[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 148 (Thursday, September 21, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H9368-H9399]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT OF 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayworth). Pursuant to House Resolution 
225 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration 
of the bill, H.R. 927.

                             {time}   1024


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 927) to seek international sanctions against the Castro 
government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government 
leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Duncan in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, 
September 20, 1995, all time for general debate had expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
consisting of the text of H.R. 2347 is considered as an original bill 
for the purpose of amendment and is considered read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Cuban 
     Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:


[[Page H 9369]]

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Purposes.
Sec. 4. Definitions.

        TITLE I--SEEKING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
Sec. 102. Enforcement of the economic embargo of Cuba.
Sec. 103. Prohibition against indirect financing of the Castro 
              dictatorship.
Sec. 104. United States opposition to Cuban membership in international 
              financial institutions.
Sec. 105. United States opposition to ending the suspension of the 
              Government of Cuba from the Organization of American 
              States.
Sec. 106. Assistance by the Independent States of the former Soviet 
              Union for the Cuban Government.
Sec. 107. Television broadcasting to Cuba.
Sec. 108. Reports on assistance and commerce received by Cuba from 
              other foreign countries.
Sec. 109. Authorization of support for democratic and human rights 
              groups and international observers.
Sec. 110. Withholding of foreign assistance from countries supporting 
              nuclear plant in Cuba.
Sec. 111. Expulsion of criminals from Cuba.

          TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

Sec. 201. Policy toward a transition government and a democratically 
              elected government in Cuba.
Sec. 202. Assistance for the Cuban people.
Sec. 203. Coordination of assistance program; implementation and 
              reports to Congress; reprogramming.
Sec. 204. Termination of the economic embargo of Cuba.
Sec. 205. Requirements for a transition government.
Sec. 206. Requirements for a democratically elected government.

  TITLE III--PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS 
           AGAINST CONFISCATORY TAKINGS BY THE CASTRO REGIME

Sec. 301. Statement of policy.
Sec. 302. Liability for trafficking in property confiscated from United 
              States nationals.
Sec. 303. Determination of claims to confiscated property.
Sec. 304. Exclusivity of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 
              certification procedure.

                 TITLE IV--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

Sec. 401. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who have 
              confiscated property of United States nationals or who 
              traffic in such property.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at 
     least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a result of--
       (A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union 
     of between 5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually;
       (B) 36 years of Communist tyranny and economic 
     mismanagement by the Castro government;
       (C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and the 
     countries of the former Soviet bloc; and
       (D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and the 
     countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic 
     relations with Cuba on strictly commercial terms.
       (2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban 
     people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this 
     economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to 
     permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.
       (3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it 
     will not engage in any substantive political reforms that 
     would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic 
     recovery.
       (4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on 
     free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations 
     of fundamental human rights have isolated the Cuban regime as 
     the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western 
     Hemisphere.
       (5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the 
     economic condition of the country and the welfare of the 
     Cuban people will not improve in any significant way.
       (6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has 
     deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve 
     their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to 
     risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from 
     Cuba to freedom.
       (7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been 
     effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news 
     and information and have helped to bolster the morale of the 
     people of Cuba living under tyranny.
       (8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba 
     since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both 
     Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep 
     faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in 
     sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.
       (9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and 
     considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human 
     rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter 
     of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of 
     Human Rights.
       (10) The Congress has historically and consistently 
     manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American 
     people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.
       (11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the 
     President to encourage the governments of countries that 
     conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit 
     relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes 
     of that Act.
       (12) The 1992 FREEDOM Support Act requires that the 
     President, in providing economic assistance to Russia and the 
     emerging Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent 
     to which they are acting to ``terminate support for the 
     communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, 
     closing military facilities, and ceasing trade subsidies and 
     economic, nuclear, and other assistance''.
       (13) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal 
     international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from 
     justice in the United States.
       (14) The Castro government threatens international peace 
     and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and 
     terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups 
     dedicated to international violence.
       (15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception 
     and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including 
     by psychiatry), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, 
     political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and 
     repression, as means of retaining power.
       (16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as 
     ``pluralistic garbage'' and continues to make clear that he 
     has no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban 
     society.
       (17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage in 
     Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because 
     relatives have escaped the country.
       (18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American 
     Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil 
     and Political Rights (which protects the right to leave one's 
     own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds embassies in its 
     capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens 
     to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the 
     Cuban people, punishing them by imprisonment for seeking to 
     leave the country and killing them for attempting to do so 
     (as demonstrated in the case of the confirmed murder of over 
     40 men, women, and children who were seeking to leave Cuba on 
     July 13, 1994).
       (19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail, 
     such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the 
     United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable 
     and illegal forms of conduct to influence the actions of 
     sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of 
     the Charter of the Organization of American States and other 
     international agreements and international law.
       (20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has 
     repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights 
     situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step of 
     appointing a Special Rapporteur.
       (21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access 
     to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its decision 
     not to ``implement so much as one comma'' of the United 
     Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur.
       (22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 
     1992/70 on December 4, 1992, Resolution 1993/48/142 on 
     December 20, 1993, and Resolution 1994/49/544 on October 19, 
     1994, referencing the Special Rapporteur's reports to the 
     United Nations and condemning ``violations of human rights 
     and fundamental freedoms'' in Cuba.
       (23) Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
     Charter provides that the United Nations Security Council 
     ``shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
     breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
     recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . 
     ., to maintain or restore international peace and 
     security.''.
       (24) The United Nations has determined that massive and 
     systematic violations of human rights may constitute a 
     ``threat to peace'' under Article 39 and has imposed 
     sanctions due to such violations of human rights in the cases 
     of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.
       (25) In the case of Haiti, a neighbor of Cuba not as close 
     to the United States as Cuba, the United States led an effort 
     to obtain and did obtain a United Nations Security Council 
     embargo and blockade against that country due to the 
     existence of a military dictatorship in power less than 3 
     years.
       (26) United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 
     31, 1994, subsequently authorized the use of ``all necessary 
     means'' to restore the ``democratically elected government of 
     Haiti'', and the democratically elected government of Haiti 
     was restored to power on October 15, 1994.
       (27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive 
     manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 
     years and the continued failure to do so constitutes 
     ethically improper conduct by the international community.
       (28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed 
     and continues to pose a 

[[Page H 9370]]
     national security threat to the United States.

     SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are as follows:
       (1) To assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom 
     and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of 
     democracies that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere.
       (2) To seek international sanctions against the Castro 
     government in Cuba.
       (3) To encourage the holding of free and fair democratic 
     elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of 
     internationally recognized observers.
       (4) To develop a plan for furnishing assistance to a 
     transition government and, subsequently, to a democratically 
     elected government when such governments meet the eligibility 
     requirements of this Act.
       (5) To protect property rights abroad of United States 
     nationals.
       (6) To provide for the continued national security of the 
     United States in the face of continuing threats from the 
     Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from United 
     States nationals, and domestic repression from which refugees 
     flee to United States shores.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act, the following terms have the following 
     meanings:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on International Relations, the Committee on Ways and Means, 
     and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
     Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate.
       (2) Commercial activity.--The term ``commercial activity'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 1603(d) of title 
     28, United States Code.
       (3) Confiscated.--As used in titles I and III, the term 
     ``confiscated'' refers to--
       (A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by 
     the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property, on 
     or after January 1, 1959--
       (i) without the property having been returned or adequate 
     and effective compensation provided; or
       (ii) without the claim to the property having been settled 
     pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or 
     other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and
       (B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default 
     by the Cuban Government on, or the failure by the Cuban 
     Government to pay, on or after January 1, 1959--
       (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government;
       (ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; or
       (iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban Government in 
     satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated property claim.
       (4) Cuban government.--(A) The term ``Cuban Government'' 
     includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, 
     and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.
       (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba'' means an agency 
     or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 
     1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with ``Cuba'' 
     substituted for ``a foreign state'' each place it appears in 
     such section.
       (5) Democratically elected government in cuba.--The term 
     ``democratically elected government in Cuba'' means a 
     government determined by the President to have met the 
     requirements of section 206.
       (6) Economic embargo of cuba.--The term ``economic embargo 
     of Cuba'' refers to the economic embargo imposed against Cuba 
     pursuant to section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)), section 5(b) of the Trading With 
     the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)), the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 and following), 
     and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2401 and following), as modified by the Cuban Democracy Act 
     of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6001 and following).
       (7) Foreign national.--The term ``foreign national'' 
     means--
       (A) an alien; or
       (B) any corporation, trust, partnership, or other juridical 
     entity not organized under the laws of the United States, or 
     of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico, or any other territory or possession of the 
     United States.
       (8) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' means with knowledge 
     or having reason to know.
       (9) Property.--(A) The term ``property'' means any property 
     (including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other 
     form of intellectual property), whether real, personal, or 
     mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, 
     security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold 
     interest.
       (B) For purposes of title III of this Act, the term 
     ``property'' shall not include real property used for 
     residential purposes unless, as of the date of the enactment 
     of this Act--
       (i) the claim to the property is owned by a United States 
     national and the claim has been certified under title V of 
     the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949; or
       (ii) the property is occupied by a member or official of 
     the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.
       (10) Traffics.--(A) As used in title III, a person or 
     entity ``traffics'' in property if that person or entity 
     knowingly and intentionally--
       (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, 
     manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or 
     purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, 
     manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in 
     confiscated property,
       (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise 
     benefiting from confiscated property, or
       (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, 
     trafficking (as described in clauses (i) and (ii)) by another 
     person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in 
     clauses (i) and (ii)) through another person,
     without the authorization of the United States national who 
     holds a claim to the property.
       (B) The term ``traffics'' does not include--
       (i) the delivery of international telecommunication signals 
     to Cuba that are authorized by section 1705(e) of the Cuban 
     Democracy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004(e)); or
       (ii) the trading or holding of securities publicly traded 
     or held, unless the trading is with or by a person determined 
     by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a specially designated 
     national.
       (11) Transition government in cuba.--The term ``transition 
     government in Cuba'' means a government determined by the 
     President to have met the requirements of section 205.
       (12) United states national.--The term ``United States 
     national'' means--
       (A) any United States citizen; or
       (B) any other legal entity which is organized under the 
     laws of the United States, or of any State, the District of 
     Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other 
     territory or possession of the United States, and which has 
     its principal place of business in the United States.
        TITLE I--SEEKING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

     SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the acts of the Castro government, including its 
     massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of human 
     rights, are a threat to international peace;
       (2) the President should advocate, and should instruct the 
     United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
     to propose and seek, within the Security Council, a mandatory 
     international embargo against the totalitarian Cuban 
     Government pursuant to chapter VII of the Charter of the 
     United Nations, which is similar to measures taken by United 
     States representatives with respect to Haiti; and
       (3) any resumption or commencement of efforts by any state 
     to make operational the nuclear facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba, 
     will have a detrimental impact on United States assistance to 
     and relations with that state.

     SEC. 102. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.

       (a) Policy.--(1) The Congress hereby reaffirms section 
     1704(a) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 that states the 
     President should encourage foreign countries to restrict 
     trade and credit relations with Cuba.
       (2) The Congress further urges the President to take 
     immediate steps to apply the sanctions described in section 
     1704(b) of that Act against countries assisting Cuba.
       (b) Diplomatic Efforts.--The Secretary of State shall 
     ensure that United States diplomatic personnel abroad 
     understand and, in their contacts with foreign officials, are 
     communicating the reasons for the United States economic 
     embargo of Cuba, and are urging foreign governments to 
     cooperate more effectively with the embargo.
       (c) Existing Regulations.--The President should instruct 
     the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to 
     enforce fully the Cuban Assets Control Regulations set forth 
     in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (d) Trading With the Enemy Act.--
       (1) Civil penalties.--Subsection (b) of section 16 of the 
     Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 16(b)) is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(b)(1) A civil penalty of not to exceed $50,000 may be 
     imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury on any person who 
     violates any license, order, rule, or regulation issued in 
     compliance with the provisions of this Act.
       ``(2) Any property, funds, securities, papers, or other 
     articles or documents, or any vessel, together with its 
     tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, that is the 
     subject of a violation under paragraph (1) shall, at the 
     discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, be forfeited to 
     the United States Government.
       ``(3) The penalties provided under this subsection may not 
     be imposed for--
       ``(A) news gathering, research, or the export or import of, 
     or transmission of, information or informational materials; 
     or
       ``(B) clearly defined educational or religious activities, 
     or activities of recognized human rights organizations, that 
     are reasonably limited in frequency, duration, and number of 
     participants.
       ``(4) The penalties provided under this subsection may be 
     imposed only on the record after opportunity for an agency 
     hearing in accordance with sections 554 through 557 of title 
     5, United States Code, with the right to prehearing 
     discovery.
       ``(5) Judicial review of any penalty imposed under this 
     subsection may be had to the extent provided in section 702 
     of title 5, United States Code.''.

[[Page H 9371]]

       (2) Forfeiture of property used in violation.--Section 16 
     of the Trading With the Enemy Act is further amended by 
     striking subsection (c).
       (3) Clerical amendment.--Section 16 of the Trading With the 
     Enemy Act is further amended by inserting ``Sec. 16.'' before 
     ``(a)''.
       (e) Coverage of Debt-for-Equity Swaps by Economic Embargo 
     of Cuba.--Section 1704(b)(2) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 
     1992 (22 U.S.C. 6003(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A);
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(B) includes an exchange, reduction, or forgiveness of 
     Cuban debt owed to a foreign country in return for a grant of 
     an equity interest in a property, investment, or operation of 
     the Government of Cuba (including the government of any 
     political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba) or of a Cuban 
     national; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following flush sentence:

     ``As used in this paragraph, the term `agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba' means an agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 
     1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with `Cuba' 
     substituted for `a foreign state' each place it appears in 
     such section.''.

     SEC. 103. PROHIBITION AGAINST INDIRECT FINANCING OF THE 
                   CASTRO DICTATORSHIP.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, no loan, credit, or other financing may be extended 
     knowingly by a United States national, permanent resident 
     alien, or United States agency, to a foreign national, United 
     States national, or permanent resident alien, in order to 
     finance transactions involving any confiscated property the 
     claim to which is owned by a United States national as of the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Termination of Prohibition.--The prohibition of 
     subsection (a) shall cease to apply on the date on which the 
     economic embargo of Cuba terminates under section 205.
       (c) Penalties.--Violations of subsection (a) shall be 
     punishable by the same penalties as are applicable to 
     violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations set forth 
     in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``permanent resident alien'' means an alien 
     admitted for permanent residence into the United States; and
       (2) the term ``United States agency'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``agency'' in section 551(1) of title 5, United 
     States Code.

     SEC. 104. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO CUBAN MEMBERSHIP IN 
                   INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       (a) Continued Opposition to Cuban Membership in 
     International Financial Institutions.--(1) Except as provided 
     in paragraph (2), the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     instruct the United States executive director to each 
     international financial institution to use the voice and vote 
     of the United States to oppose the admission of Cuba as a 
     member of that institution until the President submits a 
     determination under section 203(c)(3) that a democratically 
     elected government in Cuba is in power.
       (2) Once the President submits a determination under 
     section 203(c)(1) that a transition government in Cuba is in 
     power, the President is encouraged to take steps to support 
     the processing of Cuba's application for membership in any 
     international financial institution, subject to the 
     membership taking effect after a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba is in power.
       (b) Reduction in United States Payments to International 
     Financial Institutions.--If any international financial 
     institution approves a loan or other assistance to the Cuban 
     Government over the opposition of the United States, then the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold from payment to that 
     institution an amount equal to the amount of the loan or 
     other assistance to the Cuban Government, with respect to 
     each of the following types of payment:
       (1) The paid-in portion of the increase in capital stock of 
     the institution.
       (2) The callable portion of the increase in capital stock 
     of the institution.
       (c) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``international financial institution'' means the 
     International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development, the International Development 
     Association, the International Finance Corporation, the 
     Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the Inter-
     American Development Bank.

     SEC. 105. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO ENDING THE SUSPENSION 
                   OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FROM THE ORGANIZATION 
                   OF AMERICAN STATES.

       The President should instruct the United States Permanent 
     Representative to the Organization of American States to use 
     the voice and vote of the United States to oppose ending the 
     suspension of the Government of Cuba from the Organization 
     until the President determines under section 203(c)(3) that a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba is in power.

     SEC. 106. ASSISTANCE BY THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER 
                   SOVIET UNION FOR THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.

       (a) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     detailing progress towards the withdrawal of personnel of any 
     independent state of the former Soviet Union (within the 
     meaning of section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 
     5801)), including advisers, technicians, and military 
     personnel, from the Cienfuegos nuclear facility in Cuba.
       (b) Criteria for Assistance.--Section 498A(a)(11) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295a(a)(11)) is 
     amended by striking ``of military facilities'' and inserting 
     ``military and intelligence facilities, including the 
     military and intelligence facilities at Lourdes and 
     Cienfuegos''.
       (c) Ineligibility for Assistance.--(1) Section 498A(b) of 
     that Act (22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (4);
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
       ``(5) for the government of any independent state effective 
     30 days after the President has determined and certified to 
     the appropriate congressional committees (and Congress has 
     not enacted legislation disapproving the determination within 
     that 30-day period) that such government is providing 
     assistance for, or engaging in nonmarket based trade (as 
     defined in section 498B(k)(3)) with, the Cuban Government; 
     or''.
       (2) Subsection (k) of section 498B of that Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2295b(k)), is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) Nonmarket based trade.--As used in section 
     498A(b)(5), the term `nonmarket based trade' includes 
     exports, imports, exchanges, or other arrangements that are 
     provided for goods and services (including oil and other 
     petroleum products) on terms more favorable than those 
     generally available in applicable markets or for comparable 
     commodities, including--
       ``(A) exports to the Cuban Government on terms that involve 
     a grant, concessional price, guaranty, insurance, or subsidy;
       ``(B) imports from the Cuban Government at preferential 
     tariff rates;
       ``(C) exchange arrangements that include advance delivery 
     of commodities, arrangements in which the Cuban Government is 
     not held accountable for unfulfilled exchange contracts, and 
     arrangements under which Cuba does not pay appropriate 
     transportation, insurance, or finance costs; and
       ``(D) the exchange, reduction, or forgiveness of Cuban debt 
     in return for a grant by the Cuban Government of an equity 
     interest in a property, investment, or operation of the Cuban 
     Government or of a Cuban national.
       ``(4) Cuban government.--(A) The term `Cuban Government' 
     includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, 
     and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.
       ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba' means an agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 
     1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with `Cuba' 
     substituted for `a foreign state' each place it appears in 
     such section.''.
       (d) Facilities at Lourdes, Cuba.--(1) The Congress 
     expresses its strong disapproval of the extension by Russia 
     of credits equivalent to approximately $200,000,000 in 
     support of the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, in 
     November 1994.
       (2) Section 498A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2295a) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(d) Reduction in Assistance for Support of Intelligence 
     Facilities in Cuba.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the President shall withhold from assistance 
     provided, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     subsection, for an independent state of the former Soviet 
     Union under this chapter an amount equal to the sum of 
     assistance and credits, if any, provided on or after such 
     date by such state in support of intelligence facilities in 
     Cuba, including the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
       ``(2)(A) The President may waive the requirement of 
     paragraph (1) to withhold assistance if the President 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     the provision of such assistance is important to the national 
     security of the United States, and, in the case of such a 
     certification made with respect to Russia, if the President 
     certifies that the Russian Government has assured the United 
     States Government that the Russian Government is not sharing 
     intelligence data collected at the Lourdes facility with 
     officials or agents of the Cuban Government.
       ``(B) At the time of a certification made with respect to 
     Russia pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President shall also 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing the intelligence activities of Russia in Cuba, 
     including the purposes for which the Lourdes facility is used 
     by the Russian Government and the extent to which the Russian 
     Government provides payment or government credits to the 
     Cuban Government for the continued use of the Lourdes 
     facility.
       ``(C) The report required by subparagraph (B) may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       ``(D) For purposes of this paragraph, the term `appropriate 
     congressional committees' includes the Permanent Select 
     Committee 

[[Page H 9372]]
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(3) The requirement of paragraph (1) to withhold 
     assistance shall not apply with respect to--
       ``(A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs, 
     including disaster and refugee relief;
       ``(B) democratic political reform and rule of law 
     activities;
       ``(C) technical assistance for safety upgrades of civilian 
     nuclear power plants;
       ``(D) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental 
     organizations that are independent of government control;
       ``(E) the development of a free market economic system; and
       ``(F) assistance for the purposes described in the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public 
     Law 103-160).''.

     SEC. 107. TELEVISION BROADCASTING TO CUBA.

       (a) Conversion to UHF.--The Director of the United States 
     Information Agency shall implement a conversion of television 
     broadcasting to Cuba under the Television Marti Service to 
     ultra high frequency (UHF) broadcasting.
       (b) Periodic Reports.--Not later than 45 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every three months 
     thereafter until the conversion described in subsection (a) 
     is fully implemented, the Director of the United States 
     Information Agency shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees on the progress made in carrying out 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Termination of Broadcasting Authorities.--Upon 
     transmittal of a determination under section 203(c)(3), the 
     Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465aa and 
     following) and the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 
     1465 and following) are repealed.

     SEC. 108. REPORTS ON ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCE RECEIVED BY CUBA 
                   FROM OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, 
     the President shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees on assistance and commerce received 
     by Cuba from other foreign countries during the preceding 12-
     month period.
       (b) Contents of Reports.--Each report required by 
     subsection (a) shall, for the period covered by the report, 
     contain the following, to the extent such information is 
     known:
       (1) A description of all bilateral assistance provided to 
     Cuba by other foreign countries, including humanitarian 
     assistance.
       (2) A description of Cuba's commerce with foreign 
     countries, including an identification of Cuba's trading 
     partners and the extent of such trade.
       (3) A description of the joint ventures completed, or under 
     consideration, by foreign nationals involving facilities in 
     Cuba, including an identification of the location of the 
     facilities involved and a description of the terms of 
     agreement of the joint ventures and the names of the parties 
     that are involved.
       (4) A determination whether or not any of the facilities 
     described in paragraph (3) is the subject of a claim by a 
     United States national.
       (5) A determination of the amount of Cuban debt owed to 
     each foreign country, including--
       (A) the amount of debt exchanged, forgiven, or reduced 
     under the terms of each investment or operation in Cuba 
     involving foreign nationals; and
       (B) the amount of debt owed to the foreign country that has 
     been exchanged, reduced, or forgiven in return for a grant by 
     the Cuban Government of an equity interest in a property, 
     investment, or operation of the Cuban Government or of a 
     Cuban national.
       (6) A description of the steps taken to ensure that raw 
     materials and semifinished or finished goods produced by 
     facilities in Cuba involving foreign nationals do not enter 
     the United States market, either directly or through third 
     countries or parties.
       (7) An identification of countries that purchase, or have 
     purchased, arms or military supplies from the Cuban 
     Government or that otherwise have entered into agreements 
     with the Cuban Government that have a military application, 
     including--
       (A) a description of the military supplies, equipment, or 
     other materiel sold, bartered, or exchanged between the Cuban 
     Government and such countries;
       (B) a listing of the goods, services, credits, or other 
     consideration received by the Cuban Government in exchange 
     for military supplies, equipment, or materiel; and
       (C) the terms or conditions of any such agreement.

     SEC. 109. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC AND HUMAN 
                   RIGHTS GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.

       (a) Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, except for section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1) and comparable notification 
     requirements contained in any Act making appropriations for 
     foreign operations, export financing, and related programs, 
     the President is authorized to furnish assistance and provide 
     other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental 
     organizations to support democracy-building efforts for 
     Cuba, including the following:
       (1) Published and informational matter, such as books, 
     videos, and cassettes, on transitions to democracy, human 
     rights, and market economies, to be made available to 
     independent democratic groups in Cuba.
       (2) Humanitarian assistance to victims of political 
     repression, and their families.
       (3) Support for democratic and human rights groups in Cuba.
       (4) Support for visits and permanent deployment of 
     independent international human rights monitors in Cuba.
       (b) OAS Emergency Fund.--(1) The President shall take the 
     necessary steps to encourage the Organization of American 
     States to create a special emergency fund for the explicit 
     purpose of deploying human rights observers, election 
     support, and election observation in Cuba.
       (2) The President should instruct the United States 
     Permanent Representative to the Organization of American 
     States to encourage other member states of the Organization 
     to join in calling for the Cuban Government to allow the 
     immediate deployment of independent human rights monitors of 
     the Organization throughout Cuba and on-site visits to Cuba 
     by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
       (3) Notwithstanding section 307 of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227) or any other provision of law 
     limiting the United States proportionate share of assistance 
     to Cuba by any international organization, the President 
     should provide not less than $5,000,000 of the voluntary 
     contributions of the United States to the Organization of 
     American States as of the date of the enactment of this Act 
     solely for the purposes of the special fund referred to in 
     paragraph (1).

     SEC. 110. WITHHOLDING OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FROM COUNTRIES 
                   SUPPORTING NUCLEAR PLANT IN CUBA.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) President Clinton stated in April 1993 that ``the 
     United States opposes the construction of the Juragua nuclear 
     power plant because of our concerns about Cuba's ability to 
     ensure the safe operation of the facility and because of 
     Cuba's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     or ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.''.
       (2) Cuba has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
     of Nuclear Weapons or ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 
     latter of which establishes Latin America and the Caribbean 
     as a nuclear weapons-free zone.
       (3) The State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission, and the Department of Energy have expressed 
     concerns about the construction and operation of Cuba's 
     nuclear reactors.
       (4) In a September 1992 report to Congress, the General 
     Accounting Office outlined concerns among nuclear energy 
     experts about deficiencies in the nuclear plant project in 
     Juragua, near Cienfuegos, Cuba, including--
       (A) a lack in Cuba of a nuclear regulatory structure;
       (B) the absence in Cuba of an adequate infrastructure to 
     ensure the plant's safe operation and requisite maintenance;
       (C) the inadequacy of training of plant operators;
       (D) reports by a former technician from Cuba who, by 
     examining with x-rays weld sites believed to be part of the 
     auxiliary plumbing system for the plant, found that 10 to 15 
     percent of those sites were defective;
       (E) since September 5, 1992, when construction on the plant 
     was halted, the prolonged exposure to the elements, including 
     corrosive salt water vapor, of the primary reactor 
     components; and
       (F) the possible inadequacy of the upper portion of the 
     reactors' dome retention capability to withstand only 7 
     pounds of pressure per square inch, given that normal 
     atmospheric pressure is 32 pounds per square inch and United 
     States reactors are designed to accommodate pressures of 50 
     pounds per square inch.
       (5) The United States Geological Survey claims that it had 
     difficulty determining answers to specific questions 
     regarding earthquake activity in the area near Cienfuegos 
     because the Cuban Government was not forthcoming with 
     information.
       (6) The Geological Survey has indicated that the Caribbean 
     plate, a geological formation near the south coast of Cuba, 
     may pose seismic risks to Cuba and the site of the power 
     plant, and may produce large to moderate earthquakes.
       (7) On May 25, 1992, the Caribbean plate produced an 
     earthquake numbering 7.0 on the Richter scale.
       (8) According to a study by the National Oceanic and 
     Atmospheric Administration, summer winds could carry 
     radioactive pollutants from a nuclear accident at the power 
     plant throughout all of Florida and parts of the States on 
     the gulf coast as far as Texas, and northern winds could 
     carry the pollutants as far northeast as Virginia and 
     Washington, D.C.
       (9) The Cuban Government, under dictator Fidel Castro, in 
     1962 advocated the Soviets' launching of nuclear missiles to 
     the United States, which represented a direct and dangerous 
     provocation of the United States and brought the world to the 
     brink of a nuclear conflict.
       (10) Fidel Castro over the years has consistently issued 
     threats against the United States Government, most recently 
     that he would unleash another perilous mass migration from 
     Cuba upon the enactment of this Act.
       (11) Despite the various concerns about the plant's safety 
     and operational problems, a feasibility study is being 
     conducted that would establish a support group to include 
     Russia, Cuba, and third countries with the 

[[Page H 9373]]
     objective of completing and operating the plant.
       (b) Withholding of Foreign Assistance.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the President shall withhold from assistance allocated, 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, for any 
     country an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits, 
     if any, provided on or after such date of enactment by that 
     country or any entity in that country in support of the 
     completion of the Cuban nuclear facility at Juragua, near 
     Cienfuegos, Cuba.
       (2) Exceptions.--The requirement of paragraph (1) to 
     withhold assistance shall not apply with respect to--
       (A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs, including 
     disaster and refugee relief;
       (B) democratic political reform and rule of law activities;
       (C) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental 
     organizations that are independent of government control;
       (D) the development of a free market economic system; and
       (E) assistance for the purposes described in the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public 
     Law 103-160).
       (3) Definition.--As used in paragraph (1), the term 
     ``assistance'' means assistance under the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961, credits, sales, and guarantees of extensions of 
     credit under the Arms Export Control Act, assistance under 
     titles I and III of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
     Assistance Act of 1954, assistance under the FREEDOM Support 
     Act of 1992, and any other program of assistance or credits 
     provided by the United States to other countries under other 
     provisions of law, except that the term ``assistance'' does 
     not include humanitarian assistance, including disaster 
     relief assistance.

     SEC. 111. EXPULSION OF CRIMINALS FROM CUBA.

       The President shall instruct all United States Government 
     officials who engage in official conduct with the Cuban 
     Government to raise on a regular basis the extradition of or 
     rendering to the United States all persons residing in Cuba 
     who are sought by the United States Department of Justice for 
     crimes committed in the United States.
          TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

     SEC. 201. POLICY TOWARD A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND A 
                   DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.

       The policy of the United States is as follows:
       (1) To support the self-determination of the Cuban people.
       (2) To recognize that the self-determination of the Cuban 
     people is a sovereign and national right of the citizens of 
     Cuba which must be exercised free of interference by the 
     government of any other country.
       (3) To encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves 
     with a government which reflects the self-determination of 
     the Cuban people.
       (4) To recognize the potential for a difficult transition 
     from the current regime in Cuba that may result from the 
     initiatives taken by the Cuban people for self-determination 
     in response to the intransigence of the Castro regime in not 
     allowing any substantive political or economic reforms, and 
     to be prepared to provide the Cuban people with humanitarian, 
     developmental, and other economic assistance.
       (5) In solidarity with the Cuban people, to provide 
     appropriate forms of assistance--
       (A) to a transition government in Cuba;
       (B) to facilitate the rapid movement from such a transition 
     government to a democratically elected government in Cuba 
     that results from an expression of the self-determination of 
     the Cuban people; and
       (C) to support such a democratically elected government.
       (6) Through such assistance, to facilitate a peaceful 
     transition to representative democracy and a market economy 
     in Cuba and to consolidate democracy in Cuba.
       (7) To deliver such assistance to the Cuban people only 
     through a transition government in Cuba, through a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba, through United 
     States Government organizations, or through United States, 
     international, or indigenous nongovernmental organizations.
       (8) To encourage other countries and multilateral 
     organizations to provide similar assistance, and to work 
     cooperatively with such countries and organizations to 
     coordinate such assistance.
       (9) To ensure that appropriate assistance is rapidly 
     provided and distributed to the people of Cuba upon the 
     institution of a transition government in Cuba.
       (10) Not to provide favorable treatment or influence on 
     behalf of any individual or entity in the selection by the 
     Cuban people of their future government.
       (11) To assist a transition government in Cuba and a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba to prepare the 
     Cuban military forces for an appropriate role in a democracy.
       (12) To be prepared to enter into negotiations with a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba either to return 
     the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo to Cuba or to 
     renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable 
     terms.
       (13) To consider the restoration of diplomatic recognition 
     and support the reintegration of the Cuban Government into 
     Inter-American organizations when the President determines 
     that there exists a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba.
       (14) To take steps to remove the economic embargo of Cuba 
     when the President determines that a transition to a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba has begun.
       (15) To assist a democratically elected government in Cuba 
     to strengthen and stabilize its national currency.
       (16) To pursue trade relations with a free, democratic, and 
     independent Cuba.

     SEC. 202. ASSISTANCE FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

       (a) Authorization.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall develop a plan for 
     providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time as the 
     President determines that a transition government or a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba (as determined 
     under section 203(c)) is in power.
       (2) Effect on other laws.--Assistance may be provided under 
     this section subject to an authorization of appropriations 
     and subject to the availability of appropriations.
       (b) Plan for Assistance.--
       (1) Development of plan.--The President shall develop a 
     plan for providing assistance under this section--
       (A) to Cuba when a transition government in Cuba is in 
     power; and
       (B) to Cuba when a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba is in power.
       (2) Types of assistance.--Assistance under the plan 
     developed under paragraph (1) may, subject to an 
     authorization of appropriations and subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, include the following:
       (A) Transition government.--(i) Except as provided in 
     clause (ii), assistance to Cuba under a transition government 
     shall, subject to an authorization of appropriations and 
     subject to the availability of appropriations, be limited 
     to--
       (I) such food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment, 
     and assistance to meet emergency energy needs, as is 
     necessary to meet the basic human needs of the Cuban people; 
     and
       (II) assistance described in subparagraph (C).
       (ii) Assistance provided only after the President certifies 
     to the appropriate congressional committees, in accordance 
     with procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications 
     under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
     that such assistance is essential to the successful 
     completion of the transition to democracy.
       (iii) Only after a transition government in Cuba is in 
     power, remittances by individuals to their relatives of cash 
     or goods, as well as freedom to travel to visit them without 
     any restrictions, shall be permitted.
       (B) Democratically elected government.--Assistance to a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba may, subject to an 
     authorization of appropriations and subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, consist of additional 
     economic assistance, together with assistance described in 
     subparagraph (C). Such economic assistance may include--
       (i) assistance under chapter 1 of part I (relating to 
     development assistance), and chapter 4 of part II (relating 
     to the economic support fund), of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961;
       (ii) assistance under the Agricultural Trade Development 
     and Assistance Act of 1954;
       (iii) financing, guarantees, and other forms of assistance 
     provided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
       (iv) financial support provided by the Overseas Private 
     Investment Corporation for investment projects in Cuba;
       (v) assistance provided by the Trade and Development 
     Agency;
       (vi) Peace Corps programs; and
       (vii) other appropriate assistance to carry out the policy 
     of section 201.
       (C) Military adjustment assistance.--Assistance to a 
     transition government in Cuba and to a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba shall also include assistance in preparing 
     the Cuban military forces to adjust to an appropriate role in 
     a democracy.
       (c) Strategy for Distribution.--The plan developed under 
     subsection (b) shall include a strategy for distributing 
     assistance under the plan.
       (d) Distribution.--Assistance under the plan developed 
     under subsection (b) shall be provided through United States 
     Government organizations and nongovernmental organizations 
     and private and voluntary organizations, whether within or 
     outside the United States, including humanitarian, 
     educational, labor, and private sector organizations.
       (e) International Efforts.--The President shall take the 
     necessary steps--
       (1) to seek to obtain the agreement of other countries and 
     of international financial institutions and multilateral 
     organizations to provide to a transition government in Cuba, 
     and to a democratically elected government in Cuba, 
     assistance comparable to that provided by the United States 
     under this Act; and
       (2) to work with such countries, institutions, and 
     organizations to coordinate all such assistance programs.
       (f) Communication With the Cuban People.--The President 
     shall take the necessary steps to communicate to the Cuban 
     people the plan for assistance developed under this section.
       (g) Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing in detail the plan developed under this section.
       (h) Trade and Investment Relations.--

[[Page H 9374]]

       (1) Report to congress.--The President, following the 
     transmittal to the Congress of a determination under section 
     203(c)(3) that a democratically elected government in Cuba is 
     in power, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that describes--
       (A) acts, policies, and practices that constitute 
     significant barriers to, or distortions of, United States 
     trade in goods or services or foreign direct investment with 
     respect to Cuba;
       (B) policy objectives of the United States regarding trade 
     relations with a democratically elected government in Cuba, 
     and the reasons therefor, including possible--
       (i) reciprocal extension of nondiscriminatory trade 
     treatment (most-favored- nation treatment);
       (ii) designation of Cuba as a beneficiary developing 
     country under title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (relating to 
     the Generalized System of Preferences) or as a beneficiary 
     country under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, and 
     the implications of such designation with respect to trade 
     with any other country that is such a beneficiary developing 
     country or beneficiary country or is a party to the North 
     American Free Trade Agreement; and
       (iii) negotiations regarding free trade, including the 
     accession of Cuba to the North American Free Trade Agreement;
       (C) specific trade negotiating objectives of the United 
     States with respect to Cuba, including the objectives 
     described in section 108(b)(5) of the North American Free 
     Trade Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 3317(b)(5)); 
     and
       (D) actions proposed or anticipated to be undertaken, and 
     any proposed legislation necessary or appropriate, to achieve 
     any of such policy and negotiating objectives.
       (2) Consultations.--The President shall consult with the 
     appropriate congressional committees and shall seek advice 
     from the appropriate advisory committees established under 
     section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding the policy and 
     negotiating objectives and the legislative proposals 
     described in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 203. COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAM; IMPLEMENTATION 
                   AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS; REPROGRAMMING.

       (a) Coordinating Official.--The President shall designate a 
     coordinating official who shall be responsible for--
       (1) implementing the strategy for distributing assistance 
     described in section 202(b);
       (2) ensuring the speedy and efficient distribution of such 
     assistance; and
       (3) ensuring coordination among, and appropriate oversight 
     by, the agencies of the United States that provide assistance 
     described in section 202(b), including resolving any disputes 
     among such agencies.
       (b) United States-Cuba Council.--Upon making a 
     determination under subsection (c)(3) that a democratically 
     elected government in Cuba is in power, the President, after 
     consultation with the coordinating official, is authorized to 
     designate a United States-Cuba council--
       (1) to ensure coordination between the United States 
     Government and the private sector in responding to change in 
     Cuba, and in promoting market-based development in Cuba; and
       (2) to establish periodic meetings between representatives 
     of the United States and Cuban private sectors for the 
     purpose of facilitating bilateral trade.
       (c) Implementation of Plan; Reports to Congress.--
       (1) Implementation with respect to transition government.--
     Upon making a determination that a transition government in 
     Cuba is in power, the President shall transmit that 
     determination to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     shall, subject to an authorization of appropriations and 
     subject to the availability of appropriations, commence the 
     delivery and distribution of assistance to such transition 
     government under the plan developed under section 202(b).
       (2) Reports to congress.--(A) The President shall transmit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting 
     forth the strategy for providing assistance described in 
     section 202(b)(2) (A) and (C) to the transition government in 
     Cuba under the plan of assistance developed under section 
     202(b), the types of such assistance, and the extent to which 
     such assistance has been distributed in accordance with the 
     plan.
       (B) The President shall transmit the report not later than 
     90 days after making the determination referred to in 
     paragraph (1), except that the President shall transmit the 
     report in preliminary form not later than 15 days after 
     making that determination.
       (3) Implementation with respect to democratically elected 
     government.--The President shall, upon determining that a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, submit 
     that determination to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and shall, subject to an authorization of 
     appropriations and subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, commence the delivery and distribution of 
     assistance to such democratically elected government under 
     the plan developed under section 202(b).
       (4) Annual reports to congress.--Not later than 60 days 
     after the end of each fiscal year, the President shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     on the assistance provided under the plan developed under 
     section 202(b), including a description of each type of 
     assistance, the amounts expended for such assistance, and a 
     description of the assistance to be provided under the plan 
     in the current fiscal year.
       (d) Reprogramming.--Any changes in the assistance to be 
     provided under the plan developed under section 202(b) may 
     not be made unless the President notifies the appropriate 
     congressional committees at least 15 days in advance in 
     accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1).

     SEC. 204. TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.

       (a) Presidential Actions.--Upon submitting a determination 
     to the appropriate congressional committees under section 
     203(c)(1) that a transition government in Cuba is in power, 
     the President, after consulting with the Congress, is 
     authorized to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of 
     Cuba to the extent that such action contributes to a stable 
     foundation for a democratically elected government in Cuba.
       (b) Suspension of Certain Provisions of Law.--In carrying 
     out subsection (a), the President may suspend the enforcement 
     of--
       (1) section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(a));
       (2) section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)) with regard to the ``Republic of Cuba'';
       (3) sections 1704, 1705(d), and 1706 of the Cuban Democracy 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 6003, 6004(d), 6005);
       (4) section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985; and
       (5) the prohibitions on transactions described in part 515 
     of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (c) Additional Presidential Actions.--Upon submitting a 
     determination to the appropriate congressional committees 
     under section 203(c)(3) that a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take 
     steps to terminate the economic embargo of Cuba.
       (d) Conforming Amendments.--On the date on which the 
     President submits a determination under section 203(c)(3)--
       (1) section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)) is repealed;
       (2) section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)) is amended by striking ``Republic of 
     Cuba'';
       (3) sections 1704, 1705(d), and 1706 of the Cuban Democracy 
     Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6003, 6004(d), and 6005) are repealed; 
     and
       (4) section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985 is 
     repealed.
       (e) Review of Suspension of Economic Embargo.--
       (1) Review.--If the President takes action under subsection 
     (a) to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba, the President 
     shall immediately so notify the Congress. The President shall 
     report to the Congress no less frequently than every 6 months 
     thereafter, until he submits a determination under section 
     203(c)(3) that a democratically elected government in Cuba is 
     in power, on the progress being made by Cuba toward the 
     establishment of such a democratically elected government. 
     The action of the President under subsection (a) shall cease 
     to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution 
     described in paragraph (2).
       (2) Joint resolutions.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint resolution 
     of the 2 Houses of Congress, the matter after the resolving 
     clause of which is as follows: ``That the Congress 
     disapproves the action of the President under section 204(a) 
     of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act 
     of 1995 to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba, notice of 
     which was submitted to the Congress on ____.'', with the 
     blank space being filled with the appropriate date.
       (3) Referral to committees.--Joint resolutions introduced 
     in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and joint resolutions 
     introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations.
       (4) Procedures.--(A) Any joint resolution shall be 
     considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 
     section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and 
     Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
       (B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 
     enactment of joint resolutions, a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of any joint resolution after it has been 
     reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as 
     highly privileged in the House of Representatives.
       (C) Not more than 1 joint resolution may be considered in 
     the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 6-month 
     period beginning on the date on which the President notifies 
     the Congress under paragraph (1) of the action taken under 
     subsection (a), and in each 6-month period thereafter.

     SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

       For purposes of this Act, a transition government in Cuba 
     is a government in Cuba which--
       (1) is demonstrably in transition from communist 
     totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;
       (2) has recognized the right to independent political 
     activity and association;
       (3) has released all political prisoners and allowed for 
     investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international 
     human rights organizations;
       (4) has ceased any interference with Radio or Television 
     Marti broadcasts;

[[Page H 9375]]

       (5) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable 
     progress in--
       (A) establishing an independent judiciary;
       (B) dissolving the present Department of State Security in 
     the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees 
     for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response 
     Brigades;
       (C) respecting internationally recognized human rights and 
     basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
     Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;
       (D) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and 
     freedom of the press;
       (E) organizing free and fair elections for a new 
     government--
       (i) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to 
     exceed 1 year after the transition government assumes power;
       (ii) with the participation of multiple independent 
     political parties that have full access to the media on an 
     equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or 
     other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of 
     time for such access and the times of day such allotments are 
     given; and
       (iii) to be conducted under the supervision of 
     internationally recognized observers, such as the 
     Organization of American States, the United Nations, and 
     other elections monitors;
       (F) assuring the right to private property;
       (G) taking appropriate steps to return to United States 
     citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken 
     by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
     after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation 
     to such citizens and entities for such property;
       (H) granting permits to privately owned telecommunications 
     and media companies to operate in Cuba; and
       (I) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions 
     as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International 
     Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of 
     independent social, economic, and political associations;
       (6) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro;
       (7) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the 
     speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban 
     people;
       (8) permits the deployment throughout Cuba of independent 
     and unfettered international human rights monitors; and
       (9) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United 
     States all persons sought by the United States Department of 
     Justice for crimes committed in the United States.

     SEC. 206. REQUIREMENTS FOR A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       For purposes of this Act, a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba, in addition to continuing to comply with 
     the requirements of section 205, is a government in Cuba 
     which--
       (1) results from free and fair elections conducted under 
     the supervision of internationally recognized observers;
       (2) has permitted opposition parties ample time to organize 
     and campaign for such elections, and has permitted full 
     access to the media to all candidates in the elections;
       (3) is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and 
     human rights of the citizens of Cuba;
       (4) has made demonstrable progress in establishing an 
     independent judiciary;
       (5) is substantially moving toward a market-oriented 
     economic system;
       (6) is committed to making constitutional changes that 
     would ensure regular free and fair elections that meet the 
     requirements of paragraph (2); and
       (7) has made demonstrable progress in returning to United 
     States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken 
     by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
     after January 1, 1959, or providing full compensation for 
     such property in accordance with international law standards 
     and practice.
  TITLE III--PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS 
           AGAINST CONFISCATORY TAKINGS BY THE CASTRO REGIME

     SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The right of individuals to hold and enjoy property is 
     a fundamental right recognized by the United States 
     Constitution and international human rights law, including 
     the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
       (2) The illegal confiscation or taking of property by 
     governments, and the acquiescence of governments in the 
     confiscation of property by their citizens, undermines the 
     comity among nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic 
     development.
       (3) It is in the interest of all nations to respect equally 
     the property rights of their citizens and nationals of other 
     countries.
       (4) Nations that provide an effective mechanism for prompt, 
     adequate, and fair compensation for the confiscation of 
     private property will continue to have the support of the 
     United States.
       (5) The United States Government has an obligation to its 
     citizens to provide protection against illegal confiscation 
     by foreign nations and their citizens, including the 
     provision of private remedies.
       (6) Nations that illegally confiscate private property 
     should not be immune to another nation's laws whose purpose 
     is to protect against the confiscation of lawfully acquired 
     property by its citizens.
       (7) Trafficking in illegally acquired property is a crime 
     under the laws of the United States and other nations, yet 
     this same activity is allowed under international law.
       (8) International law, by not providing effective remedies, 
     condones the illegal confiscation of property and allows for 
     the unjust enrichment from the use of confiscated property by 
     governments and private entities at the expense of those who 
     hold legal claim to the property.
       (9) The development of an international mechanism 
     sanctioning those governments and private entities that 
     confiscate and unjustly use private property so confiscated 
     should be a priority objective of United States foreign 
     policy.

     SEC. 302. LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING IN PROPERTY CONFISCATED 
                   FROM UNITED STATES NATIONALS.

       (a) Civil Remedy.--
       (1) Liability for trafficking.--(A) Except as provided in 
     paragraphs (3) and (4), any person, including any agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state in the conduct of a 
     commercial activity, that, after the end of the 6-month 
     period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     traffics in confiscated property shall be liable to any 
     United States national who owns the claim to such property 
     for money damages in an amount equal to the sum of--
       (i) the amount which is the greater of--
       (I) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the 
     Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the International 
     Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest;
       (II) the amount determined under section 303(a)(2), plus 
     interest; or
       (III) the fair market value of that property, calculated as 
     being the then current value of the property, or the value of 
     the property when confiscated plus interest, whichever is 
     greater; and
       (ii) reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.
       (B) Interest under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be at the rate 
     set forth in section 1961 of title 28, United States Code, 
     computed by the court from the date of the confiscation of 
     the property involved to the date on which the action is 
     brought under this subsection.
       (2) Presumption in favor of certified claims.--There shall 
     be a presumption that the amount for which a person, 
     including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in 
     the conduct of a commercial activity, is liable under clause 
     (i) of paragraph (1)(A) is the amount that is certified under 
     subclause (I) of that clause. The presumption shall be 
     rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence that the amount 
     described in subclause (II) or (III) of that clause is the 
     appropriate amount of liability under that clause.
       (3) Increased liability for prior notice.--Except as 
     provided in paragraph (4), any person, including any agency 
     or instrumentality of a foreign state in the conduct of a 
     commercial activity, that traffics in confiscated property 
     after having received--
       (A) notice of a claim to ownership of the property by a 
     United States national who owns a claim to the confiscated 
     property, and
       (B) notice of the provisions of this section,
     shall be liable to that United States national for money 
     damages in an amount which is the sum of the amount equal to 
     the amount determined under paragraph (1)(A)(ii) plus triple 
     the amount determined applicable under subclause (I), (II), 
     or (III) of paragraph (1)(A)(i).
       (4) Applicability.--(A) Except as otherwise provided in 
     this paragraph, actions may be brought under paragraph (1) 
     with respect to property confiscated before, on, or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (B) In the case of property confiscated before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, no United States national may 
     bring an action under this section unless such national 
     acquired ownership of the claim to the confiscated property 
     before such date.
       (C) In the case of property confiscated on or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, no United States national 
     who acquired ownership of a claim to confiscated property by 
     assignment for value after such date of enactment may bring 
     an action on the claim under this section.
       (5) Treatment of certain actions.--(A) In the case of any 
     action brought under this section by a United States national 
     who was eligible to file the underlying claim in the action 
     with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under title V 
     of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 but did 
     not so file the claim, the court may hear the case only if 
     the court determines that the United States national had good 
     cause for not filing the claim.
       (B) In the case of any action brought under this section by 
     a United States national whose claim in the action was timely 
     filed with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under 
     title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 
     but was denied by the Commission, the court may assess the 
     basis for the denial and may accept the findings of the 
     Commission on the claim as conclusive in the action under 
     this section unless good cause justifies another result.
       (6) Inapplicability of act of state doctrine.--No court of 
     the United States shall decline, based upon the act of state 
     doctrine, to make a determination on the merits in an action 
     brought under paragraph (1).
       (b) Definition.--As used in this subsection, the term 
     ``agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 1603(b) of title 28, 
     United States Code.
       (c) Jurisdiction.--

[[Page H 9376]]

       (1) In general.--Chapter 85 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 1331 the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 1331a. Civil actions involving confiscated property

       ``The district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
     any action brought under section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and 
     Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, regardless of 
     the amount in controversy.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 1331 the 
     following:

``1331a. Civil actions involving confiscated property.''.
       (d) Certain Property Immune From Execution.--Section 1611 
     of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of 
     this chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune 
     from attachment and from execution in an action brought under 
     section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
     (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995 to the extent the property is a 
     facility or installation used by an accredited diplomatic 
     mission for official purposes.''.
       (e) Election of Remedies.--
       (1) Election.--Subject to paragraph (2)--
       (A) any United States national that brings an action under 
     this section may not bring any other civil action or 
     proceeding under the common law, Federal law, or the law of 
     any of the several States, the District of Columbia, or any 
     territory or possession of the United States, that seeks 
     monetary or nonmonetary compensation by reason of the same 
     subject matter; and
       (B) any person who brings, under the common law or any 
     provision of law other than this section, a civil action or 
     proceeding for monetary or nonmonetary compensation arising 
     out of a claim for which an action would otherwise be 
     cognizable under this section may not bring an action under 
     this section on that claim.
       (2) Treatment of certified claimants.--In the case of any 
     United States national that brings an action under this 
     section based on a claim certified under title V of the 
     International Claims Settlement Act of 1949--
       (A) if the recovery in the action is equal to or greater 
     than the amount of the certified claim, the United States 
     national may not receive payment on the claim under any 
     agreement entered into between the United States and Cuba 
     settling claims covered by such title, and such national 
     shall be deemed to have discharged the United States from any 
     further responsibility to represent the United States 
     national with respect to that claim;
       (B) if the recovery in the action is less than the amount 
     of the certified claim, the United States national may 
     receive payment under a claims agreement described in 
     subparagraph (A) but only to the extent of the difference 
     between the amount of the recovery and the amount of the 
     certified claim; and
       (C) if there is no recovery in the action, the United 
     States national may receive payment on the certified claim 
     under a claims agreement described in subparagraph (A) to the 
     same extent as any certified claimant who does not bring an 
     action under this section.
       (f) Deposit of Excess Payments by Cuba Under Claims 
     Agreement.--Any amounts paid by Cuba under any agreement 
     entered into between the United States and Cuba settling 
     certified claims under title V of the International Claims 
     Settlement Act of 1949 that are in excess of the payments 
     made on such certified claims after the application of 
     subsection (e) shall be deposited into the United States 
     Treasury.
       (g) Termination of Rights.--
       (1) In general.--All rights created under this section to 
     bring an action for money damages with respect to property 
     confiscated before the date of the enactment of this Act 
     shall cease upon the transmittal to the Congress of a 
     determination of the President under section 203(c)(3).
       (2) Pending suits.--The termination of rights under 
     paragraph (1) shall not affect suits commenced before the 
     date of such termination, and in all such suits, proceedings 
     shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the 
     same manner and with the same effect as if this subsection 
     had not been enacted.

     SEC. 303. DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS TO CONFISCATED PROPERTY.

       (a) Evidence of Ownership.--
       (1) Conclusiveness of certified claims.--In any action 
     brought under this title, the courts shall accept as 
     conclusive proof of ownership a certification of a claim to 
     ownership that has been made by the Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission pursuant to title V of the International Claims 
     Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. 1643 and following).
       (2) Claims not certified.--In the case of a claim that has 
     not been certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission before the enactment of this Act, a court may 
     appoint a special master, including the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission, to make determinations regarding the 
     amount and validity of claims to ownership of confiscated 
     property. Such determinations are only for evidentiary 
     purposes in civil actions brought under this title and do not 
     constitute certifications pursuant to title V of the 
     International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.
       (3) Effect of determinations of foreign entities.--In 
     determining ownership, courts shall not accept as conclusive 
     evidence of ownership any findings, orders, judgments, or 
     decrees from administrative agencies or courts of foreign 
     countries or international organizations that invalidate the 
     claim held by a United States national, unless the 
     invalidation was found pursuant to binding international 
     arbitration to which United States national submitted the 
     claim.
       (b) Amendment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 
     1949.--Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 
     1949 (22 U.S.C. 1643 and following) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:


  ``evaluation of ownership claims referred by district courts of the 
                             united states

       ``Sec. 514. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     title and only for purposes of section 302 of the Cuban 
     Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, a United States 
     district court, for fact-finding purposes, may refer to the 
     Commission, and the Commission may determine, questions of 
     the amount and ownership of a claim by a United States 
     national (as defined in section 4 of the Cuban Liberty and 
     Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act) resulting from the confiscation of 
     property by the Government of Cuba described in section 
     503(a), whether or not the United States national qualified 
     as a national of the United States (as defined in section 
     502(1)) at the time of the action by the Government of 
     Cuba.''.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or section 
     514 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as 
     added by subsection (b), shall be construed--
       (1) to require or otherwise authorize the claims of Cuban 
     nationals who became United States citizens after their 
     property was confiscated to be included in the claims 
     certified to the Secretary of State by the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission for purposes of future negotiation and 
     espousal of claims with a friendly government in Cuba when 
     diplomatic relations are restored; or
       (2) as superseding, amending, or otherwise altering 
     certifications that have been made pursuant to title V of the 
     International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 before the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 304. EXCLUSIVITY OF FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION 
                   CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE.

       Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 
     (22 U.S.C. 1643 and following), as amended by section 303, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


  ``exclusivity of foreign claims settlement commission certification 
                               procedure

       ``Sec. 515. (a) Subject to subsection (b), neither any 
     national of the United States who was eligible to file a 
     claim under section 503 but did not timely file such claim 
     under that section, nor any national of the United States (on 
     the date of the enactment of this section) who was not 
     eligible to file a claim under that section, nor any national 
     of Cuba, including any agency, instrumentality, subdivision, 
     or enterprise of the Government of Cuba or any local 
     government of Cuba in place on the date of the enactment of 
     this section, nor any successor thereto, whether or not 
     recognized by the United States, shall have a claim to, 
     participate in, or otherwise have an interest in, the 
     compensation proceeds or other nonmonetary compensation paid 
     or allocated to a national of the United States by virtue of 
     a claim certified by the Commission under section 507, nor 
     shall any court of the United States or any State court have 
     jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claim.
       ``(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to 
     detract from or otherwise affect any rights in the shares of 
     the capital stock of nationals of the United States owning 
     claims certified by the Commission under section 507.''.
                 TITLE IV--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

     SEC. 401. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF ALIENS WHO HAVE 
                   CONFISCATED PROPERTY OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS 
                   OR WHO TRAFFIC IN SUCH PROPERTY.

       (a) Grounds for Exclusion.--The Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, shall exclude from 
     the United States any alien who the Secretary of State 
     determines is a person who--
       (1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen the 
     confiscation of, property a claim to which is owned by a 
     United States national, or converts or has converted for 
     personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned 
     by a United States national;
       (2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is 
     owned by a United States national;
       (3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with 
     a controlling interest of an entity which has been involved 
     in the confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated 
     property, a claim to which is owned by a United States 
     national; or
       (4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person 
     excludable under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
       (b) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following 
     terms have the following meanings:
       (1) Confiscated; confiscation.--The terms ``confiscated'' 
     and ``confiscation'' refer to--

[[Page H 9377]]

       (A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by 
     foreign governmental authority of ownership or control of 
     property on or after January 1, 1959--
       (i) without the property having been returned or adequate 
     and effective compensation provided; or
       (ii) without the claim to the property having been settled 
     pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or 
     other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and
       (B) the repudiation by foreign governmental authority of, 
     the default by foreign governmental authority on, or the 
     failure by foreign governmental authority to pay, on or after 
     January 1, 1959--
       (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by foreign governmental 
     authority;
       (ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by foreign governmental 
     authority; or
       (iii) a debt which was incurred by foreign governmental 
     authority in satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated 
     property claim.
       (2) Property.--The term ``property'' does not include 
     claims arising from a territory in dispute as a result of war 
     between United Nations member states in which the ultimate 
     resolution of the disputed territory has not been resolved.
       (3) Traffics.--(A) A person or entity ``traffics'' in 
     property if that person or entity knowingly and 
     intentionally--
       (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, 
     manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or 
     purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, 
     manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in 
     confiscated property,
       (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise 
     benefiting from confiscated property, or
       (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, 
     trafficking (as described in clauses (i) and (ii)) by another 
     person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in 
     clauses (i) and (ii)) through another person,
     without the authorization of the United States national who 
     holds a claim to the property.
       (B) The term ``traffics'' does not include--
       (i) the delivery of international telecommunication signals 
     to Cuba that are authorized by section 1705(e) of the Cuban 
     Democracy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004(e)); or
       (ii) the trading or holding of securities publicly traded 
     or held, unless the trading is with or by a person determined 
     by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a specially designated 
     national.
       (c) National Interest Exemption.--This section shall not 
     apply where the Secretary of State finds, on a case-by-case 
     basis, that making a determination under subsection (a) would 
     be contrary to the national interest of the United States.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--This section applies to aliens seeking to 
     enter the United States on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (2) Trafficking.--This section applies only with respect to 
     acts within the meaning of ``traffics'' that occur on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. Before consideration of any other amendment it shall be 
in order to consider a further amendment in the nature of a substitute 
by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] or his designee. That 
amendment shall be considered read, shall be debatable for 1 hour, 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and 
shall not be subject to amendment.
  If that amendment is rejected or not offered, no further amendment 
shall be in order except the amendments printed in House Report 104-
253. Each further amendment may be considered only in the order printed 
in the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the 
report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for 20 minutes, 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall 
not be subject to amendment except as specified in the report, and 
shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time 
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed 
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device 
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by 
electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not be 
less than 15 minutes.


   amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. Mc Dermott

  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the rule, I offer an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from Washington the designee of the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton]?
  Mr. McDERMOTT. I am, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of 
a substitute.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
     McDermott:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Cuban 
     Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Purposes.
Sec. 4. Definitions.

        TITLE I--SEEKING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
Sec. 102. Enforcement of the economic embargo of Cuba.
Sec. 103. Prohibition against indirect financing of the Castro 
              dictatorship.
Sec. 104. United States opposition to Cuban membership in international 
              financial institutions.
Sec. 105. United States opposition to ending the suspension of the 
              Government of Cuba from the Organization of American 
              States.
Sec. 106. Assistance by the Independent States of the former Soviet 
              Union for the Cuban Government.
Sec. 107. Television broadcasting to Cuba.
Sec. 108. Reports on assistance and commerce received by Cuba from 
              other foreign countries.
Sec. 109. Authorization of support for democratic and human rights 
              groups and international observers.
Sec. 110. Withholding of foreign assistance from countries supporting 
              nuclear plant in Cuba.
Sec. 111. Expulsion of criminals from Cuba.
Sec. 112. Exports of food or medical items.

          TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

Sec. 201. Policy toward a transition government and a democratically 
              elected government in Cuba.
Sec. 202. Assistance for the Cuban people.
Sec. 203. Coordination of assistance program; implementation and 
              reports to Congress; reprogramming.
Sec. 204. Termination of the economic embargo of Cuba.
Sec. 205. Requirements for a transition government.
Sec. 206. Requirements for a democratically elected government.

  TITLE III--PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS 
           AGAINST CONFISCATORY TAKINGS BY THE CASTRO REGIME

Sec. 301. Statement of policy.
Sec. 302. Liability for trafficking in property confiscated from United 
              States nationals.
Sec. 303. Determination of claims to confiscated property.
Sec. 304. Exclusivity of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 
              certification procedure.

                 TITLE IV--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

Sec. 401. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who have 
              confiscated property of United States nationals or who 
              traffic in such property.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at 
     least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a result of--
       (A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union 
     of between 5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually;
       (B) 36 years of Communist tyranny and economic 
     mismanagement by the Castro government;
       (C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and the 
     countries of the former Soviet bloc; and
       (D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and the 
     countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic 
     relations with Cuba on strictly commercial terms.
       (2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban 
     people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this 
     economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to 
     permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.
       (3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it 
     will not engage in any substantive political reforms that 
     would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic 
     recovery.
       (4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on 
     free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations 
     of fundamental human rights have isolated the Cuban regime as 
     the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western 
     Hemisphere.
       (5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the 
     economic condition of the country and the welfare of the 
     Cuban people will not improve in any significant way.

[[Page H 9378]]

       (6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has 
     deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve 
     their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to 
     risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from 
     Cuba to freedom.
       (7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been 
     effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news 
     and information and have helped to bolster the morale of the 
     people of Cuba living under tyranny.
       (8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba 
     since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both 
     Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep 
     faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in 
     sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.
       (9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and 
     considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human 
     rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter 
     of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of 
     Human Rights.
       (10) The Congress has historically and consistently 
     manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American 
     people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.
       (11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the 
     President to encourage the governments of countries that 
     conduct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit 
     relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes 
     of that Act.
       (12) The 1992 FREEDOM Support Act requires that the 
     President, in providing economic assistance to Russia and the 
     emerging Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent 
     to which they are acting to ``terminate support for the 
     communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, 
     closing military facilities, and ceasing trade subsidies and 
     economic, nuclear, and other assistance''.
       (13) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal 
     international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from 
     justice in the United States.
       (14) The Castro government threatens international peace 
     and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and 
     terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups 
     dedicated to international violence.
       (15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception 
     and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including 
     by psychiatry), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, 
     political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and 
     repression, as means of retaining power.
       (16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as 
     ``pluralistic garbage'' and continues to make clear that he 
     has no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban 
     society.
       (17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage in 
     Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because 
     relatives have escaped the country.
       (18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American 
     Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil 
     and Political Rights (which protects the right to leave one's 
     own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds embassies in its 
     capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens 
     to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the 
     Cuban people, punishing them by imprisonment for seeking to 
     leave the country and killing them for attempting to do so 
     (as demonstrated in the case of the confirmed murder of over 
     40 men, women, and children who were seeking to leave Cuba on 
     July 13, 1994).
       (19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail, 
     such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the 
     United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable 
     and illegal forms of conduct to influence the actions of 
     sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of 
     the Charter of the Organization of American States and other 
     international agreements and international law.
       (20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has 
     repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights 
     situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step of 
     appointing a Special Rapporteur.
       (21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access 
     to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its decision 
     not to ``implement so much as one comma'' of the United 
     Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur.
       (22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 
     1992/70 on December 4, 1992, Resolution 1993/48/142 on 
     December 20, 1993, and Resolution 1994/49/544 on October 19, 
     1994, referencing the Special Rapporteur's reports to the 
     United Nations and condemning ``violations of human rights 
     and fundamental freedoms'' in Cuba.
       (23) Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
     Charter provides that the United Nations Security Council 
     ``shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
     breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
     recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . 
     ., to maintain or restore international peace and 
     security.''.
       (24) The United Nations has determined that massive and 
     systematic violations of human rights may constitute a 
     ``threat to peace'' under Article 39 and has imposed 
     sanctions due to such violations of human rights in the cases 
     of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.
       (25) In the case of Haiti, a neighbor of Cuba not as close 
     to the United States as Cuba, the United States led an effort 
     to obtain and did obtain a United Nations Security Council 
     embargo and blockade against that country due to the 
     existence of a military dictatorship in power less than 3 
     years.
       (26) United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 
     31, 1994, subsequently authorized the use of ``all necessary 
     means'' to restore the ``democratically elected government of 
     Haiti'', and the democratically elected government of Haiti 
     was restored to power on October 15, 1994.
       (27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive 
     manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 
     years and the continued failure to do so constitutes 
     ethically improper conduct by the international community.
       (28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed 
     and continues to pose a national security threat to the 
     United States.

     SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are as follows:
       (1) To assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom 
     and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of 
     democracies that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere.
       (2) To seek international sanctions against the Castro 
     government in Cuba.
       (3) To encourage the holding of free and fair democratic 
     elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of 
     internationally recognized observers.
       (4) To develop a plan for furnishing assistance to a 
     transition government and, subsequently, to a democratically 
     elected government when such governments meet the eligibility 
     requirements of this Act.
       (5) To protect property rights abroad of United States 
     nationals.
       (6) To provide for the continued national security of the 
     United States in the face of continuing threats from the 
     Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from United 
     States nationals, and domestic repression from which refugees 
     flee to United States shores.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act, the following terms have the following 
     meanings:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on International Relations, the Committee on Ways and Means, 
     and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
     Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate.
       (2) Commercial activity.--The term ``commercial activity'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 1603(d) of title 
     28, United States Code.
       (3) Confiscated.--As used in titles I and III, the term 
     ``confiscated'' refers to--
       (A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by 
     the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property, on 
     or after January 1, 1959--
       (i) without the property having been returned or adequate 
     and effective compensation provided; or
       (ii) without the claim to the property having been settled 
     pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or 
     other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and
       (B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default 
     by the Cuban Government on, or the failure by the Cuban 
     Government to pay, on or after January 1, 1959--
       (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government;
       (ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; or
       (iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban Government in 
     satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated property claim.
       (4) Cuban government.--(A) The term ``Cuban Government'' 
     includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, 
     and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.
       (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba'' means an agency 
     or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 
     1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with ``Cuba'' 
     substituted for ``a foreign state'' each place it appears in 
     such section.
       (5) Democratically elected government in cuba.--The term 
     ``democratically elected government in Cuba'' means a 
     government determined by the President to have met the 
     requirements of section 206.
       (6) Economic embargo of cuba.--The term ``economic embargo 
     of Cuba'' refers to the economic embargo imposed against Cuba 
     pursuant to section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)), section 5(b) of the Trading With 
     the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)), the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 and following), 
     and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2401 and following), as modified by the Cuban Democracy Act 
     of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6001 and following).
       (7) Foreign national.--The term ``foreign national'' 
     means--
       (A) an alien; or
       (B) any corporation, trust, partnership, or other juridical 
     entity not organized under the laws of the United States, or 
     of any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico, or any other territory or possession of the 
     United States.
       (8) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' means with knowledge 
     or having reason to know.

[[Page H 9379]]

       (9) Property.--(A) The term ``property'' means any property 
     (including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and any other 
     form of intellectual property), whether real, personal, or 
     mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, 
     security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold 
     interest.
       (B) For purposes of title III of this Act, the term 
     ``property'' shall not include real property used for 
     residential purposes unless, as of the date of the enactment 
     of this Act--
       (i) the claim to the property is owned by a United States 
     national and the claim has been certified under title V of 
     the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949; or
       (ii) the property is occupied by a member or official of 
     the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.
       (10) Traffics.--(A) As used in title III, a person or 
     entity ``traffics'' in property if that person or entity 
     knowingly and intentionally--
       (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, 
     manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or 
     purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, 
     manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in 
     confiscated property,
       (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise 
     benefiting from confiscated property, or
       (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, 
     trafficking (as described in clauses (i) and (ii)) by another 
     person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in 
     clauses (i) and (ii)) through another person,
     without the authorization of the United States national who 
     holds a claim to the property.
       (B) The term ``traffics'' does not include--
       (i) the delivery of international telecommunication signals 
     to Cuba that are authorized by section 1705(e) of the Cuban 
     Democracy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004(e)); or
       (ii) the trading or holding of securities publicly traded 
     or held, unless the trading is with or by a person determined 
     by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a specially designated 
     national.
       (11) Transition government in cuba.--The term ``transition 
     government in Cuba'' means a government determined by the 
     President to have met the requirements of section 205.
       (12) United states national.--The term ``United States 
     national'' means--
       (A) any United States citizen; or
       (B) any other legal entity which is organized under the 
     laws of the United States, or of any State, the District of 
     Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other 
     territory or possession of the United States, and which has 
     its principal place of business in the United States.
        TITLE I--SEEKING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

     SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the acts of the Castro government, including its 
     massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of human 
     rights, are a threat to international peace;
       (2) the President should advocate, and should instruct the 
     United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
     to propose and seek, within the Security Council, a mandatory 
     international embargo against the totalitarian Cuban 
     Government pursuant to chapter VII of the Charter of the 
     United Nations, which is similar to measures taken by United 
     States representatives with respect to Haiti; and
       (3) any resumption or commencement of efforts by any state 
     to make operational the nuclear facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba, 
     will have a detrimental impact on United States assistance to 
     and relations with that state.

     SEC. 102. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.

       (a) Policy.--(1) The Congress hereby reaffirms section 
     1704(a) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 that states the 
     President should encourage foreign countries to restrict 
     trade and credit relations with Cuba.
       (2) The Congress further urges the President to take 
     immediate steps to apply the sanctions described in section 
     1704(b) of that Act against countries assisting Cuba.
       (b) Diplomatic Efforts.--The Secretary of State shall 
     ensure that United States diplomatic personnel abroad 
     understand and, in their contacts with foreign officials, are 
     communicating the reasons for the United States economic 
     embargo of Cuba, and are urging foreign governments to 
     cooperate more effectively with the embargo.
       (c) Existing Regulations.--The President should instruct 
     the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to 
     enforce fully the Cuban Assets Control Regulations set forth 
     in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (d) Trading With the Enemy Act.--
       (1) Civil penalties.--Subsection (b) of section 16 of the 
     Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 16(b)) is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(b)(1) A civil penalty of not to exceed $50,000 may be 
     imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury on any person who 
     violates any license, order, rule, or regulation issued in 
     compliance with the provisions of this Act.
       ``(2) Any property, funds, securities, papers, or other 
     articles or documents, or any vessel, together with its 
     tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, that is the 
     subject of a violation under paragraph (1) shall, at the 
     discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, be forfeited to 
     the United States Government.
       ``(3) The penalties provided under this subsection may not 
     be imposed for--
       ``(A) news gathering, research, or the export or import of, 
     or transmission of, information or informational materials; 
     or
       ``(B) clearly defined educational or religious activities, 
     or activities of recognized human rights organizations, that 
     are reasonably limited in frequency, duration, and number of 
     participants.
       ``(4) The penalties provided under this subsection may be 
     imposed only on the record after opportunity for an agency 
     hearing in accordance with sections 554 through 557 of title 
     5, United States Code, with the right to prehearing 
     discovery.
       ``(5) Judicial review of any penalty imposed under this 
     subsection may be had to the extent provided in section 702 
     of title 5, United States Code.''.
       (2) Forfeiture of property used in violation.--Section 16 
     of the Trading With the Enemy Act is further amended by 
     striking subsection (c).
       (3) Clerical amendment.--Section 16 of the Trading With the 
     Enemy Act is further amended by inserting ``Sec. 16.'' before 
     ``(a)''.
       (e) Coverage of Debt-for-Equity Swaps by Economic Embargo 
     of Cuba.--Section 1704(b)(2) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 
     1992 (22 U.S.C. 6003(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A);
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(B) includes an exchange, reduction, or forgiveness of 
     Cuban debt owed to a foreign country in return for a grant of 
     an equity interest in a property, investment, or operation of 
     the Government of Cuba (including the government of any 
     political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba) or of a Cuban 
     national; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following flush sentence:
     ``As used in this paragraph, the term `agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba' means an agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 
     1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with `Cuba' 
     substituted for `a foreign state' each place it appears in 
     such section.''.

     SEC. 103. PROHIBITION AGAINST INDIRECT FINANCING OF THE 
                   CASTRO DICTATORSHIP.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, no loan, credit, or other financing may be extended 
     knowingly by a United States national, permanent resident 
     alien, or United States agency, to a foreign national, United 
     States national, or permanent resident alien, in order to 
     finance transactions involving any confiscated property the 
     claim to which is owned by a United States national as of the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Termination of Prohibition.--The prohibition of 
     subsection (a) shall cease to apply on the date on which the 
     economic embargo of Cuba terminates under section 205.
       (c) Penalties.--Violations of subsection (a) shall be 
     punishable by the same penalties as are applicable to 
     violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations set forth 
     in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``permanent resident alien'' means an alien 
     admitted for permanent residence into the United States; and
       (2) the term ``United States agency'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``agency'' in section 551(1) of title 5, United 
     States Code.

     SEC. 104. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO CUBAN MEMBERSHIP IN 
                   INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       (a) Continued Opposition to Cuban Membership in 
     International Financial Institutions.--(1) Except as provided 
     in paragraph (2), the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     instruct the United States executive director to each 
     international financial institution to use the voice and vote 
     of the United States to oppose the admission of Cuba as a 
     member of that institution until the President submits a 
     determination under section 203(c)(3) that a democratically 
     elected government in Cuba is in power.
       (2) Once the President submits a determination under 
     section 203(c)(1) that a transition government in Cuba is in 
     power, the President is encouraged to take steps to support 
     the processing of Cuba's application for membership in any 
     international financial institution, subject to the 
     membership taking effect after a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba is in power.
       (b) Reduction in United States Payments to International 
     Financial Institutions.--If any international financial 
     institution approves a loan or other assistance to the Cuban 
     Government over the opposition of the United States, then the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold from payment to that 
     institution an amount equal to the amount of the loan or 
     other assistance to the Cuban Government, with respect to 
     each of the following types of payment:
       (1) The paid-in portion of the increase in capital stock of 
     the institution.
       (2) The callable portion of the increase in capital stock 
     of the institution.
       (c) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``international financial institution'' means the 
     International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development, the International Development 
     Association, the International Finance Corporation, the 
     Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the Inter-
     American Development Bank.
     
[[Page H 9380]]


     SEC. 105. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO ENDING THE SUSPENSION 
                   OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FROM THE ORGANIZATION 
                   OF AMERICAN STATES.

       The President should instruct the United States Permanent 
     Representative to the Organization of American States to use 
     the voice and vote of the United States to oppose ending the 
     suspension of the Government of Cuba from the Organization 
     until the President determines under section 203(c)(3) that a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba is in power.

     SEC. 106. ASSISTANCE BY THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER 
                   SOVIET UNION FOR THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.

       (a) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     detailing progress towards the withdrawal of personnel of any 
     independent state of the former Soviet Union (within the 
     meaning of section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 
     5801)), including advisers, technicians, and military 
     personnel, from the Cienfuegos nuclear facility in Cuba.
       (b) Criteria for Assistance.--Section 498A(a)(11) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295a(a)(11)) is 
     amended by striking ``of military facilities'' and inserting 
     ``military and intelligence facilities, including the 
     military and intelligence facilities at Lourdes and 
     Cienfuegos''.
       (c) Ineligibility for Assistance.--(1) Section 498A(b) of 
     that Act (22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (4);
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
       ``(5) for the government of any independent state effective 
     30 days after the President has determined and certified to 
     the appropriate congressional committees (and Congress has 
     not enacted legislation disapproving the determination within 
     that 30-day period) that such government is providing 
     assistance for, or engaging in nonmarket based trade (as 
     defined in section 498B(k)(3)) with, the Cuban Government; 
     or''.
       (2) Subsection (k) of section 498B of that Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2295b(k)), is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) Nonmarket based trade.--As used in section 
     498A(b)(5), the term `nonmarket based trade' includes 
     exports, imports, exchanges, or other arrangements that are 
     provided for goods and services (including oil and other 
     petroleum products) on terms more favorable than those 
     generally available in applicable markets or for comparable 
     commodities, including--
       ``(A) exports to the Cuban Government on terms that involve 
     a grant, concessional price, guaranty, insurance, or subsidy;
       ``(B) imports from the Cuban Government at preferential 
     tariff rates;
       ``(C) exchange arrangements that include advance delivery 
     of commodities, arrangements in which the Cuban Government is 
     not held accountable for unfulfilled exchange contracts, and 
     arrangements under which Cuba does not pay appropriate 
     transportation, insurance, or finance costs; and
       ``(D) the exchange, reduction, or forgiveness of Cuban debt 
     in return for a grant by the Cuban Government of an equity 
     interest in a property, investment, or operation of the Cuban 
     Government or of a Cuban national.
       ``(4) Cuban government.--(A) The term `Cuban Government' 
     includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba, 
     and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.
       ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term `agency or 
     instrumentality of the Government of Cuba' means an agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 
     1603(b) of title 28, United States Code, with `Cuba' 
     substituted for `a foreign state' each place it appears in 
     such section.''.
       (d) Facilities at Lourdes, Cuba.--(1) The Congress 
     expresses its strong disapproval of the extension by Russia 
     of credits equivalent to approximately $200,000,000 in 
     support of the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, in 
     November 1994.
       (2) Section 498A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2295a) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(d) Reduction in Assistance for Support of Intelligence 
     Facilities in Cuba.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the President shall withhold from assistance 
     provided, on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     subsection, for an independent state of the former Soviet 
     Union under this chapter an amount equal to the sum of 
     assistance and credits, if any, provided on or after such 
     date by such state in support of intelligence facilities in 
     Cuba, including the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
       ``(2)(A) The President may waive the requirement of 
     paragraph (1) to withhold assistance if the President 
     certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     the provision of such assistance is important to the national 
     security of the United States, and, in the case of such a 
     certification made with respect to Russia, if the President 
     certifies that the Russian Government has assured the United 
     States Government that the Russian Government is not sharing 
     intelligence data collected at the Lourdes facility with 
     officials or agents of the Cuban Government.
       ``(B) At the time of a certification made with respect to 
     Russia pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President shall also 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing the intelligence activities of Russia in Cuba, 
     including the purposes for which the Lourdes facility is used 
     by the Russian Government and the extent to which the Russian 
     Government provides payment or government credits to the 
     Cuban Government for the continued use of the Lourdes 
     facility.
       ``(C) The report required by subparagraph (B) may be 
     submitted in classified form.
       ``(D) For purposes of this paragraph, the term `appropriate 
     congressional committees' includes the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(3) The requirement of paragraph (1) to withhold 
     assistance shall not apply with respect to--
       ``(A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs, 
     including disaster and refugee relief;
       ``(B) democratic political reform and rule of law 
     activities;
       ``(C) technical assistance for safety upgrades of civilian 
     nuclear power plants;
       ``(D) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental 
     organizations that are independent of government control;
       ``(E) the development of a free market economic system; and
       ``(F) assistance for the purposes described in the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public 
     Law 103-160).''.

     SEC. 107. TELEVISION BROADCASTING TO CUBA.

       (a) Conversion to UHF.--The Director of the United States 
     Information Agency shall implement a conversion of television 
     broadcasting to Cuba under the Television Marti Service to 
     ultra high frequency (UHF) broadcasting.
       (b) Periodic Reports.--Not later than 45 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every three months 
     thereafter until the conversion described in subsection (a) 
     is fully implemented, the Director of the United States 
     Information Agency shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees on the progress made in carrying out 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Termination of Broadcasting Authorities.--Upon 
     transmittal of a determination under section 203(c)(3), the 
     Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465aa and 
     following) and the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 
     1465 and following) are repealed.

     SEC. 108. REPORTS ON ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCE RECEIVED BY CUBA 
                   FROM OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

       (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and every year thereafter, 
     the President shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees on assistance and commerce received 
     by Cuba from other foreign countries during the preceding 12-
     month period.
       (b) Contents of Reports.--Each report required by 
     subsection (a) shall, for the period covered by the report, 
     contain the following, to the extent such information is 
     known:
       (1) A description of all bilateral assistance provided to 
     Cuba by other foreign countries, including humanitarian 
     assistance.
       (2) A description of Cuba's commerce with foreign 
     countries, including an identification of Cuba's trading 
     partners and the extent of such trade.
       (3) A description of the joint ventures completed, or under 
     consideration, by foreign nationals involving facilities in 
     Cuba, including an identification of the location of the 
     facilities involved and a description of the terms of 
     agreement of the joint ventures and the names of the parties 
     that are involved.
       (4) A determination whether or not any of the facilities 
     described in paragraph (3) is the subject of a claim by a 
     United States national.
       (5) A determination of the amount of Cuban debt owed to 
     each foreign country, including--
       (A) the amount of debt exchanged, forgiven, or reduced 
     under the terms of each investment or operation in Cuba 
     involving foreign nationals; and
       (B) the amount of debt owed to the foreign country that has 
     been exchanged, reduced, or forgiven in return for a grant by 
     the Cuban Government of an equity interest in a property, 
     investment, or operation of the Cuban Government or of a 
     Cuban national.
       (6) A description of the steps taken to ensure that raw 
     materials and semifinished or finished goods produced by 
     facilities in Cuba involving foreign nationals do not enter 
     the United States market, either directly or through third 
     countries or parties.
       (7) An identification of countries that purchase, or have 
     purchased, arms or military supplies from the Cuban 
     Government or that otherwise have entered into agreements 
     with the Cuban Government that have a military application, 
     including--
       (A) a description of the military supplies, equipment, or 
     other materiel sold, bartered, or exchanged between the Cuban 
     Government and such countries;
       (B) a listing of the goods, services, credits, or other 
     consideration received by the Cuban Government in exchange 
     for military supplies, equipment, or materiel; and
       (C) the terms or conditions of any such agreement.
     
[[Page H 9381]]


     SEC. 109. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC AND HUMAN 
                   RIGHTS GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.

       (a) Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, except for section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1) and comparable notification 
     requirements contained in any Act making appropriations for 
     foreign operations, export financing, and related programs, 
     the President is authorized to furnish assistance and provide 
     other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental 
     organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba, 
     including the following:
       (1) Published and informational matter, such as books, 
     videos, and cassettes, on transitions to democracy, human 
     rights, and market economies, to be made available to 
     independent democratic groups in Cuba.
       (2) Humanitarian assistance to victims of political 
     repression, and their families.
       (3) Support for democratic and human rights groups in Cuba.
       (4) Support for visits and permanent deployment of 
     independent international human rights monitors in Cuba.
       (b) OAS Emergency Fund.--(1) The President shall take the 
     necessary steps to encourage the Organization of American 
     States to create a special emergency fund for the explicit 
     purpose of deploying human rights observers, election 
     support, and election observation in Cuba.
       (2) The President should instruct the United States 
     Permanent Representative to the Organization of American 
     States to encourage other member states of the Organization 
     to join in calling for the Cuban Government to allow the 
     immediate deployment of independent human rights monitors of 
     the Organization throughout Cuba and on-site visits to Cuba 
     by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
       (3) Notwithstanding section 307 of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227) or any other provision of law 
     limiting the United States proportionate share of assistance 
     to Cuba by any international organization, the President 
     should provide not less than $5,000,000 of the voluntary 
     contributions of the United States to the Organization of 
     American States as of the date of the enactment of this Act 
     solely for the purposes of the special fund referred to in 
     paragraph (1).

     SEC. 110. WITHHOLDING OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FROM COUNTRIES 
                   SUPPORTING NUCLEAR PLANT IN CUBA.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) President Clinton stated in April 1993 that ``the 
     United States opposes the construction of the Juragua nuclear 
     power plant because of our concerns about Cuba's ability to 
     ensure the safe operation of the facility and because of 
     Cuba's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     or ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.''.
       (2) Cuba has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
     of Nuclear Weapons or ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 
     latter of which establishes Latin America and the Caribbean 
     as a nuclear weapons-free zone.
       (3) The State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission, and the Department of Energy have expressed 
     concerns about the construction and operation of Cuba's 
     nuclear reactors.
       (4) In a September 1992 report to Congress, the General 
     Accounting Office outlined concerns among nuclear energy 
     experts about deficiencies in the nuclear plant project in 
     Juragua, near Cienfuegos, Cuba, including--
       (A) a lack in Cuba of a nuclear regulatory structure;
       (B) the absence in Cuba of an adequate infrastructure to 
     ensure the plant's safe operation and requisite maintenance;
       (C) the inadequacy of training of plant operators;
       (D) reports by a former technician from Cuba who, by 
     examining with x-rays weld sites believed to be part of the 
     auxiliary plumbing system for the plant, found that 10 to 15 
     percent of those sites were defective;
       (E) since September 5, 1992, when construction on the plant 
     was halted, the prolonged exposure to the elements, including 
     corrosive salt water vapor, of the primary reactor 
     components; and
       (F) the possible inadequacy of the upper portion of the 
     reactors' dome retention capability to withstand only 7 
     pounds of pressure per square inch, given that normal 
     atmospheric pressure is 32 pounds per square inch and United 
     States reactors are designed to accommodate pressures of 50 
     pounds per square inch.
       (5) The United States Geological Survey claims that it had 
     difficulty determining answers to specific questions 
     regarding earthquake activity in the area near Cienfuegos 
     because the Cuban Government was not forthcoming with 
     information.
       (6) The Geological Survey has indicated that the Caribbean 
     plate, a geological formation near the south coast of Cuba, 
     may pose seismic risks to Cuba and the site of the power 
     plant, and may produce large to moderate earthquakes.
       (7) On May 25, 1992, the Caribbean plate produced an 
     earthquake numbering 7.0 on the Richter scale.
       (8) According to a study by the National Oceanic and 
     Atmospheric Administration, summer winds could carry 
     radioactive pollutants from a nuclear accident at the power 
     plant throughout all of Florida and parts of the States on 
     the gulf coast as far as Texas, and northern winds could 
     carry the pollutants as far northeast as Virginia and 
     Washington, D.C.
       (9) The Cuban Government, under dictator Fidel Castro, in 
     1962 advocated the Soviets' launching of nuclear missiles to 
     the United States, which represented a direct and dangerous 
     provocation of the United States and brought the world to the 
     brink of a nuclear conflict.
       (10) Fidel Castro over the years has consistently issued 
     threats against the United States Government, most recently 
     that he would unleash another perilous mass migration from 
     Cuba upon the enactment of this Act.
       (11) Despite the various concerns about the plant's safety 
     and operational problems, a feasibility study is being 
     conducted that would establish a support group to include 
     Russia, Cuba, and third countries with the objective of 
     completing and operating the plant.
       (b) Withholding of Foreign Assistance.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the President shall withhold from assistance allocated, 
     on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, for any 
     country an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits, 
     if any, provided on or after such date of enactment by that 
     country or any entity in that country in support of the 
     completion of the Cuban nuclear facility at Juragua, near 
     Cienfuegos, Cuba.
       (2) Exceptions.--The requirement of paragraph (1) to 
     withhold assistance shall not apply with respect to--
       (A) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs, including 
     disaster and refugee relief;
       (B) democratic political reform and rule of law activities;
       (C) the creation of private sector and nongovernmental 
     organizations that are independent of government control;
       (D) the development of a free market economic system; and
       (E) assistance for the purposes described in the 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public 
     Law 103-160).
       (3) Definition.--As used in paragraph (1), the term 
     ``assistance'' means assistance under the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961, credits, sales, and guarantees of extensions of 
     credit under the Arms Export Control Act, assistance under 
     titles I and III of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
     Assistance Act of 1954, assistance under the FREEDOM Support 
     Act of 1992, and any other program of assistance or credits 
     provided by the United States to other countries under other 
     provisions of law, except that the term ``assistance'' does 
     not include humanitarian assistance, including disaster 
     relief assistance.

     SEC. 111. EXPULSION OF CRIMINALS FROM CUBA.

       The President shall instruct all United States Government 
     officials who engage in official conduct with the Cuban 
     Government to raise on a regular basis the extradition of or 
     rendering to the United States all persons residing in Cuba 
     who are sought by the United States Department of Justice for 
     crimes committed in the United States.

     SEC. 112. EXPORTS OF FOOD OR MEDICAL ITEMS.

       (a) Amendment to Embargo Authority in the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961.--Section 620(a)(1) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 u.S.C. 2370(a)(1)) is amended by 
     striking the period at the end of the second sentence and 
     inserting the following: ``, except that any such embargo 
     shall not apply with respect to the export of any medicines 
     or medical supplies, instruments, or equipment, or staple 
     foods. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 
     `staple foods' means meat, poultry, fish, bread, cereals, 
     grains, vegetables, fruits, and dairy products.''.
       (b) Limitation on Existing Restrictions on Trade With 
     Cuba.--Upon the enactment of this Act, any regulation, 
     proclamation, or provision of law, including Presidential 
     Proclamation 3447 of February 8, 1962, the Export 
     Administration Regulations (15 CFR 368-399), and the Cuban 
     Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR 515), that prohibits 
     exports to Cuba or transactions involving exports to Cuba and 
     that is in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     shall not apply with respect to the export to Cuba of 
     medicines or medical supplies, instruments, or equipment, or 
     staple foods.
       (c) Limitation on the Future Exercise of Authority.--
       (1) Export administration act of 1979.--After the enactment 
     of this Act, the President may not exercise the authorities 
     contained in the Export Administration Act of 1979 to 
     restrict the exportation to Cuba--
       (A) a medicines or medical supplies, instruments, or 
     equipment, except to the extent such restrictions would be 
     permitted under section 5 of that Act for goods containing 
     parts or components subjects to export controls under such 
     section; or
       (B) of staple foods.
       (2) International emergency economic powers act.--After the 
     enactment of this Act, the President may not exercise the 
     authorities contained in section 203 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act to restrict the export to 
     Cuba--
       (A) of medicines or medical supplies, instruments, or 
     equipment, to the extent such authorities are exercised to 
     deal with a threat to the foreign policy or economy of the 
     United States; or
       (B) of staple foods.
       (d) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``staple foods'' means meat, poultry, fish, bread, cereals, 
     grains, vegetables, fruits, and dairy products.
       (e) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 1705 of the Cuban 
     Democracy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004) is amended--

[[Page H 9382]]

       (A) in subsection (b)--
       (i) in the subsection caption by inserting ``and Exports of 
     Staple Foods'' after ``Food''; and
       (ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting the 
     following: ``or prohibit exports to Cuba of staple foods. For 
     purposes of the preceding sentence, the term `staple foods' 
     means meat, poultry, fish, bread, cereals, grains, 
     vegetables, fruits, and dairy products.'';
       (B) by amending subsection (c)(1) to read as follows:
       ``(1) except to the extent such restrictions--
       ``(A) would be permitted under section 5 of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 for goods containing parts or 
     components subject to export controls under such section; or
       ``(B) are imposed under section 208 of the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act to deal with a threat to the 
     national security of the United States;''; and
       (C) by striking subsection (d) and redesignating 
     subsections (e), (f), and (g) as subsections (d), (e), and 
     (f), respectively.
       (2) Section 1704(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 
     1992 (22 U.S.C. 6003(b)(2)(B)(i)) is amended by inserting 
     after ``Cuba,'' the following: ``or exports of staple foods 
     permitted under section 1705(b),''.
          TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

     SEC. 201. POLICY TOWARD A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND A 
                   DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.

       The policy of the United States is as follows:
       (1) To support the self-determination of the Cuban people.
       (2) To recognize that the self-determination of the Cuban 
     people is a sovereign and national right of the citizens of 
     Cuba which must be exercised free of interference by the 
     government of any other country.
       (3) To encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves 
     with a government which reflects the self-determination of 
     the Cuban people.
       (4) To recognize the potential for a difficult transition 
     from the current regime in Cuba that may result from the 
     initiatives taken by the Cuban people for self-determination 
     in response to the intransigence of the Castro regime in not 
     allowing any substantive political or economic reforms, and 
     to be prepared to provide the Cuban people with humanitarian, 
     developmental, and other economic assistance.
       (5) In solidarity with the Cuban people, to provide 
     appropriate forms of assistance--
       (A) to a transition government in Cuba;
       (B) to facilitate the rapid movement from such a transition 
     government to a democratically elected government in Cuba 
     that results from an expression of the self-determination of 
     the Cuban people; and
       (C) to support such a democratically elected government.
       (6) Through such assistance, to facilitate a peaceful 
     transition to representative democracy and a market economy 
     in Cuba and to consolidate democracy in Cuba.
       (7) To deliver such assistance to the Cuban people only 
     through a transition government in Cuba, through a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba, through United 
     States Government organizations, or through United States, 
     international, or indigenous nongovernmental organizations.
       (8) To encourage other countries and multilateral 
     organizations to provide similar assistance, and to work 
     cooperatively with such countries and organizations to 
     coordinate such assistance.
       (9) To ensure that appropriate assistance is rapidly 
     provided and distributed to the people of Cuba upon the 
     institution of a transition government in Cuba.
       (10) Not to provide favorable treatment or influence on 
     behalf of any individual or entity in the selection by the 
     Cuban people of their future government.
       (11) To assist a transition government in Cuba and a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba to prepare the 
     Cuban military forces for an appropriate role in a democracy.
       (12) To be prepared to enter into negotiations with a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba either to return 
     the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo to Cuba or to 
     renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable 
     terms.
       (13) To consider the restoration of diplomatic recognition 
     and support the reintegration of the Cuban Government into 
     Inter-American organizations when the President determines 
     that there exists a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba.
       (14) To take steps to remove the economic embargo of Cuba 
     when the President determines that a transition to a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba has begun.
       (15) To assist a democratically elected government in Cuba 
     to strengthen and stabilize its national currency.
       (16) To pursue trade relations with a free, democratic, and 
     independent Cuba.

     SEC. 202. ASSISTANCE FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

       (a) Authorization.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall develop a plan for 
     providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time as the 
     President determines that a transition government or a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba (as determined 
     under section 203(c)) is in power.
       (2) Effect on other laws.--Assistance may be provided under 
     this section subject to an authorization of appropriations 
     and subject to the availability of appropriations.
       (b) Plan for Assistance.--
       (1) Development of plan.--The President shall develop a 
     plan for providing assistance under this section--
       (A) to Cuba when a transition government in Cuba is in 
     power; and
       (B) to Cuba when a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba is in power.
       (2) Types of assistance.--Assistance under the plan 
     developed under paragraph (1) may, subject to an 
     authorization of appropriations and subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, include the following:
       (A) Transition government.--(i) Except as provided in 
     clause (ii), assistance to Cuba under a transition government 
     shall, subject to an authorization of appropriations and 
     subject to the availability of appropriations, be limited 
     to--
       (I) such food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment, 
     and assistance to meet emergency energy needs, as is 
     necessary to meet the basic human needs of the Cuban people; 
     and
       (II) assistance described in subparagraph (C).
       (ii) Assistance provided only after the President certifies 
     to the appropriate congressional committees, in accordance 
     with procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications 
     under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
     that such assistance is essential to the successful 
     completion of the transition to democracy.
       (iii) Only after a transition government in Cuba is in 
     power, remittances by individuals to their relatives of cash 
     or goods, as well as freedom to travel to visit them without 
     any restrictions, shall be permitted.
       (B) Democratically elected government.--Assistance to a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba may, subject to an 
     authorization of appropriations and subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, consist of additional 
     economic assistance, together with assistance described in 
     subparagraph (C). Such economic assistance may include--
       (i) assistance under chapter 1 of part I (relating to 
     development assistance), and chapter 4 of part II (relating 
     to the economic support fund), of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961;
       (ii) assistance under the Agricultural Trade Development 
     and Assistance Act of 1954;
       (iii) financing, guarantees, and other forms of assistance 
     provided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
       (iv) financial support provided by the Overseas Private 
     Investment Corporation for investment projects in Cuba;
       (v) assistance provided by the Trade and Development 
     Agency;
       (vi) Peace Corps programs; and
       (vii) other appropriate assistance to carry out the policy 
     of section 201.
       (C) Military adjustment assistance.--Assistance to a 
     transition government in Cuba and to a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba shall also include assistance in preparing 
     the Cuban military forces to adjust to an appropriate role in 
     a democracy.
       (c) Strategy for Distribution.--The plan developed under 
     subsection (b) shall include a strategy for distributing 
     assistance under the plan.
       (d) Distribution.--Assistance under the plan developed 
     under subsection (b) shall be provided through United States 
     Government organizations and nongovernmental organizations 
     and private and voluntary organizations, whether within or 
     outside the United States, including humanitarian, 
     educational, labor, and private sector organizations.
       (e) International Efforts.--The President shall take the 
     necessary steps--
       (1) to seek to obtain the agreement of other countries and 
     of international financial institutions and multilateral 
     organizations to provide to a transition government in Cuba, 
     and to a democratically elected government in Cuba, 
     assistance comparable to that provided by the United States 
     under this Act; and
       (2) to work with such countries, institutions, and 
     organizations to coordinate all such assistance programs.
       (f) Communication With the Cuban People.--The President 
     shall take the necessary steps to communicate to the Cuban 
     people the plan for assistance developed under this section.
       (g) Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing in detail the plan developed under this section.
       (h) Trade and Investment Relations.--
       (1) Report to congress.--The President, following the 
     transmittal to the Congress of a determination under section 
     203(c)(3) that a democratically elected government in Cuba is 
     in power, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that describes--
       (A) acts, policies, and practices that constitute 
     significant barriers to, or distortions of, United States 
     trade in goods or services or foreign direct investment with 
     respect to Cuba;
       (B) policy objectives of the United States regarding trade 
     relations with a democratically elected government in Cuba, 
     and the reasons therefor, including possible--
       (i) reciprocal extension of nondiscriminatory trade 
     treatment (most-favored-nation treatment);
       (ii) designation of Cuba as a beneficiary developing 
     country under title V of the Trade 

[[Page H 9383]]
     Act of 1974 (relating to the Generalized System of Preferences) or as a 
     beneficiary country under the Caribbean Basin Economic 
     Recovery Act, and the implications of such designation with 
     respect to trade with any other country that is such a 
     beneficiary developing country or beneficiary country or is a 
     party to the North American Free Trade Agreement; and
       (iii) negotiations regarding free trade, including the 
     accession of Cuba to the North American Free Trade Agreement;
       (C) specific trade negotiating objectives of the United 
     States with respect to Cuba, including the objectives 
     described in section 108(b)(5) of the North American Free 
     Trade Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 3317(b)(5)); 
     and
       (D) actions proposed or anticipated to be undertaken, and 
     any proposed legislation necessary or appropriate, to achieve 
     any of such policy and negotiating objectives.
       (2) Consultations.--The President shall consult with the 
     appropriate congressional committees and shall seek advice 
     from the appropriate advisory committees established under 
     section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding the policy and 
     negotiating objectives and the legislative proposals 
     described in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 203. COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAM; IMPLEMENTATION 
                   AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS; REPROGRAMMING.

       (a) Coordinating Official.--The President shall designate a 
     coordinating official who shall be responsible for--
       (1) implementing the strategy for distributing assistance 
     described in section 202(b);
       (2) ensuring the speedy and efficient distribution of such 
     assistance; and
       (3) ensuring coordination among, and appropriate oversight 
     by, the agencies of the United States that provide assistance 
     described in section 202(b), including resolving any disputes 
     among such agencies.
       (b) United States-Cuba Council.--Upon making a 
     determination under subsection (c)(3) that a democratically 
     elected government in Cuba is in power, the President, after 
     consultation with the coordinating official, is authorized to 
     designate a United States-Cuba council--
       (1) to ensure coordination between the United States 
     Government and the private sector in responding to change in 
     Cuba, and in promoting market-based development in Cuba; and
       (2) to establish periodic meetings between representatives 
     of the United States and Cuban private sectors for the 
     purpose of facilitating bilateral trade.
       (c) Implementation of Plan; Reports to Congress.--
       (1) Implementation with respect to transition government.--
     Upon making a determination that a transition government in 
     Cuba is in power, the President shall transmit that 
     determination to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     shall, subject to an authorization of appropriations and 
     subject to the availability of appropriations, commence the 
     delivery and distribution of assistance to such transition 
     government under the plan developed under section 202(b).
       (2) Reports to congress.--(A) The President shall transmit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting 
     forth the strategy for providing assistance described in 
     section 202(b)(2) (A) and (C) to the transition government in 
     Cuba under the plan of assistance developed under section 
     202(b), the types of such assistance, and the extent to which 
     such assistance has been distributed in accordance with the 
     plan.
       (B) The President shall transmit the report not later than 
     90 days after making the determination referred to in 
     paragraph (1), except that the President shall transmit the 
     report in preliminary form not later than 15 days after 
     making that determination.
       (3) Implementation with respect to democratically elected 
     government.--The President shall, upon determining that a 
     democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, submit 
     that determination to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and shall, subject to an authorization of 
     appropriations and subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, commence the delivery and distribution of 
     assistance to such democratically elected government under 
     the plan developed under section 202(b).
       (4) Annual reports to congress.--Not later than 60 days 
     after the end of each fiscal year, the President shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     on the assistance provided under the plan developed under 
     section 202(b), including a description of each type of 
     assistance, the amounts expended for such assistance, and a 
     description of the assistance to be provided under the plan 
     in the current fiscal year.
       (d) Reprogramming.--Any changes in the assistance to be 
     provided under the plan developed under section 202(b) may 
     not be made unless the President notifies the appropriate 
     congressional committees at least 15 days in advance in 
     accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
     notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1).

     SEC. 204. TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.

       (a) Presidential Actions.--Upon submitting a determination 
     to the appropriate congressional committees under section 
     203(c)(1) that a transition government in Cuba is in power, 
     the President, after consulting with the Congress, is 
     authorized to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of 
     Cuba to the extent that such action contributes to a stable 
     foundation for a democratically elected government in Cuba.
       (b) Suspension of Certain Provisions of Law.--In carrying 
     out subsection (a), the President may suspend the enforcement 
     of--
       (1) section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(a));
       (2) section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)) with regard to the ``Republic of Cuba'';
       (3) sections 1704, 1705(d), and 1706 of the Cuban Democracy 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 6003, 6004(d), 6005);
       (4) section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985; and
       (5) the prohibitions on transactions described in part 515 
     of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (c) Additional Presidential Actions.--Upon submitting a 
     determination to the appropriate congressional committees 
     under section 203(c)(3) that a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take 
     steps to terminate the economic embargo of Cuba.
       (d) Conforming Amendments.--On the date on which the 
     President submits a determination under section 203(c)(3)--
       (1) section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)) is repealed;
       (2) section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)) is amended by striking ``Republic of 
     Cuba'';
       (3) sections 1704, 1705(d), and 1706 of the Cuban Democracy 
     Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6003, 6004(d), and 6005) are repealed; 
     and
       (4) section 902(c) of the Food Security Act of 1985 is 
     repealed.
       (e) Review of Suspension of Economic Embargo.--
       (1) Review.--If the President takes action under subsection 
     (a) to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba, the President 
     shall immediately so notify the Congress. The President shall 
     report to the Congress no less frequently than every 6 months 
     thereafter, until he submits a determination under section 
     203(c)(3) that a democratically elected government in Cuba is 
     in power, on the progress being made by Cuba toward the 
     establishment of such a democratically elected government. 
     The action of the President under subsection (a) shall cease 
     to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution 
     described in paragraph (2).
       (2) Joint resolutions.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint resolution 
     of the 2 Houses of Congress, the matter after the resolving 
     clause of which is as follows: ``That the Congress 
     disapproves the action of the President under section 204(a) 
     of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act 
     of 1995 to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba, notice of 
     which was submitted to the Congress on ____.'', with the 
     blank space being filled with the appropriate date.
       (3) Referral to committees.--Joint resolutions introduced 
     in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and joint resolutions 
     introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations.
       (4) Procedures.--(A) Any joint resolution shall be 
     considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 
     section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and 
     Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
       (B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 
     enactment of joint resolutions, a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of any joint resolution after it has been 
     reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as 
     highly privileged in the House of Representatives.
       (C) Not more than 1 joint resolution may be considered in 
     the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 6-month 
     period beginning on the date on which the President notifies 
     the Congress under paragraph (1) of the action taken under 
     subsection (a), and in each 6-month period thereafter.

     SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

       For purposes of this Act, a transition government in Cuba 
     is a government in Cuba which--
       (1) is demonstrably in transition from communist 
     totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;
       (2) has recognized the right to independent political 
     activity and association;
       (3) has released all political prisoners and allowed for 
     investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international 
     human rights organizations;
       (4) has ceased any interference with Radio or Television 
     Marti broadcasts;
       (5) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable 
     progress in--
       (A) establishing an independent judiciary;
       (B) dissolving the present Department of State Security in 
     the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees 
     for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response 
     Brigades;
       (C) respecting internationally recognized human rights and 
     basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
     Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;
       (D) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and 
     freedom of the press;
       (E) organizing free and fair elections for a new 
     government--
       (i) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to 
     exceed 1 year after the transition government assumes power;

[[Page H 9384]]

       (ii) with the participation of multiple independent 
     political parties that have full access to the media on an 
     equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or 
     other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of 
     time for such access and the times of day such allotments are 
     given; and
       (iii) to be conducted under the supervision of 
     internationally recognized observers, such as the 
     Organization of American States, the United Nations, and 
     other elections monitors;
       (F) assuring the right to private property;
       (G) taking appropriate steps to return to United States 
     citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken 
     by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
     after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation 
     to such citizens and entities for such property;
       (H) granting permits to privately owned telecommunications 
     and media companies to operate in Cuba; and
       (I) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions 
     as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International 
     Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of 
     independent social, economic, and political associations;
       (6) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro;
       (7) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the 
     speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban 
     people;
       (8) permits the deployment throughout Cuba of independent 
     and unfettered international human rights monitors; and
       (9) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United 
     States all persons sought by the United States Department of 
     Justice for crimes committed in the United States.

     SEC. 206. REQUIREMENTS FOR A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       For purposes of this Act, a democratically elected 
     government in Cuba, in addition to continuing to comply with 
     the requirements of section 205, is a government in Cuba 
     which--
       (1) results from free and fair elections conducted under 
     the supervision of internationally recognized observers;
       (2) has permitted opposition parties ample time to organize 
     and campaign for such elections, and has permitted full 
     access to the media to all candidates in the elections;
       (3) is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and 
     human rights of the citizens of Cuba;
       (4) has made demonstrable progress in establishing an 
     independent judiciary;
       (5) is substantially moving toward a market-oriented 
     economic system;
       (6) is committed to making constitutional changes that 
     would ensure regular free and fair elections that meet the 
     requirements of paragraph (2); and
       (7) has made demonstrable progress in returning to United 
     States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken 
     by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or 
     after January 1, 1959, or providing full compensation for 
     such property in accordance with international law standards 
     and practice.
  TITLE III--PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS 
           AGAINST CONFISCATORY TAKINGS BY THE CASTRO REGIME

     SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The right of individuals to hold and enjoy property is 
     a fundamental right recognized by the United States 
     Constitution and international human rights law, including 
     the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
       (2) The illegal confiscation or taking of property by 
     governments, and the acquiescence of governments in the 
     confiscation of property by their citizens, undermines the 
     comity among nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic 
     development.
       (3) It is in the interest of all nations to respect equally 
     the property rights of their citizens and nationals of other 
     countries.
       (4) Nations that provide an effective mechanism for prompt, 
     adequate, and fair compensation for the confiscation of 
     private property will continue to have the support of the 
     United States.
       (5) The United States Government has an obligation to its 
     citizens to provide protection against illegal confiscation 
     by foreign nations and their citizens, including the 
     provision of private remedies.
       (6) Nations that illegally confiscate private property 
     should not be immune to another nation's laws whose purpose 
     is to protect against the confiscation of lawfully acquired 
     property by its citizens.
       (7) Trafficking in illegally acquired property is a crime 
     under the laws of the United States and other nations, yet 
     this same activity is allowed under international law.
       (8) International law, by not providing effective remedies, 
     condones the illegal confiscation of property and allows for 
     the unjust enrichment from the use of confiscated property by 
     governments and private entities at the expense of those who 
     hold legal claim to the property.
       (9) The development of an international mechanism 
     sanctioning those governments and private entities that 
     confiscate and unjustly use private property so confiscated 
     should be a priority objective of United States foreign 
     policy.

     SEC. 302. LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING IN PROPERTY CONFISCATED 
                   FROM UNITED STATES NATIONALS.

       (a) Civil Remedy.--
       (1) Liability for trafficking.--(A) Except as provided in 
     paragraphs (3) and (4), any person, including any agency or 
     instrumentality of a foreign state in the conduct of a 
     commercial activity, that, after the end of the 6-month 
     period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     traffics in confiscated property shall be liable to any 
     United States national who owns the claim to such property 
     for money damages in an amount equal to the sum of--
       (i) the amount which is the greater of--
       (I) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the 
     Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under the International 
     Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest;
       (II) the amount determined under section 303(a)(2), plus 
     interest; or
       (III) the fair market value of that property, calculated as 
     being the then current value of the property, or the value of 
     the property when confiscated plus interest, whichever is 
     greater; and
       (ii) reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.
       (B) Interest under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be at the rate 
     set forth in section 1961 of title 28, United States Code, 
     computed by the court from the date of the confiscation of 
     the property involved to the date on which the action is 
     brought under this subsection.
       (2) Presumption in favor of certified claims.--There shall 
     be a presumption that the amount for which a person, 
     including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state in 
     the conduct of a commercial activity, is liable under clause 
     (i) of paragraph (1)(A) is the amount that is certified under 
     subclause (I) of that clause. The presumption shall be 
     rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence that the amount 
     described in subclause (II) or (III) of that clause is the 
     appropriate amount of liability under that clause.
       (3) Increased liability for prior notice.--Except as 
     provided in paragraph (4), any person, including any agency 
     or instrumentality of a foreign state in the conduct of a 
     commercial activity, that traffics in confiscated property 
     after having received--
       (A) notice of a claim to ownership of the property by a 
     United States national who owns a claim to the confiscated 
     property, and
       (B) notice of the provisions of this section,
     shall be liable to that United States national for money 
     damages in an amount which is the sum of the amount equal to 
     the amount determined under paragraph (1)(A)(ii) plus triple 
     the amount determined applicable under subclause (I), (II), 
     or (III) of paragraph (1)(A)(i).
       (4) Applicability.--(A) Except as otherwise provided in 
     this paragraph, actions may be brought under paragraph (1) 
     with respect to property confiscated before, on, or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (B) In the case of property confiscated before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, no United States national may 
     bring an action under this section unless such national 
     acquired ownership of the claim to the confiscated property 
     before such date.
       (C) In the case of property confiscated on or after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, no United States national 
     who acquired ownership of a claim to confiscated property by 
     assignment for value after such date of enactment may bring 
     an action on the claim under this section.
       (5) Treatment of certain actions.--(A) In the case of any 
     action brought under this section by a United States national 
     who was eligible to file the underlying claim in the action 
     with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under title V 
     of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 but did 
     not so file the claim, the court may hear the case only if 
     the court determines that the United States national had good 
     cause for not filing the claim.
       (B) In the case of any action brought under this section by 
     a United States national whose claim in the action was timely 
     filed with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under 
     title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 
     but was denied by the Commission, the court may assess the 
     basis for the denial and may accept the findings of the 
     Commission on the claim as conclusive in the action under 
     this section unless good cause justifies another result.
       (6) Inapplicability of act of state doctrine.--No court of 
     the United States shall decline, based upon the act of state 
     doctrine, to make a determination on the merits in an action 
     brought under paragraph (1).
       (b) Definition.--As used in this subsection, the term 
     ``agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 1603(b) of title 28, 
     United States Code.
       (c) Jurisdiction.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 85 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 1331 the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 1331a. Civil actions involving confiscated property

       ``The district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
     any action brought under section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and 
     Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, regardless of 
     the amount in controversy.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections for 
     chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 1331 the 
     following:

``1331a. Civil actions involving confiscated property.''.
       (d) Certain Property Immune From Execution.--Section 1611 
     of title 28, United 

[[Page H 9385]]
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of 
     this chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune 
     from attachment and from execution in an action brought under 
     section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
     (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995 to the extent the property is a 
     facility or installation used by an accredited diplomatic 
     mission for official purposes.''.
       (e) Election of Remedies.--
       (1) Election.--Subject to paragraph (2)--
       (A) any United States national that brings an action under 
     this section may not bring any other civil action or 
     proceeding under the common law, Federal law, or the law of 
     any of the several States, the District of Columbia, or any 
     territory or possession of the United States, that seeks 
     monetary or nonmonetary compensation by reason of the same 
     subject matter; and
       (B) any person who brings, under the common law or any 
     provision of law other than this section, a civil action or 
     proceeding for monetary or nonmonetary compensation arising 
     out of a claim for which an action would otherwise be 
     cognizable under this section may not bring an action under 
     this section on that claim.
       (2) Treatment of certified claimants.--In the case of any 
     United States national that brings an action under this 
     section based on a claim certified under title V of the 
     International Claims Settlement Act of 1949--
       (A) if the recovery in the action is equal to or greater 
     than the amount of the certified claim, the United States 
     national may not receive payment on the claim under any 
     agreement entered into between the United States and Cuba 
     settling claims covered by such title, and such national 
     shall be deemed to have discharged the United States from any 
     further responsibility to represent the United States 
     national with respect to that claim;
       (B) if the recovery in the action is less than the amount 
     of the certified claim, the United States national may 
     receive payment under a claims agreement described in 
     subparagraph (A) but only to the extent of the difference 
     between the amount of the recovery and the amount of the 
     certified claim; and
       (C) if there is no recovery in the action, the United 
     States national may receive payment on the certified claim 
     under a claims agreement described in subparagraph (A) to the 
     same extent as any certified claimant who does not bring an 
     action under this section.
       (f) Deposit of Excess Payments by Cuba Under Claims 
     Agreement.--Any amounts paid by Cuba under any agreement 
     entered into between the United States and Cuba settling 
     certified claims under title V of the International Claims 
     Settlement Act of 1949 that are in excess of the payments 
     made on such certified claims after the application of 
     subsection (e) shall be deposited into the United States 
     Treasury.
       (g) Termination of Rights.--
       (1) In general.--All rights created under this section to 
     bring an action for money damages with respect to property 
     confiscated before the date of the enactment of this Act 
     shall cease upon the transmittal to the Congress of a 
     determination of the President under section 203(c)(3).
       (2) Pending suits.--The termination of rights under 
     paragraph (1) shall not affect suits commenced before the 
     date of such termination, and in all such suits, proceedings 
     shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the 
     same manner and with the same effect as if this subsection 
     had not been enacted.

     SEC. 303. DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS TO CONFISCATED PROPERTY.

       (a) Evidence of Ownership.--
       (1) Conclusiveness of certified claims.--In any action 
     brought under this title, the courts shall accept as 
     conclusive proof of ownership a certification of a claim to 
     ownership that has been made by the Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission pursuant to title V of the International Claims 
     Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. 1643 and following).
       (2) Claims not certified.--In the case of a claim that has 
     not been certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement 
     Commission before the enactment of this Act, a court may 
     appoint a special master, including the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission, to make determinations regarding the 
     amount and validity of claims to ownership of confiscated 
     property. Such determinations are only for evidentiary 
     purposes in civil actions brought under this title and do not 
     constitute certifications pursuant to title V of the 
     International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.
       (3) Effect of determinations of foreign entities.--In 
     determining ownership, courts shall not accept as conclusive 
     evidence of ownership any findings, orders, judgments, or 
     decrees from administrative agencies or courts of foreign 
     countries or international organizations that invalidate the 
     claim held by a United States national, unless the 
     invalidation was found pursuant to binding international 
     arbitration to which United States national submitted the 
     claim.
       (b) Amendment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 
     1949.--Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 
     1949 (22 U.S.C. 1643 and following) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:


  ``evaluation of ownership claims referred by district courts of the 
                             united states

       ``Sec. 514. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     title and only for purposes of section 302 of the Cuban 
     Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, a United States 
     district court, for fact-finding purposes, may refer to the 
     Commission, and the Commission may determine, questions of 
     the amount and ownership of a claim by a United States 
     national (as defined in section 4 of the Cuban Liberty and 
     Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act) resulting from the confiscation of 
     property by the Government of Cuba described in section 
     503(a), whether or not the United States national qualified 
     as a national of the United States (as defined in section 
     502(1)) at the time of the action by the Government of 
     Cuba.''.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or section 
     514 of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as 
     added by subsection (b), shall be construed--
       (1) to require or otherwise authorize the claims of Cuban 
     nationals who became United States citizens after their 
     property was confiscated to be included in the claims 
     certified to the Secretary of State by the Foreign Claims 
     Settlement Commission for purposes of future negotiation and 
     espousal of claims with a friendly government in Cuba when 
     diplomatic relations are restored; or
       (2) as superseding, amending, or otherwise altering 
     certifications that have been made pursuant to title V of the 
     International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 before the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 304. EXCLUSIVITY OF FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION 
                   CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE.

       Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 
     (22 U.S.C. 1643 and following), as amended by section 303, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


  ``exclusivity of foreign claims settlement commission certification 
                               procedure

       ``Sec. 515. (a) Subject to subsection (b), neither any 
     national of the United States who was eligible to file a 
     claim under section 503 but did not timely file such claim 
     under that section, nor any national of the United States (on 
     the date of the enactment of this section) who was not 
     eligible to file a claim under that section, nor any national 
     of Cuba, including any agency, instrumentality, subdivision, 
     or enterprise of the Government of Cuba or any local 
     government of Cuba in place on the date of the enactment of 
     this section, nor any successor thereto, whether or not 
     recognized by the United States, shall have a claim to, 
     participate in, or otherwise have an interest in, the 
     compensation proceeds or other nonmonetary compensation paid 
     or allocated to a national of the United States by virtue of 
     a claim certified by the Commission under section 507, nor 
     shall any court of the United States or any State court have 
     jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claim.
       ``(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to 
     detract from or otherwise affect any rights in the shares of 
     the capital stock of nationals of the United States owning 
     claims certified by the Commission under section 507.''.
                 TITLE IV--EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

     SEC. 401. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF ALIENS WHO HAVE 
                   CONFISCATED PROPERTY OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS 
                   OR WHO TRAFFIC IN SUCH PROPERTY.

       (a) Grounds for Exclusion.--The Secretary of State, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, shall exclude from 
     the United States any alien who the Secretary of State 
     determines is a person who--
       (1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen the 
     confiscation of, property a claim to which is owned by a 
     United States national, or converts or has converted for 
     personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned 
     by a United States national;
       (2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is 
     owned by a United States national;
       (3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with 
     a controlling interest of an entity which has been involved 
     in the confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated 
     property, a claim to which is owned by a United States 
     national; or
       (4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person 
     excludable under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
       (b) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following 
     terms have the following meanings:
       (1) Confiscated; confiscation.--The terms ``confiscated'' 
     and ``confiscation'' refer to--
       (A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by 
     foreign governmental authority of ownership or control of 
     property on or after January 1, 1959--
       (i) without the property having been returned or adequate 
     and effective compensation provided; or
       (ii) without the claim to the property having been settled 
     pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or 
     other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and
       (B) the repudiation by foreign governmental authority of, 
     the default by foreign governmental authority on, or the 
     failure by foreign governmental authority to pay, on or after 
     January 1, 1959--
       (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by foreign governmental 
     authority;
       (ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, 
     expropriated, or otherwise taken by foreign governmental 
     authority; or

[[Page H 9386]]

       (iii) a debt which was incurred by foreign governmental 
     authority in satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated 
     property claim.
       (2) Property.--The term ``property'' does not include 
     claims arising from a territory in dispute as a result of war 
     between United Nations member states in which the ultimate 
     resolution of the disputed territory has not been resolved.
       (3) Traffics.--(A) A person or entity ``traffics'' in 
     property if that person or entity knowingly and 
     intentionally--
       (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, 
     manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or 
     purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, 
     manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in 
     confiscated property,
       (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise 
     benefiting from confiscated property, or
       (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, 
     trafficking (as described in clauses (i) and (ii)) by another 
     person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in 
     clauses (i) and (ii)) through another person,

     without the authorization of the United States national who 
     holds a claim to the property.
       (B) The term ``traffics'' does not include-
       (i) the delivery of international telecommunication signals 
     to Cuba that are authorized by section 1705(e) of the Cuban 
     Democracy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 6004(e)); or
       (ii) the trading or holding of securities publicly traded 
     or held, unless the trading is with or by a person determined 
     by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a specially designated 
     national.
       (c) National Interest Exemption.--This section shall not 
     apply where the Secretary of State finds, on a case-by-case 
     basis, that making a determination under subsection (a) would 
     be contrary to the national interest of the United States.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--This section applies to aliens seeking to 
     enter the United States on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (2) Trafficking.--This section applies only with respect to 
     acts within the meaning of ``traffics'' that occur on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Washington 
[Mr. McDermott] and a Member opposed each will be recognized for 30 
minutes.
  Is the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] opposed to the amendment?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I am.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
McDermott] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognize the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott].
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this proposal which is before us to deal with Cuba is 
primarily a bill dealing with property rights. It is in my opinion not 
a good bill, but this particular amendment, this substitute, deals with 
only one provision of that proposal which is before us, and that is to 
open up the possibility of sale of medical supplies, instruments, 
medical literature, and foodstuffs to Cuba.
  Now presently the embargo allows the donation of those kinds of 
things to Cuba. It puts no prohibition against that. But the fact is 
that we cannot through the charity system deal with the medical needs 
of Cuba.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been in Cuba, I have visited clinics, I have 
visited hospitals, I have been to the medical schools, and it is clear 
to me that the Cuban people are suffering tremendously because of the 
shortage of modern-day medical supplies, and instrumentation, and 
pharmaceuticals.
  Now it is inconceivable to me that a country 90 miles from our 
shores, when we, the United States, have in many places in the world 
insisted on international humanitarian standards being applied, would 
withhold from the Cuban people those things which are available to 
people in the United States.
  Mr. Chairman, I could give my colleagues many examples, but let us 
just take the issue of asthma. Asthma is a disease that makes it 
difficult for people to breathe. There is one of the highest rates of 
asthma in Cuba, and they are short of the kind of medication you need 
to make it possible to open up people's breathing passages so they can 
breathe.
  Now anybody who ever had asthma understands how awful that is, 
especially for children. The feeling in one's chest that they cannot 
breathe is something that any parent, looking at his own child, would 
never want his child to have, and yet we, by our Government policy, say 
that our pharmaceutical companies cannot sell the medication to the 
Cubans that is necessary so that parents can give to their children 
medication to relieve that dreadful disease. That is absolutely against 
anything that we as Americans hold ourselves out to the world as 
believing, and I do not think that that is the public policy that the 
U.S. Congress wants us to be espousing.

                              {time}  1030

  A patient came to me or a Cuban family came to me and told me about a 
cousin who was in Cuba who has leukemia. There is a treatment at the 
Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle where people can have that leukemia 
treated, and the success rate is about 90 percent. That medication is 
not readily available in Cuba, and their family member did not have 
access to that.
  Now, there is no reason why that should not be available. Mr. 
Chairman, my distinguished opponents will say the medication can be 
donated to some hospital, some church hospital or something. I do not 
know, but that simply does not apply to the whole medical system in 
Cuba. We cannot, through donations, expect that the Sisters of Charity 
or whatever are going to deliver these kind of very specialized 
treatments if they are not available through what is essentially a 
government health care system.
  By refusing to accept this amendment, we, as Members of the United 
States Congress, are saying to Cuban families, we, this bastion of 
democracy and humanitarianism, are going to withhold from people the 
ability to take care of their children and members of their family. 
There is no argument that I can see that would make possible that kind 
of a statement by the U.S. Congress.
  It is for that reason, Mr. Chairman, that I offer this. I oppose a 
lot of the other parts of the bill, but I did not touch those. I simply 
touched the thing that I think is the hardest and absolutely 
indefensible, in my opinion.
  As a physician, and if others have ever taken care of a kid and 
looked into the eyes of parents and recognized that we have the 
capacity to help them with their kid, and have been able to do it in 
this country, one can imagine what it is like in a country where we 
know that there is the medication available, but it is simply, because 
of the U.S. embargo, it is not available in another's country, and that 
child is going to either suffer or die. That is simply not what I think 
as an American we want our policy toward Cuba to be.
  We want democracy. There is nobody on this floor who is supporting 
Mr. Castro. None of us think that is a good idea. Anybody who tries to 
paint that as the attack on us is simply misrepresenting the facts.
  But in our process of pushing to change the situation in Cuba, we 
cannot use medicine and food staples as a way of doing that.
  Mr. Chairman, the fact they cannot get modern textbooks, modern 
medical textbooks, why should they have to be dealing with a textbook 
from 1949 simply because we place an embargo on them? I think this is a 
good amendment and urge the adoption of it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this, I believe, is a red herring. The fact of the 
matter is, the United States of America is the largest giver of 
humanitarian aid to Cuba in the world today. The people who are 
suffering down there get a great deal of help from the United States, 
both in medical supplies and in food. The question then comes, why are 
we going to give Castro the right to buy these products?
  My learned opponents says we are denying people with asthma the 
ability to be treated; children who have other maladies are not being 
able to be treated.
  Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely not true. Castro can buy these 
medical supplies if he wants to from anyplace in the world. We are not 
trying to keep kids from being treated or families from being treated.

[[Page H 9387]]

  As a matter of fact, as I said, we are the biggest giver of 
humanitarian and medical supplies in the world from a humanitarian 
standpoint. We do not sell them to them, we give them to them. If 
somebody in Cuba wants to contact a relative in the United States and 
say, send us some asthma medicine, they can do it and they do it.
  This is a red herring. I cannot understand why they are trying to add 
this to the bill. We are trying to put the squeeze on Fidel Castro by 
denying him hard currency so that the people of Cuba will have freedom, 
democracy, and human rights, which have been denied them for about 35 
years.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is not necessary. The United States is 
doing everything we can to help the people of Cuba. If medical supplies 
are needed, there are hundreds of countries from which Castro can buy 
these supplies. What it would do is get the camel's nose under the tent 
as far as breaking the embargo that we have on Cuba, and that is what I 
think my learned colleague is trying to do.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. 
Ros-Lehtinen].
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
time to me. Certainly the bill before us, H.R. 927, represents a new 
battlefront in our commitment for freedom for the Cuban people. 
Yesterday I showed the House--and many of our colleagues did as well--a 
letter signed by dozens of Cuban dissidents on the island, who, at 
great personal risk to their safety, sent this letter to Senator Helms. 
Let us not let down those dissidents and the other millions of Cubans 
who daily fight against the dictatorship.
  Mr. Chairman, as all of us know, Castro's repression does not go down 
at all. It does not diminish in any way. His power mongering 
continually increases. Firm and swift policies are needed to eliminate 
this dictator, and this bill, H.R. 927, contains those swift policies.
  This substitute appears to be humanitarian in nature but it could 
very well constitute an economic windfall for Fidel Castro. As the 
chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has pointed out, food and medicine are 
allowed to go to Cuba now, from the United States to Cuba. No 
prohibition. There is no prohibition. If you want to send an aspirin 
from Washington to Havana, go ahead. There is no embargo on aspirin. 
Asthma medicine. Whatever you want. Food and medicine is not 
prohibited. There is no embargo.
  I have said it five times, we will continue to say it for the entire 
hour. There is no prohibition on food and medicine going from the 
United States to Cuba. Also, Castro can get anything he wants, as Mr. 
Burton pointed out, from every other country in the world anyway. Even 
if we were to have an embargo on food and medicine--which there is no 
embargo on--he can get it from any other country. Is the United States 
the only maker of aspirin in the world? I think not.
  What does Castro do? He takes the food and medicine and he sells it 
to the tourists. He sells it to the Communist Party officials. If the 
people cannot get aspirin, if the people cannot get asthma medicine, it 
is not because it is not there in Cuba, it is because Castro takes it 
and sells it to the tourists. The best hospital facilities in the 
Caribbean are in Cuba for the tourists and for the Communist Party 
officials. But for the starving, needy people of Cuba, Castro decides--
even if they want these supplies--he will not give it to them. It is 
his way of making sure that they know that he is their supreme ruler.

  It is clear, Mr. Chairman, the goals of this bill. And once again let 
us restate them. The goals of the bill are simple. No. 1, let us try to 
have an end to the Castro regime. No. 2, let us plan for a democratic 
transition for Cuba. And No. 3, let us protect property of United 
States citizens in Cuba. Let us bring an end to this Castro regime and 
let us make sure that we understand the human rights situation in Cuba.
  We have said it over and over again. Organizations like Human Rights 
Watch Americas, Amnesty International, Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, what do they say? The Cuban Government continues to 
violate the rights of freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
freedom against arbitrary detention, security of the person, among 
others. Hundreds of political prisoners remain incarcerated under 
difficult conditions charged with political offenses that include 
handing out flyers, expressing their opinions, calling out for freedom 
in their island. That is a crime against the repressive police state.
  Castro wants and again rejects any kind of democratic approaches that 
these helpful ideologues want to give them. He has rejected them from 
Mexico, he has rejected them from Spain, he will reject them time and 
time again. Let us not get confused. Once again, well-meaning 
substitute, it is not based on facts. There is no prohibition about 
food and medicine. Castro has to lift the embargo that he has on the 
Cuban people for food, medicine, and expression of ideas. That is the 
embargo that we must lift.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. I think it is important to clarify what has just been said. 
There is no embargo on people giving. There is an embargo on any sale 
of staple foods or medicines or medical equipment in Cuba. No one 
should come away from listening to that last speech and believe that we 
can get adequate amounts of these materials into Cuba.
   Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Skaggs].
  Mr. SKAGGS. I thank my colleague for yielding me the time.
   Mr. Chairman, food and medical exports to Cuba, as would be 
authorized under the amendment offered by my colleague, the gentleman 
from Washington [Mr. McDermott], represent a modest improvement in this 
bill, and I support it. It is a step, a small step in the right 
direction, whereas this bill fundamentally is headed in the wrong 
direction.
  What is the right direction? Again, we are all interested in a Cuba 
that has an open economic system and a Democratic political system. How 
do we get there? Well, it is ironic to me that exactly the arguments 
just expressed by the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Ros-Lehtinen] were 
offered up in this body quite recently during the debate on what should 
be our policy with respect also to a repressive regime that mistreats 
its people, that does not have the kind of open economic and political 
system that we want for Cuba, namely the government in China.
  There, Mr. Chairman, we realize that exactly the kind of approach 
that the gentleman is suggesting in this amendment is in the United 
States' interest, and that is not a policy of isolation, of mindlessly 
trying to pretend that by raising up all possible impediments we are 
going to bring about the desired result in Cuba. Rather, it is a policy 
that reflects our thoughtful analysis of how we get what we want with 
respect to regimes like this everywhere else in the world except for 
Cuba, and that is a challenge directly on an economic playing field, a 
challenge directly, politically, culturally and, in the case of the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott], in 
terms of humanitarian assistance.
  The McDermott amendment is particularly addressing this last point. 
It is too bad it does not go beyond just the question of food and 
medicines to deal with the other many, many failings in the policy 
enacted into law previously through the Cuban Democracy Act and now 
being proposed to be further taken in the wrong direction by the 
legislation before the House.
  For example, Mr. Chairman, this bill not only continues but 
accelerates the idiocy inherent in the TV Marti program. It is saying 
not only have we wasted $90 million of taxpayers' money that have 
accomplished zip, zilch, nada, in getting a United States' point of 
view received on Cuban TV sets, but we are going to go even farther 
faster in wasting taxpayers' money now by saying that USIA has to 
proceed again with the mindless, ideologically-driven program of 
converting to UHF, even though two-thirds of the TVs in Cuba do not get 
UHF reception and even though UHF signals by technical analysis will be 
more easily jammed than the current failed VHF program.
  Again, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's amendment, as far as it goes, 

[[Page H 9388]]
  makes great sense. I hope my colleagues will support it. And I would 
also be interested, if the sponsor of this amendment can explain to me, 
why it is we are in this corner, why with regard to Cuba, unlike all 
other areas in the world in which we are confronting Communist regimes 
and trying, through a whole range of strategies to get them to change, 
why the approach to Cuba is different than anyplace else in the world. 
Does the gentleman understand why we are doing it this way?

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no explanation that makes any sense to me. We 
have adopted the policy in every other country that increased trade and 
involvement would ultimately bring about change in the government. We 
just opened our trade relationship with the Republic of Vietnam, a 
government that we still disagree with, that we consider oppressive. In 
fact, we are opening trade, we are involved in a variety of things. We 
are already, as the gentleman mentioned, in China doing that.
  It makes no sense, particularly in this area, where you are not 
punishing Mr. Castro, you are not punishing anybody in the top of the 
organization. You are punishing the people. That does not work and is 
wrong.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not believe my learned colleagues have read 
current law. The current law says in section 1705, ``Support for the 
Cuban people,'' under section B, ``Donations of food,'' ``Nothing in 
this or any other act shall prohibit donations of food to 
nongovernmental organizations or individuals in Cuba.''
  Under section C, ``Exports of medicines and medical supplies,'' it 
says, ``Exports of medicines or medical supplies instruments or 
equipment to Cuba shall not be restricted.'' Shall not be restricted. 
It goes on to say under subsection 1, ``On-site verifications'': 
``Subject to subparagraph B an export may be made under subsection C 
only when the President determines that United States Government is 
able to verify by on-site inspections and other appropriate means that 
the exported item is to be used for the purposes for which it was 
intended and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people.''
  The reason that language was put in there was to make sure that 
Castro did not take these supplies and use them for some other purpose, 
other than to help the Cuban people. But they can get medical supplies 
today under current law.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Diaz-Balart].
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, first of all, it is important to point 
out what this amendment is striking. Let us start off by reading what 
it says. ``Strike all after the enacting clause and insert'' their food 
and medicine provision, so-called food and medicine provision. In other 
words, no more requests for elections, no more demand for freedom, no 
more trying to get at Castro's lifeline or foreign investment. No, no.
  I am sure that when the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott] 
goes down to Cuba, I bet he does not ask for elections there either. He 
is certainly not asking for elections in this substitute amendment.
  I really think after 37 years, and I say this to our colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle, when are you going to demand elections for 
the Cuban people? When? You demanded elections in South Africa. I 
joined you. And when the President of my party, at that time President 
Reagan, was unclear or incorrect with regard to the need to come down 
hard on the South African regime, I criticized that.
  When are you going to ask for elections in Cuba? In your substitute 
amendment, which is here, you delete everything in the bill that stands 
for freedom in Cuba. So you come before us, speaker after speaker after 
speaker, saying ``Oh, we support elections.''

  When have you made a statement, Mr. McDermott? Show me when you have 
gone to Cuba to demand of the regime there that you go and visit and 
have elections?
  I will tell you this, sir: I think that it is most unfortunate that, 
after 37 years, you still come down here and in effect pay lip service 
to your supposed support for freedom for our closest neighbors, and yet 
come here and throw red herrings into this legislation.
  A point was made by the distinguished gentleman from Colorado about 
the fact that other embargoes do not include food sales. The embargo, 
for example, on Iraq, or Serbia-Montenegro, those are international 
embargoes.
  If the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott] or the gentleman 
from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] joined us in going down to the White House 
and asking that the leadership of this Nation be utilized to seek an 
international embargo against the Castro regime, we will be the first 
ones in an international embargo to obviously exclude the food issue, 
like in the embargoes against Serbia or Iraq.
  You not only are not seeking an international embargo against a 37-
year-old dictatorship of Castro. No. You are coming here and gutting a 
bill which is trying to prevent the flow of dollars to a regime that, 
after the loss of the Soviet subsidy, is hanging on by the sale of a 
slave economy, a slave economy, and the denial of all labor rights and 
all workers' rights. And you in effect are trying to gut our attempt to 
stop the flow of dollars to Castro's repressive machinery by his 
continued offer to international capitalism of the slave economy and 
the slave conditions of the Cuban worker. That is what you are doing. 
That is what you are doing.
  So do not come here and say that you are for freedom, when you are 
not asking for elections. Do not come here and say that you are for 
elections, when you go down to Cuba, and I have not seen any statement 
that you make there in demanding elections.
  So let us be honest. If you want to defend the regime, say so. Then I 
will have more respect for you.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume to respond to that.
  Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleague from Florida apparently did 
not read the bill. This is exactly his bill, with one phrase, that is 
allowing the sale of medication and staple foods. Everything else in 
the gentleman's bill is in this.
  All that demagoguery was directed at some figment of his imagination. 
The gentleman simply did not pay attention to what is in this bill. It 
is your bill, with one addition. It simply is the addition of 
medication and staple foods. We have embargoes against every other 
country, such as Iraq, but we allow food and we allow medication, and 
your bill is untouched.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. 
Moran].
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment to H.R. 927. I 
think it is important to bear in mind that we have the toughest 
sanction ever on Iraq, which I think we would all support, but the 
United States and the United Nations support full and open commerce in 
food and medicine with Iraq. So this is not a radical suggestion that 
we have full and open commerce in food and medicine.
  But the problem with this bill that this amendment attempts to 
correct is that the bill is far too inflexible and really unworkable. 
It is unlikely to lead to democratization or to political or social 
reforms, and as was said in lengthy debate on this bill last night, it 
will create serious legal problems. It could potentially tie up our 
courts in land settlements, land claims for property outside the United 
States. That sets a very dangerous precedent in terms of other 
immigrant communities who may want to seize that precedent as well. I 
do not think we have the capacity within our judicial system to settle 
these legal problems, and this is not where they should be settled, in 
the United States.
  It will create substantial business problems. It completely 
undermines NAFTA, which we just passed. It is going to make it 
extremely difficult for our corporations, who would in fact hold the 
key to a free enterprise system being established in Cuba from being 
able to trade with Cuba, and it creates unbelievable foreign policy 
problems. Just at the time when the 

[[Page H 9389]]
United States President should be able to exercise his or her ability 
in the future, and I suspect we are talking about the near-term future, 
to help Cuba achieve a transitional democratic government, even if such 
a democratic government is not actually in place at the time, we can 
precipitate that occurring. But now, with this bill, if this bill were 
to pass, the President's hands will be completely tied behind his back. 
So it does not advance the interests of the United States.
  This amendment will see to it that the United States would be able to 
act, instead of sitting on the sidelines, when change, inevitable 
change, does come to Cuba.
  This bill is based upon a policy that dates back to when Cuba was 
clearly a Soviet surrogate. They were challenging our interests for 
Africa to Central America. But that time has passed. Russia is not 
playing that role, whether Castro would like Russia to or not. So it is 
time for a comprehensive review of United States policy toward Cuba.
  So this debate is constructive, but a transition from dictatorship to 
democracy is not going to occur overnight. We know that from history. 
We ought to learn from history and try to do what we can to ensure that 
it be a peaceful transition to democracy, that it not be a violent 
revolution. We owe that to the Cuban people.
  Fidel Castro is in his 35th year of absolute power, longest in Latin 
America history. It is not going to continue. What we need to do is to 
do the same thing we did with Eastern Europe, consolidate change in 
democracy by promoting free enterprise through a democratic system, not 
in this way, but by enabling the President to act flexibly, 
constructively, with the best interests of the Cuban people in mind.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just restate, if you read current law, medical 
supplies can be sold to Cuba. There is no prohibition. I want to 
repeat, there is no prohibition. If they want to buy medical supplies 
to help the people of Cuba, they can do it. So this is just a red 
herring.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, for 3 years the United States and Fidel 
Castro have been eyeball to eyeball. An unshakeable American 
determination for free elections in Cuba and a new respect for human 
rights. Fidel Castro's commitment to hold back the forces of history 
and preserve the last Communist bastion. One side or the other is going 
to win.
  I know Americans are not a patient people, but 3 years is not a long 
time, and we are succeeding. Castro has made some beginnings of 
economic changes. The island is in economic collapse. Last year 40,000 
students gathered on the streets of Havana. The pressure internally is 
enormous, and now there are those in this country, after only 36 
months, who would step back. Eyeball to eyeball. There are some who 
would counsel to blink.
  The amendment before this body offered by some Members of this 
institution who I respect more than any others is not a narrow change 
in the legislation of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton]. It is 
not an incremental difference. Let us recognize it for what it is: It 
is an end of the American embargo against Fidel Castro, it is a repeal 
of current bipartisan policy supported by 300 Members of this 
institution, and it is an acceptance of the status quo in Cuba. Period.
  Fidel Castro is not attempting to import American automobiles or 
computers. These are the items, the commodities, that he wants. This is 
it. This is the end of the embargo, just when we built a bipartisan, 
strong, and effective policy.
  Mr. Speaker, in substance the amendment before this body is the 
judgment on American policy. I know good and decent Members of this 
institution do not want to be a part of poor and suffering people of 
Cuba suffering any more than is necessary. That is why in the Cuban 
Democracy Act we exempted out food and medicine. For 33 years before 
that, food and medicine could not be donated to Cuba. We changed that, 
and today, per capita, more food and medicine goes from the United 
States to Cuba per capita than to any other nation in the world to 
ensure that the poorest of the poor have access to food and medicine.

                              {time}  1100

  That is not what this amendment is about. We already did that. This 
amendment is to allow Cuba to rejoin the family of nations in a trading 
relationship with the United States for full access.
  What does it do? It allows Fidel Castro to escape the reality that 
communism failed in Cuba, cooperative farming, the broad state 
enterprises. A country that was once self-sufficient in food and 
exported food, now needs to import everything.
  We would allow him to escape the reality that communism is in 
collapse.
  The choice needs to remain clear. We will donate what is necessary 
through private charities to ensure that the poorest of the poor are 
protected. But Fidel Castro cannot be allowed to rejoin the family of 
trading relationships with the United States without having free 
elections and respecting human rights, eyeball to eyeball.
  Every Member of this institution must decide whether they are going 
to be part of bringing that change or allowing Fidel Castro to maintain 
his Communist system.
  You have all made that decision before, 300 of you. Your consistent 
vote is to stand both with the administration, which has supported the 
embargo, Democratic and Republican Presidents, and this institution.
  This is not about an amendment to this bill. This is about a repeal 
of the embargo.
  Please, stand with us on a bipartisan basis and reject this amendment 
and then return to support the legislation offered by the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to say if I were 
a Member setting in my office watching this on television or sitting 
here on the floor watching this, I would be confused because the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] said there is no need for this 
amendment; it is already law; they can do anything they want. And the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] stands up and says that, in 
fact, this is repealing the entire embargo. Now, which is it?
  Either we do not need the amendment because they can already do it, 
or this is a disastrous amendment which is destroying the whole policy. 
Somebody is wrong on the other side.
  The fact is that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] is 
incorrect, or he is correct in one part. It is possible for medication 
and staple foods to go to Cuba. The difference is this: If we want to 
sell food to Spain, you do not have to get a special license. If you 
want to sell food to Zaire, you do not have to get a special license. 
If you want to sell food anywhere else in the world except Cuba, you 
have to get a special license, and the policy of the Government is not 
to grant the licenses.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  If you read the law, it is very clear. It says that the President of 
the United States determined that the United States Government is able 
to verify it is being used for the benefit of the Cuban people. If 
President Clinton wants it to go there, he can verify that it is going 
to be used for the Cuban people, then it can go.
  Let me read you something from a businessman who had had a business, 
a Spanish businessman who had a business down there that was taken away 
from him by Castro. I want you to listen to this. One year ago, one 
year ago, it says:

       This same phenomenon also occurs in general with all 
     foreigners in Cuba because of the mere fact they have 
     dollars, hard currency, they have access to everything the 
     Cuban people cannot purchase with their work: food, clinics 
     with medicines, good clothes, gasoline or electricity and 
     hotels. In Cuba there are two types of citizens: those who 
     have dollars, as I did, mostly foreigners, and all with the 
     privileges that that entails and those who have Cuban pesos 
     who are literally dying of hunger and illness because of a 
     regime that refuses to change a system that is absolutely 
     incapable of generating a dignified way of life for the 
     country.

  The fact of the matter is Castro takes hard dollars, the money has to 
go to the government for somebody's payroll, and he gives them then the 
same 

[[Page H 9390]]
amount of pesos. If they get $400 a month, he gets the $400 in hard 
currency, he gives them 400 pesos, which is 80-to-1 differential, which 
means they are getting $3.20 a month, and they cannot even buy things 
you are talking about. The fact of the matter is the Cuban people are 
suffering because of this Communist dictator and his policies.
  It is a command economy that must be changed, and the only way it is 
going to change is if we pass our bill in its original form.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to respond to 
that.
  I say to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], you just made my 
case. You require a special license under the law to sell medication. 
There is no way we can sell food to Cuba. There is no special license. 
There is no way.
  What this bill is saying is we intend, if possible, to starve the 
Cuban people into submission, and that kind of policy from the Federal 
Government is why the U.N. General Assembly has voted 3 years in a row 
against our position.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time. I commend him on his initiative, and I support his 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment simply provides, I think, clear authority 
for United States companies to engage in direct commerce with Cuba in 
food and medicines. They cannot do that today.
  I think the gentleman from Indiana, my friend, is correct when he 
says that current law does not prohibit food and medicines in Cuba, and 
that is done largely today through nongovernment organizations. What is 
missing in this debate so far, it seems to me, is the plight of the 
Cuban people. No matter what is going on there today with regard to 
food and medicine, we all know what that plight is. The sugar harvest 
this year in Cuba is the lowest in a half a century. Food and medicine, 
under anybody's standards, are in very short supply. Serious epidemics 
have broken out among the Cuban people.
  In that circumstance, surely we want to try to help those Cuban 
people with the essentials of life, food and medicine, and that is all 
this amendment does. It changes no other part of the bill, as I 
understand it. It simply tries to help the Cuban people get more food 
and medicine. What in the world can be wrong with that?
  This initiative will increase our contact with the Cuban people. It 
will help the Cuban people. It will generate goodwill, and it will 
begin to ease some of their long, long suffering.
  This is no radical idea that we are presenting to you. The foremost 
Republican spokesman on foreign policy in this generation was Richard 
Nixon, and he argued shortly before his death that our policies in 
Cuba, toward Cuba, must turn away from hurting the Castro government to 
helping its people, and that is exactly right, and that is what this 
amendment tries to do.
  Let me take just a moment to try to put this whole bill in a little 
broader perspective. What we will be voting on on the final passage of 
this bill is two very different approaches to how you deal with the 
problem of Cuba. On the one hand is the philosophy of this bill, H.R. 
927. It is that if you make these conditions in Cuba significantly 
worse, you will prompt the Cuban people to rise up against their 
government. The other approach, the one I support and I think many in 
this institution do, perhaps not a majority, is the competing view that 
governments can be toppled peacefully by exposure to the free flow of 
ideas and benefits of the free market. Everybody in this Chamber agrees 
that Castro must go. But we must get away from this focus on Castro, 
and we must focus on the Cuban people and what is good for them.
  A policy of engagement, of contact, of dialogue, of exchange offers 
the best hope for what we all want, which is a peaceful transition for 
the dictatorship of Castro to a free market and an open society. We 
support free elections in Cuba. I strongly support that, and I think we 
ought to do everything we can to put Castro on the spot and say, ``Why 
don't you hold free elections?''
  I am quite prepared to support you on that. You are absolutely right 
about it. Our policy should keep the pressure on him. But I think the 
policy of isolation is a risky policy, and the reason it is risky is 
because the more pressure you apply, the more desperate you make the 
Cuban people, the more likely they will turn to violence, and that is 
what we do not want there.
  So that policy of isolation, of squeezing the Cuban people increases 
the risk of a violent explosion in Cuba and the massive exodus of 
refugees, and that, of course, is our most important concern because 
the primary threat today from Cuba is not an invasion from Cuba. It is 
not an export of revolution from Cuba. The primary threat to the United 
States from Cuba today is what you in south Florida have suffered so 
greatly from, and that is trying to assimilate a massive number of 
refugees.

  I believe the issues in this debate are very, very clear. This bill 
increases the isolation of Cuba. It increases the hardship of the Cuban 
people, and it is the wrong policy. That is what President Richard 
Nixon emphasized over and over again, and that is what Secretary of 
State, former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, has said, and the 
national security adviser under the Carter administration, Mr. 
Brzezinski, and many, many others.
  So I hope that this Chamber will defeat this bill. We should not base 
our policy on a hatred of Castro. We should base our policy on what is 
best for the United States, what is best for the Cuban people, and what 
is best for the United States and what is best for the Cuban people 
come together here.
  A policy of isolating Cuba over 36 years has not worked. Let us break 
the impasse that exists between these two nations, open up contracts 
with them, and choose to engage the Cuban people in order to increase 
the chances for a peacetime transition to a democracy and a market 
economy.
  I urge my colleagues to support the McDermott amendment, which begins 
this process in a very, very modest way, and I urge my colleagues to 
defeat H.R. 927.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  My colleagues from Indiana says we are hurting the Cuban people. Do 
you know how much they make, I ask the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Hamilton] every day? The average Cuban makes between 10 and 15 cents a 
day, 10 and 15 cents a day. How are you going to hurt them worse than 
Castro has? You cannot, and the only thing that is going to change is 
if we force this man from power, and if we deny him hard currency, we 
can get that job done and save the Cuban people. Ten cents to fifteen 
cents a day.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. 
Ros-Lehtinen].
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  I want to talk about this healing process that will take place if 
food and medicine go to Cuba.
  Castro has food now, and he feeds the tourists. Castro has medicine 
now, and he heals the tourists. He starves the Cuban people. He has the 
Cuban people suffering in pain.
  There is no prohibition on feed and medicine going to the Cuban 
people. If you want your family to have medicine, you can send them the 
medicine. If charitable organizations want to send food and medicine 
now to nongovernment agencies in Cuba, they can do so. If you sell 
goods to Castro, he will sell the goods to the tourists. If you send 
food, he will give it to the tourists.
  Because Americans are a generous people, we want all nations to 
belong to this humanitarian family, and we naively and foolishly 
believe that Castro wants the Cuban people to prosper, that he wants 
them to fulfill their dreams. What Castro wants is to remain in power, 
so he has the Cuban people suffering for their daily sustenance. It 
will go to the tourists. Reject the substitute.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, how much time does each side 
have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 10 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott] has 5\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, do we have the right to close?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has the 

[[Page H 9391]]
  right to close because he is the manager of the committee position on 
the bill.

                              {time}  1115

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez], a learned leader on the 
Democrat side of the aisle.
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleague and 
sponsor of the bill, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], who I 
must say has been a strong proponent of freedom and democracy in Cuba, 
for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, unlike many others who have spoken here, and I question 
no one's motives, I believe that they want to help the Cuban people, 
but I believe that their efforts to do so are misguided. I say that as 
someone, not who deals with this issue in the abstract. I say it as 
someone who has family living in Cuba. I say it as someone who 
understands the difficulties they go through. I go through the phone 
calls, I go through the letters; that is not something others can say. 
I do not deal with this issue of humanitarianism in the abstract. I 
deal with it in reality.
  But let us talk about some truths. Some of the truths are this:
  The Cuban people suffer, yes. Why? They suffer because the 
dictatorship does not do the market reforms and create the political 
openings that can relieve their suffering. We are not the only 
providers of food and medicine in the world. If not, we would dictate 
the world's policies. The fact of the matter is that there are 
tremendous pharmaceutical companies in Europe. The fact of the matter 
is that we have countries that are part of the breadbasket of the 
world, and the fact is they all trade with Cuba, but they are unwilling 
to give it to them gratuitously. I say to my colleagues, you need 
something called hard currency. You need money to be able to purchase 
those foods and those medical supplies, and that is what Castro simply 
does not have because he relied on $6 billion of what was the Soviet 
Union, he lost it, and now he has not made the changes to help the 
Cuban people. And do we have national interests? Absolutely.
  Mr. Chairman, this is the third-largest army in the Western 
Hemisphere. I do not suggest, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] 
has said we do not face a risk of invasion; that is not what I am 
suggesting. But why do they need the third-largest army in the 
hemisphere if their people are hungry? Why do they use money to have 
the largest standing army and a huge security force if their people are 
hungry? Stop spending the money on the bullets and the rifles, and 
start putting food on the plates of families in Cuban homes, in my 
family's homes.

  Now they have chosen to stay because they do not want to leave their 
homeland. They stay and fight, and they risk their lives every day to 
do so, and I risk it to some extent because of what I do here. Now that 
is something we do not have to worry about in the United States, so 
this debate in the abstract is one thing.
  Now we have heard a lot about what do the Cuban people want. We want 
to relieve their suffering, but we cannot do it while we have someone 
who, in fact, seeks to do everything to repress them, use his resources 
not to put food and medical supplies that he can accomplish throughout 
the world, and we are the greatest remitters of that. The Cuban 
Democracy Act that the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] 
helped pass and that was overwhelmingly voted by this House opened up 
the doors for medical supplies which did not exist prior to that in our 
embargo. But when we want to hear what the Cuban people have to say, I 
will give my colleagues two different specific examples.
  When we went with a group of Members of the House to Guantanamo where 
30,000 people risked the Florida Straits, risked their lives, brought 
their children with them to flee from a regime because of liberty, 
which is the word that used when we got there, not simply because of 
hunger, but for liberty, they said to us, the democratically elected 
leaders of those camps, the first ones who had an opportunity to have a 
free election; they did not say to us, ``The United States is punitive 
against us, you are hurting us.'' No, they said, ``Why can't you get 
the Mexicans, and the Canadians, and the Spanish, and others to join 
with us and have an international embargo,'' as we did in Haiti, as we 
did in the divestitures of South Africa, to help free those people from 
those oppressive regimes. They said, ``Why don't you do that? We want 
to end our suffering once and for all. We don't want to have to free 
our homeland.'' So who makes the Cuban people suffer? In the words of 
the Cuban people, not here in Congress; that is the words of those who 
were trying to flee, the 30,000. They said, ``We support your 
efforts.''
  And just yesterday 40-something brave Cubans who risked their lives 
by putting their names to a letter saying, ``We support his bill,'' 
told the Congress, ``Vote with us, be with us, help us in a free and 
democratic Cuba.'' They said, ``Vote with us.''
  Now these people risked their lives. Those who do not think that this 
is true, we have thousands of political prisoners in jail. We have 
these people who were willing for liberty, for freedom, and to end the 
suffering of the Cuban people.
  Now I have heard a lot about this is cold war rhetoric. The fact of 
the matter is no one has told Fidel Castro the cold war is over. He has 
not gotten over it, he has not stopped repressing his people, and what 
is best for the Cuban people? They have told us, they have told us, the 
30,000 who were in those camps, they told us, ``Strengthen this 
embargo, try to get other countries to join you.'' They did not say to 
stop it, and what did the people who valiantly fight, who are 
dissidents in Cuba, fight for, and what are they willing to risk their 
lives? Today they said, in fact, ``Go ahead and pass this bill.''
  This bill is about standing up for American interests, it is in the 
national interests, giving our companies and our citizens the right to 
sue for properties that were illegally confiscated, and it also says, 
the part that I wrote, ``We can go help the Cuban people in a 
transition to democracy, and we lay out that groundwork.''
  Vote against the substitute, vote for the bill, in the United States 
interests and also in the interests of the Cuban people.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Taylor].
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, let us start by finding 
those things we agree on, and I think every Member in this body, every 
Member of the other body, wants to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is a 
thug, he got there by force, he has stayed in power by force. But the 
present plan is not working. The first embargo was put on Castro by 
Eisenhower. He was still there when President Kennedy put an embargo on 
him. He was still there when President Johnson put an embargo on him. 
He was still there when President Nixon put an embargo on him, still 
there when President Ford continued the embargo, President Carter 
continued the embargo, President Reagan continued the embargo, 
President Bush continued the embargo, and now, under the Clinton 
administration, we still have an embargo.
  Embargo is not working. So let us try something different.
  I am going to say something good about President Reagan, and one of 
the beauties of what President Reagan did in the military buildup 
against the Soviet Union was at the same time he said, ``Let's trade 
with them. Let's show them what the worst could be, and let's show them 
what the best can be, with a free market, how a free market helps feed 
people, how a free market provides opportunities.'' I think we ought to 
do the same thing with the Cubans. I think we ought to lift the 
embargo. It is not working. I think the sooner the Cuban people can 
interface with the Americans, the sooner we give them, we show them, 
what our life is like, what our opportunities are like, in so many ways 
we give them the kind of hope, and I guarantee, if we were to lift the 
embargo within 2 years, Castro is gone, but he is gone in a peaceful 
manner rather than in the chaos that I think some people want to see 
happen.
  Mr. Chairman, my biggest concerns are to balance the budget and to 
provide for the common defense, and right now Cuba is a threat, the 
chaos down 

[[Page H 9392]]
in Cuba is a threat, in a couple of ways. First, it is only 90 miles 
from the continental United States. If Castro were to get hold of a 
missile from the former Soviet Union, then we have got a problem. It is 
also an expensive proposition right now where our Nation is spending 
about $30 million a month to take care of the Cuban boat people down at 
our base in Guantanamo, and that comes out of our defense budget, a 
defense budget that is already too small, a defense budget that is not 
building enough ships and taking good enough care of our people.
  So I asked the chairman of the Atlantic Command, a four-star Marine 
general by the name of Sheehan, if he thought it was in our Nation's 
best interests to continue the embargo or to open diplomatic relations 
with the Cubans, and I want to quote him from what he said before the 
Committee on Armed Services.

       Gen. Sheehan. I think it will be extraordinarily helpful to 
     start some type of dialogue with the process of the Cubans. 
     That is going on to the intersection in Havana. We have 
     almost on a daily basis, requirements to deal with the 
     frontier border guard and the Cubans, either because there 
     are Cuban migrants who are frustrated by the process, who are 
     actually walking through mine fields to return to Cuba and in 
     some cases they have maimed themselves. We are risking 
     American lives who go into the mine fields and pull them out.
       We have Cubans on a weekly basis go into the water to swim 
     back to Cuba. As a result, we need to have some kind of 
     mechanism just from a sheer safety standpoint to make sure 
     that these Cubans do not permanently maim or kill themselves 
     in the process.
       Castro holds all of the cards on the migrant issue. He can 
     put 100,000 Cubans in rafts tomorrow morning in a heartbeat. 
     We cannot absorb 100,000 at Guantanamo Bay Cuba. It seems to 
     me that it would be in our best interest to manage the change 
     that is going to occur in Cuba. It is going to happen.

  Mr. Chairman, this is not Gene Taylor of Mississippi speaking. This 
is a four-star Marine general who is in charge of the Atlantic Command 
for the United States of America.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington 
[Mr. McDermott] for yielding this time to me, and I want to commend 
again the gentleman from Washington for this initiative. Let me just 
address this quick question that has arisen so frequently in the last 
few minutes about why the Cuban people are suffering.
  Mr. Chairman, my friends on the other side of the aisle have 
repeatedly made the point that they are suffering because of Castro's 
policies. They are absolutely right about that. There is not any doubt 
about it. The principal reason that the people of Cuba are suffering 
today is because of the policies of Fidel Castro.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-Balart], a great American, a Cuban-
American, of whom I am very proud.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out to my 
colleagues an interesting wire that was just handed to me, a news wire 
that was just handed to me:

                cuba provides help for affected islands

       Cuba is providing $47,000 in medicines to assist islands of 
     the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) affected by the recent 
     hurricanes.
       The emergency aid will go to Antigua and Barbuds, Dominica, 
     and St. Kitts and Nevis, according to Barbados-based Cuban 
     Ambassador Lazaro Cabezas.
       Cabezas is accredited to a number of CARICOM states, 
     including Trinidad and Tobago, where Cuba plans to open a 
     diplomatic mission by the end of the year.

  Castro is not denied, as the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen] said, medicine. He has all the medicines he wants to buy with 
the dollars he gets, but he does not give them to the Cuban people.
  If my colleagues want to go to one of the most luxurious medical 
centers in the world, go to the medical center that Castro provides for 
the tourists. He has got a thriving industry to collect dollars from 
tourists from throughout the world, medical tourism. The Cuban people 
cannot go to those medical centers. The Cuban people do not have 
medicines and do not have any of the amenities that the tourists have 
because of Castro's policies, not because of the United States.
  So we continue to blame America first in this instance, blame America 
for the lack of medicines that Castro does not permit the Cuban people 
to have.
  Let us defeat this gutting amendment. Let us move forward.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance to my time to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].

                              {time}  1130

  Let us have no mistake about that. But it is also true that when you 
put on top of those failed policies an embargo from the United States, 
that that embargo increases the suffering of the Cuban people. If you 
ease that embargo by letting food and medicine go in there, which they 
desperately need, you are going to ease the plight of the Cuban people.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, Castro takes this embargo we have and uses it as a 
repressive tool in Cuba today. He uses it as an excuse for repression. 
All this amendment does is give the opportunity for more food and 
medicine to go to Cuba. What in the world is wrong with that? Why 
should we be opposed to relieving the suffering of the Cuban people?
  I do not know how much will go in. It may not be huge quantities. But 
we know the situation there today. They are suffering. They need 
medicine. They need food. Let us see if we can help them out with this 
very modest measure.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a vote against this bill, and I urge a vote for 
the McDermott substitute.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  The people in Cuba make 10 cents a day. My colleague over there says 
if we lift the embargo that we are going to help them. The fact of the 
matter is that Castro has the command of the economy; he controls the 
food and medicine.
  My colleague from Florida just pointed out that he is giving medicine 
to the hurricane victims in other countries. If he is so strapped, why 
does he not keep the medicine for his own country?
  He has the supplies. He has the food. As the gentlewoman from Florida 
[Ms. Ros-Lehtinen] pointed out, he is selling it to tourists for hard 
currency so he can pay the military to keep him in power because he is 
afraid of his own people. We will not help the Cuban people by lifting 
this embargo.
  Mr. Chairman, let me go on to say that the embargo really did not 
start until 2\1/2\ years ago when the Torricelli bill, the Cuban 
Democracy Act, passed. Up until that time, it had no teeth in it. When 
the Soviet Union cut off the aid, the $6 billion a year to Castro, he 
started to sink. He is desperately trying to survive today, and we 
should not throw him a lifeline as my colleagues unintentionally are 
trying to do. We should deny him the hard currency.
  All this bill does is say he cannot sell confiscated U.S. property. 
Our constituents had property down there that he took away from them 
that he is now selling to try to get hard currency to survive. All we 
want to do is give our constituents a way to get restitution from this 
government and deny him the hard currency he needs to survive as the 
Communist dictator, the last Communist dictator in our hemisphere.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to end up by reading to Members a part of a 
letter from Armando Valladares, who spent 22 years in Castro's gulags. 
He was our U.N. human rights ambassador, one of the most revered Cuban 
Americans and Cubans in the world. He says, ``I am a former political 
prisoner of Fidel Castro's jails, where I was confined for 22 long 
years. In those jails I saw many of my best friends die due to the 
horrible tortures and inhumane treatment. I strongly believe that the 
remaining days of Castro's tyranny will be shortened once your Libertad 
bill, now up for a vote, is passed''.
  The endorsement of our legislative by the most influential dissident 
leaders inside Cuba, inside Cuba, proves that they are convinced, as I 
am, that this law is an important contribution towards our goal: A free 
and Democratic Cuba. Viva Cuba libre.
  Mr. Chairman, we want liberty and freedom for the Cuban people, and 
this is the way to do it, to deny Castro his lifeline and the hard 
currency that he so desperately needs. With that, I urge a no vote on 
this amendment and a yes vote on the liberty amendment, the liberty 
bill, which I think will help the Cuban people.

[[Page H 9393]]

  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. McDermott].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 138, 
noes 283, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 682]

                               AYES--138

     Abercrombie
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (CA)
     Bryant (TX)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Danner
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McIntosh
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moran
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--283

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Blute
     Collins (IL)
     Gephardt
     Hilleary
     Jefferson
     Moakley
     Ney
     Payne (NJ)
     Reynolds
     Salmon
     Sisisky
     Stokes
     Tucker

                              {time}  1158

  Mr. STARK and Mr. PAYNE of Virginia changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed 
in House Report 104-253.

                              {time}  1200


                  amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Wynn

  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Wynn: Page 22, strike line 4 
     and all that follows through page 23, line 7 and insert the 
     following:
       (a) Opposition to Cuban Membership in International 
     Financial Institutions.--(1) Until such time as the President 
     determines that a transition government in Cuba is in power, 
     the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United 
     States executive director to each international financial 
     institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
     oppose the admission of Cuba as a member of such institution.
       (2) Once a transition government in Cuba is in power, the 
     President is encouraged to take steps to support the 
     processing of Cuba's application for membership in any 
     financial institution subject to the membership taking effect 
     at such time as the President deems most likely to facilitate 
     the transition to a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba.
       Page 23, line 8, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(b)''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Wynn] and a Member opposed, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], 
will each be recognized for 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].


              Amendment, As Modified, Offered by Mr. Wynn

  Mr. WYNN, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to 
modify my amendment so as to read as the text of amendment No. 4 
printed in the September 20 Congressional Record. I believe a copy of 
the modification is at the desk and also in the possession of the 
subcommittee chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Wynn: Page 22, 
     strike lines 4 through 20 and insert the following:
       (a) Opposition to Cuban Membership in International 
     Financial Institutions.--(1) Until such time as the President 
     determines that a transition government in Cuba is in power, 
     the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United 
     States executive director to each international financial 
     institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
     oppose the admission of Cuba as a member of such institution.
       (2) Once a transition government in Cuba is in power, the 
     President is encouraged to take steps to support the 
     processing of Cuba's application for membership in any 
     financial institution subject to the membership taking effect 
     at such time as the President deems most likely to facilitate 
     the transition to a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba.

  Mr. WYNN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and printed in 
the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Maryland?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I 


[[Page H 9394]]
have talked with the gentleman offering the modification to the 
amendment. I think it is a good modification and we are prepared to 
accept that.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Maryland?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, first let me thank the subcommittee chairman for his 
leadership on this issue. We have not always agreed on the appropriate 
approach but I certainly appreciate the courtesies he has extended to 
me during the course of this debate.
  The modified amendment that I am offering today will simply give the 
President the flexibility to support Cuba's membership in international 
financial institutions after a transition government is in power in 
Cuba. I believe that the most effective time for international 
assistance is during the transition period.
  If a pro-democracy transition in Cuba is going to be peaceful and if 
it is going to succeed, it will need the support of international 
financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and others can make an enormous difference in Cuba during the 
transition period because of their strict requirements for economic 
reforms. The IFI's could help Cuba privatize its industry, develop 
commercial banking systems, and develop a tax system that will support 
a market-based economy.
  Nobody knows what a transition in Cuba will look like but we must be 
prepared to react and act quickly. Let me be very clear, however, that 
the transition period that we are talking about and a transition 
government is specifically delineated within the context of the 
existing language of the bill.
  It is specified that a transition government is one in which there is 
freedom of political activity, freedom of association, freedom of the 
press, respect for internationally recognized human rights, and is in 
the process of organizing free elections. It also specifically states 
that a transition government may not include Fidel or Raoul Castro.
  I believe we are talking about a very strictly defined set of 
circumstances under which international financial assistance could be 
of great importance. Quick involvement has shown, in the case of 
Eastern Europe, that we can lend a strong effort toward the movement to 
democracy. We were successful in Eastern Europe. I believe the same 
model will apply in the case of Cuba.
  Mr. Chairman, what we saw in Eastern Europe was that the transition 
led to democracy, not toward some sort of non-Communist dictatorship. 
We would like to see the same model in Cuba. That is where the 
international financial institutions come into play.
  At some point in time, Mr. Chairman, in the not-so-distant future, 
the Castro dictatorship is going to come to an end. I do not know how 
that will be but we do know that is fact it will be.
  During that period of time, once the transition government has met 
the criteria specified in this bill, I believe that we ought to assist 
them with participation in international financial institutions. That 
is what this amendment would do. I would certainly ask the membership 
to support the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Let me just say that the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn] has come 
up with a very valuable amendment. It was well thought out. I 
appreciate very much his contribution that he has made to this 
legislation. I want to thank him for being willing to work out an 
agreement that I think is going to be better for the bill and better 
for the legislation and better for the people of Cuba in the final 
analysis. It provides a mechanism for helping them rebuild Cuba once 
the Castro dictatorship falls.
  Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. WALSH. I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to enter into a colloquy with my 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], 
along with my good friend the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Coleman].
  Mr. Chairman, section 401 of H.R. 927 would exclude from the U.S. 
aliens who have confiscated property of U.S. nationals or who traffick 
in such property. The report on H.R. 927 by our Committee on 
International Relations relates that the Department of State is 
actively engaged in prosecuting hundreds of confiscation claims of U.S. 
citizens in Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Cuba. The report then 
states:

       Persons who are responsible for these confiscations or who 
     are trafficking in such property should be among those 
     initially targeted for exclusion under this section.

  I have been working to bring to resolution an egregious expropriation 
executed by the Dominican Republic's military against Western Energy 
Inc. Western Energy is a U.S. company that was operating an important 
liquid petroleum gas facility in the Dominican Republic and operates a 
similar facility in my district in New York.
  Would the distinguished gentleman agree that the confiscators and 
traffickers in this case should also be among those initially targeted 
for exclusion?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I agree with the distinguished gentlemen from New York 
and Texas. The report on H.R. 927 cites four countries which should be 
initial targets with respect to section 401 because they have been 
found to have the most confiscation cases. However, the seriousness of 
the Western Energy case merits priority attention for exclusion of the 
persons involved, and I will work with the distinguished gentlemen to 
try to achieve that result.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I too have been working to bring to 
resolution this egregious expropriation suffered by Western Energy Co. 
that is headquartered in my congressional district. It is my 
understanding that numerous high-ranking Dominican Government officials 
have expressed both public and private outrage with their government's 
action but they have said they have been powerless to redress it.
  I think, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. Ambassador should be commended 
for her efforts to resolve the situation. An exclusion under section 
401 of H.R. 927 would certainly buttress her efforts. The names of the 
persons involved in the confiscation and who are trafficking in Western 
Energy's property are well known and could be provided by the U.S. 
Embassy as anticipated in the report on section 401 of H.R. 927.
  I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] for his response. I 
understand that he agrees that these persons should be among those 
initially targeted for exclusion under section 401 of H.R. 927. Is that 
correct?
  Mr. GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield, that is correct. I want to 
assure both gentlemen that we will work with them to try to correct 
these problems.
  Mr. WALSH. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. COLEMAN. I thank the gentleman from Indiana for yielding to the 
gentleman from New York.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Let me end, Mr. Chairman, by saying once again 
that I appreciate the hard work of the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Wynn]. He is a very thoughtful member of the Committee on International 
Relations. We are very happy to accept his amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record correspondence to the Speaker 
concerning committee consultations on H.R. 927.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                   Washington, DC, August 3, 1995.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     The Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing to you regarding the ``Cuban 
     Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995'' 
     (H.R. 927), legislation that has already been reported by the 
     Committee on International Relations (H. Rept. 104-202, Pt. 
     1). When it was introduced, H.R. 927 was also referred to 

[[Page H 9395]]
     the Committee on the Judiciary and, following the filing of the report 
     by the International Relations Committee, this referral 
     period was extended until August 4, 1995.
       H.R. 927 was referred to the Judiciary Committee because of 
     a number of its provisions fall within the Rule X 
     jurisdiction of this Committee. Specifically, section 302 
     would create a civil cause of action in U.S. district courts 
     by ``United States nationals'' against any person that 
     traffics in property that was confiscated by the Government 
     of Cuba, on or after January 1959. A ``United States 
     national'' includes individuals who became naturalized U.S. 
     citizens after the confiscation occurred. Section 303 
     establishes an alternate method for determining the amount 
     and ownership of claims brought under section 302. In doing 
     so, both section 303 and section 304 impact on the decisions 
     and jurisdiction of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 
     which is an agency under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary 
     Committee. Section 401 impacts on this Committee's 
     jurisdiction with respect to the Immigration and Nationality 
     Act by permitting the Secretary of State to exclude from 
     entry into the United States any alien who has confiscated 
     the property of a U.S. national or who traffics in such 
     property.
       As a result of consultations between the International 
     Relations Committee and the Judiciary Committee, a number of 
     changes were made in the text of H.R. 927. Consequently, the 
     Judiciary Committee does not intend to mark up H.R. 927. 
     However, this does not in any way waive this Committee's 
     jurisdiction over that bill or related legislation, nor over 
     the general subject matters contained in the bill which fall 
     within this Committee's jurisdiction. I also request that 
     Members of the Judiciary Committee be appointed to serve on 
     any conference committee appointed with respect to this 
     legislation.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Henry J. Hyde,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____

         Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
                                    Washington, DC, July 24, 1995.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker, The Capitol, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing concerning H.R. 927, the 
     Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
     1995, which the House of Representatives may consider later 
     this year. This legislation contains two provisions which 
     fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Banking and 
     Financial Services under Rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives. These provisions are found in Sections 103 
     and 104.
       Section 103 prohibits a U.S. national or agency from 
     extending a loan, credit, or other financing to a foreign 
     person or U.S. national to finance transactions involving any 
     property confiscated by the Cuban government the claim to 
     which is owned by a U.S. national as of the date of enactment 
     of H.R. 927. This provision falls under the jurisdiction of 
     the Banking Committee relating to international finance and 
     investment policies. While enforcement of this provision 
     could be complex, and its impact on the competitiveness of 
     the U.S. financial services industry is uncertain, the 
     Banking Committee agrees to waive consideration of H.R. 927 
     and requests to be discharged from further consideration of 
     Section 103 without prejudice.
       Section 104 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to 
     instruct the U.S. executive director to each international 
     financial institution (IFI) to use the voice and vote of the 
     United States to oppose the admission of Cuba as a member of 
     such institution until a democratically elected government in 
     Cuba is in power. It further requires that if any IFI 
     approves a loan or other assistance to Cuba over the 
     opposition of the United States, the Treasury Secretary is to 
     withhold payment to such institution, with respect to paid-in 
     and callable capital, of an amount equal to the amount of 
     loan or other assistance to the Cuban government.
       In this regard, it has been longstanding United States 
     policy to oppose Cuban membership in the international 
     financial institutions. Indeed, Cuba is not now a member of 
     any such international organization. Consequently, while the 
     Committee would have serious concerns about the impact of IFI 
     withholding provisions on U.S. foreign policy and the 
     international financial institutions generally, the Banking 
     Committee agrees to waive jurisdiction of H.R. 927 and 
     requests to be discharged from further consideration of 
     Section 104 without prejudice.
           Sincerely,
                                                   James A. Leach,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____

                                      Committee on Ways and Means,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                   Washington, DC, August 3, 1995.
     Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
     Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of 
         Representatives, Rayburn Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is to confirm my understanding of 
     our agreement concerning further consideration of H.R. 927, 
     the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 
     which was referred to the Committee on International 
     Relations, and in addition, to the Ways and Means Committee 
     for a period ending on August 4, 1995.
       Section 109 of H.R. 927, as reported by your Committee, 
     would impose a certification requirement on exporters of 
     sugar and sugar products to the United States. In addition, 
     sections 201 and 202 contain statements about the trade 
     policy objectives of the United States toward a democratic 
     Cuba and authorize the President to take action to achieve 
     those goals.
       The action taken by the Committee on International 
     Relations concerning the sugar provision was clearly contrary 
     to clause 5(b) of Rule XXI of the Rules of the House, which 
     provides that no bill carrying a tax or tariff measure shall 
     be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to 
     report tax and tariff measures.
       However, I now understand that you will offer a manager's 
     amendment that will drop all provisions relating to trade in 
     sugar (section 109) from the bill and change the text of the 
     remaining minor trade-related provisions to language drafted 
     by my staff. In addition, I understand that you have 
     committed to oppose any modifications or additions to these 
     provisions during further consideration in the House.
       Based on your written assurances to that effect, and in 
     response to your requests that I facilitate consideration of 
     this important legislation, I do not believe that a markup of 
     H.R. 927 by the Committee on Ways and Means will be 
     necessary.
       However, this is being done only with the understanding 
     that this does not in any way prejudice the Committee's 
     jurisdictional prerogatives in the future with respect to 
     this measure or any similar legislation, and it should not be 
     considered as precedent for consideration of matters of 
     jurisdictional interest to the Committee on Ways and Means in 
     the future. Should any provisions of jurisdictional interest 
     remain in the bill after Floor consideration, I would request 
     that the Committee on Ways and Means be named as additional 
     conferees, and as sole conferees on provisions within its 
     sole jurisdiction.
       Finally, I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters 
     on this matter be placed in the Record during consideration 
     on the Floor. With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                      Bill Archer,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____

                                                      Committee on


                                      International Relations,

                                   Washington, DC, August 4, 1995.
     Hon. Bill Archer,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to you with respect to your 
     August 3 letter and further House consideration of H.R. 927, 
     the ``Cuban and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
     1995.''
       Pursuant to agreements reached between you and key 
     proponents of this legislation, including the Chairman of the 
     Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Dan Burton, I would like to 
     assure you that the Committee intends to offer an amendment 
     during floor consideration of this measure which addresses 
     the specific concerns raised by you and your staff with 
     respect to sections 109, 201, and 202 of this legislation. 
     Moreover, I would like to further assure you that we will 
     work with you and Members of your Committee in opposing any 
     proposed modifications or additions relating to these 
     provisions during further House consideration of this 
     legislation.
       In addition, I understand that you will request that Ways 
     and Means Members be appointed as conferees on these 
     provisions and any other tax, tariff, or trade policy matters 
     that might be at issue in a conference with the Senate on 
     this legislation.
       I should note that these understandings on this legislation 
     do not prejudice in any way this Committee's jurisdiction 
     over international economic policy issues and the Committee's 
     authority to seek conferees on these and any other provisions 
     of the bill that are within the jurisdiction of the Committee 
     on International Relations during my House-Senate conference 
     committee that may be convened on this legislation.
       I extend to you my gratitude for your willingness to work 
     with members of this Committee and other interested Members 
     to move this important legislation to the full House without 
     delay.
       With best wishes,
           Sincerely,
                                               Benjamin A. Gilman,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Jacobs].
  Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, first I would like it to be understood on 
the record that there is no Member of this House for whom I have 
greater affection and respect than the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Burton].
  One of the reasons I have so much respect for him is his consistency. 
He has the same trade policy for China as he has for Cuba. Those who 
differ between the two countries, I could say, puzzle me somewhat.
  I want to quote a former U.S. Senator from Indiana, Homer E. 
Capehart, a member of the party of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Burton], who said back in the late 1950's, ``If you would let me turn 
loose 10,000 American salesmen in the Soviet Union, I would guarantee 
that the days of communism would be numbered.''

[[Page H 9396]]

  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further speakers. I would just 
indicate, therefore, in closing that I believe this is a constructive 
amendment. It will enable us to move quickly at such time as we see a 
transition government in Cuba and I believe that will help us move Cuba 
more quickly to democracy. I thank the gentleman from Indiana for his 
support with respect to this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered 
by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is advised that amendment No. 3 will not be 
offered. Is that correct?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed 
in House Report 104-253.


                 amendment no. 4 offered by mr. stearns

  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Stearns:
       Add at the end of title I the following:

     SEC. 112. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CONTACTS WITH CUBAN 
                   GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       (a) Advanced Notification Required.--No funds made 
     available under any provision of law may be used for the 
     costs and expenses of negotiations, meetings, discussions, or 
     contacts between United States Government officials or 
     representatives and officials or representatives of the Cuban 
     Government relating to normalization of relations between the 
     United States and Cuba unless 15 days in advance the 
     President has notified the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate in accordance with procedures 
     applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A 
     of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
       (b) Reports.--Within 15 days of any negotiations, meetings, 
     discussions, or contacts between individuals described in 
     subsection (a), with respect to any matter, the President 
     shall submit a report to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate detailing the individuals involved, 
     the matters discussed, and any agreements made, including 
     agreements to conduct future negotiations, meetings, 
     discussions, or contacts.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Stearns] and a Member opposed will each be recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Johnston] will be 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Stearns].
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I will be brief. This is an amendment that I had put together as a 
piece of legislation, H.R. 1909. It was introduced earlier this year 
and had bipartisan support. We had the support of Chairman Burton, 
ranking member Torricelli, as well as the Members from the State of 
Florida.
  I intend, Mr. Chairman, to withdraw this amendment, but I wanted to 
just outline a little bit about the amendment because I think it is 
important that the House be aware of what this amendment intended to 
do.
  It was also offered on the Senate side. The important part about this 
amendment is it says basically that when the administration negotiates 
with the Castro regime, that they cannot do so without notifying 
Congress first. I think that is important, particularly when we saw 
what happened in Vietnam.
  My amendment would require that the President notify congressional 
leadership prior to any meeting with the Castro regime, and that a 
timely report be made to the leadership with the results of any such 
negotiations.
  With the situation as delicate as it is right now, Mr. Chairman, I am 
a little concerned, particularly talking to people on both sides of the 
aisle, that this would move the negotiation process into a phase where 
there might be a lot of confrontation, and that the administration 
itself might not be amenable to this amendment.
  I actually withdraw this amendment, but I would like to make my 
opening statement part of the Record.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is largely identical to H.R. 1909 which I 
introduced earlier this year with broad bipartisan support and which 
includes Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Torricelli, Representative 
Ros-Lehtinen, and Representative Diaz-Balart among its original 
cosponsors.
  It was jointly introduced with an identical bill in the Senate 
offered by my colleague from Florida, Senator Mack, who was also joined 
with widespread support in the other Chamber, including Majority Leader 
Dole, Foreign Relations Chairman Helms and Senator Lieberman.
  My amendment will require that the President notify congressional 
leadership prior to any meetings with the Castro regime and that a 
timely report be made to the leadership with the results of any such 
negotiations.
  The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act is an important piece 
of legislation. It rightly steps up the pressure on the Castro regime 
in the hope that Democracy can be restored to the people of Cuba.
  But this legislation and its impact could be rendered meaningless if 
the present administration opens up negotiations which could legitimize 
the very regime we are trying to remove.
  With a situation as delicate as negotiations with one of the last 
Communist dictatorships left in the world, it is essential that 
Congress be kept aware of any attempts made by the administration to 
legitimize the Castro government.
  Already members of this administration have shown their willingness 
to deal with Castro. Chairman Burton has wisely included language in 
this bill that emphasizes the true position of our Nation: Not to deal 
with the Communist dictatorship in Cuba. This Congress must remain 
vigilant and ensure that this policy is in fact the one being followed.
  The normalization of United States relations with the Communist 
government of Vietnam is just one example of where the current 
administration has moved too quickly and without open discussions with 
the Congress prior to its actions. Had there been a provision such as 
this during the negotiations with Vietnam, at least the Congress would 
have had the ability to advise the President on how we felt. Instead, 
the President presented us with a fait accompli. We need to ensure that 
tomorrow we don't see a headline proclaiming ``Administration Officials 
Meet With Castro, Congress Caught Totally Unaware.''
  Mr. Chairman, while I recognize that it is the prerogative of the 
President to conduct foreign affairs, it is also the responsibility of 
the President to keep Congress informed of his actions so that we might 
respond accordingly. This amendment will insure this just balance of 
power.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join me in making sure that the 
United States does not rush into a closer relationship with a Communist 
dictatorship without the elected Representatives of the people being 
properly informed. I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
927, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.
  This legislation has been carefully crafted to bring an end to the 
Castro regime by reaffirming the principles contained in the Cuban 
Democracy Act passed in 1992. This legislation seeks to close the 
loopholes in order to more effectively continue our embargo against 
Cuba.
  Another provision in H.R. 927 prepares the United States to support a 
transition government which eventually will lead to a democratic 
government in Cuba. We realize that the isolated Government of Castro 
is on its last leg and this is a positive signal to the Cuban people 
that the United States will support their efforts toward 
democratization.
  Finally, this legislation takes important steps to protect the 
property interests of U.S. nationals by making persons who 
intentionally traffic in stolen property liable for damages in U.S. 
Courts.
  It is anathema to all Americans that in our own backyard we have one 
of the last Communist countries and one of the last dictators within a 
half hour plane flight. Today, Cuba is more backward than ever. This 
authoritarian regime now symbolizes the fact that communism has failed.
  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the $4.5 billion in annual 
support for Cuba has all but disappeared. No other countries have come 
to Castro's financial aid. Meanwhile, the United States embargo 
continues to keep Cuba without sought after American dollars.

[[Page H 9397]]

  Recent reports state that the deteriorating living conditions, the 
repressive control exercised by the state and economic difficulties led 
to the mass exodus on the high seas in 1994. These reports also state 
that the Cuban crisis has deep internal roots affecting not only the 
economic, political, and social sphere, but all of the island's 
institutions. This crisis is the direct result of the repressive policy 
of Castro coupled with the exclusion of differing viewpoints.
  Castro has not shown a willingness to make any efforts to liberalize 
Cuba's political system or economic markets. For this reason stronger 
actions are needed to deal with his regime as compared to other 
Communist countries which recently have shown movement toward 
democratic principles.
  In my judgment, H.R. 927 takes the necessary steps to increase 
pressure on the Castro regime to initiate needed political and economic 
reforms. By passing this measure we will also send a strong signal to 
Castro that the United States will stand firm until he is gone and Cuba 
becomes a democracy.
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my support for the 
general thrust of H.R. 927. This legislation sends an important signal 
to the Castro regime in Cuba that the United States will continue its 
vigilance in opposing the communist dictatorship there. For this 
reason, I will support passage of this bill today. At the same time, 
however, there are a number of provisions in this legislation that I 
believe could have an unintended negative impact on our efforts to 
promote a transition to a democratic government in Cuba and impede the 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy elsewhere.
  In particular, I have serious concerns about the bill's attempt to 
restrict United States assistance to international financial 
institutions and other nations based on their policies toward Cuba. I 
believe we have broader interests vis-a-vis these institutions and 
nations that should not be allowed to be dictated by our policy toward 
Cuba.
  I am also concerned that the constraints imposed by the bill on the 
types of United States assistance that may be provided to a 
transitional or democratically elected government in Cuba may in fact 
hinder our ability to promote the changes we desire there.
  In addition, it appears that some of the bill's provisions relating 
to property claims may have the unintended consequence of tying up 
considerable amounts of property in litigation for years after a 
transition to a democratic government has occurred. This could hinder 
investment by Americans desiring to promote economic development in a 
post-Castro Cuba.
  For these reasons, my vote today in support of H.R. 927 does not 
indicate an intention to support the conference version of this bill. 
Rather, I will withhold my decision on support for final passage of 
this legislation pending action by the conferees to address the 
deficiencies contained in the House version of the bill.
  Mr. COYNE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 927. I 
believe that every Member of Congress agrees on our foreign policy 
goals with regard to Cuba. We all want to encourage democracy and 
economic growth, protect human rights, and neutralize a potential 
military threat just miles away from the United States. We legitimately 
disagree, however, on the most effective means of achieving these 
goals.
  The Cuban people deserve a free, democratic, society that respects 
human rights and political freedom. Specifically, they deserve to enjoy 
the fruits of their labors and the right to travel freely across 
international borders. They deserve the freedom to speak their minds 
freely, without fear of persecution. And they deserve the fundamental 
right to organize and to control the actions of their own government 
through a free, fair, and democratic electoral process. I would 
suggest, however, that H.R. 927 is not the most effective way to 
accomplish these goals.
  The so-called Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995 is 
intended to ratchet up the pressure on Cuba by intensifying the 
economic sanctions and travel restrictions already in place. The theory 
behind this legislation is that any additional hardship imposed on the 
Cuban people will be transformed into additional dissatisfaction with 
the Castro regime and will precipitate an indigenous insurrection 
against Castro. The problem with this reasoning is that in many ways it 
plays into Castro's hands by allowing him to blame the Cuban people's 
suffering on foreign enemies--namely, the United States. Sanctions like 
these provide Castro with a convenient scapegoat for the failings of 
his unsustainable regime. Moreover, some of the provisions in this 
legislation would violate GATT and NAFTA. While I am no supporter of 
NAFTA, I believe that the United States is bound to observe 
international treaties that have been duly signed and ratified by the 
U.S. Government. We can not pick and choose as the mood takes us. 
Violation of our obligations under these treaties could result in 
sanctions on U.S. trade and the loss of U.S. export-related jobs. This 
legislation would damage the economic health of the United States 
without advancing our foreign policy goals. Consequently, I must 
conclude that H.R. 927 would do more harm than good.
  I believe that the most effective tool for fostering democracy, human 
rights, and economic development in Cuba is exposure to the citizens 
and cultures of free, democratic societies. Consequently, I am a 
cosponsor of H.R. 2229, the Free Trade with Cuba Act, which was 
introduced by my colleague from New York, Representative Charles B. 
Rangel. This legislation would lift the existing sanctions on trade, 
travel, and commerce with Cuba. It would only allow the President to 
impose new export controls on Cuba in accordance with certain sections 
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, and it would allow the 
President to apply the authority granted him under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act only in the case of a new national 
emergency resulting from actions undertaken by the Cuban Government. In 
short, this bill would normalize United States relations with Cuba.
  In closing, let me just point out that we've had sanctions against 
Cuba for over 30 years. They made some sense during the cold war, when 
Cuba was allied with a hostile superpower, but they haven't been 
particularly successful in undermining the Castro government. In the 
end, an ineffective economic system and political repression will bring 
down the Castro regime, just as similar institutions precipitated the 
collapse from within for the other countries of the Soviet bloc. The 
best ways to speed up that process is through engagement, not through 
isolation. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing H.R. 
927 here today.
  Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 927, the 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. I am proud to be a 
cosponsor of this legislation along with a bipartisan group of my 
colleagues.
  We are at an important moment in the struggle for freedom for the 
Cuban people. It is a well-known fact that the Cuban economy is in 
complete disarray. In order to prop up his failing regime, Castro has 
attempted to attract foreign investors to the country so that he may 
obtain more hard currency for his benefit, I repeat his benefit. Let us 
not pretend that the people of Cuba will benefit from these 
investments. Have no doubt, the capital that comes with foreign 
investment is for the benefit of Castro and his regime, not the people 
of Cuba.
  To those who will say that Castro is liberalizing his political and 
economic policies, this is simply untrue. There is no indication that 
elections held in Cuba are anything more than a rubber stamp of his 
corrupt regime and there simply are not real economic reforms occurring 
there. Castro will continue to control the Cuban economy and the Cuban 
people because he and his regime control all of the money received from 
foreign investments.
  To those who argue that we must end the embargo because it has not 
worked in 35 years, I would tell you that the embargo has worked best 
in the last few years due to the end of subsidies from the Soviet 
Union. The embargo is working and should be tightened, as this bill 
seeks to do, so the end of the Castro regime comes as soon as possible.
  Finally, I support the provisions of this bill that provide American 
citizens a right of action in a U.S. court of law to ensure that 
property confiscated from them is not sold for the benefit of the 
Castro regime. The only way to end Castro's dictatorship is to end his 
access to foreign capital. I support these provisions as well as those 
that provide for a smooth transition to democracy and I urge all of my 
colleagues to support this bill with a ``yes'' vote on final passage.
  Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, this bill is a clear 
statement that the American people stand arm in arm with the people of 
Cuba in their struggle against a repressive dictator, and that we will 
not back away from being partners in our common fight for freedom.
  We won the cold war because we never gave in to communism. By 
standing firm we brought down the Iron Curtain and saw communism 
collapse in Europe.
  The conditions which existed when President Kennedy implemented our 
embargo have not changed.
  Now is not the time to offer relief to the Castro regime, especially 
relief at the expense of American citizens who have had their property 
seized by Castro. Castro wants to use American property to lure foreign 
investors to Cuba who will provide cover for his dictatorship and cash 
to his treasury.
  This bill prevents the Castro regime and foreign investors from 
profiting off the confiscated property of Americans. It says, quite 
simply, theft is wrong.
  The Libertad bill allows Americans, whose property Castro has seized, 
to pursue legal redress if an international corporation or investor 
purchases that land for profit-making.

[[Page H 9398]]

  This is government-sanctioned theft.
  The bill also states that we will not allow those who traffic in this 
stolen property to enter the United States. Why should we welcome those 
who profit from property stolen from our citizens, from our 
constituents, and who are exploiting the hopes, dreams, and labor of 
the Cuban people?
  Let us be clear, foreign investment in Cuba means one thing--it is a 
lifeline to the Castro regime.
  It will legitimize an illegitimate government.
  It will offer protection to a man who must be brought down just like 
the Communist dictators of Eastern Europe.
  It will postpone the day that the people of Cuba will live in freedom 
and democracy.
  A vote for this bill is a vote in support of those trying to build 
democracy in a land that desperately wants freedom.
  This bill will help that day of liberty come sooner. This is our duty 
as Americans.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the gentleman from Washington. This amendment, which includes the 
text of my bill, H.R. 1700, would lift the embargo against Cuba on the 
sale of medicines, medical supplies and equipment, and food. It is an 
appropriate amendment and would bring to an end a policy that is 
unworthy of this great Nation.
  I realize that most of my colleagues support the embargo against Cuba 
and support this legislation that will tighten that embargo to new and 
even more absurd heights. That is not the issue before us in this 
amendment.
  What this amendment asks us is, should the U.S. demonstrate its 
disapproval of another government by cutting off the sale of food and 
medicine to civilians, the elderly, the young, and the sick?
  Historically, no matter how repugnant we have found the behavior of 
other governments, the United States has not resorted to this immoral 
and inhuman form of pressure.
  When the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile set off a terrorist bomb on 
the streets of Washington, killing an American citizen, we didn't 
punish the Chilean people by embargoing food and medicine.
  The Chinese Government brutally oppresses human rights from Beijing 
to Lhasa and is rewarded by this Congress with most-favored-nation 
treatment.
  Salvadoran Government-run death squads slaughtered tens of thousands 
of civilians, including four American nuns and the Archbishop of San 
Salvador, and El Salvador was rewarded with United States aid.
  Even when we went to war against Iraq, there was not embargo on food 
and medicine.
  So what has Cuba done that merits this sort of inhuman treatment? 
Clearly, the Members of this House are so accustomed to voting for 
sanctions against Cuba that we have lost any sense of proportion.
  I certainly understand that most Members of Congress want to seem 
tough on Cuba. I know that's where the votes are today. But in our zeal 
to be the big cowboy in the hemisphere, we should not lose sight of 
fundamental decency. The embargo on food and medicine is wrong; it is 
immoral, and it brings dishonor to the United States.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. Duncan, Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that 
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 927) to seek 
international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan 
for support of a transition government leading to a democratically 
elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes, pursuant to House 
Resolution 225, he reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, 
the question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

                              {time}  1215

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the 
engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 294, 
noes 130, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 683]

                               AYES--294

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--130

     Abercrombie
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (CA)
     Bryant (TX)
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hostettler
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Markey
     Martinez
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moran
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar

[[Page H 9399]]

     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Owens
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Rangel
     Reed
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Ward
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Clay
     Hastings (FL)
     Moakley
     Reynolds
     Salmon
     Scott
     Sisisky
     Stokes
     Tucker
     Waters

                              {time}  1238

  Mr. OWENS changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. COSTELLO, Mr. RAHALL, Mrs. KENNELLY, and Ms. McCARTHY changed 
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid upon the table.

                          ____________________