiced concerns with respect to peace plans that would destroy the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, to 
operate under the assumption that Congress will approve administration 
plans to send thousands of Americans in harm's way to enforce a 
settlement is a major error. The fact is that the Clinton 
administration may be making promises it cannot or should not keep.
  Therefore, I am writing today to the chairmen of the Appropriations, 
Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees to request that they 
hold extensive hearings on this critical issue. I will request that the 
questions asked in the letter to President Clinton form the basis of 
their examination of this matter.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the letter we sent to the 
President today be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                              Office of the Republican Leader,

                               Washington, DC, September 25, 1995.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: It is our understanding that your 
     administration, together with our NATO allies, is completing 
     plans to enforce a potential settlement in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina--a settlement not yet finalized. Much to our 
     dismay, what we have learned about possible U.S. troop 
     obligations has been largely from press reports. To date, 
     your administration has failed to consult with the Congress 
     on the nature and extent of commitments made to our NATO 
     allies and the Bosnian government regarding U.S. 
     participation in a force to implement a settlement. We are 
     especially concerned since those forces must consist 
     primarily of ground troops. There should be no doubts that 
     without the concurrence of the Congress these commitments 
     will not be fulfilled.
       In our view, your administration must answer the following 
     questions as soon as possible in order that the Senate may 
     begin to fulfill its responsibility to carefully evaluate 
     this matter:
       (1) What specific commitments regarding U.S. troop 
     participation have been made by your administration to our 
     NATO allies?
       (2) What specific commitments regarding U.S. troop 
     participation have been made by your administration to the 
     Bosnian government?
       (3) What is the range of total NATO ground force levels, 
     related to enforcement of a Bosnian peace settlement, being 
     considered in the administration and at NATO headquarters? 
     What would the U.S. contribution of forces be? What is the 
     estimate of the number of reservists that would need to be 
     called up? What is the estimated impact of such a deployment 
     on readiness?
       (4) Would this be a NATO-only operation or would Russian 
     troops and/or other troops, from Islamic countries for 
     example, also be a part of that total force enforcing a 
     settlement?
       (5) Would NATO be in complete command of all forces 
     involved in an enforcement operation? Or would Russian forces 
     an non-NATO forces be under different command arrangements? 
     If so, how would these varied command arrangements be 
     ultimately integrated in order to achieve unity of command? 
     Is there to be another dual- key command?
       (6) When would NATO forces be deployed--immediately after 
     an agreement is signed or after Bosnian government and 
     Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to lines of demarcation? What if 
     the fighting does not stop after an agreement is signed?
       (7) Is there a time table for UNPROFOR withdrawal? Would 
     some of these U.N. units, from NATO contributing countries, 
     remain as part of the new force?
       (8) When would the ``dual key'' be eliminated? Would there 
     be any other U.N. input into the command arrangements?
       (9) What would the rules of engagement for NATO forces be?
       (10) Where would NATO troops be deployed? In Bosnian Serb 
     controlled territory?
       (11) Would Bosnian government forces be supplied with 
     additional arms during this enforcement period so that Bosnia 
     can better defend itself against aggression after NATO forces 
     leave? If so, what types of weapons would be provided and by 
     whom? Has a commitment to provide military assistance--to 
     include arms and/or training--to the Bosnian government in a 
     post-settlement period been made by Assistant Secretary 
     Holbrooke, or any other administration officials to Bosnian 
     government officials?
       (12) How long would NATO troops be deployed? What is the 
     exit strategy?
       (13) What are the estimated costs of such a NATO 
     deployment? What would the U.S. share be and how does the 
     administration plan to pay for it?
       Mr. President, these are not the only questions that will 
     need to be answered, but they are essential to any 
     Congressional debate and consideration of commitments made by 
     you and your administration with respect to U.S. troops 
     participating in an enforcement operation.
       Thre are also matters of principle that will have to be 
     carefully considered. First and foremost is a very 
     fundamental question--whether United States forces should be 
     deployed to partition a sovereign and independent country 
     into two entities. Our men and women in the military have 
     protected our freedom and our interests and defended our 
     principles. Do we want to place our soldiers in harms' way to 
     defend the compromise of our principles? We must also ask 
     whether or not any settlement reached has been agreed to 
     freely by the Bosnian government and without coercion. We are 
     concerned about news reports that senior administration 
     officials gained Bosnian government agreement on the first 
     set of ``Agreed Principles'' by threatening a halt in NATO 
     bombing. Finally, we must ask whether it would not be more 
     just and more wise to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, and allow the Bosnians to fight until there is a 
     stable military balance--the precondition for any settlement 
     which would not require the deployment of thousands of 
     American and NATO troops to police it.
       Mr. President, we have serious concerns about the 
     commitments you and your administration reportedly have made 
     with respect to U.S. participation--to include thousands of 
     ground forces--in enforcing a possible Bosnian peace 
     settlement. We hope that you will begin to consult earnestly 
     and forthrightly with the Congress in the very near future.
           Sincerely,
     Robert Dole,
     John W. Warner,
     Thad Cochran,
     Bob Smith,
     Jesse Helms,
     Arlen Specter,
     James M. Inhofe,
     Dirk Kempthorne,
     Jon Kyl,
     Kay Bailey Hutchison.
  Mr. DOLE. I reserve the balance of my leader's time.

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