[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 141 (Tuesday, September 12, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13315-S13329]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                      FAMILY SELF-SUFFICIENCY ACT

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the pending 
business.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 4) to restore the American family, reduce 
     illegitimacy, control welfare spending, and reduce welfare 
     dependence.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
       Pending:
       Dole modified amendment No. 2280, of a perfecting nature.
       Feinstein modified amendment No. 2469 (to amendment No. 
     2280), to provide additional funding to States to accommodate 
     any growth in the number of people in poverty.
       Conrad-Bradley amendment No. 2529 (to amendment No. 2280), 
     to provide States with the maximum flexibility by allowing 
     States to elect to participate in the TAP and WAGE programs.

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The distinguished Senator from North 
Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. I inquire if the Conrad-Bradley 
amendment is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). The Senator is correct.


                           Amendment No. 2529

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan], for Mr. Conrad, 
     for himself and Mr. Bradley, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2529.

  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in the Friday, September 8, 
1995, edition of the Record.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, the Conrad-Bradley amendment is based on 
the four principles of requiring work, protecting children, providing 
flexibility for States, and promoting the family structure. Our 
amendment fundamentally reforms the welfare system by allowing States 
to choose between the pure block grant approach of the Dole bill and a 
program that maintains a safety net for children, provides an automatic 
stabilizer for States, and includes the funding to pay for them.
  None of us can predict the future. If there are floods in 
Mississippi, earthquakes in California, a drought in North Dakota, or 
some economic calamity in Colorado, a flat-funded block grant approach 
may not meet the need. We should retain the automatic stabilizer that 
allows a State to receive the help it requires. After all, this is the 
United States of America, not just 50 separate States.
  Our amendment allows States to choose the Dole approach or the 
Conrad-Bradley option for 4 years. After that, the State may continue 
its program or switch to the other approach at their option. Our option 
provides States with complete flexibility to design work requirements, 
job training programs, to determine eligibility and sanctions. It 
allows States to set time limits of any duration for participants, 
provided that no participants are terminated if they comply with all 
State requirements.
  The Conrad-Bradley amendment expands the State flexibility already 
included in the Dole bill. It uses States as laboratories to 
experiment, to find what is effective in welfare reform strategies. 
Although the States will have almost total flexibility to design their 
own welfare programs, they will do so without the risk that a natural 
disaster or economic collapse will prevent them from protecting 
children and families.
  The Dole proposal before us already includes such an option for the 
food stamp program. If an option to choose between a pure block grant 
approach and a system that automatically adjusts for the need is 
appropriate for food stamps, I suggest we should provide the same 
option for the Dole AFDC block grant.
  According to CBO, our amendment provides protection for children and 
States while saving $63 billion over 7 years, compared with the $70 
billion of 

[[Page S 13316]]
savings in the current version of the Dole bill. In other words, we 
reduce the overall savings in the Dole bill, which are currently $70 
billion, by $7 billion over the 7 years, in order to protect children 
and protect the States--to preserve the automatic stabilizer mechanism.
  Again, it is a State choice. They can choose the pure block grant 
approach of the Dole bill. They can choose that for 4 years. Or they 
can choose the approach in our bill, which represents the most dramatic 
welfare reform ever presented on the floor of the Senate.
  Finally, the Conrad-Bradley amendment eliminates the need to struggle 
over State allocation formulas because it allows States to choose, to 
choose between the Dole block grant approach and a funding mechanism 
that automatically adjusts for State need and effort.
  Proponents of the Dole bill say that we should let States experiment. 
We agree. That is precisely what we ought to do. Let us let the States 
go out and try various welfare reform strategies and see what works. 
That makes good sense. Let us give the States a chance to experiment. 
Let us give the States a chance to determine what works and what does 
not work. But let us maintain the automatic stabilizer to help States 
hit by natural disasters or economic calamities. Let us make certain 
they have the resources to meet the need that none of us can foresee. 
Let us make certain that we can protect children.
  We are, after all, the United States of America, not the divided 
States of America. Let us remember our strength flows not only from our 
diversity, but from our union.
  I thank the Chair and reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President at the request of the Senator from 
Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers], I ask unanimous consent that his name be added 
as a cosponsor of S. 978.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, thank you.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
Conrad amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to 
be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Conrad]. The yeas and nays have 
been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran] 
and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Simpson] are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Wyoming [Mr. Simpson] would vote ``nay.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICE. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who 
desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 54, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 409 Leg.]

                                YEAS--44

     Akaka
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--54

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Cochran
     Simpson
       
  So the amendment (No. 2529) was rejected.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was rejected.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                    Amendment No. 2469, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of Feinstein amendment No. 2469, on which there 
will be 4 minutes of debate equally divided, followed by a vote on or 
in relation to the amendment.
  The Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein], is recognized.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I respectfully suggest the Senate is not 
in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators will take their conversations off the 
floor. The Senate will be in order. There will be 4 minutes of debate.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order? We need to know what we 
are voting on. We cannot hear.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The Chair advises 
Senators to take their conversations off the floor. The Senator from 
California is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate is still not in order. There are 
too many discussions going on toward the rear of the Chamber.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators at the rear of the Chamber----
  Mr. BYRD. And staff. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West 
Virginia, because I believe this is a very important amendment.
  Let me quickly sum up how my amendment, I believe, improves the 
underlying bill. In the Dole bill, 31 States have their funding frozen 
at fiscal year 1994 levels for the next 5 years. Funding is frozen 
despite very tough mandates to States which require a minimum work 
participation rate, which CBO says, as late as last night, only 10 to 
15 States will be able to meet. Those States that cannot meet the 
minimum work participation rate will have a penalty of 5 percent with 
another 5 percent from the State, or a 10-percent cut in funds, and all 
but 19 States are locked out of the so-called growth formula.
  So this is major. What I would like to say to my colleagues who 
represent the 31 States that are frozen out of the Dole bill is this: 
Not only will your State be required to meet that mandate, not only 
will your State receive no additional funding for child care or job 
training to meet the mandate, and even though your State will almost 
definitely experience an increase in poor population, your funding is 
frozen.
  This bill, my amendment, takes the language of the House which says 
that the poor population of the State, as reflected by the census, will 
be used to determine the growth allocation. And, in fact, 27 States 
increase their funding under my amendment over the Dole bill.
  Those charts have been distributed to you, and I urge, if you are one 
of those 27 States, that you vote for this amendment. The amendment is 
fair. It is as the House does it. It simply says the census determines 
the numbers and the money for growth is accommodated in that way.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. 

[[Page S 13317]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Is there 
further debate? The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison], is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues not to vote for 
this amendment.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I must once again respectfully suggest 
the Senate is not in order. We cannot hear the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair asks that Senators withhold 
conversations. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, it was very difficult to solve the formula issue when 
we decided we were going to reform welfare. The most fair formula is 
the underlying bill, the Dole-Hutchison formula.
 What it does is allow everyone to win at some point. No one loses what 
they have now. Yet, the low-benefit, high-growth States are not 
penalized in years 3, 4, and 5.

  When we decided to block grant for 5 years, we had to look at the 
accommodation for the high-growth States where they had low benefits. 
That is because the high-benefit States get their windfall in the 
beginning. Whereas, California gets $1,016 per poor person grant. 
States like Alabama get $148. Mississippi gets $138, as compared to 
$1,000.
  So the goal of our underlying bill is to reach parity slowly, without 
hurting the New Yorks, the Michigans, and the Californias, but bringing 
up the States that no longer have to have a State match and are very 
poor. So it is equitable and it is fair.
  I ask my colleagues to look at the overall picture and understand 
that if we are going to have welfare reform, we must start with the new 
parameters, which are that the State match is going to be phased out. 
Yes, New York and California had big State matches and, therefore, got 
more Federal dollars. They are going to keep those Federal dollars, 
even as the State's match is phased out. But the low-benefit, high-
growth States are going to get their help in the end. That is why this 
is a balance. That is why this is fair and why the low-benefit States 
are not going to have to pay in order for California to continue to 
grow.
  We will never reach parity under the Feinstein amendment. There will 
never be fairness in the system as we go to the Federal dollars, 
without State matches. The only way that we can go toward the goal of 
parity and equality in this country is to stay with the underlying 
bill.
  I hope you will vote against the Feinstein amendment and stick with 
the Dole-Hutchison formula, which is fair to everyone.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment from the 
Senator from California.
  The reason I oppose this amendment is because it does nothing to help 
us meet our real goal in this debate, which is the fundamental reform 
of a failed welfare system.
  Instead it reopens a funding formula debate that pits State against 
State, and puts the whole endeavor of welfare reform in dire jeopardy.
  Let me be clear that my State is one that would benefit from the 
adoption of the Feinstein amendment. There are elements of the Senator 
from California's amendment that I believe have merit, and I believe 
she has made some important points in the debate on her amendment.
  Nevertheless, the practical effect of her amendment will be to reopen 
a battle that can only stand in the way of the enactment of this 
important welfare reform bill. I intend to vote against this amendment, 
and I encourage my colleagues to do the same.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays are ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran] 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 40, nays 59, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 410 Leg.]

                                YEAS--40

     Akaka
     Biden
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Coats
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Specter
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--59

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Mack
     McCain
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Cochran
       
  So the amendment (No. 2469), as modified, was rejected.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2488

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of the Breaux amendment, No. 2488, with time until 
12:30 to be equally divided between the sides, and a vote on or in 
relation to the amendment to occur at 2:15 p.m.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be 
limited on the Ashcroft and Shelby amendments to 1 hour on each 
amendment, equally divided between the sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BREAUX addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, the pending amendment is the so-called 
Breaux amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BREAUX. I ask unanimous consent at this time that Senators 
Jeffords, Kohl, Snowe and Baucus be added as original cosponsors to the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, what we present today in this amendment is 
a bipartisan effort, which is the way that welfare reform has to be 
accomplished in this country. There is no way that we as Democrats can 
write the bill by ourselves. There is no way the Republicans, by 
themselves, could write a bill that will become law. This amendment 
recognizes that, and it is a bipartisan effort.
  We have worked with distinguished Members of the other side, 
Republican colleagues, to craft this amendment to make it fair, to make 
it one that can receive bipartisan support and reach a majority. It may 
not be perfect, but I think it reflects the best thoughts of those of 
us who have been involved in this effort for a long period of time, and 
I ask that our colleagues give it their favorable consideration.
  Let me just preface what my amendment does by mentioning, just for a 
moment, a little of the history of this effort to try to solve welfare 
in our country. It has always been a joint effort between the States 
and the Federal Government.
  On average, the States generally contribute about 45 percent of the 
total welfare funds to welfare programs within their State borders and 
the Federal Government contributes the other 55 percent, on the other 
hand, of the welfare dollars going into various States.
  It has always been a joint venture, if you will, a partnership, if 
you will, between the Federal Government and the States. For the first 
time in the 60-year history of this bill, the other body--our 
colleagues and friends in the House--has terminated that partnership. 
They 

[[Page S 13318]]
have said that there is no longer any requirement that the States put 
up any money if they do not want to help solve this problem. They say 
they are for block grants, and that in their minds means that the 
Federal Government sends them all of the money and they have no 
obligation to put up anything. They say that the Federal Government 
will continue to give the same amount over the next 5 years even if 
some of the programs that they have developed in their State reduces 
the number of people on welfare.
  That is right. Under the House proposal, the Federal Government would 
continue to send the States the same amount of money every year for 
welfare even though there are fewer people each year in that State that 
are on welfare. What kind of a partnership is that? That is giving the 
Federal Government all of the responsibility of raising all of the 
money, and giving the States the same amount of money each year, no 
matter what happens within those State borders.
  I think the concept of block grants can be made to work sometimes, 
but it has to be a partnership. We all know that when you are spending 
somebody else's money, it is much easier to spend it in any way you 
want to spend it. All of the legislative bodies, if they think the 
money is coming from Washington, are less responsible, in my opinion, 
when it comes to spending those funds than if they have to raise it 
through the tax programs in their respective States.
  We have all heard stories about block grant programs that have not 
worked at this very point in the sense of having States misuse block 
grants coming from the Federal Government. We heard the story about the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration block grants. Someone in one 
community was using the Federal money to buy a tank for the police 
chief. Why not? It is Federal money. They did not have to contribute to 
it. They thought it was a nice thing to do, and they did it. So the 
police chief got a tank.
  The Wall Street Journal just recently reported how State auditors in 
one State discovered that the State squandered $8.3 million in Federal 
child care grants on such things as personal furniture and designer 
salt and pepper shakers. Robert Rector, of the Heritage Foundation, 
certainly not a Democratic organization by any stretch of the 
imagination, recently commented on this phenomenon by saying:

       If there's anything less frugal than a politician spending 
     other people's money, it's one set of politicians with no 
     accountability spending money raised by another set of 
     politicians.

  That is the point, Mr. President. That is the reason the Finance 
Committee considered this proposal, a proposal that said the Federal 
Government would continue to maintain our effort here in Washington in 
helping to solve welfare problems, that the State had no obligation to 
spend any of their money whatsoever. Therefore, I offered an amendment 
in the Finance Committee which required the States to maintain the same 
effort the Federal Government was maintaining; that if the States 
reduced by $5 the amount of money needed for welfare because of fewer 
welfare people, then the Federal Government would reduce our 
contribution by the same amount. That is why the amendment that is now 
before the Senate has been scored by the Congressional Budget Office to 
save $545 million over 7 years.
  This is a bipartisan amendment that the Congressional Budget Office 
says will save $545 billion over the next 7 years. That is why I think 
that all of our colleagues who are interested in trying to save money 
on welfare reform would look with favor and support my amendment.
  I want to point out on this first chart how the current system works, 
and why I think it makes sense. When you have a real partnership, with 
Federal and State funds both being used and contributed, you see here 
in the chart that about 9 million children of America get help and 
assistance under this program. You see, according to the blocks here, 
that we have five blocks with the representative Federal contribution 
and four blocks representing the State contribution to help 9 million 
kids. That is the current partnership. Without any State funds, under 
the House bill, if you say all right, the State does not have to put up 
anything, obviously, you are going to lose the blue boxes which 
represent the State contribution and instead of helping 9 million 
children get aid and assistance, you are now only helping 5 million.
  What we are saying essentially by this amendment is that we want to 
maintain the partnership, we want to maintain the effort. We think what 
the House has proposed is absolutely unacceptable because it says that 
States should not have to contribute anything if they do not want to. 
That is not what real reform is all about.
  The second chart that we have would also show something that I think 
is important. It shows that if you have the States willing to put up 
nothing, how it would affect the number of jobs that have been created 
over the past years. Right now, there are 630,000 job slots. These 
include work programs, education, training, and child care that are 
provided for through the Federal and State partnership.
  If State spending were to be cut by 10 percent, which would be 
allowable under both the House and the Senate proposals, if they were 
cut by only 10 percent, you are talking about a cut down to 290,000 
jobs being available, a dramatic reduction. If the States were to cut 
their contribution by only 20 percent, you would not have any jobs 
funded at all. We all know that without work, you are not going to have 
real reform. Welfare reform is about creating jobs. If you allow the 
States to do less than they have been doing, or nothing at all, you are 
going to obviously dramatically adversely affect the creation of jobs 
under the welfare reform bill. Therefore, this amendment is absolutely 
critical.
  The third thing is that my amendment would enable both the Federal 
Government and the State governments to share the savings of welfare 
reform. One of the reasons we are trying to enact welfare is to save 
both the Federal Government and the State governments money. My 
amendment says that if the State government is going to reduce the 
amount of money they spend on welfare, so should the Federal 
Government. The House bill, in comparison, says: Look, if the States 
are going to spend a lot less because fewer people are on welfare, the 
Federal Government is still going to continue to give the same amount 
of money to the States. What kind of nonsense is that? If the State is 
getting $10 million from the Federal Government and reduces the number 
of people on welfare, under the House bill they still get the same 
amount of money from the Federal Government. There is no reduction. 
That does not make any sense whatsoever in times of tight budgetary 
restriction. If the State government can save money because of fewer 
people being on welfare, that is a good thing to happen. But the 
Federal Government should also say that we should also be able to 
reduce our contribution if the States have been able, through new 
inventive programs, to reduce the number of people on welfare.
  Also, my amendment, which requires the States to continue to 
contribute 90 percent of their funding, would discourage the 
supplementing of existing State resources.
  With the budget that we passed in the Congress, we made a clear 
statement that, ``Federal funds should not supplant existing 
expenditures by other sources, both public and private,'' and that the 
``Federal interest in the program should be protected with adequate 
safeguards such as maintenance of effort provisions.'' My amendment 
would ensure that Federal dollars are not used to replace State welfare 
spending, which could be diverted to other uses like roads and bridges.
  Mr. President, simply put, under the House-passed amendment on 
welfare reform, the States under this provision have no requirement to 
have any maintenance of effort, no requirement to participate 
financially in solving the welfare problem. If a State wants to say, 
``Well, we used to spend X amount of dollars on welfare programs. We 
want to take half of that, and we are going to use it for roads and 
bridges, or to buy furniture for State employees, or we are going to 
use it to pay for State raises for all of the State employees,'' Mr. 
President, under this amendment, the Federal Government still continues 
to contribute the same 

[[Page S 13319]]
amount. The State is left off the hook for any real obligation to help 
solve the problem.
  We are not going to be able to solve the problem just here in 
Washington. States are going to have to be involved, and they are going 
to have to be involved financially in order to see that the programs 
are handled properly, that there is a real interest in the program, and 
that adequate funding for the program is available. We all know that 
when you come to lobbying for scarce State funds that people on 
welfare, and children in particular, who are innocent victims, do not 
have a very strong lobby.
 People who build roads and bridges and highways do. So if a State all 
of a sudden sees the House-passed bill in front of them they are going 
to say, look at this pot of money. We are going to take all the money 
that we used to use for welfare, and we are going to build roads and 
bridges and give State pay raises because that is what gets you 
reelected.

  I think that is wrong. Another thing that they could say is by 
reducing the amount of money they contribute to welfare programs, by 
reducing the income of a person, they are entitled to more food stamps 
because this is 100 percent federally funded. This is another unique 
way that the Federal Government is going to get stuck with the tab 
under the proposal in the House--let us just reduce the amount of money 
we give on welfare, and we know by doing that welfare recipients are 
going to get more in food stamps and, by golly, food stamps are paid 
for by the Federal Government 100 percent. Is this not a great way of 
getting rid of an obligation.
  What that is going to do is cost the Federal Government and the 
taxpayers substantial amounts of money. That is one of the reasons CBO 
has scored my amendment as saving $545 million over the next 7 years. 
There is no other amendment pending that is going to produce those 
types of savings. It is very simple. As a State legislator, I know if I 
reduce my State's spending on a program for welfare recipients, they 
are just going to get more money in food stamps that are paid for by 
the Federal Government 100 percent. Is that not a great way to get out 
of my obligation and stick it to the Federal Government and stick it to 
the Federal taxpayers because they are going to have to pick up 100 
percent of the tab for the cost of food stamps.
  The only way we are going to solve this problem is with a real true 
partnership. My understanding of what the majority leader on the other 
side has offered is to say I think you have a point, Breaux, and this 
zero contribution by the States is really insufficient. They have 
devised an amendment I think that says, well, we are going to require 
the States to pay up to 75 percent of what they have been spending and 
contribute 75 percent for the next 3 years. But then after that it 
disappears. If a 75 percent contribution is good for the first 3 years, 
why is it not good for the life of the program or 5 years? What is 
magical about having it for 36 months and then, poof, it disappears? If 
it is good for the first 3 years, it should be good for the years of 
the program.
  The real critical point is this. And I am really trying to speak in a 
bipartisan fashion. If my colleagues on the Republican side of the 
aisle really think 75 percent is a reasonable contribution by the 
States--I think it is too low, but they think it is reasonable--does 
anyone who has been around here more than 6 weeks think if we go to the 
conference with the House with the requirement that the States put in 
75 percent of what they have been spending and the House has a 
provision which requires zero, does anybody think we are going to come 
out with 75 percent? Of course not.
  If you have been on a conference before, you know how these things 
are generally settled. You divide by 2. The difference between 0 and 75 
is 37\1/2\ percent. And that is what likely is to come back from a 
conference when the House comes in with a zero requirement and the 
Senate comes in with a 75 percent requirement.
  So I urge my colleagues who may think that my requirement requiring a 
90 percent contribution by the States of what they have been spending 
is too high to recognize that this bill has to go to conference. If we 
are going to come out with anything near 75 percent, I suggest it is 
absolutely essential that we come in with a minimum of a 90 percent 
requirement, knowing that in the conference it is going to be 
conferenced out and you generally split the difference when you go to 
conference.
  I think we can pass all the laudatory measures and resolutions we 
want saying that our conferees should stick with 75, and we know they 
are going to stick with 75, and they will argue for 75. That is good. 
That is fine. I have been on conferences time and time again, and I 
have been around here too long to know that is not what happens. The 
other body feels very strongly that there should be no contribution by 
the States. I think almost everybody in this body thinks there should 
be a contribution. If you think 75 percent is a fair amount, it is 
absolutely essential that we go to conference with a higher amount.
  Let me also say, Mr. President, that the amendment I have offered has 
a great deal of support from people who believe in block grants in 
particular. I know that Gov. Tommy Thompson from Wisconsin, who has 
been quoted so often on welfare, has said that ``welfare reform 
requires a cash investment up front. That investment eventually turns 
into savings.''
  I agree with that, but I am concerned you are not going to be able to 
get money out of State legislative bodies for welfare reform without 
this provision. If States are told they do not have to put up anything, 
many States will put up nothing. That is simply a fact of life. 
Therefore, a requirement that they contribute in this maintenance of 
effort is absolutely essential.
  We can argue all we want about what is proper, 75 or 90, but I remind 
my colleagues when we go to conference we will be going to conference 
with a group of House Members who will feel very strongly that zero is 
the proper amount. If we are ever going to come out with something that 
maintains effort on the States at an appropriate and proper amount, 
then we absolutely are going to have to come in with an amount that is 
consistent with what I have in my amendment, and that is a 90 percent 
requirement. That allows the Federal Government to save substantial 
amounts of money--$545 million over 7 years as scored by CBO. It 
requires the States to participate in a partnership arrangement for the 
solving of this particular problem.
  Mr. President, with those comments, I reserve the remainder of my 
time at this point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I ask, how much time does the Senator 
desire?
  Ms. SNOWE. Five minutes.
  Mr. BREAUX. I will be happy to yield 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. SNOWE. I rise in support of the amendment that has been offered 
by the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Breaux], because I do think it is 
essential that we ensure a continued Federal-State partnership with 
respect to welfare programs, and certainly regarding the welfare reform 
we are attempting to make in the Congress today.
  The amendment offered by the Senator from Louisiana underscores a 
very essential point, and I think it gets to the heart of what welfare 
reform is all about--that it is in fact a mutual cooperative effort 
between the Federal Government and the States to get Americans off 
welfare, so that they can pursue opportunities to self-sufficiency, 
personal responsibility, and discipline.
  Since 1935, when title IV of the Social Security Act was adopted, 
welfare has always been a Federal-State partnership. And as we attempt 
to reengineer the welfare system in America today as we know it, I also 
think we should renew our commitment to that partnership. The bottom 
line is the States have a tremendous stake in the success and outcome 
of welfare reform.
  At the same time, I think it is also essential that they have a 
financial commitment and a financial stake in this reform. Many 
States--and I think we all can understand this--will continue to extend 
their programs to the neediest, as they do today, but they are also 
facing the same antitax, antigovernment, antiexcessive spending 
sentiment that we are in the Senate and in the entire Congress. 

[[Page S 13320]]

  These States at the same time also have balanced budget requirements 
and commitments. In fact, most States do throughout the country. So 
they will be facing competing demands and interests for money.
  Under the legislation that is pending before the Senate with respect 
to welfare reform, there is no requirement that the States contribute 
what they have spent in the past with respect to welfare. That is a 
concern which I have and one I share with the Senator from Louisiana.
  In the last 20 years, cash assistance by the States toward welfare 
has been reduced by 40 percent when you take into account inflation. 
That is 40 percent. I do not think there is any question, as we pursue 
welfare reform, that we are going to still make a commitment, probably 
as great as what we are making today, in order to ensure that those 
individuals who are on welfare will move toward self-sufficiency in the 
future.
  As the Senator from Louisiana mentioned, Governor Thompson, who has 
had a very successful welfare reform program in the State of Wisconsin, 
had to make a commitment of fivefold toward job training and child care 
in order to make it a success. For every dollar they invested, they got 
$2 in return from benefits.
  Now, the Breaux amendment says that if the States do not wish to make 
their commitment of 90 percent of their spending at the 1994 level 
toward welfare, they can reduce it, but at the same time the Federal 
share will be reduced as well, dollar for dollar. I do not think that 
is unfair. I think the Federal Government should share in the benefits 
and the success of the program as well as the savings because this 
should be a shared partnership. If we are able to save money, the 
Federal taxpayers should save it as well. We should stand to gain from 
the successes as well as the savings. So we are asking the States to 
spend 90 percent of what they spent at the 1994 level over 5 years.
  I think it is essential there is a 5-year commitment toward the 
maintenance of effort. It is not that we are saying that we do not 
expect States to make a commitment, but there have been some States who 
made a greater commitment toward welfare in the past than others. It is 
not saying we do not trust the States. I do not think it is a question 
of trust. It is a question of shared responsibility and the question of 
fairness.
  Without the requirement for a fiscal commitment by the States to at 
least spend 90 percent at the 1994 level toward welfare, some States 
may not keep their end of the deal. Now, welfare reform was not 
designed to get the States off the hook. We are trusting them immensely 
through the enormous flexibility that is being granted to them through 
the block grant program. They stand to gain enormously in terms of how 
they implement a welfare reform program that is tailored to their 
particular State and to their constituency.
  And we think that they can do a better job than the Federal 
Government. But we also know that it is going to continue to require a 
commitment on their part in terms of contributions. And that is, as we 
were having this debate this week on the issue of child care, we know 
we are going to need a tremendous commitment toward child care. And 
that is why I was pleased that Senator Dole included language that I 
and others proposed with respect to child care so that those families 
who have children of 5 years or under who demonstrated a need for child 
care and were unable to obtain it because of distance or affordability 
will not be sanctioned. And I think that is an important provision in 
the legislation.
  But I also think that we have to ensure that the States will continue 
to make their commitment toward child care or job training or health 
care. And they will have the flexibility under this legislation to 
transfer from one to the other. But the fact of the matter is, they 
should make a maintenance of effort toward what they have contributed 
in the past, and we are asking them to provide 90 percent, which is 
less than what the Federal share would be, because the Federal 
Government would be required to pay 100 percent of their share of their 
contributions to the States at the 1994 funding level.
  I think this is a very important principle to adopt, Mr. President, 
because combined Federal and State spending approximates more than $30 
billion. The States contribute about 45 percent of the total amount of 
money spent in this country on welfare. That is 45 percent. So without 
the Breaux amendment, we risk having nearly half of what is now spent 
on welfare siphoned off to other programs. That may mean that we will 
not have the kind of commitment toward child care or job training or 
education programs that are absolutely essential and necessary if we 
are going to make welfare reform work.
  We want the States to reduce the rolls, absolutely. But the question 
is how they reduce those rolls. We want to make sure they do it in a 
way that we reach the final goal of allowing welfare recipients to 
become independent and self-sufficient. That is the bottom line. 
Because that is in the best interest of this country. So I think it is 
important to have a maintenance-of-effort requirement in this 
legislation because we know that essentially the States cannot spend 
much less than what they are spending today on welfare and think that 
we are going to have a successful welfare reform program. I do not 
believe it can happen, as you can see, in the State of Wisconsin, when 
Governor Thompson made a fivefold commitment toward an increase in 
commitment toward education, job training and child care.
  So I think that this is a very important amendment. And as I said----
  Mr. BREAUX. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Ms. SNOWE. If States want to reduce their commitment, then the 
Federal share will be reduced as well. It is not preventing the States 
from reducing their share, but if they do, then we have a proportionate 
reduction of the Federal share as well.
  I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. BREAUX. I commend the Senator for her comments on this 
legislation. And I prefer calling it the Breaux-Snowe amendment and 
thank her for her contribution in that regard.
  I wanted to--the Senator served in the other body, as I have. And the 
statement that some have said is that, ``Well, you know, we really 
think that 75 percent is an appropriate amount. That is why we should 
pass a maintenance-of-effort requirement, and the States will have 75 
percent, and then when we go to conference we will come back with 45 
percent, and that will become law.'' And my concern is--and I ask the 
Senator to comment--the other body has a zero requirement for the 
States spending anything.
  Does the Senator from Maine also have the same concern about what 
would happen in the conference if we start out and figure it with a 
substantially lower amount than the body of this amendment?
  Ms. SNOWE. Yes, I share the Senator's concern in that regard because 
there is no maintenance of effort whatsoever.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BREAUX. I yield 2 additional minutes.
  Ms. SNOWE. Thank you.
  I share that concern because the House does not include any 
maintenance of effort, no percentage in that regard. So we go in, and 
we know there is going to be much less than that because of the House's 
position. So we are at 90 percent. We are going to come out with much 
less. And I think that is why this amendment is preferable in that 
regard. I think it is essential to have a 5-year commitment. If we go 
in with less than 5 years, we know we will probably, at best, probably 
get maybe 3 years. But I do think it is important that we have both the 
90 percent and the 5 years to go with a strong position into the 
conference.
  Mr. BREAUX. I thank the Senator.
  Ms. SNOWE. I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SANTORUM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Thank you, Mr. President. I hear great consternation 

[[Page S 13321]]
  of what is going to go on when this bill reaches conference. We have to 
vote for the Breaux amendment because of positioning, and we have to 
position ourselves at 90 percent so we can get something, because the 
House is at zero and we are at 90 percent. The Senator from Louisiana 
suggested we may get up to 45 percent. If we go in with 5 years, the 
House has nothing, we will get 2\1/2\ years.
  I do not want to speak for the majority leader, but I think we would 
be willing to say that we will go with 45 percent and 2\1/2\ years, and 
we will stick to that in conference.
  So if the Senator is concerned about what we are going to bargain, I 
think we are willing to make that commitment right here on the floor of 
the Senate. And I think the leader could come over and say that we will 
fight and stand firm on 45 percent and 2\1/2\ years. And if that is----
  Mr. BREAUX. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SANTORUM. We are willing to take that tough stand.
  Mr. BREAUX. Now the Senator is arguing that 45 percent is the 
appropriate, proper amount?
  Mr. SANTORUM. No. I was responding to what the Senator anticipates 
happening in conference. And I think we can save ourselves a lot of 
problems. I think what this shows is that this is not really an area of 
precision. I mean, we do not have a lot of precision here of what 
should be the maintenance of effort, whether it is 90, 75, or 50 
percent.
  It is really a question of philosophy as to whether you want to give 
the States the flexibility to be able to reap some rewards in managing 
their own program and whether you trust Governors and State 
legislatures. I think there is and has traditionally been at the 
Federal level a mistrust. I think that is unfortunate.
  I will have comments later. But I see the Senator from Missouri, who 
was a Governor of the State of Missouri, and who was elected as 
Governor and Senator. I would be interested to hear from the Senator 
from Missouri as to whether those constituencies that elected him to 
both offices require him to do different things, whether he should feel 
differently as Governor and not care for the poor as Governor but care 
for the poor more as a Senator. I would be interested in whether there 
is that transformation as held in the State office as opposed to 
holding the Federal office, whether you care more about poor people as 
a Senator than you did as a Governor.
  I would be happy to yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Thank you, Mr. President. I rise to question the public 
policy value of trying to lock States into spending 90 percent as much 
as the Federal Government has on a series of programs, many of which 
not only have failed, but have locked people into dependency and have 
locked people into poverty. I think there are very substantial and 
significant public policy reasons to say that we should allow the 
States the flexibility to correct the errors of the Federal Government 
rather than to pass legislation which would require State and local 
governments to persist in the errors of the Federal Government.
  The Breaux amendment would require that there be a 90-percent 
maintenance of effort. And in my understanding of it, that means that 
we would require that States spend 90 percent of any block grant just 
as the Federal Government did, in other words, lock in an amount of 
spending. This could be a serious problem for States because, in some 
instances, it could actually require that States build the program to 
be a much bigger program than it now is. It might require States to go 
out and get far more people into the program than they now have.
  Let me just give you one example that flows out of my experience as 
Governor, but really persists and has come as a part of the testimony 
that has been in the debate about welfare from my successor and from 
the people in his administration. As you know, I did not have the 
privilege of being succeeded by a Republican. So a Democrat is now 
Governor of our State. And so, I want you to know that these figures 
are not Republican figures or Democrat figures. They happen to be 
Democrat figures, but they came from an administration that followed 
mine.
  Take one of the biggest welfare Programs of all. The most costly 
welfare program of all is the Medicaid Program. In the Medicaid program 
in my home State, the Medicaid director has said that if he could just 
have the money and not have all the Federal red tape, instead of 
serving 600,000 people with the money, he would be able to serve 
900,000 people with that same amount of money, meaning that there are 
tremendous inefficiencies in the Federal program; that these 
inefficiencies, as a matter of fact, if they could be wiped out, would 
be more than a 10-percent benefit to the program. They could provide 
for a 50-percent increase in the population being served.
  If we were to apply the Breaux amendment to that kind of a situation, 
what would happen? The Breaux amendment would require spending 90 
percent of the money, which would mean that you would get 90 percent of 
the increased number of people that could be served absent the Federal 
regulations. That would, in a program like the Medicaid program in 
Missouri, automatically boost the program from a 600,000 population 
program to an 810,000 population program, because we would mandate that 
they spent 90 percent as much as they would now be spending, but do it 
in a context without the Federal regulations, which would allow for 
greater efficiencies.
  Mr. BREAUX. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Yes.
  Mr. BREAUX. Does the Senator realize the Republican amendment locks 
in the Federal contribution at 100 percent for 5 years? Even if the 
State is successful in reducing the amount of people on welfare, your 
amendment locks the Federal Government into spending 100 percent for 5 
years. If it is improper to lock the State into spending 90 percent, 
why is it proper to require the Federal Government spend 100 percent, 
even though you have fewer people on welfare?
  Mr. ASHCROFT. We would do so by ending the entitlement, and that 
provides an incentive to the States to reduce welfare, as opposed to 
the Breaux amendment which would provide a mandate, in many instances, 
to increase welfare.
  Mr. BREAUX. If the Senator will yield further on that point, just to 
clarify. It is an important point. Under the Republican amendment, the 
Federal Government is locked into spending 100 percent no matter what 
the State does.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. The Federal Government is locked into spending 100 
percent by an amount determined by its expenditures last year, and then 
any savings that come out of that should inure to the States. The 
difference is under the block grant proposal. There would be a massive 
incentive for the States to save money and to reduce welfare rolls.
  Under the Breaux amendment, which would require a 90-percent 
expenditure, instead of saving the money and devoting it to things that 
might be more needy, they would be required to spend it in the same way 
they had previously, which could result in the anomaly of increasing 
welfare substantially.
  Let me just move away from the area of Medicaid, for instance. Food 
stamps are the second largest of all the welfare programs. The 
testimony from the Office of Inspector General and from the Food and 
Nutrition Service and the Department of Agriculture is there is about a 
12-percent administrative cost in food stamps. There is about a 12-
percent slippage when you consider trafficking in food stamps and fraud 
and mistakes and those kinds of things, or about 24 percent of the 
program--24 percent of the program--does not really get to needy folks. 
If you are to take that kind of a welfare program and send it back to 
the States with a 90-percent requirement that they keep spending the 
money for the same program, it is another case where they might have to 
increase the number of people on welfare.
  Mr. President, I think what we have here is a classic situation: Are 
we here to reform the welfare system? Are we here to reduce welfare or 
are we here to increase welfare? In my State, the people of Missouri 
spell ``reform'' r-e-d-u-c-e. They believe they sent us here in the 
year 1994, last year, to do something about an epidemic of welfare 

[[Page S 13322]]
which is pulling more and more people into the category of dependence 
and despair and fewer and fewer people into the category of 
independence and industry.
  I think we have to ask ourselves the question: What is our purpose in 
reform? I think our purpose in reform ought to be giving States the 
incentive to move people off welfare and, yes, if there are surplus 
funds and they have been successful in doing that, let the States 
devote those funds to the benefit of the entire population.
  Let me just raise another issue. The other issue is this: If States 
do get the number of people down on welfare--and, after all, we should 
be trying to get fewer people on welfare, not more. The index of a 
compassionate society, J.C. Watts said, and he is profoundly correct on 
this, and the Chair, being from Oklahoma, knows Congressman Watts well, 
the compassion of a society should not be how many people you can get 
on welfare, but a really compassionate society should have few people 
on welfare.
  If you are required to keep spending lots and lots more money on 
welfare per capita than you have, if you have any inefficiencies now 
that are expressed in the program, if you have to spend more money per 
case, what does that do? If you have the case level down to 75 and you 
still have to spend at 90, you have to make that case much richer, you 
have to provide more benefit.
  As you increase the benefit, what do you do? You attract people back 
into the system. The pernicious impact of the Breaux amendment would be 
to attract more people into welfare to the extent the States were able 
to reduce the welfare caseload and the administrative cost to a level 
below 90 percent.
  We do not want to build a welfare system here; we want to make a 
welfare system that helps people out of welfare into work. We do not 
want to make the benefits richer so it makes it harder for people to 
move from welfare to work; we want this system to be designed to meet 
the needs of truly needy individuals but without a Federal mandate that 
might require the State of Missouri, for instance, if it were to be 
applied to Medicaid, to move from 600,000 people on welfare to 810,000 
people on welfare, or, in the area of food stamps, if you could somehow 
get a good bit of that 24-percent slippage out of the system, that 
would require an increase in the benefits so that more people would be 
enticed into the system rather than fewer.
  This is a fundamental point that if you are going to reduce the 
number of people on welfare and you require the amount of money to be 
maintained at a very high level, you have to make the benefit richer 
and richer and richer. And if you enrich the benefit while you are 
decreasing the population, then all of a sudden people will start 
seeing the benefit being richer again, and you will attract more people 
into the system.
  We do not want to build into welfare reform. We do not want to sow 
the seeds of its own destruction. We do not want to build a structure 
and mechanism which will result in welfare being increased and grown.
  I said the people of Missouri spell ``welfare reform" r-e-d-u-c-e, 
and they do not want to grow welfare, they want to slow welfare, not 
because it is so much a question of how much money we are spending, it 
is a question of how many lives we are losing. We are losing 
generations of children.
  Another point: There seems to be some question--and I am glad the 
Senator from Pennsylvania raised this with me--as to whether people at 
State capitals can be sensitive to the needs of the needy. It is as if 
somehow people can only be heard if they have needs in Washington, DC. 
I suppose it might be as a result of the history of this whole 
enterprise of welfare, if we could mislabel welfare as an enterprise. 
It might be that if we were to discuss the history, we could see why 
that question comes up, because there was a time in America's history 
when individuals who were needy were not well represented in politics.
  Back in the fifties and sixties, there were laws that related to 
access to voting which kept a lot of people from voting. The civil 
rights movement was a response to that. And then the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the 1960's said, ``We can't have rural communities 
have an improper impact on legislation because they do not have the 
population anymore.'' So there was a Supreme Court case called Baker 
versus Carr that provided for one man, one vote. And there is only one 
legislative body in the United States of America that does not 
represent one man, one vote. It is the U.S. Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). The Senator's time has 
expired.
  Mr. SANTORUM. I yield the Senator an additional 5 minutes.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, this is the only body in America that is 
not equally represented by the people of this country. Every State 
capital has a specific, both in their senate and house of 
representatives, except for Nebraska, of course, which only has one 
house, every State capital has one man, one vote. People have access to 
the ballot box like never before. As a matter of fact, the civil rights 
laws of the third quarter of this century moved to guarantee access and 
moved to remove legal barriers from voting and political participation.
 But just this decade, the Congress of the United States moved to 
remove virtually any kind of barrier. As a matter of fact, there is a 
special privilege for people on welfare. They are automatically asked 
to register when they go on welfare.

  There can be no argument that people in need are people who are 
disenfranchised in the United States. The idea that you have come to 
the Federal Government to be heard or to have an impact as a citizen is 
a bankrupt argument. It may have had currency at one time, but that 
currency has been substantially devalued by a change in the law, both 
the judicial law and the legislative law.
  The people of this country are represented and can be heard in their 
State capitals. I submit that they will be heard there better than in 
Washington, DC. As a former Governor, I witnessed far more people 
visiting me in the State capital than visiting me here in Washington, 
because the only disenfranchisement that comes now is a 
disenfranchisement of distance. Frankly, I cannot name a single State 
for which Washington, DC, is a closer destination than their State 
capital. It is simply not the case. If we give States discretion about 
how to spend this money so we can have real reform, needy people can go 
to the State capital. Needy people know that if the State makes a 
mistake, it is easier to correct and more quickly corrected than it is 
if the country makes a mistake. Needy people know that if there is a 
mistake in 1 program out of 50, it is not nearly as bad as if it is a 
national mistake. Needy people know that to get legislation changed in 
Washington, DC, you have to fight your way through special interests 
and all kinds of power groups, politically. They know that at the State 
level individual voices are heard, and the voices of neighborhoods and 
communities are heard.
  So I rise to oppose this amendment because I think it will hurt the 
people who are in need in this country. I rise to oppose this amendment 
because I think it is an amendment which is designed to 
institutionalize and guarantee the maintenance of the current system. 
It is incomprehensible to me, after the people spoke in 1994 as loudly 
as people spoke to me just last month when I was home, just 
incomprehensible to me that we would not want to really reform this 
system, that we would want to guarantee that the system is 90 percent 
the same as it is now. If a State can save enough money to go below 
that 90 percent, or devote that resource to additional education or 
additional ways of helping people pick themselves up and carry 
themselves out of poverty, we say: No dice, no; you have to be at least 
90 percent as inefficient as the Federal Government, 90 percent as 
punitive as the Federal Government; you have to be at least 90 percent 
as unsuccessful as the Federal Government.
  I think we need to turn these States loose. There is very little 
doubt in my mind that there are just ways that people will solve these 
problems. Ninety percent, I think, would lock in a spending level. 
Ninety percent would likely lock in, in some cases, an increase in the 
number of people on welfare. I cannot think of anything more tragic 
than the State to sweeten its system, to redesign its program, and as a 
result of 

[[Page S 13323]]
the redesign of the program, end up sucking more people into a system 
which has already impoverished many and stolen the future of 
generations.
  In some communities, like Detroit, 79 percent of all the children are 
born without fathers. We have an epidemic that is aided and abetted by 
this system, which is counterproductive. We should not institutionalize 
the status quo, and we must reject the Breaux amendment.
  Mr. SANTORUM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Missouri for 
his insightful comments. I think he really speaks from the kind of 
experience that we need here in this Chamber, as somebody who served as 
a Governor and has managed a welfare program, who understands the 
dynamics in the State capitals and the likelihood of success of the 
Dole substitute.
  I think his words of support and encouragement for the bill, as it is 
today, and particularly the maintenance of effort provisions, are 
important, and I want to congratulate him for not only his statement 
here, but the tremendous amount of work he has done on this 
legislation, to bring consensus to the Republican side of the aisle and 
move this matter forward. He has really been a standout on this issue. 
I thank him for his comments and for his work on this legislation.
  The Senator from Vermont is here. I will yield the floor.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I yield myself 30 seconds just to make the 
comment that there clearly must be a grave amount of misunderstanding 
of what the Breaux amendment does.
  The Breaux amendment allows the State to spend as much or as little 
as the State wants to spend. But it says that when a State spends 10 
percent less than they are spending now, the Federal Government will 
also reduce our contribution. We on our side, in a bipartisan spirit, 
do not want to make the Federal Government spend 100 percent of what we 
are spending now for the next 5 years. If the State reduces their 
amount, the Federal Government should have the right to do that, as 
well. That is what the Breaux amendment is all about.
  I yield at this time to the very distinguished Senator from Vermont, 
who has a long history of outstanding work in welfare reform and 
looking out for the needy. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Breaux 
amendment. I listened to the very eloquent and excellent statement of 
the former Governor of Missouri, and there is no question in my mind 
that if all the Governors of this Nation were like the former Governor 
of Missouri, we might not need this amendment.
  My memory goes back to the 1960's, when we started the welfare 
reform. It was because there were many areas of this Nation where the 
States dropped the ball with their responsibility on welfare, and the 
Federal Government came in to try to get some uniformity of standards 
in the ability to take care of the people of this country who were 
unable to take care of themselves or needed help in getting into a 
position where they could do so.
  I point out that in the Breaux amendment here, we are dollar for 
dollar, not percentage. So you could eliminate all your State moneys 
and, in many cases, end up with plenty of Federal funds left, so you 
are only going down dollar for dollar. I think that is an important 
concession to those of us who want to see this; that is, not to go over 
the formula reduction, so if they go down 1 percent, we go down 1 
percent. It is a modest proposal in that respect.
  Second, the 90 percent is, I think, a reasonable figure to utilize. 
It does allow some drop in State effort, without losing Federal funds.
  I would like to also emphasize how critically important this 
amendment is to some of us who want to reach a consensus on welfare 
reform. There are about three areas, to me, which make the difference 
on whether I will support the bill or not. This is one of them. It is 
critical in the length of time, as well as percentage. But we cannot 
reduce the participation of States as an important part of the welfare 
reform and make it important that they continue to participate in the 
financing of that.
  Without a partnership provision like this, States could reduce their 
welfare expenditures to zero and use only Federal dollars for the 
entire costs. But with this amendment, States will have a continuing 
incentive to use their own resources in conjunction with Federal funds. 
Without, I foresee a major shift of the entire financial responsibility 
for welfare onto our already overburdened Federal budget. I see us 
returning to the problems we had before the advent of the Federal help.
  Our efforts to reform the welfare system must not dismantle the 
current partnership by allowing this cost shift. We simply cannot 
afford it. Right now, the Federal Government funds only 55 percent of 
the total national welfare funding, while States contribute the 
remaining dollars, almost $14 billion in fiscal year 1994.
  While the exact State-by-State ratio of State to Federal dollars 
spent on welfare varies by State, depending on available resources, 
both overall and individually, States make a major contribution. This 
should continue to be the case even after welfare reform. Welfare is a 
joint State/Federal responsibility that will not be there if there is 
not a monetary commitment.
  While it is true that the leadership has incorporated a partial 
provision, an expectation of 75 percent effort from the States for the 
first 3 years of the bill, I believe that this provision for 90 percent 
for the full 5-year term of the bill is essential and critical to this 
bill being passed.
 Either we believe States have a responsibility to contribute State 
funds toward welfare or we do not. I do not think that responsibility 
somehow evaporates after the first 3 years.

  Some may argue States rights against this provision. That States must 
be allowed to decide how much to spend and on whom to spend it. Some 
may argue States must be able to innovate in their delivery of benefits 
to save money.
  I agree. I agree that States should be able to set their own funding 
levels, their own benefits, design their own programs, save money. As 
we know, perhaps too acutely right now, the appropriations process is a 
difficult one, requiring painstaking decisions. State budgets around 
the country are also under stress, some States may well decide that 
welfare is not a priority for them that it was in 1994, that they want 
to save money for welfare to use somewhere else in their budget.
  I believe that when money is saved, and less is spent on welfare, 
both the State and Federal taxpayers should share in the savings. If 
the State share goes down, so should the Federal dollar, on a dollar 
for dollar basis.
  The welfare partnership amendment has been called a maintenance of 
efforts provision. It is, in that it would encourage States to continue 
to contribute State dollars toward welfare costs. But it is not the 
same as many of the maintenance of effort provisions of the past that I 
think my colleagues are most familiar with.
  Under the partnership, we ask that the States maintain a spending 
level of only 90 percent, not 100 percent, only 90 percent of their 
1994 fiscal year expenditures on cash benefits, job education, and 
training and child care. Most maintenance of effort provisions require 
100 percent effort or penalize with a total withdrawal of all Federal 
funds.
  This partnership provision is much more reasonable. If a State 
chooses to go below the 90 percent of the fiscal year 1994 State 
funding levels, it will experience a dollar for dollar reduction in the 
Federal grant. For every dollar the State chooses not to spend, they 
will receive one less Federal dollar. Of course, the reduction does not 
even begin to occur until the State funding levels fall below 90 
percent of the 1994 levels, and that is important to remember that 
baseline is there. If you create savings, if you were able to reduce 
your roles, then that baseline still is there.
  In other words, assume that Vermont, through its innovative 
demonstration program, becomes so adapt at moving people off welfare to 
work that they save money. They do not need as much as they did in 1994 
because the caseload is dramatically reduced.
  So the State decides it can afford to spend less overall on welfare. 
Under this proposal, the first 10 percent of savings goes to the State 
alone. They we can reduce State spending by 10 percent without 
affecting their Federal 

[[Page S 13324]]
grant. After that, as the savings grow, the Federal Government share 
will go dollar for dollar in that spending reduction, once it goes 
below 90 percent of the 1994 level. If it does not go below the 1994 
level they can make the savings without the provision.
  Without this provision, we, the Federal Government, will continue to 
send the same amount to States while they cut back their own 
expenditures.
  However, I think that Vermont, like all other States, should continue 
in partnership with us for welfare spending. The States will be able to 
set levels of spending based on need. There is no financial cliff in 
this provision. No financial cliff as has been indicated by some. If 
you go one dollar below the 1994 levels you lose all your Federal 
funds. No, that is not the case. The reduction is gradual and 
proportionate to what the States set as need.
  The States currently have some flexibility in setting their benefit 
levels. Under this bill, the flexibility will be enhanced and expanded. 
I believe that many of these State flexibility changes are positive, 
that State innovation should be encouraged and the Federal requirement 
should not be overly prescriptive.
  The bill will allow States to experiment with benefit levels, 
benefits delivery and eligibility, and do all they want within the 
guidelines to be able to bring about savings.
  Left to their own devices, States can probably show us here in 
Washington a thing or two about designing programs. I am sure they can. 
My own State of Vermont has been involved in a very interesting and 
successful demonstration project using a combination of sanctions and 
additional support services with its welfare population.
  I also believe that States may well be able to save money as they 
innovate and become more efficient. As they save money and are able to 
reduce their State welfare spending by moving people off welfare into 
work, this amendment would allow the Federal Government to share in 
those State savings. This provision allows us to share in those 
provisions. I want to emphasize that.
  Without it, States would no longer need to spend their State funds on 
welfare cash assistance, child care, education, and job training in 
order to receive Federal dollars. Regardless of State funding 
commitment, the Federal Government's funding stream will remain 
constant, frozen at the 1994 level.
  Mr. President I want to remind my colleagues that it is those very 
numbers, the 1994 Federal funding levels, that were set in proportion 
to the amount spent by the States in 1994. To continue at those same 
Federal levels without a requirement that States also spend seems very 
dangerous to me.
  Realistically, the entire responsibility for the welfare system would 
be shifted to the Federal Government. States would no longer have a 
financial incentive to use State dollars along with their Federal 
allocations. The incentives for making the system better would go away. 
If they wanted they could choose to narrow their welfare eligibility 
and reduce benefits and pay for it all with Federal dollars.
  I guess this amendment is about several things. It is about savings 
for the Federal Government as well as the States after reform. It is 
about fairness. And it is about continuing shared responsibility for 
welfare. It is ironic that we talk of the devolution to the States, the 
importance of governance at the local level, we simultaneously make 
welfare a solely Federal responsibility.
  I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting what I believe is one 
of the most critical amendments we will have here today. I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that prior to 
the vote on the Breaux amendment scheduled for 2:15 that each side be 
given 2 minutes to explain their bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I yield briefly 2 minutes to the Senator 
from Missouri.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania. The suggestion 
has been made that somehow the incentives for savings persist in this 
bill. I think it is pretty clear that once you get below 90 percent for 
every dollar you save, when you would otherwise have gotten $2 for 
having saved that dollar you only get $1 because the dollar you would 
save in regard to the Federal Government then is shared back to the 
Federal Government.
  The question is, how much incentive do we want to put in this bill to 
reform welfare? I believe we want to put a substantial incentive in 
this bill to reform welfare. We want it reformed significantly.
  I do not think the people want us tinkering around the edge with the 
program, but they want us to give States broad latitude and broad 
incentives.
  My understanding of the Breaux amendment is it would reduce that 
incentive substantially. To the extent that the incentive for reform is 
reduced by having the States benefit less financially when there has 
been reform, I think we will get less reform.
  I think the question is, do we want a lot of reform? Do we want major 
reform? Do we want sweeping reform? Or do we want reform that is 
incremental, and if there are incentives to additional reform they are 
diminished substantially.
  In my judgment, we want to provide the maximum level of incentives 
which is what I believe the Dole bill does, and is the appropriate way 
for us to move in this manner.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from 
Missouri and add to that the Senator from Vermont said that there would 
be a sharing of the savings on the Federal Government side with the 90 
percent maintenance of effort, and I remind the Senator in the Dole 
modified amendment that if you fall below 75 percent, every dollar you 
fall below is shared dollar for dollar from the Federal Government.
  In other words, if the State drops below 75 percent, every dollar 
they spend less, the Federal Government has to give $1 less. So there 
is the same identical provision already in the Dole modified bill as in 
the Breaux amendment.
  There are several points I could make on the Breaux amendment and 
they go beyond the philosophy that we are discussing here as to whether 
we should be requiring States to maintain effort.
  I think one of the most important things is the drop in caseload that 
we have experienced in the last year. If you look at the numbers from 
the Department of Health and Human Services, what they show is that 
since May 1994 we have seen a drop from 14 million recipients on AFDC, 
to May 1995 a little under 13.5 million--a drop of over 525,000 
recipients in the program.
  The principal reason for the reduction is not based on the economy or 
anything; it is because we have seen States like Michigan and Wisconsin 
and others institute these work programs and change the welfare laws to 
reduce caseloads. Michigan has reduced their caseload by 30 percent in 
the past couple of years. What we are seeing is States that are doing 
exactly what this bill will facilitate other States to do, are reducing 
their caseloads. By reducing their caseloads, they are obviously saving 
money and they are putting more people to work.
  However, if we stick those States with a 90-percent maintenance of 
effort, what you say to Michigan is, ``OK, Michigan,'' or someone like 
Michigan, who after this bill passes enacts a program similar to 
Michigan's, ``You can reduce your caseload by 30 percent but you cannot 
reduce your welfare expenditures by 30 percent; you still have to spend 
90 percent of what you were spending now, based on 1994, not 1995,'' 
where, as I said, we have already seen a reduction. So you are basing 
it on last year's figure, which was a historically high figure, saying 
you have to maintain 90 percent of that even though you may drop your 
caseload under programs that are, today, as much as 30 or more percent 
reduced. So you are holding States, as the Senator from Missouri said, 
to spend money on people on welfare even though there may not be those 
people to spend it on. I think that is unwise.
  As the Senator from Missouri said, it is an incentive not to reform. 
It is an incentive not to reform if you cannot save any money by 
reforming. One of the reasons you see welfare reform is, obviously, you 
want to get people to work and off welfare. But also you want to save 
taxpayers' dollars in the process. So this is a real disincentive. 

[[Page S 13325]]

  If we were going to have a figure, 90 is much too high. It does not 
allow for innovation. It does not take into account innovations that we 
have seen in States today and the dramatic reductions in caseloads that 
we have seen in programs that I think are going to be more common after 
this legislation is passed. I think it is a step very damaging to 
reform. This is a back-door way of trying to keep the status quo in 
place, and I think it is a very dangerous addition to this bill.
  I also would say, you have an interesting question about what is 
fair. You say maintain effort at 90 percent. That sounds fair to all 
States. Every State has to maintain their effort at 90 percent. That 
would be fair if every State had the same effort in the first place. 
But they do not. In fact, there are wide disparities as to what States' 
efforts are today.
  For example, I pulled this out of the Wall Street Journal of August 
21. It is from the House Ways and Means Committee. It says that if you 
have a State like Mississippi, that their average monthly AFDC payment 
per family is $120 per family. A State like Alaska's is $762 per 
family.
  What we are saying in the Breaux amendment is, ``Mississippi, you 
have to maintain 90 percent of $120; Alaska, you have to maintain 90 
percent of $762.'' Is that fair? Is that fair to States like Alaska, 
which are now being given a block grant and, under the Dole formula, 
are not going to be growing as much? Why? Because the Hutchison growth 
formula targets low-benefit States. They will grow. Their maintenance 
of effort is 90 percent of the low number, but they will grow. States 
like California, which has a $568 per family contribution and Hawaii 
which has $653, Vermont, $548, those States with high-dollar 
contributions now will not participate in the growth fund. So you are 
locking them in at a high-participation rate and not giving them any 
more money.
  I do not think that is a fair way to do it, and, in fact, it could 
even get worse because there are many people who are going to vote for 
the Breaux amendment who are also going to vote for the Graham 
amendment, the amendment of Senator Graham from Florida, who will be 
offering his fair share amendment. That will completely eliminate all 
past relationship of how AFDC was distributed and make it purely on a 
per-person-in-poverty allocation. So the State match will be irrelevant 
under the Graham amendment.
  So, what would happen, in fact, will happen if we adopt the Breaux 
amendment, and then, as again many who will vote for the Breaux 
amendment will vote for the Graham amendment, what will happen is there 
will be States like New York and Alaska and Hawaii and California that 
will be required to spend more money than the Federal Government will 
give them under the new formula. So their maintenance of effort will 
actually be higher than what they get on the Federal level. How is that 
fair?
  We are saying you have to keep your contribution high and, oh, by the 
way, we are going to take ours and cut yours substantially from your 
current level. Those are kinds of games that you get into when you have 
a block grant and try to keep a maintenance-of-effort provision in a 
block grant proposal. It does not work.
  Mr. BREAUX. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Sure, I will be happy to.
  Mr. BREAUX. Back to the basic point I think the Senator is making, it 
is that somehow if the Breaux amendment passes States will not be able 
to reduce the amount of money they spend on welfare. That is absolutely 
and clearly incorrect. States are encouraged to spend less through 
reforms. We just say if they are spending less than 90 percent of what 
they spent the year before, the Federal Government will also reduce our 
contribution.
  Does the Senator disagree that under the Republican proposal, you 
lock in the Federal contribution for 5 years? Even if the State has 
less people on welfare, saves money, the Federal Government is still 
required to spend 100 percent of what they spent in 1994?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Yes. And the reason we lock in--reclaiming my time--the 
reason we lock in the number is because, as the Senator from Louisiana 
knows, if we did not block grant this program and did not reform this 
system and allowed what happened, for example, under the Daschle 
amendment, to occur, AFDC would continue to grow. In fact, the Federal 
commitment would be even greater in 5 to 7 years.
  So the fact we lock it in now, many would say, because of inflation, 
is ``a cut.'' We are in fact locking in. In fact, I think one of the 
biggest criticisms I have heard from the other side of the aisle is 
that what we are in fact locking in, that is not generous enough. We 
need to give more. In fact, we had an amendment there today to put in 
$7 billion more. We had an amendment from the Senator from Connecticut 
to put in $6 billion more for children. There is a barrage, and I 
assume it will continue, of amendments from your side of the aisle to 
say we should be spending more.
  We are going to try to strike a balance. We do not want this program 
to continue to increase. We do not want to cut back the Federal share 
because we, too, believe in a partnership. But we will say, we will 
tell you, States, we will commit you to flat funding over the next 5 
years. And what we want you to do is to be innovative. We will keep the 
dollars there to allow you to innovate and allow you to move forward. 
And the incentive, then, is for you to get more people off the program, 
to get more people into work, and, yes, save some State dollars.
  We think those are powerful incentives, if we keep there the steady 
hand from the Federal level. So I think it is a fair compromise, in a 
sense, not to increase funding but to hold the level funding.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I yield to the Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I think it is well known that States are 
paying disproportionate shares of the welfare benefits in their States. 
Some States pay 25 percent or 28 percent of the welfare benefit. Some 
States pay as much as 60 percent of the welfare benefit.
  In the event that some States are paying 60 percent, if they save----
  Mr. SANTORUM. The Senator from New York----
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Fifty.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, 50 percent, pardon me. I stand corrected 
and thank the Senator from New York. Fifty.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. New York is 50.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. New York is 50.
  A State that pays 25 percent of its benefit is able, by paying that 
benefit, to attract 3 Federal dollars to the State. And, so, if they 
were to effect a savings and they only got to save the State's part and 
they had to give the Federal part back, by saving 25 cents for the 
State they could curtail the flow of $1 for the State; they would 
curtail the flow of 3 additional dollars to the State.
  What I am trying to say is that a program which provides reductions, 
of course, savings--if it is just one for one--is a program which does 
not provide the same amount of incentives as if you get to keep the 
amount that is left in the block grant.
  If it is a one-for-one savings, it is the same for all States. But we 
want to have States with an incentive to reform the program, and the 
larger the reward for reforming the program and reducing the roll, the 
larger the incentive. And it seems to me the incentive is larger under 
the Dole bill, which provides that you not only get to keep the State's 
share which you save, but you get to keep a dollar that reflects the 
State's share for every dollar you save in the Federal Government.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Missouri is 
right, that the Dole formula is fair. And it is also, I think, 
structured to create the incentive for States to reform their welfare 
system. Remember, if we are going to pass the Dole amendment, the 
States will then have the opportunity--I am confident that every State 
will take this opportunity because under this bill we block grant money 
to the States--they will have to at some point convene their 
legislature and with the Governor will have to develop their own 
welfare plan. I think it would be incumbent upon them, almost a 
requirement, that they do so because they would have block grant funds 
and would have to take some action to spend the dollars. So we would be 
forcing every legislature in the country to go forward and redesign 
their program. 

[[Page S 13326]]

  What the Dole amendment does is say for the first 3 years you have to 
maintain 75 percent of effort. There is a lot of argument here about 
States racing to the bottom. You cannot race to the bottom, 
particularly if you are a high-dollar State, if you have to maintain 75 
percent of your revenue. If we are going to make the State legislatures 
reform welfare, they are going to do it relatively quickly within the 
first year or two. So we will have the results.
  To suggest that we need to stretch this to 5 years suggests that 
State legislatures are going to continually every year be reforming and 
cutting their welfare rolls. As we know, we do not do that. We do not 
do that here. The State legislatures do not reform welfare every year. 
They pass a welfare package, and, like this body, see how it works. It 
takes some time.
  So I think a lot of this, whether we have 3 or 5 years, is really 
just a matter of making yourself feel comfortable in Washington. The 
real changes in welfare will occur in the first 1 or 2 years. I think 
that is the important thing to look at.
  I want to talk a little bit more following up on the disparity among 
States. I think this is really an important and significant problem 
with this 90 percent basis of effort. One of the things that I had 
suggested--and we are not able to come to closure on this--is that it 
is not fair for New York and Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania spends per 
child, based on the State cash aid relating to this block grant, about 
$1,092 per child. That is ranked 17. Alaska is No. 1 with $3,182, and 
last is Mississippi with $107. So the disparity is just tremendous. To 
suggest that we are being fair hereby saying Mississippi has to 
maintain 90 percent of $107, and Alaska has to maintain 90 percent of 
$3,182, again does not reflect the reality of a block grant.
  Eventually over time what this block grant is hoping to do, as the 
Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, suggested with her growth 
formula is to equalize the Federal contribution per child across this 
country. So a child in Alaska should not be paid more out of the 
Federal coffers than a child in Mississippi. I think that is sort of a 
nonsense thing. I think most of us, if we are going to go to this block 
grant, would like to see us achieve a program where the Federal 
payments per child would be the same. I do not see how we get there, in 
fact, I do not think we can get there, if we require States to maintain 
this high share of effort.
  I am hopeful that we agree to this compromise that was in the Dole 
modified bill at 75 percent. It is a reasonable compromise. It puts the 
compromise in place for 3 years, which I think is the most crucial time 
when these State legislatures are enacting their programs, and it does 
not penalize a high-dollar State.
  The compromise that I had even offered was to suggest that States 
like New York and Pennsylvania would not have to maintain 75 percent of 
their effort but they would only have to maintain 75 percent of what 
the average effort is among States. So, if you took all the States' 
contributions already and set an average, I think according to the gain 
per child average of State cash aid here, I would guess would be 
around--just looking at the numbers, the 25th State is Wyoming at $758. 
That is the median. I assume the average is somewhere close to that; to 
suggest that Alaska would have to maintain 75 percent of $758 instead 
of $3,182 and any State above the average would only have to maintain 
75 percent of the average, I think is a fair burden to put on States 
given the fact that a lot of these States are going to be growing, or 
are big States and are not going to get any more money.
  Any State below the national average, Maine being one, which is 26th, 
and Louisiana, which is 50th out of the 51 jurisdictions, Louisiana is 
at $155. I mean, I can understand why the Senator from Louisiana wants 
a 90 percent maintenance of effort for Louisiana. It is $155 per child 
in 1994. But I am in Pennsylvania. I have $1,092. You are saying that 
the State government of Pennsylvania has to maintain $900-plus in 
Pennsylvania but $130 in Louisiana. How is that fair when we are block 
granting the funds? We are not over the next 5 years giving 
Pennsylvania one additional dollar, and I might add Louisiana gets a 
big chunk of the growth fund because they are a low-dollar State. This 
is having your cake and eating it, too.
  I think that is just too penalizing of larger States that have made 
substantial contributions to welfare. You are going to stick them with 
a program that maybe passes the administration. We have a new Governor 
in Pennsylvania, and the Governor, I know, is very aggressively 
pursuing a reform of the welfare system. And what we are going to do 
with Pennsylvania is lock them into high contributions of 1994 forever, 
that they have to continue if they want to continue to receive their 
Federal dollars. Remember, you say, ``Well, if you reduce the amount of 
people on welfare, you lose dollar per dollar.'' Pennsylvania is not 
going to have any increase in Federal dollars. If Louisiana goes below 
75 percent, they are still going to get an increase in Federal dollars 
because of the growth formula.
  Mr. BREAUX. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SANTORUM. I think it creates a lot of inequity in the system.
  I am happy to yield.
  Mr. BREAUX. The decision of what the States do is their decision 
taking into account the cost of living in the respective States. The 
cost of living in Louisiana is substantially less than in your State or 
New York. That is a State decision. But with the Senator's own 
amendment--the alternative does not in fact lock in the Federal 
Government at 100 percent. If it is inappropriate to lock in the 
States, why is it appropriate to lock in the Federal Government at 100 
percent no matter how much the State reduces their caseload? Under your 
approach, the Federal Government continues to have to give 100 percent 
of what they are giving in 1994. If we are going to have savings, why 
should not the Federal Government share in the savings, which, 
according to the Congressional Budget Office, saves the Federal 
Government $545 billion?
  Mr. SANTORUM. Because we would like to see some innovation occur at 
the State level. We believe if you lock in the Federal contribution and 
give the States the opportunity to actually save dollars, that is the 
key. When you say, ``Well, the States can go ahead and reduce their 
dollars,'' but when they reduce their dollars, they lose Federal 
dollars. So in a sense they are a wash because, sure, they have spent 
$1 less of their money but they get $1 less. So they are pretty much 
held harmless.
  I think that is not a great incentive to save money if in fact for 
every dollar you save you lose a dollar.
  Mr. BREAUX. Why is it inappropriate? If the States can save a dollar, 
why should not the Federal Government save a dollar?
  Mr. SANTORUM. The point that I am trying to make is that, in effect, 
when you consider the net amount of money spent by the State, it is not 
really saving any money because what they are doing is, when they 
reduce their dollar, they lose a Federal dollar. So they are at zero. 
So there is no incentive financially for them to go below the 90 
percent.
  That is why I am saying this is sort of a bad way of supporting high 
expenditures of welfare dollars. What we are trying to do is say, if 
you want to innovate, we want you to innovate. We are willing to put up 
money so we will encourage you to innovate. We will encourage you to do 
what Michigan has done--as the Senator from New York is fond of 
saying--under the current law, under the 1988 Family Support Act, to 
reduce your caseload, get people to work. And by coming up with these 
innovative solutions and getting people back into the work force, you 
will in fact benefit financially. Under the Breaux amendment, they will 
not benefit financially because for every dollar where they go below 90 
percent, they will lose a Federal dollar. So they are at a zero 
position as far as benefits. I think that is a real impediment to the 
kind of innovation that we want to see on the State level.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of the 
amendment offered by the Senator from Louisiana.
  This amendment is straight forward. It says to States, all States, if 
the Federal Government turns over a block of money to do as you please 
in welfare reform, we ask that you commit your own resources as well. 
That is a fair deal. 

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  Welfare reform is a partnership. It isn't just a State problem and it 
isn't just a national problem. It's everybody's problem. Unfortunately 
not every State has viewed it that way over these past decades. Some 
States simply don't want to make a commitment. If this legislation 
passes without a requirement that the States maintain their commitment, 
I have no doubt some Governors and State governments will quickly cut 
their funding to real welfare reform at the very same time they are 
accepting Federal dollars.
  Mr. President, what of those States that are sincere about welfare 
reform? What happens when the next recession hits? Will political 
pressures force them to fund other programs from current State welfare 
funding? There will be more people who will need assistance but at the 
same time many school budgets will be squeezed by that recession and 
they will be asking for some of these welfare dollars. In the next 
recession what if the crime rates increase? If the prison system needs 
more dollars where will these Governors get the money? And what about a 
race to the bottom? If one State cuts its spending on welfare will the 
neighboring State be forced to do the same? One State may decide it can 
attract new jobs and companies from another State by offering a 
business tax cut funded from State welfare dollars.
  In my state of Maryland we have not received an overly generous 
Federal match when it comes to welfare funding. We are willing to do 
our part. What we do not want is to be forced into a race with another 
State that is more concerned about cutting benefits as a substitute for 
real welfare reform.
  If we are serious about welfare reform then it is time we demand that 
the State governments as well as the Federal Government make a 
commitment. That commitment demands more than just different ideas, it 
demands both Federal and State resources and dollars.
  Mr. BREAUX addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished ranking 
member of our Finance Committee, the Senator from New York, 8 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Pennsylvania 
for his very open and candid remarks.
  I would like to approach this subject from a slightly different 
angle, which is to make the case that Federal initiatives have begun to 
show real results in moving persons from welfare to work. It took a 
little while for the 1988 legislation to take hold, but it did. What we 
put at risk at this point is giving up all that social learning, about 
20 years really, that built up to the 1988 legislation and has followed 
on since.
  The Senator from Louisiana mentioned it when in the Chamber he gave a 
clip from a Louisiana paper, in Baton Rouge, ``Project Independence 
Trims Welfare Rolls Across State.''
  Just a few days ago, last week, we heard Senator Harkin of Iowa 
describe the legislation that had been adopted for new pilot projects 
on welfare around Iowa, passed by Governor Branstad, now having 2 years 
of experience. ``The number of people who work doubled, went up by 
almost 100 percent and the expenditures per case are also down by about 
10 percent.'' And I point out once again that is the Family Support 
Act.
  Now, in this morning's Washington Post, we have a very able essay by 
Judith Gueron, who is the head of the Manpower Development Research 
Corp., ``A Way Out of the Welfare Bind.'' As I have said several times, 
research at MDRC was the basis of our 1988 legislation. Data we had. 
She makes a simple point that ``Public opinion polls have identified 
three clear objectives for welfare reform: Putting recipients to work, 
protecting children from severe poverty, and controlling costs.'' And 
she makes the point that this triad involves conflicting goals at first 
glance. She then goes on to say that we seem to be learning how to 
resolve those conflicts.
  I will read one statement, if I may.

       A recent study looked at three such programs in Atlanta, 
     Grand Rapids, Mich., and Riverside, Calif. It found that the 
     programs reduced the number of people on welfare by 16 
     percent, decreased welfare spending by 22 percent, and 
     increased participants' earnings by 26 percent. Other data on 
     the Riverside program showed that, over time, it saved almost 
     $3 for every $1 it cost to run the program. This means that 
     ultimately it would have cost the Government more--far more--
     had it not run the program.

  Now, Mr. President, it is not at this point any longer politically 
correct to say that those programs began under the Family Support Act. 
They are programs under the job opportunities, basic services. I regret 
that you cannot say this. The Department of Health and Human Services 
would deny it. Silence is the response to the first success we have 
ever had with this incredibly defying, mystifying, sudden social 
problem. If we give up the maintenance of effort, we will give up the 
resources that made these programs possible.
  Senator Grassley has been talking about the wonders in Iowa, Senator 
Harkin about the wonders in Iowa, Senator Breaux about fine programs 
such as Project Independence in Louisiana. Atlanta, Grand Rapids, 
Riverside--real results. They are results from a secret program called 
the Family Support Act, the job opportunities, basic services.
  I hope we do not do it, Mr. President. I hope we support the Senator 
from Louisiana. This is not a moment of which anybody can be 
particularly proud.
  Let me be clear. If we put through time limits, we strip the Federal 
Government of responsibility, you will cut caseloads 10, 15 percent. 
There is always on the margin people who really do not--if the 
alternative was sufficiently unpleasant, they would leave. But you will 
not change the basic phenomenon of nonmarital births, out-of-wedlock 
births such that in the city of New Orleans, 47 percent of the children 
are on welfare at one point or another in the year. That is small 
compared to the city of Washington, but it is not small compared to the 
concern of the Senator from Louisiana. He cares about those children. 
They are his children. They are our children, too. And if we abandon 
the Federal maintenance, the Federal level of effort, we abandon those 
children.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article in the 
Washington Post about the secret Government program that has done such 
wonders in Riverside and Grand Rapids and Atlanta be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1995]

                     A Way Out of the Welfare Bind

                         (By Judith M. Gueron)

       Much of this year's debate over welfare reform in 
     Washington has focused on two broad issues: which level of 
     government--state or federal--should be responsible for 
     designing welfare programs, and how much money the federal 
     government should be spending.
       The debate has strayed from the more critical issue of how 
     to create a welfare system that does what the public wants it 
     to do. Numerous public opinion polls have identified three 
     clear objectives for welfare reform: putting recipients to 
     work, protecting their children from severe poverty and 
     controlling costs.
       Unfortunately, these goals are often in conflict--progress 
     toward one or two often pulls us further from the others. And 
     when the dust settles in Washington, real-life welfare 
     administrators and staff in states, counties and cities will 
     still face the fundamental question of how to balance this 
     triad of conflicting public expectations.
       Because welfare is such an emotional issue, it is a magnet 
     for easy answers and inflated promises. But the reality is 
     not so simple. Some say we should end welfare. That might 
     indeed force many recipients to find jobs, but it could also 
     cause increased suffering for children, who account for two-
     thirds of welfare recipients. Some parents on welfare face 
     real obstacles to employment or can find only unstable or 
     part-time jobs.
       Others say we should put welfare recipients to work in 
     community service jobs--workfare. This is a popular approach 
     that seems to offer a way to reduce dependency and protect 
     children. But, when done on a large scale, especially with 
     single parents, this would likely cost substantially more 
     than sending out welfare checks every month. To date, we 
     haven't been willing to make the investment.
       During the past two decades, reform efforts, shaped by the 
     triad of public goals, have gradually defined a bargain 
     between government and welfare recipients: The government 
     provides income support and a range of services to help 
     recipients prepare for and find jobs. Recipients must 
     participate in these activities or have their checks reduced.
       We now know conclusively that, when it is done right, the 
     welfare-to-work
      approach offers a way out of the bind. Careful evaluations 
     have shown that tough, adequately 

[[Page S 13328]]
     funded welfare-to-work programs can be four-fold winners: They can get 
     parents off welfare and into jobs, support children (and, 
     in some cases, make them better off), save money for 
     taxpayers and make welfare more consistent with public 
     values.
       A recent study looked at three such programs, in Atlanta, 
     Grand Rapids, Mich., and Riverside, Calif. It found that the 
     programs reduced the number of people on welfare by 16 
     percent, decreased welfare spending by 22 percent and 
     increased participants' earnings by 26 percent. Other data on 
     the Riverside program showed that, over time, it saved almost 
     $3 for every $1 it cost to run the program. This means that 
     ultimately it would have cost the government more--far more--
     had it not run the program.
       In order to achieve results of this magnitude, it is 
     necessary to dramatically change the tone and message of 
     welfare. When you walk in the door of a high-performance, 
     employment-focused program, it is clear that you are there 
     for one purpose--to get a job. Staff continually announce job 
     openings and convey an upbeat message about the value of work 
     and people's potential to succeed. You--and everyone else 
     subject to the mandate--are required to search for a job, and 
     if you don't find one, to participate in short-term 
     education, training or community work experience.
       You cannot just mark time; if you do not make progress in 
     the education program, for example, the staff will insist 
     that you look for a job. Attendance is tightly monitored, and 
     recipients who miss activities without a good reason face 
     swift penalties.
       If welfare looked like this everywhere, we probably 
     wouldn't be debating this issue again today.
       Are these programs a panacea? No. We could do better. 
     Although the Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and Riverside programs 
     are not the only strong ones, most welfare offices around the 
     country do not look like the one I just described.
       In the past, the ``bargain''--the mutual obligation of 
     welfare recipients and government--has received broad 
     support, but reformers have succumbed to the temptation to 
     promise more than they have been willing to pay for. Broader 
     change will require a substantial up-front investment of 
     funds and serious, sustained efforts to change local welfare 
     offices. This may seem mundane, but changing a law is only 
     the first step toward changing reality.
       It's possible that more radical approaches--such as time 
     limits--will do an even better job. They should be tested. 
     But given the public expectations, we cannot afford to base 
     national policies on hope rather than knowledge. The risk of 
     unintended consequences is too great.
       States, in any case, are concluding that time limits do not 
     alleviate the need for effective welfare-to-work programs. In 
     a current study of states that are testing time-limit 
     programs, we have found that state and local administrators 
     are seeking to expand and strengthen activities meant to help 
     recipients prepare for and find jobs before reaching the time 
     limit. Otherwise, too many will ``hit the cliff'' and either 
     require public jobs, which will cost more than welfare, or 
     face a dramatic loss of income with unknown effects on 
     families and children and, ultimately, public budgets.
       Welfare-to-work programs are uniquely suited to meeting the 
     public's demand for policies that promote work, protect 
     children and control costs. But despite the demonstrated 
     effectiveness of this approach, the proposals currently under 
     debate in Washington may make it more difficult for states to 
     build an employment-focused welfare system. Everyone claims 
     to favor ``work,'' but this is only talk unless there's an 
     adequate initial investment and clear incentives for states 
     to transform welfare while continuing to support children.
       Many of the current proposals promise easy answers where 
     none exist. In the past, welfare reform has generated much 
     heat but little light. We are now starting to see some light. 
     We should move toward it.

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thanking the Chair and thanking my friend from 
Louisiana, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 10 seconds--
--
  Mr. BREAUX. Absolutely.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. While I put on a button from Riverside, CA. It says, 
``Life Works If You Work.'' That is the spirit of these programs, and 
they are working. But we cannot talk about them, evidently.
  I thank the Senator. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BREAUX. I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Chair.
  I wish we could solve all of our problems with a button; it would 
make it a lot better.
  What interests me about this amendment, Mr. President, in a sense, it 
may be the most important amendment we are making to this bill and yet 
it has such an awkward title, maintenance of effort, that vast numbers 
of folks who might be listening or watching do not know what we are 
talking about.
  The Breaux amendment has to pass if welfare reform is going to work. 
It absolutely has to pass. A welfare reform bill with this name should 
free up States to do all kinds of things with new flexibility, without 
micromanagement from the Government. But welfare reform should not 
encourage States, or in fact even egg them on, to back out of their 
commitment to poor children. If you look around now at State 
legislatures, what is it they are discussing? Their woes with Medicaid 
and the temptation--believe me, if they are not required to participate 
in welfare reform, a number of them will not. They simply will not.
  To me, the Breaux amendment is the answer. It very clearly says to 
the States, you keep your end of the bargain, and we at the Federal 
level are going to keep our end of the bargain, just as we have always 
done on both sides.
  Again, speaking as a former Governor, I sincerely doubt that 
Governors who like the welfare reform bill before us just exactly the 
way it is without the Breaux amendment, for example, would ever propose 
that kind of a relationship in some of their dealings with local 
communities or counties in terms of matching grants.
  In fact, that is part of what money is for, is to leverage more out 
of other people. You say, ``Here is a certain amount. You put up some 
more, and together we can do this. But if you do not participate, we 
cannot.'' And it is human nature in State and local government, just as 
it is at any level.
  The majority leader made some modifications to the Republican welfare 
package just before the recess. And one of them involves the claim that 
he added a maintenance-of-effort provision. It is not, in fact, that. 
It is very weak. And we can and must pass the Breaux amendment, in this 
Senator's judgment, and not accept the majority leader's modification.
  In the first place, the majority leader's modification only lasts for 
3 years. We are talking about a lot longer period than that before we 
come back to this subject in a major way. And it asks States to put 75 
percent of a portion of their AFDC spending back in 1994 back into 
their future welfare reform system.
  In fact, the Dole provision adds up to only asking all States to 
invest a grand total of $10 billion a year just for the first 3 years, 
with no basic matching requirement whatsoever for the last 2 years on 
this bill. So it is a fraud.
  This leaves a gaping hole in the State's share, if compared to the 
current arrangement across the country. So $30 billion could and 
possibly will disappear from this country's safety net for families and 
children.
  What is worse to me, almost more cynical, is the clever attempt in 
how a State's share is calculated under the Dole modification. The Dole 
bill would allow States to count, so to speak, State spending on a 
whole variety of programs simply mentioned in this bill but not 
pertinent.
  For example, States would be able to get credit, essentially, for 
their spending on food stamps, SSI, other programs that help low-income 
people towards meeting their requirement. That means that money for 
programs not specifically directed to financing basic welfare for 
children could easily count towards the so-called maintenance of 
effort. Again, this is a flatout invitation for States to back out of 
keeping their basic historical responsibility to children.
  And remember, two out of every three people that we are talking about 
in this country on welfare are children.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I hope urgently that colleagues on this side of the 
aisle, and as many colleagues as possible on the other side of the 
aisle, will support the very important Breaux amendment.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
  Who yields time to the Senator from Iowa?
  
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  Mr. SANTORUM. I would be happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, because I do not want to speak on the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to use my 5 minutes to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________