[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 142 (Wednesday, September 13, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8816-H8834]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dickey). Pursuant to House Resolution
216 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
bill, H.R. 1655.
{time} 1043
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
1655) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr.
Burton of Indiana in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] will be
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr.
Dicks] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
{time} 1045
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I would like to compliment the
Committee's ranking Democrat, Norm Dicks, for his highly constructive
role in the formulation of this legislation. He is a bona fide expert
in many aspects of national security and intelligence, particularly in
advanced technologies, and his influence is evident in many of our
Committee's positions. I also would like to thank the other Democratic
members of the Committee who have also joined in a spirit of
nonpartisanship to craft this legislation. I also thank my fellow
Republican Members who have worked hard in putting this bill together.
In particular, I appreciate the fine work of Jerry Lewis and Bob
Dornan, our
subcommittee chairmen. Finally, the staff on both sides of the aisle
deserve our thanks. They are a dedicated, talented group. This
legislation is the product of a lot of work, intensive deliberation,
and cooperation. The Committee held 11 full committee budget hearings,
over 20 Member briefings, and over 200 staff briefings related to the
budget. As a result, it is an act that our Committee reported out
unanimously and in which we can all take no small measure of pride.
H.R. 1655 authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1996 for all of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.
Government. The National Security Act requires that spending for
intelligence be specifically authorized.
The intelligence budget has three major components--the national
foreign intelligence program, known as the NFIP, the tactical
intelligence and related activities program, known as TIARA, and--for
the first time this year--a third program, the joint military
intelligence program, known as JMIP.
NFIP funds activities providing intelligence to national policymakers
and includes programs administered by such agencies as the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
TARA, or tactical intelligence activities, reside exclusively in the
Department of Defense. They consist, in large part, of numerous
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional
part of the basic military force structure and provide direct
information in support of military operations. Additionally, this year
we have for the first time categorized some activities under the newly
created joint military intelligence program, which provides military
intelligence principally to defensewide or theater-level consumers.
This categorization of the intelligence budget into national, defense
and tactical military intelligence programs facilitates our
understanding of the diverse uses of intelligence. Additionally, it
should increase the accountability and managerial control of
intelligence programs.
From even the above thumbnail sketch of intelligence activities, it
is obvious that, although our committee
[[Page H 8817]]
has jurisdiction over all three intelligence programs, we must work
closely with the National Security Committee, particularly in the
oversight and authorization of the TIARA program. I would like to
acknowledge the
assistance of chairman Floyd Spence, the members of the National
Security Committee, and Committee Staff.
Due to the classified nature of much of the Intelligence Committee's
work, I cannot discuss many of the specifics of the bill before the
House except in the broadest terms. This can handicap Members'
understanding of the issues at hand, particularly when we reach the
amendments phase of these proceedings. Accordingly, I strongly urge
those Members who have not yet had a chance, to read the classified
annex to this bill. The annex is available in the committee office in
the capitol--a 2-minute walk from the floor to H-405.
Now let me do what I can--in an unclassified manner--to discuss
several major elements of the bill. First, I will put the bill in the
historic context of the last few years' authorizations. Then I will
explain the philosophy we followed in considering this year's bill.
Finally, I will touch on several of the bill's most important
initiatives and emphases.
First some recent history: Those who have been tracking the
intelligence budget over this decade have seen a rather remarkable--
some would say reckless--decline in intelligence spending. This is not
news and I have discussed this at length on this floor for several
years. But let me review and update a few facts that speak volumes and
correct several common misconceptions.
Fact one: In real terms, the intelligence budget has been cut in all
but one of the last 7 years.
Fact two: The intelligence community is being reduced at twice the
rate recommended by the President's national performance review
program.
Fact three: President Clinton proposed a few years ago to cut $7
billion from intelligence by 1997. That was accomplished over a year
ago--2 years early. We will probably come very close to doubling those
cuts by 1997.
Fact four: We have, until this year, been on a glide slope of
intelligence cuts that would by the end of this decade put intelligence
spending in constant dollars at about 65 percent of the 1989 level.
Fact five: The intelligence community continues to reduce its
personnel at a rate that will, by 1999, cut more than one of every five
positions.
It was with the knowledge of this recent history that we began
consideration of the fiscal year 1996 authorization. The cumulative
effects of these developments over the last several years are troubling
to many of us on both sides of the aisle who believe that we cannot
indefinitely continue to cut critically important intelligence support
to U.S. policymakers and military commanders. Nonetheless, our
committee decided on a nonpartisan basis that it would not rush
headlong into efforts to reverse these trends of the recent past.
Responsible oversight requires an objective approach. We decided that
the 104th Congress offered us an excellent opportunity to take a fresh,
open-eyed look at intelligence. We resolved to work together in a
nonpartisan manner to make the most objective assessment possible of
each item in the intelligence budget. To do that we broke with some
recent practices, three of which I will mention here.
First, we reorganized the committee to merge the previously separate
budget and oversight/evaluation functions. Wise budgetary decisions
must be guided by evaluations of effectiveness.
Second, we broke with the past practice of concentrating on the
short-term effect of our budgetary decisions. Instead, we have taken a
longer view and designed this year's authorization with an eye toward
future needs and requirements for intelligence. This emphasis in our
authorization has coincided with our committee's major activity of this
Congress--an exhaustive and authoritative study of this country's long-
term requirements for intelligence. This study, called ``IC21: The
Intelligence Community for the 21st Century,'' will be completed in
time for its results to be considered in the preparation of what may
become semiannual legislation in next year's session.
Third, we opted for the most intellectually honest process we could
devise to judge each program on its merits and its contributions to
national security. We explicitly rejected the idea of working toward an
arbitrarily set higher or lower budget objective. We also rejected the
idea of making offsets to otherwise deserving programs so as to fund an
increase in other programs. We were confident that the Congress would
accept an intelligence authorization consisting of properly funded
programs--even if that amounted to a significant increase in the
aggregate over the President's request. As it turned out, despite some
80 budget actions taken by the committee, this bill authorizes
intelligence expenditures only 1.3 percent above the President's
request.
To understand many of the specific actions taken in H.R. 1655, the
Members will have to refer to the classified annex available to them in
our committee office. But let me give you an unclassified sketch of
several of the themes that emerge:
We have moved to centralize authorities and improve cross-program
management of intelligence activities. This reduces needless
redundancies, facilitates the identification of under- performing
programs, and increases accountability.
We have, across the board, emphasized the need for countering the
challenges of foreign denial and deception practices. We have directed
the intelligence community to do better at countering the increasingly
sophisticated capabilities of hostile foreign powers to hide their
activities from our intelligence capabilities. I note, for example, the
reported success the Iraqi regime had in hiding its massive biological
weapons program. Foreign denial and deception practices have revealed
an extraordinarily dangerous intelligence vulnerability that has not
been sufficiently addressed. Our actions will do much to reverse this
trend. I should add that this is also an issue of great interest to the
Speaker.
We have focused the intelligence community's attention more on the
downstream activities of processing, exploiting, and disseminating
intelligence. Without careful planning there is a serious danger of
painting ourselves into a corner where we devote all of the very thin
intelligence budgets we can now afford toward the development and
maintenance of expensive technical collection systems, but have
insufficient ability to make use of the intelligence we collect. We
believe this is already a problem and we have taken action to address
it.
We have urged the intelligence community to accelerate its move
toward concentrating intelligence collection and analysis on issues of
the highest national importance. We no longer have the resources or
capabilities to spare on anything but the most important intelligence
targets.
We have acted to improve counterintelligence, security, counter-
terrorism, and counterproliferation capabilities.
We have taken action to improve the
capability of the CIA to better manage and oversee its agent
operations and the intelligence emerging from them. As you all know, it
is a matter of deep importance to this committee that there be a better
process of keeping this committee informed of intelligence
developments. In addition to placing this requirement on the CIA--and
we have done so in no uncertain terms--we must give the CIA the
capability to meet our expectations. This action will enhance this
capability as well as increase the productivity of the CIA.
We made our biggest change to the administration's request in the
satellite area. Although the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]
received 99 percent of the amount requested, the funds were
significantly redistributed within the NRO account that builds and
manages our Nation's satellites. The significance is most apparent
regarding long-term policy. The committee believes the NRO needs to
reduce program costs. We believe that with creativity and cost
consciousness significant savings may be possible. The committee has
also directed that the NRO assess the long-term threats that we face to
ensure that we are building systems that will address potential
collection gaps. Finally, we concentrated on the imagery program, where
developments in the commercial arena point
[[Page H 8818]]
toward large potential cost savings in national security programs.
Without getting into the highly classified and very technical areas of
the satellite collection process, technology advances over the last 10
years, coupled with alternative launch options offer the possibility of
substantial savings while maintaining and even enhancing necessary
intelligence capabilities.
Finally, in drafting this bill, we resisted the calls of those who
advocated an unconsidered, massive infusion of funds to remedy the cuts
of the past, and we rejected the urging of those who rely on anecdotes
and headlines, many of them wrong, to dismantle intelligence. Our hard
work and pragmatic approach has paid off in producing a hard-nosed,
lean authorization at 1.3 percent above the President's request. It
focuses intelligence, increases accountability, and corrects several of
the dangerous trends in recent intelligence authorizations. This is a
responsible bill that any Member of this body can readily support.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1655, which
authorizes funds for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
for fiscal year 1996.
I want to begin by commending Chairman Combest for his leadership in
bringing this measure to the floor and for the manner in which he has
presided over the committee this year. He has been uniformly fair and
has consistently sought to involve all members in all aspects of the
committee's business. It has been a pleasure to serve with him and I
look forward to our continued collaborative efforts, not only on this
legislation, but on the other important work of the committee as well.
At a time in history when the capability to provide information
rapidly and reliably to our policymakers and military commanders is
critical, the United States is fortunate to possess the world's
preeminent intelligence system. Other nations envy the ability of our
intelligence agencies to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence
useful for purposes as varied as determining our stance in diplomatic
negotiations and reducing the threats faced by U.S. military personnel
deployed in dangerous and rapidly changing crisis situations. As has
been seen repeatedly in the past year, from Haiti to Bosnia and in many
other locations, United States intelligence is looked to not only by
our leaders, but by those of the countries with whom we are allied, to
provide that essential piece of information that determines whether
action is taken or deferred.
In an age of rapid advances in technology, maintaining a system which
ensures the best possible access to information which others would not
like us to have, interprets that information, and moves it in a matter
of seconds anywhere in the world, is an expensive proposition.
Intelligence collection and dissemination, particularly in the areas of
signals and imagery intelligence, requires substantial investments in
highly complex systems. It is impossible to fully discuss in an
unclassified setting those systems, or the manner in which human
intelligence is collected in a hostile environment by people of great
skill and courage. It is also impossible, however, to understate the
important contributions our intelligence agencies, and the men and
women who work in them, make to our national security.
Some have criticized the amount of money the United States spends on
intelligence, and it is true that H.R. 1655, in the aggregate, would
provide 1.3 percent more money than requested by the President. Those
who are critical of the size of the intelligence budget often point to
the demise of the Soviet Union as the event which should have made it
possible to substantially reduce intelligence expenditures. However,
intelligence spending has declined by several billion dollars since the
Soviet Union imploded and the number of people employed by the
intelligence agencies is declining as well. By fiscal year 1999, there
will be 22.5 percent fewer employees than there were in fiscal year
1992. These reductions come at a time when, while there is admittedly
no single threat to our national security equivalent to
that posed by the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war, an array
of challenges exists which places an extraordinary premium on accurate
and timely intelligence. Among these challenges are: The proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction; the residual nuclear capacity and
uncertain stability of the Russian Government; the need to provide data
with which to target precision guided weapons; and regional conflicts.
Advances in technology which are costly to counter but which must be
addressed only magnify these challenges.
I believe that the reductions in spending over the last 5 years have
resulted in an intelligence system of about the right size and
capability for the missions it confronts. The authorization levels in
H.R. 1655 will not provide for a significant expansion of those
capabilities beyond what had been previously planned, but in general
will ensure that modernization activities already underway are carried
through to conclusion. These activities, if completely implemented
particularly in the satellite area, will produce significant savings
over time.
The intelligence community has had many successes, the majority of
which cannot be publicized for security reasons. The last few years,
however, have not been ones of unqualified achievement. The Ames spy
case was an unmitigated disaster for the Central Intelligence Agency in
general, and the directorate of operations in particular. The need for
change in management style and attitude to better ensure accountability
within the directorate of operations was made crystal clear by the Ames
debacle. This message has not been lost on the new Director of Central
Intelligence, John Deutch. He has moved aggressively to install a new
team of senior managers who I believe are dedicated to improving the
way in which the intelligence community operates, and to making certain
that Congress is kept advised of significant intelligence activities,
as the law requires.
The well publicized failures in the intelligence community have been
frustrating and the explanations for their case have been difficult to
understand and accept. I believe, however, that these incidents do not
provide a rationale for a general reduction in intelligence spending;
rather they argue strongly for the kind of review of the internal
operations and structure of the intelligence community which our
committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Aspin-Brown
commission, and the DCI have undertaken. These efforts will produce
change that is the product of careful consideration rather than reflex,
and I believe result in an intelligence community better designed to
operate in the post-cold-war world.
H.R. 1655 was reported unanimously by the Intelligence Committee and
I have already indicated my support of it. In part, that support is
based on my belief that it is important that there be stability and
predictability in intelligence funding, particularly in highly
technical programs where uncertainty in resources and direction can
cause money to be wasted. The bill provides that kind of stability in
all areas except for the programs managed by the National
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. While I am not pleased by the NRO's
performance in keeping the committee informed about the expenditure
rates for certain programs, and the annual funding needs based on those
rates, I do not believe that the appropriate response to those
managerial shortcomings is to
radically alter the composition of our planned satellite
constellation. Certain of the actions described in the classified annex
to this bill, however, would have that effect and represent, in my
judgment, a significant departure from the direction provided by
Congress to the NRO as recently as a year ago. This departure has the
potential for sizable risk and substantial long-term costs. It should
only be undertaken if there is amply evidence that the likely gain
outweighs the financial and programmatic risks. At this point, that
evidence does not exist. I hope that in conference we will carefully
consider the advisability of taking these steps now before a thorough
record to support them is developed, both at the NRO and at the
committee.
[[Page H 8819]]
Mr. Chairman, the reservations just noted do not prevent me from
supporting this important legislation, nor in recommending it to the
House. I urge the adoption of H.R. 1655.
{time} 1100
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] for
his comments and, as I have already mentioned, I appreciate his
participation, his advice, and his dedication to the intelligence
community and to our national security.
I would like to respond to his comments regarding the National
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. I, too, am not pleased with the NRO's
performance regarding expenditure rates and funding needs. The need to
adjust some of the managerial philosophies at the NRO was even brought
out in our unclassified committee report. However, I
believe that many of our adjustments are not just in response to
managerial shortcomings, but are a recognition of the fact that rapid
advances in technology, similar to those the gentleman addressed in his
statement, also have value in the areas of satellite development. The
problem is that these types of technologies, which go beyond historical
incremental improvements, are not readily being addressed by the NRO,
who have grown comfortable philosophically with staying the course.
I take note of my colleague's concern regarding stability and
predictability in intelligence funding. That has been and remains a
major concern of mine in terms of how the House handles intelligence
oversight. Technological developments combined with the diversity of
intelligence requirements, however, dictate that we not be lulled into
complacency at a time when innovation may mean the difference between
whether or not we can meet the policymaker's needs in the 21st century.
Our bill does not attempt to push the NRO into untested areas, but
simply assures that they will be open to the possibilities inherent in
new technologies.
Again, I thank Mr. Dicks for his comments and his concerns, and
greatly look forward to exploring this area further as the committee
continues its work on 1C21.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Shuster].
(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this legislation. It is
very important to emphasize that we have already imposed multibillion-
dollar cuts on the intelligence community over the past 5 years. It is
equally important to emphasize that, under the leadership of the
distinguished chairman and the ranking member, very substantial reforms
have been put in place. It is also equally important to emphasize that
this legislation is brought to the floor by a unanimous vote of every
member of the committee. A good intelligence is even more important
today when we no longer face a monolithic opponent but rather several
rogue States.
One of the areas in which I have been particularly interested indeed
during my tenure as the ranking member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, I focused on the counternarcotics issue.
Drugs indeed are a scourge in our country today. Frankly I am deeply
concerned at the lack of emphasis that the administration seems to be
placing on curtailing both demand and supply, but I am happy to report
that there have been very, very significant intelligence successes.
Most of them cannot be talked about because they are highly classified.
I would urge my colleagues to go to the committee and to get a
classified briefing on the extraordinary successes that our
intelligence agencies have contributed to.
One example which is now in the public domain and can be talked about
is the disintegration of the Cali cartel, that notorious cartel in
Colombia which controls 80 percent of the world's cocaine supply.
Within the past few months, 6 key leaders have been captured by
Colombia law enforcement. We have been very instrumental in supporting
that effort as well as other related efforts.
Shipments of coca base from Peru to Bolivia have been interdicted
thanks to our support and the Colombian law enforcement people and
other law enforcement people to the extent that the coca base has
plummeted. Refineries simply cannot get base. In fact, much coca base
is rotting on the ground.
I would be quick to acknowledge we cannot solve the drug scourge in
this country by reducing supply only, but we can contribute to it, and
the intelligence community is making a very, very significant
contribution.
We are on the right track with this bill. I would urge my colleagues
to support your committee members who unanimously bring this
legislation to the floor.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.
First I want to commend the chairman of the committee for the very
bipartisan, cerebral and often extremely substantial way that he has
run this committee. I want to express my thanks to the chairman for
allowing me to undertake several initiatives in the foreign policy area
including the last trip that I took to Iraq.
Let me also state that I think the chairman is on the right track in
ensuring that what we try to do in the future is make sure that our
intelligence community is up to the task. With recent revelations
relating to double agents, the Ames affair, and the Howard case, the
trust that the American people have had in the intelligence community
has eroded. In fact, the reputation of the intelligence community has
been damaged by these actions. So I think it is critically important
that we make sure that we have in our intelligence community a
capability to move our intelligence operations into a new age.
The Soviet Union has fallen. There is no bipolar relationship in the
world. There are new challenges. The new challenges are in
international terrorism, in nuclear nonproliferation, in dealing with
drug cartels and economic competition, and I think it is critically
important that we move the focus of the intelligence community into
these areas.
I am not sure in the past that we have done that. There are still too
many Sovietologists, we still do not have enough people speaking
Arabic, or we do not know enough about ethnic conflicts, regional
conflicts in Bosnia, or the North Korean nonproliferation issues. We
need to find ways to engage ourselves better in these new areas. I
believe that Chairman Combest is undertaking a review of our
intelligence operations in a very effective and systematic manner.
One thing that troubles me a bit is that we do have the intelligence
authorization 1.3 percent above the administration request. I think we
have to send a signal to every department and every bureaucracy that we
are not going to be tolerating anyone getting more money than they
need. But I will entrust the chairman and the ranking member as to why
we are doing this and support their efforts to maintain the
intelligence budget at a level that the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Combest] and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] see fit. I will
support that. I just think it sends a little bit of a troubling signal.
There is an appropriations process which may not be as generous, but on
the whole I do think that we have to send a strong message to the
intelligence community that they have to do better in reducing waste,
and that they have to do better in the areas of human intelligence. We
have some very, very sophisticated systems, but we also have to do
better in the area of people.
{time} 1115
Let me say that by ``people,'' I mean intelligence--human
intelligence--spies. I was pleased to hear that today, the new Director
of CIA, Mr. Deutch, talked about the need for expanding covert action.
I think that makes sense. The statement was on the record.
The United States needs to have the capability to engage itself in
some very dicey situations, often with very unsavory people. I think we
need to support that capability. We may need to deal with those
situations and in that sense
[[Page H 8820]]
we need to have a covert action structure. For the last few years, it
has not been as strong because we have not needed it. But I think it is
critically important that we have that capability.
We have a very good new CIA Director. John Deutch knows government.
He is an academic. He has the ear of the President. He has the trust of
the intelligence community. He is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense.
He knows weapons systems. He knows technologies. He knows people and he
knows this city. He knows politics. I think we should support him. I
think we should give him political and substantive backing for what he
is trying to do.
Mr. Chairman, the message has to be clear. The culture of the CIA has
to be changed. They have to do a better job. Finally, we have to make
sure that every penny that we authorize is spent wisely.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from New
Mexico [Mr. Richardson] and enjoy working with him. The gentleman is a
dedicated Member and I assure him that any time the gentleman wants to
leave this country, I will be happy to assist him.
The gentleman knows that I say that only in jest. We are all very
proud of the activities that the gentleman from New Mexico, my neighbor
in Texas, has accomplished, and we are glad the gentleman is a part of
our team.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr.
Lewis].
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong
support for the work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, let me say at the beginning that at a moment, an
important time in terms of the history of this country and our
intelligence work, we are blessed by the fact that the leadership
within the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], my chairman,
as well as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the ranking
member, have worked in a very, very positive fashion to create an
environment that is as close to being nonpartisan in regard to these
matters as I have ever seen in the time that I have served in the
Congress.
Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we recognize that America is at a
turning point in terms of its need for information. And, indeed, it is
a new age at the end of the 20th century. The end of the cold war is
upon us. The reality that we are reducing defense budgets, because
people believe there is less of a need for more spending in that
subject area, has raised a specter regarding the future of intelligence
that is very, very important for all of us to consider seriously.
First, it is important to know that the cold war is all but over, but
indeed we continue to have serious challenges in connection with that.
Any Member who will but look will know of the difficulties in these new
fledgling democracies.
The challenges in Russia present problems for the United States that
are very real; problems that require us, both the President and our
committees, to be well informed regarding what really is happening in
that region of the world.
Above and beyond that, the intelligence community itself has faced
many a challenge. The difficulty of the Ames case raised questions
about the future of intelligence and where we should be going. It is
critical to recognize that the House must be involved in that future
direction.
Beyond that, there is a new specter that has not been the most
prominent in terms of the public's concern in the past: The prospect of
terrorism impacting our society. Terrorism that may have its source
from overseas; indeed terrorism here at home.
Mr. Chairman, all of these complicated circumstances create a
situation that would suggest to the House that the President and our
committees need more information, not less information, and excellent
information.
The work of our intelligence community is critical to us today and to
the future hope for freedom, I believe, in the world.
I urge the House to recognize the importance of this work, support
this very significant bill, and support the funding that is necessary
to carry forward our intelligence activities.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I will be offering an
amendment to reduce this budget by 3 percent. Of course, we cannot say
3 percent of what, because there is this great fear that someone might
find out a number, which everybody who needs to know it, knows it. It
is only the American people who do not know what the number is.
But it is up some. The proposed authorization is 1.7 percent higher
than last year's appropriation. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it very
clear to people, because of my respect for the rules, I am allowed
under the rules of the House to say that it is 1.7 percent higher. I am
not allowed to say what it is 1.7 percent higher than, but it is 1.7
percent higher.
It is 1.2 percent higher than what the President asked for. That
seems to me a very grave error. Of course, we want to be protected, but
there has been a more substantial drop in the task of the intelligence
community than in virtually any other area of government.
Up until 5 years ago, the intelligence community was engaged much
more heavily, than in any other activity, in monitoring the Soviet
Union's ability to destroy our society. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact were extraordinarily dangerous threats.
Mr. Chairman, that threat has very substantially diminished. There is
no more Warsaw Pact. Countries that once had troops dedicated to our
destruction, against their will, but nonetheless dedicated, they are
gone.
Mr. Chairman, the point is this. Yes, we have Iran and Libya and
North Korea to worry about. But the argument that we cannot reduce our
spending on intelligence, now that the Soviet Union's threat to our
very physical survival has collapsed, must assume that Libya, North
Korea and Iran did not exist 10 years ago.
In fact, 10 years ago we were worried about these terrorist nations.
We were worried about nuclear proliferation and we were worried about
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has collapsed. The largest single
threat has gone.
Yes, we still have these other threats, but we had them 5 and 10
years ago. Yet, Mr. Chairman, the committee now asks us, at a time when
we are cutting student loans and about to raise the premium for older
people. If my colleagues do not want to vote to raise the premium on
older people, if we did not give an increase to the intelligence
community of 1.7 percent, we would go a long way of not having to raise
the premium on older people living on $15,000 and $16,000 a year,
because those are the choices we are making.
Mr. Chairman, we are adding 1.7 percent in this authorizations to the
budget. The CIA gets a 5 percent increase. Mr. Chairman, any other
agency that had behaved disastrously, we would be talking about having
to cut it.
We were told we were going to cut Head Start. Do my colleagues know
why? Because they do not spend the money as efficiently as they could.
The Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations subcommittee charged
with Head Start said, ``I like Head Start, but they haven't spent the
money so efficiently, so let's cut them.'' Why does the exact opposite
not apply to the CIA?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 1655,
the Intelligence authorization bill for 1996. A great deal of hard work
has gone into the production of this bill. As a member of the
Intelligence Committee and chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the
Appropriations Committee, I can tell you that it is no easy task
reconciling the competing demands of national security and fiscal
responsibility. In fact, this is one of the major themes of our
intelligence authorization bill for 1996: To provide essential
intelligence capabilities while demanding cost-efficient solutions to
intelligence problems.
Another theme of our bill is the need to maintain a responsible
balance between collection, processing, and dissemination of
intelligence information. When any of these three areas is out of
balance, it reduces the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the entire
system. Historically, we have devoted more attention and resources to
collection without
[[Page H 8821]]
adequately providing for the less glamorous requirements to process
that collected information and get it to the customer when and where he
needs it. In our bill, we have made cross-program efforts to bolster
our processing capabilities, particularly of imagery and signals
intelligence.
As our chairman stated earlier, we reviewed each program on its
merits and added resources where we considered them necessary. At the
same time, however, we eliminated efforts we considered redundant or
unproductive, and we considered the long-term affordability of every
change we made. We also made every effort to engage in dialog with the
administration concerning those areas where we felt constructive change
was required. The result is an authorization that will help meet both
the intelligence and fiscal challenges of the future.
Although our authorization for fiscal year 1996 is slightly above the
President's request, we are confident that we have created no
unsustainable budget-busters in the outyears, and that our bill
provides a balanced program designed to meet our short- and long-term
intelligence needs. The intelligence budget has declined enough over
the last 8 years. I urge you to support H.R. 1655.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Burton). All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill, modified by the amendment recommended by the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight printed in the bill, and
by an amendment striking title VII, shall be considered by titles as an
original bill for the purpose of amendment. The first section and each
title are considered read.
No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as
modified, shall be in order, unless printed in the portion of the
Congressional Record designated for that purpose.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996''.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder
of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified,
be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of
a substitute, as modified, is as follows:
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 1996 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The Central Imagery Office.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1996,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1655 of the 104th
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
1996 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by
this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1996 the
sum of $80,713,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and
Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall
remain available until September 30, 1997.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The Community Management
Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized
247 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1996. Such
personnel of the Community Management Staff may be permanent
employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1996, any officer or
employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces
who is detailed to the Community Management Staff from
another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for
the performance of temporary functions as required by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 1996 the sum of $213,900,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
(a) General Provisions.--The National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new title:
``TITLE IX--APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
``Stay of Sanctions
``Sec. 901. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
President may stay the imposition of an economic, cultural,
diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United
States Government concerning a foreign country, organization,
or person when the President determines that to proceed
without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an
ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or
method. The President shall lift any such stay when the
President determines that such stay is no longer necessary to
that purpose.
``Reports
``Sec. 902. Whenever any stay is imposed pursuant to
section 901, and whenever the duration of any such stay
exceeds 120 days, the President shall promptly report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives the rationale and circumstances that led the
President to exercise the stay authority with respect to an
intelligence source or method, and to the Judiciary
Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives the
rationale and circumstances that led the President to
exercise the stay authority with respect to an ongoing
criminal investigation.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following:
``TITLE IX--APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
``Sec. 901. Stay of Sanctions.
``Sec. 902. Reports.''.
SEC. 304. THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN FORFEITURE.
Section 8432(g) of title 5, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(5)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
contributions made by the Government for the benefit of an
employee or Member under subsection (c), and all earnings
attributable to such contributions, shall be forfeited if the
annuity of the employee or Member, or that of a survivor or
beneficiary, is forfeited under subchapter II of chapter 83.
``(B) Forfeitures under this paragraph shall occur only if
the offenses upon which the requisite annuity forfeitures are
based happened
[[Page H 8822]]
subsequent to the enactment of this paragraph.''.
SEC. 305. AUTHORITY TO RESTORE SPOUSAL PENSION BENEFITS TO
SPOUSES WHO COOPERATE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY OFFENSES.
Section 8318 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(e) The spouse of an individual whose annuity or retired
pay is forfeited under section 8312 or 8313 after the date of
enactment of this subsection shall be eligible for spousal
pension benefits if the Attorney General of the United States
determines that the spouse fully cooperated with Federal
authorities in the conduct of a criminal investigation and
subsequent prosecution of the individual which resulted in
such forfeiture.''.
SEC. 306. SECRECY AGREEMENTS USED IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law not specifically
referencing this section, a nondisclosure policy form or
agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with
the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related
activity, other than an employee or officer of the United
States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the
particular activity for which such document is to be used.
Such form or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the
person will not disclose any classified information received
in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized
to do so by the United States Government.
SEC. 307. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION OF RECORDS OVER 25 YEARS OLD.
(a) In General.--Each agency of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program shall use no more than $2,500,000 of the
amounts authorized to be appropriated
by this Act to carry out the provisions of section 3.4 of
Executive Order 12958.
(b) Required Budget Submission.--The President shall submit
for fiscal year 1997 and each of the following five years a
budget request which specifically sets forth the funds
requested for implementation of section 3.4 of Executive
Order 12958.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. EXTENSION OF THE CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.
Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4(f)), is amended by
striking out ``September 30, 1997'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``September 30, 1999''.
SEC. 402. VOLUNTEER SERVICE PROGRAM.
(a) General Authority.--The Director of Central
Intelligence is authorized to establish and maintain a
program from fiscal years 1996 through 2001 to utilize the
services contributed by not more than 50 annuitants who serve
without compensation as volunteers in aid of systematic or
mandatory review for declassification or downgrading of
classified information of the Central Intelligence Agency
under applicable Executive orders governing the
classification and declassification of national security
information and Public Law 102-526.
(b) Costs Incidental to Services.--The Director is
authorized to use sums made available to the Central
Intelligence Agency by appropriations or otherwise for paying
the costs incidental to the utilization of services
contributed by individuals under subsection (a). Such costs
may include (but need not be limited to) training,
transportation, lodging, subsistence, equipment, and
supplies. The Director may authorize either direct
procurement of equipment, supplies, and services, or
reimbursement for expenses, incidental to the effective use
of volunteers. Such expenses or services shall be in
accordance with volunteer agreements made with such
individuals. Sums made available for such costs may not
exceed $100,000.
(c) Application of Certain Provisions of Law.--A volunteer
under this section shall be considered to be a Federal
employee for the purposes of subchapter I of title 81
(relating to compensation of Federal employees for work
injuries) and section 1346(b) and chapter 171 of title 28
(relating to tort claims). A volunteer under this section
shall be covered by and subject to the provisions of chapter
11 of title 18 of the United States Code as if they were
employees or special Government employees depending upon the
days of expected service at the time they begin volunteering.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS.
Section 1604 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
``Sec. 1604. Civilian personnel management
``(a) General Personnel Authority.--The Secretary of
Defense may, without regard to the provisions of any other
law relating to the number, classification, or compensation
of Federal employees--
``(1) establish such positions for employees in the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Central Imagery Office as the
Secretary considers necessary to carry out the functions of
that Agency and Office, including positions designated under
subsection (f) as Defense Intelligence Senior Level
positions;
``(2) appoint individuals to those positions; and
``(3) fix the compensation for service in those positions.
``(b) Authority To Fix Rates of Basic Pay; Other Allowances
and Benefits.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall, subject to
subsection (c), fix the rates of basic pay for positions
established under subsection (a) in relation to the rates of
basic pay provided in subpart D of part III of title 5 for
positions subject to that title which have corresponding
levels of duties and responsibilities. Except as otherwise
provided by law, an employee of the Defense Intelligence
Agency or the Central Imagery Office may not be paid basic
pay at a rate in excess of the maximum rate payable under
section 5376 of title 5.
``(2) The Secretary of Defense may provide employees of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Imagery Office
compensation (in addition to basic pay under paragraph (1))
and benefits, incentives, and allowances consistent with, and
not in excess of the levels authorized for, comparable
positions authorized by title 5.
``(c) Prevailing Rates Systems.--The Secretary of Defense
may, consistent with section 5341 of title 5, adopt such
provisions of that title as provide for prevailing rate
systems of basic pay and may apply those provisions to
positions in or under which the Defense Intelligence Agency
or the Central Imagery Office may employ individuals
described by section 5342(a)(2)(A) of such title.
``(d) Allowances Based on Living Costs and Environment for
Employees Stationed Outside Continental United States or in
Alaska.--(1) In addition to the basic compensation payable
under subsection (b), employees of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Central Imagery Office described in paragraph
(3) may be paid an allowance, in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, at a rate not in
excess of the allowance authorized to be paid under section
5941(a) of title 5 for employees whose rates of basic pay are
fixed by statute.
``(2) Such allowance shall be based on--
``(A) living costs substantially higher than in the
District of Columbia;
``(B) conditions of environment which--
``(i) differ substantially from conditions of environment
in the continental United States; and
``(ii) warrant an allowance as a recruitment incentive; or
``(C) both of those factors.
``(3) This subsection applies to employees who--
``(A) are citizens or nationals of the United States; and
``(B) are stationed outside the continental United States
or in Alaska.
``(e) Termination of Employees.--(1) Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may
terminate the employment of any employee of the Defense
Intelligence Agency or the Central Imagery Office if the
Secretary--
``(A) considers such action to be in the interests of the
United States; and
``(B) determines that the procedures prescribed in other
provisions of law that authorize the termination of the
employment of such employee cannot be invoked in a manner
consistent with the national security.
``(2) A decision by the Secretary of Defense to terminate
the employment of an employee under this subsection is final
and may not be appealed or reviewed outside the Department of
Defense.
``(3) The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Secretary terminates the employment
of any employee under the authority of this subsection.
``(4) Any termination of employment under this subsection
shall not affect the right of the employee involved to seek
or accept employment with any other department or agency of
the United States if that employee is declared eligible for
such employment by the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management.
``(5) The authority of the Secretary of Defense under this
subsection may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(with respect to employees of the Defense Intelligence
Agency), and the Director of the Central Imagery Office (with
respect to employees of the Central Imagery Office). An
action to terminate employment of an employee by any such
officer may be appealed to the Secretary of Defense.
``(f) Defense Intelligence Senior Level Positions.--(1) In
carrying out subsection (a)(1), the Secretary may designate
positions described in paragraph (3) as Defense Intelligence
Senior Level positions. The total number of positions
designated under this subsection and in the Defense
Intelligence Senior Executive Service under section 1601 of
this title may not exceed the number of positions in the
Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service as of June 1,
1995.
``(2) Positions designated under this subsection shall be
treated as equivalent for purposes of compensation to the
senior level positions to which section 5376 of title 5 is
applicable.
``(3) Positions that may be designated as Defense
Intelligence Senior Level positions are positions in the
Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Imagery Office that
(A) are classified above the GS-15 level, (B) emphasize
functional expertise and advisory activity, but (C) do not
have the organizational or program management functions
necessary for inclusion in the Defense Intelligence Senior
Executive Service.
``(4) Positions referred to in paragraph (3) include
Defense Intelligence Senior Technical positions and Defense
Intelligence Senior Professional positions. For purposes of
this subsection--
``(A) Defense Intelligence Senior Technical positions are
positions covered by paragraph (3) that involve any of the
following:
``(i) Research and development.
``(ii) Test and evaluation.
``(iii) Substantive analysis, liaison, or advisory activity
focusing on engineering, physical sciences, computer science,
mathematics, biology, chemistry, medicine, or other closely
related scientific and technical fields.
[[Page H 8823]]
``(iv) Intelligence disciplines including production,
collection, and operations in close association with any of
the activities described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) or
related activities; and
``(B) Defense Intelligence Senior Professional positions
are positions covered by paragraph (3) that emphasize staff,
liaison, analytical, advisory, or other activity focusing on
intelligence, law, finance and accounting, program and
budget, human resources management, training, information
services, logistics, security, and other appropriate fields.
``(g) `Employee' Defined as Including Officers.--In this
section, the term `employee', with respect to the Defense
Intelligence Agency or the Central Imagery Office, includes
any civilian officer of that Agency or Office.''.
SEC. 502. COMPARABLE BENEFITS AND ALLOWANCES FOR CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OVERSEAS.
(a) Civilian Personnel.--Section 1605 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
(B) by striking out ``of the Department of Defense'' and
all that follows through ``this subsection,'' and inserting
in lieu thereof ``described in subsection (d)''; and
(C) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (2);
(2) by striking out subsection (c) and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
``(c) Regulations prescribed under subsection (a) may not
take effect until the Secretary of Defense has submitted such
regulations to--
``(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
``(2) the Committee on National Security and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Subsection (a) applies to civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense who--
``(1) are United States nationals;
``(2) in the case of employees of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, are assigned to duty outside the United States and,
in the case of other employees, are assigned to Defense
Attache Offices or Defense Intelligence Agency Liaison
Offices outside the United States; and
``(3) are designated by the Secretary of Defense for the
purposes of subsection (a).''.
(b) Military Personnel.--Section 431 of title 37, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ``who are assigned
to'' and all that follows through ``of this subsection'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``described in subsection (e)'';
(2) by striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
``(d) Regulations prescribed under subsection (a) may not
take effect until the Secretary of Defense has submitted such
regulations to--
``(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
``(2) the Committee on National Security and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Subsection (a) applies to members of the armed forces
who--
``(1) are assigned--
``(A) to Defense Attache Offices or Defense Intelligence
Agency Liaison Offices outside the United States; or
``(B) to the Defense Intelligence Agency and engaged in
intelligence-related duties outside the United States; and
``(2) are designated by the Secretary of Defense for the
purposes of subsection (a).''.
SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
by striking out ``1995'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``1998''.
SEC. 504. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TIER II UAV.
All funds appropriated for fiscal year 1995 for the Medium
Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Tier II) are
specifically authorized, within the meaning of section 504 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), for such
purpose.
TITLE VI--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
SEC. 601. CLARIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO PAY FOR DIRECTOR OR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
APPOINTED FROM COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES.
(a) Clarification.--Subparagraph (C) of section 102(c)(3)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(c)(3)) is
amended to read as follows:
``(C) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active
duty who is appointed to the position of Director or Deputy
Director, while serving in such position and while remaining
on active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and
allowances. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid
shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director.''.
(b) Technical Corrections.--(1) Subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of such section are amended by striking out ``pursuant to
paragraph (2) or (3)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``to the
position of Director or Deputy Director''.
(2) Subparagraph (B) of such section is amended by striking
out ``paragraph (A)'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``subparagraph (A)''.
SEC. 602. CHANGE OF DESIGNATION OF CIA OFFICE OF SECURITY.
Section 701(b)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 431(b)(3)), is amended by striking out ``Office of
Security'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``Office of
Personnel Security''.
amendment no. 3 offered by mr. combest
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Combest: Page 7, line 9,
strike ``other''.
Page 7, line 10, insert ``identified in section 904'' after
``law''.
Page 7, line 13, insert ``and reports to Congress in
accordance with section 903'' after ``determines''.
Page 7, line 15, insert ``related to the activities giving
rise to the sanction'' after ``investigation''.
Page 7, line 16, insert ``related to the activities giving
rise to the sanctions'' after ``method''.
Page 7, beginning on line 16, strike ``The President'' and
all that follows through line 18, and insert the following:
``Any such stay shall be effective for a period of time
specified by the President, which period may not exceed 120
days, unless such period is extended in accordance with
section 902.''.
Page 7, after line 18, insert the following:
``extension of stay
``Sec. 902. Whenever the President determines and reports
to Congress in accordance with section 903 that a stay of
sanctions pursuant to section 901 has not afforded sufficient
time to obviate the risk to an ongoing criminal investigation
or to an intelligence source or method that gave rise to the
stay, he may extend such stay for a period of time specified
by the President, which period may not exceed 120 days. The
authority of this section may be used to extend the period of
a stay pursuant to section 901 for successive periods of not
more than 120 days each.
Page 7, strike line 19 and all that follows through line 6
on page 8, and insert the following:
``reports
``Sec. 903. Reports to Congress pursuant to sections 901
and 902 shall be submitted in a timely fashion upon
determinations under this title. Such reports shall be
submitted to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate. With respect to determinations
relating to intelligence sources and methods, reports shall
also be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. With respect to
determinations relating to ongoing criminal investigations,
reports shall also be submitted to the Committees on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
``laws subject to stay
``Sec. 904. The President may use the authority of sections
901 and 902 to stay the imposition of an economic, cultural,
diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United
States Government concerning a foreign country, organization,
or person otherwise required to be imposed by the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of
1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182); the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public
Law 103-236); title XVII of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510)
(relating to the nonproliferation of missile technology); the
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of
Public Law 102-484); and section 573 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1994 (Public Law 103-87), section 563 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-306), and comparable provisions
within annual appropriations Acts.
``application
``Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on the
date which is three years after the date of the enactment of
this title.''.
Page 8, after line 9 and before line 10, amend the matter
proposed to be inserted to read as follows:
``Title IX--Application of Sanctions Laws to Intelligence Activities
``Sec. 901. Stay of sanctions.
``Sec. 902. Extension of stay.
``Sec. 903. Reports.
``Sec. 904. Laws subject to stay.
``Sec. 905. Application.''.
Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, my amendment reflects the results of
discussions between the Members and staffs of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on International Relations
on issues pertaining to the application of sanction laws to
intelligence activities.
Since the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had reported out
legislation on sanctions deferrals, the committee has been working with
the Committee on International Relations to incorporate the concerns of
that committee and, therefore, modify section 303 as reported by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
[[Page H 8824]]
Mr. Chairman, that is what this amendment does. I would urge the
adoption of this amendment. Before I turn to the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Dicks], I would like to thank the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Gilman], chairman of the Committee on International
Relations, for the gentleman's interest, contribution, and his
cooperation, as well as that of the gentleman's staff; the gentlewoman
from California [Ms. Pelosi], of our committee, who was a strong
proponent of any U.S. sanction laws and has paid close attention to
this legislation; and certainly to the gentleman from California [Mr.
Berman] and his staff, all of who made very constructive contributions
and have worked closely to working this out in a bipartisan and
satisfactory manner.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Chairman Combest's
amendment to section 303 of the bill. As the committee report makes
clear, the committee intends to monitor closely the use of the
authority provided under section 303. The amendment should assist in
this regard by imposing a 3-year sunset provision.
Furthermore, as the report also points out, this authority is only
appropriate in limited cases. The amendment makes clear that the
authority only pertains to specific laws designed to limit the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems or
advanced conventional weapons. Finally, the amendment states that the
source or method or ongoing criminal investigation that the President
may delay the sanction to protect, must be related to the activities
giving rise to the sanction.
I believe this is a good amendment and I am pleased to accept it.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from California.
(Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me initially address the amendment of
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] and thank the gentleman very
much for both his remarks and his work on this amendment, as well as
thanks to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] the ranking member,
and to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] chairman of the
Committee on International Relations, and a special note of
appreciation to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi], who
pointed out to me this issue that was raised by the authorization bill.
Mr. Chairman, section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
add a new section, 901, authorizing the President to stay the
imposition of certain sanctions, should the President determine that to
proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an ongoing
criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method.
Mr. Chairman, I was originally quite troubled by that provision,
because it appeared to me to provide an open-ended opportunity for any
President to bypass the intent sanctions law. I had raised similar
concerns during House debate in 1991, on the provisions of H.R. 1415
that amended the Export Administration Act. I thought, as I pointed out
in a colloquy then with the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Mr. McCurdy, that the President, in rare
circumstances, could delay such a determination in those situations,
but the administration has raised new concerns that existing law was
not sufficient to provide them with legal flexibility.
In this case, the bipartisan cooperation of the staff of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and its leadership, has
allowed us to have a briefing from both the intelligence community and
the Department of State.
Mr. Chairman, it is now my understanding that with this amendment,
the original provision as amended, will mean that a decision to stay
temporarily consideration of the imposition of a sanction will only be
to protect sources and methods in an ongoing criminal investigation.
Such a presidential determination will not be used as the pretext for
any decision not to impose sanctions, for example, for economic or
commercial reasons, fearing that such action could jeopardize a
commercial decision, or for geopolitical reasons, fearing that such a
decision could damage our bilateral relationships with a particular
country.
I have been informed by the administration that such determinations
will only be made in exceptional circumstances. We are discussing here
a delay decision, not a decision to refuse to impose such sanctions
which are mandated under law.
{time} 1130
Should such a decision to delay determination be made by the
President, a report will be made in a prompt and expeditious manner to
the concerned committees of jurisdiction, including the Committee on
International Relations. It is my understanding that such reports will
indicate clearly the nature of the sanctionable action, the applicable
law to the sanctionable activity, the country or countries in which the
activity took place, and, where appropriate, the party to the
violation.
The intent of my amendment, which sunsets this provision 3 years from
the date of enactment, is to ensure an opportunity to evaluate the use
of this change to the National Security Act to ensure that is used for
the purpose intended and has not had a deleterious effect on the
sanctions law.
Mr. CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has
expired.
(At the request of Mr. Berman and by unanimous consent, Mr. Combest
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman will yield further, I will put my
statement in the Record.
I thank the distinguished Member from Texas and chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Combest, for his kind
remarks and those of the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Dicks. I
appreciate the effort that they have taken to accommodate my concern
and those of the chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr.
Gilman.
The amendment I have offered to the bill which has been incorporated
in the chairman's amendment, I believe, will take care of my concerns,
and those of the gentlelady from California [Ms. Pelosi], that section
303 should not unduly loosen current sanctions law.
As Mr. Combest has noted, section 303 amends the National Security
Act of 1947 to add a new section 901 authorizing the President to stay
the imposition of certain sanctions should the President determine that
to proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an
ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method.
I was troubled by that provision when initially proposed by the
administration because it appeared to me to provide an open-ended
opportunity for any President to by-pass the intent of sanctions law. I
had raised similar concerns during House debate in 1991 on provisions
in H.R. 1415 that amended the Export Administration Act and the Arms
Export Control Act. At that time I responded to an inquiry from Mr.
McCurdy, then chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, that it
was my understanding that the President, in rare circumstances, could
delay a determination on sanctions if such a delay is necessary to
protect intelligence sources and methods with the proviso that such a
delay should not be indefinite. Since then, the administration has
raised anew concerns that existing law was not sufficient to provide
them with legal flexibility.
In this case, with the bipartisan cooperation of the staff of the
Select Committee on Intelligence, whose excellent assistance I much
appreciate, I took the opportunity to be briefed by representatives
from both the intelligence community and the Department of State on
their rationale for requesting this amendment.
It is now my understanding that a decision to stay temporarily
consideration of the imposition of a sanction will only be to protect
sources and methods and ongoing criminal investigations. Such a
Presidential determination will not be used as the pretext for any
decision not to impose sanctions, for example for economic reasons,
fearing such action would jeopardize a commercial decision, or for
geopolitical reasons, fearing that such a decision would damage our
relations with a particular country. I have been informed by the
administration that such determinations will only be made in
exceptional circumstances. I should note that we are discussing a delay
in a decision, not a decision not to impose such sanctions mandated
under law. Should such a decision to delay determination be made by the
[[Page H 8825]]
President, a report will be made in a prompt and expeditious manner to
the concerned committees or jurisdiction, including the International
Relations Committee. It is my understanding that such reports will
indicate clearly the nature of the sanctionable action, the applicable
law to the sanctionable activity, the country or countries in which the
activity took place, and, where appropriate, the party to the
violation.
The intent of my amendment which sunsets this provision 3 years from
the date of enactment is to ensure an opportunity to evaluate the use
of this change to the National Security Act of 1947 to ensure that it
is used for the purpose intended and that it has not had a detrimental
effect on the intent of our sanctions law.
I am pleased with the accommodation worked out with both sides and
wish to thank Ms. Pelosi for her energetic work on this issue. Finally,
I would like to thank the Democratic and Republican staffs of both the
International Relations Committee and the Select Committee on
Intelligence for the professional and bipartisan manner in which they
resolved this issue.
I would also like to take this opportunity to raise a related issue.
As one of the authors of current sanctions law, I have become concerned
that the standards for imposing sanctions have been raised to such an
impossible level that the ability of sanctions to call attention to
grievous violations of international standards which threaten world
security and also to punish violators has been undermined. The time may
have come for us to evaluate whether or not we need a more flexible set
of policy tools to respond to such violations and violators. As we all
know, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a
serious problem. In the coming months, I hope this concern can be
engaged. The international community needs desperately to slow, if not
end, the spread of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to rogue
states.
Mr. Chairman, I do want to finish by asking the gentleman if he would
entertain a unanimous consent request that on line 10, page 2,
following the words ``submitted in a'', the gentleman would add the
word ``prompt'' so the report would be made in a prompt and timely
fashion, and I have that amendment in writing here, if the gentleman is
willing, offer it as a unanimous consent amendment to his amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I certainly concur
with the gentleman. I appreciate his further explanation of the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, is it in order at this time for the author of the
amendment to request unanimous consent to add ``prompt and'' in the
section, ``in a prompt and timely fashion'' in line 10, page 2 of the
amendment?
The CHAIRMAN. The modification is in order, without objection.
modification of amendment offered by mr. combest
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to modify the
amendment with the language which I have read.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:
Modification to amendment offered by Mr. Combest: On page
2, line 10 of the proposed amendment insert ``prompt and''
after ``submitted in a''.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification offered by the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
The text of the amendment, as modified, is as follows:
Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Combest: Page 7,
line 9, strike ``other''.
Page 7, line 10, insert ``identified in section 904'' after
``law''.
Page 7, line 13, insert ``and reports to Congress in
accordance with section 903'' after ``determines''.
Page 7, line 15, insert ``related to the activities giving
rise to the sanction'' after ``investigation''.
Page 7, line 16, insert ``related to the activities giving
rise to the sanction'' after ``method''.
Page 7, beginning on line 16, strike ``The President'' and
all that follows through line 18, and insert the following:
``Any such stay shall be effective for a period of time
specified by the President, which period may not exceed 120
days, unless such period is extended in accordance with
section 902.''.
Page 7, after line 18, insert the following:
``extension of stay
``Sec. 902. Whenever the President determines and reports
to Congress in accordance with section 903 that a stay of
sanctions pursuant to section 901 has not afforded sufficient
time to obviate the risk to an ongoing
criminal investigation or to an intelligence source or
method that gave rise to the stay, he may extend such stay
for a period of time specified by the President, which
period may not exceed 120 days. The authority of this
section may be used to extend the period of a stay
pursuant to section 901 for successive periods of not more
than 120 days each.''
Page 7, strike line 19 and all that follows through line 6
on page 8, and insert the following:
``reports
``Sec. 903. Reports to Congress pursuant to sections 901
and 902 shall be submitted in a prompt and timely fashion
upon determinations under this title. Such reports shall be
submitted to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate. With respect to determinations
relating to intelligence sources and methods, reports shall
also be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. With respect to
determinations relating to ongoing criminal investigations,
reports shall also be submitted to the Committees on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
``laws subject to stay
``Sec. 904. The President may use the authority of sections
901 and 902 to stay the imposition of an economic, cultural,
diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United
States Government concerning a foreign country, organization,
or person otherwise required to be imposed by the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of
1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182); the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (title VIII of Public
Law 103-236); title XVII of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510)
(relating to the nonproliferation of missile technology); the
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of
Public Law 102-484); and section 573 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1994 (Public Law 103-87), section 563 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-306), and comparable provisions
within annual appropriations Acts.
``application
``Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on the
date which is three years after the date of the enactment of
this title.''.
Page 8, after line 9 and before line 10, amend the matter
proposed to be inserted to read as follows:
``Title IX--Application of Sanctions Laws to Intelligence Activities
``Sec. 901. Stay of sanctions.
``Sec. 902. Extension of stay.
``Sec. 903. Reports.
``Sec. 904. Laws subject to stay.
``Sec. 905. Application.''.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I just
want to thank the gentleman for agreeing to that amendment as well as
to incorporating the sunset amendment, to thank the gentlewoman from
California for all of her help in this as well as being able to raise
this issue initially, and I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. COMBEST. I appreciate the gentleman's cooperative nature in
working this out.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I have no
objection to that change either.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I rise to express my support for Chairman Combest's
amendment and my appreciation to the chairman and the ranking member
and the committee staff for their work to address concerns about the
bill's provisions allowing the President to delay the imposition of
sanctions against other countries if the sanctions compromise, one, an
intelligence source or method or, two, an ongoing criminal
investigation.
I would also, of course, like to acknowledge and commend our
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], for his
contribution. He has been a leader in the fight against weapons
proliferation. I want to commend him for his work over the years to
make sanctions a more effective foreign policy tool. The gentleman from
California [Mr. Berman] and his staff were active participants in the
development of what, I think, is a very necessary amendment under the
leadership of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
Mr. Chairman, Congress over the years has decided that the imposition
of sanctions is appropriate response to certain activities which
threaten U.S. foreign policy goals and global stability. We have laws
on the books mandating imposition of sanctions for the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, for the illegal transfer of some
munitions, and for violation of missile technology controls. These
sanctions have had an important deterrent and punitive effect and have
increased the administration's leverage
[[Page H 8826]]
in discussing potential violations with the proliferators.
If, indeed, the sanctions which are on the books are too punitive,
too draconian to ever be used and, therefore, to be considered a
credible threat, then, we should, as a Congress, revisit those
sanctions. The gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] whom we are
blessed to have a understanding position because of his knowledge and
attention to these issues, stands ready, as he indicated in his
remarks, to assist the administration or any administration in making
appropriate changes.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. Blessed?
I appreciate the very nice comments from my friend. I just wanted to
emphasize this point. I included it in my original statement, but I did
not read it at this particular point. It is wrong to use, for instance,
this new provision to protect sources and methods as a way of getting
around the imposition of sanctions. If the feeling is the particular
sanctions law in an area, whether it is chemical, biological weapons,
missile proliferation, or nuclear, is too inflexible, then the
administration should come to the Congress and suggest those changes.
Let us take, for example, let us talk for one moment about China. It
is, without getting into any specifics, everyone understands the
importance of the political, or bilateral relationship with China, and
what that country is about and what we need to be doing there.
The key question, though, in terms of proliferation issues is whether
or not the law, as passed by Congress, as signed by the President, is
going to be followed. If that law is too inflexible, the answer is not
to avoid a conclusion with respect to proliferation The answer is to
come back to Congress and seek the flexibility that is desired.
So I appreciate the gentlewoman for bringing this up. Our only point
in this whole discussion is that we do not want this to become a new
way by which the executive branch, as a pretext, avoids imposing
sanctions because they do not want to alter some commercial deal,
because they do not want to have any disruption in the bilateral
relationship. The question of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is too important to be used as a pawn in that process. We
are ready to make those provisions more flexible if that is what is
needed. But that should not be the basis for not making a decision to
impose sanctions.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for putting that on the record
publicly because I think that should be a very important part of our
policy as we review these sanctions rather than always seeking waivers
and to make the sanctions more credible as a threat by making them more
possible to be used.
In the interests of time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my
full statement for the Record, but I would like to engage the chairman
of the full committee for a moment in colloquy.
My concerns were about time. I see the gentleman has addressed the
first time issue of prompt and timely fashion.
My other concern, Mr. Chairman, is that an administration could
feasibly stretch out this process for 3 years, 120 days at a time.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Pelosi] has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Combest and by unanimous consent, Ms. Pelosi
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I was so pleased that in the chairman's
statement he said, ``In these cases, it is expected that the utmost
will be done to resolve the sources and methods or law enforcement
problems as soon as possible.'' So that an administration could not
just use 120 days for whatever reason, economic purposes or other
reasons, in a series of these 120 days to delay addressing the real
issue at hand. Is it the gentleman's understanding that they would have
to resolve the sources and methods problem as quickly as possible, as
indicated in the statement?
Mr. COMBEST. If the gentlewoman will yield further, I totally would
concur with the gentlewoman, and I am glad the gentlewoman asked for
this time to make sure the Record reflects the intent, and I assure the
gentlewoman that I would stand by her, behind her or wherever she would
wish, in trying to nail this down much more specifically, if we
detected at all this happens to be a problem and it appears that there
is any abuse of the latitude which this amendment has provided.
Ms. PELOSI. If I may further, I thank the chairman for that
confirmation.
But I also would like to once again reaffirm the intent of Congress
that this waiver only is used when this would jeopardize sources and
methods or jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. There is no
other standard or condition under which the administration could seek
this blanket waiver?
Mr. COMBEST. If the gentlewoman will yield further, yes, that is
exactly correct. I would take that one step further and would tell the
gentlewoman I would be very glad to work with her to make certain that
it has to be very black and white, one of those areas of exemption that
there cannot be a gray area under which there was a claim of exemption
for one of those purposes, if, in fact, it was not emphatically one of
those very specified purposes.
Ms. PELOSI. As the gentleman indicated in his statement, based on the
testimony that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence received
on this subject, the instances where sanctions would be deferred due to
the source or method of criminal investigation problems would be rare?
Mr. COMBEST. I totally concur with the gentlewoman. She is absolutely
correct, and I appreciate her interest in this.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the chairman. I once again thank the chairman for
his cooperation on presenting this manager's amendment and
accommodating some of the concerns that the gentleman from California
[Mr. Berman] and I and other members of the committee had on it.
Mr. Chairman, with that, since the chairman has confirmed so many of
these issues, I can dispense with some of my statement and put it in
the Record and once again urge my colleagues to support the Combest
amendment and thank him for his leadership as well as thanking the
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] and the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Dicks].
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered
by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
(Mr. SKAGGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to take much time. I
appreciate the time at this point in the debate; since we moved through
general debate so quickly it caught some of us napping, I am afraid.
I want to thank our chairman, the gentleman from Texas, and the
ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], for their
leadership in putting this bill together this year. I was off the
committee for several months and have only recently rejoined the
committee. While I generally support this bill as meeting vital
national security needs, there are a couple of areas in which I hope we
may be able to make some changes and improvements when we get to
conference, Mr. Chairman, and I wanted to discuss those this morning.
One has to do with the funding levels for declassification as driven
by the President's new executive order. I am afraid that the relatively
low and arbitrary limits per agency that are included in the bill at
this point will seriously impede the very necessary work that needs to
be done within the intelligence community to move expeditiously to
declassify many of our relatively old but still classified, documents.
We have made some real progress in the whole question of classification
reform over the last several years. We need to proceed and stay on
track in this area.
It is very important for a functioning democracy to make as much
information as possible available to its citizens, and the
classification reform efforts that both the Congress and the
administration have taken are serving that end. We should not impede
them by unrealistically low budget caps.
[[Page H 8827]]
Second, there is, I think, too low a limit set in this bill for the
environmental task force. A different number is pending in the
legislation working its way through the other body. I hope we will be
able to make some adjustments there as well.
The committee held hearings earlier this year addressing the
intelligence community and what it should be concerned with in the next
century. Interestingly, several expert witnesses identified the
environment and the global environmental threat that we face as central
to our national security challenge in the next century.
It would be a shame, given that, for us to be shortchanging the work
that has been started in a very important initiative known as the
environmental task force, which is using products originally produced
with intelligence assets, declassifying them in appropriate ways, so
that the information can be available to policymakers, the scientific
community, and the general public. That is something I think we need to
continue, and I hope, speaking to my chairman of the committee, that we
will be able to deal with both these funding issues pertaining to
declassification and to the environmental task force when we get to
conference.
I support the Intelligence authorization bill because I believe that,
on balance, it supports vital national security needs. I believe it is
important to support the crucial activities of the intelligence
community at a time when many regions of the world are increasingly
threatened by ethnic conflict, by territorial disputes, and by arms
competition. We also need to support the use of our intelligence
resources to understand and combat new threats to our own security,
from things as obvious as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, to those as subtle as global environmental
degradation.
This bill has authorized an intelligence budget at a level slightly
higher than the President requested for fiscal year 1996. In a time of
tight budgets, when domestic programs are being slashed, I would have
preferred an authorization level closer to the President's request. And
we'll have a chance to vote on making just such an adjustment.
I also have serious concerns about two matters--funding levels for
declassification of documents and funding for the environmental task
force--that I hope can be worked out in conference.
My first concern centers around the arbitrary restrictions that this
legislation places on the amount agencies can spend to declassify
documents under the requirements of the President's new executive order
on classified national security information--signed on April 17, 1995.
These restrictions threaten to scuttle a long-needed system of reforms
to an outdated and expensive system of classifying Government
information.
When I joined the Intelligence Committee in 1993 I was astonished to
learn that agency heads couldn't even tell us roughly how much their
budget was spent on document classification and security. At that time
millions of older documents were being held under lock and key at
tremendous cost to U.S. taxpayers, even though their disclosure posed
no national security risk. Some of the most astonishing examples:
documents concerning troop movements in World War I and documents
concerning POW/MIA's in the Korean war.
Despite sweeping changes in the international arena, the Government's
classification bureaucracy had been stuck on autopilot, stamping
``secret'' on nearly 7 million new documents each year and marking 95
percent for indefinite restriction. For a democratic and free society
to work, the people must have as much information as possible about the
activities of their Government. So, I decided to do something about
this.
The result in 1994, driven by language in our 1993 Intelligence bill,
was the first-ever accounting of the costs and number of personnel
involved in classifying and maintaining Government secrets. These
reports revealed that keeping the Nation's secrets employs 32,400
workers and costs $2.28 billion. Last year, I took the reform effort
one step further by requiring agencies to come up with suggestions
about how to cut spending on classification and secrecy. This
initiative led to a Government-wide program of cost accounting and
expenditure reduction efforts involving all the agencies that make up
the intelligence community.
Both this effort and work already underway in the Clinton
administration has already begun to pay off. In fiscal year 1994 the
number of new documents being classified was down over 26 percent. Real
gains are also being made on declassification front. In 1994 there was
a 70 percent increase in pages declassified under systematic review. In
addition, the President ordered a one-time declassification in bulk of
almost 50 million pages of historical records in the National Archives.
Now the President has consolidated the reform effort with the
issuance of Executive Order 12958 on April 17, 1995. The President's
executive order balances the competing needs of access and security in
a cost-effective way by laying out a uniform system for classifying,
safeguarding, and declassifying national security information.
Unfortunately, this Intelligence authorization bill could effectively
block the crucial reform of the classification behemoth by limiting to
$2.5 million each the amount of funds that each agency can spend to
carry out the declassification provisions in the executive order.
It is important to remember that the President's executive order
requires that, unless ground for an exemption exist, classified
information contained in records that are 25 years old, and of
permanent historical value, shall be automatically declassified within
5 years of the order whether or not the records have been reviewed.
This assumes that adequate funds will be
provided to review documents to determine if their release would
jeopardize national security. So, ironically, if adequate moneys are
not provided for the declassification process, certain documents that
should not be declassified may slip through the cracks. It is
important, therefore, for Congress to provide adequate funds to carry
out a careful and comprehensive review of documents to be declassified.
Classification reform also extends to a new classification
discipline. Over-use of classification is costly in its direct budget
impacts, in that it's expensive to maintain the infrastructure to keep
secrets. It's also costly in its indirect effects of devaluing the
currency, that is for those who work with classified information to be
appropriately vigilant, there needs to be a sense that classification
is not invoked where it doesn't have to be. And then, again, there are
the costs to democracy.
Lets not trip up agency efforts to reform just as we're beginning to
turn the tide on the sea of top-secret paper.
I am also concerned about the severe funding limitations that this
bill places on the environmental task force [ETF].
Global and national environmental threats should be of real concern
to national security and intelligence experts. In fact, in hearings we
held earlier this year on ``The Intelligence Community in the Twenty
First Century'' several expert witnesses testified that environmental
threats might well prove to be the most significant challenge to our
Nation's security in the too distant future.
Why then, does this bill reduce funding authority for the ETF to $5
million, which is less than a third of the President's request? By
severely reducing the authorization for ETF this bill threatens several
efforts that are making significant environmental information derived
from intelligence assets available to the general public, the
scientific community, and other Federal agencies.
Our country has already made an enormous investment in classified
systems and technology. For a very small additional expenditure, we can
exploit this investment to benefit the ability of Government and
science and industry to anticipate and attack problems driven by global
environmental changes. The ETF initiatives is already helping
policymakers and scientists obtain the data they need to understand
long-term environmental change and develop better management techniques
to deal with natural and ecological disasters.
Critics of the ETF have argued that this initiative diverts the
intelligence community from its primary purpose. But the function of
intelligence is to support policymakers. And in this instance, the ETF
supports policymakers in a range of agencies--the Department of
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Interior, Transportation, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the National Science Foundation--enabling them to use
intelligence data to facilitate disaster relief planning and to develop
international policies that have an environmental component. For
example, there's nothing more fundamental to political stability than
adequate food stocks, which in turn are dependent on environmental
factors and population trends. All this is probably the subject of
intelligence, and the resulting intelligence products ought to be
available as widely as possible. The best technology available for
getting the data is already available. We just need to put it to better
use.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 10, after line 17,
insert the following:
SEC. 308. COMPLIANCE WITH BUY AMERICAN ACT.
No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be expended
by an entity unless the entity agrees that in expending the
assistance the entity will comply with sections 2 through 4
of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a-10c, popularly
known as the ``Buy American Act'').
[[Page H 8828]]
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS; REQUIREMENT REGARDING NOTICE.
(a) Purchase of American-Made Equipment and Products.--In
the case of any equipment or products that may be authorized
to be purchased with financial assistance provided under this
Act, it is the sense of the Congress that entities receiving
such assistance should, in expending the assistance, purchase
only American-made equipment and products.
(b) Notice to Recipients of Assistance.--In providing
financial assistance under this Act, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall provide to each recipient of the assistance a
notice describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the
Congress.
SEC. 310. PROHIBITION OF CONTRACTS.
If it has been finally determined by a court or Federal
agency that any person intentionally affixed a fraudulent
label bearing a ``Made in America'' inscription, or any
inscription with the same meaning, to any product sold in or
shipped to the United States that was not made in the United
States, such person shall be ineligible to receive any
contract or subcontract made with funds provided pursuant to
this Act, pursuant to the debarment, suspension, and
ineligibility procedures described in sections 9.400 through
9.409 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.
Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], and the ranking member, the
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], for the fine bill.
I just want to jump in here early by saying the Congress of the
United States should support John Deutsch. He knows the military well.
He knows his way around Washington, the political landscape. He has
done a remarkable job every place he has been, and I am glad to see
that he is the CIA director, and we give him the shot to perform well.
{time} 1145
Now this is a stealth budget. I have a stealth Buy American
amendment. We are all familiar with it. It makes a lot of sense, and I
would hope that the committee would accept it.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas.
Mr. COMBEST. I think I could assure the gentleman that the gentleman
from Washington would love for there to be plenty of purchases of
stealth, but I would just like to state that the Chair has seen the
amendment, we certainly concur with it, and we would accept the
amendment.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks],
the distinguished ranking member.
Mr. DICKS. I want to compliment the gentleman from Ohio who has been
steadfast in his support for the Buy American provision and for this
amendment. We have always been able to work this out in conference. The
record of the CIA and other agencies in this bill in this area is very
exemplary, by the way, but I want to compliment the gentleman. We have
enjoyed working with him over the years, and we on our side of the
aisle will be glad to accept the amendment as well.
Mr. TRAFICANT. I appreciate that. I do rise in support of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I do not offer an amendment at this time, but I would
like to just discuss generally the subject of the intelligence budget
and also a specific item under that which I think needs to be
understood by the Members of this Congress.
I am new to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in that I
joined it in January of this year, and, quite frankly, I had no idea,
as my colleague and many others in this body may, of the scope of what
the intelligence community in the United States of America and beyond
the United States of America actually does because of the nature of the
information with which we deal. Obviously a lot of this is not
discussed publicly, and I would encourage every Member, particularly
the newer Member of Congress, those like me who are serving in our
second term and the first-term Members, if they could possibly, to
visit the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rooms to learn as
much as they can about this extraordinary process. I think it is very,
very important to our national security and something we should all
understand.
I would like to congratulate the chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], and
the ranking member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], and all
the members actually of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
for the extraordinary devotion. They have been great mentors and
teachers to me. They are as devoted as any group of individuals I have
ever met to this subject and deserve, I think great congratulations.
They do speak at times in acronyms, and I cannot understand them all
the time, but I am trying to fight my way through that as well, as I
cannot say enough about the staff itself, an extremely talented group
of individuals and, again, one which is ready to help all the Members
of this Congress when we have, when the Members have, an opportunity to
understand better what we are doing in intelligence.
I did want to discuss one subject, and that is the subject of the
satellites that we are dealing with in the intelligence side of the
space program.
Pending results of the committee's IC 21 studies, which of course is
what is going to happen in the 21st century, the bill before us makes
no radical changes save in one area, and that area is satellites, where
we took a number of substantial initiatives, for two primary reasons.
First, the rationale for these actions is that current, well-published
plans to reduce the number of intelligence spacecraft on orbit will
leave us even more vulnerable to denial and deception.
A second reason is that space budgets have become unsustainably high.
without major reductions in space program costs, we will be faced with
truly unpalatable choices. We will have to devote a still greater
percentage of the intelligence budget to satellites. Or we will have
to forego or eliminate some much-needed satellite capabilities in order
to fund other overhead collection programs.
The space budget situation within the National Reconnaissance Program
is little different from that encountered by others, such as NASA. And,
our solutions sometimes will have to be similar to those now being
pioneered by NASA--cutting spacecraft weight and launch costs, building
satellites more rapidly and getting technology on orbit faster, taking
full advantage of rapidly advancing commercial technology, and so on.
Advancing technology and management changes could allow us to have more
capability for less money. We are pushing these programs very hard, and
I am pleased to see that, and we are pushing the programs, as I said,
and the methodologies, which will in a few years--could permit a large
and enduring for the future cost reduction. So we are confident that we
are dealing correctly with the present and rapidly coming future
technology which will ultimately help the taxpayers of the United
States of America.
I just close again by thanking, congratulating, those who put in a
lot of hours without television cameras or some of the normal glare and
publicity that comes with this particular job because it makes a huge
difference, and I think without it our country would suffer.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CASTLE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. First of all, I want to thank the gentleman from Delaware
[Mr. Castle] for his very kind remarks, and I want to share in those
remarks not only about the chairman, but also about the staff of the
committee. We have an extraordinary staff, and the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Combest] and I have worked very hard to try to bring the staff
together in a very bipartisan way to try to deal with the issues, and
to work for all the Members, and to work for the entire House, and I
think they do an exceptional job, and I am very proud of all of the
members of our staff.
[[Page H 8829]]
I also would point out, too, to the gentleman I think he raises a
very important point about the satellite issues. There was a long story
just the other day in the Washington Post about the Corona program
which was declassified, and one of the things that struck me in
reviewing the article was the fact that there was so much
misinformation between the United States and the Soviet Union about our
missile forces, and one of the things that happened when we had these
satellites and had better information is that is really quieted some of
the fears and, I think, may have helped us avoid a confrontation
between the United States and the soviet Union.
So good
information is important not only for us, but also for our allies,
and I think it helped the United States go through a very difficult
time in its history and as we go now into a new era.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle]
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Castle was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. DICKS. As we go into this new era, as my colleague knows, we are,
in fact, making some investments in new capabilities in the satellite
area, but over time it will help us reduce the amount of money
necessary for intelligence. It is one of those things where we have to
invest now in order to get the capability, but the capability we are
going to have will mean fewer satellites in orbit, but much more
capable satellites.
So I just hope we can stay with the program. I've urged John Deutch,
and I realize that there are budgetary limitations. We all face that,
but I think that the architecture the way we have today is a good one,
and I think in the long term it is going to give us tremendous new
capabilities that we can use more rapidly and will provide us with that
same kind of high quality information that helped us get through the
cold war era, and I think it will help us in the future as we deal with
the various crises that we face.
But I want to commend the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle],
former Governor, a person who brings a lot of talent to this committee,
as someone who I respect and who is up here every day doing his part on
the committee for his attention to what the committee has been involved
in.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr.
Dicks] for his support of what I have spoken to and also his kind
statements about me. I concur with the gentleman. The costs; I think
satellites have a tremendous place in intelligence and security for
this country. On the other hand we all know that the cost of satellites
and the whole space costs are tremendous, and I think we have to work
diligently and constantly to make sure that the reward that we get from
this is worth the costs that we are putting into it, and never can we
really let up on that. My view, after seeing this up close, is that
this is a particularly difficult, but important, area, one that should
take a substantial percentage of our time, and I agree.
Mr. DICKS. I think the gentleman is right. We are not going to have
any choice but to be very, very certain that we do not have unnecessary
redundancies and that we look at each of these architectures and try to
take advantage. There are things that can be done with some of these
satellites that will help other parts of the constellation, and that is
one thing we need to continue to work on.
amendment offered by mr. frank of massachusetts
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
Page 5, after line 22, insert the following:
SEC. 105. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the
aggregate amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act,
including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102, is reduced by
three percent.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts
authorized to be appropriated by section 201 for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
(c) Transfer and Reprogramming Authority.--(1) The
President, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may apply the
reduction required by subsection (a) by transferring amounts
among the accounts or reprogramming amounts within an
account, as specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102, so long as the
aggregate reduction in the amount authorized to be
appropriated by this Act equals three percent.
(2) Before carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
submit a notification to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, which notification
shall include the reasons for each proposed transfer or
reprogramming.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, we have just heard the
ranking minority member tell us that, if we spend a little more money
now on these satellites, it will allow us to reduce later on. I think
this is now the fifth year in a row that I have heard that, and have
yet to see the result of it. My amendment would reduce the
authorization, which is already a significant amount over the
appropriation, and again I apologize for the stupid way in which we
will have to carry out this debate because we are not allowed to
mention the gross numbers. The American public is not to be allowed to
know what the total of billions of dollars is that we are spending, and
we can talk about percentage increases, but we cannot talk about how
much.
This is an effort to reduce from last year's budget rather than
increase. The committee's proposal would increase by about 1.7 percent.
Now the President asked for 5.5-percent increase. I think both are in
error. This would be a 3-percent decrease. It would be about, oh, a
little less than 1\1/2\ percent less than last year.
The point is, Mr. Chairman, that there has been a diminution in the
task of intelligence greater than the diminution in any other
government's job. At the maximum we were spending about 10 percent more
than this bill calls for because we were confronting the Soviet Union,
the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. What we are being told is that we can
afford a really slight, a 10-percent, reduction in intelligence because
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that does not mean we can go
to Russia today, but Russia today is a pale shadow in terms of threat
that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was. We have made significant
progress with Ukraine and Kazakhstan. There are fewer nuclear weapons;
there are certainly fewer weapons of a conventional sort, and again I
want to deal with the silly argument that, well, it is true there is no
more Soviet Union, but there is Iraq, there is Libya, there is Iran.
Yes, and there were in 1985 and 1990. The argument is that the world is
today somehow no safer for us than it was when we had the Soviet Union.
It is one of the grossest examples of distorting logic to be in the
service of spending that I have ever heard.
There is not now the military threat to our very survival that we
faced. There are other threats, but there are no qualitative new
threats. Chemical and biological weapons, nuclear proliferation,
terrorism;
these are not things we just invented a year or two ago. We have had
them all along. We were 10 years dealing with the Soviet Union and with
these other threats. Today the Soviet threat has been very
substantially diminished, and the American people are not to be given
the benefit.
Mr. Chairman, we will be telling students that their student aid will
be less. It will cost one more, if they are a middle-income student, to
go to college. The Republicans plan to raise premiums on the average
Medicare recipient. We are not sure how much, whether they will be
going up by $120 a year or $250 a year. I do not know. They are
planning their budget to reduce the cost-of-living Social Security, but
at the same time we increase intelligence from this year over last
year.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk particularly about the CIA, which gets a
5-percent increase, and I am glad we have a new head of the CIA. I hope
he
[[Page H 8830]]
does much better, but if any other Government agency had been found to
have made the errors and had the inefficiencies that the CIA had, it
would be penalized.
Again I want to stress that the justification that we got from the
chairman of the Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee on Labor-HHS
is for cutting Head Start. We are giving less money to Head Start. Why
are we giving less money to Head Start? Because he said they are not
spending it as efficiently as they could, but we are going to give a 5-
percent increase to the CIA. The CIA is apparently perfectly efficient.
Now obviously, if we were in a different budgetary time, we would
like to spend more money on a lot of things, but we are in a crisis. We
are making painful cuts everywhere except in the CIA, except in these
areas where the threat has diminished. If we had had an increase in
child health equivalent to the decrease in the threat in the Soviet
Union, we would have cut a lot more at HHS.
{time} 1200
This budget erroneously says that at a time when we are cutting very
important services to middle-income and lower-income Americans, when we
are reducing money elsewhere, we are going to spend more here. There
are threats to the safety of the average American. Tragically, they
occur within the United States. I believe the average American today
feels a lot more threatened by the violence that sadly engulfs many of
our cities.
However, we cut back on money that a public housing authority could
use for drug elimination. This House wiped out money for drug
elimination grants in public housing, because we want to raise the
money for the CIA. Ask the average American: Are you feeling more
threatened by what the CIA deals with or by the drug people in your
neighborhood, by that crime and violence? However, this House, if we
pass this authorization, says no, we are going to cut out money that is
used to fight drugs in America's streets, because we are going to
increase it elsewhere.
Indeed, even terrorism has become tragically a domestic problem. That
is the FBI, that is the DEA, that is the BATF.
If we want to fight crime, we have a counterterrorism bill reported
out by the Committee on the Judiciary, but in part because there is
some right-wing unhappiness about it, that is being held up. So please
do not tell me that you are going to fight terrorism by giving more
money to the CIA and hold up the counterterrorism bill, and cut drug
elimination grants and cut other kinds of programs that would help
local law enforcement. I hope this amendment is agreed to.
Let me just make the last point, that this amendment says that the 3-
percent cut is across the board unless the President, in consultation
with intelligence officials, decides to reallocate it, and tells us
about it. So it is not going to require 3 percent for everything. It
sets a target of 3 percent and gives the President, with the Director
of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, the flexibility to
apply it as they think best.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, it comers as no surprise to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], I am sure, that I am opposed to the
amendment. I would say to the gentleman that he has been very tenacious
in his efforts. I know that the gentleman comes at this purely from a
belief that he is doing the right thing. I have always respected that,
among all Members.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make certain that there is not a
misunderstanding. This is no intent to indicate that the gentleman
intentionally misspoke. First, we will probably have a strong
disagreement on the fact that there has been actually a diminishing of
the need for intelligence. That is an arguable point, of which probably
neither of us would be swayed. I do not see that threat diminishing.
Second, as he had made reference to an earlier comment by the ranking
member, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], that expenditures
now would give us an opportunity to reduce in the future and that he
has not seen any of that reduction, I wanted to just share with the
Members the chart that we had. This is the actual expenditure line, and
it is somewhat difficult to read. On the far left is 1989, and it runs
through the 1996 mark, or the direction the intelligence budget has
been going. So there has been a decrease on overall expenditures of
intelligence through 1995 fiscal year, and it is difficult to see on
this chart, because it is a slight increase, as mentioned, 1.3. The
gentleman is totally correct, I mentioned in my opening comments the
amount of percentage, but there has been a decrease.
Candidate Clinton proposed a decrease over a period of 7 years, which
actually, in reality, was reached last year. It is an argument and a
discussion that I presume quite seriously will go on for some time. The
cut would take us below the levels of last year, if, in fact, it were
implemented. Again, I am sure it comes as no surprise, but I would rise
in strong opposition to the amendment.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Frank amendment. Frankly, this
morning, I still had not made up my mind about the amendment, because I
have not been supportive of across-the-board cuts in a budget where
people cannot really see what the expenditures are.
My colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has
clearly put forth to this body his view of the diminution of the threat
as well as the values priorities debate, the context within which this
debate on this authorization bill takes place today: our spending on
intelligence.
Certainly we can all stipulate in this body that we want our
President, whoever the President is, to have the best possible
intelligence in dealing with the international situation, in dealing
with the increased threat of terrorism, and the list goes on.
I associate myself with the remarks of our colleague, the gentleman
from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], in support of the environmental task force
and its important work. I have certain concerns about justifying the
intelligence budget on the basis for economic reasons, because I do not
believe that is what should justify our spending in the intelligence
arena.
I, too, associate myself with the remarks of our colleagues in
support of the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Deutch. I am
pleased with the comments he has made about considering protecting
human rights is determining our sources and methods as he takes over
the leadership of the intelligence community. He is a very welcome new
DCI. He has outstanding credentials. He has access to the President,
and he the respect of many Members of Congress. We all wish him well.
His success is important to us.
I do have some concerns about his statement of yesterday on expanding
covert operations, and look forward to hearing more about that.
Having said all of that about the need for our President to have the
vest possible intelligence, and also stating that I voted against the
10-percent across-the-board cut that was proposed in the appropriations
bill the other day, because of the nature of the cut, I want to commend
the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] for his amendment
today. I think the 3-percent cut is prudent and reasonable.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks when I came into the room, I
still had concerns about what I thought was an across-the-board cut,
which did not take into consideration what our ranking member referred
to and our chairman referred to as investments that will produce
savings down the road, et cetera. I do not consider every proposal or
element of this budget, of this authorization bill and the budget it
contains, to be of the same priority.
I was pleased to see, therefore, and I hope our colleagues will read
the Frank amendment because, as the gentleman said at the close of his
remarks, the amendment is very smart. It is a targeted smart amendment.
It is a 3-percent cut. It makes an exception in that it does not apply
to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency's retirement and disability fund, so that our obligations to our
retirees will be met to them.
It also gives transfer and programming authority, unlike most across-
[[Page H 8831]]
the-board cuts. It says, ``The President, in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may
apply the reductions required by subsection A by transferring amounts
among the accounts or reprogramming amounts within an account as
specified in section 102, so long as the aggregate reduction in the
amount authorized be appropriated in this act equals 3 percent.'' So I
support this amendment because it gives discretion to the President and
the Secretary of DOD and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is
very appropriate and appealing in terms of attracting the votes of our
colleagues.
I also think our colleagues should be aware of the fact that some of
the money that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] would cut
with this amendment has already been accommodated by the Committee on
Appropriations. So I thank him for giving this body an opportunity to
say to the intelligence community, ``We support you very strongly.''
Certainly, even though we cannot talk about amounts, this budget, even
with the proposed cut of the gentleman from Massachusetts, will still
be very, very substantial.
We support and encourage and congratulate and commend the new DCI,
Mr. Deutch, and hope that we can work together with him so he can be
successful. If we are asking all Americans to tighten their belts, if
we are asking all agencies of government to tighten their belts except
the DOD, and the DOD appropriations bill has already accommodated some
of this change, the DOD authorization being less than this
authorization, then I think our colleagues in this body should say to
the intelligence community, ``Join with us in being much more fiscally
responsible in terms of dollars spent for the results that we must have
to be a strong country based on the intelligence that we need for our
President to lead us.
Therefore, it is in that spirit I urge our colleagues to support this
smart amendment, the Frank amendment. It is selective, it gives
discretion to the President, it is an appropriate amount, it has
already been accommodated by the Committee on Appropriations, and it is
fair.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Frank amendment to the
1996 Intelligence authorization bill.
My friends, once again I am here to remind you, the cold war is over.
We won! It is time for the Defense and Intelligence budgets to reflect
this reality.
The Frank amendment is a reasonable amendment to the Intelligence
budget. The CIA and other parts of the intelligence apparatus can
certainly stand a 3-percent cut. This is a modest cut, a fair cut.
Do not forget, this week the Republican majority is going to ask our
seniors to take a bigger cut in their Medicare coverage. Don't forget
that we are asking our school children to take a bigger cut in
education funding. We're asking college students; working families; and
the elderly to cope with all kinds of cuts, in lots of important
programs.
Three percent? That's not much. That's reasonable. Let's cut the
bloated intelligence budget. Let's ask the CIA to sacrifice for a
change.
Pass the Frank amendment.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I will not take the full 5 minutes, but an important
fact Members need to keep in mind in judging this proposal has to do
with the action taken just last week on the defense appropriations
bill. Inherent in our decisions on the appropriations, which include
appropriations for intelligence activities, was essentially a 2-percent
reduction under the level authorized in the bill now before us. So the
practical effect of the gentleman's amendment would be another 1-
percent reduction below the 2 percent that has effectively already been
approved by this body during the appropriations process.
Should we do that? This is certainly a question about which
reasonable people, all dedicated to the proposition that we need a
strong defense and an effective intelligence operation in support of
national security, can disagree. I come down without great pleasure in
support of the gentleman's amendment, without pleasure because I
recognize, as our chairman has pointed out, that these are essential,
important functions for our overall national security.
However, the question is, are they sacrosanct? Is there no room for
some further efficiencies and some further tightening and setting of
priorities to occur within the intelligence community, beyond what we
have already forced on them, because in real dollar terms there have
been constraints imposed over the last couple of years. I believe that
they can endure that, and that they need to be asked to, out of
fundamental equity.
Our national defense and the intelligence operations in support of it
are our shield. But if that shield is surrounding a society and a
culture and a nation that has been, to some degree, eaten out from
inside, where our real strength depends on the education of our kids
and the kind of investments we are making in technology and health care
and all the rest, there is a disconnect there. I think the gentleman's
amendment establishes an equity and a connection that is very
important, as we are asking most Americans to do with less, and the
rest of Government to shrink.
This is a very modest proposal. It will not go without imposing some
pain on important functions within the intelligence community, but
comparatively speaking, the kind of pain that we are asking others in
this country to sustain as we shrink Government and cut the budget and
get things into balance, this is disproportionately small, and I think,
therefore, is something we can do in good conscience with respect to
both to national security and a sense of national equities.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to clarify for certain that I had
understood the gentleman earlier. He did rise earlier in support of
increasing the amount relative to the environmental intelligence
program and increasing the amount available for the declassification of
documents?
Mr. SKAGGS. The gentleman is correct, in support of removing the cap
that is now in the bill on the declassification operations of
individual agencies, and as the gentleman knows, the amounts that might
be involved in the environmental task force, compared to the overall
size of what we are talking about in the budget, is fractions of
hundredths of percents.
{time} 1215
If the gentleman is intent on pointing out an inconsistency in my
position on this in the technical sense, he is probably correct. In a
practical sense, I really do not think so.
Mr. COMBEST. If the gentleman will continue to yield, it is not an
inconsistency, it is just the fact that in the budget obviously the
programs we are looking at, we looked at in terms of priority. It has
been estimated that the declassification would require $70 million.
That is a substantial amount of money for declassification. That is why
we limited. It is not the objection that the chairman had to the
declassification idea. It was the fact that there are many, many
programs that would be detrimentally affected. I just wanted to make
for certain that the gentleman, while he was supporting a further
reduction, was asking for an increase in some other areas that could
amount to several tens of millions of dollars.
Mr. SKAGGS. If I can reclaim my time, I am certainly happy to discuss
with the chairman what a reasonable level would be to deal with, for
instance, the declassification issue. Having it open-ended probably is
not a reasonable approach. I think the caps that are suggested in the
bill now may be set too low and I think our colleagues in the other
body have come to that conclusion as well.
The main question here is one of setting priorities. I think
reasonable people can come to different conclusions while still having
a profound commitment to a robust and effective intelligence operation
for the country.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs]
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, and by unanimous consent,
[[Page H 8832]]
Mr. Skaggs was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
While we are talking about the whole consistency issue--at least I
am--I did want to note, I was in agreement with the chairman when he
got up and talked about the reductions, because I acknowledge there has
been some reduction. But the chairman, when he talked about reductions,
talked about 1989 dollars, in other words, a failure to keep up with
inflation is considered a cut, and I think that is an appropriate
accounting measure. But I do think that when we do that kind of
accounting, when we say that a failure to keep up with inflation is a
cut, it should not just be to the benefit of the intelligence
community, it ought to be relevant to Medicare and everything else.
I think talking about it in constant 1989 dollars, that is, saying
that a failure to keep up with inflation is a cut, that is a good way
to do accounting but it ought to be for the rest of the budget as well.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162,
noes 262, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 654]
AYES--162
Allard
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Blute
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Brownback
Bryant (TX)
Bunn
Camp
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Danner
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Doggett
Duncan
Durbin
Ehlers
Ensign
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gephardt
Goodlatte
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoekstra
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennelly
Kleczka
Klug
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Martini
McCarthy
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Metcalf
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Porter
Poshard
Ramstad
Rangel
Rivers
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Roth
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shays
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (WA)
Souder
Stark
Stenholm
Studds
Stupak
Thompson
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weller
Williams
Woolsey
Wyden
Yates
Zimmer
NOES--262
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Browder
Bryant (TN)
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooley
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
de la Garza
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (TX)
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Longley
Lucas
Mascara
Matsui
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Meek
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Paxon
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Reed
Regula
Richardson
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Salmon
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Scott
Seastrand
Shadegg
Shaw
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stockman
Stokes
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas
Thornberry
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Visclosky
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
NOT VOTING--10
Ballenger
Cardin
Frost
Johnston
Moakley
Mollohan
Reynolds
Sisisky
Tucker
Waldholtz
{time} 1236
Messrs. FAWELL, PALLONE, BAESLER, and DEUTSCH changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. BRYANT of Texas, Mr. EHLERS, and Mrs. SMITH of Washington changed
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Burton). Are there further amendments?
amendment no. 5 offered by mr. frank of massachusetts
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: Page
10, after line 17, inset the following:
SEC. 308. DISCLOSURE OF ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.
As of October 1, 1995, and for fiscal year 1996, and in
each year thereafter, the aggregate amounts requested and
authorized for, and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-
related activities shall be disclosed to the public in an
appropriate manner.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Chair
personally for the consideration shown me during this debate, and I
apologize for being held up a little bit.
This amendment would have made the last debate intelligible. I
understand that ``intelligible'' and ``intelligence'' are not identical
words, but they ought to have a closer correlation than they have
today.
Mr. Chairman, we have in the law a restriction on the American people
knowing the gross number of the intelligence authorization and
appropriation. All this amendment would do, and that is why I did not
ask that it be considered as read and that the reading be dispensed
with. I wanted it read in its entirety, because this does not say that
categories or line items or even departmental breakdowns would be
legal. It says the overall gross amount.
Mr. Chairman, we just had a debate in which we were talking about
percentage reductions and I was asked, as I am sure my colleagues on
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were asked by a number
of Members, ``Well, how much is this?''
We were able to tell each other, because as Members, we are
automatically trustworthy and, therefore, we can know about all these
secrets. We can tell each other the number. Others trying to evaluate
this debate, American citizens, journalists and others, theoretically,
are not to know what we were talking about in the previous amendment.
[[Page H 8833]]
Mr. Chairman, when I moved to cut 3 percent, 3 percent of what? Was
that $100 million; a billion dollars; $10 billion? People have an order
of magnitude idea, but especially as we were talking, as we were, about
3 percent versus 1.7 versus 0.5 percent, and the gentleman from
Colorado and the chairman of the committee were talking about tens of
millions of dollars, not having any idea, it seems to me, a mistake.
Obviously, the extent that foreign spies, foreign governments, could
benefit from knowing, this, and the argument was, let us not make this
total available, because other people could know something based on the
total.
Mr. Chairman, they know it. No one believes that people who have an
interest to malign us in knowing the total, fail to know it. All we
accomplish by this foolish restriction of publishing the gross number
is to make it harder for the American people to follow what we are
doing; to make it harder for Members to vote.
I must tell my colleagues that I myself had some difficulty, because
in preparing this amendment I had to wait until I could find the time
to go to the intelligence room, as I always do once a year to review
these things, and I had to read this and make my calculations.
Mr. Chairman, I read some calculations in the paper and people say
well, everybody knows it. There were some calculations about this
budget, in one of the most respected information sources that the House
uses, that were wrong. There was a report of a 6-percent increase.
Well, that's about a portion of it. I had difficulty in preparing this
amendment in final form because of that.
There is no justification, whatsoever, for this fundamental deviation
from basic democratic principles. Namely, that the American people
ought to know the overall total that is being spent.
No one can argue, and no one has argued, that knowing the overall
total will somehow hurt the national security. So the augment is, Well,
if we
tell them the overall total, the next thing we know they will be
getting the hat size of the chief of intelligence in country X. The
answer is no. That simply is not true.
We are changing the law. It is a statutory requirement that says we
can't give the overall total. We will amend that statutory requirement
that says you can give the overall total. Everything else that is now
illegal will be illegal. Everything else that is secret by law will be
secret and it will take a further statute to change it.
And the notion somehow that statutes are like dominos and if you
change one, it automatically hits and knocks over the next is out of
touch with reality. The American people, at a time of budgetary stress,
have a right to know what the total is, instead of trying to guess or
looking at newspapers and winking and saying it is illegal, but we do
not pay any attention to it.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the gentleman I have
supported this amendment before. I intend to support it again, but I
want to ask the gentleman: Does the gentleman believe that we should
not go further than just disclosing the top line number? Is that
adequate from the gentleman's point of view?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, yes,
that is perfectly adequate. I think if we have the top line number and
people can calculate the percentages, that is fine.
Mr. Chairman, let me say, as I recall these debates, and the
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has been in them as well, we
never debate more than the top line number, because none of us really
think that we ought to be getting into the line items.
This is one authorization where I do not remember any line item
amendments. The amendments have generally been the overall ones. I
think that reinforces the view that is what is appropriate for the
House overall is the overall number. In my amendment, I gave
flexibility below that.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would continue to yield,
one thing I want to make sure that the Members of the House understand,
because we have a lot of new Members, and that is that the intelligence
budget is part of the defense budget. These are not two separate
budgets.
Sometimes I have people say, ``I did not realize that the
intelligence budget is a piece of the defense budget.''
{time} 1245
It is one big budget.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. That is right. In fairness to the Defense
Department, the people in uniform, there ought to be some knowledge.
Nobody knows exactly what piece of the defense budget it is. It makes
it harder even when people are talking about that. You might have a
decrease in one part and an increase in another.
By the way, that is one point, we let the gross number of the defense
budget be known. Presumably, if there were some terrible problem or
even minor problem that would come from the gross number being known,
you would know that from the defense budget.
I want to reinforce what I said, I do not plan to go any further and
would not support going further than the aggregate number. Again, I
think the debate we have had in both the authorization and
appropriating process in intelligence bear that out. There has been no
effort, as I recall, to do amendments that went below the gross number.
Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield further, I say to the
gentleman, I, too, would support that position. I do not have a problem
with disclosing the overall number, but I would definitely oppose going
any further in disclosing the components of that number.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I think the gentleman. I know he could
not go any further. I would not ask him to. I appreciate his support on
this effort.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and,
again, I respect the persistence of the gentleman from Massachusetts in
this effort.
I appreciate the fact that the gentleman from Massachusetts does make
himself available, goes to the committee and takes the time to look
through the classified annex to look at the expenditure levels that we
do make available to Members of Congress in H-405. I think that shows a
seriousness and the fact that he is a very responsible Member in this
effort. I cannot argue with a number of the things the gentleman has
said and the fact that there have been a lot of reports done publicly
by media and by others approximating or at least in their wording
assuming that, or it is stated that the intelligence budget is ``X.''
That is always a second line of the story.
If there is, in fact, a specific release of the amount of moneys
expended on intelligence, that will become the story, and then the next
obvious step is to begin to look at, well, how does that break down in
expense. I think the American people understand and recognize the fact
that there are secrets. Whether or not every one of them are going to
agree with what those classified secrets should be, of course, is going
to be variable depending upon the outlook the individual may have.
I do not hear a clamor or cry to divulge the budget. I think it is
the beginning of a movement down a road that, in fact, would prove to
be burdensome later at some point.
I would, as I have indicated, rise in opposition to the amendment and
urge my colleagues to defeat the amendment.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
With the chairman's indulgence, I will be very brief.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank]. As you know, we have been
through this debate before. When Mr. Glickman was Chair of the
committee, he held hearings on this subject.
I think that the testimony was very compelling in support of
releasing the aggregate sum. I think it is important for the
intelligence community, for our committee to be able to defend that
figure in perspective and on balance as far as other Federal spending
is concerned. While I am on the subject of openness, I also want to
associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr.
Skaggs] earlier about the declassification of more information where it
is appropriate. I
[[Page H 8834]]
think that would be a good investment of our dollars.
With regard to this amendment, I thank the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] for his leadership on it and urge my
colleagues to vote ``aye'' on the Frank amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 154,
noes 271, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 655]
AYES--154
Ackerman
Bachus
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bonior
Borski
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bunn
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Danner
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dicks
Doggett
Duncan
Durbin
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Horn
Istook
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kleczka
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Metcalf
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moran
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rangel
Reed
Riggs
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Shays
Skaggs
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Velazquez
Vento
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Williams
Woolsey
Wyden
Yates
Zimmer
NOES--271
Abercrombie
Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bentsen
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boucher
Brewster
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bryant (TX)
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooley
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
de la Garza
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fattah
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Meek
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Peterson (FL)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Richardson
Rivers
Roberts
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
NOT VOTING--9
Cardin
Coburn
Moakley
Mollohan
Reynolds
Schiff
Sisisky
Tucker
White
{time} 1309
Mr. SCOTT and Mr. STOKES changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments?
If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as modified, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified,
as amended, was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Goodlatte) having assumed the chair, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
1655) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government,
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 216, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
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