[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 147 (Wednesday, September 20, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13920-S13971]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask if the pending amendment has not 
been set aside, the Brown amendment be set aside for purposes of my 
offering an amendment, at which time the amendment will recur.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2709

(Purpose: To limit Economic Support Fund assistance to Turkey, and for 
                            other purposes)

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New York [Mr. D'Amato], for himself, Mr. 
     Pressler, Mr. Sarbanes, and Ms. Snowe, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2709.

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:


                   limitation on assistance to turkey

       Sec.   . Not more than $21,000,000 of the funds 
     appropriated in this Act under the heading ``Economic Support 
     Fund'' may be made available to the Government of Turkey.
       On page 11, line 10, before the period at the end of the 
     line, insert the following: ``: Provided further, That 
     $10,000,000 of the funds made available under this heading 
     shall be transferred to, and merged with, the following 
     accounts in the following amounts: $5,000,000 for the 
     Department of the Treasury, and $5,000,000 for the Department 
     of Justice, to support law enforcement training activities in 
     foreign countries for the purpose of improving the 
     effectiveness of the United States in investigating and 
     prosecuting transnational offenses''.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I offer this amendment on behalf of 
Senator Pressler, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Snowe and myself. I rise to 
propose an amendment to the foreign operations bill, which will help 
restore credibility to our foreign assistance program by ensuring that 
one of the largest recipients of United States aid, the Republic of 
Turkey, adheres to internationally accepted standards for human rights 
and humanitarian practices.
  My amendment will cap at $21 million the amount of economic support 
funds that the United States gives to Turkey. Ten million dollars in 
savings by capping these funds would then be appropriated by $5 million 
each to the Treasury and the Justice Departments to support law 
enforcement training 

[[Page S 13921]]
activities in foreign countries for the purpose of improving the 
effectiveness of the United States in investigating and prosecuting 
transnational offenses.
  I am very pleased, and I want to commend the subcommittee, which has 
appropriated funds for the FBI with the same purpose. I want to make 
sure that there are enough funds to support the Treasury Department and 
other Justice Department activities in this area as well.
  Mr. President, let me make it clear that this amendment does not 
restrict United States military aid to Turkey. It does not restrict. 
But what I am attempting to do is send a message that the United States 
will no longer tolerate the human rights abuses in violation of 
international law that Turkey has and is conducting.
  This year the Turkish Government will receive $320 million in 
military aid from American taxpayers to address its security needs. In 
total, Turkey will receive $366 million. My amendment will bring this 
total to $341 million.
  The time has come after years of fruitless so-called quiet diplomacy 
for the Congress to take the lead in addressing a broad range of issues 
dealing with Turkey. Let me go over some of them.
  One, worsening human rights records; two, its continued blockade of 
humanitarian supplies to Armenia. It is incredible in this day and age 
that humanitarian supplies are being blocked to Armenia. Three, its 
refusal to work toward a lasting and equitable settlement in Cyprus, a 
situation that has been permitted to exist year after year after year; 
four, its denial of basic rights to its Kurdish minority.
  In each of these areas, Turkey has consistently violated 
international treaties and agreements to which it is a signatory. Among 
these are the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
  Mr. President, the Congress in the fiscal year 1995 foreign aid bill 
withheld 10 percent of the principal amount of direct loans for Turkey 
based on its human rights record and the situation in Cyprus. The 
Turkish Government has spoken clearly on that issue. It will reject any 
U.S. aid tied to its human rights record. It is clear, given the 
Turkish Government's response, that we must deal differently with 
Turkey on this subject.
  On the question of human rights we need only to look at the State 
Department's recently released 1995 Country Reports on Human Rights. 
What does it say? We see that years--and even decades--of behind-the-
scenes efforts by the State Department have not produced any 
improvement in the human rights situation in Turkey. This report 
concludes in fact that ``the human rights situation in Turkey has 
worsened in 1994.''
  Mr. President, this is our Government's report, the State 
Department's report. This is not a report of the Senator from New York, 
or a conclusion that I have come up with. It is our Government's 
report. Again, the human rights situation in Turkey has worsened 
significantly in 1994.
  Mr. President, do we reward them with aid? The full spectrum of human 
rights monitoring organizations have condemned Turkey for its 
systematic and widespread abuse of human rights, including the use of 
torture. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the U.N. Committee 
Against Torture, the European Parliament, and others go on and on in 
their condemnation of their systematic deprivation of basic human 
rights.
  Let us talk about Kurdish rights and the Kurdish problem. Nowhere is 
the case for cutting off aid to Turkey more compelling than the 
question of the Turks. To this day, Turkey continues to deny the very 
existence of its 15 million Kurdish citizens. Their military has 
systematically emptied over 2,000 Kurdish villages and uprooted over 1 
million Kurdish citizens from their homes. This is not to mention the 
recent incursion into northern Iraq against the Kurds.
  The Turkish Government's systematic and deliberate campaign to 
eradicate the Kurdish identity within its borders is in many ways the 
high-technology murder, massacres, and deportations of Armenian 
genocide earlier this century.
  The question of Cyprus remains unresolved. Twenty-one years after 
Turkey illegally, in 1974, invaded the island nation, despite countless 
U.N. resolutions and international agreements, Turkey continues its 
illegal military occupation and obstructive efforts toward a peaceful 
settlement. The division of the island and the massive uprooting of the 
Greek Cypriots caused by the 1974 invasion remains a constant reminder 
of the failure of the international community to enforce a lasting and 
equitable resolution to the conflict. Turkey still must demonstrate its 
support for a settlement recognizing the sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus with a constitutional democracy based 
on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protection of minority 
rights.
  Mr. President, nowhere is the case more compelling for our stopping 
assistance--this does not relieve some assistance, but I believe it is 
a very reasonable course--than the case of what Turkey is doing today 
to Armenia. The failure of quiet diplomacy--that is what the State 
Department talks about--is no more evident than in the case of the 
Turkish blockade of humanitarian aid to Armenia. How in this day and 
age, in 1995, can we countenance Turkey refusing to permit humanitarian 
aid to a nation and to its people? It is in violation of all 
international law. It is in defiance of the United Nations. Yet they 
continue to blockade the borders with Armenia.
  How long has this taken place and gone on? For 2 years. For 2 years 
the Turkish Government has refused to allow desperately needed United 
States and other international assistance to reach the people of 
Armenia. Even the United States of America--even planes from the United 
States delivering aid to Armenia have been refused. It is wrong. We 
should not reward nations with our money when they conduct that kind of 
policy.
  Unable to cross Turkish territory or transit its airspace, relief 
supplies--we are not talking about equipment, war-making equipment. We 
are not talking about munitions. We are not talking about tanks. We are 
not talking about armaments. We are talking about basic relief 
supplies--food, clothing, and medicine--have had to be rerouted through 
Georgia where, due to instability widespread, large portions of that 
aid have sometimes been lost, along with the cost and the time 
necessary to get basic aid to a people whose suffering mounts and the 
toll of the devastation increases.
  We should not be rewarding with taxpayers' money that kind of 
conduct. And the business of saying they are our allies has long played 
out. It is not right that American taxpayers continue this kind of 
program. I hope that this sends a message that we say to the Turkish 
Government, fine, you are an ally, but basic human rights must be 
observed.
  It is for those reasons that I have offered this amendment, not just 
for the American taxpayer but for the defense of American values and 
ideals. If we are to make a difference, certainly there is no more 
compelling case than here and now. This is a small step in signaling 
that we mean what we say, that we are for democracy and we are for 
human rights. I do not understand how we can be sending millions of 
dollars in America taxpayer moneys encouraging the kinds of activities 
that the Turkish Government is engaged in.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the D'Amato amendment, I 
would like to express my strong support for his proposal to reduce our 
economic assistance to Turkey. The D'Amato amendment would cut economic 
aid to Turkey by $25 million, capping aid to Turkey next year at $21 
million. A similar amendment passed overwhelmingly in the House earlier 
this year.
   Mr. President, this bill represents cuts of $1.2 billion from the 
fiscal year 1995 appropriated level. It is $2.4 billion less than the 
administration's $14.8 billion request. I support the fiscal 
responsibility of this bill, and I believe that this amendment will 
help to bring the Turkish account into line with other reductions 
contained in this bill.

[[Page S 13922]]

  But there are more important reasons to make this cut than just 
achieving budgetary savings. For decades, Turkey has had a consistent 
record of human rights abuses against its own people and against its 
neighbors.
  I would like to emphasize that this cut will only affect economic 
assistance, not military assistance.
  There are a great number of reasons to support this amendment, but I 
would like to list just a few:
  Turkey has illegally occupied 40 percent of the territory of 
neighboring Cyprus for 21 years. Turkey has consistently refused to 
withdraw its 35,000 occupation troops, and has impeded efforts to 
reunify the island.
  The Turkish army has forcibly evacuated or destroyed nearly 2,000 
Kurdish villages. More than 2 million of Turkey's Kurdish citizens have 
been made refugees in their own country.
  Over 10,000 Turkish Kurds have been killed by Turkish Government 
forces. More than 5,000 of these deaths have come in just the past 5 
years.
  American weapons and equipment have been used repeatedly by Turkey in 
their internal and external atrocities, including the 1974 invasion of 
Cyprus and the attacks against Kurds in U.N. protected areas of 
northern Iraq earlier this year.
  Torture, extrajudicial execution, and unlawful detention continue to 
be common in Turkey. This has been confirmed by State Department human 
rights reports and all credible private human rights organizations such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
  Turkey persists in blocking the delivery of desperately-needed 
humanitarian assistance to Armenia, a land-locked neighboring country. 
This is particularly egregious because of Turkey's own past atrocities 
toward the Armenian people during World War I. This is commonly 
referred to the Armenian Genocide, in which 1.5 million Armenians--or 
half of all the Armenian people at that time--died.
  Seven European countries have cut off all arms sales to Turkey, and 
the European Union has refused to even consider a free trade agreement 
with Turkey because of the treatment of the Kurdish people.
  Against its own international agreements, in 1971 Turkey shuttered 
the seminary school of the Eastern Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
This was done in an effort to undermine and eventually destroy this 
most hallowed institution revered by over 200 million Eastern Orthodox 
faithful around the world.
   Mr. President, I frankly do not understand why we continue to 
provide such high levels of economic assistance to Turkey. But the 
purpose of this amendment is not to totally cut off all aid to Turkey, 
only to send a strong message that Turkey must reform its human rights 
record both with its neighbors and with its own people.
  I urge passage of the D'Amato amendment, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the pending 
amendment of the Senator from New York, pertaining to assistance for 
Turkey. I will support the motion to table this amendment, and I urge 
my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. President, I have very firmly held beliefs regarding the 
importance of the United States-Turkish relationship, and these beliefs 
have only been strengthened, not diminished, by recent events. Turkey 
has long been considered of great strategic importance to the United 
States, most notably since the height of the cold war, when Turkey's 
participation in NATO gave this important alliance a steady anchor in 
the Middle East. It was a tremendous advantage to have a stalwart ally 
of the West sitting in between the Soviet Union and the oil fields and 
tensions of the Middle East.
  Let us remember also how Turkey frequently provided more troops to 
NATO than any nation other than the United States. We are increasingly 
cognizant that the peace in Europe was kept throughout those years not 
by the procedures of the United Nations, but by the resolve of NATO--
and Turkey played an indispensable role in that alliance.
  During the cold war, we came to view the alliance with Turkey as 
being critically important largely for geographic reasons, and reasons 
of military strategy. However, since the demise of the Soviet Union, we 
have found our relationship with Turkey to be of even greater 
importance.
  If one lists the principal international developments in the post-
cold war world, one repeatedly comes across unmistakable trends which 
underscore the importance of Turkey. To name but a few: The 
expansionism of Turkey's neighbor Saddam Hussein, the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia along ethnic lines, renewed nationalism and anti-Western 
feeling on the part of many Moslem states, the breakaway of the central 
Asian republics from Russia, and on, and on.
  I earnestly hope that my colleagues have noted the opposition of our 
most notable military leaders to any reductions in assistance to 
Turkey. Gen. John Shalikashvili has written to commend Turkey's 
participation in the Korean war, as well as Turkey's defense of 37 
percent of the frontier between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the 
cold war. During the gulf war, strike missions against Iraq were 
initiated from Turkish soil--nearly 2,700 sorties, according to the 
general.
  Perhaps Turkey's biggest contribution to that effort was the closing 
of the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, which clamped down solidly on 
Hussein's strength and surely cost Turkey and its economy dearly. Few 
Americans know that Turkey contributed troops to the Somalian effort, 
as
 well as 1,500 troops in Bosnia.

  Secretary of Defense William Perry has also testified to the value of 
continued assistance for Turkey.
  The great ideological contest in the world is no longer between 
communism and democracy--capitalist democracy has clearly been the 
victor of that battle for the allegiance of the greater part of 
humankind. But there are still contests taking place all over the 
globe, between competing visions such as secular democracies, 
nationalist autocracies, and military-religious states. Too much of the 
Moslem world has chosen the latter route, choosing to devote the 
resources of the state to military confrontation with their neighbors, 
and at home, enforcement of religious scruples by the state.
  Not only did Turkey cast its lot with the West when it was in a 
lonely military position, surrounded by Soviet-leaning neighbors, but 
it chooses still to cast its lot with us even when in close contact 
with many anti-Western Moslem regimes. The majority of Turks believe 
this is the right thing to do, but there are also voices within Turkey 
who wonder why it chooses to ally itself with the West, only to receive 
criticism and suspicion in return from too many quarters.
  It is greatly and unquestionably in the United States' interest that 
Turkey's decision to remain a friendly, secular republic be seen as 
fruitful for a Moslem nation. We do not have a good track record in our 
relations with Islamic countries. If Turkey is rebuffed in its 
continued allegiance to us, this will only provide fodder for those who 
believe that the West cannot be trusted to remain truly friendly toward 
a Moslem country.
  None of us would claim that the human rights situation in Turkey is 
what we would like to see. But we should remember as well that Turkey 
has been the recipient of thousands upon thousands of uninvited guests, 
in many cases Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq. Most Kurdish people 
are not terrorists. They are poor refugees struggling to cope with the 
tragic reality of living under unfriendly, repressive regimes such as 
that of Saddam Hussein. But United States protection of the safe havens 
in northern Iraq also served to shelter those Kurds in the PKK, who 
were indeed engaged in terrorist attacks against Turkey. Thus we have 
made our own inadvertent contribution to the conflict Turkey is 
experiencing in the eastern part of the country. We would do well to 
confine our sermons about human rights to those situations to which we 
ourselves have not contributed.
  Mr. President, I believe that it is strongly in the interest of the 
United States that we maintain a strong relationship with Turkey, both 
an economic and military relationship, and that the Turkish commitment 
to its status as a secular republic be proved again and again to be a 
most successful one which will assist our friends the Turks to continue 
the course and the 

[[Page S 13923]]
cause of peace and prosperity in their country. We have a tremendous 
stake in this question, thus I strongly urge the defeat of the D'Amato 
amendment.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the able 
Senator from New York. It removes the discretion and the flexibility 
now in the bill for the President to provide economic assistance 
according to his best judgment as to the need of the recipient country.
  Mr. President, Turkey is a member of NATO. It has been consistently 
of great assistance, great assistance to the United States--by the way, 
may I say also assistance to Israel--as we pursue our goals in the 
Middle East and southern Europe. Turkey has been of assistance as a 
NATO ally in supporting NATO's actions in Bosnia. She has provided 
support to the Bosnian Moslems, helping to right the balance in Bosnia 
vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serb forces.
  Turkey was of crucial early assistance to us in the gulf war, as we 
all know. And she is still paying for that. She is still paying for 
having helped us. She was of crucial heroic assistance to the United 
States in Korea. Her economic needs are substantial. As I say, she is 
still paying a heavy price for cutting off the oil pipeline with Iraq. 
And she still loses revenue heavily on a daily basis. I cannot 
understand why anyone wants to remove the President's flexibility in 
this area, and I do not think that Turkey should be singled out.
  I oppose the amendment, and I hope that the managers will move to 
table it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. D'AMATO addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The Senator from New York.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I do not mean to have a protracted debate on this, but I 
will take the time to read several excerpts from the State Department 
countries report, our State Department's report this year on Turkey as 
it relates to human rights. This comes from the report directly.

       The human rights situation in Turkey worsened significantly 
     in 1994.

  Worsened significantly in 1994.

       The police and security forces often employed torture 
     during periods of incommunicado detention and interrogation, 
     and the security forces continued to use excessive force 
     against noncombatants.

  Let me go on a little further.

       Various agencies of the Government continued to harass, 
     intimidate, indict, and imprison human rights monitors, 
     journalists, lawyers, and professors for ideas which they 
     expressed in public forums. Disappearances and mystery murder 
     cases continued at a high rate in the southeast.

  Let me go to page 3. I have another excerpt.

       Political murders and extrajudicial killings attributed to 
     Government authorities and terrorist groups continued at the 
     relatively high 1993 rates. Government authorities were 
     responsible for the deaths of detainees in official custody; 
     suspects in houses raided by security forces; and other types 
     of civilian deaths in the southeast.
       Disappearances continued in 1994, while most of those 
     reported in 1993 and earlier remained unsolved.

  This is a pattern. This has not just evolved. And it is not getting 
better. It is getting worse.
  Mr. President, again, it is not good enough to say that while one has 
joined us in an effort to investigate aggressions against the United 
States, to be helpful as it were, and more than helpful in our battle 
to liberate Kuwait, it is not sufficient to say that because one has 
loaned itself militarily to our defense, we look the other way when it 
continues these kinds of basic human rights violations not only of its 
citizens but of other citizens. It is inexcusable and intolerable for 
them to be permitted and for us to countenance by way of our actions, 
by way of making aid available, the continued blockade of the 2 million 
people in Armenia. It is wrong. And quiet diplomacy has not reduced 
that situation or resolved that situation. It continues. And on and on 
it goes.
  One might talk about the situation in Cypress and what the Government 
of Turkey has done is simply by way of armed force taken and occupied 
that country illegally, and it thumbs its nose at the United Nations 
and those attempting to bring about a peaceful resolve. I believe until 
we do what we are supposed to do--and I say it pays dividends because 
we did not win the cold war with the Soviets because we decided to look 
the other way on human rights abuses. It is because we stood up to them 
and we said we are not going to treat you the way we would the other 
nations that follow the normal patterns of conduct, conduct that is 
expected.
  So, Mr. President, I hope that my colleagues will accept this 
amendment. I think this amendment will be a very powerful impact in 
sending the right signal and maybe seeing that someday there are basic 
freedoms that are guaranteed, that nations will not be suppressed by 
the use of Turkish military might, that food and aid to people who are 
needy and starving will be permitted. That seems to me to be something 
that is so easy, but when a nation is so intolerant and so indifferent 
to the rights of others, then I think we have to send a clear message 
and that is why the Senator offers this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I understand the message the distinguished 
Senator is trying to send, but we are also going to send a message to a 
valuable ally, a valuable ally, an ally that is struggling to continue 
to orient itself toward the West, an ally that sits within a sea of 
potential enemies, surrounded by Moslem countries. Turkey is a Moslem 
country itself. It is a representative democracy. There are forces in 
Turkey that would like very much to see that country become another 
Iran, and there is a very real danger it could become another Iran. 
Look at the map. Note the geopolitical position of Turkey, the old 
great crossroads of the world in the days of Constantinople and 
Byzantium. We can send a message, but we can also cut off our nose to 
spite our face, and we will not change anything except to drive a very 
valuable and dependable ally away from the West.
  Turkey was very important to us in the Persian Gulf war, very 
important. We all wanted Turkey's help. We wanted Turkey to cut off the 
flow of oil. She cut it off.
  Mr. President, I have an amendment in my pocket and I have the floor. 
I have a second-degree amendment to cut aid to Israel by $1 billion.
  Now, we are getting ready to cut programs that are important to the 
American people. We talk about cutting Medicare, cutting Medicaid, 
cutting moneys for the Park Service, Fish and Wildlife, health 
programs, education programs. But not a word about cutting aid to 
Israel, not a word; $3 billion to Israel, $2 billion to Egypt.
  Now, if anyone wants to talk about entitlements, those are looked 
upon as entitlement programs by the recipient countries. I am not anti-
Israel nor am I anti-Egypt. But when we talk about cutting 
entitlements, cutting programs that benefit the American people, the 
old, the young--but not a word said about cutting that $5 billion for 
Israel and Egypt--why not offer an amendment that will cut that 
largesse and see how many brave souls there are in this Senate?
  Senators would run like turkeys and head for the doors as if they 
were fire escapes. I know, because I have tried such an amendment on 
two occasions. I got one vote on each occasion. Perhaps these brave 
souls should be put to the test every now and then.
  I will not offer my amendment to this amendment at this time. It 
would be an attractive idea to offer it to this amendment and then have 
someone move to table the underlying amendment; and with my amendment 
as the second-degree amendment, watch Senators head for the doors.
  Where are all these brave souls? How about cutting aid to Israel? I 
will not offer the amendment at this time. I hope that the managers 
will move to table the pending amendment. I hope that it will be tabled 
by an overwhelming vote. Let us send a message to Turkey that we are 
still her friend, and we want her to be our friend.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  
[[Page S 13924]]

  Mr. McCONNELL. Let me say with regard to the amendment of the 
distinguished Senator from New York, that the internal human rights 
practices of a number of America's close friends in that section of the 
world probably could not meet our test. And it seems to me the 
situation in Turkey is largely indistinguishable from the situation 
inside the borders of a number of other, not only good friends of the 
United States, but aid recipients of the United States in that part of 
the world.
  I share the concern that many people have about the human rights 
situation in Turkey and in a lot of other places. The question is 
whether or not the amendment by the Senator from New York to cap, cut 
off assistance will generate any improvements. I am concerned, as the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia is concerned, that it might 
have just the opposite effect.
  First, let me point out that the administration is planning $100 
million for ESF for Turkey whether or not we pass an amendment. Now I 
do not see how this level can be achieved given the overall reduction 
in the foreign operations budget.
  It seems to me that before we engage in the kind of debate we are 
having, calling attention to Turkey's internal problems, we ought to 
think a little bit about the neighborhood. Iraq, Iran, Syria all 
present unique security challenges, complicated by the crisis in 
Georgia and ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
  In the middle of this, Turkey has preserved at least basic principles 
of democracy, including free and fair elections, the orderly transition 
of power, an independent legislature, and enacted a free press. Do they 
have some problems? Yes. But compared to other countries in the area, 
you would have to say they have done rather well. It is far from a 
perfect picture. But then many of our traditional friends and allies 
have not achieved the freedom and success that we enjoy here in this 
country.
  Let us remember that Turkey has 62 million people, 99 percent of whom 
are Moslem, a factor which could easily influence closer ties with 
Iran. Yet Turkey remains the only secular democracy with a free market 
that has a majority Moslem population. Turkey has also maintained its 
strong link with NATO providing peacekeepers in Bosnia and 
participating in F-16 patrol of the no-fly zone. As the Senator from 
West Virginia mentioned, at the end of the Persian Gulf war, Operation 
Provide Comfort was established in northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish 
population, in addition to providing humanitarian aid. The Turkish 
Parliament voted to continue the operation for 6 more months.
  Prime Minister Ciller takes the issue of human rights seriously, and 
committed her nation to a course of reform. In July, under her 
leadership, 16 amendments were passed to their Constitution, expanding 
political participation and democracy. When Parliament reconvenes in 
October, it is my understanding that there will be several more pieces 
of reform legislation considered.
  So the point is, Turkey certainly is not perfect, but it has made a 
lot of progress. When you compare it to the others in the neighborhood, 
it does rather well.
  Mr. President, I do not know what more needs to be said on this. It 
was my plan to offer a motion to table, which I will now do.
  Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Kansas [Mrs. Kassebaum] 
and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] are necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] is absent 
due to illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] would vote ``yea.''
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is 
absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 60, nays 36, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 451 Leg.]

                                YEAS--60

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Daschle
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Stevens
     Thompson
     Thurmond

                                NAYS--36

     Biden
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bryan
     Coats
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Helms
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Pell
     Pressler
     Reid
     Robb
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Thomas
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Hatfield
     Kassebaum
     Pryor
     Warner
  So, the motion to table the amendment (No. 2709) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL.  Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I 
move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent that Eugene D. Schmiel, a 
recent addition to my staff, be extended the privilege of the floor. He 
is a State Department Fellow who will be fulfilling legislative duties.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Colorado is seeking 
recognition. I will not hold the floor, but I urge Senators who have, 
on our side--and I suspect the distinguished Senator from Kentucky will 
make the same request on his side--I urge Senators on our side, who 
have amendments that they intend to offer to this bill, to come and let 
us know. There may well be amendments that could be accepted. At least 
let us know that. We will start working toward that situation so at 
some point the distinguished manager and myself could work at accepting 
those, and others that might not be accepted, may require rollcall 
votes, that we might set some time certain or at least get some time 
agreements on them.
  I commend the distinguished Senator from New York and the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia in their debate. They kept it 
to a very short time. We were able to move on. But this is a bill I 
know the distinguished Republican leader and the distinguished 
Democratic leader want to get moved forward, so I urge those who are 
listening to come let us know. At least on my side, I have a more 
accepting mood when it is early on in the game than I might toward the 
end.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.


                           Amendment No. 2708

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the 
Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the amendment No. 
2708, offered by the Senator from Colorado to the committee amendment 
on page 15.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, one of the things the opponents have 
brought up in the series of extended debates preceding the offering of 
the amendment this time has been the question of how significant the 
one-fourth of the arms package is that would be delivered under the 
President's compromise.
  We have held extensive hearings on this question. I wanted to share 
with the Members some quotes from the experts who testified. We made an 
effort to invite both Democrats and Republicans, both liberals and 
conservatives, experts from the military and academia as well as 
experts that had shown a greater degree of experience 

[[Page S 13925]]
with India than Pakistan. Here are some brief quotes I think are 
helpful in describing that package.
  It is $368 million of military equipment that was contracted for 9 
years ago, whose delivery was withheld 5 years ago, even though in 
substance it had been paid for, committed for by the Pakistanis.

       In terms of the regional military balance, I don't think 
     that the release of this military equipment . . . really will 
     have no significant impact on the balance one way or the 
     other.

  That is from Stephen Cohen, who is the director of Program in Arms 
Control, from the University of Illinois.
  From George Tanham, vice president of Rand Corp:

     . . . I agree with Steve that the package won't change the 
     balance at all. In fact, there is no balance now. India 
     dominates so strongly. They have twice as large an army as 
     Pakistan, twice as large an air force, twice as large a navy, 
     and twice as many tanks, twice as many airplanes. So there 
     isn't a balance at the moment. And India has overwhelming 
     strength.

  This one is from the Honorable William Clark, Jr. He was the 
ambassador to India from 1989 to 1992. ``We have got F-16's that have 
been sitting in the desert and being maintained. The P-3 and the 
Harpoon, three of them are marginally useful, if at all, and they have 
already been--the requirement has been met in other ways--from the 
politics of it, it is terribly important. The military utility of 
it''--he is referring to this settlement and those weapons--``they 
would rather buy more modern equipment with the money.''
  The focus of his remarks was simply to point out that actually if the 
Pakistanis had their choice, they could buy better equipment and more 
modern equipment with their money rather than the old equipment. Again, 
relating to the significance of the package that would be delivered 
under the President's compromise.
  This is from James Clad. He is a professor at Georgetown University. 
They offer for Pakistan ``exactly as Mr. Tanham pointed out, an 
equalizing hand in trying to somehow correct the subcontinental 
mismatch of conventional weaponry capability and geographical reality * 
* * I think another turn on a dime on this issue is going to I think do 
further damage to American diplomacy.'' The turn on the dime would be 
failure to follow up on the President's commitment.
  This last one is from Bruce Fein. He is a constitutional and 
international law specialist and syndicated columnist. ``It is true 
that they''--referring here to India--``they are searching at present 
for substantial additional arms purchases, hundreds of millions that I 
think would dwarf anything that would follow any relaxation of the 
Pressler amendment: (Incidentally) very high technology MiG aircraft.'' 
He is referring to what India already is doing.
  What we have here is an effort to deny the President of the United 
States a vote on an arrangement, a negotiation that he himself 
instigated. The President took on a tough problem. For 5 years we have 
refused to return the Pakistanis' money, and for 5 years we have 
refused to deliver the planes, and for 5 years, because it has been a 
tough problem, we failed to act.
  I think it is to the President's credit that he has been willing to 
step forward, he has been willing to negotiate out a compromise. Some 
may disagree with the compromise. Some may think it is too tough on 
Pakistan. Some may think it is too tough on India. But the President 
had the courage to step forward and negotiate that compromise and put a 
package and a recommendation before this Congress. The question is 
whether or not the President is allowed to have a vote on his package.
  We considered this whole question in the drafting of the State 
Department authorization bill. But when that bill got to the floor, it 
was filibustered and the President was denied an opportunity to have 
his proposal which would have added to that as part of that which was 
voted on. We then offered this package as an amendment to the Defense 
authorization bill. But the opponents fought that, threatened to 
filibuster all night, and denied us a vote. Finally, in an effort to 
make sure that important Defense authorization bill passed without the 
delay that that threat brought about, I was willing to withdraw the 
amendment upon assurances that we would have an opportunity to offer it 
later and be voted on. That bill has moved ahead.
  We bring it up today after notice and discussion. This amendment was 
offered shortly after 11 o'clock this morning. It was one of the first 
amendments offered to this bill. And the opponents again sought to 
delay. The first thing they said is, ``We want a secret briefing for 
everyone.'' Mr. President, we have had secret briefings. We have had 
secret briefings covering the exact subjects that they want to talk 
about. First of all, the Intelligence Committee conducted a briefing on 
this very subject, exactly the same subject, at the end of July and 
early August. Members were invited. Those who did not attend could have 
come to a Members' briefing that I arranged with the subcommittee on 
last Tuesday.
  Incidentally, Senator Glenn's staff attended that briefing. We 
invited every Member of the Senate to be present at that briefing. So 
the briefing that they talked about delaying this consideration for has 
not only already taken place, but it has already taken place twice. 
Incidentally, I might say transcripts of those are available for 
Members who want to see them.
  So to suggest that we have to delay consideration of this proposal 
once again for a briefing is simply another tactic, in this Member's 
opinion, to delay consideration of an important amendment.
  Mr. President, we have had hearing after hearing after hearing on 
this subject. We had a hearing on March 7. We had a hearing on March 9. 
We had a hearing and discussion--at least for comment--when we had 
committee markup. Incidentally, Senator Pressler was invited and 
appeared at that committee markup and gave comments. We had a hearing 
on this last Thursday in which Senator Pressler came and discussed it 
specifically.
  So, Mr. President, what we have seen here is a concerted effort to 
avoid a vote on this question. I believe the President at least 
deserves a vote on the package, the compromise, that he has negotiated 
out. One may disagree with it. One may think it is right to keep both 
the military aircraft and Pakistanis' money. But, Mr. President, I do 
not. I think we deserve an answer one way or another.
  What I find is an effort now to delay this important bill, an effort 
by filibustering this amendment to delay the consideration of this 
vital bill that has such a major impact on our foreign policy 
considerations around the world.
  Once again, I do not want to delay the important business of the 
Senate. It is why I brought this amendment up early and brought it up 
for consideration. But what I find is a concerted plan and effort to 
simply filibuster this, to delay consideration and to deny the 
President of the United States a vote on his carefully negotiated 
compromise.
  When I was asked to grant more time to opponents, we agreed to set 
aside this amendment for Senator Lautenberg to speak, which, of course, 
he did. Then once again, because the opponents wanted more time, we 
agreed to another delay and agreed to set aside the amendment for 
consideration of Senator D'Amato's amendment, which has been fully 
debated and voted on, as the Senators will recall from just a few 
moments ago. But, Mr. President, further delay, further filibustering 
of this important legislation and delay of this important bill will be 
a mistake for the Senate. I believe it is important to move ahead on 
it.
  I am saddened by the fact that the opponents have not come to speak 
up and to offer debate. Mr. President, most important of all, when the 
State Department authorization bill was here, they refused to join in a 
time agreement. When the Defense authorization bill was here, they 
refused to join in a time agreement. Now, in spite of my request and 
others' requests to have a time agreement, basically carte blanche 
whatever they want, they refused to join in a time agreement.
  So, my proposal is this: I think the President deserves a vote. This 
is an important matter that does not get better by delay. The longer we 
delay, the more storage costs there are on the airplanes. The longer 
they filibuster, the more the quality of the material deteriorates. The 
longer they refuse to give the President a vote, the more 

[[Page S 13926]]
cost is added to this proposal and the more difficult it is to work out 
a settlement.
  Mr. President, my suggestion is this: Let us get a vote. If I do not 
have 60 votes, I am not going to stop this bill or have others 
filibuster this important piece of legislation just for this amendment. 
But if we can get 60 votes, then I want this considered, and we will 
see if we cannot bring closure on this issue. But I believe the 
President of the United States deserves an answer and deserves a vote.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Brown 
amendment. This amendment will further United States relations with 
Pakistan--by allowing for cooperative programs on counternarcotics and 
counterterror- 
ism--and by resolving a longstanding dispute over the delivery of 
military hardware.
  I understand the concerns of opponents of this amendment--and I share 
some of them. There is no more important issue in South Asia than 
nuclear proliferation.
  But I believe that this issue is hindering our efforts to build 
strong ties with Pakistan--and that strong relations with Pakistan are 
crucial to improving our security and furthering our interests in South 
Asia.
  I also believe that we need to show support for the current 
Government of Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto is a woman of great 
courage. She has endured arrest, imprisonment, and exile. She has 
worked to transform Pakistan from a military dictatorship to a 
parliamentary democracy.
  The Prime Minister has been courageous in her efforts to build close 
ties to the West. Under her leadership, Pakistan has proven to be a 
valuable ally in combatting terrorism and in stemming international 
flow of illegal drugs. She has been liberalizing the economy and 
opening it up to foreign trade and investment.
  It has come to the point where this issue is clouding all others. 
Improved human rights, nonproliferation and greater trade and 
investment are held hostage to this largely symbolic issue.
  So I will support the Brown amendment. The Pressler amendment will 
still stand--and it should. Pakistan will not receive the F-16's. But 
by passing the Brown amendment, we will remove an impediment to our 
relations with Pakistan--and we will be able to focus on improving 
security in South Asia.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I move to table the Brown amendment and ask 
for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). Is there a sufficient second?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is to determine if there is 
a sufficient second.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  Mr. GLENN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The assistant legislation clerk continued the call of the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Kassebaum and Senator Pell be allowed to address the Senate and, at the 
end of their comments, the status quo be resumed.
  Mr. BROWN. Does that include a limitation on the amount of time? I 
reserve the right to object.
  Mr. McCONNELL. How much time does the Senator from Kansas have in 
mind? I say to my friend from Colorado, I am trying to just process 
something here while we are waiting.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I came to speak because there was a 
quorum call on, so I could tailor my remarks to the time I would be 
allowed. I would say about 5 minutes.
  Mr. BROWN. I take it the unanimous-consent request is for a maximum 
of 5 minutes?
  Mr. McCONNELL. With 5 minutes for Senator Pell as well.
  Mr. BROWN. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Kansas is 
recognized.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I first want to commend the chairman 
of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Senator McConnell, and the 
ranking member, Senator Leahy, for their leadership on this bill. 
Getting a foreign operations appropriations bill through the Senate is 
never an easy process. I think they have done an extraordinary job. 
This legislation is a reasonable approach that meets the stringent 
reality of the Federal budget but also recognizes that our national 
interest requires America to be a leader in world affairs.
  For years, we have been engaged in a debate about how best to reform 
our foreign aid programs. I have long been an advocate of reform, and I 
continue to believe it is necessary. The debate has taken on new vigor 
this year with the chairmanship of Senator Helms in the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and it is ongoing.
  The legislation before us today walks a fine line and, in my view, 
does so appropriately. On the one hand, it recognizes the substantial 
reform of our foreign aid programs is properly carried out through the 
authorizing legislation, not through this appropriations bill. On the 
other hand, this bill undertakes important reforms necessary to ensure 
that the shrinking resources it provides can be used to the greatest 
effect.
  The foreign affairs budget, which, unlike other accounts in the 
Federal budget, had already been cut dramatically before this year, has 
been cut even further. I regret that decision, but that die was cast 
last spring during the budget resolution debate. Given the limited 
resources available, it will become increasingly important that the 
President have more flexibility to target our resources toward the 
areas of greatest importance.
  This is not easy to do. We always feel that we want to have some 
hand--and we should have--in shaping those priorities. On the other 
hand, I think flexibility is needed for administrative decisions and it 
is important that legislative and administrative bodies work as closely 
together as possible.
  While some of the accounts retain their traditional protection, this 
legislation on the whole has very few earmarks. Again, I want to 
commend the committee for that. It is not an easy task. At the same 
time, the bill seeks to promote fairness by preventing any single 
account or region of the world from bearing a disproportionate share of 
budget reduction.
  As a long observer of United States policy toward Africa, I believe 
this legislation treats Africa fairly and recognizes that continent's 
importance in the overall reach of United States foreign policy. I am 
particularly pleased with the sincere effort to address the difficult 
problem of African debt relief.
  However, important African issues will remain for the conference 
committee--in particular, this legislation's consolidation of the 
Development Fund for Africa into a larger economic assistance account 
diverges from the path Congress has followed since 1987. The House has 
retained the Development Fund for Africa regional account. The Congress 
created the DFA in 1987, with bipartisan support, to ensure that 
consistent long-term funding for African development would be there if 
it were necessary. I hope that as we debate funding the mechanisms and 
accounts this year, we will not lose sight of, or compromise, this 
important goal.
  I am particularly concerned about the effect on our foreign policy 
and the sharp cuts in two programs in this bill. One is the 
International Development Association, funded at $775 million, well 
below the $1.3 billion request. While it has detractors, I believe this 
program is an effective means of leveraging U.S. foreign aid and 
effecting change in the economic policies of countries abroad. I worry 
that low-balling this funding--and the House is lower still--will cause 
other donors to do the same and threaten the viability of this 
important program.
  I also worry about cuts in our contributions to international 
organizations and programs. Last year, we 

[[Page S 13927]]
spent $374 million on this account, but this bill includes only $260 
million--again, better than the House bill. Mr. President, 
international organizations and programs is never a popular part of the 
budget. Again, I share the view that we should critically reevaluate 
our participation in many low-priority international organizations. But 
it seems to me we should conduct that review as a matter of policy and 
take steps to reform or withdraw from organizations in accordance with 
the obligations we have made to them. We should not just stop paying 
our bills.
  These cuts in important programs are, to me, made more frustrating by 
another item in the bill. This legislation would appropriate $150 
million for international narcotics control--$45 million more than last 
year and $37 million more than was approved by the House. This account 
may be politically popular, but, in my view, it is a poor candidate for 
added funding. I doubted the effectiveness of this program in both the 
Reagan and Bush administrations--not that we do not want to direct our 
attention to getting narcotics abuse and use under control--even 
though, however, we had programs over the years in narcotics control 
initiatives, and they keep requesting more money. In 1995, we will 
spend nearly $13.3 billion on antidrug measures, of which $1.6 billion 
will go for international and interdiction efforts. I can only hope it 
will be successful. But I do question whether we are monitoring closely 
the successes of these efforts.
  I care just as deeply as everybody else about getting the 
international narcotics problem under control, but I am not convinced 
that increased funding for this program will make any real difference 
in reducing the flow of drugs into this country. Frankly, I would 
prefer we consider reducing funding from fiscal year 1995 levels, but, 
at the very least, I think we should not increase funding. I suggest 
that the $45 million added beyond current-year levels will be better 
used elsewhere within this bill, or for deficit reduction.
  Mr. President, I think I am beyond my time.
  I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes to speak to an 
amendment I would like to offer as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. First, I conclude my statement by saying that despite 
the concerns I have raised I believe this bill on the whole represents 
very responsible leadership in the field of foreign affairs. I intend 
to support it.


                           Amendment No. 2710

  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I rise today to submit an amendment on 
Liberia.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I think we need to lay aside the 
pending amendments.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. I send that amendment to the desk. I understand it 
will be a noncontroversial amendment and it is just to express strong 
support for the latest Liberia peace agreement and facilitate the 
provision of limited United States assistance to Liberia.
  It will be considered at another time.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized 
for a unanimous-consent agreement.


                           Amendment No. 2708

  Mr. PELL.
   Mr. President, I wish to speak in connection with the Brown 
amendment on Pakistan. As many of us know, deliveries of United States 
military equipment purchased by Pakistan have been suspended since 1990 
under the terms of the Pressler amendment. This amendment would lift 
the suspension temporarily to allow the delivery of much of the 
military equipment--including naval aircraft, missiles, and spare 
parts. While it would not permit the delivery of the F-16's purchased 
by Pakistan but still undelivered, the amendment would allow for a plan 
to sell the F-16's to a third country and to provide those proceeds to 
Pakistan.

  The sponsors of this amendment argue that it will help to improve 
United States relations with Pakistan. I want to say at the outset that 
I well understand the importance of good relations with Pakistan. Not 
only was Pakistan an important ally in the Afghan resistance to the 
Soviet Union, but Pakistan also continues to be a key player in the 
South Asia region.
  I also wish to be supportive of the current Prime Minister, Benazir 
Bhutto. When Pakistan was ruled by an oppressive military dictatorship, 
I tried to be helpful in securing Mrs. Bhutto's release from house 
arrest, and in promoting a return to democracy in Pakistan. I have long 
considered Prime Minister Bhutto a friend, and have promised her to do 
what I can to ensure strong United States-Pakistani relations. That 
being said, I must balance my support and affection for Pakistan 
against what I believe to be right for United States nonproliferation 
policy. And I believe that this amendment goes too far. I support 
resuming economic assistance, but oppose the delivery of the military 
equipment. I will vote accordingly when the time comes.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on the Brown motion to 
table the Brown amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] is 
absent due to illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] would vote ``yea.''
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is 
absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 37, nays 61, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 452 Leg.]

                                YEAS--37

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bumpers
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gramm
     Hollings
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     McConnell
     Moynihan
     Pell
     Pressler
     Robb
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--61

     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Craig
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Ford
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Hatfield
     Pryor
       
  So the motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2708) was 
rejected.
  Mr. BROWN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. HARKIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold for one moment so 
I can make an announcement?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I withhold.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, on this subject there will be a briefing at 
5:30 in S-407, I am advised by the distinguished Senator from Ohio. It 
is open to all Senators and is on the subject we just voted on. But 
that will be in S-407 at 5:30. I wanted to make that announcement.
  Mr. GLENN. It is a classified briefing.
  Mr. LEAHY. It is a classified briefing.
  
[[Page S 13928]]

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Brown 
amendment No. 2708 be temporarily laid aside until 7 p.m. this evening, 
and at that time there will be 5 hours for debate to be equally divided 
in the usual form; and when the Senate resumes the amendment on 
Thursday, there be 1 hour remaining for debate to be equally divided in 
the usual form; and following the conclusion or yielding back of time, 
the Senate proceed to vote on the Brown amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the quorum call be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, it is my understanding the Senator from 
Nevada is prepared to offer an amendment. We would like to handle as 
many amendments as we can between now and 7, when we resume debate on 
the Brown amendment.
  So I encourage any Senators who have amendments they think can be 
accepted or would not be controversial to please come over and let us 
try to get them taken care of before 7, because we have very few 
remaining contentious amendments after the Pakistan amendment and some 
Helms amendments.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. It is my understanding that we are now working on the 
committee amendments?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that they be set aside and that I 
be allowed to offer my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.

                           amendment no. 2711

    (Purpose: To prohibit female genital mutilation, and for other 
                               purposes)

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment will 
be set aside.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Reid] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2711.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following new section:

     SEC.   . FEDERAL PROHIBITION OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION.

       (a) Title 18 Amendment.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``Sec. 116. Female genital mutilation

       ``(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever 
     knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or 
     any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of 
     another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall 
     be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
     years, or both.
       ``(b) A surgical operation is not a violation of this 
     section if the operation is--
       ``(1) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is 
     performed, and is performed by a person licensed in the place 
     of its performance as a medical practitioner; or
       ``(2) performed on a person in labor or who has just given 
     birth and is performed for medical purposes connected with 
     that labor or birth by a person licensed in the place it is 
     performed as a medical practitioner, midwife, or person in 
     training to become such a practitioner or midwife.
       ``(c) In applying subsection (b)(1), no account shall be 
     taken of the effect on the person on whom the operation is to 
     be performed of any belief on the part of that or any other 
     person that the operation is required as a matter of custom 
     or ritual.
       ``(d) Whoever knowingly denies to any person medical care 
     or services or otherwise discriminates against any person in 
     the provision of medical care or services, because--
       ``(1) that person has undergone female circumcision, 
     excision, or infibulation; or
       ``(2) that person has requested that female circumcision, 
     excision, or infibulation be performed on any person;

     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
     one year, or both.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``116. Female genital mutilation.''.

       (b) Information and Education Regarding Female Genital 
     Mutilation.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
     shall carry out the following activities:
       (A) Compile data on the number of females living in the 
     United States who have been subjected to female genital 
     mutilation (whether in the United States or in their 
     countries of origin), including a specification of the number 
     of girls under the age of 18 who have been subjected to such 
     mutilation.
       (B) Identify communities in the United States that practice 
     female genital mutilation, and design and carry out outreach 
     activities to educate individuals in the communities on the 
     physical and psychological health effects of such practice. 
     Such outreach activities shall be designed and implemented in 
     collaboration with representatives of the ethnic groups 
     practicing such mutilation and with representatives of 
     organizations with expertise in preventing such practice.
       (C) Develop recommendations for the education of students 
     of schools of medicine and osteopathic medicine regarding 
     female genital mutilation and complications arising from such 
     mutilation. Such recommendations shall be disseminated to 
     such schools.
       (2) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the term 
     ``female genital mutilation'' means the removal or 
     infibulation (or both) of the whole or part of the clitoris, 
     the labia minor, or the labia major.
       (c) Effective Dates.--
       (1) Subsection (b) shall take effect immediately, and the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services shall commence 
     carrying it out not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (2) Subsection (a) shall take effect 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, last September, about a year ago, I 
introduced a resolution condemning the practice of female genital 
mutilation.
  At that time, there was talk on the Senate floor that perhaps the 
United Nations would do something, perhaps some States would do 
something. The fact of the matter is, a year has gone by and this 
practice continues.
  Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to stand and talk about 
something as repulsive and as cruel and as unusual as this practice is. 
But I feel that we have an obligation to speak about the unspeakable, 
and that is what I am on the floor to talk about today.
  What is female genital mutilation? I will be as brief in the 
description as I can be, but I feel that it is important to my 
colleagues for me to explain in some detail what this practice is.
  There are many countries around the world that allow this practice to 
take place. Some call it female circumcision.
  There are a number of countries around the world that this is, in 
effect, a rite of passage for little girls. Little girls between the 
ages of 6 and 11 are forced into this gruesome ritual of female 
circumcision by their parents most of the time.
  The procedure is something that has been written about at great 
length, and for purposes of this debate, we will refer to this as FGM, 
female genital mutilation. I will not refer to those terms anymore.
  Mr. President, in its most extreme forms, a little girl's external 
sexual organs are scraped away entirely, and then the procedure--most 
of the time very crudely, this is rarely, rarely done by physicians--
the vulva is sewn together with some type of stitching. Many times, Mr. 
President, the little girl's legs are bound together for weeks while a 
permanent scar forms.
  The reasons for this are historical in nature. No one really knows. 
In that this takes place in many Moslem countries, I think this is fair 
to say this is not in the Koran, this is nothing that is taught by the 
Koran, but it is practiced in 20 African countries, in Oman, South 
Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, India, Pakistan.
  So, I think we have the general idea of what this procedure is.
  Why should we be talking about this on the floor of the U.S. Senate? 
We talk about it because it is important to focus attention on what is 
going on around the world, of course. It is important because these 
girls who go through this process die on occasion, but they are 
permanently scarred, not only physically but emotionally, because the 
immediate effect is bleeding, shock, infections, and even death because 
of hemorrhage and unhygienic conditions. 

[[Page S 13929]]

  The reason I am involved in this is because I received a call from a 
close personal friend of mine in Las Vegas, NV, a mother of six 
children who called me to say that she had watched the night before the 
most repulsive thing that she had ever seen on television, and this was 
a picture which I saw on video later of a little girl having this 
process performed on her in Egypt.
  As a result of that, I felt it was important that I learn more about 
it, as I have done. I have learned that some 15 percent of all these 
females die of bleeding or infections. As I have already stated, the 
rest of their lives the women are afflicted with scarring, physically 
and emotionally. They also have recurring infections, some suffer 
complicated and sometimes even fatal childbirths.
  I realize the significance of this ritual in the cultural and 
societal systems in communities of Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
where it is done often. This procedure has been performed on not 
hundreds of women, not thousands of women, but we are now into the 
millions of women.
  I repeat, this is a cruel and tortuous procedure performed on young 
girls against their will. The United States must make all efforts to 
condemn and to curb this practice.
  Some might say that FGM is not a concern of the United States. Mr. 
President, it is a concern of the United States, because it does occur 
in the United States. Because of immigration patterns and for other 
reasons, this ritual comes to the United States with people coming from 
other parts of the world. The same procedure has been outlawed in the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, to name just a few. They have all 
passed legislation prohibiting FGM. France and Canada maintain that FGM 
violates already established laws.
  So we in the United States also must speak out against this torture 
to women in the United States. Hopefully by speaking out, it will focus 
attention on this practice that is going on in other parts of the 
world.
  I am really surprised that the United Nations takes up all the human 
rights things that they do, and I can appreciate that. We as a country 
take up human rights concerns. People who go to prison may spend too 
much time in prison. Why should we not speak out on the torture taking 
place on a daily basis to women throughout the world? This seems much 
more egregious than some of the other things we throw up our arms about 
dealing with human rights violations.
  What this amendment does is make it illegal to perform the procedures 
of FGM on girls younger than 18. The legislation defines the following 
measures: That we compile data on the number of females in the United 
States who have already been subjected to this; that we identify 
communities in the United States in which FGM is practiced; that we 
design and implement outreach activities to inform people of the 
physical and psychological effects of FGM; and that we develop 
recommendations for educating students in our medical schools on 
treating women who have been subject to this torture.
  As I have stated, this is difficult to talk about, but ignoring the 
issue perpetuates the silent acquiescence to this barbarous practice.
  I was very happy to hear that at the conference in Beijing, China, 
which was just completed last weekend, that FGM was a topic at the U.N. 
Conference on Women. I say through this legislation, the United States 
can acknowledge the importance of this issue to all women.
  I further say, Mr. President, that I appreciate the support of my 
efforts in this matter by Senator Moseley-Braun, Senator Wellstone, and 
Senator Simon. I hope, Mr. President, that this matter will be 
resoundingly accepted. I think it is important for us as a body, as a 
Congress, and as a Nation to speak out against this. The very least we 
can do is have a law on the books that makes this illegal in our 
country.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the issue of female genital mutilation 
[FGM] was first brought before the Senate last September when Senator 
Reid introduced a sense-of-the-Senate resolution condemning this cruel 
ritual practice and commending the Government of Egypt for taking quick 
action against two men who performed this deed on a 10-year-old girl in 
front of CNN television cameras.
  This amendment would make it illegal to perform the procedures of FGM 
on girls younger than 18. In addition, it proscribes the following 
measures as necessary to the eradication of this procedure: compiling 
data on the number of females in the U.S. who have been subjected to 
FGM, identifying communities in the United States in which it is 
practiced, designing and implementing outreach activities to inform 
people of its physical and psychological effects, and developing 
recommendations for educating students in medical schools on treating 
women and girls who have undergone mutilations. I am proud to be a 
cosponsor of this amendment that addresses an issue so crucial to the 
mental and physical health of women and girls.
  The ritual practice of female genital mutilation currently affects an 
estimated 80 million women in over 30 countries. Although FGM is most 
widespread in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, 
immigrants from practicing groups have brought the custom to wherever 
they have settled.
  In the countries and cultures of its origin, FGM is most commonly 
performed with crude instruments such as dull razor blades, glass, and 
kitchen knives while the girl is tied or held down by other women. In 
most cases, anesthesia is not used. Afterwards, herb mixtures, cow 
dung, or ashes are often rubbed on the wound to stop the bleeding.
  Aside from the obvious emotional and physical trauma which are caused 
by this procedure, it has been estimated that 15 percent of all 
circumcised females die as a result of the ritual. The long term 
effects dealt with by American doctors who treat mutilated women and 
girls are listed by the New England Journal of Medicine as including 
chronic pelvic infections, infertility, chronic urinary tract 
infections, dermoid cysts (which may grow to the size of a grapefruit), 
and chronic anxiety or depression.
  Although female genital mutilation has sometimes been viewed as a 
purely cultural phenomena, it is clear that no ethical justification 
can be made for this inhumane practice in any country.
  Additionally, FGM has already been banned in many Western nations. In 
1982, Sweden passed a law making all forms of female circumcision 
illegal, and the United Kingdom passed a similar law in 1985. France, 
the Netherlands, Canada, and Belgium have each set a precedent for the 
illegality of female circumcision by holding that it violates laws 
prohibiting bodily mutilation and child abuse. Action has been taken to 
enforce the statutes banning this practice in all the countries I've 
just mentioned.
  However, due to complex cultural factors, dealing with this issue in 
the United States requires more than making the ritual practice of FGM 
illegal. Immigrant parents in the United States who import a 
circumciser from their home country or find an American doctor willing 
to perform the procedure claim to do so out of a desire to do the best 
thing for their daughters. In the societies and cultures that practice 
it, FGM is said to be an integral part of the socialization of girls 
into acceptable womanhood. Often, the mutilations are perceived by a 
girl's parents as her passport to social acceptance or the required 
physical marking of her marriageability. In spite of its obvious 
cruelty therefore, FGM is a part of cultural identity. Clearly, female 
genital mutilation must be dealt with in a manner which takes into 
account its complex causes and meanings.
  Because of the complexity of this issue and the lack of available 
information regarding FGM in the United States, this amendment includes 
a provision ensuring that research be carried out to determine the 
number of females in the U.S. who have undergone mutilations. This 
research would also 

[[Page S 13930]]
document the types of physical and psychological damage dealt with by 
American medical professionals who treat mutilated woman.
  Finally, this amendment would ensure that medical students are 
educated in how to treat women and girls who have undergone FGM. In 
1994, the New England Journal of Medicine reported that pregnant women 
who have undergone infibulation--in which the labia majora are stitched 
to cover the urethra and entrance to the vagina--are at serious risk, 
as are their unborn babies, if treated by physicians who have not been 
trained in dealing with infibulated women. In fact, untreated 
infibulated women have double the risk of maternal death and several 
times increased risk of stillbirth when compared with women who have 
not undergone mutilation.
  Passage of this amendment would also send a clear message to American 
medical professionals, some of whom reportedly have been offered as 
much as $3,000 to perform mutilations on young girls. It would see to 
it that the names of Western doctors who mutilate girls would no longer 
be passed around in immigrant communities.
  Female genital mutilation is the world's most widespread form of 
torture, yet no other mass dilation of humanity has received so 
comparatively little journalistic or governmental attention. We in the 
United States should make it clear that it is a serious crime if it 
occurs here. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment as an 
essential tool in the straggle against the perpetuation of this heinous 
practice.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am not aware of any opposition to the 
Reid amendment. We are prepared to accept it.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from Nevada. I 
have heard him discuss this in Appropriations Committee. I know this is 
something he feels passionately about. We have no objection to it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2711) was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska is here.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
pending committee amendment be laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent to offer a freestanding 
amendment.
  Mr. LEAHY. Reserving the right to object, I still have no idea what 
is in the amendment. I wonder if I might have a chance at least to see 
it before I agree.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I am happy to provide the Senator from Vermont with a 
copy of the amendment. It would be a freestanding amendment.
  Mr. McCONNELL. May I suggest the Senator from Alaska explain the 
amendment before he sends it up.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I advise my friend from Alaska, I do not 
want to block him from getting the amendment up, but I want some idea 
of what it is. Maybe he might try explaining it and then remake the 
motion.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank my colleagues from Kentucky and Vermont.
  My amendment adds specificity to the timing as well as the sequencing 
of aspects that are key to the agreed framework on nuclear issues, 
which the administration signed with North Korea last October. This 
would ensure that everyone, including the North Koreans, knows exactly 
how and when--and if--the funding will be provided by the Congress or 
additional diplomatic or economic steps will be taken toward North 
Korea.
  The amendment parallels much of House Joint Resolution 83 passed 
September 18 by the House of Representatives. The Senate, I think, 
should go on record in similar detail.
  I am pleased that the amendment is cosponsored by the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, as well as Senator McCain, 
one of the Senate's most respected voices on North Korean matters, and 
the Senate Republican Policy chairman, Senator Nickles.


                           Amendment No. 2712

  (Purpose: To provide authorization for implementation of the Agreed 
          Framework between the United States and North Korea)

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, with permission of the floor managers, 
I propose a freestanding amendment and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2712.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place insert the following:


 Authorization for Implementation of the Agreed Framework between the 
                     United States and North Korea

       Sec. 575. (a) This section may be cited as the 
     ``Authorization for Implementation of the Agreed Framework 
     Between the United States and North Korea Act''.
       (b)(1) The purpose of this section is to set forth 
     requirements, consistent with the Agreed Framework, for the 
     United States implementation of the Agreed Framework.
       (2) Nothing in this section requires the United States to 
     take any action which would be inconsistent with any 
     provision of the Agreed Framework.
       (c)(1) The United States may not exercise any action under 
     the Agreed Framework that would require the obligation or 
     expenditure of funds except to the extent and in the amounts 
     provided in an Act authorizing appropriations and in an 
     appropriations Act.
       (2) No funds may be made available under any provision of 
     law to carry out activities described in the Agreed Framework 
     unless the President determines and certifies to Congress 
     that North Korea is in full compliance with the terms of the 
     Agreed Framework.
       (d) None of the funds made available to carry out any 
     program, project, or activity funded under any provision of 
     law may be used to maintain relations with North Korea at the 
     ambassadorial level unless North Korea has satisfied the IAEA 
     safeguards requirement described in subsection (g), the 
     additional requirements set forth in subsection (h), and the 
     nuclear nonproliferation requirements of subsection (i).
       (e)(1) The President shall not terminate the economic 
     embargo of North Korea until North Korea has satisfied the 
     IAEA safeguards requirement described in subsection (g), the 
     additional requirements set forth in subsection (h), and the 
     nuclear nonproliferation requirements of subsection (i).
       (2) As used in this subsection, the term ``economic embargo 
     of North Korea'' means the regulations of the Department of 
     the Treasury restricting trade with North Korea under section 
     5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)).
       (f)(1) If North Korea does not maintain the freeze of its 
     graphite-moderated nuclear program as defined in the Agreed 
     Framework, or if North Korea diverts heavy oil for purposes 
     not specified in the Agreed Framework, then--
       (A) no additional heavy oil may be exported to North Korea 
     if such oil is subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
     States, or is exported by a person subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States;
       (B) the United States shall immediately cease any direct or 
     indirect support for any exports of heavy oil to North Korea; 
     and
       (C) the President shall oppose steps to export heavy oil to 
     North Korea by all other countries in the Korean Peninsula 
     Energy Development Organization.
       (2) Whoever violates paragraph (1)(A) having the requisite 
     knowledge described in section 11 of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410) shall be 
     subject to the same penalties as are provided in that section 
     for violations of that Act.
       (g) The requirement of this section is satisfied when the 
     President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that North Korea is in full 
     compliance with its safeguards agreement with the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/403), in 
     accordance with part IV (3) of the Agreed Framework under the 
     timetable set forth therein, as determined by the Agency 
     after--
       (1) conducting inspections of the two suspected nuclear 
     waste sites at the Yongbyon nuclear complex; and

[[Page S 13931]]

       (2) conducting such other inspections in North Korea as may 
     be deemed necessary by the Agency.
       (h) The additional requirements referred to in subsections 
     (d) and (e) are the following, as determined and certified by 
     the President to the appropriate congressional committees:
       (1) That progress has been made in talks between North 
     Korea and the Republic of Korea, including implementation of 
     confidence-building measures by North Korea as well as other 
     concrete steps to reduce tensions.
       (2) That the United States and North Korea have established 
     a process for returning the remains of United States military 
     personnel who are listed as missing in action (MIAs) during 
     the Korean conflict between 1950 and 1953, including field 
     activities conducted jointly by the United States and North 
     Korea.
       (3) That North Korea no longer meets the criteria for 
     inclusion on the list maintained by the Secretary of State 
     under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 of countries the governments of which repeatedly provide 
     support for acts of international terrorism.
       (4) That North Korea has taken positive steps to 
     demonstrate a greater respect for internationally recognized 
     human rights.
       (5) That North Korea has agreed to control equipment and 
     technology in accordance with the criteria and standards set 
     forth in the Missile Technology Control Regime, as defined in 
     section 74(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2797c).
       (i) The nuclear nonproliferation requirements referred to 
     in subsections (d) and (e) are the following, as determined 
     and certified by the President to the appropriate 
     congressional committees and the Committee on Energy and 
     Natural Resources of the Senate:
       (1) All spent fuel from the graphite-moderated nuclear 
     reactors of North Korea have been removed from the territory 
     of North Korea as is consistent with the Agreed Framework.
       (2) The International Atomic Energy Agency has conducted 
     any and all inspections that it deems necessary to account 
     fully for the stocks of plutonium and other nuclear materials 
     in North Korea, including special inspections of suspected 
     nuclear waste sites, before any nuclear components controlled 
     by the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines are delivered for a 
     light water reactor for North Korea.
       (3) The dismantlement of all graphite-based nuclear 
     reactors in North Korea, including reprocessing facilities, 
     has been completed in accordance with the Agreed Framework 
     and in a manner that effectively bars in perpetuity any 
     reactivation of such reactors and facilities.
       (j) The United States shall suspend actions described in 
     the Agreed Framework if North Korea reloads its existing 5 
     megawatt nuclear reactor or resumes construction of nuclear 
     facilities other than those permitted to be built under the 
     Agreed Framework.
       (k) The President may waive the application of subsection 
     (g), (h), (i), or (j) if the President determines, and so 
     notifies in writing the appropriate congressional committees, 
     that to do so is vital to the security interests of the 
     United States.
       (k)(1) Beginning 6 months after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the President shall 
     transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     setting forth--
       (A) an assessment of the extent of compliance by North 
     Korea with all the provisions of the Agreed Framework and 
     this subtitle;
       (B) a statement of the progress made on construction of 
     light-water reactors, including a statement of all 
     contributions, direct and indirect, made by any country to 
     the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization from the 
     date of signature of the Agreed Framework to the date of the 
     report;
       (C) a statement of all contributions, direct or indirect, 
     by any country which is not a member of the Korean Peninsula 
     Energy Development Organization for implementation of the 
     Agreed Framework;
       (D) a statement of all expenditures made by the Korean 
     Peninsula Energy Development Organization, either directly or 
     indirectly, for implementation of the Agreed Framework;
       (E) an estimate of the date by which North Korea is 
     expected to satisfy the IAEA safeguards requirement described 
     in subsection (g);
       (F) a statement whether North Korea is transferring 
     missiles or missile technology to other countries, including 
     those countries that are state sponsors of international 
     terrorism;
       (G) a description of any new developments or advances in 
     North Korea's nuclear weapons program;
       (H) a statement of the progress made by the United States 
     in fulfilling its actions under the Agreed Framework, 
     including any steps taken toward normalization of relations 
     with North Korea;
       (I) a statement of any progress made on dismantlement and 
     destruction of the graphite-moderated nuclear reactors of 
     North Korea and related facilities;
       (J) a description of the steps being taken to implement the 
     North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 
     Korean Peninsula;
       (K) an assessment of the participation by North Korea in 
     talks between North Korea and the Republic of Korea; and
       (L) a description of any action taken by the President 
     under subsection (f)(1)(B).
       (2) To the maximum extent possible, the President should 
     submit the report in unclassified form.
       (l) As used in this section:
       (1) Agreed framework.--The term ``Agreed Framework'' means 
     the document entitled ``Agreed Framework Between the United 
     States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea'', signed October 21, 1994, at Geneva, and the attached 
     Confidential Minute.
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committees 
     on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committees on International Relations and National Security 
     of the House of Representatives.
       (3) IAEA safeguards.--The term ``IAEA safeguards'' means 
     the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country 
     and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as authorized by 
     Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency.
       (4) North korea.--The term ``North Korea'' means the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including any agency 
     or instrumentality thereof.
       (5) Inspections.--The term ``inspections'' means 
     inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency pursuant to an IAEA safeguards agreement, including 
     special inspection of undeclared information or locations if 
     the IAEA cannot account for nuclear material and is therefore 
     unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear 
     materials.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, in view of the fact that much of the 
opening description of the amendment has already been read, I am going 
to dispense with that. I am sure the reporter has it.
  Let me take a moment and review for my colleagues what was in the 
October framework agreement that I think deserves a little reflection. 
You will all recall that North Korea gets two 1000-megawatt light water 
reactors at a cost of at least $4 billion. We do not know exactly what 
that cost might be. It might be more than that right now. North Korea 
gets free oil, $500 million worth, until the new reactors can be 
brought on line. And North Korea gets normalized relations and relaxed 
trade restrictions with the United States, which they have sought for a 
number of decades. North Korea gets freedom from the IAEA special 
inspections for some years into the future.
  I might add that North Korean is the only country which has been 
exempted from immediate special inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, to exempt from the mandatory inspections. South Africa, 
for example, opened up its entire program for inspection. So, clearly, 
what we have done in North Korea is without precedent.
  Furthermore, we were led to believe that the United States would not 
be responsible for any significant funding. I am told unofficially that 
after we get a little further along the line with the commitments to 
provide the light water reactors, we are going to be asked to 
contribute a significant amount of aid for switch gear. The switch gear 
is the mechanical capability to dispense power once the power is 
generated, and the North Koreans do not have that capability, nor do 
they have anywhere near the capacity in their current switching gear. 
They will be requesting assistance in the amount of roughly $1 billion. 
We should see that as a likely reality.
  I have told you what was in the October deal and what the North 
Koreans get. Let us review what we get. We get North Korea's promise to 
freeze the current nuclear program, including their graphite-moderated 
reactors and reprocessing facilities; we get North Korea's promise for 
the IAEA special inspections--only we get it some 5 years in the 
future, something they previously agreed to in January of 1992 but have 
refused to allow.
  Finally, we get North Korea's promise that its some 8,000 spent 
nuclear rods filled with weapons-grade plutonium will not be 
reprocessed in North Korea. In the interim, we have won the right to 
stabilize these rods, at, apparently, our expense. The question of 
where these rods are going to be stored is still open--we have an issue 
in our own country, a significant issue, on the unacceptability of 
storing high-level nuclear waste rods at our power sites. That is what 
we get--promises, but nothing else yet.
  So I remain a critic of several aspects of the deal, although, as 
they say, hindsight is cheap. I also recognize 

[[Page S 13932]]
that the administration, of course, had the authority to negotiate the 
deal. I have always been critical of the deal because I think we gave 
away our leverage when we allowed the North Koreans to simply dictate 
the terms of the agreement. When you negotiate a deal, there are 
certain things that are on the table and certain things that are not on 
the table. The fact that we allowed the North Koreans to be exempt from 
special inspections, I think, was a very, very poor decision on behalf 
of the administration. Nevertheless, it is a decision that was made by 
the administration.
  But I do believe that Congress has a role as well, and that role has 
thus far been somewhat ignored. It has been piqued when we had 
discussions or floor statements on the subject. But I do not think we 
can ignore it any longer, now that the administration has turned to us 
for funding. I will have, in a future speech, some specific references 
where the administration assured us there will be very little 
likelihood of significant funding.
  However, today we are told the administration has sought funding from 
Congress for all aspects of the deal--all aspects: delivering heavy 
oil, dealing with spent fuel, the light water reactor project, and even 
the setup costs of KEDO. That is the international consortium that is 
attempting to put this together.
  For fiscal year 1995, the administration spent $4.7 million in 
emergency Department of Defense funds. I have heard members of the 
Armed Services Committee on this floor question how in the world 
Department of Defense emergency funds could ever be utilized for this 
purpose. But that is where the administration saw fit to expend the 
funds. The administration took $4.7 million in emergency DOD funds and 
bought heavy oil for North Korea.
  What did North Korea do with the heavy oil? They were supposed to use 
it for power generation. We know for a fact some of it was funneled off 
into industrial complexes, and it was interesting to note there was an 
increase in military activity shortly after that oil flowed in, which I 
find rather confounding. Mr. President, $10 million in reprogrammed 
Department of Energy funds have been used and $4 million from 
reprogrammed Department of State funds.
  So when the administration suggests it is not going to cost much, we 
have already expended approximately $20 million.
  For this fiscal year, the administration has requested $22 million in 
Department of State funds and $5 million of Department of Energy 
funds--about $27 million.
  If U.S. taxpayers' funds are going to be used, then I think Congress 
must play a monitoring role. My legislation outlines that role for the 
Congress.
  The proposed amendment is consistent with the agreed framework. It is 
not an attempt to sabotage the agreement, but the amendment does 
attempt to hold North Korea to its promises before the United States 
simply gives it everything it wants. So far we have been doing all the 
giving and North Korea has been doing all the taking. Eventually North 
Korea, too, has to do some giving, including giving up entirely its 
nuclear ambitions as well as the sale of arms to other nations.
  Specifically, before the United States fully normalizes political and 
economic relations with North Korea, my amendment would require the 
full implementation of the IAEA safeguards requirements, including 
allowing inspections of the two suspected nuclear waste sites; allowing 
the removal of all spent fuel to a third country--any third country, of 
course, other than the United States, by preference; and making 
progress in North-South dialog.
  In addition, North Korea must address other areas of U.S. concern:
  First, they must agree to go beyond the current and very ineffective 
process for returning remains of United States missing in action from 
the North Korean war. Mr. President, currently we have 8,177--8,177--
still listed as missing in action in North Korea. We have reason to 
believe we know where many of those remains might be, as we have 
identified crash sites and other areas of high-intensity activity.
  It is interesting to do a comparison: 8,177 MIA's in North Korea, 
1,621 in Vietnam. Yet the entire focus of the Nation has been 
traditionally on those missing in action in the Vietnam conflict. As a 
consequence of the success of the joint field activities in Vietnam, we 
propose that same type of joint field activities in North Korea.
  Finally, North Korea must cease the export of ballistic missiles and 
related military technology. There is evidence that North Korea is 
exporting missiles to Iran, among other terrorist nations, from time to 
time.
  The amendment would also condition future funding on North Korea 
fulfilling the terms of the agreed framework and the confidential 
minute in accordance with the schedule set forth on the agreed 
framework.
  On the particular issue of the supply of heavy oil, the amendment 
would restrict U.S. support for exports of heavy oil if North Korea 
diverts heavy oil to purposes not specified in the agreed framework or 
otherwise is not in compliance with the agreed framework. We have 
already seen violations of this section of the agreement, as I have 
outlined for my colleagues.
  Finally, the amendment makes clear that the United States will 
suspend its participation in the agreed framework if North Korea 
reloads its existing 5 megawatt reactor or resumes construction of 
nuclear facilities.
  In concluding, let me reiterate that this amendment should not be 
seen as a rejection of the committee's original language but as a 
necessary enhancement. It contains a reasonable and detailed road map 
for progress in the United States-Democratic Republic of North Korea 
relations, while providing an appropriate monitoring role for Congress, 
because after all it is our money.
  The House has also taken similar action. I think we should take steps 
to ensure that North Korea keeps its promises. I urge my colleagues and 
the administration to support this approach in the national interest 
and in the interest of continuity.
  I thank my colleagues and I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under 
the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is the Murkowski 
amendment No. 2712.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Murkowski amendment be laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Florida, 
Senator Mack, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Not to be considered, just to be filed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be submitted and numbered.


            Amendments Nos. 2710, 2714 through 2722, En Bloc

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have seven amendments that are 
routine, and as far as I know there are no objections to them. Let me 
list them: an amendment by Senator Specter on section 660, which has to 
do with police training; amendments for myself regarding competitive 
financing; an amendment by Senator Stevens of Alaska dealing with the 
issue of mapping; an amendment by Senator Kassebaum already at the desk 
regarding Liberia; an amendment by Senator Bingaman concerning energy; 
two amendments by Senator Mack, one relating to the World Bank and one 
relating to the index of economic freedom; and an amendment by my 
colleague from Vermont on Honduras.
  Mr. President, I send those amendments to the desk en bloc and I ask 
for their immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments will be 
considered en bloc.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


[[Page S 13933]]

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] proposes 
     amendments numbered 2710, 2714 through 2722 en bloc.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendments be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:
                           Amendment no. 2710

  (Purpose: Expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the 
                       peace process in Liberia)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:


                                liberia

       Sec.   . (a) The Congress finds that--
       (1) the war in Liberia begun in 1989 has devastated that 
     country, with more than 150,000 people killed, 800,000 people 
     forced to flee to other countries, and thousands of children 
     conscripted into the rebel armies;
       (2) after nearly six years of conflict, on August 19, 1995, 
     the Liberia factions signed a peace agreement in Abuja, 
     Nigeria; and
       (3) the Liberian faction leaders and regional powers appear 
     to be committed to the most recent peace accord, including 
     the installation of the new ruling council.
       (b) It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
     should strongly support the peace process in Liberia, 
     including diplomatic engagement, support for the west African 
     peacekeeping force, humanitarian assistance, and assistance 
     for demobilizing troops and for the resettlement of refugees.
       (c) Section 1(b)(2) of Public Law 102-270 is amended by 
     striking ``to implement the Yamoussoukro accord''.

  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment on 
Liberia. I am pleased to be joined by Senator Simon, former chairman of 
the Africa Subcommittee, and Senator Feingold, ranking member of the 
Subcommittee.
  This amendment expresses strong support for the latest Liberia peace 
agreement and facilitates the provision of limited United States 
assistance to Liberia.
  Begun on Christmas day 1989, the civil war in Liberia has devastated 
that country. More than 150,000 people have been killed, mostly 
innocent women and children. Upward of three-quarters of a million 
people have been forced to flee to neighboring countries. Most heart-
wrenching is the disastrous effect of the war on the children of 
Liberia. Many young boys--probably tens of thousands--have been 
conscripted by the warring factions, handed weapons sometimes bigger 
than they are, and sent into battle.
  Mr. President, in August 1990, the Economic Community of West African 
States sent a peacekeeping force led by Nigeria. The force, called 
ECOMOG, did stop the rebel advance--but over time became one of the 
combatants and did little to bring peace to Liberia.
  And, the situation has only become more confused the last couple of 
years. The number of factions multiplied. Some of these groups have 
split and others connected with a rebel movement in Sierra Leone. 
ECOMOG formed alliances with certain factions. Arms flows continued. 
Clearly the warlords appeared much more interested in their personal 
power and wealth than in the future of their country.
  After more than 5 years of brutal and inhuman conflict, many in the 
outside world had simply given up on Liberia. I must say that I was one 
who had become increasingly frustrated with the situation and 
pessimistic about the future of Liberia.
  Yet, in the midst of the cynicism, we have seen a dramatic and very 
positive breakthrough in Liberia. Last month, the major faction 
leaders--under intense pressure from Ghanaian President Jerry 
Rawlings--signed a peace agreement in Abuja, Nigeria. Unlike the 
previous 11 accords, many believe and hope that this is a peace accord 
with a difference. For once, the Nigerians--the leaders of ECOWAS--and 
rebel leader Charles Taylor appear to have reached an understanding. 
All the major faction leaders are part of the transition.
  Mr. President, I believe that now is the time for the international 
community, including the United States, to respond positively to this 
latest development. Liberia is a country founded by a group of freed 
American slaves. We have a long history of involvement in Liberia and, 
I believe, a special responsibility for its future.
  This amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the United States 
should strongly support the recent peace accord. We should assist with 
the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. We should help demobilize the troops, 
many of which are children. We should support efforts to resettle the 
refugees.
  This amendment also facilitates the delivery of United States relief 
by waiving the Brooke amendment for Liberia for these types of aid. 
Because of the irresponsible fiscal policies of former President Doe 
and the war, Liberia is prevented from receiving any nonemergency 
United States assistance under the Brooke amendment.
  In 1992, I sponsored a bill--signed into law by President Bush--which 
waives the Brooke amendment for limited types of assistance to Liberia. 
That action followed an earlier peace accord that many hoped would end 
the fighting. But, as we know, the war resumed, and the current 
authority does not apply because the law refers only to the 
Yamoussoukro accord. This amendment simply deletes the reference to 
``Yamoussoukro'' in the current law. It does not appropriate any new 
money or affect direct spending. It only gives the President the 
limited authority to support the latest peace agreement in Liberia from 
existing accounts.
  Mr. President, I would urge support for this amendment. I believe it 
is a limited, but important, step in facilitating United States 
assistance for Liberia at this critical time. It is my hope that this 
latest peace agreement will hold and the devastating and brutal 
conflict in Liberia will finally end.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, before I begin speaking about Liberia, I 
would like to congratulate the managers of this bill for the good work 
they have done on behalf of Africa in this bill. The Chairman's mark 
reflects cuts to the accounts that affect development in sub-Saharan 
Africa, but they do not paralyze our program or signal a United States 
withdrawal from the region. I think the Chairman acted very 
responsibly, and I would urge him and the other Senate conferees to 
protect this mark, at a minimum, in conference. The case for continued 
support for Africa is strong, and, I believe, that the United States 
has serious national security interests in the region, which make our 
investment there an imperative.
  Today I want to talk about Liberia specifically, though, and to speak 
as a cosponsor of the Kassebaum amendment on Liberia, which I expect is 
non-controversial. The amendment will make what a technical fix in 
existing law, and permit the United States to provide assistance to 
Liberia to implement the Abuja peace accords reached last month.
  Since 1989, Liberia has suffered some of the most wretched and 
vengeful warfare in Africa. More than 180,000 people have been killed; 
approximately half the country's population has been displaced; and the 
capital city of Monrovia is bursting with three times its prewar 
population. The country has been shattered by senseless ethnic and 
individual rivalries, and has been on the verge of total collapse and 
anarchy. The conflict has contributed to instability throughout West 
Africa, and serious violence--mirroring Liberia's factional divides--
has recently erupted in Sierra Leone.
  I had the opportunity last year to visit Liberia with the past 
chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator Simon, and 
listened to first-hand accounts about the war. Children were fighting 
children to seek revenge for relatives' deaths, or just simply to earn 
a day's food; arms flow from state to state, available to anyone 
seeking anything explosive; and violence marks the life of every 
Liberian citizen.
  Since 1989 the United States has provided over $380 million for 
humanitarian relief in Liberia, and $60 million for efforts aimed at 
conflict resolution. The United Nations has maintained a small 
peacekeeping mission in Liberia, and the Economic Community of West 
African States [ECOWAS] has deployed thousands of peacekeepers in an 
effort to quell some of the violence. It has been a difficult 
assignment, to say the least.
  There have been a dozen peace accords in Liberia in the past 6 years. 
They have failed for a variety of reasons, but most of them were doomed 
because they were not negotiated with the concept of powersharing for 
all the factional leaders; rather they sought to isolate some parties, 
in a war which nobody has won, and in fact everybody has lost. 
Consequently, there has not 

[[Page S 13934]]
been a unified national will to stop the fighting.
  The Abuja accord signed last month, though, represents a new way of 
doing business in Liberia: for the first time, all seven factions are 
represented and invested in the agreement; and for the first time, 
there is a concept of power-sharing in Liberia. It also comes at a time 
when the people of Liberia have actively demonstrated their yearning 
for an end to the war. Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings deserves a 
great deal of credit for his tenacity and creativity in facilitating 
the Abuja accord. I also commend the Nigerians for the role they have 
played in these groundbreaking negotiations.
  For that reason, it is with a cautious sense of relief that I 
congratulate the people of Liberia on the peace agreement, and join 
Senator Kassebaum in urging support for the Abuja accord. Given the 
discouraging history of this war, success is, quite frankly, a 
longshot, but this agreement is Liberia's best hope at this time for 
peace.
  The task of reconciliation in Liberia is daunting, so the Abuja 
accord must be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. But if the 
parties take the first steps and demonstrate their commitment to the 
process, then the United States will finally have an opportunity--after 
spending years of investing in humanitarian relief for Liberia--to 
bolster a peace.
  The first signs have been promising. A ceasefire has been in place, 
and holding more or less, since August 26; the new transitional 
government, the Council of State, was inaugurated on September 1; an 
ambitious timeline for disarmament and demobilization has been set; and 
democratic elections have been scheduled for August 1996. But there is 
a long and difficult road ahead, with many obstacles to overcome.
  For most of the problems, the answers will be hard to come by. For 
instance, when I was in Monrovia last year, Liberia was in the process 
of trying to disarm soldiers, pursuant to the Cotonou accords. Yet all 
they could offer a demobilized soldier was a bag of rice, a jug of 
cooking oil, and a pair of tennis shoes--just enough to feed a family 
for a few weeks, and hardly enough to substitute for a job as a 
soldier. Similarly, to reintegrate a child soldier requires a school 
and other constructive programs. Clearly, this will be a tremendously 
complicated and long-term process--one which involves not only national 
reconciliation, but also the development of alternative economic 
opportunities.
  The United States has a moral interest in the fate of Liberia, and we 
have responded significantly to the humanitarian disaster of the past 6 
years. We now must seize the opportunity to invest in peace. While we 
have limited funds to allocate to foreign aid at all this year, we can 
use our unique historical relationship with Liberia and the weight of 
creative diplomacy to advance the process of reconciliation in Liberia.
  First, we must continue to offer support to the Council of State and, 
where appropriate and possible, facilitate attempts at reconciliation. 
We should be available to President Rawlings in his efforts through 
ECOWAS to forge peace in the region as well. Second, we should redouble 
efforts to work with other West African States--namely Burkina Faso, 
Cote D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria--to stop the flagrant arms 
transfers to Liberia. Third, Liberia should be designated as a priority 
within our aid budget to Africa, and resources should be allocated 
accordingly to support the peace process. If the Abuja accords prove 
successful, then the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
the Honorable George Moose, or other high-ranking Administration 
officials should consider visiting Monrovia. These are all issues we 
will explore when the subcommittee holds its hearings on the prospects 
for peace in Liberia next week.
  Over the years, the United States has proven itself willing to 
contribute in disaster assistance to Liberia. With the Abuja accord, we 
have a long overdue opportunity to help support a peace. After 6 harsh 
years of sadistic violence and dislocation, Liberia needs this 
agreement to succeed. This amendment will clarify that that can happen.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
                           amendment no. 2714

 (Purpose: To Allow Training of Foreign Police Forces During and After 
                       U.S. Military Operations)

       On page 81, line 21, strike ``paragraph'' and insert 
     ``paragraphs.'' On page 81, line 23, after ``enforcement.'' 
     insert the following:
       ``(6) with respect to assistance provided to reconstitute 
     civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict 
     restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purposes of 
     supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the 
     provision of professional public safety training, to include 
     training in internationally recognized standards of human 
     rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion 
     of civilian police roles that support democracy.''

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, for two decades, section 660 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 has prohibited the U.S. Government from 
training foreign police forces.
  There are a number of exemptions, however: For example, antiterrorism 
and counterdrug training have been permitted. The foreign operations 
bill contains a new exemption; namely, for training foreign police to 
monitor and enforce sanctions.
  The 1996 foreign operations report contains an additional exemption; 
that is, training for monitoring and enforcing embargoes.
  Deputy Secretary John White and other officials believe that another 
exemption is needed.
  In their view, the U.S. Government should be allowed to carry out 
police training during and after U.S. military operations.
  During military operations in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, 
public order broke down. Creating new public safety forces in these 
countries was essential: U.S. forces were unable to leave until there 
was a new police force in place to protect the public.
  But section 660 prohibitions technically prevented the Defense 
Department--the most effective organization in hostile environments--
from performing this training; as the report of the congressionally 
mandated, bipartisan Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed 
Forces stated, ``there are no civilian agencies capable of short notice 
training in hostile, demanding environment. We expect DOD will continue 
to be called upon to carry out law enforcement operations in the 
future.''
  The Commission recommended that legislation that restricts the 
ability of the Federal Government to conduct constabulary training, for 
example, section 660, should be amended to allow greater DOD 
participation.
  The Pentagon is prepared to accept its responsibility for short-term 
training in hostile environments, for example, Somalia. Before they do 
so, however, they wish to see section 660 amended.
  The amendment would not require the Defense Department to do the 
training. Rather, it would allow the President to use whatever 
Government agency he felt was appropriate. In a lsss hostile 
environment, for example, Panama after Noreiga's capture, the FBI or 
other agency might do the training.
                           amendment no. 2715

       On page 67, line 11, add the following section:
       (b) Direct costs associated with meeting a foreign 
     customer's additional or unique requirements will continue to 
     be allowable under such contracts. Loadings applicable to 
     such direct costs shall be permitted at the same rates 
     applicable to procurement of like items purchased by the 
     Department of Defense for its own use.
                                                                    ____



                           amendment no. 2716

   (Purpose: To require a report providing a concise overview of the 
 prospects for economic growth on a broad, equitable, and sustainable 
basis in the countries receiving economic assistance under title II of 
                               this act)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC.   . INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM.

       (a) Reporting Requirement.--The President shall include in 
     the congressional presentation materials on United States 
     bilateral economic assistance submitted to the appropriate 
     congressional committees for a fiscal year a report providing 
     a concise overview of the prospects for economic growth on a 
     broad, equitable, and sustainable basis in the countries 
     receiving economic assistance under title II of this Act. For 
     each country, the report shall discuss the laws, policies and 
     practices of that country that most contribute to or detract 
     from the achievement of this kind of growth. The report 
     should address relevant macroeconomic, microeconomic, social, 
     legal, environmental, and political factors and include 
     economic freedom criteria regarding policies wage and 

[[Page S 13935]]
     price controls, state ownership of production and distribution, state 
     control of financial institutions, trade and foreign 
     investment, capital and profit repatriation, tax and private 
     property protections.
       (b) Countries.--The countries referred to in subsection (a) 
     are countries--
       (1) for which in excess a total of $5,000,000 has been 
     obligated during the previous fiscal year for assistance 
     under sections 103 through 106, chapters 10, 11 of part I, 
     and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961, and under the Support for Eastern Democracy Act of 
     1989; or
       (2) for which in excess of $1,000,000 has been obligated 
     during the previous fiscal year for assistance administered 
     by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
       (c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State shall submit the 
     report required by subsection (a) in consultation with the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Agency 
     for International Development, and the President of the 
     Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
                                                                    ____



                           amendment no. 2717

   (Purpose: To direct USAID contracting of mapping and surveying to 
                      qualified U.S. contractors)

       Add the following in the appropriate section:
       ``To the maximum extent possible, the funds provided by 
     this Act shall be used to provide surveying and mapping 
     related services through contracts entered into through 
     competitive bidding to qualified U.S. contractors.''

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment which will 
require AID to contract out mapping and surveying work to qualified 
U.S. companies when such work can be accomplished by the private 
sector.
  Mr. President, I am deeply concerned that while the Agency for 
International Development requires surveying and mapping in countries 
that receive development assistance, this mapping work is most often 
contracted out by AID to other government agencies. In many instances 
Federal agencies are aggressively marketing their mapping capabilities 
to foreign governments in direct competition with qualified United 
States companies. Despite language in previous committee reports, the 
amount of contracting for such services has not increased.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment.
                           amendment no. 2718

 (Purpose: To reduce the energy costs of Federal facilities for which 
                funds are made available under this Act)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC.  . ENERGY SAVINGS AT FEDERAL FACILITIES.

       (a) Reduction in Facilities Energy Costs.--The head of each 
     agency for which funds are made available under this Act 
     shall take all actions necessary to achieve during fiscal 
     year 1996 a 5 percent reduction, from fiscal year 1995 
     levels, in the energy costs of the facilities used by the 
     agency.
       (b) Use of Cost Savings.--An amount equal to the amount of 
     cost savings realized by an agency under subsection (a) shall 
     remain available for obligation through the end of fiscal 
     year 1997, without further authorization or appropriation, as 
     follows:
       (1) Conservation measures.--Fifty percent of the amount 
     shall remain available for the implementation of additional 
     energy conservation measures and for water conservation 
     measures at such facilities used by the agency as are 
     designated by the head of the agency.
       (2) Other purposes.--Fifty percent of the amount shall 
     remain available for use by the agency for such purposes as 
     are designated by the head of the agency, consistent with 
     applicable law.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than December 31, 1996, the head 
     of each agency described in subsection (a) shall submit a 
     report to Congress specifying the results of the actions 
     taken under subsection (a) and providing any recommendations 
     concerning how to further reduce energy costs and energy 
     consumption in the future.
       (2) Contents.--Each report shall--
       (A) specify the total energy costs of the facilities used 
     by the agency;
       (B) identify the reductions achieved; and
       (C) specify the actions that resulted in the reductions.
                                                                    ____



                           amendment no. 2719

 (Purpose: To require certification by the Secretary of the State that 
   the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has not 
                      approved any loans to Iran)

       On page 39, after line 19, insert the following: ``Provided 
     further, That not more than twenty-one days prior to the 
     obligation of each such sum, the Secretary shall submit a 
     certification to the Committees on Appropriations that the 
     Bank has not approved any loans to Iran since October 1, 
     1994, or the President of the United States certifies that 
     withholding of these funds is contrary to the national 
     interest of the United States.''

                           amendment no. 2720

 (Purpose: To require additional reports pursuant to the United States-
               Hong Kong Policy Act (22 U.S.C. Sec. 5731)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC.  . REPORTS REGARDING HONG KONG.

       (a) Extension of Reporting Requirement.--Section 301 of the 
     United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731) 
     is amended in the text above paragraph (1)--
       (1) By inserting ``March 31, 1996,'' after ``March 31, 
     1995,''; and
       (2) by striking ``and March 31, 2000,'' and inserting 
     ``March 31, 2000, and every year thereafter,''.
       (b) Additional Requirements.--In light of deficiencies in 
     reports submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 301 of 
     the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act (22 U.S.C. 5731), the 
     Congress directs that reports required to be submitted under 
     that section on or after the date of enactment of this Act 
     include detailed information on the status of, and other 
     developments affecting, implementation of the Sino-British 
     Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, including--
       (1) the Basic Law and its consistency with the Joint 
     Declaration;
       (2) the openness and fairness of elections to the 
     legislature;
       (3) the openness and fairness of the election of the chief 
     executive and the executive's accountability to the 
     legislature;
       (4) the treatment of political parties;
       (5) the independence of the judiciary and its ability to 
     exercise the power of final judgment over Hong Kong law; and
       (6) the Bill of Rights.

  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act and 
the reports pursuant to that act have contributed to United States 
policy goals in Hong Kong. Senator McConnell deserves thanks and 
appreciation for the work he did in seeing that bill passed into law.
  The amendment adds the requirement of a report in 1996 and every year 
after 2000 pursuant to the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act. 
Currently, reports are not required in those years. The amendment also 
includes directive language establishing criteria for reporting on six 
issues related to the implementation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint 
Declaration on Hong Kong. Past reports have been deficient on these 
points. The purpose of the directive language, which does not amend the 
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act, is to give guidance on title III's 
existing reporting requirements. They do not reflect a departure or a 
change in Congress's stated policies in the act.
                           amendment no. 2721

   (Purpose: To require a report providing a concise overview of the 
 prospects for economic growth on a broad, equitable, and sustainable 
basis in the countries receiving economic assistance under title II of 
                               this act)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC.   . INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM.

       (a) Reporting Requirement.--The President shall include in 
     the congressional presentation materials on United States 
     bilateral economic assistance submitted to the appropriate 
     congressional committees for a fiscal year a report providing 
     a concise overview of the prospects for economic growth on a 
     broad, equitable, and sustainable basis in the countries 
     receiving economic assistance under title II of this Act. For 
     each country, the report shall discuss the laws, policies and 
     practices of that country that most contribute to or detract 
     from the achievement of this kind of growth. The report 
     should address relevant macroeconomics, microeconomic, 
     social, legal, environmental, and political factors and 
     include economic freedom criteria regarding policies wage and 
     price controls, state ownership of production and 
     distribution, state control of financial Institutions, trade 
     and foreign investment, capital and profit repatriation, tax 
     and private property protections.

  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, once again this year, I have submitted an 
amendment to require administration reports on economic policies in 
countries receiving U.S. economic assistance. It seems to me that in 
the wake of the collapse of communism and the vindication of free-
market capitalist economic policies, it is absolutely essential that 
our policymakers keep in mind the economic principles and protections 
that have made the United States the freest and strongest country on 
the face on the Earth.


                           amendment no. 2722

 (Purpose: To state the sense of the Congress that the Administration 
  should expeditiously declassify documents relating to Hondurans who 
        were allegedly ``disappeared,'' and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.   . HONDURAS.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:

[[Page S 13936]]

       (1) In 1981, a secret Honduran army death squad known as 
     Battalion 316 was created. During the 1980's Battalion 316 
     engaged in a campaign of systematically kidnapping, torturing 
     and murdering suspected subversives. Victims included 
     Honduran students, teachers, labor leaders and journalists. 
     In 1993 there were reportedly 184 unsolved cases of persons 
     who were allegedly ``disappeared.'' They are presumed dead.
       (2) At the time, Administration officials were aware of the 
     activities of Battalion 316, but in its 1983 human rights 
     report the State Department stated that ``There are no 
     political prisoners in Honduras.''
       (b) Declassification of Documents.--It is the sense of the 
     Congress that the President should order the expedited 
     declassification of any documents in the possession of the 
     United States Government pertaining to persons who allegedly 
     ``disappeared'' in Honduras, and promptly make such documents 
     available to Honduran authorities who are seeking to 
     determine the fate of these individuals.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, amendment that I am sponsoring on behalf of 
myself, Senator Dodd and Senator Sarbanes, calls on the administration 
to declassify documents relating to individuals who were disappeared in 
Honduras during the 1980's.
  There is considerable evidence that in 1981, a secret Honduran army 
death squad was created with the knowledge and assistance of the 
American Government. It was known as Battalion 316, and during the 
1980's it engaged in a campaign of systematically kidnapping, torturing 
and murdering suspected subversives. These were labor organizers, human 
rights activists, journalists, lawyers, students and teachers. The 
majority of them were engaged in activities that would be lawful in any 
democracy.
  At that time, the American Embassy, which had ample reason to know 
about these activities, denied them. Even today, U.S. officials who 
were stationed there claim not to know.
  But the fact is that as many as 184 people remain unaccounted for who 
may have been disappeared, and the Honduran Government, to its credit, 
has undertaken to determine their fate.
  Regrettably, the U.S. Government has not done all it could to assist 
in this effort. In fact, it has been unhelpful. For that reason, 
consistent with a letter sent this week to the President by Senator 
Harkin, myself, and several other Senators, this amendment calls on the 
administration to promptly make documents in its possession which 
pertain to these allegedly disappeared individuals available to 
Honduran authorities.
  I understand this amendment is acceptable to the other side.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, as I indicated, I am unaware of any 
problems with the amendments that have just been submitted to the desk 
on this side.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I advise my friend from Kentucky that there 
are no objections on this side. They have been cleared for adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments 
en bloc.
  So the amendments (Nos. 2710 and 2714 through 2722) were agreed to en 
bloc.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous-consent that tonight when 
we have the debate under the previous unanimous-consent request 
regarding the Brown amendment, the time on this side under my control 
be under the control of the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio, 
Senator Glenn, or his designee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, let me just say that we are hoping to 
handle an amendment or two before 7. And I remind everyone that 
beginning at 7, as Senator Leahy indicated, there is a period of 5 
hours of debate on the Brown amendment which will kick in. But we would 
like to handle some more amendments before then.
  Already I think we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. There 
is no reason why we cannot finish this bill sometime tomorrow. The 
number of contentious amendments is relatively small already. So I am 
optimistic we will be able to finish. Obviously we will be able to 
finish tomorrow much more easily if we can get some more amendments 
processed between now and 7. So I would invite anyone to come over. I 
know that Senator Smith has an amendment and may well be willing to 
offer it sometime before 7. But we would welcome anyone to come over.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, in keeping with the earlier 
designation by Senator Leahy, I ask unanimous consent that all time in 
opposition to the Brown amendment be under the control of Senator 
Glenn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. For the information of all Senators, I see Senator 
Smith is here and it is my understanding we will be able to have a vote 
on or in relation to the Smith amendment before 7 o'clock, so all 
Senators should be alert to the fact that there will be, in all 
likelihood, one more rollcall tonight before we go into debate, the 
lengthy debate on the Brown amendment.
  Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in 
order to offer an amendment to the committee amendment on page 11, 
lines 9 and 10.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


 Amendment No. 2723 to Committee Amendment on Page 11, Lines 8 through 
                                   10

 (Purpose: To prohibit financial assistance to Vietnam unless certain 
 conditions relating to Americans unaccounted for from the Vietnam war 
                                are met)

  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I send this amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith], for himself, 
     Mr. Thomas, Ms. Snowe, and Mr. Helms, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2723 to committee amendment on page 11, lines 8 
     through 10.

  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the Committee amendment, add the following:


   prohibition on financial assistance to the socialist republic of 
                                vietnam

       Sec. ____. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available by this Act may be used to establish most-favored-
     nation trading status with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
     or to extend financing or other financial assistance to the 
     Socialist Republic of Vietnam from the Export-Import Bank of 
     the United States, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 
     or Trade and Development Agency unless the President--
       (1) provides Congress with the original case-by-case 
     analytical assessments on unaccounted for American servicemen 
     from the Vietnam Conflict which were completed by the Defense 
     POW/MIA Office in July, 1995; and
       (2) certifies to Congress that the Socialist Republic of 
     Vietnam is being fully cooperative and fully forthcoming, on 
     the basis of information available to the United States 
     Government, in the four areas stipulated by the President, 
     namely--
       (A) concrete results from efforts by Vietnam to recover and 
     repatriate American remains;
       (B) continued resolution of discrepancy cases, live-
     sightings, and field activities,
       (C) further assistance in implementing trilateral 
     investigations with the Lao; and
       (D) accelerated efforts to provide all documents that will 
     help lead to the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIAs; and

[[Page S 13937]]

       (3) certifies to Congress, after consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, that the Socialist Republic 
     of Vietnam is being fully forthcoming in providing the United 
     States with access to those portions of wartime Central 
     Committee-level records and reports that pertain to the 
     subject of Americans captured or held during the Vietnam War 
     by North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, or Vietcong forces in 
     Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and
       (4) certifies to Congress that the Government of the 
     Socialist Republic of Vietnam is making substantial progress 
     to address United States concerns about the continued 
     suppression of the nonviolent pursuit of democratic freedoms 
     by the people of Vietnam, including freedom of expression and 
     association, and the continued imprisonment of political and 
     religious leaders, including American citizens.

  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I do not choose to take too much of the 
Senate's time. I will be very brief. I know that Senator Thomas and 
Senator McCain are going to be speaking for and against the amendment.
  I am very pleased in offering this amendment to join with the 
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senator Thomas, in offering this amendment. 
I very much appreciate his support. I also appreciate the support of 
the Senator in the chair, the Senator from Maine, for her support and 
cosponsorship as well.
  The language in this amendment is very straightforward. It prohibits 
the granting of any special trading privileges to the socialist 
Republic of Vietnam unless the President makes two key certifications 
to Congress. The first of these is that Vietnam is cooperating fully 
with efforts to account for missing American servicemen from the 
Vietnam war.
  That is very straightforward. It does not mean that they have to 
provide answers for every single person who is missing; some they may 
not be able to provide. The key is, are they fully cooperating with 
those efforts to account for missing Americans, giving us the help and 
assistance that we need to try to get information regarding our 
missing.
  Second, that Vietnam has taken steps to improve its human rights 
record, which is far from exemplary, and that would include addressing 
United States objections over the detention of American citizens now in 
Vietnam. The POW/MIA-related portion of this amendment was part of a 
resolution I introduced this past May which was cosponsored by the 
majority leader, Senator Dole, and by the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, the Banking Committee chair, the 
Asian Pacific Subcommittee and Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, the 
Commerce-State-Justice Appropriations Subcommittee, and the 
International Operations Subcommittee. All of those chairs supported 
this.
  As my colleagues may recall, since coming to office, President 
Clinton has taken five major steps to improve relations with Vietnam. 
Let me just briefly reiterate those.
  One, in July 1993, 2 years ago, the President ended United States 
objections to Vietnam having access to International Monetary Fund 
loans, a very significant step, moving Vietnam allegedly into the 
international community.
  Second, in September 1993, the President allowed United States 
companies to bid on internationally financed development projects in 
Vietnam.
  Third, in February, 1994, he ended the U.S. trade embargo.
  Fourth, in January 1995, the President allowed Vietnam and the United 
States to open liaison offices in our respective capitals.
  And finally, Madam President, this past summer the President 
announced his decision to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam.
  So the administration has taken very dramatic steps in the past 2 
years to bring Communist Vietnam into the family of nations, but it 
should not be one-sided, Madam President. There should be a two-sided 
equation.
  Quite frankly, I think it is now time for Vietnam to take some very 
dramatic steps equaling in significance the steps taken by the 
President before the American taxpayer is asked to subsidize specific 
trading privileges with that country.
  Specifically, I want the President to tell us if Vietnam is fully 
cooperating on the POW/MIA issue. That is all I am asking--the 
President to say Vietnam is fully cooperating with us on the POW/MIA 
issue.
  I would like assurances that Vietnam is addressing our human rights 
concerns as well.
  We also would like the President to provide us with complete 
information on the status of those who are still missing from the war, 
something which was required last year by a unanimous vote in this 
Chamber. By unanimous vote of the Senate, we asked that information on 
the status of Americans still missing from the Vietnam war be provided 
to the Congress.
  Mr. President, for the information of my colleagues, I would just 
include three items in the Record that will give a perspective of where 
we are concerning the issue of human rights in Vietnam and the MIA/POW 
issue.
  The first item is an Associated Press article from last month 
concerning the sentencing of two American citizens in Ho Chi Minh City 
who did nothing more than try to organize a nonviolent conference in 
Vietnam. That was their crime, a nonviolent conference.
  I know that Senator Thomas has already expanded on this issue of 
Vietnam's human rights record in a floor statement he made earlier this 
month so I am not going to belabor it because I think he will speak to 
that.
  The second item is a letter I sent to the Under Secretary of Defense 
in August requesting information on POW/MIA cases, as is required by 
law. There has been no response to that request despite the 
congressional testimony earlier this year that the requested 
information would be provided to Congress by this past July. It is a 
difficult task to provide this information, and I am fully aware of 
that, but it has not been provided. I think Congress should have this 
information. That is all I am asking. Let Congress get this information 
before any further trade decisions are made on Vietnam.
  I think this is especially important because these trade agreements 
with Vietnam are going to be subsidized through some of these 
international monetary organizations by the American taxpayer. We are 
cutting moneys everywhere to reconcile our budget, get it balanced and 
have a 7-year plan to do it, and surely the American taxpayer should 
not be subsidizing this country if it has not provided the information 
as required by the laws passed by this Congress.
  The third item is a breakdown of 2,197 cases of unaccounted Americans 
from the Vietnam war by country of loss and military service. And I ask 
unanimous consent, Madam President, that these referenced items be 
printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, this is a very reasonable amendment. I 
know there is some opposition to it, but it makes clear to Vietnam, it 
sends a very strong message to Vietnam and to President Clinton about 
the seriousness of our resolve in Congress to obtain full cooperation 
on the POW issue as well as improvements in human rights cases. It 
sends that message. That is a reasonable message to send that we expect 
full cooperation and we expect improvement in human rights cases if we 
are going to provide taxpayer subsidies to help them, the Vietnamese, 
get loans. This is not an attempt to replay the decision that was made 
to establish full diplomatic relations. We lost that debate, and I 
understand that. I did not like it, but I understand it. But what we 
are trying to do now is make Vietnam comply with what is required.
  When the President is ready to tell the American people that our 
concerns have been addressed, then I will withdraw any objections that 
I have to move forward on trade. But the President must tell us, and he 
has not done that. If the President is going to move forward on trade, 
forward on establishing the diplomatic relations and the mission and 
all of those things, is it too much to ask to simply have the President 
of the United States certify to Congress that we are receiving the 
fullest possible accounting? 

[[Page S 13938]]

  I hope that my colleague, the Senator from Kentucky, might take a 
second look at opposition to this amendment because I do not think it 
is unreasonable. It is really very, very specific and very, very 
reasonable. We should not have to fund any trade decisions before 
receiving a certification from the President. It is that simple. That 
is what the law provides for.
  Let us hope, Madam President, that the leaders of Vietnam will choose 
to respond in a significant way to the five major concessions that this 
President has already made to Vietnam. I have listed all five. And they 
have been made in the last 2 years, not over a period of 20 years, but 
a period of 2, very rapidly.
  And I would just say that if those conditions would be met, if the 
Vietnamese could respond to those five points, the President steps 
forward and says that we have fully received now the full cooperation 
of the Vietnamese and we get that list on MIA's and we can get the 
cooperation on the human rights violations, both specifically--I think 
Senator Thomas will discuss the two cases--then I think we can move on. 
But we should not be moving on before. A lot of people died in this 
war, and a lot of families are still waiting for answers. And they 
deserve to have the President of the United States step up to the 
microphone, face the American people, and say very simply, the 
Vietnamese are fully cooperating; they are providing all the 
information that they have and can provide unilaterally to the United 
States of America regarding their missing in action. When he says that, 
the day he says that, I will be the first Senator down on the floor to 
say, ``Fine. Let us move on.'' That is all I am asking. That is not an 
unreasonable request.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dole be listed 
as an original cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH. I yield the floor.
                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Associated Press, Aug. 16, 1995]

  State Department Calls Vietnamese Jailing of U.S. Citizens Unwelcome

       Washington.--The State Department says the jailing by 
     Vietnam of two Vietnamese-Americans on subversion charges is 
     unwelcome.
       In a two-day trial ending Saturday, a court in Ho Chi Minh 
     City sentenced Nguyen Tan Tri, 39, to seven years in prison 
     and Tran Quang Liem, 45, to four years on charges of trying 
     to overthrow Vietnam's government.
       Both hold American as well as Vietnamese citizenship and 
     have been held since November 1993. Seven Vietnamese also 
     were sentenced.
       David Johnson, a State Department spokesman, said Tuesday 
     he did not know specific charges against the two Americans, 
     although U.S. diplomats attended the trial.
       ``It's certainly unwelcome that American citizens engaged 
     in the peaceful expression of political views are arrested 
     and imprisoned,'' Johnson said.
                                                                    ____


                     [From Reuters, Aug. 16, 1995]

               U.S. Rights Group Condemn Vietnam Verdicts

                            (By John Rogers)

       Hanoi, Vietnam.--The U.S government and human rights groups 
     have attacked two Vietnamese court verdicts that showed 
     communist authorities were maintaining a tough stance against 
     dissidents.
       The cases appeared likely to heighten strains over 
     treatment of political offenders between Hanoi and Western 
     countries with which it is doing increasing business, 
     diplomats said in Hanoi Wednesday.
       In Washington, the State Department criticized prison 
     sentences passed by a Ho Chi Minh City court last week on two 
     Americans of Vietnamese origin and seven other people for 
     attempted subversion.
       The nine were jailed for between four and 15 years for 
     setting up an illegal opposition party in 1992 in Ho Chi Minh 
     City, the official Vietnam News Agency (VNA) reported 
     earlier.
       The Communist Party is Vietnam's only legal party.
       State Department spokesman David Johnson said Washington 
     conveyed its displeasure to Hanoi over the case.
       ``We have repeatedly voiced our support for peaceful 
     expression of political views and urged the Vietnamese 
     authorities to recognize that right,'' he said.
       The U.S.-based pressure group Human Rights Watch/Asia also 
     attacked the verdict, as well as the jailing of a leading 
     dissident Buddhist monk and five other Buddhists in an 
     unrelated trial Tuesday.
       The Ho Chi Minh City People's Court jailed the monk, Thich 
     Quang Do, for five years over an attempt by dissident 
     Buddhists to mount a relief effort separate from the 
     government's for victims of severe floods in the Mekong Delta 
     last year.
       Do, deputy leader of the banned Unified Buddhist Church of 
     Vietnam (UBCV), was tried under his lay name of Dang Phuc Tue 
     because, the government said, the case did not involve 
     religious activities.
       He and his co-defendants, UBCV supporters, were convicted 
     of undermining national solidarity and ``taking advantage of 
     the right of freedom and democracy to damage the interests of 
     the government and social organizations.''
       Human rights Watch/Asia, in a statement sent to news 
     bureaux in Hanoi, called for the release of those convicted.
       ``In both cases, we are unaware of any evidence that the 
     defendants have committed any acts that could be 
     characterized under international law as criminal.'' its 
     counsel Dinah PoKempner said.
       ``Their offence appears to consist of having peacefully 
     expressed controversial religious or political views.''
       Western diplomats said the two cases showed Hanoi was not 
     easing political controls despite improving relations and 
     business ties with the West and non-communist Asia.
       The United States finally established diplomatic relations 
     with Hanoi this month, 20 years after the Vietnam War. 
     Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
     (ASEAN) in July, becoming its first communist-ruled member.
       The Paris-based International Buddhist Information Bureau, 
     which acts as the UBCV's overseas mouthpiece, condemned Do's 
     conviction and called for a retrial.
                                                                    ____

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, August 18, 1995.
     Hon. Walter B. Slocombe,
     Under Secretary of Defense,
     Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
       Dear Walter: I am writing to express my concern that the 
     Congress has yet to receive the final results of the 
     comprehensive review of Vietnam-era POW/MIA cases promised by 
     Secretary of Defense Perry in his letter to the Senate Armed 
     Service Committee dated February 17, 1995. As you know this 
     review was initiated in response to Section 1034 of the 
     Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act (Public 
     Law 103-337), the intent of which was to require a listing of 
     such cases by November 17, 1994.
       In a followup letter to me dated April 7, 1995, you stated 
     that the Department of Defense was giving this matter its 
     utmost attention and that you were confident the review would 
     be completed during the summer. You also reiterated that 
     ``the Department will report the results of DPMO's review to 
     Congress on its completion.'' Subsequently, in testimony 
     before Congress on June 28, 1995, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
     of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs James Wold stated that he 
     expected that the review would be an ``all-encompassing look 
     at every individual case which would provide a solid analytic 
     assessment of the appropriate next steps for achieving the 
     fullest possible accounting.'' I support Secretary Wold's 
     conclusion on June 28th with respect to this review that 
     ``our unaccounted for Americans deserve no less,'' and that 
     he would ``work to ensure that we keep our promise to them.''
       It is my understanding that the above-mentioned review has 
     now been completed by the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO), in 
     conjunction with J2 of the Joint Task Force (Full 
     Accounting). I further understand that the analytical product 
     which resulted from this review has been presented to 
     National Security Council and Department of Defense policy 
     level officials for comment before it is forwarded to the 
     Congress.
       As you know, there are many of us in Congress who believe 
     that the results of an honest and thorough analytical review 
     of outstanding POW/MIA cases by DPMO would likely reinforce 
     previous CIA and DOD assessments that Communist Vietnamese 
     and Laotian officials have the ability to unilaterally 
     account for several hundred missing American servicemen.
       It is my hope that you will keep the commitment in your 
     letter dated April 7, 1995 to ``report the results of DPMO's 
     review to Congress on its completion.'' I certainly 
     understand the obvious interest of DOD and NSC policy level 
     officials in the results of this review, especially in view 
     of Administration statements that Communist Vietnam's 
     ``splendid and superb'' cooperation on the POW/MIA issue 
     provided justification for the President's decision to expand 
     diplomatic and economic relations with Hanoi. Nonetheless, I 
     hope that any objective assessments by DPMO's intelligence 
     analysts will not now be subjected at the policy level to 
     ``different views about how things should be put in the 
     report,'' as you described on April 7th. As you know, I 
     previously raised similar concerns about policy level skewing 
     of intelligence information in my March 7, 1995 letter to you 
     regarding Secretary Perry's February 17th interim report.
       Accordingly, I request that the analytical results of 
     DPMO's comprehensive review of Vietnam-era cases of 
     unaccounted for personnel be immediately forwarded to the 
     Congress. Aside from myself, there are several members of 
     Congress, working on behalf of constituents and POW/MIA 
     families, who have been waiting nearly a year to scrutinize 
     this information.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Bob Smith,
                                            United States Senator.

               Subject: monthly pw/mia statistical report

       Background: The Department of Defense, Washington 
     Headquarters Service, and the 

[[Page S 13939]]
     Department of State report the current numbers of Americans who are 
     unaccounted for in Southeast Asia:

         FIGURE 1.--AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Country of loss                PW/MIA      KIA/BNR     Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Vietnam..........................         337          256     593
South Vietnam..........................         430          592   1,022
Laos...................................         317          181     498
Cambodia...............................          36           41      77
China..................................           6            2       8
                                        --------------------------------
  Total................................       1,126        1,072   2,198
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Status as of Homecoming.                                              

       Figure 2 summarizes all unaccounted for Americans in 
     Southeast Asia by components:

               FIGURE 2.--U.S. LOSSES BY SERVICE COMPONENT              
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Component                   PW/MIA      KIA/BNR     Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA....................................         353          313     666
USN....................................         115          317     432
USMC...................................         101          174     275
USAF...................................         523          260     783
USCG...................................           0            1       1
Civilian...............................          34            7      41
                                        --------------------------------
  Total................................       1,126        1,072   2,198
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I had some lingering hope that the 
Congress, or at least the Senate, had finished debating Vietnam. The 
President made his decision to normalize relations with Vietnam--a wise 
decision in my judgment--and most Americans, including most veterans, 
concurred in that decision. Editorial opinion was almost uniformly 
positive.
  There was, of course, some inflammatory language coming from some 
Members of the House of Representatives--but they were so few in number 
as to be insignificant. Suffice it to say, that the President was right 
to normalize relations with Vietnam, and the country has breathed a 
sigh of relief that our long war with Vietnam is over.
  It is also apparent to all that there is little support in the Senate 
for reversing the President's decision to open an embassy in Hanoi. If 
there were such support I am sure we would be debating an amendment to 
prohibit funds for an embassy. Thus, Madam President, I was lulled into 
the comforting, but false notion that I would not be obligated to 
debate my colleagues again on the subject of Vietnam.
  I should have known better.
  Mr. dear friend--and he is my dear friend--from New Hampshire is a 
persistent opponent on this question. He has chosen to take another cut 
at running our Government's Vietnam policy out of his office. It is his 
right to make such an attempt. And while I respect his zeal and his 
patriotism, I hope he will under stand my disappointment in having to 
come to the floor to take issue with him again. I fear that it has 
become my fate to forever fight about Vietnam, and that is something I 
never anticipated when I left that country so many years ago.
  Madam President, the President of the United States has set the 
policy for United States-Vietnam relations, as it is his duty to do. It 
is my friend from New Hampshire's right to oppose that policy. And make 
no mistake, his amendment is an attempt to overturn it.
  Although the amendment does not reverse the President's decision to 
open an embassy, it does prevent or at least impede the development of 
normal relations between our two countries. I think that is a serious 
mistake; I think most Americans will see it as a mistake, and I hope 
the Senate will go on record in strong opposition to it.
  On the question of using trade as leverage to ensure continued POW/
MIA progress, let me point out an incontrovertible fact: Before the 
President lifted our trade embargo against Vietnam, opponents of that 
decision warned that without the coercion of an embargo, the Vietnamese 
would stop cooperating with our efforts to account for our remaining 
missing. As it turned out, quite the reverse happened. Vietnam's 
cooperation increased. Before the President decided to open an embassy 
in Hanoi, opponents of that decision warned that once we abandoned the 
incentive of diplomatic relations, the Vietnamese would stop 
cooperating with our accounting efforts. Again, quite the reverse 
happened. Cooperation has continued.
  Eight sets of remains, believed to be Americans, have been recovered 
since the President announced his intention to normalize relations.
  During his August visit, the Vietnamese gave Secretary Christopher a 
3\1/2\ inch stack of wartime records, 116 documents in all.
  Senator Harkin, in his trip to Vietnam this summer, also received a 
great many pages of documents, records from the Vietnamese Interior 
Ministry.
  Our 37th joint field operation with the Vietnamese is currently 
underway and yielding good results.
  Now, the opponents of normal relations argue that if we do not freeze 
the development of normal relations by restricting United States 
businesses from trading with and investing in Vietnam, Hanoi will no 
longer cooperate with us. On this, as on every occasion in the past, 
they will be proven wrong. They will be proven wrong because the 
Vietnamese, like most Americans, believe it is in their interests--
their best interests--to develop a strong, mutually beneficial 
relationship. Those interests override any lingering resentments from 
the war.
  Vietnam's interests are numerous. The most obvious are Vietnam's 
desire to enter the modern world and enjoy the same economic growth and 
prosperity experienced by their Southeast Asian neighbors. They also 
are rightly concerned about regional stability and the determination 
that no single power dominate Southeast Asia.
  It is for these reasons and others that Vietnam will continue to 
cooperate with our POW/MIA efforts. There is also the fact that there 
is nothing to be gained by not cooperating. The Vietnamese are a lot of 
things, but it has been my experience that they are seldom capricious. 
They act in their interest. Their interests are best served by good 
relations with the United States--whether or not we give them MFN or 
OPIC credits or whatever. They know that, and will act accordingly.
  It is also in our interests to engage Vietnam. First, as I have 
already pointed out, because it best serves the cause of POW/MIA 
accounting. Second, because we too have an interest in regional 
stability, and an economically sound Vietnam playing a responsible role 
as a valued member of ASEAN serves that end very well.
  I also believe that since it is not in our power to isolate Vietnam--
they have rapidly developing relations with the rest of the world--our 
best hope for encouraging political reforms is to engage Vietnam and 
become more deeply involved in their economic well-being.
  Madam President, I do not really want to debate this issue much 
longer. Few topics have been so extensively debated in American history 
as Vietnam. Frankly, I am extremely weary of the subject, so I will 
conclude with this reminder.
  It is profoundly in our interest to construct from the peace a 
relationship with Vietnam that serves the interest of the Vietnamese 
and the American people far better than our old antagonism did. The war 
in Vietnam is over. It is over. I respectfully ask my colleagues to 
demonstrate that the Senate has grasped this reality and support the 
President in his attempt to make something better from our future 
relations with Vietnam than we were able to do in our sad distant past.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. THOMAS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Madam President, I rise in strong support of the 
amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire to H.R. 1868, regarding the 
extending of economic benefits to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
  I shall be brief. My associate from Missouri wants to speak, and we 
want to vote before 7 o'clock.
  As Senator Smith pointed out, while the Clinton administration has 
been quick to normalize relations with the Government of Vietnam, it 
has not been as quick to meet its obligations to the Congress and the 
American people. For example, section 1034 of Public Law 103-337 
requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the Congress with a 
complete list of missing or unaccounted United States military 
personnel about whom it is possible that Vietnamese and Laotian 
officials could produce information or remains.
  The statute mandated that report to be submitted to us by November 
17, 1994. When the DOD requested an extension of the deadline to 
February 17, 1995, we did not object. We did not object when the DOD 
supplied us with a 

[[Page S 13940]]
sadly incomplete interim report. But, Madam President, more than 7 
months after that date, we still have not received the complete report 
required by the statute. This was not a request, not a casual 
invitation to provide information. It is a legal mandate.
  Second, despite both administration and Vietnam protestations to the 
contrary, I do not believe the Government of Vietnam has done its 
fullest to account for the POW/MIA's, especially as regards records of 
United States servicemen who disappeared in, or were taken across the 
border into Laos.
  Finally, in all this controversy surrounding the POW/MIA issue, we 
seem to have lost sight of the important fact that there is disregard 
for human rights in that country. I will not go into detail. I put them 
in the Record some time ago.
  So I will just conclude by saying, until the President can certify to 
us that, in his judgment, the Vietnamese are living up to their 
expectation--that is not too much to ask--and their promises regarding 
the MIA's and POW's and its international right to commitment, I think 
it is irresponsible and bad judgment for us to provide funding for 
them.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Senator's amendment. I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I say to the Senator from Missouri, I 
will take just a couple minutes.
  I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I have a couple of brief responses.
  I thank my colleague from Wyoming for his remarks. He has been very 
helpful on this issue. This amendment, I want to point out, does not 
reverse anything the President has already done. It does not reverse 
the diplomatic ties, it does not go back and replay the war, it does 
not mean that Senator Smith is running Vietnam policy out of his 
office. What it does mean is that this debate continues because this is 
a one-sided equation. It continues because the President of the United 
States has made significant movements. Some of us oppose those 
movements, but we are not replaying that. He made those decisions, and 
he moved forward.
  I respect the will of the majority. That decision has been made. I am 
not replaying that. But what I am trying to point out is that the 
Vietnamese have not responded in kind to those moves. I think we have 
an obligation to the families who still wait for answers to have them 
respond in time before the taxpayers of America, through subsidizing 
the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations, 
are going to be providing funds to the Vietnamese. I think they have a 
right to have the President of the United States, who implemented this 
policy, stand before the Congress and the American people and say: 
``The Vietnamese are fully cooperating with the United States 
Government on the accounting of our men.''
  I ask any of my colleagues who have spoken previously in opposition 
to my amendment, or who will speak in the future in opposition to my 
amendment, whether it be Senator Bond or anyone else, stand here on the 
floor of the Senate and make the statement in the affirmative that the 
Vietnamese are fully cooperating--fully cooperating--with the United 
States of America and the accounting of our men. I have not heard that.
  If you think Vietnam has been fully cooperative, if you really think 
they have been, vote against my amendment; I want you to vote against 
my amendment. If you believe the Vietnamese are fully cooperating on 
this issue, then vote against my amendment. If you believe they are 
not, then you should vote for my amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I join my colleagues from Arizona and 
Massachusetts in urging Senators to oppose this amendment. Earlier this 
year, President Clinton made the decision to restore diplomatic 
relations with Vietnam. That was a correct decision for him to make, 
one which I supported and I believe a majority of this body supported.
  Frankly, when the President announced his recognition of Vietnam, he 
made an announcement at the time that the conditions had been complied 
with. I think it is time the United States restore relations with 
Vietnam. It is in the best interest of the United States and in the 
best interest of the families of those soldiers who continue to be 
missing in action.
  I did not serve in Vietnam, as did my colleagues from Arizona, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, but I have traveled, however, to 
Vietnam in the past year. I participated in extensive meetings with our 
military officials there who are responsible for discovering the fate 
of those missing in action.
  I came away from every single one of those conversations with the 
same clear message, and that is, the Vietnamese are working very hard 
to meet our request for assistance. I got the same message in June when 
I met with the Presidential delegation who just returned from meetings 
in Vietnam. Vietnam has allowed us to conduct field exercises, allowed 
us to dig up military cemeteries.
  Can you imagine our permitting a nation with which we engaged in 
armed conflict to come in and dig up Arlington? You talk about 
cooperation. I had the opportunity to talk with Col. Mel Richmond who 
is in charge of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting, and he has 
outlined the great lengths of cooperation to which the Vietnamese have 
gone. I can tell you from the men who are directly involved in the 
effort that they believe that increased contacts and relations between 
the United States and Vietnam will increase our ability to find out any 
possible leads to those who remain, and they are very few.
  Those who were not lost at sea, those who have had any possible 
sightings, there are fewer than 100 open cases, and there have been 
extensive efforts on behalf of each of those cases to track them down.
  The amendment that is offered by our friend from New Hampshire would 
set additional conditions before the administration can go forward with 
additional trade ties, including Eximbank support, OPIC, TDA and MFN 
status.
  There would not, as suggested by my colleagues, be any savings to the 
American taxpayer. These activities, basically, are to provide 
assistance to American businesses which are now competing for business 
in Vietnam. These programs carry with them their own conditions on when 
they can be utilized, and there is, in my judgment, no reason to delay 
at this point the opportunities to obtain, through better contact, 
information from Vietnam by allowing American businesses who are there 
competing for the opportunities in a growing market to go further.
  I believe that the demonstrated activities, the demonstrated efforts 
by the Vietnamese have justified the President's announcement on the 
signing of the relationship agreement with Vietnam that the conditions 
are being complied with.
  That does not make sense. It would only have the impact of keeping 
United States firms from being competitive with their European, 
Japanese, and Taiwanese competitors. It will do nothing to help the MIA 
search.
  All of these programs carry requirements that must be met in terms of 
human rights certifications, labor certifications, and so forth. It 
does not make sense to add additional requirements.
  Certainly we need to keep pressure on the Vietnamese Government to 
help us with the MIA search, and certainly we need to keep pressure on 
them to improve human rights.
  However, it only makes sense to increase bilateral ties, increase 
trade ties, and have as many Americans over there. That increased 
contact is the best thing we can do to influence their conduct.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, as a cosponsor, I rise in support of the 
amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Smith.
  Mr. President, I would like to recognize the distinguished Senator 
from New Hampshire for his tireless efforts on behalf of the families 
of American POW's and MIA's. As a Vietnam veteran, he has always kept 
first in his 

[[Page S 13941]]
concern the fate of those American men and women who never returned 
from this most divisive of all of our wars.
  This amendment puts aside the controversies over President Clinton's 
decision to grant full diplomatic relations to the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. Rather, this amendment simply says that Vietnam will not 
receive most favored nation trading status, or other trade benefits 
until the President reports to Congress that Vietnamese officials are 
fully meeting United States expectations on the POW/MIA issue.
  I would like to emphasize that the criteria the President would have 
to certify are drawn directly from the President's own past statements 
on the strict standards he would use for judging whether the Vietnamese 
have indeed been entirely cooperative in achieving the fullest possible 
accounting of America's MIA's.
  We all have the same goal, which is to achieve the fullest possible 
accounting for those Americans who did not return from Vietnam. But the 
families and loved ones of those Americans are not able to so easily 
put this issue behind them. They have a need to know; they have a right 
to know.
  And that leads to what I believe this issue is all about: that is, 
what does this nation stand for? My personal belief is that a basic 
principle is at stake here.
  What America is all about requires us to keep our faith with the 
families of those who remain missing and who are unaccounted for from 
the Vietnam war. This argues for using the leverage we have to ensure 
the greatest possible accounting for these missing Americans.
  To this end, the United States has already come half way. Indeed, we 
have come more than half way.
  In just the past 19 months, the United States lifted its economic and 
trade embargo, permitting full trade relations and investment by U.S. 
companies in the country. In addition, we reached an accord with 
Vietnam settling property claims between our two governments; we have 
established in Hanoi a United States liaison office staffed by American 
diplomats and functioning as a lower-level diplomatic presence; we have 
signed a diplomatic agreement protecting United States citizens who may 
reside in or travel to Vietnam; and we have established full diplomatic 
relations with Vietnam.
  For years the Government of Vietnam refused to provide even the 
slightest assistance in resolving these MIA cases. Vietnam only began--
grudgingly--to assist in accounting for these missing Americans when 
the country lost its patron with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  In the words of the American Legion, ``Vietnam's cooperation on the 
resolution of the POW/MIA issue has not fulfilled reasonable 
expectations.'' The National League of Families of American Prisoners 
and Missing in Southeast Asia has also criticized those, ``commending 
Vietnam for full POW/MIA cooperation despite evidence to the 
contrary.''
  In fact, the league has noted that actions the United States already 
took leading up to the President's normalization decision have, 
``signaled Vietnam that unilateral actions on their part are not 
expected nor required to achieve their political and economic 
objectives.''
  And since the President ended the United States embargo on Vietnam, 
only eight Americans who were captured or became missing in action in 
North Vietnam have been accounted for.
  I believe that we should have been more insistent in using the 
considerable leverage we have with Vietnam--leverage that we are in 
danger of throwing away if this amendment is not approved. Vietnam is 
anxious to establish close economic and political ties to the United 
States as a counter-weight to China, its traditional rival to the 
north.
  But to me, and I believe to most Americans, full cooperation in 
accounting for our remaining MIA's should have been an absolute 
threshold that Vietnam was required to meet before we took the final 
step of rewarding the Vietnamese Government with a full United States 
trade relations.
  The only step remaining is the granting of full trading relations to 
Vietnam. I believe that the status of our relations with Vietnam are 
still too new and too uncertain for such a precipitous step. Granting 
this final concession now is simply too great a risk, given continuing 
grave uncertainties about the true level of Vietnamese knowledge about 
the fate of the many of the Americans who never returned.
  And the POW/MIA issue does remain in question. The names of 58,196 
Americans have been etched into the reflective walls of the Vietnam 
Veteran's Memorial. Listed with them, each marked with a simple cross, 
are the names of 2,205 Americans still unaccounted for in Vietnam. This 
means that for every 25 young Americans who gave their life in Vietnam, 
an additional American simply disappeared and was never heard from 
again.
  A much more reasonable approach, I believe, is the approach proposed 
by the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Smith. The Smith amendment 
would ensure that our duty and obligation as a nation is fully met to 
our MIA's and their families before we in the U.S. Senate endorse full 
trade relations between our two countries.
  I urge adoption of the Smith amendment, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. The hour of 7 o'clock will momentarily arrive. I know the 
Senate is under a UC to go into certain business.
  I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed for no longer 
than 3 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I will be very, very brief. There are 
times when many of us have been prompted to come to the Senate floor in 
order to solicit action from the Congress on the basis that the 
President was not doing something or we were engaged in a bad policy. 
But, as my colleagues on the other side of the aisle know--and I know 
the Senator from Arizona has followed this as closely as anybody in the 
Senate--the President has been pursuing a very deliberate, very 
careful, very cautious strategy with respect to Vietnam and, step by 
step, has guaranteed that they are cooperating fully in the process of 
accountability.
  We have heard these arguments before. Each year, when we have heard 
these arguments, we have seen irrefutable proof that Vietnam is 
cooperating to the best of our military commander's judgment, to the 
best of the judgment of the people in the field.
  I would think most of my colleagues would feel that this is really an 
excessive intrusion on the part of the Congress, an unwarranted 
intrusion into the legitimate powers of the President, and at a time 
when there is nothing that suggests that anything but a careful and 
deliberative accounting process is going on.
  Finally, there is language in this particular amendment which is so 
unspecific, nonspecific, as to open a Pandora's box of capacity for 
really an imprecision that allows nobody to know exactly what documents 
we are asking for, and precisely who has them. I say that based on my 
knowledge of this issue, at this point, there is no knowledge that they 
even exist. So we, once again, begin chasing one of the mythical 
dragons. I think it is unnecessary. I associate myself with the 
comments of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the yeas 
and nays have been ordered on the Smith amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I suggest that we vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] is 
absent due to illness.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] would vote ``nay.''
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden], and 

[[Page S 13942]]
  the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller] are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 39, nays 58, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 453 Leg.]

                                YEAS--39

     Abraham
     Brown
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Dorgan
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     Moseley-Braun
     Nickles
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--58

     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Harkin
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Simpson
     Specter

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Biden
     Hatfield
     Rockefeller
  So the amendment (No. 2723) was rejected.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BROWN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2708

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I believe the next item on the agenda is 
the debate scheduled on the Brown amendment. I would like at this time 
to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Washington.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senate that on the Brown 
amendment No. 2708, there will be 5 hours of debate equally divided, 
and the Senator from Colorado yields to the Senator from Washington, 
[Mr. Gorton].
  The Senator from Washington.
  Mr. GORTON. I thank the Chair.
  I appear here this evening to add my voice to my vote in supporting 
the amendment of the Senator from Colorado. Much, perhaps all, that 
needs to be said on this issue has already been said, but I believe it 
important that there be more voices than the handful that have spoken 
out so far.
  The Senator from Colorado has pointed out that in spite of the 
policies of the United States, Pakistan has continued to be a friend 
and an ally of the United States, has helped the United States when we 
were involved in assisting rebels in Afghanistan, has helped the United 
States in connection with the return of fugitives fleeing justice here 
in this country, has moved in spite of great difficulties more and more 
toward a democratic system and toward a system based on free market 
economies.
  As the Senator from Colorado has pointed out, in a very difficult 
part of the world, this nation has helped in the pursuit of peace and 
security and stability.
  I should like to say that in the most profound sense, as we deal with 
this issue, that friendship and that assistance is almost irrelevant. 
This debate in this body at least is not so much about Pakistan and 
India as it is about the United States, its administration, and this 
body.
  Mr. President, a great nation honors its commitments. This Nation has 
repudiated its commitments and should reverse its course of action and 
embrace that part of honor once again. This Nation permitted the 
manufacture and sale to Pakistan of certain military aircraft. They 
have been bought and paid for, and yet for years we have not only 
denied the right of the purchaser to take possession of those aircraft, 
we have added insult to injury by not showing our willingness, having 
set this policy, to pay back the purchase price and in fact are 
demanding from Pakistan payment for storage charges for the aircraft.
  That is not the action of an honorable country. That is not the 
action of a nation which keeps its commitments. I strongly suspect that 
the Senator from Colorado would prefer simply that we keep our original 
agreement. He has not gone so far. He has simply suggested that those 
items of military equipment that are owned by Pakistan that are here 
for repair, which have also effectively been confiscated by the actions 
of our Government, be returned to Pakistan and that in the most modest 
possible way of dealing with the aircraft, they be sold to third 
parties and the proceeds of those sales be returned to the nation which 
has paid for them.
  I wish we were voting on a more decisive action, Mr. President. I 
have that wish not so much because of a strong opinion on the rivalry 
between India and Pakistan as I do to remove this blot from our own 
record. As I said earlier, an honorable nation keeps its commitments. 
We have not kept our commitments. We should do so to the extent 
required by this amendment.
  Mr. PRESSLER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me time?
  Mr. GLENN. I yield the Senator 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized 
for 20 minutes.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, let me give a little history of how this 
amendment came about, if I may be allowed to do so.
  In the mid 1980's, the Carter administration had shut off aid to 
Pakistan because of their alleged nuclear activities. In about 1985, 
there was an amendment in the Foreign Relations Committee known as the 
Cranston amendment which would have legally shut off aid to Pakistan. 
The Reagan administration at that time asked me to offer an amendment 
to the Cranston amendment which would allow Pakistan to get money. The 
amendment said that Pakistan would receive United States aid money and 
buy military aircraft, and so forth, so long as the President could 
certify that they did not have a nuclear weapon.
  Now, under the terms of that agreement, Vice President Bush at that 
time and others were promised by the Pakistanis that they were not 
developing a nuclear weapon and that the so-called Pressler amendment 
would never come into effect. Indeed, until 1990, Pakistan received aid 
and received military equipment and there was military sales.
  Then, in 1990, then President Bush, who had been Vice President at 
the original time we worked this out, was President and his 
administration could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have a 
nuclear weapon. So, in other words, President Bush concluded that 
Pakistan had not told the truth and it was buying arms under false 
premises.
  That is the twist to this debate which seems to have been forgotten. 
Originally, Pakistan supported the Pressler amendment. Originally, the 
Pressler amendment was a means to help Pakistan get money and to buy 
arms provided that she was not developing a nuclear weapon.
  That seems to have been forgotten in this whole debate, because we 
talk about countries' honor and countries' decency, and so forth. There 
are many twists to this story regarding the Pressler amendment. Since 
1990, each year our CIA with our technical means of assessment has 
concluded that Pakistan does, indeed, have a nuclear weapon, although 
Pakistan has continued to deny that, although on one or two occasions 
their top generals have said that that is true.
  Another complex thing in this whole matter is that there seems to be 
two distinct governments in Pakistan. And let me say, first of all, I 
like Pakistan. I have been to Pakistan several times.
  I want our country to be friends with Pakistan. I have been up to the 
Khyber Pass. I know that Pakistan has been our ally and Pakistan has 
done a great deal for and with the United States, and we have done a 
great deal for Pakistan. I want to be friends with India and Pakistan 
in the long run. I think China is driving the nuclear weapons race over 
there, basically. And China 

[[Page S 13943]]
really is the country we should be worried about. So I am not here to 
beat up on Pakistan or to criticize it.
  But I would also say that I have had some good talks with the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan about trying to get this resolved. The problem is 
that it is the Pakistani military who really makes the decisions, I 
think, on the issue of nuclear weapons and on whether or not they 
possess them. So that is how we have gotten to where we are today.
  Now, it is proposed that we are somehow guilty or we have done 
something wrong as a nation. But Pakistan purchased these planes while 
knowing very well that they were developing nuclear weapons, knowing 
very well that we had a law against it, knowing very well that they 
would not be able to be delivered if that were discovered. And in 1990 
that was discovered. So there has been kind of a twist put on this 
whole thing that is a reverse twist so to speak.
  Now, Mr. President, the three key powers in the region--Pakistan, 
India, and China--have nuclear weapons programs. A fourth, the renegade 
terrorist state of Iran, will stop at nothing to acquire nuclear 
capability. All are striving to obtain modern delivery systems, such as 
ballistic missiles and aircraft. There also have been credible reports 
that Pakistan has received from Communist China M-11 ballistic missile 
technology. Without question, a nuclear war in South Asia would be 
cataclysmic. The names of the perpetrators, and their accessories, 
would be cursed for a millennium.
  To its credit, Mr. President, the U.S. Senate consistently has taken 
initiatives to promote peace and stability in South Asia--the core of 
that leadership has been the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In 
1985, the committee--under the able leadership of the distinguished 
senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar]--voted to adopt my amendment 
that allowed United States aid to Pakistan to continue as long as the 
President could certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a 
nuclear explosive device--the so-called Pressler amendment.
  Why did the committee take this action? At that time, Pakistan was 
the third largest recipient of United States foreign assistance, 
receiving as much as $600 million annually. Pakistan and its people 
were instrumental in channeling American resources to Afghan rebels as 
they sought to repel Soviet invaders.
  U.S. officials rightly were concerned, however, that government in 
Islamabad at that time was intent on developing a nuclear weapon--a 
course of action clearly not in our national interest.
  I have recounted the events, but the purpose of the Pressler 
amendment was designed to send one message: Nuclear proliferation has a 
price. And if we are going to do what is in the Brown amendment, we are 
accepting nuclear proliferation.
  Now, let me say, Mr. President, I think it is very strange that the 
Clinton administration, with all the things President Clinton and Al 
Gore have said about nonnuclear proliferation, that they would allow 
support for this amendment or they would give support for this 
amendment, because we are excusing nuclear proliferation, we are 
excusing a country that promised us, that made a deal with us, that 
they would not develop a bomb. We are giving them a carte blanche to go 
ahead.
  In fact, a number of Senators believed enough evidence existed to 
verify Pakistan's drive for the bomb, and strong enforcement of United 
States laws that would result in an immediate cutoff of United States 
aid. The Pressler amendment was designed to avoid an immediate United 
States aid cutoff, but reinforce our Nation's policy that it would not 
condone--through United States taxpayer dollars--Pakistan's drive for 
the bomb. In addition, the Pressler amendment was designed to give 
Pakistan a financial incentive to ensure that its nuclear program 
served a peaceful purpose. In short, the Pressler amendment was 
designed to send one message: Nuclear proliferation has a price.
  Mr. President, those were the key reasons why the U.S. Congress 
adopted the Pressler amendment 10 years ago. It was the right thing to 
do. President Ronald Reagan agreed. So did the Government of Pakistan 
at that time. Let me repeat that: the Government of Pakistan supported 
the Pressler amendment. It gave our Government its assurance that it 
was not pursuing a nuclear bomb program. By supporting the Pressler 
amendment. Pakistan agreed that if it acquired a nuclear explosive 
device, it deserved the penalty of a United States aid cutoff.
  In 1990, President Bush could no longer certify, under the terms of 
the Pressler amendment, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
explosive device. As a result, all United States economic and military 
aid to Pakistan was terminated. Further, a $1.4 billion commercial 
order of military equipment to Pakistan was put on hold.
  Now, Mr. President, it is clear that Pakistan possesses nuclear 
weapons. It is also clear that Pakistan was pursuing a nuclear bomb 
program between 1985 and 1990, despite repeated public assurances that 
it was not. During that time, Pakistan received approximately $3.5 
billion in United States foreign aid. Again, the Government received 
these funds from the American taxpayer in return for its assurance that 
it would not go nuclear. Yet, the reality was that the existing 
government in Pakistan in fact produced nuclear explosive and used the 
American people's money to do it. That was an extraordinary act of 
deception.
  That is the history behind the Pressler amendment. And to borrow the 
words of Abraham Lincoln, we cannot escape history. We cannot escape 
the fact that the United States subsidized Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
program for 5 years after the Pressler amendment became law. We cannot 
escape the fact that Pakistan repeatedly assured its ally, the United 
States, it was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto stood in this building--in the House Chamber--on June 7, 
1989, and stated: ``Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not 
possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our 
policy.'' The opposite was true in each case.
  Mr. President, we cannot escape history.
  We also were given assurances by Pakistan's government regarding the 
level of enrichment of its uranium, foreign nuclear procurement, 
cooperation with communist China, and other related nonproliferation 
issues. In each case, the Government of Pakistan broke its word.
  Thus, despite United States law, despite clear United States policy, 
and despite repeated assurances from its leaders, Pakistan built a 
nuclear weapons program and used American taxpayer dollars to do it.
  Those are the facts. We cannot escape history.
  Yet, we are here today to consider an amendment that ignores history. 
Even worse, if we adopt this amendment, we would be condemning 
ourselves to repeat history. Nothing in the Brown amendment would 
ensure that American taxpayer assistance would not further directly or 
indirectly Pakistan's bomb program. Do any of my colleagues believe we 
should reverse this long-standing United States policy? Should we risk 
once again subsidizing Pakistan's nuclear bomb program with the 
American people's tax dollars? Certainly not. That is the fundamental 
reason why this amendment should be defeated, because that is exactly 
what it would do.
  So, Mr. President, what I am saying to you, in the past, American tax 
dollars directly or indirectly have been used to develop a nuclear bomb 
in Pakistan. The passage of this amendment will allow American 
taxpayers' dollars to be used in that regard again.
  I urge my colleagues to consider the impact of unconditionally 
reversing a fundamental element of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 
policy. I ask my colleagues to consider what signal this amendment 
would send to other nations who play by international non-proliferation 
rules. Frankly, it sends the worst possible message: nuclear 
proliferation pays.
  Mr. President, some years ago I served as chairman of the Arms 
Control Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. We held 
numerous hearings, and we urged other nations to engage in 
nonproliferation policies. We have elaborate schemes and treaties. This 
amendment would leave a big hole and set a terrible precedent for 

[[Page S 13944]]
our nuclear nonproliferation efforts throughout the world.
  Perhaps no issue is more critical to our national security--and the 
security of all people--than nuclear nonproliferation. I agree strongly 
with the Senator from Colorado that we must improve our relations with 
Pakistan. And I would like for us to be friends with Pakistan. I 
consider myself a friend of Pakistan. Very few would disagree. The 
question is: How? My concern here is that our nuclear nonproliferation 
policy will made a sacrificial lamb on the alter of better relations 
with Pakistan.
  The Pressler amendment has achieved a number of successes in the area 
of nuclear nonproliferation. First, through never verified, Pakistan 
claims it has ceased developing weapons grade enriched uranium. Second, 
the threat of Pressler sanctions has deterred a number of states that 
pursued active nuclear weapons research programs in the 1980's, 
including Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa.
  Second, despite what's being said, nuclear nonproliferation does not 
discriminate against Pakistan.
  Pakistan is not the only country that is identified by name for 
nonproliferation sanctions. For years a number of other countries have 
been designated for special controls and sanctions. China has been 
singled out for violations of ballistic missile sanctions. Yet, 
ironically, Pakistan is the only country to receive waivers of United 
States nonproliferation laws in order to receive United States aid. One 
eight occasions, Congress authorized special waivers of United States 
nonproliferation laws just for Pakistan. The Pressler amendment itself 
was effectively a waiver to prevent tougher enforcement of U.S. law. 
Yes, Congress has engaged in special discrimination, but it was 
discrimination in favor of Pakistan, and against all other countries 
that play by international nonproliferation rules.
  In addition, Mr. President let me point out that our relationship 
with India is impacted by United States nonproliferation policy. 
Because of India's unsafeguarded nuclear program, there is no United 
States/Indian agreement for nuclear cooperation. United States military 
cooperation with India is merely consultative. The United States will 
not export certain forms of missile equipment and technology to India 
and any other goods that are related to weapons of mass destruction. It 
is true that United States sanctions have not been invoked against 
India, but that is because India has not violated its commitments under 
United States law. Mr. President, the bottom line is this: in 1985, the 
Government of Pakistan agreed with the United States government that 
future United States aid would be tied to its development of a nuclear 
explosive device. That was Pakistan's contract with America. Pakistan 
understood and accepted the potential price if it development the bomb. 
I believe my friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator Glenn, said it 
best in 1989 when he said: ``There simply must be a cost to 
noncompliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution 
does not lie in voiding the pledge.''
  The Brown amendment proposes that very solution. We are being asked 
to void a portion of this contract by allowing nonmilitary aid to 
resume unconditionally.
  Second, we are being asked to set aside Pakistan's contract with 
America so that the administration can deliver without conditions 
nearly $400 million of United States military equipment previously 
purchased by Pakistan. This package--part of a larger $1.4 billion 
order that included 28 F-16's--includes P-3C Orion antisubmarine 
aircraft, Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles, and engines and parts for 
Pakistan's existing fleet of Cobras and F-16 aircraft, which are 
capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
  Though it supported its 1985 contract with America, the Government of 
Pakistan now argues that we should either return the military equipment 
or pay back Pakistan. In short, we are being asked to honor our 
military contract with Pakistan. The reason why the equipment and the 
funds remain out of Pakistan's hands is because Pakistan was found in 
1990 to have violated its 1985 contract with America. Pakistan knew 
that if the Pressler contract was violated, its military contract would 
be put on hold. I recognize that is a tough deal. Again, nuclear 
proliferation has a price.
  However, I am willing to consider options to compensate Pakistan. In 
fact, I would not oppose using proceeds from a third party sale of any 
of the equipment to reimburse Pakistan. That is a fair approach.
  To his credit, President Clinton took my suggestion to seek a third 
party sale of the 28 F-16 aircraft sought by Pakistan. I commend the 
President. It was a wise move for one simple reason: F-16's are capable 
of carrying a nuclear payload. It would be contrary to the spirit and 
letter of our Nation's nuclear nonproliferation policy for the United 
States to waive a nonproliferation law so that Pakistan could take 
possession of nuclear delivery vehicles.
  That is one of the main reasons why I called for a third party sale 
of the F-16's last May. However, I also stated I would oppose the 
return of any military equipment to Pakistan that would serve to 
undermine our nuclear nonproliferation goals, and add to the current 
instability in the region. That is why I am opposed to the Brown 
amendment.
  The military transfer called for in the Brown amendment is ill-
advised for three key reasons:
  First, it would spark a renewed arms race between Pakistan and India. 
As my colleagues know, P-3's serve a dual function--they are naval 
reconnaissance aircraft with offensive capabilities. The military aid 
package also includes torpedoes and missiles that can be launched from 
a P-3. The P-3's would give Pakistan greater naval surveillance and 
striking capabilities than the aircraft Pakistan currently uses, the 
French-made Atlantique.
  In addition, as the Department of Defense admitted, the F-16 
components in the military package represent a reliability upgrade of 
Pakistan's F-16 aircraft, which are capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons. Given our longstanding policy on nuclear nonproliferation, I 
do not understand why the Clinton administration would seek to improve 
Pakistan's nuclear delivery capability with United States-made 
equipment.
  I recognize that the Senator from Colorado has gone to great lengths 
and made every conceivable effort to reassure his colleagues that this 
military package would not upset the strategic balance between India 
and Pakistan.
  However, the Indian Government assessed this package on all levels--
political, strategic, and diplomatic. It concluded it would have no 
choice but to engage in additional military procurement if this 
transfer goes through. Why should the United States risk a potential 
arms race in an already unstable South Asia?
  Second, the military transfer could inadvertently improve the 
terrorist state of Iran's military capability in the region. According 
to news reports, Iran and Pakistan have been cooperation on nuclear 
weapons research for a decade. Also, Iran and Pakistan have been 
engaged in cooperative military efforts dating back as far as last 
year, when the two countries conducted joint naval maneuvers in the 
Arabian Sea. I was disturbed to learn that a new round of naval 
maneuvers is scheduled later this fall.
  Given this sustained Pakistan-Iran cooperation, the P-3's take on 
added significance. The P-3's surveillance capability would cover the 
entire Arabian Sea and the entire Persian Gulf. The data from this 
extended surveillance--data on the movements of our own Navy in the 
region--surely would be of critical use to Iran as it seeks to extend 
the reach of its naval power.
  Is there anything in the Brown amendment that would require a written 
assurance from Pakistan that the P-3's or any other United States made 
military equipment would not be used to benefit a terrorist country? 
No.
  If that is the case, why would we inadvertently enhance Iran's 
military alliance with Pakistan to the detriment of our own naval 
forces, and our friends and allies in the region? It makes no sense.
  Finally, this transfer sends the worst possible message: nuclear 
proliferation pays.
  In this case, a country that has gone into nuclear proliferation, 
after it agreed with us not to, is being rewarded, and we are supposed 
to have sanctions against countries that have 

[[Page S 13945]]
entered into agreements and broken them. So we are rewarding nuclear 
proliferation in this very move.
  The Clinton administration assured Congress that the United States 
would oppose any commercial military upgrades for Pakistan. This has 
been U.S. policy since 1990. Yet, the proposed transfer would break its 
assurance to Congress in the worst way--by upgrading Pakistan's nuclear 
delivery vehicles--its F-16's. This upgrade is not just a reversal of 
U.S. arms policy, it undermines the very principles of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. It defies logic that the Clinton 
administration would work so valiantly to ratify this treaty and then 
turn around and support a clear violation of that treaty's core 
principles.
  Despite these very disturbing activities, the administration is 
intent on going ahead with the military transfer--one that does not 
achieve one credible United States policy initiative, while undermining 
three vital policies--regional stability in South Asia, containment of 
Iran, and worldwide nuclear nonproliferation.
  Do we have alternatives? Yes. Last week, I called on President 
Clinton to expand this initiative one step further by pursuing the 
third party sale option on all the military equipment sought by 
Pakistan. And as I said with respect to the F-16's, if the 
administration and the Congress wish to use the proceeds from the third 
party sales to reimburse Pakistan, I would not object.
  Mr. President, let me take a moment to discuss the provisions in the 
amendment that would repeal nonmilitary sanctions against Pakistan. My 
colleagues will recall that similar language was offered by my friend 
from Colorado during consideration of the Department of Defense 
authorization bill. These provisions, though seemingly well-intended, 
go too far.
  First, this amendment specifically rewrites the Pressler amendment so 
that the sanctions apply only to military aid. This amounts to an 
unconditional repeal of nonmilitary sanctions against Pakistan. This is 
an extraordinary and far-reaching change that could have serious 
implications.
  In fact, this amendment could be used to aid Pakistan's nuclear bomb 
program. All of us know that scores of nonmilitary items can serve 
military purposes. Pakistan knows that all to well. Let me provide one 
specific example: A story in the McGraw-Hill newsletter NuclearFuel, 
detailed how Pakistan intended to violate a joint venture with Siemens 
AG by using telecommunications equipment as part of a project to 
enhance uranium into bomb grade material. I ask unanimous consent that 
this story be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   [From Nuclear Fuel, Aug. 28, 1995]

       Siemens Venture Believed Used in Pakistan Centrifuge Quest

                            (By Mark Hibbs)

       Departing from company procurement rules, Pakistan in 1991 
     used a national telecommunications joint venture with Siemens 
     AG to try to obtain equipment in Germany that export control 
     officials suspect had been sought instead for gas centrifuge 
     rotor assemblies used to enrich uranium.
       Intelligence sources said that the case is apparently 
     similar to others in which it is believed Pakistan used 
     legitimate businesses to disguise nuclear procurement. 
     Sources said that in the U.S., Pakistan hid nuclear 
     procurement by giving as the end use a bona fide Pakistan-
     U.S. program to supply equipment to maintain Pakistan's fleet 
     of F-16 aircraft.
       At issue in the German case are specialized ring magnets 
     that Western officials say Pakistan has repeatedly sought 
     from firms in Germany, Britain, and elsewhere in Europe since 
     the mid-1980s for its clandestine uranium enrichment program.
       The top magnetic suspension bearing of gas centrifuges 
     built by Pakistan at its Kahuta enrichment plant features a 
     pair of ring magnets. The upper magnet is suspended in a 
     housing containing oil that is resistant to the highly 
     corrosive uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas fed through 
     centrifuges. The other magnet is fitted to the top end cap of 
     the rotor assembly.
       According to Western officials, the Pakistan Embassy in 
     Bonn, on behalf of Telephone Industries of Pakistan (PVT) 
     Ltd., in early 1991 sought ring magnets from the firm 
     Magnetfabrik Bonn (MFB) GmbH. But German experts suspected 
     that the technical specifications given for the magnets did 
     not match the non-nuclear end use cited by the Pakistan firm, 
     and MFB blocked the transfer of the magnets after discussing 
     the matter with German export control authorities. The export 
     had initially been approved by Germany.
       Telephone Industries of Pakistan is a joint venture between 
     Siemens and Pakistan's national post, telephone, and 
     telegraph (PTT) organization, and is located in Haripur, 
     Pakistan. Siemens controls 30.02% of the venture. The 
     government-owned Pakistan PTT owns 69.98%.
       According to Reiner Schoenrueck, a Siemens spokesman, the 
     Pakistan joint venture makes equipment, including telephones, 
     for digital communications systems. Queried by NuclearFuel, 
     he reported that Telephone Industries is authorized to 
     independently purchase equipment locally in Pakistan. ``But 
     any equipment which Telephone Industries wants in Germany 
     must be obtained through Siemens itself,'' Schoenrueck said, 
     not by the Pakistan government or by officials at the 
     venture's office in Haripur.
       NuclearFuel has learned that regardless of these 
     procurement guidelines, Telephone Industries of Pakistan 
     recently renewed independent efforts to order magnet parts in 
     Germany. Current attempts are said to involve items having 
     different specifications than magnets ordered on its behalf 
     in 1991. Sources said the Pakistan firm has given non-nuclear 
     engineering end uses, such as motors and power equipment, for 
     items it now seeks.
       In March 1991, Azmat Ullah, an official at the Pakistani 
     Embassy in Bonn, first made contact with MFB on behalf of 
     Telephone Industries of Pakistan to obtain so-called 
     aluminum-nickel-cobalt (Alnico)-260 S-ring magnets. Officials 
     said that, after Pakistan provided a non-critical end use for 
     the magnets, an export permit was awarded by Germany.
       However, sources said that in late 1991, after the permit 
     was awarded but before the magnets were exported, the 
     manufacturer became aware of the potential use of ring 
     magnets containing cobalt in gas ultracentrifuges. The 
     company then contacted the Federal Economics Office, now the 
     Federal Export Control Office (BAFA) in
      Eschborn, responsible for export controls, and the export 
     authorization to Pakistan was rescinded.
       Section 0201/2.D of Germany's commodity control list, valid 
     in 1991 when the export was approved, required express 
     authorization for complete magnet assemblies only: ``Liquid-
     damped magnetic bearings, made of ring magnets, which are 
     mounted in a housing containing a damping medium. The magnet 
     is mounted on a rotor end cap pole piece or coupled to a 
     second magnet.'' According to a spokesman at BAFA, the export 
     to Pakistan of magnets not conforming precisely to these 
     specifications would have been approved provided no 
     ``knowledge'' was available that the equipment would be used 
     in weapons of mass-destruction or that the peaceful end use 
     was ``implausible.''
       Western officials said the parts MFB was to make for 
     Pakistan did not fall within 0201/2.D so the export was 
     initially approved. Officials said, however, that the German 
     firm later doubted the peaceful end use given by Pakistan 
     after Pakistan specified that the magnets must feature 
     unusually fine machining tolerances and a capability to 
     withstand exceedingly high rotating speeds.
       Pakistan had first indicated that Telephone Industries 
     sought magnets sized at 52 millimeters in diameter and 8 mm 
     in height, with a ring thickness of 36 mm. It later specified 
     a precise diameter of 52.8 mm and a thickness of 36.8 mm and 
     defined fine tolerance requirements in the range of a few 
     hundredths of millimeters.
       Azmat Ullah, the Pakistan government employee who sought 
     the ring magnets for Telephone Industries of Pakistan, was 
     listed in the official German register of foreign diplomats 
     for 1991 and 1992 as an attache in the commercial section of 
     the Pakistan Embassy. He left Germany in 1993. According to 
     diplomatic sources, the Pakistani attache had been involved 
     in previous attempts to obtain material in Germany for 
     Pakistan's centrifuge program before he sought the ring 
     magnets. Sources said that in 1985, for example, Ullah had 
     been responsible at the embassy for ordering centrifuge-grade 
     maraging steel produced by Arbed Saarstahl, a German 
     specialty steel producer. The steel is believed to have been 
     intended for making centrifuge rotor tubes for Kahuta.
       In early 1992, after the planned magnet export to Pakistan 
     was stopped, MFB alerted other German magnet-producing firms, 
     including subsidiaries of Krupp AG and Thyssen AG, about the 
     intended transaction. In addition to stopping the export from 
     MFB to Pakistan by withdrawing the permit, BAFA also blocked 
     transfer of the ring magnets to Pakistan from all other 
     German firms.


                   no critical magnet deal with iran

       Contrary to previous non-official reports asserting that 
     German firms contributed recently to an Iranian program to 
     develop gas centrifuges, MFB, which was solicited without 
     success by Pakistan to obtain ring magnets, never supplied 
     any critical magnets or magnetic equipment to Iran, company 
     officials said.
       According to customs intelligence documents obtained by 
     NuclearFuel, the Sharif University of Technology in
      Tehran has tried to obtain nuclear-related equipment from 
     firms in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, including 
     equipment meant to be used for a 

[[Page S 13946]]
     centrifuge development program (NF, 28 March '93, 10). On the basis of 
     this information, BAFA will not award export permits for 
     any equipment destined for end use at Sharif University. 
     But the Zollkriminalamt (ZKA), Germany's customs 
     investigative agency, denies that any German firms have 
     exported equipment to Iran's nuclear program over the last 
     10 years (NF, 10 April '94, 5).
       Herbert Krosney, author of the book ``Deadly Business,'' 
     claimed that Sharif University approached MFB for Alnico 
     centrifuge magnets and that the German firm ``received a 
     substantive order from Iran.''
       MFB said this month that the statement is false. It 
     asserted that the company never agreed to transact any Alnico 
     centrifuge magnet business with Iran and that MFB was never 
     contacted by Sharif University for any business. Since 1993, 
     MFB has sold some ferritic magnets to Iran. They were not, 
     BAFA ruled, useful for uranium enrichment.
       In the wake of information it obtained alleging that MFB 
     had been involved in violations of export rules, Western 
     intelligence sources said, the Oberfinanzdirektlon in 
     Cologne, a customs investigation arm of the Federal Ministry 
     of Finance, searched the MFB premises in 1990, one year 
     before Pakistan attempted to obtain ring magnets from the 
     Bonn company.
       According to a statement that company management provided 
     to employees, however, no violations were found and the 
     firm's conduct was judged ``exemplary.''
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, this is just one example. The fact is 
Pakistan built its current bomb program in part from seemingly 
nonmilitary transactions. Further, in February 1993, then-CIA Director 
James Woolsey described for the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs how untied and seemingly nonmilitary loans and grants could 
further Pakistan's nuclear program.
  Does the Brown amendment require Pakistan to make written and 
verifiable assurances that seemingly nonmilitary aid will not aid 
directly or indirectly its bomb program? No.
  Again, Mr. President, we cannot escape history. We once before 
inadvertently aided Pakistan's bomb program. Now, with this open-ended, 
unconditional repeal of a portion of the Pressler amendment, we are 
setting ourselves up to make the same mistake yet again. Why would we 
once again put American taxpayers in the position of aiding Pakistan's 
bomb program?
  Further, let me correct for the record a serious misperception of the 
Pressler amendment. Some have argued that we need this amendment so 
that we can provide vital civic and humanitarian assistance to 
Pakistan. We already can provide that assistance. Current law permits 
United States aid to Pakistan through nongovernmental organizations in 
a wide range of areas, including agriculture and rural development, 
nutrition, human rights, endangered species, and illicit narcotics 
prevention. Pakistan also continues to receive annually hundreds of 
millions of dollars in development assistance via multilateral lending 
agencies to which the United States is a major contributor. The Brown 
amendment goes beyond even a limited approach, and again would do so 
without requiring a single nuclear concession from Pakistan.
  Mr. President, I strongly respect and admire my friend from Colorado. 
He sincerely is interested in trying to find ways to improve our 
relations with Pakistan and improve the conditions for the entire 
Indian subcontinent. I commend him for proposing a U.S.-led 
multilateral summit designed to reduce the presence of nuclear weapons 
in South Asia. I would support such a summit. It represents a more 
constructive first-step toward what I hope is the elimination of the 
nuclear threat from South Asia.
  But, in this case, we are not moving toward nonproliferation with 
this particular amendment. We cannot escape history, and I have 
outlines that history of the Pressler amendment, of which there is much 
misunderstanding.
  Beyond that, my friend from Colorado and I disagree on how best to 
approach the vexing problems in South Asia. We also need to keep in 
mind the question of United States--India relations. For more than 40 
years, our relations with the world's most populous democracy were 
difficult, dictated largely by cold war conventional wisdom. Since 
1991, our relations have improved markedly. India's economy is 
undergoing a remarkable transformation, fueled by a nearly five-fold 
increase in foreign investments from 1990 to 1994. More than one-third 
of those investments were from American firms. It is my hope that 
Pakistan can enjoy similar progress in the near future. Economic growth 
for both countries is the key to long-term regional stability.
  One of the lessons of our improved relationship with India is that 
our actions have a clear impact on Indian public opinion. That 
certainly is the case in Pakistan as well. Given this impact, I believe 
that we must pursue our policies in South Asia with great care and 
great caution. We must ensure that we do not unnecessarily return to 
the previous, unproductive levels of our relationship. We also must 
ensure that we do not unnecessarily fuel the already strong tensions 
that exist in the region.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, I must repeat yet again, we cannot 
escape history--both the history behind us and before us. The history 
we make today not only will determine the history of tomorrow, but will 
determine how well we comprehended the hard lessons of history. The 
Brown amendment is a grim reminder to all of us that those who try to 
escape history are condemned to relive it. I cannot allow that to 
happen. We must not ask the American taxpayer to subsidize a bomb 
program we cannot condone. Nor do we need ask the American taxpayer to 
subsidize an arms race in South Asia, or the military ambitions of a 
terrorist state.
  Last year, the President states that no single foreign policy issue 
was more important than nuclear nonproliferation. If that is the case, 
there is no justifiable reason why Pakistan once again must be exempt 
from Federal nonproliferation laws or the nonproliferation policies we 
impose on all other signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  Let us give Pakistan some concrete incentives to honor its word.
  Let us not reward proliferation.
  Since we cannot escape history, let us learn constructively from it.
  I urge the defeat of the Brown amendment. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.


                 Action on Amendment No. 2721 Vitiated

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the 
action on amendment No. 2721. It is my understanding this has been 
cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment no. 2708

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDENT OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. Brown. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota 
has raised a number of important points. I will not try to deal with 
all of them right now, but I do think it is important to respond.
  First, let me commend the Senator for his leadership in this area. 
While we disagree on the particular resolutions of these contract items 
that have been in dispute for a number of years, I think his efforts 
toward nonproliferation and his sincerity and hard work in the area are 
to be commended and reflect great credit on the American psyche in 
dealing with foreign policy.
  Mr. President, there are a couple of things that I think are 
important to look at, though, that I hope Members will consider.
  First of all, statements were made that the amendment is 
unconditioned and open-ended repeal. Mr. President, I think he was 
referring to parts of it. But I sincerely believe that is not a fair 
description of what is anticipated here.
  First of all, let me emphasize what the amendment does not do. It 
does not, in any way, repeal the restriction on military aid or 
military sales to Pakistan. There are a couple of areas that are 
clarified, though, and let me be specific about that. The bars and 
restrictions on aid and sales stay in place. We do a couple of things 
here. One, we make it clear that parts that had been sent--military 
parts--to the United States for repair and had never been repaired were 
be shipped back to them. These are used parts that were not 
functioning. I suppose we can insist on keeping those used parts here, 
but it seemed like that should be sent back. I do not think that is an 
open-ended repeal. That is a disposition of parts that 

[[Page S 13947]]
have been around for a long time and they are sent back unrepaired.
  Second, we deal with contracts that are 8 and 9 years old that have 
been paid for. We allow three-fourths of them--or almost three-fourths 
of them--to have their money back and not get delivery of the planes. 
Those are the things that all of the people in the area have looked at 
and say are the most inflammatory--that is, the F-16. We allow delivery 
of $368 million of military equipment. Those are on contracts that were 
executed before the 1990 action under the Pressler amendment.
  Mr. President, what this issue is all about is simply and solely 
saying you are either going to get your money back, or you are going to 
get the parts back, or you are going to get the things you contracted 
for. It is simple fairness. We signed a contract to sell military 
equipment. We have not delivered on it. We have taken their money, and 
we have refused both to give them their money back and/or deliver on 
our contract.
  All we are trying to do with this is make it clear that we ought to 
either give them their money back or give them what they contracted 
for. The compromise, I suppose, somebody could criticize. This was 
worked out by the President. I do not think the President or the 
administration claims it is perfect, nor do I.
  Mr. President, I do know that the planes amount to almost three-
fourths of the entire package. The planes are the things that almost 
every critic I know of says is the most inflammatory and significant 
part of the package, and the planes are not delivered. The other parts 
of the package--and we already quoted from experts that indicate that 
these are not significant in terms of the military balance of the area. 
We have already pointed out that India enjoys a two-to-one advantage.
  Mr. President, there is another item that I think ought to be at 
least quoted at this point. The suggestion was that we are already in 
the process of delivering aid to Pakistan and that it is not necessary 
to have this amendment. The suggestion was that NGO's are authorized 
under aid to Pakistan. Indeed, we have NGO's allowed to conduct 
activity in Pakistan right now. It is on temporary authority, and that 
authority is on a 1-year waiver and that waiver is not renewed and it 
runs out. So as far as NGO's being able to operate in the country and 
deliver aid, which they have talked about, the point is that the facts 
are exactly the opposite of what was said on the floor. The NGO's are 
not going to be able to do that. We need this legislation to be able to 
involve ourselves with Pakistan, and this is to our benefit. I have yet 
to hear anyone say that cooperating with the Pakistanis in the 
suppression of the narcotics trade is not to our benefit. It clearly is 
in our benefit. Cooperating with the Pakistanis in this is in our 
benefit. So both of those points do not hit the mark.
  Let me put a few things in the Record, and I will try and do it 
briefly. I want to quote the Assistant Secretary of State, who 
responded to the committee's questions.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
  Mr. BROWN. I yield myself 5 additional minutes.
  This is what our Assistant Secretary of State said when asked about 
the Pakistan question, and particularly why we have been involved in 
assistance to Pakistan. That was certainly raised by the Senator. I 
will have more to say about this later. But I want to quote the 
Assistant Secretary of State on that question of why we aided Pakistan:

       Pakistan undertook substantial risks as our partner in an 
     effort to stand up to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan 
     during the 1980's. Intrusions into Pakistan airspace by 
     Soviet war planes were common. On several occasions, Soviet 
     military aircraft actually bombed Pakistani facilities along 
     the border in retaliation for Pakistan's assistance to the 
     mujaheddin. I might say it was assistance to us in helping to 
     liberate Afghanistan.

  She continues:

       Pakistan was also a target of Scud missiles. During the 
     period, the Soviets also initiated numerous covert actions 
     against the government of Pakistan, including actions aimed 
     at destroying caches of munitions and arms in Pakistan.

  Mr. President, this is what Pakistan put on the line. They risked 
their very existence, they risked military attacks from one of the 
strongest military powers in the world, the Soviet Union. They did it 
at our request.
  She continues:

       During the Soviet occupation, 5 million Afghan refugees 
     flooded into Pakistan. With the help of the international 
     community, Pakistan provided food and shelter for the 
     refugees. Many remain in Pakistan because of the unsafe 
     conditions in Afghanistan.

  To suggest that our aid had nothing to do with the 5 million refugees 
that came in, I believe, ignores the facts.
  She continues:

       Finally, there were widespread fears that the Soviet Union 
     did not intend to stop its expansion into the Afghan border 
     with Pakistan. Many in Pakistan believe that an accommodation 
     with the Soviets was called for and the government was under 
     pressure to follow such a course.

  Mr. President, imagine what would happen if the Government of 
Pakistan--which has been so maligned in the discussions on this issue 
in this Chamber--would have acceded to people in their country to make 
an accommodation with the Soviet Union. It is not just the Afghans that 
would not have an opportunity for freedom today, it is a great many 
more people in the world.
  Mr. President, she concluded her response to that question by this 
statement:

       The primary purpose of U.S. military and economic 
     assistance to Pakistan during this period was to help 
     Pakistan manage these risks and burdens.

  Mr. President, the suggestion that the reason Pakistan got military 
aid and assistance during this period was solely to stop the 
development of nuclear weapons I do not believe is accurate. It 
certainly does not square with this. I do think it is accurate, as 
Members pointed out, that that was an interest of the United States at 
the time, that it was hoped that would be a reaction of the Pakistanis. 
But to say that is the reason for their aid, I do not think that 
squares with the history and with the statement of the Assistant 
Secretary of State.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and retain the remainder of my time.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. 
Exon] is recognized.
  Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from Ohio. Were it not for the fact that 
I have made a commitment to go to an affair elsewhere in the Capital 
City, I would stay and become involved in this debate. I am going to be 
very brief because others here will go into the matter in more detail.
  I simply say, Mr. President, that while a case can be made that we 
need improved relations with Pakistan, from the information that I 
have, the proliferation arrangement and laws of the United States of 
America have been violated by arrangement, among others, of shipments 
of materiel from China to Pakistan. I simply say that while we can make 
excuses, and while we can say that we need the cooperation of Pakistan 
with regard to drugs and terrorism, which I agree with, the fact of the 
matter is that the laws of the United States have been violated.
  An official of the Clinton administration called me and asked me to 
support the Brown amendment. I asked that individual was it not true 
that the laws had been violated, but the administration, working with 
the majority in the U.S. Senate, are simply going to wink at that and 
say, it is OK.
 It is OK. We are going to make this exception to make them happy.

  It seems to me we are setting a precedent here. I do not believe my 
voice or the voice of others is going to change the vote, but as well 
intentioned as the amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado is, 
it is a mistake. It is a mistake entered into by the Clinton 
administration. They are wrong, in my opinion. I state that as clearly 
as I can.
  What they are doing in this particular case, Mr. President, is simply 
to offer an alibi to try to soothe the Government of Pakistan.
  If our laws with regard to proliferation are going to mean anything, 
then we have to recognize that both Pakistan and China should be 
subject to the laws that we enacted in the Congress of the United 
States and cannot be winked at.
  I object to the fact that the Clinton administration is winking, 
going back 

[[Page S 13948]]
on the laws that we have in our land. I think that is a mistake, Mr. 
President.
  I suspect that the Senate is going to make a mistake because I do not 
think 5 hours of debate after most people have gone home is going to 
change any minds.
  I simply back the position of Senator Glenn and Senator Levin, both 
associates of mine from long standing on the Armed Services Committee. 
I hope that the Senate will come to its senses and do an about face on 
the earlier vote that we had in the Senate on this matter today.
  I thank my friend from Ohio. I thank my friend from Michigan. I thank 
my friend, Senator Feinstein, from California, who I understand is 
going to speak on this. I thank my friend, Larry Pressler of South 
Dakota, who was author, I believe, of the law that we have in place.
  I simply say, Mr. President, this is a mistake. I hope the U.S. 
Senate will reverse course, recognize it is a mistake, notwithstanding 
the pressure that has been brought to bear by the Clinton 
administration to not change the vote.
  Mr. BROWN. Will my good friend from Nebraska yield for a question?
  Mr. EXON. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BROWN. I know the Senator has had a number of people talk to him, 
and I did not know if the Senator was aware of subsection 8 where we 
specifically state, ``Nothing contained herein shall affect sanctions 
for the transfers of missile equipment or technology required under 
section 11(B), the Export Administration Act of 1979, or section 73 of 
the Arms Control Act.''
  In effect, Mr. President, what we do is specifically make it clear 
that the ballistic missile sanctions are in no way affected by this.
  Mr. EXON. I say to my friend from Colorado that I think if we get 
into those kinds of details, we may cloud the central purpose. The 
central purpose of my opposition to this, notwithstanding the strong 
feeling about my friend and associate from the neighboring State of 
Colorado, is that we are violating both the intent and the principles 
of the law that we have in effect with regard to proliferation. 
Therefore, this Senator feels it is a mistake.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. President, I know we want to hear from other speakers, but I did 
want to respond to a very important point that I think the 
distinguished senior Senator from Nebraska made.
  He is concerned about the potential impact of missile sanctions. Mr. 
President, I am concerned about that as well.
  We have added to this amendment exact and specific language that 
makes it very clear that nothing in this amendment in any way 
interferes with the sanctions, should they ever take place.
  Members should rest assured that I am very conscious of that, and we 
have provided specific legislative language to make it quite clear that 
this in no way waives any sanctions with regard to violations of 
missile agreements for U.S. legislation.
  That point has been raised. The fact is, at least in my view, it is 
invalid because we specifically made it clear that this in no way 
interferes with that. Indeed, if they have violated it, they will be 
sanctioned, and they should be sanctioned.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
a statement from our Secretary of State.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, on U.S. National 
                  Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region

       Question: Will the Clinton Administration order additional 
     sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to 
     Pakistan and Iran?
       Secretary Christopher: As I mentioned in my remarks, we are 
     concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly 
     concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor 
     it very carefully and very closely.
       At the present time, although there is a fairly large body 
     of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that 
     would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to 
     assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter 
     carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law 
     in this regard.

  Mr. BROWN. The question was asked, will the Clinton administration 
order additional sanctions against China for supplying missile 
technology to Pakistan or Iran?
  Secretary Christopher said, ``As I mentioned in my remarks, we are 
concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly concerned 
about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor it very carefully and 
closely.''
  Here is what he says: ``At the present time, although there is a 
fairly large body of evidence, we do not think there is evidence there 
that would justify the imposition of sanctions.''
  Mr. President, the point is this: The sanctions are for any violation 
of a missile treaty or missile technology restrictions in U.S. laws. In 
no way does this amendment interfere with those sanctions whatever. As 
a matter of fact, the review of the administration in this area has 
been clear and significant and, if sanctions are justified, they will 
take place.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. GLENN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I thank the 
Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the 
distinguished Senator from Colorado. As the ranking member of the Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, I have worked closely with Senator Brown, the chairman of 
this subcommittee, to try to work toward a more productive United 
States policy in South Asia.
  I respect him and I respect what he is trying to do. However, while 
there are some issues on which we are in agreement, there are many on 
which we differ.
  Let me first say that I echo the statement of the Senator from 
Nebraska by saying that I believe the administration is wrong.
  I have heard two major reasons put forward as to why we should put 
this $368 million of military equipment in Pakistan's hands now. The 
first is, they paid for it, it is the honorable thing to do.
  I agree. I will introduce an amendment which will carry with it Sense 
of Congress language which will say that the President is asked to try 
to sell the F-16's and return as much of the equity payment made by 
Pakistan back to Pakistan as possible. I believe that is the honorable 
thing to do.
  The second thing I have heard is that we have to buttress the Bhutto 
regime. This is what gives me the deepest trouble.
  If there is anybody that believes that one stabilizes or buttresses a 
regime which suffers from instability, in an area where there is a 
tinderbox of hostilities between two countries, and where both 
countries have the ability in a matter of days to have a nuclear 
capacity utilized--I think that is the wrong idea. I could not go to 
sleep at night knowing this equipment went, and that I voted for it, at 
absolutely the wrong time. I will explain in my remarks why I believe 
it is the wrong time.
  Sanctions were invoked against Pakistan in 1990 because President 
Bush could not certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
explosive device.
  Nothing has changed since that time. To this day, neither President 
Bush nor President Clinton has been able to make that certification. 
And today President Clinton cannot make that certification.
  So, despite its remonstrances to the contrary, Pakistan to this day 
continues to develop its nuclear weapons program and has technology 
imported from abroad. And I believe even today Pakistan is engaged in 
developing an indigenous capability to produce nuclear weapons--not to 
have to get the technology from abroad, but to do it right at home.
  As late as a couple of months ago, the Prime Minister of Pakistan 
denied that. That is a problem for me. That is a problem for me, to 
vote for something which I know will be used for one purpose and one 
purpose only, and that is probably to attack a neighbor, when I am told 
an untruth. As Senator Glenn, I believe, will outline, these same 
statements have been made year after year for the past decade.
  So, under these circumstances, I believe it is wholly inappropriate 
for the United States to release to Pakistan 

[[Page S 13949]]
this military equipment. For us to take this step, Pakistan should make 
vast improvements in the area of nonproliferation.
  I believe that Pakistan has acquired M-11 missiles in violation of 
the MTCR. Pakistan is subject to MTCR sanctions. We have alleged that 
China sold these missiles to Pakistan. China is not a signatory to the 
MTCR. Recently, as a product of negotiations with our State Department, 
China has agreed to abide by the MTCR. But Pakistan knows better. They 
are subject to MTCR rules, and every M-11 has inherent nuclear 
capability. Let there be no doubt about that. So, if one looks at both 
India and Pakistan, to add weapons at this time is a big mistake.
  Let me tell you what the Indian Ambassador has told me. What he has 
told me is that he believes that the 28 Harpoon missiles which are part 
of this package, would give Pakistan a standoff capability to which 
India has no immediate response.
  What does this mean? If we do this now, India is a few months before 
an election. It simply fuels the fires within the Indian political 
structure and perhaps prompts them to deploy a missile known as the 
Prithvi, which they have, in response to this. That is a scenario that 
I find inescapable in the transfer of these weapons.
  We can cloak this in any terms we want. But if we know and honestly 
believe that this might be the result of the delivery of these weapons, 
why are we doing it? How can we sleep and do it? The P-3C aircraft can 
launch a Harpoon. The Harpoon also has a surface-to-surface capability. 
The Indians believe the P-3C can carry the Harpoon from Karachi to Sri 
Lanka, so it has the distance.
  There are certain aspects of the Brown amendment that I support. I 
certainly share the view that it is desirable for there to be an 
improvement in the United States-Pakistani relationship. Pakistan is 
strategically located, has a significant population, it is a good 
friend in the Moslem world, it is an emerging democracy in a part of 
the world where we would like to see more democracy.
  As has been said, Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in a 
variety of ways. It is the second largest contributor of troops to U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. I think that is a big deal. Pakistan has been 
prepared to put its troops on the line to keep peace in the world, and 
I, for one, appreciate that.
  It has assisted in our antinarcotics efforts, and it has been helpful 
to U.S. antiterrorism efforts. And it is helpful right now in a very 
terrible and tragic situation in Kashmir, where one American is still 
being held hostage.
  There is certainly room for more cooperation and the kinds of 
nonmilitary assistance which would be allowed to resume under this 
proposal--antiterrorism assistance, antinarcotics assistance, 
immigration control training, environmental and population assistance, 
civil aviation cooperation--would not only build even greater 
cooperation, but they would directly benefit the effort and interests 
of the United States in a range of areas.
  Part of the amendment I will offer will do just that: Take the 
nonmilitary part of Senator Brown's amendment and allow it to go ahead. 
It is my understanding that these types of assistance were never 
envisioned to be cut off at the time that the Pressler amendment was 
adopted, so I see no harm and much good that could come by restoring 
these types of assistance programs to Pakistan.
  I was pleased to cosponsor an amendment with the Senator from 
Colorado in the Foreign Relations Committee to allow this assistance. 
However, I think we need to tread much more carefully when it comes to 
military assistance. Returning Pakistan's broken spare parts is, I 
think, a reasonable gesture of good will--no problem with that. 
Allowing Pakistan to resume its participation in the IMET military 
training course will help rebuild the ties between the United States 
and the Pakistani military, which is important for strategic 
cooperation. But allowing the transfer of the package of equipment 
allowed by this amendment is another story.
  The Pressler amendment sanctions took effect because our Government 
in effect knew that Pakistan was not abiding by earlier agreements made 
with our Government, and commitments made to United States Senators on 
this floor at that time, in the 1980's. They asked for aid contingent 
on them not pursuing nuclear weapons, and then they turned around and 
did just what they said they would not do.
  Pakistan needs to make progress reversing that problem, and I believe 
we would send a dubious message by renewing our supply line to the 
Pakistani military. As I mentioned, the package transferred under this 
proposal would include P-3C surveillance aircraft, capable of providing 
submarine deterrence, which is a major concern to India; the Harpoon 
missiles; the TOW missile launchers; the spare parts for F-16's; and 
other sophisticated equipment.
  It is not a significant enough package to substantially alter the 
military balance in South Asia, but it is a change in the military 
balance of South Asia. Do we want to change the military balance of 
South Asia shortly before a hotly contested election in India, when we 
know major candidates running in that race will be forced to respond? 
They will be forced to respond, and one of the things that has been a 
goal of American foreign policy is to prevent the deployment of the 
Prithvi missile. Instead, we are providing the excuse for the 
deployment of the Prithvi missile, and therefore further escalating and 
heightening tensions between the two countries.
  And there is major tension. There is no subject as sensitive, as 
difficult, on which the sides are more implacable than the Kashmir 
problem. You have seen the worst results of that tension in terms of 
the taking of the hostages, the cutting off of the head of one of them, 
and the rolling of the head down the street. If that does not 
demonstrate what feelings are, I do not know what will.
  So, I know the Clinton administration does not want to prop up 
unstable regimes, does not want to put equipment in the middle of a 
tinderbox, but that is exactly what this does, and there is no way to 
say it does not. It does.
  Anyone who has had the security briefing I think better understands 
the problem.
  So I cannot support a resumption of these arms transfers. The 
greatest threat of nuclear war on the planet today, I believe, rests in 
South Asia and rests between India and Pakistan. India has contributed 
to this tension just as much as Pakistan has. But it is there. It is 
real. It is palpable and it is fueled by a dramatic ongoing debate 
which one country views as a major assault on its territorial 
sovereignty. What else does one need as a precipitant to a 
conflagration?
  So I urge my colleagues to look carefully at this resolution, to look 
carefully at the list of equipment, at the rockets, at the missiles, at 
the parts that are being sent in this $368 million transfer. I hope 
that the Brown amendment might be defeated and that we would have an 
opportunity to put forward an amendment which would carry forth the 
economic and the humanitarian, the antinarcotics and antiterrorism 
portions of Senator Brown's very well-meaning amendment.
  I thank the Chair. I yield my time.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, first of all, I want to say what a great 
pleasure it has been to work with the distinguished Senator from 
California. She is bright and thoughtful and she has been very 
energetic in applying herself to not only the committee work but this 
particular problem. I have found her to be very thorough and very 
sincere in the kind of approach she has taken, I might say also very 
constructive. And I appreciate the fact that she will offer an 
alternative to Members of the Senate to review that will give them some 
choices on this issue.
  I must say as a Member I have found it a bit difficult to discuss the 
issue in trying to develop legislation, which I think is our job as 
legislators, with some Members who simply want to preclude the issue 
from being reviewed or discussed or legislated on and view the right 
way to do it is with a filibuster. I believe reasonable men and women 
can come to a reasonable solution that 

[[Page S 13950]]
is best for our country, and so I welcome her initiatives and I commend 
her on a very thoughtful approach to it.
  Mr. President, I might say my approach all along has been to say, 
look, what is central here is for the United States to be true to 
itself. It is not in character for us to take someone's money for a 
contract and then refuse to return their money or refuse to deliver on 
that contract. What we need to do is either give them their money back 
or give them their equipment that they contracted for but not keep 
both. That I think is simple basic fairness that most Americans would 
agree with. I believe the Senator from California shares that view. She 
does have a different view than I in terms of the package, limited 
package of military equipment that my amendment would deliver.
  Mr. President, I will simply add one other comment at this point. It 
is something of a technical background for Members. I note the 
distinguished Senator from Ohio is here and he has been a leader in the 
Senate, and in the world I might say, in terms of nonproliferation.
  The MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime, has 25 countries--at 
least that is the latest CRS report--that indicate they are not so much 
signers but partners, in the parlance of the CRS, and these partners in 
addition have contacted other countries that do include China, that 
have agreed to abide by their guidelines. Pakistan is not a partner in 
MTCR, and they are not listed by the CRS among the countries that have 
agreed to observe it.
  I believe the MTCR is a very important item here for Members to 
consider. We have statutes that are designed to control this 
technology. The suggestion has been made by some Members, for whom I 
have a great deal of respect, there may have been a violation of this 
statute with regard to China and Pakistan. If that is true, there will 
be severe sanctions. It is very important to know that the amendment 
which is before the Senate in no way waives those sanctions. As a 
matter of fact, it has a separate specific section that makes it 
crystal clear that nothing in this legislation waives those sanctions.
  So should you be concerned about MTCR? Absolutely. But does this 
amendment in any way interfere with MTCR? Absolutely not. In fact, it 
does the opposite. It makes it crystal clear if there are sanctions 
there they have the responsibility to go ahead with them as provided by 
our law.
  Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 15 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my friend from Ohio. And 
also let me commend the Senator from Ohio for the decades of work he 
has put in in the fight against the proliferation both of nuclear 
weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and means of delivery of those 
weapons. It is the missiles particularly which we are talking about 
today, but there are also weapons themselves which are involved in this 
debate, and nobody has worked harder than the Senator from Ohio to try 
to address the proliferation concerns which are the emerging threats to 
this world. The cold war may be over, but the world is a more dangerous 
place in many ways now than it was before. The reason it is more 
dangerous in many ways is because of the threat of nuclear weapons, 
weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, the 
proliferation threat which we face.
  The issue is whether we are going to be serious about them. That is 
really what the Senate is going to decide tomorrow, whether or not we 
are going to be serious about a proliferation issue which is so clear 
that I would urge our colleagues to go up to the fourth floor, as about 
10 of us have, and review the materials. They are there. The charts are 
there. They will be there in the morning. Some of us have had this 
briefing now three times. We can hide our head in the sand and we can 
say, well, gee, maybe there is not a violation of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, which is supposed to be enforced by our 
export control laws, but I think it is pretty difficult to do that 
after the briefings that we have received.
  Now, that is my conclusion. Maybe others can reach different 
conclusions. It is difficult for me to see how any of us can reach a 
different conclusion, but it is more difficult for me to see how we 
would not at least go up to the fourth floor and expose ourselves to 
those materials which are there very clearly for each Member of this 
Senate to see and consider.
  If there is no more serious issue than proliferation--and I do not 
know of too many issues that are more serious--surely it is worth a 
visit to the fourth floor to review the intelligence reports on the 
question of whether or not China has delivered, transferred to Pakistan 
missiles or missile components which exceed the limits which are 
provided for in the Missile Technology Control Regime.
  Now, our good friend from Colorado has given a bunch of reasons that 
we should proceed with the sale of this equipment to Pakistan. Pakistan 
is an ally; that is true. Pakistan has supported common goals in 
Afghanistan; that is true. Of course, it was in their own self-interest 
to pursue those goals, but nonetheless they were common goals and she 
pursued them. Pakistan, indeed, supports multinational peace 
enforcement. So do we.
  I hope it is in her self-interest to do that. But the fact that we 
have a common interest in that is given as a reason for why we should 
proceed with the sale of this nature.
  I think the other point that the Senator from Colorado makes, which 
is one I share, which is that it is not in our character to take folks' 
money and then not deliver the product, I must say in this regard I 
think that the Senator from Colorado is correct, that if equity 
requires that we not allow that money to be kept at the same time that 
the delivery has not been made, then true to ourselves, whatever 
portion of that money equity requires be returned to Pakistan should be 
returned to Pakistan.
  But that is not the issue here tonight either. The Senator from 
California is going to be introducing an amendment tomorrow which will 
take us down that path which is the path of being true to ourselves and 
our laws on exports at the same time living up to a moral obligation to 
be true to ourselves to not take money from folks and not deliver the 
product.
  Now, I believe that the Senator from California's amendment tomorrow 
is going to be worded in such a way that whatever funds equity requires 
be returned to Pakistan, or words to that effect, should be returned to 
Pakistan. And I would be supporting that amendment because that is the 
way we can be true to ourselves in all regard.
  We can make sure that we enforce our laws against proliferation at 
the same time we do not take money which does not belong to us and keep 
money which does not belong to us. But we can do both.
  The issue in this amendment tonight that we are debating, the Brown 
amendment, is whether or not we are going to ignore our law relative to 
the proliferation of missiles by authorizing the shipment of military 
equipment which, if Pakistan received missiles that exceed the limits 
in the missile technology control regime, could not be properly sent to 
Pakistan.
  Now, our law is clear. It is the Arms Export Control Act. The law 
says that sanctions will be applied to those who export, transfer or 
trade in certain areas. And then they refer to the missile technology 
control regime annex. And that missile technology control regime is 
very specific, that if missiles or components of technology have a 
range of more than 300 kilometers and a payload of more than 500 
kilograms, then that is violative of the missile technology control 
regime and then people who export, transfer or trade that type of 
missile or components for those missiles or technologies for those 
missiles will be subject the sanctions. It does not say ``may be 
subject to sanctions,'' by the way. It says the President ``shall 
impose sanctions'' in that event.
  Now, that leaves it up to each of us to reach our own conclusion as 
to whether or not missiles have been transferred to Pakistan which 
exceed those limits. If so, our law does not permit the transfer of the 
equipment which would be allowed under the Brown amendment. Our law 
just simply does not permit that. 

[[Page S 13951]]

  Now, maybe individuals can conclude that the evidence is not clear on 
this issue, that Pakistan has received missiles of this range and 
payload. And if an individual, a Member of the Senate, can go up to the 
fourth floor and reach that conclusion, it seems to me they could then 
support the Brown amendment. But I would urge Members to do that. I 
have done that now twice. I have had a third briefing on top of that. I 
cannot in good conscience reach any conclusion such as that, or come 
close to it. It is not even, to me, a close question.
  I think in order for a person to conclude anything other than what I 
have concluded would require absolutely closing one's eyes to the 
extraordinarily clear evidence on this subject. What is that evidence? 
We are not allowed to describe that on the Senate floor. It is 
classified. We can describe our own conclusions, and we have. We can 
urge our colleagues to go and review that evidence--it does not take 
long--and reach their own conclusions, which surely our colleagues I 
believe should do. But the issue here is so important. It is a 
proliferation issue that it is incumbent upon those of us who have seen 
that briefing to urge our colleagues tomorrow morning, prior to the 
vote, to take a few minutes and go up and look at those materials in 
room S-407.
  Now, our good friend from Colorado--I must commend him for a lot of 
reasons--he has applied an intellectual acumen to this matter as well 
as his own great spirit which makes it always difficult for those of us 
who disagree with him to disagree with him, because he is a man of 
great reason and a man of great integrity. He has pointed out in his 
amendment that it specifically says that ``nothing contained herein 
shall affect sanctions for transfers of missile equipment or technology 
required under section 11B.'' And that language is indeed in his 
amendment.
  The problem is that his amendment does affect sanctions. The words in 
section 8 which I just read, which says nothing shall affect sanctions, 
are the words. But actions speak louder than words. The action part of 
this amendment is earlier in the amendment when it says that military 
equipment, ``other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan 
pursuant to contracts for cases entered into before October 1, 1990.'' 
So the words in subsection (h) which say that ``nothing contained 
herein shall affect sanctions'' are contradicted by what is contained 
herein, which is the authority to transfer military equipment to 
Pakistan. That is the action part of the amendment.
  How I wish it were true that nothing herein affected sanctions for 
transfers of missile equipment required under section 11B. If there 
were nothing in here which affected our missile technology control 
regime, if there were nothing in here which affected our Arms Export 
Control Act, there would not be any opposition to the Brown amendment 
on this floor. The problem is that this very amendment, by authorizing 
the transfer of military equipment to Pakistan, is undermining the Arms 
Export Control Act which says that this equipment shall not be 
transferred if--this is the big ``if''--if, in fact, Pakistan has 
received missiles or components or technology within the missile 
technology control regime. That is the ``if.''
  Each one of us can reach our own conclusion. I think the conclusion 
is so crystal clear that there is not much room for doubt. The 
Secretary of State apparently has said that there is enough doubt in 
his mind that he has not yet reached that conclusion. How he has been 
able to say that in light of all that evidence beats me. But I hope 
everybody will reach their own conclusion. But this issue is so 
critically important, this proliferation issue, that it requires each 
of us to focus on that evidence, reach our conclusion, and if the 
conclusion is that, in fact, missiles have been transferred and if the 
conclusion is that they have a range and payload that exceeds the 
missile technology control regime, then it seems to me that the Brown 
amendment must be defeated.
  And so, Mr. President, again, let me commend the Senator from Ohio, 
thank him for yielding me time. I also want to thank the Senator from 
California for the amendment which she is working on which will give us 
an opportunity to do two right things: One is to live up to our own 
Arms Export Control Act and to do the right thing on proliferation at 
the same time that we do what equity requires relative to the return of 
any funds that indeed equity might require be returned to Pakistan.
 We cannot do both things.

  The Senator from California will be offering an amendment which will 
allow us to do both things, but the amendment before us puts us on a 
very, very difficult road which I think undermines the deep concerns 
which every Member of this body feels about proliferation.
  Mr. HARKIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I not only yield, I am happy to yield the floor.
  Mr. JEFFORDS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Vermont 
wants to make a brief presentation. While I have indicated to the 
Senator from Iowa that he would be next, with his acquiescence, I yield 
5 minutes to the Senator from Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I will be brief, as I have to take the 
chair as soon as I can.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that John F. 
Guerra, a Pearson fellow on my staff, be granted the privilege of the 
floor for the pendency of this legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I will be brief. First, I will support 
the amendment of the Senator from Colorado, but I also will take a 
moment to commend the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] for the 
time and hard work he and his staff put into crafting this legislation. 
He has done a commendable job with a tough assignment: to reduce our 
expenditures on foreign aid by a significant amount without 
compromising national interests. I appreciate his willingness to work 
with all of the members of the subcommittee to craft a bill that meets 
the budget allocation and comes to the floor with a broad backing of 
both the Appropriations Committee and a majority of the foreign 
assistance community.
  Let us look at the big picture for a moment. We have committed 
ourselves to reducing the crippling Federal deficit, and failure to do 
so would irrevocably cripple our Nation and our economy for years to 
come.
  Yet, we must not blindly slash spending across the board. We must 
carefully review our priorities and assign our limited funds 
accordingly.
  I have been arguing for some time that education must be one of our 
top priorities. Spending on education is only about 3 percent of the 
entire Federal budget. Yet, if we do not prepare our children for the 
future, we will be unable to maintain our standard of living.
  I am concerned that the quality of our educational system is falling 
behind that of our major international competitors, and if this trend 
continues, we will find ourselves severely handicapped in our efforts 
to maintain a position of economic leadership and our standard of 
living.
  The other very small, yet very important, area of Federal spending is 
foreign aid. While many Americans think we spend about 15 percent of 
our budget on foreign aid, in truth foreign aid comprises only 1 
percent of the budget. And this small investment is being cut in this 
bill by almost 10 percent. Foreign aid is doing its share in 
contributing to deficit reduction.
  Yet, there is a danger in cutting these accounts too deeply. Much of 
this funding goes to meeting basic human needs abroad and to empower 
people to take control of their own development. If we do not make a 
modest contribution to the efforts of certain less developed nations to 
get their societies and economies on the right track, then we will lose 
out as these markets open to foreign business. If we do not increase 
our exports, we will not be able to maintain our standard of living. It 
is that simple.
  Let me touch briefly on a few of the concerns I have with the bill. I 
am confident that the chairman and the ranking member will continue to 
work with me and other Members to address the 

[[Page S 13952]]
issues as we move through the process. While I am appreciative of the 
efforts that have been made to increase the funding for international 
organizations and programs account, more needs to be done. The funding 
is highly leveraged in most cases by funding matches from many other 
countries that share these development and environmental priorities.
  I hope we can address this issue further as we move through this 
process. Otherwise, I worry that we may jeopardize the very good work 
done by many international organizations, including those ably led by 
Americans.
  Let me mention the consolidation of the development assistance and 
economic support fund into a single assistance account. That dissolves 
the well-established separation between those two distinct aspects of 
U.S. economic aid. I am worried this change makes developmental 
assistance vulnerable, especially in the event of emergencies, to 
short-term pressures at the expense of long-term goals.
  I understand the chairman's reasons for including both the 
development fund for Africa and the child's survival program in the new 
bilateral economic assistance account. However, I trust that as we move 
through the process, every effort will be made to protect these 
programs from any further reductions. It is critical that the funding 
for these neediest individuals and the neediest continent be preserved.
  The cut of $28 million below the administration's request for 
voluntary funding for the peacekeeping account is also of concern. 
International peacekeeping is a great way of leveraging our defense 
expenditures and reducing the exposure of our troops, while helping to 
resolve conflicts of direct concern to us. It is one of the most cost-
effective methods of increasing capabilities while sharing the burden 
in situations that demand our attention.
  Mr. President, I want to again commend the Senator from Colorado for 
raising and discussing very eloquently this very difficult and 
important amendment. I also again want to commend both the chairman and 
ranking member of the subcommittee for their efforts in crafting a bill 
under extremely difficult circumstances.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. BROWN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, we have been trading back and forth. I have 
committed to the Senator from Iowa. I certainly will understand if the 
distinguished Senator from Ohio----
  Mr. GLENN. That is all right.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I thank him and thank him for his 
generosity in allowing us to proceed. I yield now to the Senator from 
Iowa such time as he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding me this 
time.
  I am proud to join with my colleague, Senator Brown, in cosponsoring 
this amendment to the foreign operations bill. I think this amendment 
by Senator Brown is the first step in moving toward a stronger and more 
flexible relationship with Pakistan, and I commend the Senator for all 
of his work on this important issue.
  First, I will just say that some may call this a pro-Pakistan 
amendment, implying this is to help Pakistan and nothing more. Quite 
frankly, I see this as a pro-American amendment that strengthens U.S. 
interests and objectives in a vital region of the world.
  I am sorry I was not able to be here for some of the earlier 
statements that were made, but I was here for most of the comments made 
by my colleague from Michigan. As I was listening, I was jotting down 
some notes. I could not help but think, as the Senator from Michigan, 
my good friend, was speaking, that the missile technology control 
regime only covers exports and imports. It obviously does not cover 
missiles developed in the country.
  The question I was going to pose to the Senator from Michigan when he 
yielded the floor was whether or not the Senator from Michigan would be 
willing to extend these kinds of sanctions to India, even though it is 
not under the MTCR? We understand that. But nonetheless, a duck by any 
other name is still a duck, and when you are talking about missile 
technology and throw weight and whether or not you have the capability 
of delivering certain types of weapons, then certainly India has 
proceeded down that path.
  MTCR, as we know, only covers imports and exports, but when you are 
talking about sanctions in terms of a missile regime, I think you have 
to look at it more broadly than that. So, again, if you are going to 
have sanctions, why not have sanctions on India, too? I rather doubt 
the Senator would be in favor of that.
  But I say to my friend from Michigan that I think--and I checked 
this; it has been checked by staff with the State Department--that the 
major flaw in the argument of the Senator from Michigan is this: If 
there are violations, would the MTCR prohibit only all new licenses to 
Pakistan and China? The items we are talking about here were already 
licensed in the 1980's. These are old licenses, not new.
  So my point is that even if MTCR sanctions were imposed tomorrow, all 
of these items could still go to either Pakistan or to China.
  So the Senator from Michigan made an interesting statement, but it 
just does not comport with the facts and with what MTCR covers.
  Mr. President, again, whether or not this evidence exists, let me 
read here a statement made by Secretary Warren Christopher on July 28, 
1995, this summer, to the National Press Club.
  Here was the question:

       Will the Clinton Administration order additional sanctions 
     against China for supplying missile technology to Pakistan 
     and Iran.
       Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are 
     concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly 
     concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor 
     it very carefully and very closely.
       At the present time, although there is a fairly large body 
     of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that 
     would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to 
     assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter 
     carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law 
     in this regard.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this statement appear at 
this point in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S. National 
 Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Press Club, Washington, 
                                  DC.

       Question. Will the Clinton Administration order additional 
     sanctions against China for supplying missile technology to 
     Pakistan and Iran?
       Secretary Christopher. As I mentioned in my remarks, we are 
     concerned about proliferation issues, and we are certainly 
     concerned about it as they relate to South Asia. We monitor 
     it very carefully and very closely.
       At the present time, although there is a fairly large body 
     of evidence, we do not think there is the evidence there that 
     would justify the imposition of sanctions. But I want to 
     assure all that we feel an obligation to keep this matter 
     carefully under review and to follow and comply with the law 
     in this regard.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, again, Secretary Christopher said, as late 
as July 28, there was not enough evidence that would justify the 
imposition of sanctions.
  That is really kind of what we are talking about here. Again, my 
friend from Michigan mentioned something in his comments about the 
transfer of missiles and missile technology. All I can say is that the 
last paragraph of the amendment is very clear and unequivocal. It says:

       Nothing contained herein shall affect sanctions for 
     transfers of missile equipment or technology required under 
     section 11B of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or 
     section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act.

  You cannot get much clearer than that. Again, I think the Senator 
from Michigan sort of raised a kind of straw man here because, 
obviously, the amendment offered by the Senator from Colorado is 
explicit in its last paragraph in saying that nothing herein shall 
violate the Arms Export Control Act.
  Next, Mr. President, in case anybody says, ``Well, that was July 28 
that Secretary Christopher made those comments,'' I have a copy of a 
letter here to the majority leader, Senator Dole, from Secretary 
Christopher, regarding several issues, one of which is the issue 
regarding Pakistan. Let me read this paragraph that is in the letter 
dated September 20:

       We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in 
     improving our relationship with 

[[Page S 13953]]
     Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to 
     Pakistan that is in our own interest, such as trade 
     promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and counterterrorism 
     programs. We also support language that would allow for the 
     return of military equipment for which Pakistan has already 
     paid.

  That is what is in the Brown amendment.

       To engage Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including 
     non-proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair 
     situation.

  That is dated September 20.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that be printed at this 
point in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                           Secretary of State,

                                   Washington, September 20, 1995.
       Dear Senator Dole: As the Senate begins consideration of 
     the FY 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, I would 
     like to address several issues in the version of the bill as 
     reported by the full Appropriations Committee.
       At the outset I would like to thank Chairman McConnell and 
     Senator Leahy for their willingness to work with us and to 
     include priority initiatives such as a long-term extension of 
     Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) and a drawdown 
     authority for Jordan in the subcommittee mark. We would 
     oppose any amendments that would alter the carefully 
     negotiated language for either of these initiatives. Also, we 
     appreciate the Subcommittee's removal of objectionable 
     conditions adopted by the House on population assistance and 
     aid to Turkey, Haiti, and Mexico. We hope to continue in this 
     cooperative fashion to produce a Foreign Operations bill that 
     can be presented to the President with bipartisan support.
       Despite the favorable aspects of the legislation, there are 
     several items that are of great concern to be Department of 
     State. The funding levels throughout the bill are well below 
     the President's request level. The Foreign Operations cuts, 
     coupled with the cuts being proposed to international 
     programs in the Senate's Commerce, Justice, State Department 
     Appropriations bill, represent a serious threat to America's 
     leadership in international affairs.
       The bill also contains numerous earmarks and substantially 
     restructures our foreign aid accounts. We expect 
     international agencies to do their share in the effort to 
     balance the budget as the President's budget plan makes 
     clear. However, we, the Administration, should have the 
     flexibility to apply funds to the programs that provide the 
     best results. Earmarks in our programs for the New 
     Independent States, International Counternarcotics, and 
     economic assistance would prevent us from being able to 
     respond to the crises and unexpected requirements of the 
     post-Cold War world. Further, the proportionality requirement 
     in the new Economic Assistance account restricts our ability 
     to change the distribution of these funds from year to year. 
     We oppose these restrictions.
       The bill also contains a number of objectionable policy 
     provisions. Retrictions on our ability to contribute to the 
     Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would, in 
     effect, prevent U.S. funding of KEDO and greatly hinder, if 
     not destroy, the international effort to implement the Agreed 
     Framework. We oppose linking KEDO funding to substantial 
     progress on North Korean/South Korean dialogue. Imposing an 
     artificial and unrealistic deadline on North/South talks, 
     which have taken years to progress, will hold hostage the 
     very funding that will facilitate the progress we all so 
     desire. We remain convinced that the North/South dialogue 
     will move forward substantially as a result of the Agreed 
     Framework and the creation of KEDO. Our failure to contribute 
     to KEDO will threaten its ability to meet its obligations 
     under the Framework and, consequently, invite North Korean 
     non-compliance. The Agreed Framework is working. North Korea 
     has frozen its nuclear weapons program. We need Congressional 
     support for KEDO to keep the freeze in place.
       Regarding assistance to the New Independent States (NIS) 
     and Russia, we have reached a critical moment in the reform 
     process. Continued funding is essential. It can make a major 
     difference in whether reformers in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, 
     Moldova and other states will be able to maintain momentum, 
     or the opponents of reform will halt the development of 
     democratic market societies. We need to stay the course for 
     this transitional period, while normal trading and investment 
     relationships develop in the former Soviet states. We very 
     much appreciate the continued support we have received from 
     the Congress, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in 
     particular, for this critical effort, as reflected in this 
     bill.
       At the same time, however, we oppose new conditions on 
     assistance to the NIS. It is of course tempting to withdraw 
     our assistance as punishment when we do not agree with 
     Russian actions or policies. But this would be a mistake. 
     This assistance is in our national interest. Cutting or 
     restricting aid would hurt reformers, the very people who 
     have protested the war in Chechnya, criticized Russia's 
     proposed nuclear sale to Iran, or insisted that Russia end 
     cooperation with Cuba. We urge you to remove such conditions 
     from this bill. Let me assure you that we share your concerns 
     about Russia's policies in these areas; that is why we 
     continue to work on other fronts to stop the Russian nuclear 
     reactor sale to Iran and to prevent completion of the Cuban 
     reactor project.
       We also urge you to restore the national security waiver 
     for the certification requirement on violations of 
     territorial integrity, which has been removed from the Senate 
     version of this bill. It is important that the President 
     retain the ability to determine whether the national security 
     of the United States justifies a waiver of this requirement. 
     Moreover, removal of the waiver provision could have 
     unintended consequences, such as prohibiting humanitarian 
     assistance to the victims of regional conflicts in countries 
     such as Armenia.
       The language regarding restrictions on the terminaiton of 
     sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro also reflects 
     objectionable House language carried over in the Senate bill. 
     The recent combination of NATO's resolve and energetic United 
     States leadership on the diplomatic front has led to some 
     encouraging opportunities for a negotiated settlement to the 
     conflict. To prematurely close off any avenues that may lead 
     to a diplomatic settlement, including adjustments to the 
     sanctions regime against Serbia, would complicate our 
     efforts.
       We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in 
     improving our relationship with Pakistan. We would support an 
     amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in our 
     own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics 
     assistance, and counterterrorism programs. We also support 
     language that would allow for the return of military 
     equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage 
     Pakistan on issues of concern to us, including non-
     proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair 
     situation.
       There remain other problematic issues in the bill, but we 
     are encouraged by the willingness of the bill's managers to 
     work with us, and we hope that these other issues can be 
     resolved on the Senate floor or in conference.
           Sincerely,
                                                Warren Christopher

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, last, regarding the letters, in making the 
point that the points of the Senator from Michigan are not in keeping 
with the views of the Secretary of State or of this administration, let 
me also read from a letter dated August 2 from the Secretary of 
Defense, William Perry, to the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Strom Thurmond. Again, I will read the first 
paragraph:

       For the past six months, the Administration has wrestled 
     with the difficult problem of trying to build a stronger, 
     more flexible relationship with Pakistan--an important, 
     moderate Islamic democracy in a troubled region which has 
     been a long-time friend and has become a major partner in 
     peacekeeping operations--while promoting the very important 
     nonproliferation goals of the Pressler Amendment.

  Then he went on in the letter to point out basically what is in the 
amendment and what the President would support. And then Secretary 
Perry says this:

       While we recognize this is not a perfect solution, it is, 
     we believe, the course which will best help us resolve a 
     difficult problem with a country which has long been a 
     friend. This is an effort to resolve issues involving 
     ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our 
     relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to 
     resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability 
     to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is 
     eroding. The status quo, unfortunately, offers few incentives 
     for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, 
     whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. If we 
     succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a 
     better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on 
     issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this entire letter to 
Senator Strom Thurmond, dated August 2, 1995, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                   Washington, DC, August 2, 1995.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: For the past six months, the 
     Administration has wrestled with the difficult problem of 
     trying to build a stronger, more flexible relationship with 
     Pakistan--an important, moderate Islamic democracy in a 
     troubled region which has been a long-term friend and has 
     become a major partner in peacekeeping operations--while 
     promoting the very important nonproliferation goals of the 
     Pressler Amendment.
       Based on a detailed review within the Administration and 
     consultations with Congress, the President had decided to 
     address this matter on three fronts:
       First, he strongly supports provisions already contained in 
     the House and Senate versions of the Foreign Aid 
     Authorization 

[[Page S 13954]]
     bill that would permit us to resume economic assistance and limited 
     military assistance affecting clear U.S. interests (including 
     assistance in peacekeeping, counterterrrorism and 
     counternarcotics as well as IMET).
       Second, the President has decided to seek authority, as 
     provided by an amendment to be proposed by Senator Brown, 
     that would release approximately $370 million worth of 
     embargoed military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the 
     imposition of Pressler sanctions. This authority would 
     specifically exclude the release of the F-16s. Among the 
     items that would be released are three P-3C Orion maritime 
     patrol aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, counter-mortar 
     radars, howitzers, and support kits for F-16s and Cobra 
     helicopters already in the Pakistani inventory. These items 
     will not disturb the conventional arms balance in South Asia 
     which overwhelmingly favors India.
       Finally, the President has decided that, rather than 
     releasing the 28 F-16s to Pakistan, he will seek to sell them 
     to a third country and deposit the proceeds of any sale in 
     the Pakistan Trust Fund to reimburse, as much as the sale 
     permits, Pakistan's investment in these aircraft.
       While we recognize that this is not a perfect solution, it 
     is, we believe, the course which will best help us resolve a 
     difficult problem with a country which has long been a 
     friend. This is an effort to resolve issues involving 
     ``fairness'' that have become a major irritant in our 
     relationship with Pakistan--it is in no way an effort to 
     resume a military supply relationship. Meanwhile, our ability 
     to work with Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation goals is 
     eroding. The status quo unfortunately, offers few incentives 
     for future cooperation or restraint by Pakistan--or by India, 
     whose nuclear and missile programs are also of concern. If we 
     succeed in putting this issue behind us, we will be in a 
     better position to engage Pakistan in a constructive way on 
     issues of concern to us, particularly nonproliferation.
       The second aspect of this three-part effort--embodied in 
     Senator Brown's pending amendment to provide authority to 
     release the embargoed Pakistan equipment other than the F-
     16s--may be coming to a vote very shortly. I urge you to 
     support our efforts to resolve this problem by supporting 
     Senator Brown's amendment when it is offered.
           Sincerely,
     William J. Perry.
                                                                    ____

 Putting the Release of Embargoed Pakistani Equipment into Perspective

       The total package has a value of $368 million--not $700 
     million as has been reported.
       Although the P-3C Orion provides a long-range offensive 
     capability, three aircraft would hardly disturb India's 
     nearly 2 to 1 advantage over Pakistan in naval systems:
       It is claimed that the P-3s provide a ``lethal stand off 
     capability'' against Indian naval targets as far south as 
     Cochin; however, it should be noted that because the Pakistan 
     Navy has no aircraft carriers (of which the Indian Navy has 
     two), the Pakistanis would be unable to provide fighters to 
     escort these slow aircraft when operating at such a great 
     distance from Karachi--thus leaving them vulnerable to 
     interception by either land-based Indian Air Force fighters 
     or carrier based Indian Navy aircraft.
       It is incorrect to say that the P-3C represent a new 
     weapons system for the region as the Indian Navy already has 
     two squadrons of similar maritime patrol aircraft that 
     include five Il-38 (the Russian version of the P-3) and eight 
     Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. While these aircraft do not have a 
     system equivalent to the Harpoon, they do have equipment to 
     locate submarines and are capable of launching torpedoes.
       The Indian Navy also possesses an anti-ship missile, the 
     Sea Eagle, which is similar to the Harpoon. Although not 
     capable of being launched from the maritime patrol aircraft 
     mentioned above, the Indian Sea Eagles can be carried on the 
     Sea Harrier jets and the Sea King helicopters which operate 
     from India's two aircraft carriers--thus giving the Indian 
     Navy a more formidable long-range strike capability than that 
     provided by three P-3s.
       C-NITE would enable Pack Cobra helicopters to launch TOW 2 
     anti-tank guided missiles at night; however, these 19 
     helicopters, so equipped, would hardly offset India's 2 to 1 
     advantage (by over 2000 tanks) over Pakistan.
       The Pakistani F-16s are already equipped with the AN/ALR-69 
     radar warning receiver and AN/ALQ-131 electronic counter 
     measures jamming equipment. These are defensive rather than 
     offensive systems. The ALR-69 alerts the pilot that a radar 
     has ``painted'' his aircraft; the ALQ-131 electronically 
     deflects the hostile missile. The ALR-69 and ALQ-131 kits 
     that would be released would enhance the reliability of these 
     systems rather than provide any new military capability.
       Since Pakistan has previously received over 200 AIM-9L air-
     to-air missiles, the release of 360 more will not provide any 
     new capability. Furthermore, India will still enjoy an almost 
     2 to 1 advantage in jet combat aircraft over Pakistan to 
     include a better than 2 to 1 advantage in aircraft equivalent 
     to the Pakistani F-16s (i.e., MiG-29 and Mirage 2000).
       The 24 howitzers that would be released to Pakistan are 
     M198 155 mm towed howitzers. Given the fact that the Indian 
     Army has over 3000 towed artillery pieces (almost twice the 
     number in the Pakistani inventory), 24 more will not make a 
     significant difference. It should be noted that during the 
     nearly five years that these howitzers were embargoed, India 
     acquired over 250 equivalent artillery pieces from 
     Czechoslovakia and Russia/USSR.
       In regard to MK-46 torpedoes, Pakistan will receive parts 
     that constitute less that one operational MK-46.
       As for the 2.75'' rockets, these constitute a resupply of 
     ammunition for one of the weapons systems on the Pakistani 
     Cobra helicopters--they do not give Pakistan any new 
     capability.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I wanted to make those points up front to 
adequately refute, I think, some of the points made by my friend from 
Michigan. This basically is, as the Senator from Colorado has stated so 
many times, a basic issue of fairness. Pakistan has been a long-time 
friend and ally of the United States.
  I know the hour is late, but I think it is important that, once 
again, we review a little bit of history so that we do not kind of 
operate in a vacuum, as though Pakistan was born yesterday, or that 
somehow our relationship with Pakistan just started.
  This is a relationship that goes back a long way. At the time of its 
independence, in 1947, Pakistan made a conscious choice to promote 
friendship with the United States rather than the Soviet Union. The 
first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, chose to undertake 
his first overseas visit to the United States instead of to the Soviet 
Union, despite efforts by Moscow to entice him there. While in the 
United States during 1950, the Prime Minister explained to various 
American audiences that the principles on which the nation of Pakistan 
was based were as compatible with the political, economical, and 
ideological goals of the United States as they were incompatible with 
communism. He expressed that it would be the view of his government to 
``throw all its weight in the effort to maintaining stability in 
Asia.''
  In a speech to this Congress, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan 
proclaimed that ``no threat or persuasion, no material peril, or 
ideological allurement could deflect Pakistan from its chosen path of 
free democracy.''
  Pakistan lived up to its commitments later on in June of 1950 when it 
declared its unqualified support for the United States in our war in 
Korea and backed us in that war.
  In 1954, they joined the Central Treaty Organization. In 1955, they 
joined SEATO. These two American-backed alliances were aimed at the 
containment of communism and were very successful. In 1959, our two 
countries signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which is still operational 
today. So this is a long history.
  Again, some will say, well, Pakistan has had military dictatorships 
and violations of human rights. Listen, I understand that. But I 
believe that the freedom advocates in Pakistan have been at it 
continually. They have been assassinated and tortured, but they 
continue to struggle for democratic freedoms in that country. Those are 
the ones about whom I spoke, not the military dictators, not the 
repressive forces in Pakistan, of which there are more than just a few, 
but to those brave people of Pakistan who, through all of this, 
continue to struggle and to fight and to maintain an adherence to 
democracy.
 In 1960, Pakistan's commitment, its friendship to the United States 
was put to a very severe test.

  Again, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty, Pakistan allowed 
us to set up some bases. One of them was a base from which we flew our 
U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and one of those flights, as we all 
too sadly remember, was shot down by the Soviets. Francis Gary Powers 
was the pilot. We all know how the Soviets paraded him as one of their 
trophies.
  Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev turned his ire on Pakistan because he 
knew that is where the plane left from. He threatened to use nuclear 
arms and weapons against Pakistan. He boasted that the City of Peshawar 
would be wiped off the face of the earth because that is where the base 
was. The former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in his recently published 
account of the incident, describes the cool and confident reaction of 
the then-President of Pakistan, who dismissed the Soviet threat by 
saying, ``So what?" 

[[Page S 13955]]

  Again, put yourself in that context. Korean war, Mutual Defense 
Treaty, allowing us to base our U-2 flights here. They are bordering 
right on the Soviet Union, and yet they stood by us.
  Pakistan again came to the help of the United States by helping to 
facilitate the crucial opening of American relations with China. In 
1970, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger undertook a secret visit 
to China from Pakistan. Thus, again, Pakistan served as that vital 
bridge between the United States and China. Again, it was critical in 
the cold war to restrain the Soviet Union.
  Moscow began to speak of the Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis. 
Again, it was only Pakistan which bore the brunt of Soviet anger when 
Moscow signed the defense treaty with India, and through a massive 
transfer of arms as well as political support which enabled India to 
invade East Pakistan in 1971.
  Regrettably, the United States stood by even though we had a mutual 
defense treaty with Pakistan at that time.
  In 1979, once again Pakistan's friendship with the United States was 
put to a severe test when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Over 
the next decade, Pakistan joined the United States in helping to roll 
back Soviet communism and expansion. It did so at great cost. Not only, 
again, did the Soviet Union threaten Pakistan with dire consequences, 
but launched a campaign of subversion and terror against Pakistan. The 
country experienced numerous violations of its ground and airspace, 
terrorist bombings, subversion.
  To add to these problems, Pakistan provided refuge to more than 3.2 
million Afghans at great political and economic cost to itself. Think 
about that, Mr. President: 3.2 million Afghans sought refuge in 
Pakistan.
  Pakistan continues to pay the price for the role it played in the 
defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. But they stood by us and 
they helped. Ironically, however, this successful cooperation between 
Pakistan and the United States was followed by the worst period in 
their bilateral relations with our country with the imposition of the 
Pressler sanctions against Pakistan in 1990.
  Even despite this development, Pakistan continued to seek friendly 
relations with the United States and came to our assistance whenever we 
requested. Pakistan made significant troop contributions to the 
multinational forces during the gulf war to liberate Kuwait. At the 
political level, Pakistan not only condemned the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait but was instrumental in promoting the U.N. efforts for the 
liberation of Kuwait.
  Again, Pakistan took a lead role in the peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia, serving together with American troops in that country. It was 
not the first time that American and Pakistani soldiers died together 
for the same cause.
  Again, at our request, Pakistan has been at the forefront of 
contributing to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Pakistan forces have been 
deployed for peacekeeping purposes in Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti. Pakistani 
troops were in Haiti, helping us to restore democracy to Haiti, Western 
Sahara, Mozambique, Georgia.
  Recently, the United States and Pakistan have also joined hands in 
the fight against terrorism and narcotics. Recently, and in cooperation 
with American personnel, Pakistan recently apprehended Ramzi Yousaf for 
alleged involvement in the World Trade Center bomb blast, and Pakistan 
has extradited over half a dozen drug barons to the United States in 
our joint counter-narcotics drive.
  Again, Mr. President, I recite all this. I know a lot of people know 
this history, but maybe too many of us have forgotten, and we have 
forgotten what a close friend and ally Pakistan has been.
  Again, as a moderate democratic Islamic country, Pakistan is the only 
tried and trusted friend that we have in that Islamic world. The recent 
visit of Prime Minister Bhutto clearly demonstrated that Pakistan's 
commitment to friendship with the United States remains as strong as it 
was during the cold war.
  Mr. President, with this kind of history, for the life of me, I 
cannot understand why we continue to treat that country as we do. 
Again, I am only talking again about fairness. Secretary of State 
Christopher said that. It is an issue of fairness. Secretary of Defense 
Perry said it is a question of fairness and a question of our 
relationships with Pakistan.
  Mr. President, again, neither India or Pakistan are a party to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I wish they were. If I had an argument 
against Pakistan, it would be that argument. They ought to be a part of 
it. But so should India. India cannot skate by on this simply because 
they say they are not importing and they are building their own. They 
cannot skate by on that kind of flimsy excuse.
  Again, I do not think anyone here would advocate unilateral 
disarmament on our part. Certainly, we could not expect Pakistan to 
have a unilateral disarmament on their part.
  Again, I hope that both sides, India and Pakistan, would agree to a 
regime of peaceful relations and a downgrading of both of their 
military systems. But we cannot expect Pakistan unilaterally to do 
that, not given the history of that region.
  I understand Pakistan is not a perfect country. But, again, what we 
are doing is not fair. Absolutely not fair.
  The Brown amendment moves United States policy forward so that we can 
work with Pakistan to tackle a lot of problems: drug trafficking, 
international terrorism, peacekeeping, illegal immigration. But, again, 
it also strengthens a competitive position for United States companies 
to do business in Pakistan. So it advances our interests abroad.
  Again, on the question of military equipment, the Brown amendment is 
a fair and responsible approach. A fair and responsible approach. We 
should not be charging Pakistan with the storage of military equipment 
they purchased that we did not release. It is not fair. We should not 
be holding on to military equipment that Pakistan simply sent here for 
repair. It is not fair. And we should not hold on to the money and hold 
on to the equipment that Pakistan has bought and paid for. That, too, 
is unfair.
  This issue has led to a steady erosion of our relationship with 
Pakistan, an old friend--a struggling democracy, struggling, a very 
troubled part of the world.
  So in order to strengthen our partnership and advance American 
interests, it is essential to put this problem behind us, wipe the 
slate clean and concentrate on the issue of nonproliferation, which is 
the intent of the Pressler amendment.
  The Brown amendment helps us do just that.
  Again, when you look at the equipment that we are talking about, 
there is nothing in here that is new. As I said, these are items that 
were already approved. These are not items that would be covered under 
the missile technology control regime.
  I want to make that point one more time to my friend from Michigan. 
Even if the MTCR sanctions were imposed tomorrow, all the items in the 
Brown amendment could go because they had already been approved under 
the old regime.
  Again, the Brown amendment is fair, it is responsible, it is 
reasonable, it will wipe the slate clean. I think it will help promote 
democracy and the democratic forces that are struggling and have 
struggled so hard in Pakistan. I do not think it will do one iota in 
any way to encourage any kind of nuclear proliferation or technology of 
missiles or anything else. As I said, the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense have both said that the evidence is not there in 
sufficient amount to impose these kinds of sanctions.
  So, again, I would just say that it is in our best interests to adopt 
the Brown amendment. That is why the administration supports it so 
strongly. That is why I support it. I believe we have to get on with 
renewing our relationship with Pakistan, to wipe the slate clean, to 
treat them fairly--not unfairly.
  If people want to talk about the country that has, I think, pushed us 
to the limits in terms of using nuclear devices, testing nuclear 
weapons, and building up nuclear arsenals, we ought to be talking about 
India, not Pakistan. So I think this will get us back on a more even 
keel and perhaps will set us up in a regime where we can actually 
engage both India and Pakistan 

[[Page S 13956]]
to begin a process of more peaceful relations and negotiations leading 
to a cooling down in that region of the world and, perhaps, even a 
reduction in the weapons in both India and Pakistan.
  If we continue on the way we are going, then I fear the hard line 
forces in Pakistan, the antidemocratic forces, are going to go to the 
forefront. I think they are the ones who are going to be able to say 
look, how can you trust the United States? Here we have done all these 
things for the United States over all these years--we have supported 
them, been their great friends, backed them up, and they turned their 
back on us.
  If you want to push Pakistan, as some of these people are saying, 
closer to China, that is the way you do it. If you defeat the Brown 
amendment you will get just what you asked for. You will get the more 
repressive forces in Pakistan going along with the repressive forces 
that are dominant in China today, and then we really will have a 
problem in South Asia.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the Brown amendment and I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, before the Senator from Iowa leaves, I want 
to point out, he was questioning whether we would have the guts to 
sanction India. I point out to him that we did sanction India under the 
MTCR. We had United States sanctions imposed against India, the Indian 
space research organization, and against Russia, Glavcosmos, for the 
Russian transfer of cryogenic rocket engines. That was in 1992, I 
believe. So we did actually have sanctions against India.
  What we did was we cut the United States exports of missiles for a 2-
year period, I believe it was. I do not have the exact date it was put 
into effect--yes, we do. This is out of the May 12, 1992 Washington 
Post, an article by R. Geoffrey Smith titled, ``U.S. Imposes Sanctions 
Against Russian-Indian Concerns Over Rocket Deals.''
  Mr. HARKIN. If the Senator will yield, that is true, but the 
sanctions have since expired.
  Mr. GLENN. They expired, but I thought the point was we did not have 
guts enough to assign sanctions against India--but we did. We have done 
it.
  Mr. HARKIN. Again, we continued the sanctions on Pakistan but let 
them expire on India.
  Mr. GLENN. The same sanctions expired on India. But, anyway, the 
issue here is not the money, small amounts of equipment and so on. The 
issue is: Does the United States of America have a nuclear 
nonproliferation policy worthy of the name or not? That is basically 
what we are talking about. Do we have one and are we willing to abide 
by it? Or is it a sham? Is it only for press conferences? Is it only 
for campaign talk and little else? That is the question.
  Talk about trusting the United States, let us talk about how much we 
can trust other nations of the world whom we try to help and work with. 
We have felt strongly enough about our nuclear stockpiles and what is 
going on around the world that we have exhorted other nations to please 
sign up under the nonproliferation treaty. At the same time, we pledged 
that if a situation ever got to where we could start working our 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons down, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, we 
would do that. Fortunately, at this day and time, after all these years 
of cold war, we have reached that point where we now are downsizing, as 
we call it, our nuclear weapons stockpiles. And we are all glad that is 
occurring.
  In the meantime we asked other nations to sign up under the NPT, to 
submit to IAEA inspections. And we have had 178 other nations that have 
put their faith in the United States of America, to follow our lead and 
say, ``Yes, we trust you. And, yes, we will go along, we will not 
develop nuclear weapons in return for America's cooperation in peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy.''
  Who is the most egregious violator of all these things with regard to 
not signing up, refusing to sign up under the nonproliferation treaty, 
not cooperating in matters nuclear, in fact telling untruths, one right 
after the other, one right after the other, on and on and on and on and 
on? That is Pakistan.
  I can appreciate very much the situation Pakistan finds itself in. 
Some years ago China developed nuclear weapons. They have been part of 
the nuclear weapons scene across the world for many years. India and 
China have had border troubles, disputed territories. Both claimed 
certain areas up along the border, and they have been back and forth at 
each other for many, many decades, going way back. So, as soon as China 
developed nuclear weapons, India felt they had to do the same thing or 
they would not be safe. So they set about a nuclear weapons development 
program. In 1974 they set off their first nuclear device. They called 
it a PNE, a peaceful nuclear explosion. OK, that is fine, they can call 
it what they want, but a bomb is a bomb is a bomb is a bomb, whether 
you call it a peaceful bomb underground for test purposes or whether it 
is a bomb that is usable, an explosive device that will go off 
somewhere else.
  As a result of the Indian PNE, then we had Pakistan swore they would 
get the bomb one way or another, no matter what they had to do to do 
it. In fact then Prime Minister Bhutto, the current Prime Minister's 
father, who later died, said that, to quote his words, Pakistan would 
``eat grass'' if it was necessary to get that nuclear capability. They 
have been embarked on a nuclear weapons program ever since, even though 
they have steadfastly denied it, year after year after year after year. 
And they have been untruthful to us.
  I went to Pakistan, met personally with President Zia back years ago, 
with Yaqub Khan, who was foreign minister, and their atomic energy 
commissioner at that time, met with all these people, sat and talked to 
them one on one, looked them right in the eye, and they swore up and 
down they had no nuclear program under way. And I think they even knew 
at that time that I knew that what they were telling me was not true, 
even though we had good intelligence information at that time.
  Let me just quote--I am going to put some of this in the Record later 
on at the end of my remarks, but let us bring it up to date here with 
the present Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto. Listen to some of her 
comments on this. Going back when she was opposition leader, Benazir 
Bhutto, shortly before she became Prime Minister, the Washington Post 
quotes her as saying:

       We don't want any controversy with the U.S. on the nuclear 
     issue. We want it clear beyond doubt that we are interested 
     only in energy, not nuclear weapons.

  That was on November 19, 1988.
  On November 28, 1988, once again opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, 
interviewed in Time Magazine, says:

       We believe in a peaceful nuclear program for energy 
     purposes and nothing else.

  Now Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interviewed in the Calcutta 
Telegraph on December 14, 1988--she is now Prime Minister--is quoted as 
follows:

       I can tell you with confidence there is no bomb program in 
     Pakistan. There is no bomb program. There is no bomb program.

  Later on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interviewed on MacNeil/Lehrer 
on December 16, 1988:

       We are committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't 
     have any nuclear weapons policy. Pakistan doesn't have any 
     intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear weapon.

  Bring it on up a little bit. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, once 
again addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress, on the other end 
of the Capitol from us, when she came over here and addressed us on 
June 7, 1989, said:

       Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess 
     nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is our 
     policy.

  That was to the Congress of the United States.
  July 10, 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto:

       Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting 
     together or making a bomb or taking it to the point where you 
     can put it together.

  Another one quoted by AFP on August 29, 1989:

       We do have the knowledge but I do think there is a 
     difference between knowledge and capability. So we do have a 
     knowledge, if confronted with a threat to use, but we do not 
     in the absence of any threat intend to 

[[Page S 13957]]
     use that knowledge. In fact, as a matter of policy, my government is 
     firmly committed to nonproliferation.

  Then quoted in an interview in a German newspaper, as quoted by 
Reuters, on October 22, 1989:

       It is true that Pakistan has certain knowledge in the 
     nuclear field but it has no intention of using this 
     knowledge. To put it another way, we do not want to convert 
     this knowledge into, shall we say, a nuclear capability at 
     the present time.

  And the last one that I will read here out of a number of other 
examples I could give was in 1994, last November, November 18, 1994, 
being interviewed by David Frost on PBS. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto:

       We have neither detonated one nor have we got nuclear 
     weapons. Being a responsible state and a state committed to 
     nonproliferation, we in Pakistan through five successive 
     governments have taken a policy decision to follow a peaceful 
     nuclear program.

  Well, at a later time I will ask to enter these in the Record at the 
end of my remarks. But those are examples of some of the statements and 
there are several dozen others here by various Pakistani officials that 
go along the same line.
  Well, so much for the protestations that they have made through the 
years.
  In 1987, Yaqub Khan, father of the bomb in Pakistan as he is known, 
in an interview, I believe it was in London, made the mistake of saying 
that, yes, they had the bomb. That was it, period.
  MTCR was brought up a little while ago as well as M-11's. When we 
talked to some of the people over at the White House today, after I 
said, what if the missile technology, MTCR, has been violated? What 
would be the administration's policy? I was told by the person I was 
talking to, not the President, but I was told by the person I was 
talking to, ``Well, if MTCR has been violated, we will abide by the 
law.''
  I hope they mean it. I wish they would do the same thing with regard 
to the Pressler amendment and with the other legislation that we have 
had on the books for a long time.
  To understand how we arrived at this difficult state of affairs with 
Pakistan, in which they have paid $658 million in cash and used $200 
million in credits for 28 F-16's but cannot have them delivered, I 
think we need to go back. I think we need to review a little bit of the 
history of Pakistan.
  I would also add that $658 million in cash and $200 million in 
credits comes up to about $858 million that we are talking about.
  But to go back a little bit, in the mid-1970's, Congress became 
concerned about increasing evidence of international nuclear trade in 
dangerous technologies associated with producing nuclear weapon 
materials.
  A number of countries, including but not limited to Pakistan, South 
Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, were actively engaged in seeking such 
technologies, and suppliers such as France and Germany seemed prepared 
to meet the demand.
  Now, in an attempt to dampen such activity, in 1976 and 1977, 
Congress enacted what is now called the Glenn-Symington amendment to 
the Foreign Assistance Act which provided that countries importing or 
exporting such dangerous technologies under certain conditions would be 
cut off from U.S. economic and military assistance.
  This law was universal in its application. It was not directed 
specifically toward Pakistan at all. Nonetheless, in 1979, after much 
information became available about illegal Pakistani activities 
involving the smuggling of design information and equipment related to 
nuclear enrichment, President Carter invoked the Glenn-Symington 
amendment to cut off the Pakistanis.
  After the war in Afghanistan broke out, attempts by the Carter 
administration to restore some assistance to Pakistan in return for 
restraints on their nuclear program were rebuffed by the Pakistanis. 
When the Reagan administration arrived, aid to Pakistan and the 
mujaheddin was high up on the administration's foreign policy agenda. 
At that time, they even suggested repeal of the Glenn-Symington 
amendment. That was suggested during some of the congressional 
consultations we had with them. That was rejected.
  Instead, a proposal was made and adopted into law that allowed the 
President to resume aid to Pakistan for 6 years despite its violations 
of section 669 of the Glenn-Symington amendment which related to 
uranium enrichment activities. President Reagan used this authority in 
1982 and also issued a waiver under section 670 of the amendment. This 
related to reprocessing activities--to exempt Pakistan indefinitely 
from the cutoff provisions of that section of the Glenn-Symington 
legislation as well.
  Now, he could not do the same under section 669 unless he had 
reliable assurances that the Pakistanis were not developing nuclear 
weapons. And such assurances were clearly not available.
  Thus, a specific waiver for Pakistan was created and has been 
subsequently renewed five times. That allowed them to escape from the 
sanctions imposed by United States law for proliferators. This has been 
done for no other country that I am aware of. So anyone who thinks we 
are being too harsh on Pakistan, poor little Pakistan, we have renewed 
that waiver on five different occasions. Nonetheless, Congress was 
unwilling to give a complete blank check to Pakistan and stipulated in 
the waiver legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if--if--it 
received or exploded a nuclear device.
  Now, in addition, Congress stipulated that an annual report would be 
provided on Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could 
confirm that United States assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's 
bomb program as was confidently assumed by Reagan administration 
officials.
  We have a number of statements that they made at that time about what 
a big thing this was going to be, and that was the best thing to do to 
get the Pakis to hold back on their bomb program. So we required 
reports, and those reports, along with supplementary intelligence 
information, revealed there was no effect whatsoever on the pace or the 
direction of the Pakistani bomb program.
  The Pakistanis continued to say publicly they had no nuclear weapons 
program and continually lied to United States authorities whenever 
questioned. Indeed, then-President Zia and then-head of the Pakistani 
atomic energy commission, Mir Khan, both lied to me in my visit to 
Islamabad in 1984. Lying is a harsh word, but I cannot put any other 
word to it. That occurred when I asked about information I had 
concerning their nuclear program.
  The result of all this mendacity, plus ongoing information that the 
Pakistani program was progressing, was the enactment of the Pressler 
amendment. The Pressler amendment was passed in 1985, which was 
designed to draw a new line in the sand regarding the extent of United 
States forbearance over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
  The amendment required the United President to certify annually that 
Pakistan did not ``possess,'' in quotes--``possess,'' key word--a 
nuclear explosive device in order for assistance to continue and that 
such assistance would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan would 
possess such a device.
  Please note that the argument about the Pressler amendment being 
unfair because it applies only to Pakistan is completely disingenuous 
because it ignores the fact that Pressler was created to shape further 
the unique special exemption from United States nonproliferation law 
given to Pakistan years earlier. If we had not had the waiver, we would 
not have needed Pressler.
  It has been reported that CIA officials who were privy to 
intelligence information concerning the Pakistani program were very 
skeptical beginning from 1987 on that the President could make the 
appropriate certifications under Pressler to allow aid to continue; in 
other words, to say with some certainty that they did not possess any 
nuclear device and that our assistance was significantly reducing the 
risk that they would possess.
  Statements from high-ranking Pakistani officials around this time 
suggested they had the bomb within their grasp. Nonetheless, President 
Reagan in 1987 and 1988 and President Bush in 1989 made those 
certifications. It has also been reported that President Bush told the 
Pakistanis in 1989 that he would be unable to make this certification 
the next year in 1990.
  Now, the contract for the sale of 28 F-16's was signed in 1989, the 
year Pakistan ostensibly had been warned that there would be no further 
certification that would allow them to receive military equipment from 
the 

[[Page S 13958]]
United States. The first cash payment by Pakistan of $50 million was 
made at the beginning of fiscal year 1990. Subsequent to the cutoff, 
which came because of the Pressler amendment which took affect in 
October 1990, Pakistan continued to send periodic payments for the 
manufacture of F-16's. That is, $150 million in fiscal 1991, $243 
million in fiscal 1992, $215 million in fiscal 1993, for a total of 
$658 million.
  Why did they continue to send money when they knew that U.S. law 
would not enable them to receive the planes? That is a question only 
they can answer. But it is not unlike an investor buying a stock of a 
company whose assets are under lien in the hope that the lien will 
somehow be removed. If it does not get removed, the investor can hardly 
call foul.
  All this is to say that the Pakis are hardly entitled to any sympathy 
in their national security plight in South Asia. They fought three wars 
with a much larger adversary, India, who is pursuing a nuclear weapons 
program and exploded a device in 1974. By virtue of the India nuclear 
program being indigenous and not in violation of the terms of the 
Glenn-Symington amendment, the Indians have not been subject to the 
amendment sanctions, which would not have been effective in any case 
since the Indians received only token amounts of economic or military 
assistance from the United States.
  But that is not the same thing as saying that United law is 
discriminatory in its application. Now, I indicated earlier we have 178 
nations who have signed up and extended the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty, made it a permanent treaty. It has been the policy of every 
American President over the past 25 years since the treaty went into 
effect to support the treaty, and we have been steadfast in that 
support.
  Now, the members of the treaty deserve our trust. We have to be 
deserving of that trust. They put their trust in us.
  Now, how will we be keeping faith with those 178 nations meeting in 
New York if the message that is sent is that a proliferator with a 
history of mendacity can receive from the United States a significant 
number of nuclear-weapons-delivery systems, that is, F-16's. Well, to 
even ask the question is to give the answer: The United States cannot 
be a champion of nonproliferation on the one hand and a facilitator of 
nuclear weapons development or delivery on the other.
  Sending F-16's to Pakistan before full realization of the history we 
laid out in this letter would indeed be a gross violation of our 
commitment to foster nonproliferation ethics in the world through the 
NPT and other means and would rightfully subject us to strong 
international criticism.
  I am certainly not an enemy of Pakistan. I visited there. I like the 
country. I supported them when they were threatened in the past, such 
as during the war in Afghanistan. I want their cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism and drugs. But surely we have to find a way to 
support them in these activities without enhancing their nuclear-
weapons-delivery systems.
  As to the cash payments for the F-16's, we cannot ignore the fact 
that, contrary to the grossly incorrect public statement made by 
Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel at a White House briefing on April 11, 
no payments were made by Pakistan before fiscal 1990. Sticking to the 
payment schedule of the contract until fiscal 1993 was a gamble by 
Pakistan that did not pay off. Now they want to be held harmless from 
losing their gamble.
  Now, I want to get them their money back, if we can possibly do it. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that U.S. officials did not disabuse the 
Pakistanis of the hope that making those payments would put pressure on 
the United States to reverse the Pressler sanctions and deliver the 
planes. But that is no reason to turn that hope into reality right now.
  Mr. President, there have been a number of milestones in the United 
States-Pakistan nuclear relations. The background of this arms transfer 
scheme can be summarized by recalling a sequence of some 10 milestones 
in the history of our nonproliferation efforts in Pakistan. I guess 
milestone 1 would involve those waivers and favors. Throughout the 
1980's, officials from the executive branch assured Congress and the 
American taxpayers that billions of dollars in aid that we shipped to 
Pakistan throughout that decade would shore up Pakistan's security and 
thereby act as a substantial break on Pakistan's nuclear program.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert at the end of my 
remarks a list of no less than 20 such assurances to Congress.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1).
  Mr. GLENN. To get this aid to Pakistan, Congress had to create some 
special waivers for the President to invoke, discriminatory waivers 
tailored exclusively on Pakistan's behalf. There was a waiver of our 
uranium enrichment sanctions on February 10, 1982, just for Pakistan. 
There was a waiver of our plutonium reprocessing sanctions on the same 
day, February 10, 1982, just for Pakistan. There was another waiver of 
our uranium enrichment sanctions on January 15, 1988, just for 
Pakistan. There was a waiver of a nuclear procurement sanction on the 
same day, January 15, 1988, just for Pakistan.
  There was a waiver of our uranium enrichment sanctions on March 28, 
1990, just for Pakistan.
  There were waiver authorities of uranium enrichment sanctions that 
Congress created but which fortunately were not exercised by the 
President on November 5, 1990, October 6, 1992, and September 30, 1993, 
once again, just for Pakistan.
  So much for the discrimination in United States policy, as though we 
are picking on Pakistan.
  By this record, the United States has unquestionably and shamelessly 
discriminated on behalf of Pakistan where American law was concerned. 
The next time I hear much complaint about the fact that the Pressler 
amendment only refers to Pakistan, I can only wonder what has happened 
to our memory about these waivers and about our appreciation for that 
history.
  The future of this great Republic depends upon our Nation's ability 
to learn from, not ignore, its experiences. I am tired of 
discrimination--all discrimination--but most especially discrimination 
in favor of proliferation. Of all the arguments that have been levied 
against the Pressler amendment, I have never heard anyone accuse it of 
being in favor of proliferation. That is more than I can say about the 
current proposal.
  Milestone 2, we title this ``Those Peaceful Nuclear Assurances.''
  Officials from Pakistan, meanwhile, lost no effort in blanketing our 
Capital with a blizzard of peaceful nuclear assurances. My staff 
assembled an impressive collection of over 70 of these promises, 
assurances, pledges and other offerings intended to reassure America 
that Pakistan was not just taking our aid and proceeding with its bomb, 
which is, of course, exactly what Pakistan was doing.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record at the 
end of my remarks a collection of these assurances that was compiled by 
Michelle Fraser, an intern with the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I recall hearing the testimony of the State 
Department's Under Secretary James L. Buckley before the 
Nonproliferation Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
back on June 24, 1981. He stated:

       I was assured by the ministers, I was assured by the 
     President himself that it was not the intention of the 
     Pakistani Government to develop nuclear weapons.

  Mr. Buckley went on to argue how new United States aid would act to 
curb Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Recall that at the time those 
remarks were spoken, very few commentators or analysts were claiming 
that Pakistan was a de facto nuclear weapons state. Pakistan did not 
have bomb-grade uranium from its unsafeguarded enrichment plant at 
Kahuta. News reports had not yet circulated that China had provided a 
design of a nuclear weapon to Pakistan along with other nuclear 
assistance. We had seen virtually nothing about Pakistan engaging in 
high-explosive testing of components of nuclear weapons.
  Pakistan had no fleet of F-16 aircraft which could potentially be 
used as a delivery system for nuclear weapons. 

[[Page S 13959]]
No, indeed, all the above came only after or during the massive flow of 
aid to Pakistan through the 1980's.
  Despite this record, we are hearing today some of the same old 
recycled arguments: Provide aid and it will buy us influence. Some 
people just refuse to believe that what Pakistan really wants is both 
its bomb and our aid.
  Milestone No. 3 we can title ``Proliferation Unbounded.'' By the mid-
1980's, the situation was really getting out of hand. Everybody knew 
that Pakistan's bomb program was rolling right along. This aid included 
substantial quantities of military assistance, even F-16 aircraft, that 
were quite suitable for use in delivering nuclear weapons.
  To illustrate the scope of the progress Pakistan was making on its 
bomb as we continued providing aid, Mr. President, I ask unanimous 
consent to print in the Record at the end of my remarks a chronology 
showing how bad the problem was.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the record is thus quite clear. There was a 
direct positive relationship between the flow of United States aid and 
the progress of Pakistan's bomb program, not the negative relationship 
that the executive repeatedly assured Congress would exist.
  Milestone No. 4, ``Congress Steps In.'' By 1985, Congress justifiably 
had enough. With the agreement of the executive and even the Pakistani 
Government, we passed a law known as the Pressler amendment to set some 
ground rules to permit the resumption of aid to Pakistan.
  That is overlooked, as my colleague Senator Pressler said on the 
floor just a while ago; that the Pressler amendment was supposed to set 
some ground rules to permit resumption of aid to Pakistan. First, 
Pakistan must not possess a nuclear explosive device, however; and 
second any new aid must reduce significantly the risk that it will 
possess such a device.
  Note how far the current legislative proposal departs from these 
responsible standards. Not only does the proposal call for resuming 
full economic aid and significant new arms deliveries to Pakistan 
despite its failure to satisfy the nonpossession standard, but the aid 
is supposed to be provided even if it has no effect whatsoever upon 
reducing the risk of Pakistan getting the bomb. For those who truly 
care about nonproliferation, this is truly a lose-lose proposition. 
Where is the beef? There is no beef.
  This brings me to milestone 5, the issue of the certifications that 
Pakistan did not possess the bomb. I guess we could title milestone 5, 
``From Red Line to Elastic Clause.''
  In the late 1980's, Pakistan crossed several additional red lines 
toward acquiring the bomb. Even its top nuclear scientists boasted in 
1987 that Pakistan already possessed the bomb, and somehow Pakistan 
kept receiving its annual certification that it did not possess. As for 
the executive's approach to the word ``possess'' through that period, I 
am reminded of a quote from a character in Lewis Carroll's ``Through 
the Looking Glass:'' ``When I use a word,'' Humpty Dumpty said in 
rather a scornful tone, ``it means just what I choose it to mean, 
neither more or less.''
  That is where we find ourselves in regard to defining the word 
``possess.'' It can mean so many different things.
  There comes a time when we need to hold the line against the 
temptation of our officials to redefine terms of law for diplomatic 
convenience. As for the possession standard, fate would soon catch up 
with Pakistan.
  Milestone 6, ``A Nuclear Near Miss.'' In the summer of 1990, Pakistan 
almost engaged in a nuclear exchange with India. If any of my 
colleagues are skeptical about the relevance of nuclear weapons 
proliferation in South Asia to United States national security, I 
strongly recommend they read Seymour Hersh, in an article published in 
the New Yorker on March 29, 1993, aptly entitled ``On the Brink of 
Nuclear War: How Pakistan Came Close to Dropping the Bomb--And How We 
Helped Them Get It.''
  This article is, incidentally, also a good candidate of the 
eccentricities of our system for enforcing export controls. The article 
describes a 1986 United States undercover operation to stop yet another 
planned Pakistani purchase of United States nuclear-related material. 
According to Hersh:

       The State Department's Near East Bureau was not told of the 
     planned operation, for fear that the officers there would tip 
     off the Pakistanis, as they had done in the past, by sending 
     a diplomatic protest (known as a demarche) to the Pakistani 
     Government.

  Though the operation ultimately led to the highly publicized arrest 
of Mr. Arshad Z. Pervez in July 1987 on charges of trying illegally to 
buy 25 tons of special steel used in Pakistan's uranium enrichment 
program, it was surely not due to much help from the regional experts 
in the State Department. In a statement related directly to our subject 
today, one nonproliferation official told Hersh in the article that.

       ``The only thing we had going for us. . .was the Pressler 
     and Solarz amendments.''

  Such accounts of our export control process only further reinforce my 
opposition to the scheme offered in the recent State authorization bill 
to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and transfer all of 
its functions to the State Department, in effect, making State the new 
nonproliferation czar.
  Fortunately, there do appear to be some individuals left in 
Government, as indicated in the last quote, who treat the Pressler 
amendment as a useful tool rather than an obstacle to be circumvented.
  Milestone 7, ``Judgment Day.'' By October 1, 1990, even the State 
Department lawyers had enough and finally ran out of words to explain 
why Pakistan deserved its annual nuclear certification. President Bush 
decided not to renew Pakistan's nuclear meal ticket. The time had 
finally come for proliferation to start costing something.
  Milestone 8, ``New Nuclear Assurances, This Time to Congress.'' Since 
1990, representatives from both the Bush and Clinton Administrations 
have sought to repeal the Pressler amendment--these representatives 
promised Congress, in writing and repeatedly, that even if the Pressler 
amendment were repealed, rest assured, it would remain the policy of 
the United States to require Pakistan to satisfy the Pressler 
standards. Furthermore, Congress was assurred by the Executive that 
when it came to licensing commercial arms sales, we would never, never, 
never approve any ``upgrades'' to existing military capabilities in 
Pakistan.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
at this point a few samples of these assurances.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Conditions for Resuming Economic Aid to Pakistan: A Historical Review 
               of Executive Branch Assurances to Congress

       April 12, 1991: President Bush sends a letter to Congress 
     accompanying the Administration's ``International Cooperation 
     Act of 1991''--the letter acknowledges an intent to repeal 
     the Pressler Amendment, but reassures Congress that: ``I will 
     continue to insist on unambiguous specific steps by Pakistan 
     in meeting nonproliferation standards, including those 
     specifically reflected in the omitted language, known as the 
     Pressler Amendment. Satisfaction of the Pressler standard 
     will remain the essential basis for exercising the national 
     interest waiver that is in the Administration's proposal in 
     order to resume economic and military assistance to 
     Pakistan.''
       November 24, 1993: State Department spokesman Michael 
     McCurry says that: ``. . . as a matter of administration 
     policy, we will continue to apply Pressler standards'' to 
     Pakistan.
       November 25, 1993: Assistant Secretary of State Wendy 
     Sherman is quoted as having said in a letter to Congress 
     accompanying the Clinton Administration's new foreign 
     assistance bill that: ``The absence of any country-specific 
     language in this draft should not be interpreted as 
     constituting a change in U.S. policy toward any country.''
       November 26, 1993: After the Clinton Administration 
     introduced its new foreign aid legislation would repeal the 
     Pressler Amendment, the State Department issued the following 
     statement: ``Even if a new foreign assistance act without 
     specific language on Pakistan were passed, we would continue 
     to apply Pressler standards to Pakistan.''
       November 30, 1993: State Department spokeswoman, Christine 
     Shelley, tells reporters that despite the Administration's 
     efforts to drop the Pressler Amendment, ``. . . satisfaction 
     of the Pressler standard will remain the essential basis for 
     exercising any national interest waiver and for resuming 
     economic and military assistance, including any decision by 
     the U.S. Government to sell or transfer military technology 
     to Pakistan . . . What we have indicated is that Pakistan 
     would continue to be subject to sanctions 

[[Page S 13960]]
     along the lines of the Pressler amendment under the administration's 
     new proposal.''

  Mr. GLENN. Just as the United States expects Pakistan to comply with 
its nuclear assurances, I think it is fair for the Congress to insist 
on the Executive honoring its own assurances to Congress when it comes 
to implementing our nuclear nonproliferation policy.
  Milestone 9, ``Some Early Signs of Restraint.'' Although Pakistan's 
bomb program is no doubt continuing, and it is indeed maintaining its 
nuclear and missile cooperation with China, it may have also acted to 
halt production of highly-enriched uranium I would like to inform my 
colleagues today that this is the most significant restraint I have 
seen in some 15 years in Pakistan's nuclear program--the bad news is 
that Pakistan's bomb program has not disappeared from the face of the 
earth, the good news is that it is not expanding as rapidly as we once 
thought, and the news which most Americans will probably be most 
gratified to hear is that this first demonstration of genuine nuclear 
restraint by Pakistan did not cost the American taxpayer a red cent--it 
is due entirely to the effect of the Pressler amendment. This is the 
law that detractors continue to tar as having been ``ineffective'' or 
``inflexible.''
  Supporters of the Pressler amendment make no apologies about standing 
up for this ``inflexible'' law. After all, my dictionary defines this 
term as follows, ``. . . of an unyielding temper, purpose, will, etc.'' 
To supporters of nonproliferation generally, the alternative of 
``passive accommodation'' has little attraction indeed. Thus we have no 
quarrel with the charge that the Pressler amendment has been 
inflexible. Let us be glad it has.
  Unfortunately, this term is not quite accurate, given the significant 
flexibility that the law has shown in recent years to allow the 
following to occur in spite of Pakistan's continued violations of that 
law: First, the United States still issues licenses to export 
commercial munitions and spare parts to Pakistan, including spares for 
Pakistan's nuclear-weapon delivery vehicle, the F-16; second, United 
States military visits and joint training exercises continue to take 
place; third, United States aid with respect to agriculture, 
counterterrorism, nutrition, population control, literacy, advancement 
of women, health and medicine, environmental protection, disaster 
relief, and many other areas can continue to flow to Pakistan via 
nongovernmental organizations; fourth, the Export-Import Bank also has 
extended loans, grants, and guarantees to Pakistan; fifth, PL-480 
agricultural aid continues; sixth, arms control verification assistance 
continues (a seismic station); seventh, millions of dollars of aid in 
the ``pipeline'' as of October 1990 was allowed to flow to Pakistan; 
eighth, cooperation on peacekeeping is continuing; and ninth, Pakistan 
continues to receive billions of dollars in development assistance via 
multilateral lending agencies.
  Also under this so-called inflexible law, Pakistan has used almost 
$200 million in FMS credits to fund the purchase of 11 F-16's between 
fiscal years 1989 and 1993, of which about $150 million were used after 
the Pressler sanctions were invoked. And the United States continues to 
review and license exports of dual-use goods and technology to 
Pakistan.
  Milestone 10, ``Today's Debate.'' Which brings us here today: a 
milestone of its own in the history of United States efforts to grapple 
with Pakistan's bomb. It is not so much a milestone as a crossroads--do 
we stand up for a strong nonproliferation policy, or do we tell 
Pakistan and the rest of the world that proliferation pays, in a big 
way?
  Here we stand, debating a proposal which I think is appropriate to 
call, ``Operation Deja Vu''--a scheme to ship, under the false flags of 
``fairness'' and helping out an old friend, several more hundred 
million dollars of military equipment to Pakistan. Who knows, the 
argument goes, it may even lead to some sentiment of good will that may 
someday serve the cause of nonproliferation. There never was a better 
illustration a policy based on a triumph of hope over experience, than 
there has been with respect to United States policies toward Pakistan's 
bomb.
  Why in the world, given the chronology I have just reviewed, should 
any one Member of this August Chamber believe for a single moment that 
the delivery of this lethal military gear will have any effect 
whatsoever on restraining Pakistan's bomb program? Why should we be 
unconditionally lifting all economic sanctions on Pakistan? Has anybody 
really even considered the signal such a gesture would send to 
proliferators around the world?
  This gear that we would transfer under this proposal is, by the way, 
not only lethal, but it could well trigger a regional arms race that 
would destabilize the whole balance of power in South Asia. The Indian 
government has already said it would not simply stand by and watch 
hundreds of millions of dollars in new military gear flow from the 
United States to Pakistan. We are talking about delivering upgrades for 
Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Upgrades for Cobra 
helicopters. Additional P-3 antisubmarine aircraft. All kinds of 
tactical missiles: Harpoons, AIMs, TOW's, and battlefield rockets. Over 
a quarter billion dollars' worth of such items. To say the shipment of 
these goods will have no political or military consequences in South
 Asia is simply wrong. But the proposal does not only address new 
military transfers.

  It is the unconditional lifting of economic sanctions, also. The 
proposal would also lift unconditionally all economic sanctions against 
Pakistan under the Pressler amendment, even though Pakistan is still in 
violation of that amendment. It seems reasonable that before we rush 
off to provide United States Government guarantees for private loans to 
Pakistan, we should surely first take a close look at the potential 
risks and costs that will be borne by the American taxpayer who will, 
under the current proposal, underwrite those hundreds of millions of 
dollars in private United States investment in Pakistan--a country 
whose once-impressive leading city is now virtually off-limits to 
foreign visitors because it has become a battleground of urban 
terrorism. Editorials in Pakistani newspapers are themselves asking if 
Pakistan can survive in such a climate of domestic unrest.
  Economic aid might also not quite be the peaceful activity that some 
might believe it is. For years, our intelligence experts have been 
aware of the potential role that economic assistance can play in 
assisting a country to acquire the bomb. Then-CIA Director James 
Woolsey, for example, stated the following in a written reply to a 
question after a hearing of the Governmental Affairs Committee on 
February 24, 1993:

       Loans and grants from both bilateral and multilateral aid 
     agencies free money for Pakistan to spend on its nuclear 
     program . . . these untied funds helped finance civilian 
     imports, freeing an equivalent amount of funds to spend on 
     the nuclear program.

  No, unconditionally lifting economic sanctions on Pakistan is not a 
neutral benign act. It is an action that conflicts with, rather than 
promotes, our nonproliferation goals. Providing such assistance will 
not give Pakistan a free market. It surely does not have such a market 
today. Indeed, the Heritage Foundation recently issued a survey called 
``The Index of Economic Freedom'' which placed Pakistan's market in the 
category, ``Mostly Not Free.'' As for foreign economic aid, here is 
what the study had to say about past aid to Pakistan:

       Much of this aid has been squandered in economically 
     useless projects, and Pakistan has been unwilling to adopt 
     significant economic reforms.

  Yet proponents of lifting economic sanctions still seem to believe--
despite both facts and reason to the contrary--that this is a great 
idea. That it will serve our economic interests. That it will 
discourage proliferation.
  All of this I feel is utter nonsense. The aid will only inspire the 
flow of American tax dollars out of the wallets of U.S. citizens to a 
country determined to have both the bomb and U.S. aid. I think that is 
the wrong course to go.
  Now to look at the F-16's for a moment.
  I have examined the list of items that would be shipped off to 
Pakistan under this proposal and find that it actually includes 
upgrades--that is right, reliability upgrades--to the engines for 
Pakistan's F-16 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. So here we are, 
waving 

[[Page S 13961]]
our finger at Pakistan's bomb program, while bending over backward to 
assist Pakistan directly to deliver such weapons. With due respect to 
my colleague from Colorado and to a few offices in the Executive who 
support this scheme, there is simply no justification for such a 
transfer that serves our nonproliferation interests. None.
  I have heard it often said that basic ``fairness'' requires us to 
deliver this equipment since Pakistan already ``paid'' for it.
  What exactly did Pakistan actually pay for? Pakistan surely did not 
pay cash for all of these goods--a good part of their purchases were 
financed by United States taxpayers by means of foreign military sales 
credits, many of them, by the way were used well after sanctions came 
into effect in October 1990. All of the P-3 aircraft that Pakistan 
wants to use for antisubmarine operations, for example, had an FMF 
funding source. In February 1994, I regret to report, Pakistan engaged 
in joint naval exercises with Iran--by at least one account, P-3 
aircraft were used in those exercises. Why are we even considering 
shipping antisubmarine aircraft to a country that engages in joint 
military exercises with a terrorist state--not just any run-of-the-mill 
terrorist state, but a terrorist state that our own Secretary of State 
has declared is pursuing a crash program to acquire nuclear weapons?
  The proposal would also upgrade Pakistan's Cobra helicopters--
evidently abandoning our current policy of not
 upgrading Pakistan's military capabilities. This assistance too is 
funded by FMF credits. How about tactical missile systems? The Harpoon 
antiship, TOW missiles, AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, and 2.75-inch 
rockets in this little package are also funded via the FMF route--
presumably these missiles are not exclusively for peaceful purposes, 
except perhaps by Pakistan's definition of the phrase.

  Even many of the engine upgrades for Pakistan's F-16 nuclear weapon 
delivery vehicle were paid for using FMF money. Eleven of the twenty-
eight F-16's that Pakistan ordered, but which could not be delivered 
due to Pakistan's noncompliance with the Pressler amendment, were 
financed with FMF money. Recall that of the $199 million available in 
FMF credits for the eleven planes, Pakistan used only a quarter of 
these credits by the time sanctions were invoked in October 1990. They 
used the remaining three-quarters after sanctions were in place. As for 
the remaining 17 planes, they were paid for in cash--of these payments, 
however, over $600 million out of a total $658 million were paid by 
Pakistan after sanctions were invoked in October 1990. In short, they 
were paying for planes they knew they were not qualified to receive.
  Besides the issue of money, why should we help Pakistan to improve 
its nuclear weapon delivery capability? My staff has brought to my 
attention a major study performed by Stanford University's 
distinguished Center for International Security and Arms Control in 
1991 entitled, ``Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its 
Control.'' Here is what the Stanford study had to say about Pakistan's 
F-16's:

       Pakistan is widely believed to have either already 
     developed nuclear warheads or to be on the brink of acquiring 
     them. Pakistani F-16 aircraft could be effective nuclear-
     delivery vehicles even if Pakistan's nuclear warheads are 
     large and heavy.

  Now that quote is significant enough to leave little doubt about the 
capabilities of this aircraft; indeed, they are nuclear-capable in our 
own inventory. But it is also interesting that at least three officials 
of the current administration, including Secretary of Defense Perry, 
were listed as participants in that study.
  I am reminded also of a passage from Seymour Hersh's article in the 
March 1993 issue of the New Yorker. Writing about the near nuclear war 
between Pakistan and India in 1990, Hersh writes:

       The American intelligence community noticed an intense 
     increase in Pakistani radar activity early in the year. 
     Earlier reports showed that the Pakistani Air Force, working 
     closely with officials from Pakistan's nuclear-weapons 
     program, had stepped up its F-16 training to practice what 
     seemed to be the dropping of a nuclear bomb. Further 
     intelligence, from Germany, reported that the Pakistanis had 
     designed a nuclear warhead that could be fitted under the 
     wing of an F-16, and that the design had gone through a 
     series of wind-tunnel tests. Pakistan was also reported to 
     have learned to program its in-flight computer system to 
     provide the correct flight path for a nuclear-bomb run.

  I ask unanimous consent that several quotes relating to Pakistan's F-
16's be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 4.)
  Mr. GLENN. So now we are discussing shipping over some more spare 
parts for these nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Here is what 
Pakistan's federal minister for defense production, Mir Hazar Khan 
Bijarani, said in an interview in 1992 concerning the various ways the 
Pressler amendment has been interpreted with respect to Pakistan's F-
16's:

       We did face tremendous problems in acquiring spare parts 
     [for F-16's] after the suspension of U.S. military 
     assistance, but now we have overcome this problem as the 
     Americans have lifted [the] ban on commercial sales.

  See how this works. First we relax commercial sales of spare parts 
for Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. And now, here we are 
debating whether to provide on a government-to-government basis some 
gear to upgrade Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.
  Let us not be blind to what we are proposing to do: after years of 
fighting for nuclear nonproliferation, the Congress under this proposal 
would put on the statute books America's first nuclear proliferation 
law. Rest assured, if this proposal passes, America will not be the 
only country with other nuclear proliferation laws on their own books. 
The race will be on to cash in on proliferation, rather than to prevent 
it. This is an extremely dangerous course and one which the Congress 
should summarily reject as contrary to the national security interests 
of the United States. It is an embarrassment to this legislature even 
to be debating this extremely ill-advised scheme.


                             what is fair?

  I must come back to the basic question: what exactly is fair? Is it 
fair for Pakistan to have given the United States solemn assurances 
that it proceeded to break with impunity?
  Recently, Prime Minister Bhutto declared during her recent visit to 
the United States that Pakistan had kept its contract with
 America. I will repeat this: that Pakistan had kept its contract with 
America.

  Some of us might recall when Prime Minister Bhutto addressed a joint 
session of Congress back on June 7, 1989, when the Prime Minister 
solemnly stated the following:

       Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not 
     possess, nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. [Extended 
     applause.] That is our policy.

  Mr. President, that was Pakistan's contract with America. That is 
what United States taxpayers were being told about Pakistan's bomb 
program. It is that contract, I submit, that Pakistan has proven so 
utterly incapable of fulfilling. Yet here we stand, debating fairness. 
The absurdity of the proposal that is the focus of this debate simply 
defies description.
  I read recently a statement from Mr. John Malott, then the interim 
director of the State Department's South Asia bureau, which appeared in 
an AFP wire service report on May 16, 1993. Here is what Mr. Malott had 
to say about the fairness issue:

       We kept our part of the bargain but Pakistan let us down by 
     crossing the line in 1990 . . . we had promised Pakistan 
     billions and billions of dollars if that line was not 
     crossed.

  So much for what is fair. Mr. Malott put it exactly right: Pakistan 
broke its contract with America. It is now paying a price that should 
only go up with time, not down. To lower the price of proliferation is 
to condone proliferation. That is not our policy. That is not our 
domestic law. That is not at all consistent with our solemn 
international treaty commitments.
 That is how we should want other countries to treat proliferants.

  Mr. President, I want to restate very briefly the theme I used in 
starting out. This is not about fairness. We have been fair. Pakistan 
has been unfair with us.
  The issue here is, are we serious about nonproliferation in the 
world? Are we a world leader in nonproliferation or are we not? Do we 
have a proliferation policy or is it one that only 

[[Page S 13962]]
comes out for press conference purposes or at time of political 
campaigns?
  We took the lead in getting 178 nations to sign the nonproliferation 
treaty. They put their trust in us. They also trusted that there would 
be sanctions against people who were not willing to cooperate, if they 
were egregious violators of what we thought was right.
  We have seen Pakistan be the most egregious violator. We have seen 
them be uncooperative with regard to nuclear matters. They have not 
joined NPT. They have not gone by NPT rules. They have violated every 
norm of diplomatic behavior in telling us things that were not true and 
that we knew were not true. I do not think that kind of mendacity 
should be rewarded by sending the material that is proposed by the 
amendment.
  These have been nothing but untruths told to us through the years, 
over and over again. I will not read those off again. It seems to me, 
if we are to deserve the trust of the nations that signed up under NPT 
and followed our leadership, then I believe we must refuse to approve 
this amendment. I know the Senator from California will have a proposal 
in the morning for a substitute amendment and we will look at it in the 
morning and see whether we feel we can support it or not. But as for 
the amendment we are debating tonight, it is one I just cannot support 
and I urge my colleagues not to support it.
                               Exhibit 1

     U.S. Aid Policies and Pakistan's Bomb: What were we trying to 
                              accomplish?

       Letters to Congress from Presidents Reagan & Bush, 1985-
     1989, required under Sec. 620E(e) of Foreign Assistance Act 
     (Pressler Amendment):
       ``The proposed United States assistance program for 
     Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk 
     that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a 
     device. I am convinced that our security relationship and 
     assistance program are the most effective means available for 
     us to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive 
     devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan 
     address its substantial and legitimate security needs, 
     thereby reducing incentives and creating disincentives for 
     Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives.''--President 
     George Bush, 10/5/89; President Ronald Reagan, 11/18/89; 12/
     17/87; 10/27/86; & 11/25/85.
       President George Bush, letter to Congress (addressed to J. 
     Danforth Quayle as President of the Senate), 12 April 1991, 
     urging abandonment of Pressler certification requirement:
       ``. . . my intention is to send the strongest possible 
     message to Pakistan and other potential proliferators that 
     nonproliferation is among the highest priorities of my 
     Administration's foreign policy, irrespective of whether such 
     a policy is required by law.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer, 
     testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
       ``None of the F-16's Pakistan already owns or is about to 
     purchase is configured for nuclear delivery . . . a Pakistan 
     with a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated 
     to purchase a nuclear weapons capability.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, 
     testimony before House subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
       ``Finally, we believe that past and continued American 
     support for Pakistan's conventional defense reduces the 
     likelihood that Pakistan will feel compelled to cross the 
     nuclear threshold.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Peck, testimony 
     before House subcommittee, 17 February 1988:
       ``We believe that the improvements in Pakistan's 
     conventional military forces made possible by U.S. assistance 
     and the U.S. security commitment our aid program symbolizes 
     have had a significant influence on Pakistan's decision to 
     forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons.''
       Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony 
     before two House subcommittees, 22 October 1987:
       ``We have made it clear that Pakistan must show restraint 
     in its nuclear program if it expects us to continue providing 
     security assistance.''
       Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, testimony 
     before Senate subcommittee, 18 March 1987:
       ``Our assistance relationship is designed to advance both 
     our non-proliferation and our strategic objectives relating 
     to Afghanistan. Development of a close and reliable security 
     partnership with Pakistan gives Pakistan an alternative to 
     nuclear weapons to meet its legitimate security needs and 
     strengthens our influence on Pakistan's nuclear decision 
     making. Shifting to a policy of threats and public ultimata 
     would in our view decrease, not increase our ability to 
     continue to make a contribution to preventing a nuclear arms 
     race in South Asia. Undermining the credibility of the 
     security relationship with the U.S. would itself create 
     incentives for Pakistan to ignore our concerns and push 
     forward in the direction of nuclear weapons acquisition.''
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Howard Schaffer, 
     testimony before House subcommittee 6 February 1984:
       ``The assistance program also contributes to U.S. nuclear 
     non-proliferation goals. We believe strongly that a program 
     of support which enhances Pakistan's sense of security helps 
     remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition 
     of a nuclear weapons capability. The Government of Pakistan 
     understands our deep concern over this issue. We have made 
     clear that the relationship between our two countries, and 
     the program of military and economic assistance on which it 
     rests, are ultimately inconsistent with Pakistan's 
     development of a nuclear explosive device. President Zia has 
     stated publicly that Pakistan will not manufacture a nuclear 
     explosives device.''
       Special Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, testimony 
     before two House subcommittees, 1 November 1983:
       ``By helping friendly nations to address legitimate 
     security concerns, we seek to reduce incentives for the 
     acquisition of nuclear weapons. The provision of security 
     assistance and the sale of military equipment can be major 
     components of efforts along these lines. Development of 
     security ties to the U.S. can strengthen a country's 
     confidence in its ability to defend itself without nuclear 
     weapons. At the same time, the existence of such a 
     relationship enhances our credibility when we seek to 
     persuade that country to forego [sic] nuclear arm . . . We 
     believe that strengthening Pakistan's conventional military 
     capability serves a number of important U.S. interests, 
     including non-proliferation. At the same time, we have made 
     clear to the government of Pakistan that efforts to acquire 
     nuclear explosives would jeopardize our security assistance 
     program.''
       Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry 
     Marshall, 12 September 1983, before International Nuclear Law 
     Association, San Francisco.
       ``U.S. assistance has permitted Pakistan to strengthen its 
     conventional defensive capability. This serves to bolster its 
     stability and thus reduce its motivation for acquiring 
     nuclear explosives.''
       President Ronald Reagan, Report to Congress pursuant to 
     Sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601 
     Report''), for calendar year 1982:
       ``Steps were taken to strengthen the U.S. security 
     relationship with Pakistan with the objective of addressing 
     that country's security needs and thereby reducing any 
     motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives.''
       ``President Ronald Reagan, Report to Congress pursuant to 
     Sec. 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (``601 
     Report''), for calendar year 1981:
       ``Military assistance by the United States and the 
     establishment of a new security relationship with Pakistan 
     should help to counterpart its possible motivations toward 
     acquiring nuclear weapons . . . Moreover, help from the 
     United States in strengthening Pakistan's conventional 
     military capabilities would offer the best available means 
     for counteracting possible motivations toward acquiring 
     nuclear weapons.''
       Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, address before 
     Atomic Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 1 December 1981:
       ``We believe that this assistance--which is in the 
     strategic interest of the United States--will make a 
     significant contribution to the well-being and security of 
     Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that 
     government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers 
     the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding 
     with the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives.
       Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before 
     Senate Foreign Relations committee, 12 November 1981:
       ``We believe that a program of support which provides 
     Pakistan with a continuing relationship with a significant 
     security partner and enhances its sense of security may help 
     remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition 
     of a nuclear weapons capability. With such a relationship in 
     place we are hopeful that over time we will be able to 
     persuade Pakistan that the pursuit of a weapons capability is 
     neither necessary to its security nor in its broader interest 
     as an important member of the world community.''
       Testimony of Undersecretary of State James Buckley, in 
     response to question from Sen. Glenn, Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee, 12 November 1981, on effects of a 
     nuclear detonation on continuation of cash sales of F-16's:
       ``[Sen Glenn] . . . so if Pakistan detonates a nuclear 
     device before completion of the F-16 sale, will the 
     administration cut off future deliveries?
       ``[Buckley] Again, Senator, we have underscored the fact 
     that this would dramatically affect the relationship. The 
     cash sales are part of that relationship. I cannot see 
     drawing lines between the impact in the case of a direct cash 
     sale versus a guaranteed or U.S.-financed sale.''
       Undersecretary of State James Buckley, letter to NY times, 
     25 July 1981:
       ``In place of the ineffective sanctions on Pakistan's 
     nuclear program imposed by the past Administration, we hope 
     to address through conventional means the sources of 
     insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a 
     nuclear capability in the first place.''
                                                                    ____


[[Page S 13963]]


                               Exhibit 2

           Pakistan's Peaceful Nuclear Assurances: 1979-1995

       ``[Pakistan's government has] . . . summarily rejected as 
     false the charge that Pakistan was developing its nuclear 
     program with assistance from or in partnership with Libya or 
     any other country.''--Pakistani Foreign Ministry Spokesman, 
     NY Times, 4/9/79.
       ``Pakistan has not sought or obtained financial assistance 
     from Libya or any other country for its nuclear program.''--
     Pakistan Embassy, Pakistan Affairs, 6/16/80.
       ``Pakistan's nuclear development programme is solely for 
     peaceful purposes and it has no plans to make nuclear 
     weapons.''--Qutubuddian Aziz, Pakistan Embassy in UK, London 
     Sunday Times, 2/1/81.
       ``I was assured by the ministers, I was assured by the 
     President [Zia] himself that it is not the intention of the 
     Pakistani Government to develop nuclear weapons.''--Under 
     Secretary of State James Buckley, congressional hearing, 6/
     24/81.
       Senator John Glenn. ``. . . is it your view that we should 
     go ahead with the arms sale to Pakistan without assurances 
     that they are not in a [nuclear] weapons production mode?''
       Under Secretary Buckley. ``That assurance was given . . . 
     by the Pakistani government.''--Under Secretary of State 
     James Buckley, congressional hearing, 6/24/81.
       ``I say that Pakistan's nuclear technology will not be 
     given to any other nation. We will work, we will borrow, and 
     we will beg for this technology. God willing we will never 
     pass it to any other nation.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, 
     interview published in Turkish Hurriyet, 11/25/81.
       ``You know, Pakistan is engaged and will strive to acquire 
     nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But Pakistan has 
     neither the capability nor the intention of making an atomic 
     bomb . . . in no circumstances.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, 
     after meeting with President Mitterrand, Reuters, 1/26/82.
       ``We, too, are engaged in a nuclear programme, with the 
     sole aim of finding a viable alternate to the traditional 
     sources of energy, which are in scarce supply in Pakistan. 
     Despite our repeated assurances, however, there has been an 
     orchestrated campaign to malign us by falsely attributing to 
     our peaceful programme a nonexistent military dimension.''--
     President Zia-Ul-Haq, address at US National Press Club, 12/
     8/82.
       ``The Pakistan side reiterated that Pakistan was not 
     interested in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
     weapons. . . . We accept that the President of Pakistan is 
     telling us the truth.''--U.S. official, after meeting between 
     Presidents Zia and Reagan, NY Times, 12/8/82.
       ``[President Zia] . . . stated very emphatically that it is 
     not the intention of Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and 
     that it is not doing so.''--Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, 
     Washington Post, 12/8/82.
       ``. . . I would like to state once again, and with all the 
     emphasis at my command, if I have that, that our on-going 
     nuclear programme has an exclusively peaceful dimension and 
     that Pakistan has neither the means nor, indeed, any desire 
     to manufacture a nuclear device. I thrust [sic] that this 
     distinguished gathering will take note of my assurance, which 
     is given in all sincerity and with a full sense of 
     responsibility.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, address before 
     Foreign Policy Association, 12/9/82.
       ``In our opinion, there is no such thing as a peaceful 
     [nuclear] device or a nonpeaceful device. It's like a sword. 
     You can cut your throat; you can save yourself. We are 
     planning neither.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, Meet the Press, 
     12/12/82.
       ``. . . I hereby certify that I have reliable assurances 
     that Pakistan will not transfer sensitive United States 
     equipment, materials, or technology in violation of 
     agreements entered into under the Arms Export Control Act to 
     any communist country, or to any country that receives arms 
     from a communist country.''--President Ronald Reagan, 
     Presidential Determination 83-4, 1/3/83.
       ``The Government of Pakistan understands our deep concern 
     over this issue [Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons]. We 
     have made clear that the relationship between our two 
     countries, and the program of military and economic 
     assistance on which it rests, are ultimately inconsistent 
     with Pakistan's development of a nuclear explosives device. 
     President Zia has stated publicly that Pakistan will not 
     manufacture a nuclear explosives device.''--Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary of State Howard Shaffer, congressional testimony, 
     2/6/84.
       ``I must make one thing absolutely clear: contrary to the 
     mischievous foreign propaganda, no foreign country has given 
     financial or technical aid to us in this [nuclear] field . . 
     . The `Islamic bomb' is a figment of the Zionist mind . . 
     .''.--Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's top nuclear 
     scientist, interview published 2/10/84.
       ``Pakistan has stated time and again that it has absolutely 
     no intention of using nuclear technology for military 
     purposes.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, address on 7/10/84.
       ``Pakistan does not deny that it has a research and 
     development program on uranium enrichment at Kahuta. But it 
     is of a modest scale and is designed entirely for acquiring 
     technology to meet Pakistan's future power generation 
     requirements based on light water reactors . . . Pakistan has 
     no team for designing nuclear weapons . . . Pakistan has 
     never used Turkey as a channel for the import of materials 
     from French or West German companies. Nor has it imported 
     uranium from Libya . . . It was established long ago that 
     Libya was not giving Pakistan any assistance for its nuclear 
     program. Similarly, the allegation of Saudi help is also 
     without foundation. For its non-existent nuclear weapons 
     program Pakistan has neither sought nor has it received 
     assistance from China.''--Information Division, Embassy of 
     Pakistan, July 1984.
       ``We have repeatedly declared that our nuclear energy 
     program has an exclusively peaceful dimension and that we 
     have no intention of acquiring or manufacturing nuclear 
     weapons . . . The allegation of any nuclear cooperation 
     between Pakistan and China has been rejected by both 
     countries . . .''--Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Kahn, 
     Islamabad, 7/28/84.
       ``We are now approaching the end of 1984, but the dread 
     explosion of imaginary Pakistani nuclear device is nowhere in 
     sight. What could be a more convincing proof of the sincerity 
     of Pakistan's repeated assurances that its program is not 
     weapon-oriented?''--Iqbal Butt, Minister of Information, 
     Embassy of Pakistan, Washington Post, 8/30/84.
       ``I have no fears at all that [American] aid will be 
     stopped. The relationship is based on trust and I have said 
     we are not building a nuclear bomb.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, 
     interview with AP, 8/12/84. (Pakistan Affairs, 9/1/84).
       ``As we have repeatedly stated, we have assurances from the 
     Pakistani government that its nuclear power program is 
     entirely peaceful in intent and that it does not seek to 
     acquire nuclear explosives of any kind.''--State Department 
     spokesman John Hughes, quoted by AP, 10/25/84.
       ``We accepted President Zia-Ul-Haq's categorical statement 
     that Pakistan's nuclear program is devoted entirely to power 
     generation.''--US Ambassador at Large Richard Kennedy, 11/2/
     84, in Pakistan Affairs, 12/1/85.
       ``US officials say the letter [from President Reagan to 
     President Zia] warned Zia not to process uranium at the 
     controversial Kahuta plant outside Islamabad beyond 5 per 
     cent enrichment . . . Zia's letter [of reply] gave assurances 
     that Pakistan would respect the new marker . . . Other 
     markers previously communicated to Pakistan include not 
     testing a bomb, not reprocessing plutonium . . . not 
     assembling a bomb, and not asking another country to test a 
     device on Pakistan's behalf . . .''--Simon Henderson, London 
     Financial Times, 12/7/84.
       ``. . . our [nuclear] programme is for our own resources to 
     be generated. It is not for any atomic bomb or any other 
     purpose.''--Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, interview, 
     6/14/85.
       ``The Government of Pakistan and its President have 
     repeatedly declared that Pakistan would not produce nor 
     acquire nuclear weapons, and that our research programme is 
     for purely peaceful purposes.''--Ali Arshad, Embassy of 
     Pakistan in UK, London Times, 9/27/85.
       ``I take this opportunity to reaffirm Pakistan's policy of 
     developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and its 
     irrevocable commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or 
     nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan has neither the 
     capability nor the desire to develop nuclear weapons.''--
     President Zia-Ul-Haq, Address before UN General Assembly, 10/
     23/85.
       ``As for the Kahuta laboratory, it has been clarified time 
     and again at the highest political level that the modest 
     exercise there in uranium enrichment is on a research and 
     development scale. It is solely motivated by a desire to 
     achieve a degree of self-reliance in the front end of the 
     nuclear fuel cycle, that is, a 3-percent enrichment of 
     uranium.''--Leaflet from Information Division, Embassy of 
     Pakistan, October 1985.
       ``Let me add here, Mr. Chairman, President Zia has, in 
     fact, given the most unequivocal assurances on the question 
     of a nuclear explosives program. He has stated there will be 
     no such explosives program completed and that he understands
      fully the concerns which we have expressed to him and 
     respects those concerns.''--Ambassador Richard Kennedy, 
     congressional testimony on 4/10/86.
       ``Dr. [Abdul Qadeer Khan] noted that President Zia ul-Haq 
     had made a commitment to the U.S. not to enrich beyond 5 per 
     cent and said ``we are keeping to it.''--Simon Henderson, 
     interview with Dr. A.Q. Khan, Financial Times, 7/16/86.
       ``[Prime Minister Junejo reportedly assures U.S. senators 
     that Pakistan is] . . . abiding by the guidelines'' 
     established by the U.S. and specifically that Pakistan is 
     keeping components separate.''--Don Oberdorfer, Washington 
     Post, 7/17/86. [Oberdorfer wrote that Junejo appeared to be 
     referring to Reagan's September 1984 letter asking Pakistan's 
     to limit its uranium enrichment level at 5 percent, 
     Oberdorfer added that ``Earlier U.S. messages to Pakistan 
     reportedly included a warning not to assemble components in a 
     way that would create a bomb.'']
       ``The prime minister [Junejo] confirmed that Pakistan 
     pledged in response to a 1984 letter from Reagan not to 
     enrich uranium in its nuclear facilities to a level higher 
     than 5 percent.''--Interview with Prime Minister Mohammad 
     Khan Junejo, Washington Post, 7/18/86.
       ``Ours is a modest research programme. Its aim is to 
     acquire fuel production capability for the reactors we need 
     to meet our energy requirements. I reiterate here that 
     Pakistan has no intention to produce nuclear weapons. We do 
     not posses the capability and the resources.''--Prime 
     Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, Foreign Policy Association, 7/
     21/86.

[[Page S 13964]]

       ``[On U.S. concerns about Pakistan's bomb program] This 
     matter has been raised between us and the United States for 
     the last eight years. I have convinced them that we are using 
     nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.''--President Zia-
     Ui-Haq, Interview, 8/23/86.
       ``President Reagan in late 1984 told Pakistani President 
     Mohammed Zia ul-Haq in a top-secret letter that 5 percent 
     would be the highest enrichment level acceptable to the 
     United States.''--Bob Woodward, Washington Post, 11/4/86.
       ``In an interview with the Post on July 18, [Prime 
     Minister] Junejo confirmed that Pakistan had pledged, in 
     response to a 1984 letter from Reagan, not to enrich uranium 
     in its nuclear facilities to a level higher than 5 
     percent.''--Washington Post, 11/5/86.
       ``Pakistan does not have and is not producing highly 
     enriched uranium necessary for a nuclear explosive device . . 
     . the enrichment level has remained well within limits of the 
     research and development program for fuel.''--Pakistani 
     Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar, Washington Post, 11/5/86.
       ``Pakistan has renounced for itself the military use of 
     nuclear energy and has used this energy only in pecaeful 
     fields.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, Interview, 1/29/87.
       ``A Foreign Office spokesman said in Islamabad today that 
     Pakistan's nuclear program is of a peaceful nature and this 
     fact has been proved during the last 6 or 7 years.''--Karachi 
     Domestic Service radio broadcast, 2/11/87.
       Senator Sasser. ``Have the Pakistanis pledged not to 
     continue illegal purchases of nuclear equipment or technology 
     from the United States?''
       Ambassador Richard Kennedy. ``Yes sir, they have indicated 
     which this is something which they understand is against the 
     law and we have brought to their attention the law and its 
     proscription.''--Hearing, Senate Committee on Governmental 
     Affairs, 2/25/87.
       ``As I so often publicly stated, Pakistan's enrichment 
     research is solely aimed at the development of fuel-grade 
     uranium for our future power reactors. The Government of 
     Pakistan has made it abundantly clear that it has no desire 
     to produce nuclear weapons.''--Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, 
     Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, NY Times, 3/2/87.
       ``The minister in charge for science and technology, Mr. 
     Wasim Sajjad, categorically stated in the National Assembly 
     today that Pakistan does not possess an atomic bomb, has no 
     desire to have a bomb, and it cannot afford to manufacture 
     and atomic bomb.''--Karachi Overseas Service broadcast, 3/5/
     87.
       ``No power on Earth can deter us from pursuing our peaceful 
     nuclear program because our conscience is clear and our aim 
     is peaceful.''--Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign 
     Affairs, Zain Noorani, AP, 3/9/87.
       ``. . . we believe in nonproliferation, and our nuclear 
     research is, therefore, devoted entirely to peaceful purposes 
     . . . the president and prime minister of Pakistan have 
     repeatedly expressed their commitment to nonproliferation . . 
     .''--Pakistani Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, Washington Post, 
     3/1/87.
       ``We are not producing Atomic weapons nor intend to do so, 
     but we shall continue to develop our nuclear capabilities for 
     peaceful purposes no matter whether any of our friends likes 
     it or not.''--Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign 
     Affairs, Zain Noorani, statement, 3/16/87.
       ``. . . Pakistan has not enriched its uranium above the 
     normal grade level required for peaceful purposes.''--
     President Zai-Ul-Haq, Time, 3/23/87.
       ``Pakistan has neither the desire, nor the intention, nor 
     the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon . . . We have the 
     ability to enrich uranium, but only below 5 percent, so it 
     can only be used for power generation.'' [The article 
     continued: ``Zia said he had made a written commitment to 
     President Reagan that Pakistan would not embarrass the United 
     States and he would not go back on this gentleman's 
     agreement'']--Pakistani President Zia-Ul-Haq, Interview in 
     Defense Week, 4/6/87.
       President Zia. ``We are honorable people, and when 
     President Reagan wrote this [a certification in October 1986 
     that Pakistan does not possess the bomb], I gave him my 
     assurances. When Prime Minister Junejo visited the United 
     States of America early this, last year, he gave him the same 
     assurances. And we will give him the assurances, with the 
     word, that Pakistan's word is to be honored . . .''
       Mr. McLaughin. ``. . . is it safe for him [Reagan] to say 
     that . . . by giving you the aid, he is going to, in effect, 
     discourage you from moving on to develop the nuclear bomb?''
       President Zia. ``According to the American thinking, he is 
     just, and perfect and correct.''
       Mr. McLaughlin. ``What about Pakistani thinking?''
       President Zia. ``Exactly the same, because we have no 
     intention of developing a nuclear device.''
       Mr. McLaughlin. ``How does it follow if he gives you the 
     aid you will be disinclined to develop the bomb?''
       President Zia. ``Why do you want to have a bomb? To ensure 
     security, to create a deterrent, to have our own defensive 
     means. If we have it otherwise, why should Pakistan indulge 
     in the proliferation, against which Pakistan on principle is 
     opposed to?''
       Mr. McLaughlin. [Asks if Pakistan is building the bomb by 
     just producing all the components without assembling them.]
       President Zia. ``Nonsense. False. Totally false. When 
     Pakistan does not have the intention or the urge and desire 
     to have a nuclear device, why should we have----
       Mr. McLaughlin. ``Why is this development going on?''
       President Zia. ``Our effort is only in the technical field, 
     for peaceful purposes. They are just enriching uranium to a 
     particular degree. That's all.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, 
     McLaughlin ``One on One,'' 6/15/87.
       ``No agency of the [Pakistan] government placed any order 
     for this steel and no evidence has so far been brought to our 
     knowledge that even any private company in Pakistan is 
     responsible for this order.''--Pakistani foreign office 
     spokesman, commenting about a recent US Customs sting 
     operation, UPI, 7/16/87.
       ``. . . the Pakistan government has provided assurances 
     both certainly in public as well as in private that it is not 
     enriching [uranium] above 5 percent.''--Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary of State Robert Peck, congressional testimony, 7/
     22/87.
       ``Pakistan's verifiable compliance with [its] past 
     commitments is vital to any further United States military 
     assistance.''--Text of S. Res. 266, passed the Senate by 
     unanimous consent on 7/31/87.
       ``The time has come [for Pakistan] to choose. If it wants 
     to build nuclear weapons, under US law, it cannot have US 
     foreign assistance. It is time for the Government of Pakistan 
     to take concrete action to bring its nuclear program in line 
     with its assurances.''--Sen. Robert Byrd, Congressional 
     Record, 7/31/87.
       ``[In passing S. Res. 266 Congress was] . . . simply 
     calling upon the Government of Pakistan to make good on 
     promises which it has already extended in the past years.''--
     Sen. Gordon Humphrey, Congressional Record, 7/31/87.
       ``[America and Pakistan] . . . share an overriding mutual 
     interest that can best be promoted by Pakistan's decision to 
     comply with this own stated policy for peaceful nuclear 
     development.''--Sen. Bill Bradley, Congressional Record 7/31/
     87.
       ``Pakistan must be made to understand that the United 
     States is to keep its commitments.''--Sen. Claiborne Pell, 
     Congressional Record 7/31/87.
       ``. . . It is essential at a minimum that our allies, and 
     especially the recipients of US economic and military 
     assistance, understand that the United States expects 
     reasonable commitments concerning non-proliferation.''--Sen. 
     Jesse Helms, Congressional Record 7/31/87.
       ``Mr. Armacost [US Under Secretary of State] also stressed 
     the importance of Pakistan's compliance, with their assurance 
     not to enrich uranium about the five percent level.''--State 
     Department spokesman Charles Redman, press briefing, 8/10/87.
       ``We are enriching uranium in very small quantities, meant 
     only for peaceful purposes.''--Minister of State for Foreign 
     Affairs, Zain Noorani, interview on 8/27/87.
       ``Pakistan, let me reiterate, is against the spread of 
     nuclear weapons in South Asia.''--Foreign Minister Yaqub 
     Khan, speech in Islamabad, 9/1/87.
       ``The bogey of `the Islamic bomb' was made up in countries 
     that mean harm to Islam and Pakistan . . . We have neither 
     the intention nor the capability to produce a nuclear weapon 
     . . . Our [nuclear] technology has no military dimension . . 
     . we have stated many times that we do not possess a 
     bomb.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, interview published on 10/3/87 
     Jordan.
       ``I have said in that past that we are not manufacturing a 
     bomb. We are using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes . 
     . . [Pakistan and Turkey] are not cooperating on the 
     manufacture of a bomb. The Jewish lobby is probably behind 
     such reports.''--President Zia-Ul-Haq, interview published on 
     10/4/87 in Turkey.
       ``We gave [the United States nonproliferation] commitments 
     at an earlier stage and as an elected government I will only 
     go further'' [if India gives commitments also].--Prime 
     Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo, interview in Washington Post, 
     10/13/87.
       Ambassador Kennedy. ``. . . Pakistan has assured us that 
     they were conducting their [nuclear] program wholly for 
     peaceful purposes . . . they have told us that they are 
     renouncing nuclear explosives of any kind . . . and as to 
     their enrichment facility, they have indicated that it is 
     devoted to producing material at low enrichment levels for 
     peaceful purposes only . . . [and] they have indicated that 
     they would not undertake any testing . . .''
       Mr. Solarz. ``Have they also given us some assurances that 
     they are not and do no intend to enrich uranium over the five 
     percent level?''
       Ambassador Kennedy. ``The president [Zia] has stated that 
     publicly . . .''
       Mr. Solarz. ``I have the impression that position is also 
     being conveyed directly to President Reagan by President 
     Zia.''
       Ambassador Kennedy. ``The same kind of statement . . .''
       Mr. Wolpe. ``Are they not continuing to enrich uranium 
     beyond the 5-percent level . . . In blatant violation of 
     their own expressed explicit commitment to President 
     Reagan?''
       Ambassador Kennedy. ``That may well be, and we are 
     concerned about that, and it is precisely because of that, we 
     are exerting all kinds of pressure on them.''--Ambassador 
     Richard Kennedy, congressional testimony, 10/22/87.
       ``Pakistan . . . is not for a nuclear device, and I can 
     assure you we will not embarrass 

[[Page S 13965]]
     the U.S. by suddenly producing one . . . The truth is that we don't 
     have a device and we are not building one . . .''--President 
     Zia-Ul-Haq, interview published in Washington Time, 11/16/87.
       ``[Pakistan has neither] . . . the capability nor the 
     intention'' to produce nuclear weapons.--President Zia-Ul-
     Haq, interview published in Wall Street Journal, 12/1/87.
       ``In his interview . . . Zain Noorani reiterated that 
     Pakistan's atomic program is totally peaceful and its 
     objective is to make the country self reliant in energy 
     resources by 2000 AD.''--Minister of State for Foreign 
     Affairs Zain Noorani, Islamabad Domestic Service broadcast, 
     1/9/88.
       ``I am aware of your abiding interest in and strong 
     commitment to, nuclear non-proliferation. We share these 
     concerns, for Pakistan has unequivocally committed itself to 
     nuclear non-proliferation.''--Letter from Pakistani 
     Ambassador Jamsheed Marker to Sen. John Glenn, 1/20/88.
       ``The Pakistan government has not modified its position 
     that its uranium enrichment activities are strictly peaceful 
     and that it will not enrich uranium above the 5% level, nor 
     has it given any new assurances with respect to its 
     enrichment activities.''--Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
     Robert Peck, congressional testimony, 2/17/88.
       ``In August [1984], President Reagan drafted a letter to 
     Zia warning Pakistan not to cross `the red line' of enriching 
     uranium above 5 percent . . . the President's letter, sent on 
     Sept. 12 . . . [warned] that if Zia crossed the 5 percent 
     `red line,' he would face unspecified `grave consequences.' 
     In November 1984 . . . President Zia gave written assurances 
     to Reagan that the American limit would be respected.''--
     Hedrick Smith, ``A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan,'' NY Times 
     Magazine, 3/16/88.
       ``Perhaps the [US] effort was to stop us from that 
     enrichment program. Having seen that Pakistan has gone and 
     succeeded, the best thing now is to enjoy and relax.'' [Zia 
     reportedly also stated that Pakistan does not have a nuclear 
     weapon or a program to build one.]--President Zia-Ul-Haq, 
     interview in Wall Street Journal, 4/26/88.
       ``Pakistan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is 
     firm and unwavering . . . Pakistan does not possess nuclear 
     weapons, nor does it intend to possess them. We have not 
     carried out a nuclear explosion nor do we intend to conduct 
     one. Our nuclear programme is emphatically peaceful in 
     nature. Indeed, we are firm in our resolve to keep our area 
     free from all nuclear weapons.''--Pakistan's UN Ambassador S. 
     Shah Nawaz, address before UN General Assembly, 6/13/88.
       ``Pakistan's nuclear programs are peaceful and do not 
     represent a threat to any other nation in the region. 
     Pakistan has repeatedly declared, at the highest levels of 
     our government, that we do not possess, and have no intention 
     of developing, a nuclear weapon.''--Letter from Pakistani 
     Ambassador Jamsheed Marker to Sen. John Glenn, 8/4/88.
       ``We don't want any controversy [with the US] on the 
     nuclear issue . . . We want it clear beyond doubt that we're 
     interested only in energy, not nuclear weapons.''--Opposition 
     leader Benazir Bhutto, Washington Post, 11/19/88, shortly 
     before becoming Prime Minister.
       ``We believe in a peaceful [nuclear] program for energy 
     purposes and nothing else.''--Opposition leader Benazir 
     Bhutto, interview in Time, 11/28/88.
       ``I can tell you with confidence that there is no bomb 
     programme in Pakistan . . . There is no bomb programme . . . 
     there is no bomb programme.''--Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 
     interview in Calcutta Telegraph, 12/14/88.
       ``We're committed to a peaceful energy program. We don't 
     have any [nuclear] weapons policy . . . Pakistan doesn't have 
     any intention to get a nuclear device or a nuclear 
     weapon.''--Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interviewed on 
     ``McNeil/Lehrer,'' 12/16/88.
       ``Talking to a visiting American [congressional] delegation 
     . . . President Ghulam Ishaq Khan stated categorically that 
     Pakistan's nuclear program was designed purely for peaceful 
     purposes and that Pakistan had no intention to build or 
     acquire nuclear weapons.''--Islamabad Domestic Services 
     broadcast, 1/16/89.
       ``It is right to say that we are one of the `threshold' 
     states . . . We have deliberately chosen not to take the 
     final step, to build a bomb and test it, because we don't 
     think it is right.''--Pakistani Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, 
     quoted in Washington Times, 2/8/89.
       ``We manufactured small reactors and built nuclear power 
     plants. However, we have never considered this for military 
     purposes.''--Minister of State for Defense Ghulam Sarwar 
     Cheema, in Istanbul Hurriyet, 5/4/89.
       ``The Pakistan delegate, Mr. Mirza Javed Chauhan, told the 
     [UN] Disarmament Commission that Pakistan does not possess 
     nuclear weapons, nor does it have any
      intention to do so.''--Islamabad Domestic Service broadcast, 
     5/10/89.
       ``Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not 
     possess nor do we intend to make a nuclear device. That is 
     our policy.''--Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, address before 
     Joint Session of US Congress, 6/7/89.
       ``. . . Bhutto promised during her visit that Pakistan will 
     not produce `weapons-grade uranium' . . . or take the final 
     step to assemble a nuclear device.''--Washington Post, 6/15/
     89.
       ``Pakistan has not, nor do we have any intention of putting 
     together or making, a bomb, or taking it to the point where 
     you can put it together.''--Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 
     New York Times, 7/10/89.
       ``Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on Sunday flatly 
     denied speculation that her country is developing nuclear 
     weapons. She said in an interview with a British television 
     network that Pakistan will never possess such weapons in the 
     future.''--Reported by Kyodo News Service, 7/10/89.
       ``We do have the knowledge but I think there is a 
     difference between knowledge and capability . . . So we do 
     have a knowledge, if confronted with a threat, to use . . . 
     But we do not in the absence of any threat intend to use that 
     knowledge . . . In fact, as matter of policy my government is 
     firmly committed to nonproliferation.''--Prime Minister 
     Benazir Bhutto, quoted by AFP, 8/29/89.
       ``It is true that Pakistan has certain knowledge in the 
     nuclear field but it has no intention of using this knowledge 
     . . . To put it another way, we do not want to convert this 
     knowledge into--shall we say--a nuclear capability at the 
     present time.''--Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interview in 
     Die Welt, as quoted by Reuters, 10/22/89.
       ``There was a [nuclear weapons] capability in 1989 when the 
     present Government came to power, and that means we could 
     have moved forward in an unwise direction . . . But we 
     didn't. Instead, we froze the program.''--Pakistani Foreign 
     Secretary Shahryar Khan, NY Times, 2/8/92.
       ``We kept our part of the bargain but Pakistan let us down 
     by crossing the line in 1990 . . . We had promised Pakistan 
     billions and billions of dollars if that line was not 
     crossed.''--John Malott, interim director of State Department 
     South Asia Bureau, AFP, 5/16/93.
       ``India is the nuclear delinquent in the region while 
     Pakistan has always been exercising restraint . . . 
     [Pakistan] does not possess a nuclear explosive device and 
     does not intend to make one.''--Pakistani Foreign Minister 
     Assef Ahmed Ali, quoted in AFP, 11/28/93.
       ``We are a very responsible country, and we do not believe 
     in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.''--Pakistani Foreign 
     Minister Assef Ahmed Ali, quoted in Washington Times, 8/25/
     94.
       ``I want to say categorically and finally that Pakistan has 
     not made nuclear weapons . . . Pakistan does not intend to 
     make nuclear weapons.''--Pakistani Foreign Minister Assef 
     Ahmed Ali, quoted in New York Times, 8/25/94.
       ``We have made a sovereign decision not to produce nuclear 
     weapons.''--Munir Akram, foreign ministry spokesman, 
     Washington Times, 8/25/94.
       ``We have neither detonated one, nor have we got nuclear 
     weapons . . . being a responsible state and a state committed 
     to nonproliferation, we in Pakistan, through five successive 
     governments have taken a policy decision to follow a peaceful 
     nuclear program.''--Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, interview 
     with David Frost on PBS, 11/18/94.
       ``. . . Pakistan has not acquired the [nuclear-capable] M-
     11 or any other missile from China that violates the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime . . .''.--Press Release, 
     Information Division, Pakistan Embassy, 7/27/95.
       Senator Brown. ``Did we have an agreement with the 
     Pakistani government that in return for the assistance we 
     provided, that they would not develop nuclear weapons? Was 
     that a condition for our cooperation with them in the late 
     1980's?''
       Assistant Secretary Raphel: ``The short answer to that is 
     no. There was no such explicit agreement . . . there was no 
     explicit quid pro quo there.''--Testimony of Assistant 
     Secretary of State Robin Raphel, South Asia subcommittee of 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9/14/95.
                                                                    ____

                               Exhibit 3

   From Myth to Reality: Evidence of Pakistan's ``Nuclear Restraint''

       Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a 
     pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.
       Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-
     grade enriched uranium from China.
       1980--U.S. nuclear export control violation: Reexport via 
     Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge 
     enrichment activities).
       1981--U.S. nuclear export control violation: New York, 
     zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
       1981--AP story cites contents of reported U.S. State 
     Department cable stating ``We have strong reason to believe 
     that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives 
     capability . . . Pakistan is conducting a program for the 
     design and development of a triggering package for nuclear 
     explosive devices.''
       1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent 
     Pakistan efforts to contruct a nuclear test site.
       1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that 
     Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire 
     bomb parts (13-inch ``steel spheres'' and ``steel petal 
     shapes'').
       1983--Recently declassified U.S. government assessment 
     concludes that ``There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan 
     actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program . . . 
     We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium 
     produced at Kahufa, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly 
     nuclear weapons.''

[[Page S 13966]]

       1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a 
     ``very modest'' uranium enrichment capability for ``nothing 
     but peaceful purposes.''
       1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of ``grave 
     consequences'' if it enriches uranium above 5%.
       1985--ABC News reports that U.S. believes Pakistan has 
     ``successfuly tested'' a ``firing mechanism'' of an atomic 
     bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that U.S. 
     Krytrons ``have been acquired'' by Pakistan.
       1985--U.S. nuclear export control violation: Texas, 
     Krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).
       1985--U.S. nuclear export control violation: U.S. cancelled 
     license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear 
     weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
       1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-
     grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the U.S.
       1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged 
     DIA report saying Pakistan ``detonated a high explosive test 
     develop between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its 
     continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear 
     weapon''; says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 
     93.5% level.
       1986--Press reports cite U.S. ``Special National 
     Intelligence Estimate'' concluding that Pakistan had produced 
     weapons-grade material.
       1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General 
     Zia tells interviewer, ``It is our right to obtain the 
     technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic 
     world will possess it with us.''
       1986--Recently declassified memo to then-Secretary of State 
     Henry Kissinger states, ``Despite strong U.S. concern, 
     Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * 
     * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium 
     enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material 
     to build several nuclear devices per year.''
       1987--U.S. nuclear export control violation: Pennsylvania, 
     maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture 
     and bomb components).
       1987--London Financial Times reports U.S. spy satellites 
     have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant 
     in Pakistan.
       1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist states in 
     published interview that ``what the CIA has been saying about 
     our possessing the bomb is correct.''
       1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment 
     recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for ``at 
     least 93% enrichment'' of uranium; blueprints of uranium 
     enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.
       1987--U.S. nuclear export control violation: California, 
     oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon 
     R&D).
       1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign 
     ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, U.K. government 
     official tells German counterpart on European 
     nonproliferation working group that he was ``convinced that 
     Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.''
       1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan 
     due to an export control violation; in his formal 
     certification, he confirmed that ``material, equipment, or 
     technology covered by that provision was to be used by 
     Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.''
       1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York times reports U.S. 
     government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough 
     highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.
       1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in 
     interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability 
     ``that is good enough to create an impression of 
     deterrence.''
       1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying U.S,-supplied 
     F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel 
     tests cited in document reportedly from West German 
     intelligence service.
       1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 
     kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets ``nuclear-
     capable'' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.
       1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental 
     Affairs Committee hearing that ``Clearly Pakistan is engaged 
     in developing a nuclear capability.''
       1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and 
     tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.
       1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to 
     missile program in Pakistan.
       1989--U.K. press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan 
     and Iraq.
       1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States 
     has issued ``about 100 specific communiques to the West 
     German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan 
     Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;'' 
     exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery 
     facility.
       1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states 
     ``source close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed 
     that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation 
     mechanisms for a nuclear device.''
       1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West 
     German magazine Stern reports, ``since the beginning of the 
     eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied 
     sensitive goods to
      enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for 
     Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.''
       1989--Gerard Smith, former U.S. diplomat and senior arms 
     control authority, claims U.S. has turned a ``blind eye'' to 
     proliferation developments in Pakistan and Israel.
       1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements 
     addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment 
     commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on 
     nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's 
     democratically elected government after a year in office; 
     Glenn concluded, ``There simply must be a cost to non-
     compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the 
     solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.''
       1989-90--Reports of secret construction of unsafeguarded 
     nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.
       1990--U.S. News cites ``western intelligence sources'' 
     claiming Pakistan recently ``cold-tested'' a nuclear device 
     and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article 
     says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.
       1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German 
     government document citing claim by U.K. official that 
     British government believes Pakistan already possesses ``a 
     few small'' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy 
     claim to U.K. diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to 
     the U.S. not to enrich uranium over 5%.
       1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet 
     concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 
     aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; 
     claims U.S. spy satellites have observed ``heavily armed 
     conveys'' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at 
     Kahuta and heading for military airfields.
       1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. 
     Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb) claims U.S. showed 
     ``model'' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as 
     part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.
       1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports ``U.S. 
     officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient 
     computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary 
     to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear 
     weapons technology.''
       1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives 
     ``Man of the Nation Award.''
       1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by 
     Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear 
     and missile applications.
       1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-
     capable M-11 missile from China.
       1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, ``Last 
     July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear warheads. And 
     they've still got them.''
       1991--Time quotes businessman, ``BCCI is functioning as the 
     owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.''
       1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses 
     Pakistan's possession of ``cores'' of nuclear devices.
                                                                    ____

                               Exhibit 4

  Are Pakistan's F-16's ``Nuclear-Capable''? It Depends on Who You Ask

       William T. Pendley, Office of Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense/ISA, Letter to Sen. Glenn on 13 April 1993:
       ``Pakistan could . . . theoretically attach a [nuclear] 
     weapon and deliver it to a target with their F-16s, or any 
     other aircraft in their inventory, if arming and fuzing 
     procedures were accomplished before takeoff, and safety and 
     placement accuracy were not considered.''
       Robert Gates, CIA Director, Testimony Before Senate 
     Governmental Affairs Committee, 15 January 1992:
       [Sen. Glenn]--``How about delivery systems? Is there any 
     evidence that Pakistan converted F-16s for possible nuclear 
     delivery use?
       [Gates]--``We know that they are--or we have information 
     that suggests that they're clearly interested in enhancing 
     the ability of the F-16 to deliver weapons safely. But we 
     don't really have--they don't require those changes, I don't 
     think, to deliver a weapon. We could perhaps provide some 
     additional detail in a classified manner.''
       ``Assessing ballistic missile proliferation and its 
     control, ``Report of Center for International Security and 
     Arms Control, Stanford University, November 1991:
       ``Pakistani F-16 aircraft could be effective nuclear-
     delivery vehicles even if Pakistan's nuclear warheads are 
     large and heavy.''
       ``Western intelligence sources'' cited in U.S. News & World 
     Report, 12 February 1990:
       ``The sources say Pakistan, in violation of agreements with 
     Washington, is busily converting U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter 
     planes--60 more are scheduled to be sent this year--into 
     potential nuclear-weapons carriers by outfitting them with 
     special structures attached to the plane's underwing 
     carriage. The structure allows the mounting of a dummy under 
     one wing of the F-16 to balance the weight of the bomb under 
     the other wing.''
       Deptuy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, 
     testimony before House Subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
       ``In order to deliver a nuclear device with any reasonable 
     degree of accuracy and safety, it first would be necessary to 
     replace the entire wiring package in the aircraft. In 
     addition to building a weapons carriage mount, one would also 
     have to re-do the fire control computer, the stores 
     management system, and mission computer software to allow the 
     weapon to be dopped accurately and to redistribute weight and 
     balance after release. We believe this capability far exceeds 
     the state of the art in Pakisan and could only be 
     accomplished with a major release of data and industrial 
     equipment from the U.S.'' . . .

[[Page S 13967]]

       [Rep. Solarz]--Now, in your testimony, Mr. Hughes, I gather 
     you've said that the F-16s which we have already sold them 
     are not nuclear capable?
       [Hughes]--That's right sir.
       [Rep. Solarz]--And the planes we're planning to sell will 
     not be configured in such a way that they could deliver 
     nuclear ordnance?
       [Hughes]--That's right, Mr. Chairman.
       Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Teresita Schaffer, 
     testimony before House Subcommittee, 2 August 1989:
       ``None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to 
     purchase is configured for nuclear delivery. Pakistan, 
     moreover, will be obligated by contract not to modify its new 
     acquisitions without the approval of the United States.''
       Views attributed to German Intelligence Agency (BND), in 
     Der Spiegel, 24 July 1989:
       ``The Pakistanis have secretly planned to use the fighter 
     aircraft as a delivery system for their bomb. According to a 
     report by the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), relevant 
     tests have already been successfully concluded. The BND has 
     reported to the Chancellor's Office that, using an F-16 
     model, the Pakistanis have made wind tunnel tests and have 
     designed to shell of the bomb in a way that allows them to 
     install it underneath the wings. At the same time, the 
     detonating mechanism has been improved, so that the weapons 
     can now be used. . . According to the BND report, the 
     Pakistanis long ago found out how to program the F-16 on-
     board computer to carry out the relevant flight maneuvers in 
     dropping the bomb. According to the report from Pullach [BND 
     headquarters], they also know how to make the electronic 
     contact between the aircraft and the bomb.''
       Sen. John Glenn, letter to President Ronald Reagan, 5 March 
     1987:
       ``And I believe we should continue to try to provide 
     assistance to the Afghans. But if the price that must now be 
     paid is acceptance of Pakistani nuclear weapons production 
     along with the continued provision of a `make in the U.S.A.' 
     delivery system (F-16s), a combination certain to ultimately 
     erode the national security of the United States and some of 
     its closest allies, then the price is too high.''
       Undersecretary of State James Buckley, testimony before the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 November 1981:
       [Sen. Hayakawa]--``Do the F-16's provide Pakistan with a 
     delivery system for nuclear devices?''
       [Buckley]--``Yes, they would. But by the same token, this 
     is not the only aircraft that would have that capability. My 
     understanding is that the Mirage III currently possessed by 
     Pakistan, would have the capability of delivering a small 
     nuclear device.''
       E.F. Von Marbod, Director of Defense Security Assistance 
     Agency, testimony before two House Subcommittees, 16 
     September 1981:
       [Solarz]--``I gather the F-16's are technically capable of 
     carrying nuclear weapons. Will the F-16's supplied Pakistan 
     be able to carry nuclear weapons?''
       [Von Marbod]--``Mr. Solarz, all nuclear capabilities will 
     be deleted from these F-16's. All wiring to the pylons, all 
     computer software programs that manage the hardware stores 
     and all cockpit controls that are nuclear-related.''

  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter to 
the President regarding the Pakistani situation that I sent on April 19 
be printed in the Record, and I reserve the remainder of my time.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                            Committee on Governmental Affairs,

                                   Washington, DC, April 19, 1995.
     President William Clinton,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to express my concern 
     about the direction of U.S. nonproliferation policy in South 
     Asia in the wake of the visit last week of Prime Minister 
     Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan. Press reports and commentary 
     regarding her visit and the joint press conference you held 
     with her have been singularly devoid of information on the 
     history of the Pressler Amendment, the activities of Pakistan 
     in the nuclear area, and the circumstances surrounding the 
     two 1989 contracts for the sale of F-16s. Without such 
     understanding, it is easy to conclude that an injustice has 
     been perpetrated upon Pakistan, and that to rectify it, a 
     major adjustment in our nonproliferation policy must be made. 
     The truth, however, is much more complicated, and the problem 
     does not lend itself to easy resolution.
       To understand how we have arrived at this difficult state 
     of affairs with Pakistan, in which they have paid $658 
     million in cash and used $200 million in credits for 28 F-16s 
     but cannot have them delivered, let us review some history.
       In the mid-70s, Congress became concerned about increasing 
     evidence of international nuclear trade in dangerous 
     technologies associated with producing nuclear weapon 
     materials. A number of countries, including but not limited 
     to Pakistan, South Korea, Brazil, and Taiwan were actively 
     engaged in seeking such technologies, and suppliers such as 
     France and Germany seemed prepared to meet the demand. In an 
     attempt to dampen such activity, in 1976 and 1977, Congress 
     enacted what is now called the Glenn/Symington amendment to 
     the Foreign Assistance Act which provided that countries 
     importing or exporting such dangerous technologies under 
     certain conditions would be cut off from U.S. economic and 
     military assistance. This law was universal in its 
     application and was not directed specifically toward 
     Pakistan. Nonetheless, in 1979, after much information became 
     available about illegal Pakistani activities involving the 
     smuggling of
      design information and equipment related to nuclear 
     enrichment, President Carter invoked the Glenn/Symington 
     Amendment to cut off the Pakistanis. After the war in 
     Afghanistan broke out, attempts by the Carter 
     Administration to restore some assistance to Pakistan in 
     return for restraint on their nuclear program were 
     rebuffed by the Pakistanis.
       When the Reagan Administration arrived, aid to Pakistan and 
     the Mujahideen was high up on the administration's foreign 
     policy agenda, and the repeal of the Glenn/Symington 
     Amendment was suggested during Congressional consultations. 
     This was rejected. Instead, a proposal was made and adopted 
     into law that allowed the President to resume aid to Pakistan 
     for six years despite its violations of ``Section 669'' of 
     the Glenn/Symington Amendment (relating the uranium 
     enrichment activities). President Reagan used this authority 
     in 1982 and also issued a waiver under ``Section 670'' of the 
     amendment (relating to reprocessing activities) to exempt 
     Pakistan indefinitely from the cutoff provisions of that 
     section of the Glenn/Symington legislation as well/ (He could 
     not do the same under Section 669 unless he had ``reliable 
     assurances'' that the Pakistanis were not developing nuclear 
     weapons, and such assurances were clearly not available). 
     Thus, a specific waiver for Pakistan was created (and has 
     been subsequently renewed five times) that allowed them to 
     escape from the sanctions imposed by U.S. law for 
     proliferators. This has been done for no other country that I 
     am aware of.
       Nonetheless, Congress was unwilling to give a complete 
     blank check to Pakistan, and stipulated in the waiver 
     legislation that Pakistan would still be cut off if it 
     received or exploded a nuclear device. In addition, Congress 
     stipulated that an annual report would be provided on 
     Pakistan's nuclear activities so that Congress could confirm 
     that U.S. assistance was indeed inhibiting Pakistan's bomb 
     program as was confidently assumed by Reagan Administration 
     officials.
       Those reports, along with supplementary intelligence 
     information, revealed that there was no effect whatsoever on 
     the pace or direction of the Pakistani bomb program. The 
     Pakistanis continued to say publicly that they had no nuclear 
     weapons program, and continually lied to U.S. authorities 
     whenever questioned. Indeed, then-President Zia and the then-
     head of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Khan, 
     both lied directly to me during my visit to Islamabad in 1984 
     when I asked them about information I had concerning their 
     nuclear program.
       The result of all this mendacity, plus ongoing information 
     that the Pakistani program was progressing, was the enactment 
     of the Pressler Amendment, passed in 1985, which was designed 
     to draw a new line in the sand regarding the extent of U.S. 
     forbearance of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The 
     amendment required the U.S. President to certify annually 
     that Pakistan did
      not ``possess'' a nuclear explosive device in order for 
     assistance to continue, and that such assistance would 
     ``significantly reduce the risk'' that Pakistan would 
     possess such a device. Please note that the argument about 
     the Pressler Amendment being unfair because it applies 
     only to Pakistan is completely disingenuous because it 
     ignores the fact that Pressler was created to shape 
     further the unique, special exemption from U.S. 
     nonproliferation law given to Pakistan years earlier.
       It has been reported that C.I.A. officials who were privy 
     to intelligence information concerning the Pakistani program 
     were skeptical, beginning from 1987 on, that the President 
     could make the appropriate certifications under Pressler to 
     allow aid to continue. Statements from high ranking Pakistani 
     officials around this time suggested that they had the bomb 
     within their grasp. Nonetheless, President Reagan in 1987 and 
     1988, and President Bush in 1989 made those certifications. 
     It has also been reported that President Bush told the 
     Pakistanis in 1989 that he would be unable to make the 
     certification in 1990.
       Now, the contracts for the sale of 28 F-16s was signed in 
     1989, the year Pakistan was ostensibly warned that there 
     would be no further certifications that would allow them to 
     receive military equipment from the United States. The first 
     cash payment (of $50 million) was made at the beginning of FY 
     1990. Subsequent to the cutoff, which took effect in October, 
     1990, Pakistan continued to send periodic payments for the 
     manufacture of F-16s, i.e., $150 million in FY 1991, $243 
     million in FY 1992, and $215 million in FY 1993, for a total 
     of $658 million.
       Why did they continue to send money when U.S. law would not 
     enable them to receive the planes? This is a question only 
     they can answer. But it is not unlike an investor buying the 
     stock of a company whose assets are under a lien in the hope 
     that the lien will somehow be removed. If it doesn't get 
     removed, the investor can hardly call ``foul''.

[[Page S 13968]]

       All this is not to say that the Pakistanis are not entitled 
     to any sympathy in their national security plight in South 
     Asia. They have fought three wars with a much larger 
     adversary, India, who is also pursuing a nuclear weapons 
     program and exploded a device in 1974. By virtue of India's 
     nuclear program being indigenous and therefore not in 
     violation of the terms of the Glenn/Symington Amendment, the 
     Indians have not been subject to the amendment's sanctions 
     (which would not have been effective in any case, since the 
     Indians received only token amounts of economic or military 
     assistance from the U.S.). That is not the same thing as 
     saying that U.S. law is discriminatory in its application.
       As I write this, more than 170 nations are meeting in New 
     York to determine whether and for how long to extend the 
     Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has been the policy of 
     every American President over the past twenty five years 
     since the Treaty went into effect to support the Treaty and 
     we have been steadfast in that support. As a result, we have 
     every right to ask, as you have done, that the members of the 
     Treaty vote for indefinite extension. The NPT has been a 
     success because we have cooperated with those Parties to the 
     Treaty who have taken their nonproliferation commitments 
     seriously, just as we are taking our own commitments 
     seriously by reducing our stockpiles of weapons and engaging 
     in a moratorium on testing.
       How will we be keeping faith with those 170+ nations 
     meeting in New York if the message we send is that a 
     proliferator with a history of mendacity can receive from the 
     United States a significant number of nuclear weapons 
     delivery systems (F-16s)? To ask the question is to give the 
     answer.
       The U.S. cannot be a champion of nonproliferation on the 
     one hand and a facilitator of nuclear weapons development or 
     delivery on the other. To send F-16s to Pakistan with full 
     realization of the history I have laid out in this letter 
     would be a gross violation of our commitment to foster a 
     nonproliferation ethic in the world through the NPT and other 
     means, and would rightfully subject us to strong 
     international criticism.
       I am not an enemy of Pakistan, and I have supported them 
     when they have been threatened in the past, such as during 
     the war in Afghanistan. And I, along with you, Mr. President, 
     want their cooperation in the fight against terrorism and 
     drugs. Surely we ought to be able to find a way to support 
     them in these activities without giving them a nuclear 
     weapons delivery system. I am prepared to discuss with you or 
     your representatives various options in which such support 
     might be provided without undermining our nonproliferation 
     standing and efforts around the world.
       As to the cash payments for the F-16s, we cannot ignore the 
     fact that, contrary to the grossly incorrect public statement 
     made by Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel at a White House 
     briefing on April 11, no payments were made by Pakistan 
     before FY1990. Sticking to the payment schedule of the 
     contract until FY1993 was a gamble by Pakistan that didn't 
     pay off, and now they want to be held harmless from losing 
     their gamble. It is perhaps unfortunate that U.S. officials 
     did not disabuse the Pakistanis of the hope that making those 
     payments would put pressure on the U.S. to reverse the 
     Pressler sanctions and deliver the planes, but that is no 
     reason to turn that hope into reality now.
       In closing, Mr. President, I urge again that in finding 
     ways to improve our relations with Pakistan, we not lose 
     sight of the importance of keeping good relations with the 
     nonproliferators of the world. They have a large claim on our 
     loyalty.
           Sincerely,
                                                       John Glenn,
                                                   Ranking Member.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I defer to the distinguished Senator from 
Rhode Island.
  Mr. GLENN. I thank my colleague and I yield 10 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from Rhode Island is 
recognized.


                        environmental provisions

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I would like to briefly draw the attention 
of my colleagues to the funding measures that the foreign operations 
appropriation bill recommends with regard to our participation in 
important ongoing international environmental efforts. In particular, I 
wish to refer to the allocation of $50 million that have been earmarked 
for the Global Environment Facility, commonly referred to as the GEF. 
At the outset, let me highlight that while this amount falls short of 
the $110 million that the administration had requested, it represents a 
66-percent increase from the amount that the House of Representatives 
had recommended. This important increase is the result of the joint 
efforts of Democrats and Republicans, who in a spirit of bipartisanship 
joined their efforts to increase funding for international 
environmental activities.
  Mr. President, the GEF was recently restructured and now represents 
all the good that can come out of sound international efforts on the 
environment. The committee report that accompanies the foreign 
operations bill correctly emphasizes the need to maintain U.S. 
leadership in this vital organization, which seeks to combat ocean 
pollution, ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, and other serious 
threats to the Earth's environment. Specifically, the GEF aims to 
assist developing countries in meeting the
 new challenges of sustainable development.

  We are now at a time where the impacts of global change are starting 
to have significant effects on our environment and the United States 
just cannot afford to relinquish its leadership role. This point was 
highlighted in a recent editorial piece in the New York Times, which 
enumerated the mounting evidence experts now have on the depletion of 
the ozone layer and other climate change factors. I ask unanimous 
consent that a copy of this article be included at the end of my 
remarks. We should not be reducing our commitment to a healthy global 
environment at such a critical time.
  I also note that the Senate Appropriations Committee has increased 
from the House bill the amount that will be dedicated to international 
organizations and programs, which also includes U.S. efforts to promote 
sustainable development, and particularly the protection of the global 
environment. The United States has been an active partner in the 
activities of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Montreal Protocol on the Depletion of the Ozone Layer. The 
administration has highlighted the fact that the Montreal protocol fund 
is a low-cost and very effective shield to protect the health of our 
citizens and our environment. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change addresses the problem of climate change with policies that are 
both good for the environment and good for the economy. The committee 
report recognizes the importance of these organizations and programs 
and urges that adequate funding be provided for these important 
activities.
  The need to protect biodiversity is also highlighted as a priority 
and the report recognizes that global biological wealth is vital to 
U.S. security and key to our own agricultural and pharmaceutical 
interests. The report thus urges AID to remain active in regions that 
are significant for biological diversity. I support that commitment.
  Finally, the foreign operations bill recognizes the key role played 
by the U.N. Environment Programme [UNEP], by requiring that any 
reduction in the amounts made available for UNEP shall not exceed the 
percentage by which the total amount appropriated for international 
operations and programs is reduced. UNEP provides a means to pursue 
international environmental standards that are both compatible with 
U.S. interests and comparable to U.S. regulatory requirements and 
restraints. Further, UNEP goals are complementary to our own, 
particularly in the area of climate change and ozone depletion.
  Mr. President, I am grateful for the bipartisn approach that 
prevailed in the Appropriations Committee which has allowed us to 
ensure that the United States will remain committed in our very 
important efforts to protect the environment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
an editorial from the New York Times on that subject, and I yield the 
floor.
  There being no objection, the articles was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1995]

                        Global Warming Heats Up

       The evidence mounted last week that manmade gases are 
     causing deterioration of the earth's atmosphere. First came 
     news that a United Nations scientific panel believes it has 
     found, for the first time, evidence that human activities are 
     indeed causing a much-debated warming of the globe. The 
     report, though preliminary, appeared to strengthen the case 
     that governments throughout the world may need to take 
     stronger action to head off potential damage.
       Then came an announcement from the World Meteorological 
     Organization that a worrisome hole in the earth's protective 
     ozone shield appears to be getting even larger over 
     Antarctica. Such enlargement had been expected because it 
     will take a while 

[[Page S 13969]]
     for corrective actions already taken by many governments to exert their 
     effect. But the report underscored that the battle to save 
     the ozone layer is not yet safely won.
       The U.N.'s global warming report, described by William K. 
     Stevens in the Sept. 10 Times, indicates that man-made global 
     warming is a real phenomenon. It can not be dismissed as 
     unproved ``liberal claptrap,'' as Representative Dana 
     Rohrabacher, Republican of California, who heads a house 
     environmental subcommittee, has derisively suggested.
       For years now scientists have been arguing over whether the 
     omission of ``greenhouse gases,'' such as carbon dioxide 
     generated by the burning of fossil fuels, has contributed to 
     a small rise in global temperatures over the past century--
     and whether such emissions will drive temperatures even 
     higher in coming decades.
       Such a change in temperature might, if drastic enough, have 
     serious consequences, as is made clear today in a second 
     article by Mr. Stevens. Global warming could cause a rise in 
     sea level that would flood coastal lowlands, an increase in 
     weather extremes and damage to forest and croplands in some 
     regions. Forestalling truly severe damage might will warrant 
     action to slow the emission of greenhouse gases by reducing 
     the world's reliance on fossil fuels. But that would be a 
     wrenching, costly process that few political leaders are 
     eager to undertake absent compelling evidence that human 
     activities really are driving world temperatures toward 
     dangerous levels.
       Now the U.N's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
     the scientific panel charged with analyzing the problem, has 
     concluded in a draft report that it is seeing signals that 
     man-made global warming is under way. The signals are not in 
     the form of a ``smoking gun.'' Instead, they are found in 
     computer patterns. The computer models that predict rising 
     temperatures seem to be matching up more closely with some of 
     the patterns of climate change actually observed. There are 
     great uncertainties in how much the temperature will rise and 
     how great any damage might be. But the case for being 
     concerned about global warming is getting stronger.
       That makes it especially distressing that committees in the 
     House and Senate are slashing funds for programs aimed at 
     protecting the global environment. Steep cuts have been 
     imposed on research to study global climate change, on 
     programs to help reduce carbon emissions and on funds to help 
     developing countries phase out their ozone-destroying 
     chemicals. It is perverse that, as the evidence of global 
     atmospheric harm gets somewhat stronger, the political 
     response to mitigating it gets progressively weaker.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished Senator from Ohio for 
his very thoughtful comments. He has been a very sincere and a tireless 
advocate of the cause of nonproliferation, and he has made a major 
contribution not only to the United States effort in that but to the 
worldwide efforts in that. While we find ourselves on opposite sides of 
this particular issue, I certainly want to indicate my admiration for 
his tireless efforts and also my thanks for the contribution he has 
made to the debate tonight. I think it has been helpful and 
constructive. I do come to a different conclusion with regard to the 
amendment, but that does not mean I do not share his strong feelings 
toward nonproliferation. I do.
  The first portion of what has been said that I want to deal with is 
the very significant question: What is the value, militarily, of the 
slightly more than one-fourth of the package that would be delivered 
under this amendment. These are arms negotiated for in 1986 and 1987 
and 1988. These are arms that have aged somewhat, that are somewhat out 
of date. But I thought that was a valid question and an important one 
for our deliberations.
  We held a series of hearings on this whole matter, including one 
directed specifically to that particular question; that is: How 
significant are these weapons? What kind of problems would they create? 
How significant are they in military terms?
  I want to deal with the specifics of the answers but let me just 
summarize. The experts that we called in were both Democrat and 
Republican, they were both military personnel and personnel from 
academia. They were both people who had worked with India--we had the 
former Ambassador to India as well as other experts on India, 
consultants who work with India all the time--and there were experts 
who had worked in Pakistan. So we had a broad range of people, 
backgrounds, and issues. We asked all of them the same question: What 
is the effect on the balance of power in the area?
  They said this. First, that India maintains the balance of power and 
that it is militarily overwhelming, roughly a ratio of 2 to 1, 
depending on the category of weapons system. In some areas the ratio is 
even more than 2 to 1. Certainly in population it is much more than 
that. In overall resources it is more than that.
  Second, these experts said it would not affect the balance of power 
at all.
  Third, they said the weapons themselves are not terribly significant.
  I have summarized what they said. I want the Record to reflect 
precisely what they said. But the military significance of the items 
that would be transferred to Pakistan is a valid question. I think the 
Senator is right to raise it. I wanted the Senator and other Members of 
this Chamber to know I was concerned about it, that we called a hearing 
on it, that we got testimony from all the experts including the 
administration, all of which agreed stated that the equipment to be 
transferred would have little military significance.
  I will just give a quick sampling of the testimony taken because it 
lends important background as Members consider this particular 
question. How significant are these arms that will be delivered under 
this amendment? Here is what Stephen Cohen, Director of Program in Arms 
Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of 
Illinois, said:

       In terms of the regional military balance, I don't think 
     that the release of this military . . . equipment really will 
     have no significant impact on the balance one way or another.

  Those remarks, sentiments, were echoed by George Tanham. He was the 
Vice President of the Rand Corp. I believe he is retired at this point, 
but nevertheless is an important expert in this area.
  I agree with Steve that the package won't change the balance at all. 
In fact, there is no balance now. India dominates so strongly. They 
have twice as large an army as Pakistan, twice as large an air force, 
twice as large a navy, twice as many tanks, twice as many airplanes. So 
there isn't a balance at the moment. India has overwhelming strength.
  This one is from Michael Krepon. He is the president of the Henry 
Stimson Center.

       Conventional arms transfers like those under consideration 
     by the Congress have not in the past been sources of 
     instability or arms racing in the region.

  This next one is by the Honorable William Clark, Jr. He was the U.S. 
Ambassador to India during the period of 1989 to 1992.

       We have got F-16's that have been sitting in the desert and 
     being maintained. The P-3 and the Harpoon, three of them are 
     marginally useful, if at all, and they have been already. The 
     requirement has been met in other ways. From the politics of 
     it, it is terribly important. The military utility of it, 
     they would rather buy more modern equipment with the money.

  What he is suggesting there is that if the Pakistanis had the choice, 
they probably could get better quality weapons if we returned their 
money than if we delivered the weapons. That is particularly important 
if, indeed, the amendment proposed by the Senator from California is 
offered with an alternative to return the money.
  This is from James Clad, professor at Georgetown University.

       The offer for Pakistan is exactly as Dr. Tanham pointed out 
     an equalizing hand in trying to somehow correct the 
     subcontinental mismatch of conventional weaponry capability 
     and geographical reality. I think another turn on a dime on 
     this issue is going to I think do further damage to the 
     American diplomacy.

  Professor Clad's ``other turn'' was reversing the President's 
compromise reached after negotiations with the Pakistan government, 
which, of course, is the amendment we have offered. If we turn down the 
President after he has negotiated a settlement, after he has taken the 
lead and gotten an agreeable settlement in this very sore situation, we 
not only discredit the President but we undercut his ability to 
negotiate for us in the future. Those are my words, not Professor 
Clad's, but I think the point that he makes is very accurate.
  The last one is from Bruce Fein. He is a constitutional and 
international law specialist and also a syndicated columnist.

       It is true that they--

  Referring to India--


[[Page S 13970]]

     are searching at present for substantial additional arms 
     purchases, hundreds of millions, that I think would dwarf 
     anything that would follow any relaxation of the Pressler 
     amendment: very high technology MiG aircraft.

  I might say, Mr. President, that nothing compares in this package to 
anything that India is currently shopping for, has the money to buy and 
apparently will buy at some point.
  Mr. President, those comments deal as seriously as I know how to deal 
with the question of how significant the equipment that is transferred 
will be. The experts tell us it is not significant and, indeed, that is 
what the administration tells me.
  Now, that was not Hank Brown talking. Those statements were given by 
experts in the field in a public hearing subject to the scrutiny and 
review of the media and other experts. It is important because I must 
tell you my own view is I do not want to get involved in arms sales to 
the subcontinent that will create an escalating arms race or that 
change in the balance in favor of one side or the other. I want the 
United States to be friends with both countries. We have a great future 
of trade, investment and mutual development with both India and 
Pakistan.
  Ultimately, the people who have tried to exploit the difference 
between those two countries will be viewed with hostility by both 
nations as well. Ultimately, both of these neighbors will face common 
challenges. They must be friends and must work together. The American 
sense that we do not want to get in between the two is the right sense. 
That is why it is so important to clear up this contractual dispute 
after 9 years and get it out of our way. The administration is right 
when they say it is not their intention to get involved in future arms 
sales.
  That deals with the question of how significant the one-fourth of the 
package that is being delivered is. A second area that I thought maybe 
was worthwhile: Much has been made by my distinguished friends about 
the fact that Pakistan did not reveal the full extent of what they were 
doing with nuclear material or other areas.
  What perhaps was not said is what India said about their nuclear 
program. We are not dealing with a nation in isolation. Pakistan's 
neighbor, which is geographically far bigger, has a much greater 
population and a military that is twice its size, also has nuclear 
weapons. But all that has been criticized here tonight are the 
statements and denials of Pakistan. Nothing has been said about the 
statements of India.
  Now, it is in our interest as a country to run down either country, 
but it is unfair to turn a blind eye to what goes on in that 
subcontinent. If we are to be concerned about one country, we must be 
concerned about the other. The reality is that between the two 
countries, India and Pakistan, our legal restrictions apply to Pakistan 
but exempt India.
  Is this an inconsistent policy? Mr. President, I believe it is. The 
waivers that were talked about earlier simply relate to Pakistan 
because the restrictions apply to Pakistan. The fact is this: If we are 
concerned about nuclear weapons, we ought to be concerned about both 
India and Pakistan and our laws ought to apply equally to both 
countries.
  Mr. President, they do not. If we are concerned about statements 
countries make about their nuclear weapons program, we ought to be 
concerned about statements by India as well as by Pakistan. Mr. 
President, we have not heard that concern about India tonight. We have 
only heard it about Pakistan.
  If Members are concerned about violations of the MTCR--and I am--if 
they are concerned and want to impose sanctions, they ought to be doing 
what the law says, which is to impose sanctions not only in the country 
that buys items that violate the MTCR but also on the country that 
sells in violation. We have had a lot of people talk about applying 
penalties against Pakistan under the MTCR. But who has come forward to 
propose penalties against China? Under MTCR, they are equally at risk 
if, indeed, the allegations are correct, but the reality is that all we 
have heard are sanctions against Pakistan and none against China, or at 
least the Members who have spoken have not talked about China.
  Mr. President, I yield myself an additional 10 minutes.
  It seems to me, if we are going to be consistent, we ought to apply 
our concerns about nuclear technology to both India and Pakistan. If we 
are concerned about nuclear technology, we ought to be willing to apply 
the laws that restrict its development and spread to both India and 
Pakistan, not just to one of the two. If we are concerned about 
missiles and missile technology, we ought to be willing to apply those 
restrictions to both India and Pakistan. The fact is the MTCR does not 
apply to missiles that are developed in-country but they do apply to a 
country that acquires them from outside.
  Once again, we have drafted a law that only applies in this case to 
Pakistan and not to India, at least in relation to the two countries.
  Lastly, Mr. President, if we are going to be consistent, we ought to 
talk about penalties not just for Pakistan if, indeed, they have 
violated the MTCR, but for China as well. Yet what we have heard 
tonight are slings and arrows pointed only at Pakistan.
  Well, that is perhaps appropriate in some ways. This amendment does 
deal with Pakistan. It is right for them to bring these issues up. But 
from my point of view, our level of consistency ought to be higher than 
that.
  Lastly, let me ask Members this: If you were a reporter and you 
talked to President Truman in 1944 and you said, ``Mr. Truman, tell me 
whether or not the United States has a nuclear weapon?'' What do you 
think President Truman would have said? Would he have said, ``Well, 
it's a top military secret. Its disclosure would harm our national 
security. But I want to tell you anyway and I'll tell you all about 
it''?
  Does anybody here think President Truman would have said that?
  He was not President in 1944; he was Vice President. But at least at 
that period of time.
  But the fact is, President Roosevelt--later President Truman who led 
us in the later 1940's--did not reveal, to questions, that we had a 
nuclear weapon. It was a matter of utmost national security.
  Should the Pakistanis have revealed their national security secrets 
to us? Well, maybe they should have. I can understand Members' 
frustration with that. But I also understand this, India has the 
nuclear weapons. And they had them first. If anyone is shocked or 
surprised that Pakistan, who has been involved in three wars with India 
and lost all three, would think about developing weapons comparable to 
the country that beat them in three wars, I think they have not studied 
much of world politics.
  Is anyone surprised that Pakistan sought to get missiles, if indeed 
they have? I suspect they have sought to find missiles. The fact is 
that India has developed missiles. Is anybody surprised that Pakistan 
then in turn would try to acquire missiles? I am not surprised. Do we 
wish this was not going on? Absolutely. But our challenge ought to be 
to think of ways that we can slow it down or stop it. That involves 
additional leverage. To ignore the situation, to close off our contacts 
and our discourse with Pakistan is not the way to solve the problem.
  Mr. President, I offer these observations at the same time I want to 
renew my sense that it is terribly important that we pursue our efforts 
to slow proliferation or stop it. What is at stake here is solving an 
old dispute, and what stays in place, what is unharmed or unchanged is 
the flat prohibition on military aid or sales to Pakistan. That is 
unchanged. What stays in place is a strong penalty against Pakistan who 
has been our ally through thick and thin. We keep that in place because 
we want to keep a lesson out there for the rest of the world that there 
is a penalty.
  But this amendment delivers a small portion of the package of 
equipment that Pakistan had contracted for 8 or 9 years ago, which they 
have paid for and which is deemed to be militarily insignificant by the 
experts, to them. Their money on three-fourths of the package is sent 
back to them, or at least inasmuch as we can sell those planes for 
something and send it back. What we do in this package is begin to deal 
fairly with Pakistan. What we do not do is undercut our efforts at 
nonproliferation. I believe in the long run we improve those efforts.
  Mr. President, I retain the remainder of my time. 

[[Page S 13971]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, as I understood it, we cannot carry this 
time over until tomorrow. The time has to be used this evening.
  We have 1 hour total equally divided. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I would be prepared to yield back the 
remainder of my time, if the Senator from Colorado is prepared to do 
the same.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I also would be happy to yield back the 
remainder of my time for this evening.
  Mr. President, at this point I will suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                        Aid to Israel and Egypt

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today in support of U.S. aid to 
our strongest allies in the Middle East: Israel and Egypt.
  I believe foreign aid should be dispensed only when and where it is 
in America's national interest, and H.R. 1868, the foreign operations, 
export financing and related appropriations bill of 1996, meets those 
criteria.
  H.R. 1868 authorizes $3 billion for Israel, including $1.8 billion in 
military assistance and $1.2 billion in economic aid; and $2.12 billion 
for Egypt--$1.3 billion in military aid and $815,000 in economic 
assistance.
  Mr. President I believe support for Israel and Egypt furthers our 
goal of supporting countries that defend and advance America's 
interests.
  The Middle East is an incredibly volatile region and events that 
transpire there have major implications for the United States. Both 
Israel and Egypt help protect our strategic interests in that part of 
the world and for this reason they deserve our continued support.
  Now is not the time to abandon our friends, but rather the time to 
assist them as they face many of the same challenges we do as we strive 
to promote stability in the post-cold war world.
  The Middle East has witnessed historic changes that seemed 
unimaginable only 5 years ago: the collapse of the Soviet Union has 
removed the most powerful supporter of rogue nations in the region; the 
United States, with Egypt's crucial involvement, led an international 
coalition in a successful effort during the Persian Gulf War; political 
and economic relations were established between Israel and Morocco, 
Tunisia, and many other countries around the world; bilateral 
negotiations were initiated between Israel and some of her most ardent 
enemies; an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was 
formalized; and a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed.
  But despite these developments and achievements, the Middle East is 
still among the most dangerous regions in the world.
  Instability in the Middle East is contrary to our national security 
interests because it threatens the supply of oil, which could create a 
crisis the likes of which the people of Western Europe and America have 
experienced before. It could also threaten our access to the Suez Canal 
and increase the influence of terrorist regimes.
  And this instability could resurface at any time. Parties opposed to 
the peace process have sought to undermine it. Economic 
underdevelopment in many countries breeds political instability and 
even violence.
  In order to minimize these dangers while continuing to build on 
historic accomplishments in the region, United States support for 
Israel and Egypt is as critical today as ever. Both Israel and Egypt 
stand firmly with us in countering these threats.
  The joint military exercises the United States conducts with Israel 
promote American goals in the region by solidifying a cooperative 
strategic plan which can be quickly implemented. Dozens of American 
weapons systems, including the Patriot missile and the F-15 fighter, 
have been improved with Israeli technological innovations. The Arrow 
missile program, which has been a joint American-Israeli project, 
should some day help America and our allies protect ourselves against 
ballistic missile attacks. I should also point out that aid to Israel 
is used primarily to purchase United States-made military equipment.
  Similarly, joint United States-Egyptian military exercises have 
proven fruitful in such coordinated efforts as Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm. As the United States assists in maintaining the efficiency of 
the Egyptian armed forces, these forces can continue to protect and 
enhance our interests in the region. Furthermore, Egypt purchases over 
85 percent of its military equipment from the United States, including 
the M1A1 tanks.
  Mr. President, we must authorize these funding levels not only 
because it makes sense when considering our strategic goals in the 
Middle East, but also because it is consistent with our objectives in 
the ongoing peace process.
  As the chief sponsor of both past and current peace negotiations, the 
United States should maintain its leadership role in pursuing peace in 
the region by continuing its unequivocal support for Israel and Egypt. 
Peaceful resolutions to Middle East conflicts will promote stability in 
this important part of the world.
  The provisions of this aid package are, in my view, well structured 
to serve the interests of Americans, Israelis and Egyptians.
  Additionally, H.R. 1868 provides funding for the United States to 
assist the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as they develop their 
economy and strive to accomplish peace in the region. In my view, the 
United States should help lead an international community effort to 
stimulate private investment in Gaza and Jericho, including the 
continuation of a free-trade agreement and the development of 
industrial parks. Such initiatives can drive economic growth for the 
Palestinians. A stronger economy in turn will ultimately help produce 
peaceful self-rule.
  Mr. President, l believe we must continue to assist nations which 
serve our interests by promoting stability in a volatile region. I am 
hopeful that ultimately there will be a peaceful resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. I urge my colleagues to vote for this 
legislation, because I believe aid to Israel and Egypt, as well as to 
the Palestinians, is a small price to help attain paramount 
international goal of the United States--permanent stability and peace 
in the Middle East.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, during the wrapup tonight--I know the 
procedures for tomorrow will be laid out by my distinguished colleague 
here. Since the regular floor managers for this bill are not here this 
evening, I would like to point out that Senator Feinstein had hoped to 
be able to put her amendment in and have it considered at the end of 
the hour period and following the vote that will occur on Senator 
Brown's amendment.
  Although the managers are not here tonight, I hope we can honor that 
position for her so that the votes on this same subject will occur at 
about the same time or in sequence tomorrow. I hope that the floor 
managers tomorrow will look favorably on that, although they are not 
here to approve that tonight.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________