[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 145 (Monday, September 18, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H9047-H9050]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA AGREED FRAMEWORK

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
joint resolution (H.J. Res. 83) relating to the United States-North 
Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that 
and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula and dialogue with the Republic of Korea, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                              H.J. Res. 83

       Whereas the United States-Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea Agreed Framework (``Agreed Framework''), entered into 
     on October 21, 1994, between the United States and North 
     Korea, requires North Korea to stop and eventually dismantle 
     its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor program and related 
     facilities, and comply fully with its obligations under the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 
     exchange for alternative energy sources, including interim 
     supplies of heavy fuel oil for electric generators and more 
     proliferation-resistant light water reactor technology;
       Whereas the Agreed Framework also commits North Korea to 
     ``consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint 
     Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'' 
     and ``engage in North-South'' dialogue with the Republic of 
     Korea;
       Whereas the Agreed Framework does not indicate specific 
     criteria for full normalization of relations between the 
     United States and North Korea, and does not link the 
     sequencing of actions in the Agreed Framework with any time-
     frame for carrying out the provisions of the North-South 
     Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
     Peninsula and carrying out the dialogue between North Korea 
     and the Republic of Korea;
       Whereas the commitment by North Korea to carry out the 
     letter and spirit of the Agreed Framework has been put into 
     doubt by actions of North Korea since October 21, 1994, 
     including the suspected diversion of United States heavy fuel 
     oil in apparent contravention of the agreed purpose of the 
     interim fuel deliveries, the resistance to accepting light 
     water reactors from the Republic of Korea, the harsh 
     denunciations of the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
     other actions contrary to the commitment by North Korea to 
     engage in a dialogue with such Government, and the continued 
     conduct of provocative, offensive oriented military 
     exercises; and
       Whereas the nuclear threat posed by North Korea is just one 
     of a number of security concerns of the United States arising 
     out of the policies of North Korea: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
                   OBLIGATIONS OF NORTH KOREA UNDER THE AGREED 
                   FRAMEWORK.

       It is the sense of the Congress that in discussions or 
     negotiations with the Government of North Korea pursuant to 
     the implementation of the United States-Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea Agreed Framework (in this joint resolution 
     referred to as the ``Agreed Framework'') entered into on 
     October 21, 1994, the President should uphold the following 
     minimum conditions relating to nuclear nonproliferation:
       (1) All spent fuel from the graphite-moderated nuclear 
     reactors and related facilities of North Korea should be 
     removed from the territory of North Korea as is consistent 
     with the Agreed Framework.
       (2) The International Atomic Energy Agency should have the 
     freedom to conduct any and all inspections that it deems 
     necessary to fully account for the stocks of plutonium and 
     other nuclear materials in North Korea, including special 
     inspections of suspected nuclear waste sites before any 
     nuclear components controlled by the Nuclear Supplier Group 
     Guidelines are delivered for a light water reactor for North 
     Korea.
       (3) The dismantlement of all declared graphite-based 
     nuclear reactors and related facilities in North Korea, 
     including reprocessing units, should be completed in 
     accordance with the Agreed Framework and in a manner that 
     effectively bars in perpetuity any reactivation of such 
     reactors and facilities.
       (4) The United States should suspend actions described in 
     the Agreed Framework if North Korea attempts to reload its 
     existing 5 megawatt nuclear reactor or resumes construction 
     of nuclear facilities other than those permitted to be build 
     under the Agreed Framework.

     SEC. 2. ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNDER THE AGREED 
                   FRAMEWORK.

       It is further the sense of the Congress that the Republic 
     of Korea should play the central role in the project to 
     provide light water reactors to North Korea under the Agreed 
     Framework.

     SEC. 3. FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES SECURITY AND 
                   POLITICAL INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH 
                   KOREA.

       It is further the sense of the Congress that, after the 
     date of the enactment of this joint resolution, the President 
     should not take further steps toward upgrading diplomatic 
     relations with North Korea beyond opening liaison offices, or 
     relaxing trade and investment barriers imposed against North 
     Korea without--
       (1) action by the Government of North Korea to engage in a 
     North-South dialogue with the Government of the Republic of 
     Korea;
       (2) significant progress toward implementation of the 
     North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 
     Korean Peninsula; and
       (3) progress toward the achievement of several long-
     standing United States policy objectives regarding north 
     Korea and the Korean Peninsula, including--
       (A) reducing the number of military forces of North Korea 
     along the Demilitarized Zone and relocating such military 
     forces away from the Demilitarized Zone;
       (B) prohibiting any movement by North Korea toward the 
     deployment of an intermediate range ballistic missile system; 
     and
       (C) prohibiting the export by North Korea of missiles and 
     other weapons of mass destruction, including related 
     technology and components.

     SEC. 4. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE 
                   KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
                   ORGANIZATION.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 620G. ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE KOREAN 
                   PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.

       ``(a) In General.--No assistance may be provided under this 
     Act or any other provision of law to North Korea or the 
     Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization unless--
       ``(1) such assistance is provided in accordance with all 
     requirements, limitations, and 

[[Page H 9048]]
     procedures otherwise applicable to the provision of such assistance for 
     such purposes; and
       ``(2) the President--
       (A) notifies the congressional committees specified in 
     section 634(a) of this Act prior to the obligation of such 
     assistance in accordance with the procedures applicable to 
     reprogramming notifications under that section, irrespective 
     of the amount of the proposed obligation of such assistance; 
     and
       ``(B) determines and reports to such committees that the 
     provision of such assistance is vital to the national 
     interests of the United States.
       ``(b) Exception.--The requirement of subsection (a)(2) 
     shall not apply with respect to assistance authorized to be 
     appropriated and appropriated for North Korea or the Korean 
     Peninsula Energy Development Organization.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Section 620G of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a), applies with respect 
     to assistance provided to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula 
     Energy Development Organization on or after the date of the 
     enactment of this joint resolution.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will be recognized for 20 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, the behavior of the isolated, 
authoritarian Communist regime in North Korea continues to remind us 
that important American nonproliferation and regional security 
interests remain at great risk notwithstanding the October 1994 United 
States-DPRK Agreed Framework. North Korea remains an outlaw state that 
will not easily adapt itself to international norms. This has been 
underscored by Pyongyang's bitter resistance to accepting light water 
reactor technology from South Korea under the October 1994 accord, 
recent steps by North Korea that would have the effect of unilaterally 
undermining the Military Armistice Commission [MAC] that supervises the 
truce along the demilitarized zone [DMZ], and continued refusal to 
engage in normalization talks with the Republic of Korea, in the South.
  In theory, the October 1994 framework agreement provides a mechanism 
for reining in Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and addressing other 
United States security concerns regarding the Korean Peninsula. With 
the North Koreans, however, nothing is ever simple or settled. In June, 
Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord noted at a regional security 
hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific that ``We're 
going to have a very arduous journey in the next 10 or 15 years in 
implementing the Agreed Framework.''
  North Korea's confrontational behavior continues to raise fundamental 
questions about whether Pyongyang is acting in good faith. North Korea 
has diverted some of the United States-supplied heavy oil that we 
already have delivered under the terms of the agreement, and the North 
has continued its relentless political attacks against our ally, South 
Korea. North Korea continues to make new and outrageous demands, 
including a demand for a billion dollars in additional assistance to 
enhance its power grid and for other purposes. Its implicit agreement 
that a South Korean firm will be the prime contractor for the project 
under the management of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization [KEDO], negotiated at Kuala Lumpur this summer, remains to 
be tested.
  House Joint Resolution 83 was introduced by this Member, together 
with my friend and distinguished subcommittee colleague from 
California, Mr. Kim, and was marked up by the full House International 
Relations Committee on June 29, The resolution provides policy guidance 
to the administration as it seeks to engage with North Korea. Not 
incidentally, the resolution will also send a signal from the Congress 
to Pyongyang that there can be no deviation from the terms of the 
United States-DPRK agreement. The resolution is similar to language 
adopted by the full House in action on H.R. 1561. The most important 
exception is a small but important change to section 4, which is 
intended to alleviate the administration's concerns that the resolution 
not impose a reprogramming notification requirement in regard to funds 
specifically authorized and appropriated by Congress for KEDO.
  Despite the fact that the resolution is imbedded in the American 
Overseas Interests Act, there are compelling reasons to adopt it 
separately. Passage of the resolution will be a fitting expression of 
congressional support for our ally of more than five decades, the 
Republic of Korea, recently commemorated during the visit of President 
Kim Yong-sam to attend the dedication of the Korean War Veterans 
Memorial last July.
  I believe that there is nothing on this issue that we in Congress can 
do which is more important than to go on record to emphasize the 
continuing concern of the United States for maintaining the peace and 
stability of the Korean Peninsula, and to categorically insist that 
South Korea must be allowed to play a central role in arrangements 
negotiated by the United States to address the problem of North Korea's 
nuclear program.
  Because this issue is so important, this Member will take a moment to 
explain more precisely what this legislation does.
  House Joint Resolution 83 has 4 major sections, addressing 4 
concerns:
  First, it spells out minimum objectives for United States 
nonproliferation policy in regard to North Korea's obligations under 
the United States-DPRK Agreed Framework. This is necessary to make 
explicitly clear that there can be no retreat from what is in the 
agreement regarding North Korea's obligations, and to clarify where 
Congress stands on issues that the administration may possibly consider 
as still subject to future negotiation.
  Second, it insures that our longstanding ally South Korea remains a 
key player in the accord by reaffirming that the Republic of Korea is 
the only acceptable source for the light water reactors that are to be 
provided to North Korea under the accord.
  Third, House Joint Resolution 83 establishes minimum preconditions 
for further moves toward relaxing United States trade sanctions and 
normalizing relations with North Korea. These include a requirement 
that North Korea engage in dialog with the South per a 1992 North-South 
Agreement, and also the North-South agreement on Korean Peninsula 
denuclearization. It also conditions further steps toward normalization 
on progress toward the achievement of longstanding United States goals 
of reducing the military threat posed by North Korea's excessive 
military forces, its ballistic missile programs and its exports of 
ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction.
  This latter point is important. In my view and that of many other 
Members of Congress and security policy experts, the administration has 
been understandably focused but unduly focused on containing North 
Korea's nuclear program and avoiding the need to seek international 
economic sanctions, and not enough focused on broader United States 
security concerns regarding the North.
  Fourth, House Joint Resolution 83 imposes notification requirements 
on the use of reprogrammed funds to support the agreement, by 
establishing the same terms and conditions regarding authorizations and 
appropriations from non-Foreign Assistance Act sources as would apply 
to assistance provided to North Korea under the Foreign Assistance Act. 
This includes the notification of any reprogramming actions to the 
House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, no matter from what source the funding is 
obtained, and full justification for assistance provided under waiver 
authority to provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act that otherwise 
would prohibit such assistance.
  Mr. Speaker, this Member thanks the chairman of the International 
Relations Committee, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman], for his support and assistance in crafting this legislation. 
The chairman's staff provided invaluable assistance in addressing many 
of the issues in House Joint Resolution 83.
  In addition, this Member would assure all of his colleagues that 
every effort has been made to make this a bipartisan initiative. This 
Member would point to the very constructive additions made by the 
ranking Democrat 

[[Page H 9049]]
on the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, distinguished gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. Speaker, this is indeed a very important, long-term policy issue 
that merits a firm statement of congressional will. The North Korean 
nuclear issue is certainly, quite arguably, the most dangerous and 
unpredictable challenge facing us today. The resolution provides needed 
policy guidance to the administration, protects the interests of our 
ally, South Korea, broadens the scope of United States policy concerns, 
and protects the jurisdictional interests of this body.
  I urge the House to adopt the joint resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. HAMILTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. I 
regret the necessity to do that. I do think that the distinguished 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], the author of the resolution, 
has really worked very hard to meet many of the objections of our side, 
and I think he has met a number of them that we originally had. 
Nonetheless, for my part at least, the resolution still amounts to a 
unilateral rewriting of the United States-North Korean agreed 
framework.
  It is important to point out, I think, that the administration 
opposes this resolution. It is also important to point out that the 
agreement, the North Korean agreed framework with the United States, 
has served United States interests very well. It perhaps is worth 
remembering that before the negotiations got under way, there were many 
respected voices in this town calling for bombing North Korea, but that 
agreement has been struck, and it serves United States interests well. 
Because of this agreement North Korea has shut down its only operating 
reactor. It has halted construction on two new reactors. It has sealed 
its reprocessing facility and stopped construction on a new 
reprocessing line. It has refrained from reprocessing the spent fuels 
in its possession. It has given the IAEA inspectors and U.S. 
technicians access to nuclear facilities, and it has agreed not only to 
resume IAEA inspections, but to go beyond its obligations under the 
nonproliferation treaty and forgo reprocessing altogether.
  Mr. Speaker, dealing with North Korea of course is never easy, but 
this resolution makes the President's job all the more difficult. House 
Joint Resolution 83 adds new conditions which North Korea must meet 
before the United States can take further steps to upgrade our 
diplomatic relations or economic relations with the North.
  Now all of us want North Korea to take those steps, and all of us 
hope that North Korea will do so. But these steps, it should be very 
clear to all, go beyond what is called for in the agreed framework by 
loading up the agreement with new unilaterally imposed conditions. This 
resolution lessens the prospects of that agreement's success, and then 
we could be back in the midst of a full-scale nuclear crisis with a 
North Korea leading to sanctions, escalation, and perhaps the bombing 
that some people were asking for only a few months ago.
  I urge my colleagues not to allow the pursuit of an ideal outcome to 
destroy a good agreement that is working and working in the interests 
of the United States. Remember, since October 1994, North Korea's 
nuclear program has been frozen in its tracks. I do not thank we should 
jeopardize the agreement that has achieved this success, and I urge a 
``no'' vote on this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, my colleagues, I have great respect for the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the ranking minority member of the 
committee. I regret the fact that he rises in opposition to the 
resolution, but I appreciate his kind words, and I would have to say in 
response just a reminder to my colleagues.
  The gentleman from Indiana; I know he is aware of this fact, that the 
elements to which he objects are contained in a sense-of-the-Congress 
section, section 3, and in fact those items that we list as being 
important, things that should not be forgotten in this whole process, 
such as the continued focus on accelerating North-South dialog, all of 
these are existing policy supported by this administration and previous 
administrations, and I dare say the majority in Congress, and I would 
say further that in a sense-of-the-Congress resolution, it does not in 
any fashion object to the diplomatic relations that have been 
established with North Korea, although many Members do object to that 
fact. It says that the President should not take further steps toward 
upgrading diplomatic relations.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would say that I regard this resolution as 
strengthening the hand of the administration in negotiating with the 
North Koreans and assuring that we keep their feet to the fire and that 
we do verify their compliance with the agreement. I think it 
strengthens the hand of the administration in this respect. In fact, I 
would not offer it if I did not feel very strongly that it was the 
case, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished 
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], who by his experience and 
involvement is quite an expert on the Korean Peninsula.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's kind remarks, and 
I compliment him for the fine job he is doing in managing this 
legislation. I, too, am sorry to hear that the administration is 
opposed to this resolution. The reason I say that is this resolution, 
as I see it, only reemphasizes the points in our agreement with North 
Korea, and all we are saying is that we expect the North Koreans to 
live up to that agreement, and so I cannot see why the administration 
would be opposed to this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, all of us in this House would like to think that this 
resolution is unnecessary. But the North Koreans have displayed, time 
after time, that they cannot be trusted. Now they have lied, they have 
stalled, and they have cheated for too many years, and for us not to be 
alert to this skullduggery I think would be unwise.
  It is important for the Congress to send a clear message, and this is 
a message to both the North Koreans and to our allies in the South. 
Basically what we are saying is that this resolution underscores that 
Congress is steadfast in that first, the terms of last October's 
agreement are the absolute minimum acceptable; secondly, that North 
Korea will not be allowed to divide us from South Korea. In this regard 
any further steps toward normalization must be linked to real progress 
in North-South dialog. Third, the only acceptable source for two 
nuclear reactors is South Korea; and, fourth, our other military and 
political objective for the Korean Peninsula will not be neglected or 
even bargained with. Fifth, Congress retains final authority under any 
expenditures in support of this agreement.
  Apparently this last point has caused some controversy with the 
administration, and, to be honest with my colleagues, I am surprised. 
Under the current law we already require congressional notification and 
a waiver for any such use in the 150 account. It is natural that we 
require the same here. this resolution simply insures that the 
President is up front with the congress and with the U.S. taxpayers. 
this is what I call a sunshine provision. Everyone should know what is 
in it; everyone should live up to the terms.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot see any reason why anyone would be opposed to 
this resolution, and so I want to, in conclusion, thank my friend from 
Nebraska for bringing this resolution to the floor. He has presented 
and provided a needed opportunity to underscore the underlying and 
unyielding support for South Korea and for the United States vital 
interests in the Korean Peninsula. North Korea should have no 
delusions. We are resolute as a Congress, and as a people we will live 
up to these commitments, and we expect the North Koreans to live up to 
those commitments also.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Roth] for his kind 
remarks and for the information that he conveyed to our colleagues, 
which is 

[[Page H 9050]]
very important, about our resolve to see that North Koreans live with 
the agreement and that we not backpedal in any way on our commitment 
that there be a North-South dialog and that we not permit the North 
Koreans to divide the Republic of Korea, South Korea, and the United 
States.
  Mr. KIM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Joint 
Resolution 83, the resolution relating to the United States-North Korea 
Agreed Framework. As the only Korean-American in Congress, I am proud 
to have sponsored this measure with Asia Subcommittee chairman Doug 
Bereuter.
  In October 1994, when the administration first unveiled the United 
States-North Korea Agreed Framework, many praised it as the beginning 
of the end to a perilous nuclear crisis in the Pacific rim. 
Unfortunately, I did not share that same optimism. In fact, I felt that 
the agreed framework was yet another effort to appease North Korea at 
the expense of the national security interests of both the United 
States and our ally, the Republic of Korea. It looked to me like the 
United States was obligated to give more than it received in return.
  In that regard, I was pleased to help sponsor House Joint Resolution 
83 because it defines the specific direction which the administration 
must follow in its dealings with North Korea, rather than allowing that 
direction to be dictated by the leadership in Pyongyang. Most important 
of all is the stipulation that a North-South dialog be of the highest 
priority to ensure a reduction in the hostilities between the two 
governments in the hopes of long-term peace on the peninsula.
  I think it is important that this Congress, and this administration, 
send a clear message to North Korea by setting forth a blueprint of 
what we will accept as positive progress. And, with House Joint 
Resolution 83 we make it clear that without such progress, we will not 
provide North Korea with the economic and political benefits they want. 
Therefore, I ask all of my colleagues to support the immediate passage 
of House Joint Resolution 83 so that we set a clear plan of action with 
respect to North Korea.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I commend the distinguished chairman of our 
subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Bereuter, for bringing this 
resolution before the House. I also commend the distinguished ranking 
member of the subcommittee, Mr. Berman, for his helpful contributions.
  The substance of the resolution has, of course, already passed the 
House as part of H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interests Act, and so 
I expect it to receive broad bipartisan support today.
  The resolution serves two useful purposes. First, it articulates the 
views of the Congress with respect to the October 21, 1994, agreed 
framework between the United States and North Korea under which North 
Korea is to suspend and then dismantle its nuclear program in exchange 
for deliveries of heavy fuel oil and construction in North Korea of two 
1,000 megawatt light water nuclear reactors.
  The resolution does not criticize or reject the agreed framework, but 
it does sound several cautionary notes about implementation of the 
agreement. In particular, it urges that the agreed framework be 
implemented in a manner consistent with United States interests; that 
South Korea have a central role in implementing the agreed framework; 
and that the United States not take further steps to normalize our 
relations with North Korea until North Korea improves its behavior in 
other areas of concern to us, such as implementing the North-South 
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
curtailing ballistic missile exports, and reducing tensions along the 
DMZ.
  The second purpose of the resolution is to ensure that all United 
States foreign assistance that is provided to North Korea or the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization pursuant to the agreed 
framework is provided under the same terms and conditions that govern 
all other United States foreign assistance. This is necessary because 
the administration has already on two occasions sought to deliver 
assistance to North Korea from funds not subject to the terms and 
conditions of the Foreign Assistance Act--in one case from Defense 
Department funds, and in the other from Energy Department funds.
  House Joint Resolution 83 will make an important contribution to the 
Congress' ability to oversee implementation of the agreed framework, 
and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I, too, have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 83, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended, and the joint resolution, as 
amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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