[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 144 (Friday, September 15, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13655-S13656]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT ON TURKEY
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the August recess two members of the
Foreign Relations Committee minority staff traveled to Turkey at my
direction to assess a range of issues related to United States-Turkish
bilateral relations. Turkey, one of the largest recipients of United
States military assistance, is an important United States ally in a
dangerous and unstable region. It is therefore, incumbent upon us to
take a close look at what is occurring in Turkey--the threats to its
security, its political struggles, and its human rights situation. In
particular, I asked my staff to focus on Turkey's Kurdish problem,
which has broad implications for regional stability, as well as
Turkey's relations with the West.
Among the staff's findings is that the Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK]
poses a grave threat not only to Turkey, but to regional stability as
well. At the same time, the Government of Turkey is unable--or
unwilling--to distinguish the genuine threat posed by the PKK from the
legitimate rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people. Turkey is
responding with a heavy-handed, indiscriminate military campaign
against the Kurds, even as it shuts off opportunities for nonviolent,
Kurdish political expression. Consequently, Turkey may be fomenting,
rather than preventing Kurdish separatism.
I believe this report makes an important contribution to the
Congress' consideration of the United States approach toward Turkey. I
ask unanimous consent that the ``Summary of Key Findings'' be placed
into the Record at this point, and would commend the full report, which
is a available at the Foreign Relations Committee office, to my
colleagues' attention.
Summary of Key Findings
Turkey, which places a high priority on good relations with
the West in general and the United States in particular, is
an important U.S. ally in a dangerous and unstable
neighborhood: Three of its immediate neighbors--Iran, Iraq,
and Syria--are on the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism; it is engaged in an economic and political
competition with Russia for influence in and access to the
resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus; there is ongoing
conflict to Turkey's north--in Georgia and between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. Turkey is not, however, a disinterested in
neutral party, it is openly sympathetic to Azerbaijan's
position, and although it has opened an air corridor to
Armenia, Turkey maintains a road and rail blockade; it
continues to spar with Greece over Cyprus and other issues,
in particular, a dispute over maritime boundaries in the wake
of Greece's ratification of the Law of the Sea treaty
threatens to bring Turkey and Greece into outright conflict.
The Kirdistan Workers' Party (PKK) poses a grave threat not
only to Turkey, but to regional stability as well. The PKK--
which employs deadly terrorist tactics against innocent
noncombatants in Turkey and
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against innocent civilians elsewhere in the Middle East and
Europe--bears direct responsibility for much of the tensions
in southeast Turkey and for prompting the recent Turkish
invasions of Iraq.
Operation Provide Comfort, the allied humanitarian and
security operation in Northern Iraq, is a critical element of
U.S. and Western strategies with regard to Iraq, and may be
the only thing preventing tens of thousands of Kurds from
pouring into southeastern Turkey. Although some Turkish
officials recognize these facts and military officials at
Incirlik have provided splendid cooperation to their British,
French and American counterparts, other Turkish military and
political officials (including parliamentarians) argue that
Provide Comfort offers the PKK protection and cover in
Northern Iraq. This rather schizophrenic view of Provide
Comfort makes Turkey appear a relucant participant in the
allied effort, which Turkey has exploited to its advantage in
dealings with its allies.
In keeping with traditions established during the days of
Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, Turkey has an almost paranoid fear of
losing its Turkish identity. The government of Turkey
accordingly is unable--or unwilling--to distinguish the
genuine threat posed by the PKK from the legitimate rights
and aspirations of the Kurdish people. As a result, Turkey
refuses to engage in a political dialogue with nonviolent
Kurdish representatives, and is executing a heavy-handed,
indiscriminate military campaign to eradicate what it views
as a monolithic threat to the unity of the country.
The city of Diyarbakir, which symbolizes the ethnic
difficulties that persist within Turkey, has become a haven
for rural Kurds forced to evacuate neighboring towns and
villages destroyed by the Turkish military. By some
estimates, the city's population has grown from roughly
300,000 to more than 1,500,000 during the past five years.
Although Turkish officials, local residents, and some
independent observers suggest that tensions have subsided
during the past two years, it is evident that any existing
calm is tenuous and the result of Turkey's overwhelming--and
at times oppressive--security presence, which has exacted a
high cost in terms of human rights violations.
Turkey's government refuses even to acknowledge that there
is a ``Kurdish problem,'' and thereby is ignoring the real
issue. By equating all Kurdish aspirations with the terrorist
designs of the PKK, Turkey effectively has eliminated outlets
for nonviolent Kurdish political or cultural expression. As a
consequence, Turkey unintentionally may be contributing to
the PKK's appeal.
Turkey desperately wants to join the European Union's
Customs Union, and is making some effort to meet the European
Parliament's minimum demands regarding democratization and
human rights in order to achieve membership. It may even make
some modifications to Article 8 of the Anti-Terror law (which
prohibits the advocacy of separatism). Turkey will not,
however, take any action which it perceive as comprising the
Turkish identity, so there are limits to the amount of
genuine change it will make to gain membership in the Customs
Union. It is equally unclear that the West would have much
impact on Turkish behavior by withholding benefits such as
Customs Union membership.
Despite claims that it regards fundamentalism as a threat
to its secular heritage, the government of Turkey appears to
be encouraging and even sponsoring Islamic activities in an
attempt to bind the country together and defuse separaist
sentiment. Such a strategy--which parallels efforts of
governments in the Near East seeking to counter radical
lefist groups during the 1970s and early 1980s--could
backfire and inadvertently provide a foothold for Islamic
extremists.
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