[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 142 (Wednesday, September 13, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8816-H8834]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dickey). Pursuant to House Resolution 
216 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 1655.

                              {time}  1043


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
1655) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. 
Burton of Indiana in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Dicks] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I would like to compliment the 
Committee's ranking Democrat, Norm Dicks, for his highly constructive 
role in the formulation of this legislation. He is a bona fide expert 
in many aspects of national security and intelligence, particularly in 
advanced technologies, and his influence is evident in many of our 
Committee's positions. I also would like to thank the other Democratic 
members of the Committee who have also joined in a spirit of 
nonpartisanship to craft this legislation. I also thank my fellow 
Republican Members who have worked hard in putting this bill together. 
In particular, I appreciate the fine work of Jerry Lewis and Bob 
Dornan, our
 subcommittee chairmen. Finally, the staff on both sides of the aisle 
deserve our thanks. They are a dedicated, talented group. This 
legislation is the product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation, 
and cooperation. The Committee held 11 full committee budget hearings, 
over 20 Member briefings, and over 200 staff briefings related to the 
budget. As a result, it is an act that our Committee reported out 
unanimously and in which we can all take no small measure of pride.

  H.R. 1655 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1996 for all of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. 
Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for 
intelligence be specifically authorized.
  The intelligence budget has three major components--the national 
foreign intelligence program, known as the NFIP, the tactical 
intelligence and related activities program, known as TIARA, and--for 
the first time this year--a third program, the joint military 
intelligence program, known as JMIP.
  NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers 
and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency.
  TARA, or tactical intelligence activities, reside exclusively in the 
Department of Defense. They consist, in large part, of numerous 
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional 
part of the basic military force structure and provide direct 
information in support of military operations. Additionally, this year 
we have for the first time categorized some activities under the newly 
created joint military intelligence program, which provides military 
intelligence principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers.
  This categorization of the intelligence budget into national, defense 
and tactical military intelligence programs facilitates our 
understanding of the diverse uses of intelligence. Additionally, it 
should increase the accountability and managerial control of 
intelligence programs.
  From even the above thumbnail sketch of intelligence activities, it 
is obvious that, although our committee 

[[Page H 8817]]
has jurisdiction over all three intelligence programs, we must work 
closely with the National Security Committee, particularly in the 
oversight and authorization of the TIARA program. I would like to 
acknowledge the
 assistance of chairman Floyd Spence, the members of the National 
Security Committee, and Committee Staff.

  Due to the classified nature of much of the Intelligence Committee's 
work, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before the 
House except in the broadest terms. This can handicap Members' 
understanding of the issues at hand, particularly when we reach the 
amendments phase of these proceedings. Accordingly, I strongly urge 
those Members who have not yet had a chance, to read the classified 
annex to this bill. The annex is available in the committee office in 
the capitol--a 2-minute walk from the floor to H-405.
  Now let me do what I can--in an unclassified manner--to discuss 
several major elements of the bill. First, I will put the bill in the 
historic context of the last few years' authorizations. Then I will 
explain the philosophy we followed in considering this year's bill. 
Finally, I will touch on several of the bill's most important 
initiatives and emphases.
  First some recent history: Those who have been tracking the 
intelligence budget over this decade have seen a rather remarkable--
some would say reckless--decline in intelligence spending. This is not 
news and I have discussed this at length on this floor for several 
years. But let me review and update a few facts that speak volumes and 
correct several common misconceptions.
  Fact one: In real terms, the intelligence budget has been cut in all 
but one of the last 7 years.
  Fact two: The intelligence community is being reduced at twice the 
rate recommended by the President's national performance review 
program.
  Fact three: President Clinton proposed a few years ago to cut $7 
billion from intelligence by 1997. That was accomplished over a year 
ago--2 years early. We will probably come very close to doubling those 
cuts by 1997.
  Fact four: We have, until this year, been on a glide slope of 
intelligence cuts that would by the end of this decade put intelligence 
spending in constant dollars at about 65 percent of the 1989 level.
  Fact five: The intelligence community continues to reduce its 
personnel at a rate that will, by 1999, cut more than one of every five 
positions.
  It was with the knowledge of this recent history that we began 
consideration of the fiscal year 1996 authorization. The cumulative 
effects of these developments over the last several years are troubling 
to many of us on both sides of the aisle who believe that we cannot 
indefinitely continue to cut critically important intelligence support 
to U.S. policymakers and military commanders. Nonetheless, our 
committee decided on a nonpartisan basis that it would not rush 
headlong into efforts to reverse these trends of the recent past. 
Responsible oversight requires an objective approach. We decided that 
the 104th Congress offered us an excellent opportunity to take a fresh, 
open-eyed look at intelligence. We resolved to work together in a 
nonpartisan manner to make the most objective assessment possible of 
each item in the intelligence budget. To do that we broke with some 
recent practices, three of which I will mention here.
  First, we reorganized the committee to merge the previously separate 
budget and oversight/evaluation functions. Wise budgetary decisions 
must be guided by evaluations of effectiveness.
  Second, we broke with the past practice of concentrating on the 
short-term effect of our budgetary decisions. Instead, we have taken a 
longer view and designed this year's authorization with an eye toward 
future needs and requirements for intelligence. This emphasis in our 
authorization has coincided with our committee's major activity of this 
Congress--an exhaustive and authoritative study of this country's long-
term requirements for intelligence. This study, called ``IC21: The 
Intelligence Community for the 21st Century,'' will be completed in 
time for its results to be considered in the preparation of what may 
become semiannual legislation in next year's session.
  Third, we opted for the most intellectually honest process we could 
devise to judge each program on its merits and its contributions to 
national security. We explicitly rejected the idea of working toward an 
arbitrarily set higher or lower budget objective. We also rejected the 
idea of making offsets to otherwise deserving programs so as to fund an 
increase in other programs. We were confident that the Congress would 
accept an intelligence authorization consisting of properly funded 
programs--even if that amounted to a significant increase in the 
aggregate over the President's request. As it turned out, despite some 
80 budget actions taken by the committee, this bill authorizes 
intelligence expenditures only 1.3 percent above the President's 
request.
  To understand many of the specific actions taken in H.R. 1655, the 
Members will have to refer to the classified annex available to them in 
our committee office. But let me give you an unclassified sketch of 
several of the themes that emerge:
  We have moved to centralize authorities and improve cross-program 
management of intelligence activities. This reduces needless 
redundancies, facilitates the identification of under- performing 
programs, and increases accountability.
  We have, across the board, emphasized the need for countering the 
challenges of foreign denial and deception practices. We have directed 
the intelligence community to do better at countering the increasingly 
sophisticated capabilities of hostile foreign powers to hide their 
activities from our intelligence capabilities. I note, for example, the 
reported success the Iraqi regime had in hiding its massive biological 
weapons program. Foreign denial and deception practices have revealed 
an extraordinarily dangerous intelligence vulnerability that has not 
been sufficiently addressed. Our actions will do much to reverse this 
trend. I should add that this is also an issue of great interest to the 
Speaker.
  We have focused the intelligence community's attention more on the 
downstream activities of processing, exploiting, and disseminating 
intelligence. Without careful planning there is a serious danger of 
painting ourselves into a corner where we devote all of the very thin 
intelligence budgets we can now afford toward the development and 
maintenance of expensive technical collection systems, but have 
insufficient ability to make use of the intelligence we collect. We 
believe this is already a problem and we have taken action to address 
it.
  We have urged the intelligence community to accelerate its move 
toward concentrating intelligence collection and analysis on issues of 
the highest national importance. We no longer have the resources or 
capabilities to spare on anything but the most important intelligence 
targets.
  We have acted to improve counterintelligence, security, counter- 
terrorism, and counterproliferation capabilities.
  We have taken action to improve the
   capability of the CIA to better manage and oversee its agent 
operations and the intelligence emerging from them. As you all know, it 
is a matter of deep importance to this committee that there be a better 
process of keeping this committee informed of intelligence 
developments. In addition to placing this requirement on the CIA--and 
we have done so in no uncertain terms--we must give the CIA the 
capability to meet our expectations. This action will enhance this 
capability as well as increase the productivity of the CIA.

  We made our biggest change to the administration's request in the 
satellite area. Although the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] 
received 99 percent of the amount requested, the funds were 
significantly redistributed within the NRO account that builds and 
manages our Nation's satellites. The significance is most apparent 
regarding long-term policy. The committee believes the NRO needs to 
reduce program costs. We believe that with creativity and cost 
consciousness significant savings may be possible. The committee has 
also directed that the NRO assess the long-term threats that we face to 
ensure that we are building systems that will address potential 
collection gaps. Finally, we concentrated on the imagery program, where 
developments in the commercial arena point 

[[Page H 8818]]
toward large potential cost savings in national security programs. 
Without getting into the highly classified and very technical areas of 
the satellite collection process, technology advances over the last 10 
years, coupled with alternative launch options offer the possibility of 
substantial savings while maintaining and even enhancing necessary 
intelligence capabilities.
  Finally, in drafting this bill, we resisted the calls of those who 
advocated an unconsidered, massive infusion of funds to remedy the cuts 
of the past, and we rejected the urging of those who rely on anecdotes 
and headlines, many of them wrong, to dismantle intelligence. Our hard 
work and pragmatic approach has paid off in producing a hard-nosed, 
lean authorization at 1.3 percent above the President's request. It 
focuses intelligence, increases accountability, and corrects several of 
the dangerous trends in recent intelligence authorizations. This is a 
responsible bill that any Member of this body can readily support.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1655, which 
authorizes funds for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
for fiscal year 1996.
  I want to begin by commending Chairman Combest for his leadership in 
bringing this measure to the floor and for the manner in which he has 
presided over the committee this year. He has been uniformly fair and 
has consistently sought to involve all members in all aspects of the 
committee's business. It has been a pleasure to serve with him and I 
look forward to our continued collaborative efforts, not only on this 
legislation, but on the other important work of the committee as well.
  At a time in history when the capability to provide information 
rapidly and reliably to our policymakers and military commanders is 
critical, the United States is fortunate to possess the world's 
preeminent intelligence system. Other nations envy the ability of our 
intelligence agencies to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence 
useful for purposes as varied as determining our stance in diplomatic 
negotiations and reducing the threats faced by U.S. military personnel 
deployed in dangerous and rapidly changing crisis situations. As has 
been seen repeatedly in the past year, from Haiti to Bosnia and in many 
other locations, United States intelligence is looked to not only by 
our leaders, but by those of the countries with whom we are allied, to 
provide that essential piece of information that determines whether 
action is taken or deferred.
  In an age of rapid advances in technology, maintaining a system which 
ensures the best possible access to information which others would not 
like us to have, interprets that information, and moves it in a matter 
of seconds anywhere in the world, is an expensive proposition. 
Intelligence collection and dissemination, particularly in the areas of 
signals and imagery intelligence, requires substantial investments in 
highly complex systems. It is impossible to fully discuss in an 
unclassified setting those systems, or the manner in which human 
intelligence is collected in a hostile environment by people of great 
skill and courage. It is also impossible, however, to understate the 
important contributions our intelligence agencies, and the men and 
women who work in them, make to our national security.
  Some have criticized the amount of money the United States spends on 
intelligence, and it is true that H.R. 1655, in the aggregate, would 
provide 1.3 percent more money than requested by the President. Those 
who are critical of the size of the intelligence budget often point to 
the demise of the Soviet Union as the event which should have made it 
possible to substantially reduce intelligence expenditures. However, 
intelligence spending has declined by several billion dollars since the 
Soviet Union imploded and the number of people employed by the 
intelligence agencies is declining as well. By fiscal year 1999, there 
will be 22.5 percent fewer employees than there were in fiscal year 
1992. These reductions come at a time when, while there is admittedly 
no single threat to our national security equivalent to
 that posed by the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war, an array 
of challenges exists which places an extraordinary premium on accurate 
and timely intelligence. Among these challenges are: The proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction; the residual nuclear capacity and 
uncertain stability of the Russian Government; the need to provide data 
with which to target precision guided weapons; and regional conflicts. 
Advances in technology which are costly to counter but which must be 
addressed only magnify these challenges.

  I believe that the reductions in spending over the last 5 years have 
resulted in an intelligence system of about the right size and 
capability for the missions it confronts. The authorization levels in 
H.R. 1655 will not provide for a significant expansion of those 
capabilities beyond what had been previously planned, but in general 
will ensure that modernization activities already underway are carried 
through to conclusion. These activities, if completely implemented 
particularly in the satellite area, will produce significant savings 
over time.
  The intelligence community has had many successes, the majority of 
which cannot be publicized for security reasons. The last few years, 
however, have not been ones of unqualified achievement. The Ames spy 
case was an unmitigated disaster for the Central Intelligence Agency in 
general, and the directorate of operations in particular. The need for 
change in management style and attitude to better ensure accountability 
within the directorate of operations was made crystal clear by the Ames 
debacle. This message has not been lost on the new Director of Central 
Intelligence, John Deutch. He has moved aggressively to install a new 
team of senior managers who I believe are dedicated to improving the 
way in which the intelligence community operates, and to making certain 
that Congress is kept advised of significant intelligence activities, 
as the law requires.
  The well publicized failures in the intelligence community have been 
frustrating and the explanations for their case have been difficult to 
understand and accept. I believe, however, that these incidents do not 
provide a rationale for a general reduction in intelligence spending; 
rather they argue strongly for the kind of review of the internal 
operations and structure of the intelligence community which our 
committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Aspin-Brown 
commission, and the DCI have undertaken. These efforts will produce 
change that is the product of careful consideration rather than reflex, 
and I believe result in an intelligence community better designed to 
operate in the post-cold-war world.
  H.R. 1655 was reported unanimously by the Intelligence Committee and 
I have already indicated my support of it. In part, that support is 
based on my belief that it is important that there be stability and 
predictability in intelligence funding, particularly in highly 
technical programs where uncertainty in resources and direction can 
cause money to be wasted. The bill provides that kind of stability in 
all areas except for the programs managed by the National 
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. While I am not pleased by the NRO's 
performance in keeping the committee informed about the expenditure 
rates for certain programs, and the annual funding needs based on those 
rates, I do not believe that the appropriate response to those 
managerial shortcomings is to
 radically alter the composition of our planned satellite 
constellation. Certain of the actions described in the classified annex 
to this bill, however, would have that effect and represent, in my 
judgment, a significant departure from the direction provided by 
Congress to the NRO as recently as a year ago. This departure has the 
potential for sizable risk and substantial long-term costs. It should 
only be undertaken if there is amply evidence that the likely gain 
outweighs the financial and programmatic risks. At this point, that 
evidence does not exist. I hope that in conference we will carefully 
consider the advisability of taking these steps now before a thorough 
record to support them is developed, both at the NRO and at the 
committee.

[[Page H 8819]]


  Mr. Chairman, the reservations just noted do not prevent me from 
supporting this important legislation, nor in recommending it to the 
House. I urge the adoption of H.R. 1655.

                              {time}  1100

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for 
his comments and, as I have already mentioned, I appreciate his 
participation, his advice, and his dedication to the intelligence 
community and to our national security.
  I would like to respond to his comments regarding the National 
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. I, too, am not pleased with the NRO's 
performance regarding expenditure rates and funding needs. The need to 
adjust some of the managerial philosophies at the NRO was even brought 
out in our unclassified committee report. However, I
 believe that many of our adjustments are not just in response to 
managerial shortcomings, but are a recognition of the fact that rapid 
advances in technology, similar to those the gentleman addressed in his 
statement, also have value in the areas of satellite development. The 
problem is that these types of technologies, which go beyond historical 
incremental improvements, are not readily being addressed by the NRO, 
who have grown comfortable philosophically with staying the course.

  I take note of my colleague's concern regarding stability and 
predictability in intelligence funding. That has been and remains a 
major concern of mine in terms of how the House handles intelligence 
oversight. Technological developments combined with the diversity of 
intelligence requirements, however, dictate that we not be lulled into 
complacency at a time when innovation may mean the difference between 
whether or not we can meet the policymaker's needs in the 21st century. 
Our bill does not attempt to push the NRO into untested areas, but 
simply assures that they will be open to the possibilities inherent in 
new technologies.
  Again, I thank Mr. Dicks for his comments and his concerns, and 
greatly look forward to exploring this area further as the committee 
continues its work on 1C21.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
[Mr. Shuster].
  (Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this legislation. It is 
very important to emphasize that we have already imposed multibillion-
dollar cuts on the intelligence community over the past 5 years. It is 
equally important to emphasize that, under the leadership of the 
distinguished chairman and the ranking member, very substantial reforms 
have been put in place. It is also equally important to emphasize that 
this legislation is brought to the floor by a unanimous vote of every 
member of the committee. A good intelligence is even more important 
today when we no longer face a monolithic opponent but rather several 
rogue States.
  One of the areas in which I have been particularly interested indeed 
during my tenure as the ranking member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I focused on the counternarcotics issue. 
Drugs indeed are a scourge in our country today. Frankly I am deeply 
concerned at the lack of emphasis that the administration seems to be 
placing on curtailing both demand and supply, but I am happy to report 
that there have been very, very significant intelligence successes. 
Most of them cannot be talked about because they are highly classified. 
I would urge my colleagues to go to the committee and to get a 
classified briefing on the extraordinary successes that our 
intelligence agencies have contributed to.
  One example which is now in the public domain and can be talked about 
is the disintegration of the Cali cartel, that notorious cartel in 
Colombia which controls 80 percent of the world's cocaine supply. 
Within the past few months, 6 key leaders have been captured by 
Colombia law enforcement. We have been very instrumental in supporting 
that effort as well as other related efforts.
  Shipments of coca base from Peru to Bolivia have been interdicted 
thanks to our support and the Colombian law enforcement people and 
other law enforcement people to the extent that the coca base has 
plummeted. Refineries simply cannot get base. In fact, much coca base 
is rotting on the ground.
  I would be quick to acknowledge we cannot solve the drug scourge in 
this country by reducing supply only, but we can contribute to it, and 
the intelligence community is making a very, very significant 
contribution.
  We are on the right track with this bill. I would urge my colleagues 
to support your committee members who unanimously bring this 
legislation to the floor.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  First I want to commend the chairman of the committee for the very 
bipartisan, cerebral and often extremely substantial way that he has 
run this committee. I want to express my thanks to the chairman for 
allowing me to undertake several initiatives in the foreign policy area 
including the last trip that I took to Iraq.
  Let me also state that I think the chairman is on the right track in 
ensuring that what we try to do in the future is make sure that our 
intelligence community is up to the task. With recent revelations 
relating to double agents, the Ames affair, and the Howard case, the 
trust that the American people have had in the intelligence community 
has eroded. In fact, the reputation of the intelligence community has 
been damaged by these actions. So I think it is critically important 
that we make sure that we have in our intelligence community a 
capability to move our intelligence operations into a new age.
  The Soviet Union has fallen. There is no bipolar relationship in the 
world. There are new challenges. The new challenges are in 
international terrorism, in nuclear nonproliferation, in dealing with 
drug cartels and economic competition, and I think it is critically 
important that we move the focus of the intelligence community into 
these areas.
  I am not sure in the past that we have done that. There are still too 
many Sovietologists, we still do not have enough people speaking 
Arabic, or we do not know enough about ethnic conflicts, regional 
conflicts in Bosnia, or the North Korean nonproliferation issues. We 
need to find ways to engage ourselves better in these new areas. I 
believe that Chairman Combest is undertaking a review of our 
intelligence operations in a very effective and systematic manner.
  One thing that troubles me a bit is that we do have the intelligence 
authorization 1.3 percent above the administration request. I think we 
have to send a signal to every department and every bureaucracy that we 
are not going to be tolerating anyone getting more money than they 
need. But I will entrust the chairman and the ranking member as to why 
we are doing this and support their efforts to maintain the 
intelligence budget at a level that the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Combest] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] see fit. I will 
support that. I just think it sends a little bit of a troubling signal. 
There is an appropriations process which may not be as generous, but on 
the whole I do think that we have to send a strong message to the 
intelligence community that they have to do better in reducing waste, 
and that they have to do better in the areas of human intelligence. We 
have some very, very sophisticated systems, but we also have to do 
better in the area of people.

                              {time}  1115

  Let me say that by ``people,'' I mean intelligence--human 
intelligence--spies. I was pleased to hear that today, the new Director 
of CIA, Mr. Deutch, talked about the need for expanding covert action. 
I think that makes sense. The statement was on the record.
  The United States needs to have the capability to engage itself in 
some very dicey situations, often with very unsavory people. I think we 
need to support that capability. We may need to deal with those 
situations and in that sense 

[[Page H 8820]]
we need to have a covert action structure. For the last few years, it 
has not been as strong because we have not needed it. But I think it is 
critically important that we have that capability.
  We have a very good new CIA Director. John Deutch knows government. 
He is an academic. He has the ear of the President. He has the trust of 
the intelligence community. He is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
He knows weapons systems. He knows technologies. He knows people and he 
knows this city. He knows politics. I think we should support him. I 
think we should give him political and substantive backing for what he 
is trying to do.
  Mr. Chairman, the message has to be clear. The culture of the CIA has 
to be changed. They have to do a better job. Finally, we have to make 
sure that every penny that we authorize is spent wisely.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from New 
Mexico [Mr. Richardson] and enjoy working with him. The gentleman is a 
dedicated Member and I assure him that any time the gentleman wants to 
leave this country, I will be happy to assist him.
  The gentleman knows that I say that only in jest. We are all very 
proud of the activities that the gentleman from New Mexico, my neighbor 
in Texas, has accomplished, and we are glad the gentleman is a part of 
our team.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Lewis].
  (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong 
support for the work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. Chairman, let me say at the beginning that at a moment, an 
important time in terms of the history of this country and our 
intelligence work, we are blessed by the fact that the leadership 
within the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], my chairman, 
as well as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the ranking 
member, have worked in a very, very positive fashion to create an 
environment that is as close to being nonpartisan in regard to these 
matters as I have ever seen in the time that I have served in the 
Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we recognize that America is at a 
turning point in terms of its need for information. And, indeed, it is 
a new age at the end of the 20th century. The end of the cold war is 
upon us. The reality that we are reducing defense budgets, because 
people believe there is less of a need for more spending in that 
subject area, has raised a specter regarding the future of intelligence 
that is very, very important for all of us to consider seriously.
  First, it is important to know that the cold war is all but over, but 
indeed we continue to have serious challenges in connection with that. 
Any Member who will but look will know of the difficulties in these new 
fledgling democracies.
  The challenges in Russia present problems for the United States that 
are very real; problems that require us, both the President and our 
committees, to be well informed regarding what really is happening in 
that region of the world.
  Above and beyond that, the intelligence community itself has faced 
many a challenge. The difficulty of the Ames case raised questions 
about the future of intelligence and where we should be going. It is 
critical to recognize that the House must be involved in that future 
direction.
  Beyond that, there is a new specter that has not been the most 
prominent in terms of the public's concern in the past: The prospect of 
terrorism impacting our society. Terrorism that may have its source 
from overseas; indeed terrorism here at home.
  Mr. Chairman, all of these complicated circumstances create a 
situation that would suggest to the House that the President and our 
committees need more information, not less information, and excellent 
information.
  The work of our intelligence community is critical to us today and to 
the future hope for freedom, I believe, in the world.
  I urge the House to recognize the importance of this work, support 
this very significant bill, and support the funding that is necessary 
to carry forward our intelligence activities.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I will be offering an 
amendment to reduce this budget by 3 percent. Of course, we cannot say 
3 percent of what, because there is this great fear that someone might 
find out a number, which everybody who needs to know it, knows it. It 
is only the American people who do not know what the number is.
  But it is up some. The proposed authorization is 1.7 percent higher 
than last year's appropriation. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it very 
clear to people, because of my respect for the rules, I am allowed 
under the rules of the House to say that it is 1.7 percent higher. I am 
not allowed to say what it is 1.7 percent higher than, but it is 1.7 
percent higher.
  It is 1.2 percent higher than what the President asked for. That 
seems to me a very grave error. Of course, we want to be protected, but 
there has been a more substantial drop in the task of the intelligence 
community than in virtually any other area of government.
  Up until 5 years ago, the intelligence community was engaged much 
more heavily, than in any other activity, in monitoring the Soviet 
Union's ability to destroy our society. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact were extraordinarily dangerous threats.
  Mr. Chairman, that threat has very substantially diminished. There is 
no more Warsaw Pact. Countries that once had troops dedicated to our 
destruction, against their will, but nonetheless dedicated, they are 
gone.
  Mr. Chairman, the point is this. Yes, we have Iran and Libya and 
North Korea to worry about. But the argument that we cannot reduce our 
spending on intelligence, now that the Soviet Union's threat to our 
very physical survival has collapsed, must assume that Libya, North 
Korea and Iran did not exist 10 years ago.
  In fact, 10 years ago we were worried about these terrorist nations. 
We were worried about nuclear proliferation and we were worried about 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has collapsed. The largest single 
threat has gone.
  Yes, we still have these other threats, but we had them 5 and 10 
years ago. Yet, Mr. Chairman, the committee now asks us, at a time when 
we are cutting student loans and about to raise the premium for older 
people. If my colleagues do not want to vote to raise the premium on 
older people, if we did not give an increase to the intelligence 
community of 1.7 percent, we would go a long way of not having to raise 
the premium on older people living on $15,000 and $16,000 a year, 
because those are the choices we are making.
  Mr. Chairman, we are adding 1.7 percent in this authorizations to the 
budget. The CIA gets a 5 percent increase. Mr. Chairman, any other 
agency that had behaved disastrously, we would be talking about having 
to cut it.
  We were told we were going to cut Head Start. Do my colleagues know 
why? Because they do not spend the money as efficiently as they could. 
The Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations subcommittee charged 
with Head Start said, ``I like Head Start, but they haven't spent the 
money so efficiently, so let's cut them.'' Why does the exact opposite 
not apply to the CIA?
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1655, 
the Intelligence authorization bill for 1996. A great deal of hard work 
has gone into the production of this bill. As a member of the 
Intelligence Committee and chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the 
Appropriations Committee, I can tell you that it is no easy task 
reconciling the competing demands of national security and fiscal 
responsibility. In fact, this is one of the major themes of our 
intelligence authorization bill for 1996: To provide essential 
intelligence capabilities while demanding cost-efficient solutions to 
intelligence problems.
  Another theme of our bill is the need to maintain a responsible 
balance between collection, processing, and dissemination of 
intelligence information. When any of these three areas is out of 
balance, it reduces the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the entire 
system. Historically, we have devoted more attention and resources to 
collection without 

[[Page H 8821]]
adequately providing for the less glamorous requirements to process 
that collected information and get it to the customer when and where he 
needs it. In our bill, we have made cross-program efforts to bolster 
our processing capabilities, particularly of imagery and signals 
intelligence.
  As our chairman stated earlier, we reviewed each program on its 
merits and added resources where we considered them necessary. At the 
same time, however, we eliminated efforts we considered redundant or 
unproductive, and we considered the long-term affordability of every 
change we made. We also made every effort to engage in dialog with the 
administration concerning those areas where we felt constructive change 
was required. The result is an authorization that will help meet both 
the intelligence and fiscal challenges of the future.
  Although our authorization for fiscal year 1996 is slightly above the 
President's request, we are confident that we have created no 
unsustainable budget-busters in the outyears, and that our bill 
provides a balanced program designed to meet our short- and long-term 
intelligence needs. The intelligence budget has declined enough over 
the last 8 years. I urge you to support H.R. 1655.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Burton). All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill, modified by the amendment recommended by the 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight printed in the bill, and 
by an amendment striking title VII, shall be considered by titles as an 
original bill for the purpose of amendment. The first section and each 
title are considered read.
  No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as 
modified, shall be in order, unless printed in the portion of the 
Congressional Record designated for that purpose.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1996''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder 
of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified, 
be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of 
a substitute, as modified, is as follows:
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1996 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1996, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1655 of the 104th 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1996 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by 
     this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1996 the 
     sum of $80,713,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall 
     remain available until September 30, 1997.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The Community Management 
     Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 
     247 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1996. Such 
     personnel of the Community Management Staff may be permanent 
     employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1996, any officer or 
     employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces 
     who is detailed to the Community Management Staff from 
     another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1996 the sum of $213,900,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) General Provisions.--The National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), is amended by adding at the end 
     thereof the following new title:

  ``TITLE IX--APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


                          ``Stay of Sanctions

       ``Sec. 901. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     President may stay the imposition of an economic, cultural, 
     diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United 
     States Government concerning a foreign country, organization, 
     or person when the President determines that to proceed 
     without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an 
     ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or 
     method. The President shall lift any such stay when the 
     President determines that such stay is no longer necessary to 
     that purpose.


                               ``Reports

       ``Sec. 902. Whenever any stay is imposed pursuant to 
     section 901, and whenever the duration of any such stay 
     exceeds 120 days, the President shall promptly report to the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives the rationale and circumstances that led the 
     President to exercise the stay authority with respect to an 
     intelligence source or method, and to the Judiciary 
     Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives the 
     rationale and circumstances that led the President to 
     exercise the stay authority with respect to an ongoing 
     criminal investigation.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof 
     the following:
   ``TITLE IX--APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
``Sec. 901. Stay of Sanctions.
``Sec. 902. Reports.''.
     SEC. 304. THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN FORFEITURE.

       Section 8432(g) of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(5)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     contributions made by the Government for the benefit of an 
     employee or Member under subsection (c), and all earnings 
     attributable to such contributions, shall be forfeited if the 
     annuity of the employee or Member, or that of a survivor or 
     beneficiary, is forfeited under subchapter II of chapter 83.
       ``(B) Forfeitures under this paragraph shall occur only if 
     the offenses upon which the requisite annuity forfeitures are 
     based happened 

[[Page H 8822]]
     subsequent to the enactment of this paragraph.''.

     SEC. 305. AUTHORITY TO RESTORE SPOUSAL PENSION BENEFITS TO 
                   SPOUSES WHO COOPERATE IN CRIMINAL 
                   INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS FOR NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY OFFENSES.

       Section 8318 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) The spouse of an individual whose annuity or retired 
     pay is forfeited under section 8312 or 8313 after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection shall be eligible for spousal 
     pension benefits if the Attorney General of the United States 
     determines that the spouse fully cooperated with Federal 
     authorities in the conduct of a criminal investigation and 
     subsequent prosecution of the individual which resulted in 
     such forfeiture.''.

     SEC. 306. SECRECY AGREEMENTS USED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law not specifically 
     referencing this section, a nondisclosure policy form or 
     agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with 
     the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related 
     activity, other than an employee or officer of the United 
     States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the 
     particular activity for which such document is to be used. 
     Such form or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the 
     person will not disclose any classified information received 
     in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized 
     to do so by the United States Government.

     SEC. 307. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR AUTOMATIC 
                   DECLASSIFICATION OF RECORDS OVER 25 YEARS OLD.

       (a) In General.--Each agency of the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program shall use no more than $2,500,000 of the 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated
      by this Act to carry out the provisions of section 3.4 of 
     Executive Order 12958.
       (b) Required Budget Submission.--The President shall submit 
     for fiscal year 1997 and each of the following five years a 
     budget request which specifically sets forth the funds 
     requested for implementation of section 3.4 of Executive 
     Order 12958.
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF THE CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.

       Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
     Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4(f)), is amended by 
     striking out ``September 30, 1997'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``September 30, 1999''.

     SEC. 402. VOLUNTEER SERVICE PROGRAM.

       (a) General Authority.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence is authorized to establish and maintain a 
     program from fiscal years 1996 through 2001 to utilize the 
     services contributed by not more than 50 annuitants who serve 
     without compensation as volunteers in aid of systematic or 
     mandatory review for declassification or downgrading of 
     classified information of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     under applicable Executive orders governing the 
     classification and declassification of national security 
     information and Public Law 102-526.
       (b) Costs Incidental to Services.--The Director is 
     authorized to use sums made available to the Central 
     Intelligence Agency by appropriations or otherwise for paying 
     the costs incidental to the utilization of services 
     contributed by individuals under subsection (a). Such costs 
     may include (but need not be limited to) training, 
     transportation, lodging, subsistence, equipment, and 
     supplies. The Director may authorize either direct 
     procurement of equipment, supplies, and services, or 
     reimbursement for expenses, incidental to the effective use 
     of volunteers. Such expenses or services shall be in 
     accordance with volunteer agreements made with such 
     individuals. Sums made available for such costs may not 
     exceed $100,000.
       (c) Application of Certain Provisions of Law.--A volunteer 
     under this section shall be considered to be a Federal 
     employee for the purposes of subchapter I of title 81 
     (relating to compensation of Federal employees for work 
     injuries) and section 1346(b) and chapter 171 of title 28 
     (relating to tort claims). A volunteer under this section 
     shall be covered by and subject to the provisions of chapter 
     11 of title 18 of the United States Code as if they were 
     employees or special Government employees depending upon the 
     days of expected service at the time they begin volunteering.
         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS.

       Section 1604 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 1604. Civilian personnel management

       ``(a) General Personnel Authority.--The Secretary of 
     Defense may, without regard to the provisions of any other 
     law relating to the number, classification, or compensation 
     of Federal employees--
       ``(1) establish such positions for employees in the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency and the Central Imagery Office as the 
     Secretary considers necessary to carry out the functions of 
     that Agency and Office, including positions designated under 
     subsection (f) as Defense Intelligence Senior Level 
     positions;
       ``(2) appoint individuals to those positions; and
       ``(3) fix the compensation for service in those positions.
       ``(b) Authority To Fix Rates of Basic Pay; Other Allowances 
     and Benefits.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall, subject to 
     subsection (c), fix the rates of basic pay for positions 
     established under subsection (a) in relation to the rates of 
     basic pay provided in subpart D of part III of title 5 for 
     positions subject to that title which have corresponding 
     levels of duties and responsibilities. Except as otherwise 
     provided by law, an employee of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency or the Central Imagery Office may not be paid basic 
     pay at a rate in excess of the maximum rate payable under 
     section 5376 of title 5.
       ``(2) The Secretary of Defense may provide employees of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Imagery Office 
     compensation (in addition to basic pay under paragraph (1)) 
     and benefits, incentives, and allowances consistent with, and 
     not in excess of the levels authorized for, comparable 
     positions authorized by title 5.
       ``(c) Prevailing Rates Systems.--The Secretary of Defense 
     may, consistent with section 5341 of title 5, adopt such 
     provisions of that title as provide for prevailing rate 
     systems of basic pay and may apply those provisions to 
     positions in or under which the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     or the Central Imagery Office may employ individuals 
     described by section 5342(a)(2)(A) of such title.
       ``(d) Allowances Based on Living Costs and Environment for 
     Employees Stationed Outside Continental United States or in 
     Alaska.--(1) In addition to the basic compensation payable 
     under subsection (b), employees of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency and the Central Imagery Office described in paragraph 
     (3) may be paid an allowance, in accordance with regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, at a rate not in 
     excess of the allowance authorized to be paid under section 
     5941(a) of title 5 for employees whose rates of basic pay are 
     fixed by statute.
       ``(2) Such allowance shall be based on--
       ``(A) living costs substantially higher than in the 
     District of Columbia;
       ``(B) conditions of environment which--
       ``(i) differ substantially from conditions of environment 
     in the continental United States; and
       ``(ii) warrant an allowance as a recruitment incentive; or
       ``(C) both of those factors.
       ``(3) This subsection applies to employees who--
       ``(A) are citizens or nationals of the United States; and
       ``(B) are stationed outside the continental United States 
     or in Alaska.
       ``(e) Termination of Employees.--(1) Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may 
     terminate the employment of any employee of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency or the Central Imagery Office if the 
     Secretary--
       ``(A) considers such action to be in the interests of the 
     United States; and
       ``(B) determines that the procedures prescribed in other 
     provisions of law that authorize the termination of the 
     employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner 
     consistent with the national security.
       ``(2) A decision by the Secretary of Defense to terminate 
     the employment of an employee under this subsection is final 
     and may not be appealed or reviewed outside the Department of 
     Defense.
       ``(3) The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Secretary terminates the employment 
     of any employee under the authority of this subsection.
       ``(4) Any termination of employment under this subsection 
     shall not affect the right of the employee involved to seek 
     or accept employment with any other department or agency of 
     the United States if that employee is declared eligible for 
     such employment by the Director of the Office of Personnel 
     Management.
       ``(5) The authority of the Secretary of Defense under this 
     subsection may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of 
     Defense, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     (with respect to employees of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency), and the Director of the Central Imagery Office (with 
     respect to employees of the Central Imagery Office). An 
     action to terminate employment of an employee by any such 
     officer may be appealed to the Secretary of Defense.
       ``(f) Defense Intelligence Senior Level Positions.--(1) In 
     carrying out subsection (a)(1), the Secretary may designate 
     positions described in paragraph (3) as Defense Intelligence 
     Senior Level positions. The total number of positions 
     designated under this subsection and in the Defense 
     Intelligence Senior Executive Service under section 1601 of 
     this title may not exceed the number of positions in the 
     Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service as of June 1, 
     1995.
       ``(2) Positions designated under this subsection shall be 
     treated as equivalent for purposes of compensation to the 
     senior level positions to which section 5376 of title 5 is 
     applicable.
       ``(3) Positions that may be designated as Defense 
     Intelligence Senior Level positions are positions in the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Imagery Office that 
     (A) are classified above the GS-15 level, (B) emphasize 
     functional expertise and advisory activity, but (C) do not 
     have the organizational or program management functions 
     necessary for inclusion in the Defense Intelligence Senior 
     Executive Service.
       ``(4) Positions referred to in paragraph (3) include 
     Defense Intelligence Senior Technical positions and Defense 
     Intelligence Senior Professional positions. For purposes of 
     this subsection--
       ``(A) Defense Intelligence Senior Technical positions are 
     positions covered by paragraph (3) that involve any of the 
     following:
       ``(i) Research and development.
       ``(ii) Test and evaluation.
       ``(iii) Substantive analysis, liaison, or advisory activity 
     focusing on engineering, physical sciences, computer science, 
     mathematics, biology, chemistry, medicine, or other closely 
     related scientific and technical fields.

[[Page H 8823]]

       ``(iv) Intelligence disciplines including production, 
     collection, and operations in close association with any of 
     the activities described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) or 
     related activities; and
       ``(B) Defense Intelligence Senior Professional positions 
     are positions covered by paragraph (3) that emphasize staff, 
     liaison, analytical, advisory, or other activity focusing on 
     intelligence, law, finance and accounting, program and 
     budget, human resources management, training, information 
     services, logistics, security, and other appropriate fields.
       ``(g) `Employee' Defined as Including Officers.--In this 
     section, the term `employee', with respect to the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency or the Central Imagery Office, includes 
     any civilian officer of that Agency or Office.''.
     SEC. 502. COMPARABLE BENEFITS AND ALLOWANCES FOR CIVILIAN AND 
                   MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OVERSEAS.

       (a) Civilian Personnel.--Section 1605 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
       (B) by striking out ``of the Department of Defense'' and 
     all that follows through ``this subsection,'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``described in subsection (d)''; and
       (C) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (2);
       (2) by striking out subsection (c) and inserting in lieu 
     thereof the following:
       ``(c) Regulations prescribed under subsection (a) may not 
     take effect until the Secretary of Defense has submitted such 
     regulations to--
       ``(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       ``(2) the Committee on National Security and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Subsection (a) applies to civilian personnel of the 
     Department of Defense who--
       ``(1) are United States nationals;
       ``(2) in the case of employees of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency, are assigned to duty outside the United States and, 
     in the case of other employees, are assigned to Defense 
     Attache Offices or Defense Intelligence Agency Liaison 
     Offices outside the United States; and
       ``(3) are designated by the Secretary of Defense for the 
     purposes of subsection (a).''.
       (b) Military Personnel.--Section 431 of title 37, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``who are assigned 
     to'' and all that follows through ``of this subsection'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``described in subsection (e)'';
       (2) by striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu 
     thereof the following:
       ``(d) Regulations prescribed under subsection (a) may not 
     take effect until the Secretary of Defense has submitted such 
     regulations to--
       ``(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       ``(2) the Committee on National Security and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Subsection (a) applies to members of the armed forces 
     who--
       ``(1) are assigned--
       ``(A) to Defense Attache Offices or Defense Intelligence 
     Agency Liaison Offices outside the United States; or
       ``(B) to the Defense Intelligence Agency and engaged in 
     intelligence-related duties outside the United States; and
       ``(2) are designated by the Secretary of Defense for the 
     purposes of subsection (a).''.
     SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking out ``1995'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``1998''.

     SEC. 504. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TIER II UAV.

       All funds appropriated for fiscal year 1995 for the Medium 
     Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Tier II) are 
     specifically authorized, within the meaning of section 504 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), for such 
     purpose.
                     TITLE VI--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

     SEC. 601. CLARIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO PAY FOR DIRECTOR OR 
                   DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   APPOINTED FROM COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE 
                   ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Clarification.--Subparagraph (C) of section 102(c)(3) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(c)(3)) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(C) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active 
     duty who is appointed to the position of Director or Deputy 
     Director, while serving in such position and while remaining 
     on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and 
     allowances. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid 
     shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director.''.
       (b) Technical Corrections.--(1) Subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
     of such section are amended by striking out ``pursuant to 
     paragraph (2) or (3)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``to the 
     position of Director or Deputy Director''.
       (2) Subparagraph (B) of such section is amended by striking 
     out ``paragraph (A)'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``subparagraph (A)''.

     SEC. 602. CHANGE OF DESIGNATION OF CIA OFFICE OF SECURITY.

       Section 701(b)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 431(b)(3)), is amended by striking out ``Office of 
     Security'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``Office of 
     Personnel Security''.
                 amendment no. 3 offered by mr. combest

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Combest: Page 7, line 9, 
     strike ``other''.
       Page 7, line 10, insert ``identified in section 904'' after 
     ``law''.
       Page 7, line 13, insert ``and reports to Congress in 
     accordance with section 903'' after ``determines''.
       Page 7, line 15, insert ``related to the activities giving 
     rise to the sanction'' after ``investigation''.
       Page 7, line 16, insert ``related to the activities giving 
     rise to the sanctions'' after ``method''.
       Page 7, beginning on line 16, strike ``The President'' and 
     all that follows through line 18, and insert the following: 
     ``Any such stay shall be effective for a period of time 
     specified by the President, which period may not exceed 120 
     days, unless such period is extended in accordance with 
     section 902.''.
       Page 7, after line 18, insert the following:


                          ``extension of stay

       ``Sec. 902. Whenever the President determines and reports 
     to Congress in accordance with section 903 that a stay of 
     sanctions pursuant to section 901 has not afforded sufficient 
     time to obviate the risk to an ongoing criminal investigation 
     or to an intelligence source or method that gave rise to the 
     stay, he may extend such stay for a period of time specified 
     by the President, which period may not exceed 120 days. The 
     authority of this section may be used to extend the period of 
     a stay pursuant to section 901 for successive periods of not 
     more than 120 days each.
       Page 7, strike line 19 and all that follows through line 6 
     on page 8, and insert the following:


                               ``reports

       ``Sec. 903. Reports to Congress pursuant to sections 901 
     and 902 shall be submitted in a timely fashion upon 
     determinations under this title. Such reports shall be 
     submitted to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate. With respect to determinations 
     relating to intelligence sources and methods, reports shall 
     also be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. With respect to 
     determinations relating to ongoing criminal investigations, 
     reports shall also be submitted to the Committees on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.


                         ``laws subject to stay

       ``Sec. 904. The President may use the authority of sections 
     901 and 902 to stay the imposition of an economic, cultural, 
     diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United 
     States Government concerning a foreign country, organization, 
     or person otherwise required to be imposed by the Chemical 
     and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 
     1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182); the Nuclear 
     Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public 
     Law 103-236); title XVII of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510) 
     (relating to the nonproliferation of missile technology); the 
     Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of 
     Public Law 102-484); and section 573 of the Foreign 
     Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations 
     Act, 1994 (Public Law 103-87), section 563 of the Foreign 
     Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations 
     Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-306), and comparable provisions 
     within annual appropriations Acts.


                             ``application

       ``Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on the 
     date which is three years after the date of the enactment of 
     this title.''.
       Page 8, after line 9 and before line 10, amend the matter 
     proposed to be inserted to read as follows:

  ``Title IX--Application of Sanctions Laws to Intelligence Activities

       ``Sec. 901. Stay of sanctions.
       ``Sec. 902. Extension of stay.
       ``Sec. 903. Reports.
       ``Sec. 904. Laws subject to stay.
       ``Sec. 905. Application.''.

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, my amendment reflects the results of 
discussions between the Members and staffs of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on International Relations 
on issues pertaining to the application of sanction laws to 
intelligence activities.
  Since the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had reported out 
legislation on sanctions deferrals, the committee has been working with 
the Committee on International Relations to incorporate the concerns of 
that committee and, therefore, modify section 303 as reported by the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

[[Page H 8824]]

  Mr. Chairman, that is what this amendment does. I would urge the 
adoption of this amendment. Before I turn to the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks], I would like to thank the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman], chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations, for the gentleman's interest, contribution, and his 
cooperation, as well as that of the gentleman's staff; the gentlewoman 
from California [Ms. Pelosi], of our committee, who was a strong 
proponent of any U.S. sanction laws and has paid close attention to 
this legislation; and certainly to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Berman] and his staff, all of who made very constructive contributions 
and have worked closely to working this out in a bipartisan and 
satisfactory manner.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Chairman Combest's 
amendment to section 303 of the bill. As the committee report makes 
clear, the committee intends to monitor closely the use of the 
authority provided under section 303. The amendment should assist in 
this regard by imposing a 3-year sunset provision.
  Furthermore, as the report also points out, this authority is only 
appropriate in limited cases. The amendment makes clear that the 
authority only pertains to specific laws designed to limit the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems or 
advanced conventional weapons. Finally, the amendment states that the 
source or method or ongoing criminal investigation that the President 
may delay the sanction to protect, must be related to the activities 
giving rise to the sanction.
  I believe this is a good amendment and I am pleased to accept it.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me initially address the amendment of 
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] and thank the gentleman very 
much for both his remarks and his work on this amendment, as well as 
thanks to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] the ranking member, 
and to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] chairman of the 
Committee on International Relations, and a special note of 
appreciation to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi], who 
pointed out to me this issue that was raised by the authorization bill.
  Mr. Chairman, section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
add a new section, 901, authorizing the President to stay the 
imposition of certain sanctions, should the President determine that to 
proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an ongoing 
criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method.
  Mr. Chairman, I was originally quite troubled by that provision, 
because it appeared to me to provide an open-ended opportunity for any 
President to bypass the intent sanctions law. I had raised similar 
concerns during House debate in 1991, on the provisions of H.R. 1415 
that amended the Export Administration Act. I thought, as I pointed out 
in a colloquy then with the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Mr. McCurdy, that the President, in rare 
circumstances, could delay such a determination in those situations, 
but the administration has raised new concerns that existing law was 
not sufficient to provide them with legal flexibility.
  In this case, the bipartisan cooperation of the staff of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and its leadership, has 
allowed us to have a briefing from both the intelligence community and 
the Department of State.
  Mr. Chairman, it is now my understanding that with this amendment, 
the original provision as amended, will mean that a decision to stay 
temporarily consideration of the imposition of a sanction will only be 
to protect sources and methods in an ongoing criminal investigation.
  Such a presidential determination will not be used as the pretext for 
any decision not to impose sanctions, for example, for economic or 
commercial reasons, fearing that such action could jeopardize a 
commercial decision, or for geopolitical reasons, fearing that such a 
decision could damage our bilateral relationships with a particular 
country.
  I have been informed by the administration that such determinations 
will only be made in exceptional circumstances. We are discussing here 
a delay decision, not a decision to refuse to impose such sanctions 
which are mandated under law.

                              {time}  1130

  Should such a decision to delay determination be made by the 
President, a report will be made in a prompt and expeditious manner to 
the concerned committees of jurisdiction, including the Committee on 
International Relations. It is my understanding that such reports will 
indicate clearly the nature of the sanctionable action, the applicable 
law to the sanctionable activity, the country or countries in which the 
activity took place, and, where appropriate, the party to the 
violation.
  The intent of my amendment, which sunsets this provision 3 years from 
the date of enactment, is to ensure an opportunity to evaluate the use 
of this change to the National Security Act to ensure that is used for 
the purpose intended and has not had a deleterious effect on the 
sanctions law.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has 
expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Berman and by unanimous consent, Mr. Combest 
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
  Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman will yield further, I will put my 
statement in the Record.
  I thank the distinguished Member from Texas and chairman of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Combest, for his kind 
remarks and those of the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Dicks. I 
appreciate the effort that they have taken to accommodate my concern 
and those of the chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr. 
Gilman.
  The amendment I have offered to the bill which has been incorporated 
in the chairman's amendment, I believe, will take care of my concerns, 
and those of the gentlelady from California [Ms. Pelosi], that section 
303 should not unduly loosen current sanctions law.
  As Mr. Combest has noted, section 303 amends the National Security 
Act of 1947 to add a new section 901 authorizing the President to stay 
the imposition of certain sanctions should the President determine that 
to proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an 
ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method.
  I was troubled by that provision when initially proposed by the 
administration because it appeared to me to provide an open-ended 
opportunity for any President to by-pass the intent of sanctions law. I 
had raised similar concerns during House debate in 1991 on provisions 
in H.R. 1415 that amended the Export Administration Act and the Arms 
Export Control Act. At that time I responded to an inquiry from Mr. 
McCurdy, then chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, that it 
was my understanding that the President, in rare circumstances, could 
delay a determination on sanctions if such a delay is necessary to 
protect intelligence sources and methods with the proviso that such a 
delay should not be indefinite. Since then, the administration has 
raised anew concerns that existing law was not sufficient to provide 
them with legal flexibility.
  In this case, with the bipartisan cooperation of the staff of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, whose excellent assistance I much 
appreciate, I took the opportunity to be briefed by representatives 
from both the intelligence community and the Department of State on 
their rationale for requesting this amendment.
  It is now my understanding that a decision to stay temporarily 
consideration of the imposition of a sanction will only be to protect 
sources and methods and ongoing criminal investigations. Such a 
Presidential determination will not be used as the pretext for any 
decision not to impose sanctions, for example for economic reasons, 
fearing such action would jeopardize a commercial decision, or for 
geopolitical reasons, fearing that such a decision would damage our 
relations with a particular country. I have been informed by the 
administration that such determinations will only be made in 
exceptional circumstances. I should note that we are discussing a delay 
in a decision, not a decision not to impose such sanctions mandated 
under law. Should such a decision to delay determination be made by the 


[[Page H 8825]]
President, a report will be made in a prompt and expeditious manner to 
the concerned committees or jurisdiction, including the International 
Relations Committee. It is my understanding that such reports will 
indicate clearly the nature of the sanctionable action, the applicable 
law to the sanctionable activity, the country or countries in which the 
activity took place, and, where appropriate, the party to the 
violation.
  The intent of my amendment which sunsets this provision 3 years from 
the date of enactment is to ensure an opportunity to evaluate the use 
of this change to the National Security Act of 1947 to ensure that it 
is used for the purpose intended and that it has not had a detrimental 
effect on the intent of our sanctions law.
  I am pleased with the accommodation worked out with both sides and 
wish to thank Ms. Pelosi for her energetic work on this issue. Finally, 
I would like to thank the Democratic and Republican staffs of both the 
International Relations Committee and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence for the professional and bipartisan manner in which they 
resolved this issue.
  I would also like to take this opportunity to raise a related issue. 
As one of the authors of current sanctions law, I have become concerned 
that the standards for imposing sanctions have been raised to such an 
impossible level that the ability of sanctions to call attention to 
grievous violations of international standards which threaten world 
security and also to punish violators has been undermined. The time may 
have come for us to evaluate whether or not we need a more flexible set 
of policy tools to respond to such violations and violators. As we all 
know, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a 
serious problem. In the coming months, I hope this concern can be 
engaged. The international community needs desperately to slow, if not 
end, the spread of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to rogue 
states.
  Mr. Chairman, I do want to finish by asking the gentleman if he would 
entertain a unanimous consent request that on line 10, page 2, 
following the words ``submitted in a'', the gentleman would add the 
word ``prompt'' so the report would be made in a prompt and timely 
fashion, and I have that amendment in writing here, if the gentleman is 
willing, offer it as a unanimous consent amendment to his amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I certainly concur 
with the gentleman. I appreciate his further explanation of the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, is it in order at this time for the author of the 
amendment to request unanimous consent to add ``prompt and'' in the 
section, ``in a prompt and timely fashion'' in line 10, page 2 of the 
amendment?
  The CHAIRMAN. The modification is in order, without objection.


            modification of amendment offered by mr. combest

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the 
amendment with the language which I have read.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Combest: On page 
     2, line 10 of the proposed amendment insert ``prompt and'' 
     after ``submitted in a''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Combest: Page 7, 
     line 9, strike ``other''.
       Page 7, line 10, insert ``identified in section 904'' after 
     ``law''.
       Page 7, line 13, insert ``and reports to Congress in 
     accordance with section 903'' after ``determines''.
       Page 7, line 15, insert ``related to the activities giving 
     rise to the sanction'' after ``investigation''.
       Page 7, line 16, insert ``related to the activities giving 
     rise to the sanction'' after ``method''.
       Page 7, beginning on line 16, strike ``The President'' and 
     all that follows through line 18, and insert the following: 
     ``Any such stay shall be effective for a period of time 
     specified by the President, which period may not exceed 120 
     days, unless such period is extended in accordance with 
     section 902.''.
       Page 7, after line 18, insert the following:


                          ``extension of stay
       ``Sec. 902. Whenever the President determines and reports 
     to Congress in accordance with section 903 that a stay of 
     sanctions pursuant to section 901 has not afforded sufficient 
     time to obviate the risk to an ongoing
      criminal investigation or to an intelligence source or 
     method that gave rise to the stay, he may extend such stay 
     for a period of time specified by the President, which 
     period may not exceed 120 days. The authority of this 
     section may be used to extend the period of a stay 
     pursuant to section 901 for successive periods of not more 
     than 120 days each.''
       Page 7, strike line 19 and all that follows through line 6 
     on page 8, and insert the following:


                               ``reports

       ``Sec. 903. Reports to Congress pursuant to sections 901 
     and 902 shall be submitted in a prompt and timely fashion 
     upon determinations under this title. Such reports shall be 
     submitted to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate. With respect to determinations 
     relating to intelligence sources and methods, reports shall 
     also be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. With respect to 
     determinations relating to ongoing criminal investigations, 
     reports shall also be submitted to the Committees on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.


                         ``laws subject to stay

       ``Sec. 904. The President may use the authority of sections 
     901 and 902 to stay the imposition of an economic, cultural, 
     diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United 
     States Government concerning a foreign country, organization, 
     or person otherwise required to be imposed by the Chemical 
     and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 
     1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182); the Nuclear 
     Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public 
     Law 103-236); title XVII of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510) 
     (relating to the nonproliferation of missile technology); the 
     Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of 
     Public Law 102-484); and section 573 of the Foreign 
     Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations 
     Act, 1994 (Public Law 103-87), section 563 of the Foreign 
     Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations 
     Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-306), and comparable provisions 
     within annual appropriations Acts.


                             ``application

       ``Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on the 
     date which is three years after the date of the enactment of 
     this title.''.
       Page 8, after line 9 and before line 10, amend the matter 
     proposed to be inserted to read as follows:
  ``Title IX--Application of Sanctions Laws to Intelligence Activities

``Sec. 901. Stay of sanctions.
``Sec. 902. Extension of stay.
``Sec. 903. Reports.
``Sec. 904. Laws subject to stay.
``Sec. 905. Application.''.

  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I just 
want to thank the gentleman for agreeing to that amendment as well as 
to incorporating the sunset amendment, to thank the gentlewoman from 
California for all of her help in this as well as being able to raise 
this issue initially, and I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. COMBEST. I appreciate the gentleman's cooperative nature in 
working this out.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I have no 
objection to that change either.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, I rise to express my support for Chairman Combest's 
amendment and my appreciation to the chairman and the ranking member 
and the committee staff for their work to address concerns about the 
bill's provisions allowing the President to delay the imposition of 
sanctions against other countries if the sanctions compromise, one, an 
intelligence source or method or, two, an ongoing criminal 
investigation.
  I would also, of course, like to acknowledge and commend our 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], for his 
contribution. He has been a leader in the fight against weapons 
proliferation. I want to commend him for his work over the years to 
make sanctions a more effective foreign policy tool. The gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman] and his staff were active participants in the 
development of what, I think, is a very necessary amendment under the 
leadership of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  Mr. Chairman, Congress over the years has decided that the imposition 
of sanctions is appropriate response to certain activities which 
threaten U.S. foreign policy goals and global stability. We have laws 
on the books mandating imposition of sanctions for the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, for the illegal transfer of some 
munitions, and for violation of missile technology controls. These 
sanctions have had an important deterrent and punitive effect and have 
increased the administration's leverage 

[[Page H 8826]]
in discussing potential violations with the proliferators.
  If, indeed, the sanctions which are on the books are too punitive, 
too draconian to ever be used and, therefore, to be considered a 
credible threat, then, we should, as a Congress, revisit those 
sanctions. The gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] whom we are 
blessed to have a understanding position because of his knowledge and 
attention to these issues, stands ready, as he indicated in his 
remarks, to assist the administration or any administration in making 
appropriate changes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERMAN. Blessed?
  I appreciate the very nice comments from my friend. I just wanted to 
emphasize this point. I included it in my original statement, but I did 
not read it at this particular point. It is wrong to use, for instance, 
this new provision to protect sources and methods as a way of getting 
around the imposition of sanctions. If the feeling is the particular 
sanctions law in an area, whether it is chemical, biological weapons, 
missile proliferation, or nuclear, is too inflexible, then the 
administration should come to the Congress and suggest those changes.
  Let us take, for example, let us talk for one moment about China. It 
is, without getting into any specifics, everyone understands the 
importance of the political, or bilateral relationship with China, and 
what that country is about and what we need to be doing there.
  The key question, though, in terms of proliferation issues is whether 
or not the law, as passed by Congress, as signed by the President, is 
going to be followed. If that law is too inflexible, the answer is not 
to avoid a conclusion with respect to proliferation The answer is to 
come back to Congress and seek the flexibility that is desired.
  So I appreciate the gentlewoman for bringing this up. Our only point 
in this whole discussion is that we do not want this to become a new 
way by which the executive branch, as a pretext, avoids imposing 
sanctions because they do not want to alter some commercial deal, 
because they do not want to have any disruption in the bilateral 
relationship. The question of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is too important to be used as a pawn in that process. We 
are ready to make those provisions more flexible if that is what is 
needed. But that should not be the basis for not making a decision to 
impose sanctions.
  Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for putting that on the record 
publicly because I think that should be a very important part of our 
policy as we review these sanctions rather than always seeking waivers 
and to make the sanctions more credible as a threat by making them more 
possible to be used.
  In the interests of time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my 
full statement for the Record, but I would like to engage the chairman 
of the full committee for a moment in colloquy.
  My concerns were about time. I see the gentleman has addressed the 
first time issue of prompt and timely fashion.
  My other concern, Mr. Chairman, is that an administration could 
feasibly stretch out this process for 3 years, 120 days at a time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Pelosi] has expired.
  (At the request of Mr. Combest and by unanimous consent, Ms. Pelosi 
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I was so pleased that in the chairman's 
statement he said, ``In these cases, it is expected that the utmost 
will be done to resolve the sources and methods or law enforcement 
problems as soon as possible.'' So that an administration could not 
just use 120 days for whatever reason, economic purposes or other 
reasons, in a series of these 120 days to delay addressing the real 
issue at hand. Is it the gentleman's understanding that they would have 
to resolve the sources and methods problem as quickly as possible, as 
indicated in the statement?
  Mr. COMBEST. If the gentlewoman will yield further, I totally would 
concur with the gentlewoman, and I am glad the gentlewoman asked for 
this time to make sure the Record reflects the intent, and I assure the 
gentlewoman that I would stand by her, behind her or wherever she would 
wish, in trying to nail this down much more specifically, if we 
detected at all this happens to be a problem and it appears that there 
is any abuse of the latitude which this amendment has provided.
  Ms. PELOSI. If I may further, I thank the chairman for that 
confirmation.
  But I also would like to once again reaffirm the intent of Congress 
that this waiver only is used when this would jeopardize sources and 
methods or jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. There is no 
other standard or condition under which the administration could seek 
this blanket waiver?
  Mr. COMBEST. If the gentlewoman will yield further, yes, that is 
exactly correct. I would take that one step further and would tell the 
gentlewoman I would be very glad to work with her to make certain that 
it has to be very black and white, one of those areas of exemption that 
there cannot be a gray area under which there was a claim of exemption 
for one of those purposes, if, in fact, it was not emphatically one of 
those very specified purposes.
  Ms. PELOSI. As the gentleman indicated in his statement, based on the 
testimony that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence received 
on this subject, the instances where sanctions would be deferred due to 
the source or method of criminal investigation problems would be rare?
  Mr. COMBEST. I totally concur with the gentlewoman. She is absolutely 
correct, and I appreciate her interest in this.
  Ms. PELOSI. I thank the chairman. I once again thank the chairman for 
his cooperation on presenting this manager's amendment and 
accommodating some of the concerns that the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Berman] and I and other members of the committee had on it.
  Mr. Chairman, with that, since the chairman has confirmed so many of 
these issues, I can dispense with some of my statement and put it in 
the Record and once again urge my colleagues to support the Combest 
amendment and thank him for his leadership as well as thanking the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] and the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks].
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered 
by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  (Mr. SKAGGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take much time. I 
appreciate the time at this point in the debate; since we moved through 
general debate so quickly it caught some of us napping, I am afraid.
  I want to thank our chairman, the gentleman from Texas, and the 
ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], for their 
leadership in putting this bill together this year. I was off the 
committee for several months and have only recently rejoined the 
committee. While I generally support this bill as meeting vital 
national security needs, there are a couple of areas in which I hope we 
may be able to make some changes and improvements when we get to 
conference, Mr. Chairman, and I wanted to discuss those this morning.
  One has to do with the funding levels for declassification as driven 
by the President's new executive order. I am afraid that the relatively 
low and arbitrary limits per agency that are included in the bill at 
this point will seriously impede the very necessary work that needs to 
be done within the intelligence community to move expeditiously to 
declassify many of our relatively old but still classified, documents. 
We have made some real progress in the whole question of classification 
reform over the last several years. We need to proceed and stay on 
track in this area.
  It is very important for a functioning democracy to make as much 
information as possible available to its citizens, and the 
classification reform efforts that both the Congress and the 
administration have taken are serving that end. We should not impede 
them by unrealistically low budget caps. 

[[Page H 8827]]

  Second, there is, I think, too low a limit set in this bill for the 
environmental task force. A different number is pending in the 
legislation working its way through the other body. I hope we will be 
able to make some adjustments there as well.
  The committee held hearings earlier this year addressing the 
intelligence community and what it should be concerned with in the next 
century. Interestingly, several expert witnesses identified the 
environment and the global environmental threat that we face as central 
to our national security challenge in the next century.
  It would be a shame, given that, for us to be shortchanging the work 
that has been started in a very important initiative known as the 
environmental task force, which is using products originally produced 
with intelligence assets, declassifying them in appropriate ways, so 
that the information can be available to policymakers, the scientific 
community, and the general public. That is something I think we need to 
continue, and I hope, speaking to my chairman of the committee, that we 
will be able to deal with both these funding issues pertaining to 
declassification and to the environmental task force when we get to 
conference.
  I support the Intelligence authorization bill because I believe that, 
on balance, it supports vital national security needs. I believe it is 
important to support the crucial activities of the intelligence 
community at a time when many regions of the world are increasingly 
threatened by ethnic conflict, by territorial disputes, and by arms 
competition. We also need to support the use of our intelligence 
resources to understand and combat new threats to our own security, 
from things as obvious as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, to those as subtle as global environmental 
degradation.
  This bill has authorized an intelligence budget at a level slightly 
higher than the President requested for fiscal year 1996. In a time of 
tight budgets, when domestic programs are being slashed, I would have 
preferred an authorization level closer to the President's request. And 
we'll have a chance to vote on making just such an adjustment.
  I also have serious concerns about two matters--funding levels for 
declassification of documents and funding for the environmental task 
force--that I hope can be worked out in conference.
  My first concern centers around the arbitrary restrictions that this 
legislation places on the amount agencies can spend to declassify 
documents under the requirements of the President's new executive order 
on classified national security information--signed on April 17, 1995. 
These restrictions threaten to scuttle a long-needed system of reforms 
to an outdated and expensive system of classifying Government 
information.
  When I joined the Intelligence Committee in 1993 I was astonished to 
learn that agency heads couldn't even tell us roughly how much their 
budget was spent on document classification and security. At that time 
millions of older documents were being held under lock and key at 
tremendous cost to U.S. taxpayers, even though their disclosure posed 
no national security risk. Some of the most astonishing examples: 
documents concerning troop movements in World War I and documents 
concerning POW/MIA's in the Korean war.
  Despite sweeping changes in the international arena, the Government's 
classification bureaucracy had been stuck on autopilot, stamping 
``secret'' on nearly 7 million new documents each year and marking 95 
percent for indefinite restriction. For a democratic and free society 
to work, the people must have as much information as possible about the 
activities of their Government. So, I decided to do something about 
this.
  The result in 1994, driven by language in our 1993 Intelligence bill, 
was the first-ever accounting of the costs and number of personnel 
involved in classifying and maintaining Government secrets. These 
reports revealed that keeping the Nation's secrets employs 32,400 
workers and costs $2.28 billion. Last year, I took the reform effort 
one step further by requiring agencies to come up with suggestions 
about how to cut spending on classification and secrecy. This 
initiative led to a Government-wide program of cost accounting and 
expenditure reduction efforts involving all the agencies that make up 
the intelligence community.
  Both this effort and work already underway in the Clinton 
administration has already begun to pay off. In fiscal year 1994 the 
number of new documents being classified was down over 26 percent. Real 
gains are also being made on declassification front. In 1994 there was 
a 70 percent increase in pages declassified under systematic review. In 
addition, the President ordered a one-time declassification in bulk of 
almost 50 million pages of historical records in the National Archives.
  Now the President has consolidated the reform effort with the 
issuance of Executive Order 12958 on April 17, 1995. The President's 
executive order balances the competing needs of access and security in 
a cost-effective way by laying out a uniform system for classifying, 
safeguarding, and declassifying national security information.
  Unfortunately, this Intelligence authorization bill could effectively 
block the crucial reform of the classification behemoth by limiting to 
$2.5 million each the amount of funds that each agency can spend to 
carry out the declassification provisions in the executive order.
  It is important to remember that the President's executive order 
requires that, unless ground for an exemption exist, classified 
information contained in records that are 25 years old, and of 
permanent historical value, shall be automatically declassified within 
5 years of the order whether or not the records have been reviewed. 
This assumes that adequate funds will be
 provided to review documents to determine if their release would 
jeopardize national security. So, ironically, if adequate moneys are 
not provided for the declassification process, certain documents that 
should not be declassified may slip through the cracks. It is 
important, therefore, for Congress to provide adequate funds to carry 
out a careful and comprehensive review of documents to be declassified.

  Classification reform also extends to a new classification 
discipline. Over-use of classification is costly in its direct budget 
impacts, in that it's expensive to maintain the infrastructure to keep 
secrets. It's also costly in its indirect effects of devaluing the 
currency, that is for those who work with classified information to be 
appropriately vigilant, there needs to be a sense that classification 
is not invoked where it doesn't have to be. And then, again, there are 
the costs to democracy.
  Lets not trip up agency efforts to reform just as we're beginning to 
turn the tide on the sea of top-secret paper.
  I am also concerned about the severe funding limitations that this 
bill places on the environmental task force [ETF].
  Global and national environmental threats should be of real concern 
to national security and intelligence experts. In fact, in hearings we 
held earlier this year on ``The Intelligence Community in the Twenty 
First Century'' several expert witnesses testified that environmental 
threats might well prove to be the most significant challenge to our 
Nation's security in the too distant future.
  Why then, does this bill reduce funding authority for the ETF to $5 
million, which is less than a third of the President's request? By 
severely reducing the authorization for ETF this bill threatens several 
efforts that are making significant environmental information derived 
from intelligence assets available to the general public, the 
scientific community, and other Federal agencies.
  Our country has already made an enormous investment in classified 
systems and technology. For a very small additional expenditure, we can 
exploit this investment to benefit the ability of Government and 
science and industry to anticipate and attack problems driven by global 
environmental changes. The ETF initiatives is already helping 
policymakers and scientists obtain the data they need to understand 
long-term environmental change and develop better management techniques 
to deal with natural and ecological disasters.
  Critics of the ETF have argued that this initiative diverts the 
intelligence community from its primary purpose. But the function of 
intelligence is to support policymakers. And in this instance, the ETF 
supports policymakers in a range of agencies--the Department of 
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Interior, Transportation, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the National Science Foundation--enabling them to use 
intelligence data to facilitate disaster relief planning and to develop 
international policies that have an environmental component. For 
example, there's nothing more fundamental to political stability than 
adequate food stocks, which in turn are dependent on environmental 
factors and population trends. All this is probably the subject of 
intelligence, and the resulting intelligence products ought to be 
available as widely as possible. The best technology available for 
getting the data is already available. We just need to put it to better 
use.
                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 10, after line 17, 
     insert the following:

     SEC. 308. COMPLIANCE WITH BUY AMERICAN ACT.

       No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be expended 
     by an entity unless the entity agrees that in expending the 
     assistance the entity will comply with sections 2 through 4 
     of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a-10c, popularly 
     known as the ``Buy American Act'').
     
[[Page H 8828]]


     SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS; REQUIREMENT REGARDING NOTICE.

       (a) Purchase of American-Made Equipment and Products.--In 
     the case of any equipment or products that may be authorized 
     to be purchased with financial assistance provided under this 
     Act, it is the sense of the Congress that entities receiving 
     such assistance should, in expending the assistance, purchase 
     only American-made equipment and products.
       (b) Notice to Recipients of Assistance.--In providing 
     financial assistance under this Act, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall provide to each recipient of the assistance a 
     notice describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the 
     Congress.

     SEC. 310. PROHIBITION OF CONTRACTS.

       If it has been finally determined by a court or Federal 
     agency that any person intentionally affixed a fraudulent 
     label bearing a ``Made in America'' inscription, or any 
     inscription with the same meaning, to any product sold in or 
     shipped to the United States that was not made in the United 
     States, such person shall be ineligible to receive any 
     contract or subcontract made with funds provided pursuant to 
     this Act, pursuant to the debarment, suspension, and 
     ineligibility procedures described in sections 9.400 through 
     9.409 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.

  Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], and the ranking member, the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], for the fine bill.
  I just want to jump in here early by saying the Congress of the 
United States should support John Deutsch. He knows the military well. 
He knows his way around Washington, the political landscape. He has 
done a remarkable job every place he has been, and I am glad to see 
that he is the CIA director, and we give him the shot to perform well.

                              {time}  1145

  Now this is a stealth budget. I have a stealth Buy American 
amendment. We are all familiar with it. It makes a lot of sense, and I 
would hope that the committee would accept it.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. I think I could assure the gentleman that the gentleman 
from Washington would love for there to be plenty of purchases of 
stealth, but I would just like to state that the Chair has seen the 
amendment, we certainly concur with it, and we would accept the 
amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], 
the distinguished ranking member.
  Mr. DICKS. I want to compliment the gentleman from Ohio who has been 
steadfast in his support for the Buy American provision and for this 
amendment. We have always been able to work this out in conference. The 
record of the CIA and other agencies in this bill in this area is very 
exemplary, by the way, but I want to compliment the gentleman. We have 
enjoyed working with him over the years, and we on our side of the 
aisle will be glad to accept the amendment as well.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I appreciate that. I do rise in support of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not offer an amendment at this time, but I would 
like to just discuss generally the subject of the intelligence budget 
and also a specific item under that which I think needs to be 
understood by the Members of this Congress.
  I am new to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in that I 
joined it in January of this year, and, quite frankly, I had no idea, 
as my colleague and many others in this body may, of the scope of what 
the intelligence community in the United States of America and beyond 
the United States of America actually does because of the nature of the 
information with which we deal. Obviously a lot of this is not 
discussed publicly, and I would encourage every Member, particularly 
the newer Member of Congress, those like me who are serving in our 
second term and the first-term Members, if they could possibly, to 
visit the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rooms to learn as 
much as they can about this extraordinary process. I think it is very, 
very important to our national security and something we should all 
understand.
  I would like to congratulate the chairman of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], and 
the ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], and all 
the members actually of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
for the extraordinary devotion. They have been great mentors and 
teachers to me. They are as devoted as any group of individuals I have 
ever met to this subject and deserve, I think great congratulations. 
They do speak at times in acronyms, and I cannot understand them all 
the time, but I am trying to fight my way through that as well, as I 
cannot say enough about the staff itself, an extremely talented group 
of individuals and, again, one which is ready to help all the Members 
of this Congress when we have, when the Members have, an opportunity to 
understand better what we are doing in intelligence.
  I did want to discuss one subject, and that is the subject of the 
satellites that we are dealing with in the intelligence side of the 
space program.
  Pending results of the committee's IC 21 studies, which of course is 
what is going to happen in the 21st century, the bill before us makes 
no radical changes save in one area, and that area is satellites, where 
we took a number of substantial initiatives, for two primary reasons. 
First, the rationale for these actions is that current, well-published 
plans to reduce the number of intelligence spacecraft on orbit will 
leave us even more vulnerable to denial and deception.
  A second reason is that space budgets have become unsustainably high. 
without major reductions in space program costs, we will be faced with 
truly unpalatable choices. We will have to devote a still greater
 percentage of the intelligence budget to satellites. Or we will have 
to forego or eliminate some much-needed satellite capabilities in order 
to fund other overhead collection programs.

  The space budget situation within the National Reconnaissance Program 
is little different from that encountered by others, such as NASA. And, 
our solutions sometimes will have to be similar to those now being 
pioneered by NASA--cutting spacecraft weight and launch costs, building 
satellites more rapidly and getting technology on orbit faster, taking 
full advantage of rapidly advancing commercial technology, and so on. 
Advancing technology and management changes could allow us to have more 
capability for less money. We are pushing these programs very hard, and 
I am pleased to see that, and we are pushing the programs, as I said, 
and the methodologies, which will in a few years--could permit a large 
and enduring for the future cost reduction. So we are confident that we 
are dealing correctly with the present and rapidly coming future 
technology which will ultimately help the taxpayers of the United 
States of America.
  I just close again by thanking, congratulating, those who put in a 
lot of hours without television cameras or some of the normal glare and 
publicity that comes with this particular job because it makes a huge 
difference, and I think without it our country would suffer.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CASTLE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. First of all, I want to thank the gentleman from Delaware 
[Mr. Castle] for his very kind remarks, and I want to share in those 
remarks not only about the chairman, but also about the staff of the 
committee. We have an extraordinary staff, and the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Combest] and I have worked very hard to try to bring the staff 
together in a very bipartisan way to try to deal with the issues, and 
to work for all the Members, and to work for the entire House, and I 
think they do an exceptional job, and I am very proud of all of the 
members of our staff.

[[Page H 8829]]

  I also would point out, too, to the gentleman I think he raises a 
very important point about the satellite issues. There was a long story 
just the other day in the Washington Post about the Corona program 
which was declassified, and one of the things that struck me in 
reviewing the article was the fact that there was so much 
misinformation between the United States and the Soviet Union about our 
missile forces, and one of the things that happened when we had these 
satellites and had better information is that is really quieted some of 
the fears and, I think, may have helped us avoid a confrontation 
between the United States and the soviet Union.
  So good
   information is important not only for us, but also for our allies, 
and I think it helped the United States go through a very difficult 
time in its history and as we go now into a new era.

  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle] 
has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Castle was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. DICKS. As we go into this new era, as my colleague knows, we are, 
in fact, making some investments in new capabilities in the satellite 
area, but over time it will help us reduce the amount of money 
necessary for intelligence. It is one of those things where we have to 
invest now in order to get the capability, but the capability we are 
going to have will mean fewer satellites in orbit, but much more 
capable satellites.
  So I just hope we can stay with the program. I've urged John Deutch, 
and I realize that there are budgetary limitations. We all face that, 
but I think that the architecture the way we have today is a good one, 
and I think in the long term it is going to give us tremendous new 
capabilities that we can use more rapidly and will provide us with that 
same kind of high quality information that helped us get through the 
cold war era, and I think it will help us in the future as we deal with 
the various crises that we face.
  But I want to commend the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], 
former Governor, a person who brings a lot of talent to this committee, 
as someone who I respect and who is up here every day doing his part on 
the committee for his attention to what the committee has been involved 
in.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. 
Dicks] for his support of what I have spoken to and also his kind 
statements about me. I concur with the gentleman. The costs; I think 
satellites have a tremendous place in intelligence and security for 
this country. On the other hand we all know that the cost of satellites 
and the whole space costs are tremendous, and I think we have to work 
diligently and constantly to make sure that the reward that we get from 
this is worth the costs that we are putting into it, and never can we 
really let up on that. My view, after seeing this up close, is that 
this is a particularly difficult, but important, area, one that should 
take a substantial percentage of our time, and I agree.
  Mr. DICKS. I think the gentleman is right. We are not going to have 
any choice but to be very, very certain that we do not have unnecessary 
redundancies and that we look at each of these architectures and try to 
take advantage. There are things that can be done with some of these 
satellites that will help other parts of the constellation, and that is 
one thing we need to continue to work on.
            amendment offered by mr. frank of massachusetts

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
       Page 5, after line 22, insert the following:

     SEC. 105. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
     aggregate amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act, 
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, is reduced by 
     three percent.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated by section 201 for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
       (c) Transfer and Reprogramming Authority.--(1) The 
     President, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may apply the 
     reduction required by subsection (a) by transferring amounts 
     among the accounts or reprogramming amounts within an 
     account, as specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, so long as the 
     aggregate reduction in the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by this Act equals three percent.
       (2) Before carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
     submit a notification to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, which notification 
     shall include the reasons for each proposed transfer or 
     reprogramming.

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, we have just heard the 
ranking minority member tell us that, if we spend a little more money 
now on these satellites, it will allow us to reduce later on. I think 
this is now the fifth year in a row that I have heard that, and have 
yet to see the result of it. My amendment would reduce the 
authorization, which is already a significant amount over the 
appropriation, and again I apologize for the stupid way in which we 
will have to carry out this debate because we are not allowed to 
mention the gross numbers. The American public is not to be allowed to 
know what the total of billions of dollars is that we are spending, and 
we can talk about percentage increases, but we cannot talk about how 
much.
  This is an effort to reduce from last year's budget rather than 
increase. The committee's proposal would increase by about 1.7 percent. 
Now the President asked for 5.5-percent increase. I think both are in 
error. This would be a 3-percent decrease. It would be about, oh, a 
little less than 1\1/2\ percent less than last year.
  The point is, Mr. Chairman, that there has been a diminution in the 
task of intelligence greater than the diminution in any other 
government's job. At the maximum we were spending about 10 percent more 
than this bill calls for because we were confronting the Soviet Union, 
the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. What we are being told is that we can 
afford a really slight, a 10-percent, reduction in intelligence because 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that does not mean we can go 
to Russia today, but Russia today is a pale shadow in terms of threat 
that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was. We have made significant 
progress with Ukraine and Kazakhstan. There are fewer nuclear weapons; 
there are certainly fewer weapons of a conventional sort, and again I 
want to deal with the silly argument that, well, it is true there is no 
more Soviet Union, but there is Iraq, there is Libya, there is Iran. 
Yes, and there were in 1985 and 1990. The argument is that the world is 
today somehow no safer for us than it was when we had the Soviet Union. 
It is one of the grossest examples of distorting logic to be in the 
service of spending that I have ever heard.
  There is not now the military threat to our very survival that we 
faced. There are other threats, but there are no qualitative new 
threats. Chemical and biological weapons, nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism;
 these are not things we just invented a year or two ago. We have had 
them all along. We were 10 years dealing with the Soviet Union and with 
these other threats. Today the Soviet threat has been very 
substantially diminished, and the American people are not to be given 
the benefit.

  Mr. Chairman, we will be telling students that their student aid will 
be less. It will cost one more, if they are a middle-income student, to 
go to college. The Republicans plan to raise premiums on the average 
Medicare recipient. We are not sure how much, whether they will be 
going up by $120 a year or $250 a year. I do not know. They are 
planning their budget to reduce the cost-of-living Social Security, but 
at the same time we increase intelligence from this year over last 
year.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to talk particularly about the CIA, which gets a 
5-percent increase, and I am glad we have a new head of the CIA. I hope 
he 

[[Page H 8830]]
does much better, but if any other Government agency had been found to 
have made the errors and had the inefficiencies that the CIA had, it 
would be penalized.
  Again I want to stress that the justification that we got from the 
chairman of the Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee on Labor-HHS 
is for cutting Head Start. We are giving less money to Head Start. Why 
are we giving less money to Head Start? Because he said they are not 
spending it as efficiently as they could, but we are going to give a 5-
percent increase to the CIA. The CIA is apparently perfectly efficient.
  Now obviously, if we were in a different budgetary time, we would 
like to spend more money on a lot of things, but we are in a crisis. We 
are making painful cuts everywhere except in the CIA, except in these 
areas where the threat has diminished. If we had had an increase in 
child health equivalent to the decrease in the threat in the Soviet 
Union, we would have cut a lot more at HHS.

                              {time}  1200

  This budget erroneously says that at a time when we are cutting very 
important services to middle-income and lower-income Americans, when we 
are reducing money elsewhere, we are going to spend more here. There 
are threats to the safety of the average American. Tragically, they 
occur within the United States. I believe the average American today 
feels a lot more threatened by the violence that sadly engulfs many of 
our cities.
  However, we cut back on money that a public housing authority could 
use for drug elimination. This House wiped out money for drug 
elimination grants in public housing, because we want to raise the 
money for the CIA. Ask the average American: Are you feeling more 
threatened by what the CIA deals with or by the drug people in your 
neighborhood, by that crime and violence? However, this House, if we 
pass this authorization, says no, we are going to cut out money that is 
used to fight drugs in America's streets, because we are going to 
increase it elsewhere.
  Indeed, even terrorism has become tragically a domestic problem. That 
is the FBI, that is the DEA, that is the BATF.
  If we want to fight crime, we have a counterterrorism bill reported 
out by the Committee on the Judiciary, but in part because there is 
some right-wing unhappiness about it, that is being held up. So please 
do not tell me that you are going to fight terrorism by giving more 
money to the CIA and hold up the counterterrorism bill, and cut drug 
elimination grants and cut other kinds of programs that would help 
local law enforcement. I hope this amendment is agreed to.
  Let me just make the last point, that this amendment says that the 3-
percent cut is across the board unless the President, in consultation 
with intelligence officials, decides to reallocate it, and tells us 
about it. So it is not going to require 3 percent for everything. It 
sets a target of 3 percent and gives the President, with the Director 
of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, the flexibility to 
apply it as they think best.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, it comers as no surprise to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], I am sure, that I am opposed to the 
amendment. I would say to the gentleman that he has been very tenacious 
in his efforts. I know that the gentleman comes at this purely from a 
belief that he is doing the right thing. I have always respected that, 
among all Members.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to make certain that there is not a 
misunderstanding. This is no intent to indicate that the gentleman 
intentionally misspoke. First, we will probably have a strong 
disagreement on the fact that there has been actually a diminishing of 
the need for intelligence. That is an arguable point, of which probably 
neither of us would be swayed. I do not see that threat diminishing.
  Second, as he had made reference to an earlier comment by the ranking 
member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], that expenditures 
now would give us an opportunity to reduce in the future and that he 
has not seen any of that reduction, I wanted to just share with the 
Members the chart that we had. This is the actual expenditure line, and 
it is somewhat difficult to read. On the far left is 1989, and it runs 
through the 1996 mark, or the direction the intelligence budget has 
been going. So there has been a decrease on overall expenditures of 
intelligence through 1995 fiscal year, and it is difficult to see on 
this chart, because it is a slight increase, as mentioned, 1.3. The 
gentleman is totally correct, I mentioned in my opening comments the 
amount of percentage, but there has been a decrease.
  Candidate Clinton proposed a decrease over a period of 7 years, which 
actually, in reality, was reached last year. It is an argument and a 
discussion that I presume quite seriously will go on for some time. The 
cut would take us below the levels of last year, if, in fact, it were 
implemented. Again, I am sure it comes as no surprise, but I would rise 
in strong opposition to the amendment.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Frank amendment. Frankly, this 
morning, I still had not made up my mind about the amendment, because I 
have not been supportive of across-the-board cuts in a budget where 
people cannot really see what the expenditures are.
  My colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has 
clearly put forth to this body his view of the diminution of the threat 
as well as the values priorities debate, the context within which this 
debate on this authorization bill takes place today: our spending on 
intelligence.
  Certainly we can all stipulate in this body that we want our 
President, whoever the President is, to have the best possible 
intelligence in dealing with the international situation, in dealing 
with the increased threat of terrorism, and the list goes on.
  I associate myself with the remarks of our colleague, the gentleman 
from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], in support of the environmental task force 
and its important work. I have certain concerns about justifying the 
intelligence budget on the basis for economic reasons, because I do not 
believe that is what should justify our spending in the intelligence 
arena.
  I, too, associate myself with the remarks of our colleagues in 
support of the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Deutch. I am 
pleased with the comments he has made about considering protecting 
human rights is determining our sources and methods as he takes over 
the leadership of the intelligence community. He is a very welcome new 
DCI. He has outstanding credentials. He has access to the President, 
and he the respect of many Members of Congress. We all wish him well. 
His success is important to us.
  I do have some concerns about his statement of yesterday on expanding 
covert operations, and look forward to hearing more about that.
  Having said all of that about the need for our President to have the 
vest possible intelligence, and also stating that I voted against the 
10-percent across-the-board cut that was proposed in the appropriations 
bill the other day, because of the nature of the cut, I want to commend 
the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] for his amendment
 today. I think the 3-percent cut is prudent and reasonable.

  As I said at the beginning of my remarks when I came into the room, I 
still had concerns about what I thought was an across-the-board cut, 
which did not take into consideration what our ranking member referred 
to and our chairman referred to as investments that will produce 
savings down the road, et cetera. I do not consider every proposal or 
element of this budget, of this authorization bill and the budget it 
contains, to be of the same priority.
  I was pleased to see, therefore, and I hope our colleagues will read 
the Frank amendment because, as the gentleman said at the close of his 
remarks, the amendment is very smart. It is a targeted smart amendment. 
It is a 3-percent cut. It makes an exception in that it does not apply 
to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency's retirement and disability fund, so that our obligations to our 
retirees will be met to them.
  It also gives transfer and programming authority, unlike most across-

[[Page H 8831]]
  the-board cuts. It says, ``The President, in consultation with the 
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may 
apply the reductions required by subsection A by transferring amounts 
among the accounts or reprogramming amounts within an account as 
specified in section 102, so long as the aggregate reduction in the 
amount authorized be appropriated in this act equals 3 percent.'' So I 
support this amendment because it gives discretion to the President and 
the Secretary of DOD and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is 
very appropriate and appealing in terms of attracting the votes of our 
colleagues.
  I also think our colleagues should be aware of the fact that some of 
the money that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] would cut 
with this amendment has already been accommodated by the Committee on 
Appropriations. So I thank him for giving this body an opportunity to 
say to the intelligence community, ``We support you very strongly.'' 
Certainly, even though we cannot talk about amounts, this budget, even 
with the proposed cut of the gentleman from Massachusetts, will still 
be very, very substantial.
  We support and encourage and congratulate and commend the new DCI, 
Mr. Deutch, and hope that we can work together with him so he can be 
successful. If we are asking all Americans to tighten their belts, if 
we are asking all agencies of government to tighten their belts except 
the DOD, and the DOD appropriations bill has already accommodated some 
of this change, the DOD authorization being less than this 
authorization, then I think our colleagues in this body should say to 
the intelligence community, ``Join with us in being much more fiscally 
responsible in terms of dollars spent for the results that we must have 
to be a strong country based on the intelligence that we need for our 
President to lead us.
  Therefore, it is in that spirit I urge our colleagues to support this 
smart amendment, the Frank amendment. It is selective, it gives 
discretion to the President, it is an appropriate amount, it has 
already been accommodated by the Committee on Appropriations, and it is 
fair.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Frank amendment to the 
1996 Intelligence authorization bill.
  My friends, once again I am here to remind you, the cold war is over. 
We won! It is time for the Defense and Intelligence budgets to reflect 
this reality.
  The Frank amendment is a reasonable amendment to the Intelligence 
budget. The CIA and other parts of the intelligence apparatus can 
certainly stand a 3-percent cut. This is a modest cut, a fair cut.
  Do not forget, this week the Republican majority is going to ask our 
seniors to take a bigger cut in their Medicare coverage. Don't forget 
that we are asking our school children to take a bigger cut in 
education funding. We're asking college students; working families; and 
the elderly to cope with all kinds of cuts, in lots of important 
programs.
  Three percent? That's not much. That's reasonable. Let's cut the 
bloated intelligence budget. Let's ask the CIA to sacrifice for a 
change.
  Pass the Frank amendment.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I will not take the full 5 minutes, but an important 
fact Members need to keep in mind in judging this proposal has to do 
with the action taken just last week on the defense appropriations 
bill. Inherent in our decisions on the appropriations, which include 
appropriations for intelligence activities, was essentially a 2-percent 
reduction under the level authorized in the bill now before us. So the 
practical effect of the gentleman's amendment would be another 1-
percent reduction below the 2 percent that has effectively already been 
approved by this body during the appropriations process.
  Should we do that? This is certainly a question about which 
reasonable people, all dedicated to the proposition that we need a 
strong defense and an effective intelligence operation in support of 
national security, can disagree. I come down without great pleasure in 
support of the gentleman's amendment, without pleasure because I 
recognize, as our chairman has pointed out, that these are essential, 
important functions for our overall national security.
  However, the question is, are they sacrosanct? Is there no room for 
some further efficiencies and some further tightening and setting of 
priorities to occur within the intelligence community, beyond what we 
have already forced on them, because in real dollar terms there have 
been constraints imposed over the last couple of years. I believe that 
they can endure that, and that they need to be asked to, out of 
fundamental equity.
  Our national defense and the intelligence operations in support of it 
are our shield. But if that shield is surrounding a society and a 
culture and a nation that has been, to some degree, eaten out from 
inside, where our real strength depends on the education of our kids 
and the kind of investments we are making in technology and health care 
and all the rest, there is a disconnect there. I think the gentleman's 
amendment establishes an equity and a connection that is very 
important, as we are asking most Americans to do with less, and the 
rest of Government to shrink.
  This is a very modest proposal. It will not go without imposing some 
pain on important functions within the intelligence community, but 
comparatively speaking, the kind of pain that we are asking others in 
this country to sustain as we shrink Government and cut the budget and 
get things into balance, this is disproportionately small, and I think, 
therefore, is something we can do in good conscience with respect to 
both to national security and a sense of national equities.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to clarify for certain that I had 
understood the gentleman earlier. He did rise earlier in support of 
increasing the amount relative to the environmental intelligence 
program and increasing the amount available for the declassification of 
documents?
  Mr. SKAGGS. The gentleman is correct, in support of removing the cap 
that is now in the bill on the declassification operations of 
individual agencies, and as the gentleman knows, the amounts that might 
be involved in the environmental task force, compared to the overall 
size of what we are talking about in the budget, is fractions of 
hundredths of percents.

                             {time}   1215

  If the gentleman is intent on pointing out an inconsistency in my 
position on this in the technical sense, he is probably correct. In a 
practical sense, I really do not think so.
  Mr. COMBEST. If the gentleman will continue to yield, it is not an 
inconsistency, it is just the fact that in the budget obviously the 
programs we are looking at, we looked at in terms of priority. It has 
been estimated that the declassification would require $70 million. 
That is a substantial amount of money for declassification. That is why 
we limited. It is not the objection that the chairman had to the 
declassification idea. It was the fact that there are many, many 
programs that would be detrimentally affected. I just wanted to make 
for certain that the gentleman, while he was supporting a further 
reduction, was asking for an increase in some other areas that could 
amount to several tens of millions of dollars.
  Mr. SKAGGS. If I can reclaim my time, I am certainly happy to discuss 
with the chairman what a reasonable level would be to deal with, for 
instance, the declassification issue. Having it open-ended probably is 
not a reasonable approach. I think the caps that are suggested in the 
bill now may be set too low and I think our colleagues in the other 
body have come to that conclusion as well.
  The main question here is one of setting priorities. I think 
reasonable people can come to different conclusions while still having 
a profound commitment to a robust and effective intelligence operation 
for the country.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] 
has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, and by unanimous consent, 

[[Page H 8832]]
  Mr. Skaggs was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  While we are talking about the whole consistency issue--at least I 
am--I did want to note, I was in agreement with the chairman when he 
got up and talked about the reductions, because I acknowledge there has 
been some reduction. But the chairman, when he talked about reductions, 
talked about 1989 dollars, in other words, a failure to keep up with 
inflation is considered a cut, and I think that is an appropriate 
accounting measure. But I do think that when we do that kind of 
accounting, when we say that a failure to keep up with inflation is a 
cut, it should not just be to the benefit of the intelligence 
community, it ought to be relevant to Medicare and everything else.
  I think talking about it in constant 1989 dollars, that is, saying 
that a failure to keep up with inflation is a cut, that is a good way 
to do accounting but it ought to be for the rest of the budget as well.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162, 
noes 262, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 654]

                               AYES--162

     Allard
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Blute
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunn
     Camp
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Ehlers
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gephardt
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoekstra
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennelly
     Kleczka
     Klug
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Owens
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Porter
     Poshard
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Studds
     Stupak
     Thompson
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weller
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--262

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Browder
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (TX)
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Longley
     Lucas
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Meek
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Reed
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Salmon
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Scott
     Seastrand
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Ballenger
     Cardin
     Frost
     Johnston
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Reynolds
     Sisisky
     Tucker
     Waldholtz

                              {time}  1236

  Messrs. FAWELL, PALLONE, BAESLER, and DEUTSCH changed their vote from 
``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. BRYANT of Texas, Mr. EHLERS, and Mrs. SMITH of Washington changed 
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Burton). Are there further amendments?


         amendment no. 5 offered by mr. frank of massachusetts

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: Page 
     10, after line 17, inset the following:

     SEC. 308. DISCLOSURE OF ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.

       As of October 1, 1995, and for fiscal year 1996, and in 
     each year thereafter, the aggregate amounts requested and 
     authorized for, and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities shall be disclosed to the public in an 
     appropriate manner.

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Chair 
personally for the consideration shown me during this debate, and I 
apologize for being held up a little bit.
  This amendment would have made the last debate intelligible. I 
understand that ``intelligible'' and ``intelligence'' are not identical 
words, but they ought to have a closer correlation than they have 
today.
  Mr. Chairman, we have in the law a restriction on the American people 
knowing the gross number of the intelligence authorization and 
appropriation. All this amendment would do, and that is why I did not 
ask that it be considered as read and that the reading be dispensed 
with. I wanted it read in its entirety, because this does not say that 
categories or line items or even departmental breakdowns would be 
legal. It says the overall gross amount.
  Mr. Chairman, we just had a debate in which we were talking about 
percentage reductions and I was asked, as I am sure my colleagues on 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were asked by a number 
of Members, ``Well, how much is this?''
  We were able to tell each other, because as Members, we are 
automatically trustworthy and, therefore, we can know about all these 
secrets. We can tell each other the number. Others trying to evaluate 
this debate, American citizens, journalists and others, theoretically, 
are not to know what we were talking about in the previous amendment.

[[Page H 8833]]

  Mr. Chairman, when I moved to cut 3 percent, 3 percent of what? Was 
that $100 million; a billion dollars; $10 billion? People have an order 
of magnitude idea, but especially as we were talking, as we were, about 
3 percent versus 1.7 versus 0.5 percent, and the gentleman from 
Colorado and the chairman of the committee were talking about tens of 
millions of dollars, not having any idea, it seems to me, a mistake.
  Obviously, the extent that foreign spies, foreign governments, could 
benefit from knowing, this, and the argument was, let us not make this 
total available, because other people could know something based on the 
total.
  Mr. Chairman, they know it. No one believes that people who have an 
interest to malign us in knowing the total, fail to know it. All we 
accomplish by this foolish restriction of publishing the gross number 
is to make it harder for the American people to follow what we are 
doing; to make it harder for Members to vote.
  I must tell my colleagues that I myself had some difficulty, because 
in preparing this amendment I had to wait until I could find the time 
to go to the intelligence room, as I always do once a year to review 
these things, and I had to read this and make my calculations.
  Mr. Chairman, I read some calculations in the paper and people say 
well, everybody knows it. There were some calculations about this 
budget, in one of the most respected information sources that the House 
uses, that were wrong. There was a report of a 6-percent increase. 
Well, that's about a portion of it. I had difficulty in preparing this 
amendment in final form because of that.
  There is no justification, whatsoever, for this fundamental deviation 
from basic democratic principles. Namely, that the American people 
ought to know the overall total that is being spent.
  No one can argue, and no one has argued, that knowing the overall 
total will somehow hurt the national security. So the augment is, Well, 
if we
 tell them the overall total, the next thing we know they will be 
getting the hat size of the chief of intelligence in country X. The 
answer is no. That simply is not true.

  We are changing the law. It is a statutory requirement that says we 
can't give the overall total. We will amend that statutory requirement 
that says you can give the overall total. Everything else that is now 
illegal will be illegal. Everything else that is secret by law will be 
secret and it will take a further statute to change it.
  And the notion somehow that statutes are like dominos and if you 
change one, it automatically hits and knocks over the next is out of 
touch with reality. The American people, at a time of budgetary stress, 
have a right to know what the total is, instead of trying to guess or 
looking at newspapers and winking and saying it is illegal, but we do 
not pay any attention to it.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the gentleman I have 
supported this amendment before. I intend to support it again, but I 
want to ask the gentleman: Does the gentleman believe that we should 
not go further than just disclosing the top line number? Is that 
adequate from the gentleman's point of view?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, yes, 
that is perfectly adequate. I think if we have the top line number and 
people can calculate the percentages, that is fine.
  Mr. Chairman, let me say, as I recall these debates, and the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has been in them as well, we 
never debate more than the top line number, because none of us really 
think that we ought to be getting into the line items.
  This is one authorization where I do not remember any line item 
amendments. The amendments have generally been the overall ones. I 
think that reinforces the view that is what is appropriate for the 
House overall is the overall number. In my amendment, I gave 
flexibility below that.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would continue to yield, 
one thing I want to make sure that the Members of the House understand, 
because we have a lot of new Members, and that is that the intelligence 
budget is part of the defense budget. These are not two separate 
budgets.
  Sometimes I have people say, ``I did not realize that the 
intelligence budget is a piece of the defense budget.''
                              {time}  1245

  It is one big budget.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. That is right. In fairness to the Defense 
Department, the people in uniform, there ought to be some knowledge. 
Nobody knows exactly what piece of the defense budget it is. It makes 
it harder even when people are talking about that. You might have a 
decrease in one part and an increase in another.
  By the way, that is one point, we let the gross number of the defense 
budget be known. Presumably, if there were some terrible problem or 
even minor problem that would come from the gross number being known, 
you would know that from the defense budget.
  I want to reinforce what I said, I do not plan to go any further and 
would not support going further than the aggregate number. Again, I 
think the debate we have had in both the authorization and 
appropriating process in intelligence bear that out. There has been no 
effort, as I recall, to do amendments that went below the gross number.
  Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield further, I say to the 
gentleman, I, too, would support that position. I do not have a problem 
with disclosing the overall number, but I would definitely oppose going 
any further in disclosing the components of that number.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I think the gentleman. I know he could 
not go any further. I would not ask him to. I appreciate his support on 
this effort.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and, 
again, I respect the persistence of the gentleman from Massachusetts in 
this effort.
  I appreciate the fact that the gentleman from Massachusetts does make 
himself available, goes to the committee and takes the time to look 
through the classified annex to look at the expenditure levels that we 
do make available to Members of Congress in H-405. I think that shows a 
seriousness and the fact that he is a very responsible Member in this 
effort. I cannot argue with a number of the things the gentleman has 
said and the fact that there have been a lot of reports done publicly 
by media and by others approximating or at least in their wording 
assuming that, or it is stated that the intelligence budget is ``X.'' 
That is always a second line of the story.
  If there is, in fact, a specific release of the amount of moneys 
expended on intelligence, that will become the story, and then the next 
obvious step is to begin to look at, well, how does that break down in 
expense. I think the American people understand and recognize the fact 
that there are secrets. Whether or not every one of them are going to 
agree with what those classified secrets should be, of course, is going 
to be variable depending upon the outlook the individual may have.
  I do not hear a clamor or cry to divulge the budget. I think it is 
the beginning of a movement down a road that, in fact, would prove to 
be burdensome later at some point.
  I would, as I have indicated, rise in opposition to the amendment and 
urge my colleagues to defeat the amendment.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  With the chairman's indulgence, I will be very brief.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank]. As you know, we have been 
through this debate before. When Mr. Glickman was Chair of the 
committee, he held hearings on this subject.
  I think that the testimony was very compelling in support of 
releasing the aggregate sum. I think it is important for the 
intelligence community, for our committee to be able to defend that 
figure in perspective and on balance as far as other Federal spending 
is concerned. While I am on the subject of openness, I also want to 
associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Skaggs] earlier about the declassification of more information where it 
is appropriate. I 

[[Page H 8834]]
think that would be a good investment of our dollars.
  With regard to this amendment, I thank the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] for his leadership on it and urge my 
colleagues to vote ``aye'' on the Frank amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
                             recorded vote

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 154, 
noes 271, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 655]

                               AYES--154

     Ackerman
     Bachus
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bonior
     Borski
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bunn
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Horn
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moran
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rangel
     Reed
     Riggs
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--271

     Abercrombie
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Meek
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Cardin
     Coburn
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Reynolds
     Schiff
     Sisisky
     Tucker
     White

                              {time}  1309

  Mr. SCOTT and Mr. STOKES changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments?
  If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as modified, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified, 
as amended, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Goodlatte) having assumed the chair, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
1655) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to 
House Resolution 216, he reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read 
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the 
table.

                          ____________________