[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 139 (Friday, September 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8685-H8704]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DISAPPROVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 2908 of Public Law 101-
510 and by direction of the Committee on National Security, I call up
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 102) disapproving the recommendations
of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and ask
unanimous consent for its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from South Carolina?
There was no objection.
The text of House Joint Resolution 102 is as follows:
H.J. Res. 102
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress
disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on
July 13, 1995.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2908 of the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the gentleman from South Carolina
[Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda] will each be
recognized for 1 hour.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, today, the House will consider whether to disapprove the
recommendations of the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission to close 28 major military installations and realign the
mission at another 77 bases. I rise in opposition to House Joint
Resolution 102, which would disapprove the Commission's
recommendations, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.
We are currently in the fourth round of base closures since 1989, and
the third and final round under the Commission's present charter. We
all recognize that base closures are a reality in the post-cold-war
world, particularly in view of the reductions in force structure that
have taken place over the past 6 years.
The Department of Defense is counting on the savings resulting from
base closure and realignment to fund currently underfunded
modernization and infrastructure improvements late this decade and into
the next century. According to the Commission, implementation of their
recommendations would result in one-time costs of approximately $3.6
billion. However, the Commission expects $1.6 billion in annual savings
and net present value savings of $19.3 billion over the next 20 years
to result from the 1995 base closure recommendations.
Personally, I am concerned about ongoing force structure reductions
as well as the closing of a number of installations already in the
works under BRAC. At least some of these bases are unique national
assets that we will never reconstitute even if needed in the future.
A number of Members, including myself, have been skeptical when it
comes to the rosy projections that have been made in previous base
closure rounds concerning the savings that will accrue
[[Page H 8686]]
to the military services. To date, savings have fallen well short of
expectations while the up-front costs of closures have soared beyond
initial estimates and remain underfunded. Reluctantly, however, I
realize that with the
growing pressures on defense resources we simply cannot afford to keep
all the installations and facilities open that I believe our military
may one day need again.
Speaking from experience, I understand the pain and dislocation that
a base closure or major realignment can inflict on a community, even a
region. In the past, even if I was not supportive of the closing of
bases, I was at least satisfied that the Commission and the closure
process had essentially worked as intended--that politics had not been
the determining factor in the development of the administration's or
the Commission's numerous recommendations.
In this sense, I was especially concerned about the administration's
handling of the Commission's recommendations. There is no question that
Presidential politics were paramount in the White House's very public
and tortured consideration of the Commission's recommendations. The
veneer of a national security justification for rejection of the list
was dropped as politics quickly took center stage. Fortunately, common
sense prevailed over politics and the administration ultimately backed
down and allowed the process to proceed. For the sake of the process, I
am nonetheless relieved that the President finally opted to allow
substance and process to prevail over politics in his decision to
submit the Commission's recommendations to the Congress.
However, I remain concerned about recent comments made by senior
administration officials implying that the White House will find a way
to assist a select few installations in politically sensitive States by
``privatizing in place.'' Some have gone so far as to guarantee
employment to workers at installations scheduled to be closed--a
guarantee that everyone knows will be nearly impossible to honor.
While I am sympathetic to the desire to preserve defense skills and
jobs, it is clear that the Commission was seriously concerned about the
cost of maintaining excess capacity at several types of installations,
particularly Air Force depots. Privatization of workloads at these
particular installations was only one of several options recommended by
the Commission. Contrary to the assertions of some, Congress ultimately
will retain the authority to determine how and if privatization in
place makes sense.
Mr. Speaker, the National Security Committee considered the
recommendations of the Commission very carefully. While some Members
expressed concern with individual recommendations contained in the
Commission's report, the committee decided to support the Commission's
findings. The committee voted 43 to 10 to report House Joint Resolution
102 adversely. In the committee's judgment, this resolution should be
defeated. I urge a ``no'' vote to my colleagues.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to divide my 1 hour
of debate so the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] is able to
control 20 minutes of that time and I will control 40 minutes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda] will
be recognized for 40 minutes, and the gentleman from California [Mr.
Fazio] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda].
(Mr. TEJEDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this resolution represents the end of a long and painful
process for many communities and their citizens. While these
communities are now turning their attention toward reuse efforts and
planning for the future, we have this final opportunity to overturn the
Base Closure Commission's recommendations.
In my opinion, the base Closure Commission made a mistake in voting
to close two of the Air Force's air logistics centers. These depots are
located in San Antonio, TX and Sacramento, CA. My colleagues from San
Antonio and Sacramento will speak to this decision in a few minutes, so
I will not add to that specific debate yet.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the San Antonio and
Sacramento delegations introduced resolutions of disapproval. This
issue is not a partisan issue. Base closures and economic losses cut
across party lines. I stand here before the House because my
constituents and my district, in fact this Nation, does not deserve the
closure of Kelly Air Force Base. I do not believe that
closure of Kelly Air Force Base is in the best interest of our
national security. If there is a way to keep Kelly open, we will fight
that fight, and this is what this resolution of disapproval is all
about.
I expect nothing less from my colleagues across the Nation who also
lose bases and jobs in this process. And we will hear from them. In
contrast, I expect those whose districts stand to gain from these
recommendations to voice their strong support for the Base Closure
Commission's recommendations.
I have no illusions about the final outcome of this matter. It is the
bottom of the ninth and we are behind by a lot of runs. But this does
not mean we give up and walk off the field. There are important issues
which need to be addressed, and I look forward to a lively discussion
during the next 2 hours.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from
Texas sharing his time with me, and I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the BRAC Commission's
1995 base closure list and in support of this resolution. I do so for
the first time. While this is the fourth round of base closure, it is
the first time that I have risen in opposition, despite the fact that
it is the third of four rounds that have impacted the community,
Sacramento, CA, that I represent along with several of my colleagues
who will appear later today.
I want to join with the comments that my friend, Mr. Tejeda, of San
Antonio has made with reference to my particular opposition to the
decision to close two of the five Air Logistics Centers under the
Materiel Command based in Dayton, OH. I strongly supported the position
that the Air Force and DOD took to downsize in place. I think that was
the right decision, both in terms of keeping capacity available for any
international emergency that would have required surge capability.
I regret the decision, which was very hard fought
within the Commission, to close the two facilities that now will
undergo privatization. As my friend from San Antonio said, we will hear
a good deal from people who expected to gain a great deal from the
closure of our two bases, who are troubled by the report of the DOD
Commission on Roles and Missions which has advocated strongly the
privatization of our heretofore public Air Force Logistics Centers.
I know what I am engaging in here today is probably under the rubric
of a primal scream. I understand that I am probably engaging in a
fruitless protest, and I have seen others whose bases have closed do so
in prior discussions of resolutions to, in effect, reverse the
decisions of the BRAC process of the Commission. But I think I have
justification in using this last opportunity to express my measure of
protest, because in fact nowhere in the United States has the BRAC had
such a devastating impact as it has had in the Sacramento area.
In all four rounds of the BRAC, the Sacramento area has shouldered
well over a quarter of all the jobs lost in California due to BRAC. In
fact, the Sacramento area standing alone has absorbed more base closure
losses in terms of direct and indirect jobs than any other State in the
Nation. In fact, the same could be said of the Sacramento as well as
San Francisco Bay area individually.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
[[Page H 8687]]
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 102 and I
urge my colleagues to vote against it.
I supported the establishment of the current base closure process in
1990. I believed then, and I continue to believe, that the disposal of
unneeded military infrastructure and overhead would save scarce
resources. I think we have come a long way in that regard.
Frankly we have closed bases through this process that I never
thought would ever be closed--and we have closed some that we may
ultimately wish we had not. Personally, I was opposed to the closure in
previous rounds of facilities such as Lowry Air Force Base and Pueblo
Army Depot in Colorado. I fought to keep them from closing, but when
faced with the decision to accept or reject the entire list produced by
the
Commission, I concluded that the Commission had acted appropriately,
and that in an era of declining defense dollars the national interest
had been served. This year I feel the same way, even though Fitzsimons
Army Medical Center is on the list.
I want to briefly say a word about the ultimate reuse for facilities
such as Fitzsimons. One of our goals throughout this process has been
to get installations slated for closure as quickly as possible into
reuse by the local community. I have been impressed with the speed and
dedication with which the city of Aurora has approached redevelopment.
Working with the University of Colorado, an impressive reuse plan is
already taking shape for Fitzsimons. I want to encourage the Department
of Defense, particularly the Department of the Army, to do what it can
to facilitate a rapid transition of the facility and related property
to the local redevelopment authority so that the people of Aurora and
Colorado can benefit from reuse as soon as possible.
Mr. Speaker, since the first round of base closures in 1988, over 100
major U.S.-based facilities have closed, and plant replacement value
has been reduced by 21 percent. The Commission's 1995 recommendations
will raise the number of major U.S.-based installations closed to about
130, and plant replacement value will have been reduced by another 6
percent or so.
Although not covered by BRAC, unneeded overseas infrastructure has
also been reduced substantially. During the BRAC period, the services
have closed or reduced operations at over 950 bases overseas--a plant
replacement value reduction of 43 percent.
Despite all the rhetoric from some quarters, including from some in
the administration who periodically suggest that we have not done
enough, I believe this process has resulted in a significant downsizing
of our military infrastructure. In my judgment, the military services
need to adjust to the sharp base and installation reductions they will
have to absorb.
As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and
Facilities, I have been approached about the possibility of authorizing
another round of base closures in 6 years of so. Indeed, that was one
of the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. There may be a need in the future to resurrect this
process, but I believe that authorizing another round now would be a
mistake.
The services need time to adjust to a post-BRAC environment. Some
units have moved as many as three times throughout the final phases of
BRAC. Once force structure and installations infrastructure have
stabilized, and once we have a clear understanding of the actual costs
and savings balance from BRAC, Congress will be in a better position to
assess whether any further rounds of base closure are necessary. While
I have great respect for the Commissioners, particularly Chairman Alan
Dixon, I would not support authorization of a future round at this
time.
There is no doubt that there are problems in the BRAC process. It is
clear that the upfront costs of base closures and realignments have
been substantially more than anyone expected. It is also true that
revenues from disposal have not been realized, and realized savings
have fallen far short of original estimates. This does not mean that
the process has not worked or that it has collapsed. It is an
indication of just how difficult the implementation of BRAC, with its
huge upfront costs and hidden environmental cleanup costs, has proven
to be in practice.
Mr. Speaker, the first hearing the Subcommittee on Military
Installations and Facilities held in this session concerned the BRAC
process. I want to assure the House that the subcommittee will continue
its commitment to oversight of BRAC implementation even after the
formal Commission process ends this year.
The Secretary of Defense estimates that $40 billion will be saved as
a result of action taken in all four phases of base closure. He may be
right. I hope he is; but even if savings fall short of expectations,
there is no question that we must complete the process we began 7 years
ago. I urge my colleagues to support the judgment of the National
Security Committee and vote ``no'' on the resolution of disapproval.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Sacramento, CA [Mr. Matsui], who has
worked so long and hard to build McClellan Air Force Base into the
modern entity it is today.
{time} 0920
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from
California [Mr. Fazio], but first of all, I would like to take a moment
to first of all thank both the gentleman from California [Mr.
Doolittle] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo] for the hard
work they did in trying to pursue our efforts to save McClellan Air
Force Base. We had a very strong bipartisan effort in northern
California an without their help, I do not believe we could have gotten
as far as we did.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to spend a few moments to talk about my
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio], who is adjacent
to me in Sacramento County. The gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio]
and I have worked over the years to get $400 million of construction
programs for McClellan in the last decade and a half. This is because
the Air Force has suggested that we should do this to maintain
McClellan as a viable, strong base of the five maintenance depots.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman, over the last 8 or 9 months in
particular, did a tremendous job in doing whatever he could to save
McClellan Air Force Base. I think the final recommendation, that is the
privatization of this base, would not have occurred without his able
assistance and his ability to put together this package in a coalition.
So, Mr. Speaker, I say to the gentleman from California, on behalf of
my constituents in the Fifth Congressional District, I want to thank
him very much for his help, because I think we will be able to maintain
a level of employment at that base now that will not create economic
disruption. So I just want to pay my respects for the gentleman's
efforts over the last 8 months to a year.
Mr. Speaker, I would also like to acknowledge the President's
activities in this. As you know, the Air Force, the Pentagon, and the
President did not want to close McClellan Air Force Base. He wanted to
basically keep the five logistic depots open and downsize all five of
them for the purpose of future possible national international crises.
Those are the five probably most important depots in the country.
When these five depots are compared to the Army or the Navy, we always
come out ahead, because we have become technologically the most
proficient. Obviously, we have one of the best work forces in the
entire Federal Government and, as a result of that, I believe the long-
range plans of this administration, but particularly of the people that
are running on a long-term basis the Pentagon, have felt if we ever
went into interservicing, these bases should be the ones to preserve.
As my colleagues know, the President attempted to save these bases
for that future possibility. Unfortunately, the Commission, in its own
wisdom, decided to close two bases, one in Texas and the McClellan Air
Force Base in California. This was against the strenuous objection of
the administration, the Pentagon, and the Air Force.
I have to say that the reason I am going to vote in favor of this
resolution, and against the recommendations
[[Page H 8688]]
of this Commission, is because originally this process was to be
nonpolitical. It was to be an objective process. We have had two prior
closings and we had two bases in my district that closed as a result of
those two prior Commissions. Mr. Speaker, I voted to close those bases,
even though there was a total of 10,000 employees, because I thought
the process was fair and objective.
But I have to tell my colleagues that this
process was the most outrageous process around. Those Commissioners,
not all of them, but many of them, had their own agenda. One who was a
high-ranking Army official, for example, not only during his
discussions showed significant bias, but he was actually outwardly
favoring Army depots saying all his experience with the Army led him to
believe that we should save these bases. That is not the way this
process was supposed to work.
In fact the irony of all of this is when Sacramento Army Depot in my
district closed, we were able to get the last Commission to allow
certain functions to be bid out and McClellan was one of the bidders,
along with Tobyhanna and some other Army bases. Believe it or not,
McClellan Air Force Base was the one that actually prevailed over the
Army bases to get an Army contract. Now that contract is going to be
going to an Army base, even though they were less efficient.
So, Mr. Speaker, I am going to be voting for this resolution because
I felt that the process was unfair.
Mr. Speaker, in conclusion I would like to make one further
observation. To the employees of Sacramento County who over the years
have just done a tremendous job, I want to thank them for their efforts
on behalf of the national defense of this country. We are going to do
everything we can to make sure this privatization plan that the
President and the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] put together
will work.
And I want to make an admonition. I am going to be one of the
strongest proponents of privatization of depots in the future. And if,
in fact, we are able to pursue this and make progress in this area, it
is my opinion that those bases that were protected for political
reasons, not for substantive reasons, and some were protected for
substantive reasons, but those that were protected for political
reasons will find that they are the most in jeopardy as we go into the
21st century.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cunningham].
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am amazed, especially at my California
colleagues. When they vote for a $177 billion cut in defense, and
California is the leader in the defense industry and most of our bases
are in California, what did they expect? What did they expect?
They vote for a Clinton tax package and $177 billion cut, after Colin
Powell, Dick Cheney, and then-candidate Clinton said that anything
above a $50 billion cut would put us into a hollow force. And then I
hear that the President wanted to save California bases. Yes,
California is important in a 1996 election. Sure, he would like to save
them.
But I think we need to look at why we are closing those bases in the
first place. Who called for an additional base closure round? The very
same people now that are saying that the President wants to save those
bases. Give me a break.
Mr. Speaker, in committee they used the analogy of a fisherman and
they said take the analogy of a catfish that has now been cut and we
are going to skin him alive, gut him, and eat him. Well, do not expect
us to sit there and take it. If my colleagues voted for the defense
cuts and they are from California,
they are not the fish; they are the in the role os a fisherman. They
caused the problem.
I take a look at what we have gone through and why many of us are
fighting against the continued assaults on DOD spending. I look at the
increase in nondefense spending by 261 percent by Members and, yes,
even some of the Members on our own committee in this House.
I take a look at the extension of Somalia, which cost us billions of
dollars, and Haiti, which has cost us billions of dollars, and what
they want to do is delay this process. And right now, DOD is having to
eat the overhead, because we have not funded BRAC.
Mr. Speaker, if families are from El Toro and they are have to move,
or Miramar and having to move to Fallon, Nevada, NTC, all over the
State of California, those families are being disrupted and they are
losing their jobs, defense jobs with the military and associated jobs.
We lost a million jobs in the State of California.
But as Paul Harvey said, the rest of the story is look at who caused
it. And they say that the President wants to save those bases.
Absolutely, he caused it.
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, as I said in my comments, I supported the
last two closings, including bases in my district. No one is suggesting
the downsizing should not occur. It is the process that is extremely
important in this particular effort.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I disagree.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah
[Mr. Hansen].
(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to House
Joint Resolution 102 and in support of the recommendations of the BRAC
Commission.
I know BRAC is painful. The First District of Utah has lost a base in
each round of BRAC and will lose Defense Depot Ogden if this list is
accepted. While I may not agree with every decision, I believe the BRAC
process is fair and must remain independent. That is why I will vote
against this resolution.
Now, after the game has been fairly played, the President wants to go
back and change the rules. Under Public Law 101-510, the President had
two choices: Either send the list back to the Commission with
recommended changes or accept the list in total. The President instead
decided to play outside the law, and forward the list to Congress with
two substantial changes.
The President's unprecedented direction to the Pentagon to privatize
in place the majority of jobs at the McClellan and Kelly Air Logistics
Centers is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the independent
BRAC process for the political expediency of satisfying northern
California.
The administration has continued to play fast and lose with the law.
On a recent visit to McClellan, White House Chief of Staff, Leon
Panetta, issued the following threat:
If there is any action in Congress or by any other depots
to try to inhibit the privatization effort, the President has
made it clear that we will consider that a breach of process
and he will order the McClellan be kept open.
I find that kind of blatant disregard for the law offensive and
contemptuous of the law and of Congress. I want to be very clear, I do
not consider the President's letter, directing privatization inplace,
to be part of the BRAC recommendations we will approve here today.
I also want to point out that any plan to do so would clearly violate
at least five sections of title 10, United States Code. The President
simply cannot ignore current law to solve his own political problems.
Our country has found, several times in our history, that no one is
above the law.
It appears the President has once again come up with a lose-lose-lose
compromise by worrying about political repercussions instead of leading
the Nation.
This plan to privatize inefficient excess capacity and guarantee jobs
is bad for the Department of Defense because it does not address the
fundamental excess capacity questions in the depot system and will only
result in higher maintenance costs and substantially lower savings.
It is bad for the country because it undermines the integrity of a
process designed to be free from this kind of political tampering.
And it is bad for many of the workers at McClellan and Kelly who will
now lose the option to follow their Federal job to another DOD depot.
This recommendation ignores the BRAC Commission findings that ``the
closure of McClellan AFB, and the San Antonio Air Logistics Center,
permits
[[Page H 8689]]
significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduces
DOD operating costs.'' The closure was deemed a necessity given the
significant amount of excess depot capacity and limited defense
resources.
I have already joined with other Members of Congress to raise these
objections to the Pentagon. It is obvious that all bases, would prefer
a second chance to save the majority of the jobs through privatization
in place. Support of this option for political expediency at McClellan,
will endanger the entire BRAC process and the $19 billion in savings it
represents.
I urge all my colleagues to vote against this resolution and to join
me in holding the President, and Department of Defense, accountable for
compliance with the law of the land.
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn].
Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the closure process is an attempt to be
objective. By and large it has been objective. It is not a generally
partisan process. However, it is an intense process within the services
and between the services where there are very high partisan rivalries.
In the case of the Navy, it is a matter of the air wing versus the
surface fleet versus the underseas fleet. What happened in the case of
the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the only shipyard that
has ever returned, consistently, money to the Treasury; the most
efficient one, if you listen to the former commander of the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, Captain Bowman, when he was on the 1993 Base Closure
Commission. He said that everyone in the Navy knows that Long Beach has
been 4 years ahead of every single yard, both in efficiency and
effectiveness.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to put in the Record at this point various
material to back up that and other statements.
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1995.
Hon. Alan J. Dixon,
The Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1700 North Moore
Street, Suite 1425, Arlington, VA.
Dear Chairman Dixon: I am writing to address several issues
which are crucial to the deliberations the 1995 Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission will soon be undertaking
concerning the potential closure of naval shipyards. As you
are aware, The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of
1990 (Public Law 101-510) and subsequent changes made by the
Congress (Public Law 102-311 and Public Law 102-484) were
designed to provide a fair and impartial process for the
timely closure and realignment of domestic military
installations. Under the provisions of this legislation,
specific criteria were established under which the Department
of Defense recommends a military installation for closure.
The law specifically states that these recommendations must
be based on the future force structure plan and
preestablished final selection criteria.
Public Law 101-510 specifically states that the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission can make changes in
the recommendations made by the Department of Defense only if
the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated
substantially from the future force-structure plan and final
selection criteria. (See Attachment A, Sec. 2903(d)(2)(B) and
(C) of Public Law 101-501.)
It has been proven conclusively that in recommending Long
Beach Naval Shipyard for closure, the Department of Defense
substantially deviated from the future force structure plan
and the preestablished final selection criteria. A summary of
the evidence and rationale for this conclusion is presented
in Attachment B.
If the Commission concludes that the Department of Defense
substantially deviated from the criteria established in
Public Law 101-510 then, under this law, this consideration,
and this consideration alone, is sufficient grounds to change
the Secretary of Defense's recommendation.
Representatives of the City of Long Beach and I have had
several meetings with Commission staff where we have
presented the arguments which prove that there has been
substantial deviation. It is my belief that Commission staff
is generally in agreement with our position. However, there
seems to be a concern that since so much overcapacity exists,
some closures will have to occur.
In this regard, the technical case to keep the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard open appears to rest heavily on nuclear
issues, rather than on the future force structure plan and
the preestablished final selection criteria. Based on the
criteria established in Public Law 101-510, if overcapacity
considerations argue for the closure of a naval shipyard, the
data clearly favor keeping the Long Beach Naval Shipyard
open. In addition, closing the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has
a much greater effect on reducing excess capacity. Based on
the data presented by Commission staff at the Commission
``add'' hearing on May 10, 1995, public naval shipyard
nuclear excess capacity is currently 37 percent; conventional
non nuclear excess capacity is 16 percent.
Closing conventional shipyards such as SRF Guam and the
Long Beach Naval Shipyard does not change the Navy's excess
capacity at nuclear shipyards. That remains untouched at its
current level of 37 percent. However, this closure would
result in a shortage of non nuclear shipyard capacity of
minus 17 percent. The irony is that with the exception of a
few aircraft carriers and submarines, the Navy's future ships
will be conventionally powered. In brief, the future of the
Navy seems to be non nuclear. Closing SRF Guam and the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would reduce nuclear excess
capacity to 14 percent, and reduce non-nuclear excess
capacity to 7 percent (See Attachment C, the bar charts
prepared by Commission staff).
Thus, in terms of attaining the objective of reducing
excess capacity, if one of these shipyards has to be closed,
the numbers show that the Commission should close the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
On another related but relevant issue, it is my
understanding that a primary consideration in the decision
not to close McClellan Air Force Base in 1993 was the cost of
environmental clean-up. Moreover, the presentation made by
community representatives at the Wednesday, May 24, 1995
regional hearing heavily emphasized the high cost of
environmental restoration in the case to keep McClellan Air
Force Base open.
As you are aware, legislation and the Department of Defense
guidelines preclude consideration of the costs of
environmental clean-up in the installation closure decision
making process. However, if the potential environmental
clean-up costs are used as a justification not to close
anyone particular installation, these criteria should be
applied equally to all other installations being considered
for closure.
I would like to make one final comment. It appears that
many of the actions in defense of the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard may have been driven by the upcoming New Hampshire
Presidential Primary, as opposed to the cr4iterai established
by Public Law 101-510. A month before the base closure
recommendations were made by the Secretary of Defense,
President Clinton publicly stated that he did not believe the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would be on the list of
installations recommended by the Navy and the Department of
Defense for closure. More recently, the President spoke over
four New Hampshire radio stations as follows: ``I support the
Secretary of Defense's recommendations and I believe that
they will be upheld.''
The Navy sent its most senior officials to the Portsmouth
site visit and regional hearing. Included were Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment
Robert B. Pirie, Jr.; Chief of Naval Operations Jeremy M.
Boorda; Director of Naval
Reactors Admiral Bruce DeMars; and the Commander of the
Naval Sea Systems Command, Vice Admiral George Sterner.
This is unprecedented. Never in the history of the base
closure process have such senior members of any military
service attended a site visit and regional hearing for the
express purpose of advocating that a particular
installation remain open.
I am confident that the Commission will do all it can to
assure that any decisions made regarding the closure of
either the Portsmouth or the Long Beach Naval Shipyard will
be fair and impartial--and made outside of the political
arena--in accordance with the procedures established in
Public Law 101-510. The injection of politics at the highest
level is, I believe, unfortunate and has made more difficult
the already considerable challenge of convincing affected
communities that political considerations are not a factor in
the BRAC decision making process. Your efforts to assure the
integrity of the process are appreciated.
Thank you for considering these very important issues.
Sincerely,
Stephen Horn,
U.S. Representative.
____
Attachment A
Sec. 2903 (d)(2)(B) and (C) of Public Law 101-510
``(B)'' Subject to subparagraph (C), in making ``its
recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of
the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission
determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the
force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in
subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.
``(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D)
in the recommendations made by the Secretary, the Commission
may make the change only if the Commission--
``(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B);
``(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the
force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in
subsection (c)(1);
``(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the
Federal Register not less than 30 days before transmitting
its recommendations to the president pursuant to paragraph
(2); and
``(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change.''
____
[[Page H 8690]]
Attachment B
long beach naval shipyard
Examples of Where the Navy/Department of Defense
Substantially Deviated from the Future Force Structure Plan
and the Preestablished Final Selection Criteria:
1. The Navy predetermined the fate of the Long Beach Naval
Shipyard (Long Beach NSY).
Shifting critical workload away.
Ignored a $100 million offer by the Port of Long Beach to
consolidate facilities from the Naval Station for Shipyard
convenience. Why?
Studied feasibility of bringing a floating drydock from
Hawaii to San Diego (The Machinist).
Never included the Long Beach NSY in the Regional
Maintenance Center concept, but did include the Puget Sound
and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards.
Has postponed the transfer of surplus Naval Station
property from BRAC 91 to BRAC 95. Is there a connection?
2. The Navy states future uncertainties of the force
structure prevent the closure of the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard (Portsmouth NSY).
Public Law 101-510 clearly states that the force structure
plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 be the basis for
making recommendations for base closures and realignments.
The Navy argues, that the uncertainty of the future
submarine force (including future proposed new construction)
including beyond 2001 is a valid and essential consideration.
This is clearly outside the future force structure plan
parameters established by Public Law 101-510.
3. Using the new force structure as the reason not to need
Drydock #1.
In BRAC 1992 and BRAC 1993, the Navy stated that Drydock #1
was essential for conventional aircraft carrier (CV) and
nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) emergent docking on the west
coast.
Additionally, in BRAC 1991 and BRAC 1993 the Navy stated
unequivocally that it could not fulfill its pacific Fleet
mission requirements without Drydock #1.
There are still twelve aircraft carriers in the Fleet with
six homeported in the Pacific area.
The percentage of large deck ships in the new force
structure is increasing.
Drydock #1 is one of two drydocks on the entire west coast
capable of docking EVERY SHIP IN THE NAVY including CVNs and
submarines. Once this asset is lost, its lost forever.
4. The Navy used different economic data and thresholds in
its analysis of installations considered for closure.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance in the BRAC
process stipulates that economic impact is to be assessed at
the economic area level (metropolitan statistical area or
county).
The Navy evaluated the potential impact of closing the Long
Beach NSY based on this criteria.
Four California installations were removed by the Navy due
to cumulative total direct and
indirect job change, even though military value
considerations presented them as viable candidates for
closure.
Long Beach's cumulative total direct and indirect job
change is higher than three of these installations.
Thus, the Navy applied economic impact criteria differently
between the Long Beach NSY and the other four Navy
installations. Again, the Navy/Department of Defense
substantially deviated from the final selection criteria.
5. The Navy recommended the closure of the Long Beach NSY
and not the Portsmouth NSY.
The military value of the Long Beach NSY was higher than
the Portsmouth NSY.
The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria are weighted heavily
toward military value.
The Navy contends that nuclear issues significantly
outweigh the established selection criteria, therefore the
Portsmouth NSY should not be closed.
This is a substantial deviation from the final selection
criteria.
Therefore, if the Portsmouth NSY remains open, the Long
Beach NSY should also remain open due to substantial
deviation in the final selection criteria.
6. The Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) developed data
call scenarios, military value criteria and their evaluation
criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and caused the Long
Beach NSY to obtain lower scores.
This accounts for the Long Beach NSY having a military
value of 48.7 in 1993 and 38.04 in 1995.
The Department of Defense did not establish new final
selection criteria between 1993 and 1995. Thus, based on the
final selection criteria, the relative rankings of the
military value of shipyards should not have changed.
Thus, there was a substantial deviation from the
established final selection criteria.
7. The Navy used different and possibly non-existent
selection criteria in its consideration of private shipyards
on the east coast and the west coast.
The Navy has stated on the record that regardless of
whether technical capabilities or capacity exist, the private
sector on the east coast can not and should not absorb
transferred workload from east coast public shipyards.
Ironically, both Newport News and Electric Boat have the
capability and capacity to handle any transferred workload
from the Portsmouth NSY.
The Navy contends that it is acceptable for the majority of
the Long Beach NSY's transferred workload to be absorbed by
the west coast private shipyards. However, the small private
shipyards on the west coast do not have the capability to
handle large deck ships.
The 1995 BRAC process does not list the quantitation of
private sector capabilities as a part of the final selection
criteria.
8. The Navy badly underestimated the cost of closure
($74.53 million).
The Navy's cost of closure budget submitted to Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) is $433 million. Some sources have
indicated that NAVSEA considers this estimate too low. [See
attached letter from Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard,
dated May 17, 1995.]
Over $500 million of additional workman's compensation
costs over a 20 year period were not included.
Thus, the cost of closure is understated by $858 million.
If the costs of homeporting CVNs at North Island as opposed
to the Long Beach NSY are properly calculated and included,
Long Beach NSY closure costs may exceed $1 billion.
9. The Navy calculates a 20 year Return on Investment of at
least $1.948 billion. The Navy says this is due to workload
shifting to other shipyards. Independent estimates, based on
the workload planning for the Long Beach NSY for fiscal years
1996 through 2001, show that performing this work at other
locations will cost about $450 million less than at the Long
Beach NSY. The result is a break even point of about 40 years
rather than the Navy's claim of an immediate return on
investment. The workman's compensation included in the Long
Beach NSY costs, which must be paid whether the Long Beach
NSY closes or not, will wipe out the $450 million savings.
10. The data call scenarios and military value criteria
established by the BSAT included many factors intended to
address nuclear issues. Yet, the Navy now argues that the
nuclear issues alone are sufficient grounds to keep the
Portsmouth NSY open and close the Long Beach NSY. The Navy
now contends;
No nuclear shipyard should be closed.
All non-nuclear work can be done in nuclear shipyards, but
nuclear work can only be done in nuclear shipyards.
However, nuclear issues always seem to be unclear. The
facts are that the only components on any nuclear ship that
are ``nuclear'' are the reactor compartment, the cooling
systems, and the propulsion systems. Nuclear certification is
required to work on these, and only these components.
It is estimated that 85% of a nuclear ship work package is
conventional work and can be done in non-nuclear shipyards.
The Long Beach NSY with its nuclear certified drydock could
work on any nuclear ship with the assistance of tiger teams
from a nuclear shipyard.
Is the BRAC Commission prepared to:
Balance the true cost of keeping this strategic waterfront
ship repair facility against the unknown future needs of our
Navy and our national defense.
Lose the capability and the strategic location of the Long
Beach NSY's Drydock #1. Once closed, Drydock #1 will be lost
forever.
Close the one public shipyard that complied with Department
of Defense guidance to install more efficient management,
right-sized, and has returned money to the taxpayer six years
in a row. Long Beach NSY is the only public shipyard
operating in the black. What kind of a message does this send
to other federal facilities that are attempting to become
more efficient to ensure their long-term survival.
____
Department of the Navy,
Long Beach Naval Shipyard,
Long Beach, CA, May 17, 1995.
From: Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
To: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 97E).
Subject: FY96 Budget Submission.
Enclosure: (1) Overview Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget. (2)
Long Beach Naval Shipyard Base Closure Budget.
1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted as the Overview
Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget and the Long Beach Naval
Shipyard Base Closure Budget.
J.A. Pickering.
[[Page H 8691]]
EXHIBIT BCIV-02--BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (1995) COMMISSION--FINANCIAL SUMMARY
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity: Long Beach Naval Complex
UIC:
Funded
One-time implementation costs:
Military construction................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Family housing....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Construction..................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Operations....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Environmental........................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Studies.......................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Compliance....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Restoration...................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Operation and maintenance............ 13,980 60,550 ........ ........ ........ ........ 74,530
Military personnel--PCS.............. ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
HAP.................................. ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Other................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. 13,980 60,550 ........ ........ ........ ........ 74,530
======================================================================
Unfunded
One-time implementation costs:
Military construction................ 3,100 9,300 ........ ........ ........ ........ 12,400
Family housing....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Construction..................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Operations....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Environmental........................ 15,597 17,455 ........ ........ ........ ........ 33,052
Studies.......................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Compliance....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Restoration...................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Operation and maintenance............ 73,460 135,499 20,739 15,695 15,729 15,765 276,887
Military personnel--PCS.............. ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
HAP.................................. ........ 36,383 ........ ........ ........ ........ 36,363
Other................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. 92,157 198,617 20,739 15,695 15,729 15,765 358,702
======================================================================
Total Requirement
One-time implementation costs:
Military construction................ 3,100 9,300 ........ ........ ........ ........ 12,400
Family housing....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Construction..................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Operations....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Environmental........................ 15,597 17,455 ........ ........ ........ ........ 33,052
Studies.......................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Compliance....................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Restoration...................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Operation and maintenance............ 87,440 196,049 20,739 15,695 15,729 15,765 351,417
Military personnel--PCS.............. ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .........
Other................................ ........ 36,363 ........ ........ ........ ........ 36,363
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................. 106,137 259,167 20,739 15,695 15,729 15,765 433,232
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Memorandum from U.S. Representative Stephen Horn, June 20, 1995]
Presidential Politics and the 1995 Round of Military Base Closures
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990
(Public Law 101-510) and subsequent changes made by the
Congress (Public Law 102-311 and Public Law 102-484) were
designed to provide a fair and impartial process for the
timely closure and realignment of domestic military
installations. One of the primary objectives of this
legislation was to move the closure of military installations
outside of the political arena, and to base installation
closure actions on the future force structure plan and
preestablished final selection criteria.
Most of the actions which have been taken by the Department
of Defense and past Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commissions appear to have fulfilled these objectives.
However, the actions taken by the Navy, the Department of
Defense, the President, and certain Republican Presidential
candidates in regard to attempting to prevent the closure of
one military installation in New Hampshire appear to violate
the spirit and intent of the law and are unprecedented. It
appears that the actions being taken to save the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard are driven by the 1996 New Hampshire
Presidential Primary as opposed to the criteria established
in Public Law 101-510.
In regard to the Navy's actions in developing the data base
which resulted in the Department of Defense not recommending
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for closure, a few examples are
relevant.
1. The Navy deviated from the future force structure plan
parameters established in Public Law 101-510 in an attempt to
prevent closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Public Law 101-510 clearly states that the Force Structure
Plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 be the basis for
making recommendations for base closures and realignments.
The Navy argues that the uncertainty of the future
submarine force (including future proposed new construction)
including beyond 2001 is a valid and essential consideration.
This is outside the force structure parameters established
by Public law 101-510.
2. The Navy recommended that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
remain open and that another shipyard with a higher military
value be closed. The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria is
weighted heavily toward military value. Thus, there is a
substantial deviation from the established selection
criteria.
3. The Navy attempted to develop their data call scenarios
and military value criteria in a manner that was prejudicial
and would result in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard obtaining a
higher score.
Many factors were included which addressed nuclear issues.
The weighing of military value components was changed to
favor the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was still ranked the second
lowest in military value.
The Navy now contends that nuclear issues alone are
sufficient grounds to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
open, regardless of the fact that they were adequately
considered in the calculation of military value. This is a
substantial deviation from the established final selection
criteria.
There is also evidence that the Department of Defense took
certain actions in an attempt to assure that the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard would remain open. The Department of Defense
established a Joint Cross-Service Group to review base
closure recommendations in regard to inter-servicing. The
Joint Cross Services Group analyzed and reviewed six primary
scenarios for naval shipyard closures. Only one of these
options concluded that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard should
remain open. Yet, when the Department of Defense made its
final recommendations, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was not
among the military installations that it recommended for
closure.
In late January, President Clinton told a Manchester, New
Hampshire radio station audience that he did not believe the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would be on the list of military
installations the Navy and Department of Defense would be
recommending for closure. This was about a month before the
Department of Defense recommendations were released. These
kinds of statements by the President certainly must have had
some effect on Navy and Department of Defense officials who
were in the process of making the final decisions on which
installations to recommend for closure.
After the Department of Defense made their final base
closure recommendations, the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission technical staff conducted an extensive
analysis of whether the recommendation not to close the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard conformed to the legislated future
force structure plan and final selection criteria
requirements. The technical staff then made the
recommendation to add the Portsmouth
[[Page H 8692]]
Naval Shipyard to those military installations being considered for
closure. On May 10, 1995, the Commission voted six to two to
add the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list of bases being
considered for closure. It is interesting that the two
members of the Commission who voted against adding the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list were appointed to the
Commission by Senator Robert Dole, a 1996 Republican
Presidential candidate.
Adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for consideration
caused President Clinton to conduct interviews with four New
Hampshire radio stations stating he did not believe that the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard will be shut down by the Commission
and that he stands behind the Pentagon's original list of
base closures. ``I support the Secretary of Defense's
recommendations, and I believe that they will be upheld.''
Although such behavior, while not appropriate, is expected
of politicians, one might not expect that the White House
would ask the Navy and Department of Defense to go outside
the guidelines established by Public Law 101-510 to attempt
to unduly influence and intimidate the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission. There was so much political heat
that all eight Commissioners decided that they had better
attend the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard site visit and regional
hearing. In the entire history of the base closure and
realignment process, all of the Commissioners have never
attended a site visit and regional hearing for one particular
installation.
Perhaps one of the reasons all eight Commissioners decided
to attend was because they knew the Navy was sending its
``Big Guns'' to shepherd these events. Conducting the site
visit were Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations
and Environment Robert B. Pirrie, Chief of Naval Operations
Jeremy M. Boorda, and the Director of Naval Reactors Admiral
Bruce DeMars. This is unprecedented. Never in the entire
history of the base closure process, have such senior members
of a military service attended an installation site visit. In
addition, Vice Admiral George Sterner, Commander of the Naval
Sea Systems Command, testified in support of the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard at the regional hearing. Again, this has never
happened in conjunction with any potential base closure and
is unprecedented.
No supportable analytical data was presented by the Navy or
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard advocates at the regional hearing.
Instead, the Navy simply said over and over again that the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was absolutely essential for the
Navy to continue its mission, and regardless of the lower
military value ranking and discrepancies in the data base,
the Navy's judgement should be upheld by the Commission. At
one point in the hearing Senator William Cohen lectured the
Commission and implied that the Commissioners did not have
the technical expertise to question subjective judgements
made by the Navy. One can only wonder if all of these high
level Federal officials were ordered to the site visit and
the regional hearing in an attempt to intimidate the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
At this point, one might ask:
Why was the Navy and Department of Defense willing to
deviate substantially from the future force structure plan
and the preestablished final selection criteria and recommend
that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard remain open?
Why did the Commissioners appointed by Senator Robert Dole
vote against adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list
of military installations the Commission is considering for
closure?
What is so important about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard?
The importance of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is that the
vast majority of its personnel live in New Hampshire, the
State that has the first 1996 presidential primary. President
Clinton, Governor Wilson, and Senator Dole all want a strong
showing. The fact that three incumbent presidents, Johnson
Carter, and Bush, all lost their presidencies in part due to
an early challenge from within their own parties has not been
lost on President Clinton and his advisors. The fact that
should the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard close, New Hampshire
voters might take their frustration out on Republican
candidates who they thought could and should have been able
to save it, has not been lost on Governor Wilson or Senator
Dole.
This all makes good sense if you are a Presidential
candidate, but how about:
Good government?
Circumventing the spirit and intent of legislation that was
expressly passed to insure a fair and impartial base closure
process?
Should the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard be held to the same
standards as other military installations which will be
closed?
What about the families and workers who lose their jobs due
to base closures because their State does not have the first
presidential primary?
The real message in the 1994 elections was not a shift from
the Democratic to the Republican party. What the American
Public was trying to tell its elected officials is that it is
tired of a government which does not work, and makes
decisions based on political considerations instead of the
merits of the situation. The situation created by the intense
political effort to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard open
and the upcoming 1996 New Hampshire Presidential Primary is
exactly what the American Public voted against in 1994.
Hopefully, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission will make its ultimate decision based on the
merits rather than politics.
Mr. HORN. The politics of the services seem to be overriding. This
year Admiral Boorda walked into a meeting and said, ``Let's save all
the nuclear shipyards.'' There is only one nonnuclear shipyard and that
is the one that is the most efficient: Long Beach. So that was Death
Knell I for Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
Mr. Speaker, it was the wrong way to go about it. Admiral Boorda
looked me in the eye a month before the decision was made and said,
``Gee, I was sort of out of the loop. I didn't have anything to do with
it.'' I thought that was a little strange for the Chief of Naval
Operations, but so be it.
But then we had the President in Connecticut asked about Portsmouth.
There is something that goes on in New Hampshire every 4 years that I
guess guided this answer. He was not alone. He had Republican
candidates say just what he said. ``Aw, shucks, I sure hope that they
keep Portsmouth open,'' was the attitude. That was a month before the
decision was made in the Navy. That was Death Knell II.
Mr. Speaker, naval political appointees are not stupid. When the boss
says keep one open, it meant the death knell of the other one who had
been ahead of Portsmouth, and even though they juggled the numbers and
tried to make it the other way, was still one-tenth of a point ahead of
Portsmouth on what really counts and that is the military value.
We can argue all the disasters to unemployment, and indeed they are.
Long Beach as a city has suffered more than 46 States in base closure.
In 1991, we had the naval station and the hospital close. In 1995, the
shipyard.
As I said, this is not partisan and does not affect seniority here.
My colleagues will remember the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dellums], the distinguished former chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services, Mare Island and Alameda were closed. The gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
National Security, ranking Republican then, Charleston was closed.
My predecessor, Glenn Anderson, two decades in Congress, a committee
chairman; the naval station and naval hospital were closed.
What bothers me though is that partisan politics got into it with
reference to New Hampshire, and yet the President made an impassioned
speech that morning, and later in the day he simply signed the
recommendations of the defense bureaucrats and politicians and sent
them to Congress.
And, finally, there was the former Senator from Illinois, Mr. Alan
Dixon, who was the President's choice for chairman of the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission. Never have I seen such an arbitrary
chairman. He remains unmatched in my mind as I compare him to some of
the well-known autocratic chairs that existed in the House and the
Senate over the last half century.
Before the Commission's own staff presentation on the Long Beach
Naval Shipyard was completed, Chairman Dixon arbitrarily shut if off,
refused to delay the vote until after lunch, and generally harangued
his colleagues. That was Death Knell III.
And so a great naval shipyard--the youngest, born in 1943; the most
modern; the most efficient and effective of any shipyard will be no
more. No longer will 70 percent of the surface ships in the Pacific
Fleet be within 100 miles of this great facility. Those vessels will
have to travel 1,600 to 2,600 miles to secure comparable service. No
longer will a great work force of 3,000 dedicated men and women, a 60-
percent minority and women work force be available to serve well the
Navy and the Nation. This is indeed a sad day in the military history
of our country.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution, in
favor of the Base Closure Commission recommendations.
Mr. Speaker, this is not an easy process. It is often painful. But,
Mr. Speaker, it is a very necessary process for us to go through.
We like to point out that we have a wonderful military, and the
military
[[Page H 8693]]
did its job during the cold war. It was necessary during that era to
have an extremely large and strong multibased, multipost military
within our country.
We won the cold war, and to those who are losing installations in
their area, they nevertheless should take pride in the fact that they
did their job. The men and women, civilian, military, at those
particular posts, installations, did an excellent job in protecting
freedom through the years.
But this process is one that I have watched. I had the opportunity to
testify in front of the Base Closure Commission. I found them to be
fair. I found them to listen. I found them to read and understand the
facts. They also visited the various installations throughout the
country.
Mr. Speaker, I hope that this body will give a strong vote of support
for the Base Closure Commission, voting against this resolution,
because this is the only process available to save money so that we
will have those dollars to modernize our military; to take care of the
needs, the family needs, the family housing; to make sure we do not cut
our military too small. Mr. Speaker, these Base Closure Commission
savings will help us do that.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut [Ms. DeLauro].
Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution
to reject the recommendations of the Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
I support the base closure and realignment process and believe it has
led to the orderly downsizing of our Nation's defense infrastructure,
given the end of the cold war. The Department of Defense and the
Commission have made a tremendous effort to carefully examine every
base during this and prior base closure rounds.
Nonetheless, I continue to believe the Commission made a shortsighted
decision when it voted to close the Stratford, CT, Army Engine Plant. I
believe that the Army has substantially understated the military value
of the Stratford plant, and it has substantially underestimated the
cost of closing the facility and reconstituting its capabilities
elsewhere.
The Stratford Army Engine Plant is the only place in the country
where we build the AGT1500 tank engines and critical spare parts that
will be used in the Abrams tank for the next 30 years. In my view, it
is a tremendous risk to national security to close this plant and lose
its unique capabilities. With no new tank engine in development, we
need the Stratford plant to extend the life of the engines now in use;
to build critical spares; to provide field expertise to resolve
problems that arise in battlefield situations; and to quickly build new
engines should that be required by a military emergency.
I also remain skeptical about the feasibility of the Army's plan to
reconstitute the dual-use technology that the Stratford plant has used
to produce top quality engines for tanks, helicopters, hovercraft and
commercial jets.
The Army has proposed moving the helicopter work to Corpus Christi,
TX and the tank work to Anniston, AL. But this is much simpler said
than done. The same equipment and the same work force teams at the
plant produce military and commercial products for both aviation and
ground use. All but 2 of 11 manufacturing cells are dual-use, as is the
vast majority of machines. Recreating this capability elsewhere will be
expensive and time consuming.
I also believe the Army has substantially underestimated the cost of
closing the plant.
This year, the Army itself recognized that our Nation's tank engine
industrial base would benefit from continued operation of the Stratford
plant as a dual-use manufacturing facility. In February, the Army
announced that it would invest $47.5 million to downsize the facility,
enhance engine durability, and initiate a Service Life Extension
Program. The employees of the plant, the union members, and the
management joined together to make this plan work--they are cutting
costs, improving productivity, and diversifying the product line into
the commercial marketplace.
This dual-use approach would maintain the vital military value of the
Stratford Army Engine Plant, while reducing costs to the Army by
expanding commercial use of the plant. This would be the best option
for national security and the best option for the taxpayer.
It is hard to understand why the Stratford Army Engine Plant was
recommended for closure when a promising plan for downsizing and dual-
use manufacturing was already in place. I was disappointed by the Base
Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendation to close the
Stratford site and joined the plant's workers and management, and the
community in making our case to the Commission. I still believe
maintaining military and commercial production at Stratford would serve
our country best.
I urge my colleagues to support the resolution of disapproval.
{time} 0940
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Doolittle]. He is from an adjoining
district to mine who has fought staunchly for McClellan Air Force Base.
(Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I have in the past supported the BRAC
Commission process, viewing it as a reasonable way to effect the
necessary downsizing of excess capacity.
As the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] mentioned, I have been
very involved with him, the gentleman from California [Mr. Matsui], the
gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo], the gentleman from California
[Mr. Herger], and others from our region in fighting for McClellan Air
Force Base. I can tell you that the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen]
was right last year or the year before when he proposed cutting off the
process after the first three rounds. I am sorry that we have gone to
the fourth round. The fourth round has disappointed me.
The idea that we somehow remove politics from the BRAC process, in my
opinion, did not turn out to be the case. In fact, it reminds me of the
method for selecting judges advocated by the American Bar Association
throughout the country where all they do is shift the politics from the
more open forum of the Governor, et cetera, and move it back behind
closed doors where intense logrolling and politicking is going on. We
should have had cross-servicing. That would have saved McClellan Air
Force Base. It is a modern base capable of doing the job. But, no,
despite the fact that every major panel has recommended cross-
servicing, we do not have it. It is not part of our defense policy. It
is a tragedy, Mr. Speaker.
We should pass this resolution. We should go back to the drawing
boards. We should get cross-servicing in as part of this, and if we are
going to have politics in the process, then let us get it out in the
open.
Mr. Speaker, I must add I am disappointed in the President. The
President told the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] and me of his
keen awareness of how California has had 15 percent of the military
personnel around the country and suffered 85 percent of the personnel
reductions, and yet when the time came, when the one person that could
have intervened to make a difference here could have exercised that, he
did not.
With the privatization we have got, even that is slipping. I intend
to fight for that. I urge approval of this resolution.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose the
resolution and to ask our colleagues to support the recommendations of
the BRAC Commission.
I cannot help but note the irony of today's debate. Where are our
colleagues who yesterday were on the House floor saying that we have
not cut defense; where are they today? Are they hiding in their
offices? We heard all of these Members stand up and say we are not
doing enough to cut defense. We need to the defense budget more and
more. Where are they today as we are about to decide to close a number
of additional installations that will affect ultimately over 1 million
American people in both the services, the uniforms,
[[Page H 8694]]
and the industrial segment of our community and society who supports
the military?
Why are these cuts occurring? They are occurring because we have been
on a dramatic downsizing of the military, unlike any other period in
the history of this country, down to 3 percent of our GNP, and 16 cents
of every Federal dollar, when you compare it to John Kennedy's tenure
where we were spending 9 percent of our GNP and 55 cents of every
Federal dollar on the military.
We have made dramatic cuts. You are seeing the results of those cuts
partially today.
I think the BRAC Commission did a commendable job. I am not happy
with everything they did. I have been trying for 8 years to close a
facility in my old hometown. I testified three times before the
commission, ``Close this Army facility down. We don't want it. The town
doesn't want it. The county doesn't want it.'' Again, it is not on the
list for closure. So I do not like that, and I will be happy to be back
again next year either legislatively or before the BRAC Commission to
close it again.
I can tell you this Commission accepted a higher percentage of
Pentagon recommendations than any other commission, and despite what
President Clinton said, this Commission came up with more savings than
what the administration had.
But what really outrages me, what really outrages me as a member of
the Committee on National Security and as someone who is going to, at
the end of this month, see the last of 13,000 workers leave the
Philadelphia Navy Yard, the Philadelphia Navy Base, and before that,
the Philadelphia naval hospital, is to see this President play partisan
politics with the lives of people in the military. It is an absolutely
disgusting outrage. Again, this President wants to have it both ways.
He does not have the backbone or the guts to stand up and disapprove
the list and send it back for a reconsideration of McClellan or Kelly.
What does he do? He signs it and then sends a letter down saying, ``I
really don't want to sign it.''
Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely outrageous. But that is what this
President did.
I would like to, at this point in time, ask the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, is it your
distinguished interpretation that that letter has absolutely no legal
standing whatsoever in this process?
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.
Mr. HEFLEY. I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] I
absolutely agree with him.
It has no legal standing as far as we can determine. Our committee
did consider this, and let me just quote from the committee report just
a moment:
In our judgment, the letter of the President of July 13,
1995, communicating his approval of the recommendations of
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Committee, has no
standing beyond certification. Public Law 101-510 does not
provide for any such communication to contain assumptions
about the implementation of the recommendations of the
Commission.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the chairman for that comment.
I would add it is the feeling of this committee that that letter has
no standing whatsoever. It is a political document.
But I would say to the President, Where is your letter for the 13,000
Philadelphia, PA, tri-State workers that are going to be laid off at
the end of this month? Where is your letter of concern for them? Where
is your letter of concern for all of those other bases, or are we just
pandering to one State because of the electoral votes there?
Mr. Speaker, I am absolutely outraged at, again, the lowness of the
depths that this President would take in this process. He has demeaned
the Commission. He has demeaned the process. But somehow that does not
surprise me.
Vote ``no.''
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Evans].
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the
resolution of disapproval. I must do this because I am deeply disturbed
by the base closure process. In the rush to close installations there
has been a failure to analyze all of the facts carefully. This is
obvious from the recommendation made by the Commission concerning the
Savanna Army depot activity.
In the case of Savanna, the Commission ignored a number of important
factors. For example, closing the installation would result in the loss
of important and hard to replicate capabilities, increase costs above
the Army estimate to close the base and move its functions, and reduce
ammo storage capability below critical military needs.
For instance, the Commission failed to consider that Savanna is one
of the most efficient facilities in the Army. During Desert Storm,
Savanna had the highest outloading rate of any depot. It is also one of
the few with adequate rail service to shipping centers. These national
assets would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.
In addition, the estimate of the cost of closing Savanna and
relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School [USADACS]
is too low. DOD stated that it would cost $38 million to close the
installation and relocate functions. However, the Savanna Army depot
realignment task force estimates that the cost of closing the facility
and moving the school is much higher--as much as $88 million. This
includes new construction that will have to take place at McAlester to
complete the move.
Even more important, the decision to close ammunition storage
facilities failed to take into account storage needs. The Army's 1993
Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with
11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside storage will be
needed to match our Nation's future ammunition stockpile. This could
indicate that the ammunition study is flawed. Because of this decision,
we may not have enough space to meet future storage needs.
Our ammunition depots are a national asset that will be needed to
meet future mobilization needs. The Commission's recommendation will
mean the loss of an important part of this irreplaceable asset.
I believe that we must reject the recommendations made by the
Commission. From the errors I have seen made in just the case of the
Savanna Army depot activity, I am concerned that other mistakes may
have been made that will force us to make poor choices concerning our
Nation's defense infrastructure and unnecessarily eliminate the jobs of
thousands of civilian employees who have served our Nation proudly. I
hope my colleagues will join me in opposing these recommendations.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam
[Mr. Underwood].
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time.
Mr. Speaker, as I have pointed out on several occasions previously,
no community is more negatively affected on a per capita basis by the
BRAC 1955 decisions than Guam. We are losing a ship repair facility and
a fleet industrial supply center, the only such facilities on U.S. soil
on the other side of the international dateline, and potentially some
10 percent of our total work force on Guam will be affected.
My community, small and loyal, will be suffering. But my point here
in standing in support of House Joint Resolution 102 is not just to
bemoan the effects of the BRAC process on a small island 9,000 miles
away, with no electoral votes to give and no vote to cast on this
floor. My purpose is to draw attention to the disjunctures in the BRAC
process, to point out that the forward positioning of U.S. forces in
Asia is benefiting foreign countries over U.S. communities.
On the very day the BRAC process was announced, riggers at the ship
repair facility on Guam were offered positions at the Yokosuka ship
repair facility
in Japan, and to point out that America's war fighting capacity in
Asia is overly dependent upon the stationing of forces in foreign
countries when U.S. soil is available, and to point out that the BRAC
process ignored the sound advice of people in uniform and favored the
bean counters, the so-called men in suits in the Pentagon.
For the record, I would like to point out that even as BRAC put forth
a disagreeable decision, Guam is determined to make the best of it and
to
[[Page H 8695]]
survive. In this, I have asked the Department of Defense and the
administration to give Guam the same consideration that other
communities are apparently receiving. In short, we are asking for the
best arrangements possible, a kind of most-favored-base closing
treatment.
I recognize that the resolution may not pass, and I do not intend to
confound the laws which govern the BRAC process and which have served
the country generally well. But consider casting a symbolic vote to
send a message regarding the 1995 process.
Support the Tejeda resolution.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution now
pending before us.
Last year I joined with those who supported postponing the 1995 base
closure round. But the amendment to postpone it was opposed by the
Defense Department, which argued that it needed these savings for
systems modernization and other recapitalization efforts, and this
effort was soundly defeated.
Thus, the 1995 base closure deliberations proceeded. Ultimately, the
Base Closure Commission recommended the closure or realignment of 132
installations, including 123 of the Secretary of Defense's 146
recommendations. The projected savings total $19.3 billion over 20
years.
I do not agree with every one of these decisions, and I sympathize
deeply with those of my colleagues who lost facilities in the 1995 BRAC
process. Northeast Florida will lose thousands of military billets as a
result of the 1993 base closure round, so I am quite familiar with that
pain.
But the Commission, the Pentagon, and the GAO did a huge amount of
work to reach their conclusions in this round. They worked in good
faith. The national security calculations were made. The savings are
now budgeted. It makes no sense to dismiss this enormous effort now. We
should vote down this resolution.
Having said that, I must register my grave concern about the manner
in which the President responded to the Commission's recommendations.
It is my strong view that he has sought to interject politics into this
process by calling for the privatization in place of two major Air
Force logistics facilities that the Commission ordered closed.
In doing so, he has articulated a plan that undermines the entire
purpose behind base closure law, which is to reduce the Pentagon's
excess capacity. By privatizing in place, the administration not only
fails to eliminate this excess capacity, but it exacerbates the current
excess capacity problems at those facilities that the Commission
deemed, after a careful review of objective criteria, to be our most
efficient.
Instead of performing America's essential military maintenance
functions at those facilities the Commission preserved, the
administration would perform them at the facilities deemed least
deserving. It would then further subject these mission critical
functions to a very risky new private management scheme.
To top it off, his plan would violate current law if carried to
fruition.
I urge a no vote on this resolution, but more important, I hope my
colleagues will oppose the administration's attempts to subvert the
BRAC process for political gain.
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo], a gentleman who has worked very
closely with us since his arrival in Congress to save McClellan Air
Force Base.
(Mr. POMBO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. POMBO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this resolution, and in
strong opposition to the 1995 defense base closure recommendations
forwarded to Congress by the President.
I oppose this list for reasons both broad and specific. Specifically,
the inclusion of McClellan AFB on this list is wholly unacceptable. The
Sacramento area of California has already suffered through two previous
rounds of base closures resulting in the total loss of over 28,000
jobs. The closure of McClellan will add another 13,000 direct, and many
more indirect, jobs to that figure.
This BRAC list calls for the closure of McClellan and Kelly Air Force
Bases. This represents the costliest, most disruptive way to eliminate
excess capacity in the Air Force depot system--and will have the worst
impact on military mission support capabilities.
More broadly, however, I am concerned that we are cutting muscle, and
not just fat, with this round of closures. After extensive visits and
consultations, I am convinced that there are serious questions of
national security arising from this BRAC list.
Once we close a military facility, we will never get it back.
Therefore, it is common sense that we must be cautious and discerning
about each and every facility we close.
At issue here is, first and foremost, an issue of America's military
preparedness, and of our ability to influence and shape global affairs
into the next century. I have not yet seen a serious, detailed, and
integrated plan for our future security requirements that analyzes base
closures in light of the needs of our 21st century military. I believe
that such a plan must be produced and debated prior to closing scores
of military bases, and most especially before consideration is given to
closing McClellan Air Force Base.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. Watts].
{time} 1000
Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, President Harry Truman once said,
``Every segment of our population and every individual has the right to
expect from our Government a fair deal.''
Mr. Speaker, the BRAC process was a fair deal for every individual in
this country. Before the BRAC process, bases did not close, downsizing
was simply a theory, and the American taxpayer was charged with
unnecessary bills for the maintenance of excess capacity in our Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
The BRAC process closes unneeded military installations. Military
facilities across the land compete on a level playing field. Some win,
some lose, but the fight is fair and without the political influence of
the Congress or the President. The victors should be honored and now is
the time to stand up and do what is right for this country and her
people. This BRAC has left some in the executive branch with a message
they could not politically swallow. They are now attempting to corrupt
a fair process that estimates a savings of more than $19 billion. Well,
this Congressman and many who sit on both sides of the aisle simply
will not tolerate that and will fight to make certain the BRAC process
remains as apolitical as was originally intended.
BRAC is a proven process and to dismantle that process by
disapproving the list would, in the words of Chairman Alan Dixon,
``destroy the BRAC process forever and fail to save an estimated 19
billion dollars.'' That is simply not an acceptable course of action.
Disagreements between how the BRAC list will be implemented will lead
to heated discussions throughout this Congress. I am especially upset
about the President's decision to privatize-in-place at McClellan and
Kelly Air Force Bases. The President's decision to accept the BRAC list
with a privatize-in-place option is a play that wasn't in the play book
or within the rules of the game. He has taken an apolitical process and
turned it into a zero-sum-game. If this Congress allows the Department
of Defense to privatize-in-place, we will never achieve the savings
that were clearly identified by the BRAC's recommendation, nor will the
BRAC process retain the credibility it has worked so hard to achieve.
But that fight is for another day. Today, we face the question of
rejecting the BRAC list. This question has but one answer--``No.''
Today, we must do what it takes to deliver on our promise for a fair
deal to those we represent. To do this there is only one reasonable
action; accept the BRAC recommendation by voting down the resolution to
disapprove recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission.
I ask you to do the right thing and cast your vote against the
resolution to disapprove the BRAC recommendation.
[[Page H 8696]]
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject the BRAC
Commission's recommendation because they violated not only the spirit
of the law, but the letter of the law that empowers them to close bases
in the first place, and, as an example of that I am deeply disturbed by
the conduct of the BRAC Commission with respect to the Military Ocean
Terminal, Bayonne, NJ, specifically with regard to the recommendation
to eliminate dedicated military ocean terminals. Never before has the
Commission decided, on its own initiative, to virtually eliminate an
entire military mission. Ironically, the Commission found precisely
what I had alleged--that the Secretary had substantially deviated from
the selection criteria in its recommendation to close MOTBY which is
grounds for removal from the list. However, the Commission far exceeded
its statutory charter by expanding the scope of realignments and
eliminated the entire military ocean terminal mission.
Let me outline the numerous legal and factual errors that the BRAC
failed to take into account in their sloppy, haphazard proceedings.
First, a fatally flawed recommendation from the Secretary to close
the Army portion of MOTBY without regard for the cross service
assessment of the Navy Military Sealift Command, leaving this agency
stranded, required removal of the base from the list.
Second, this legal error was further tainted by a legally invalid
attempt to rescue the first recommendation by closing and not enclaving
MSC. This is an unlawful expansion of the scope of realignment because
the BRAC failed to add the MSC enclave at the legal deadline for the
consideration of additional bases.
Third, the BRAC, Navy and DoD have violated the letter and intent of
the BRAC statute by increasing the scope of activities to be realigned
away from Bayonne 1 week away from the Commission's final round of
hearings. This left the community with no time to respond to the
proposed revisions.
Fourth, the BRAC on its own motion realigned activities away from
MOTBY to a so-called Base X. This is a violation of its own selection
criteria 2, regarding the availability and condition of land and
facilities at potential receiving locations. The Commission has failed
to follow its own rules. By randomly assigning missions to mythical
bases, the cost and manpower implications of criteria 4 become
infinite.
Fifth, although the BRAC has limited judicial review of its actions,
it is clear that this is a major abuse of discretion in two areas. The
BRAC's actions are ultra vires and wildly beyond the bounds of its
enabling statute and the Commission has completely failed to follow its
own regulations.
I do not want to seem to be calling sour grapes over this decision. I
want to establish a record because in the next few weeks legislation,
which is equally ill conceived, and proves my case today. This
legislation greatly threatens the military and economic security of the
United States. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act, when combined with the
closure of the dedicated military ocean terminals at both Bayonne and
Oakland, poses the most serious threat to our Nation's ability to
mobilize in this century.
There are compelling military value reasons to reject MOTBY's
closure. MOTBY is a unique strategic asset. No other port on the east
or gulf coasts, commercial or military, can duplicate its combination
of advantages in the support of power projection from the continental
United States without the disruption of commercial port activities.
This was amply demonstrated during the Gulf war and our recent
operations in Somalia and Haiti.
Having investigated and documented this matter fully, it was shocking
to see the assortment of half truths and mischaracterizations that was
paraded before the Commission as analysis, without an opportunity for
rebuttal. For example, the
staff alleged that MOTBY was only used to mobilize the 10th Mountain
Light Infantry Division when, in fact, dozens of units shipped through
MOTBY as well as outsized cargo such as M1A2 tanks from as far as Fort
Hood, TX.
Bayonne sits astride the huge, highly developed, multimodal
transportation network of the American Northeast Corridor. Once cargo
arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast covered
warehouses or uncovered--and fully secure--staging areas. All types of
cargo, from heavy, outsized weapons like the M1A2 tank and the Patriot
antimissile system, to the full range of munitions available to our
fighting forces can be loaded by Bayonne's specially trained union
force using state of the art, dedicated rail lines using every type of
roll-on/roll-off vessel in the MSC inventory. Bayonne has the best
steaming times to Europe, a full day's advantage over any other U.S.
port, military or civilian.
Nowhere in the staff presentation was there any reflection of the
shortcomings of commercial ports. For example, since most ports are
containerized, there are no commercial ports which can lift the 70 tons
of the M1A2 Abrams. If forced to rely on roll-on/roll-off ships in the
MSC inventory, the number of useable commercial ports plummets and even
the tiny, remaining Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, NC, an
ammunition depot, quickly becomes unusable.
Finally as operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia and Haiti have
proven beyond doubt, MOTBY's unique heavy sealift capabilities are
always available to us in a crisis. The Pentagon's recommendation that
Bayonne be closed is based on the untested premise that commercial
ports on the east and gulf coasts will be both willing and able to
forego their profitable contracts to accommodate time sensitive
military cargo. The exact opposite of this premise was experienced with
the ports of Houston and Portland during the Gulf war. Indeed, the
director of port operations of the Port of New York and New Jersey,
Lillian Liburdi, an acknowledged expert on military cargo management,
testified that no commercial port on the east or gulf coast could
substitute for MOTBY. DoD has acknowledged this by contracting with
MARAD and Louisiana State University to study this very issue of
commercial port availability should Bayonne be closed--a study that
should have preceded any closure recommendation.
Past BRACs have wrestled with the depot issue and this BRAC has 14
boxes of studies on depots. It is extremely reckless to leap ahead with
the unstudied and untested assumptions that commercial ports can
replace dedicated military ports in all war fighting scenarios. It
threatens the soldier waiting for resupply on the beach and it
threatens the economy whose ports may be subjected to commandeering at
short notice. The role of MOTBY is essential. If it is closed, we will
be forced to recreate it, at enormous cost, every time we mobilize even
the smallest forces.
Finally, I have taken this time to go into great detail in rebutting
the Commission's finding point by point because of my great policy
concern about maritime commerce. In its ignorance the Commission found,
``six ports capable of deploying an infantry division within 1 day's
rail movement of Bayonne.'' As I warned the Commission in their
regional hearing, legislation deregulating of the maritime industry, in
the form of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, has already been reported
out of the Committee on Transportation. Maritime deregulation will have
powerful shakeouts for ports, much as airline deregulation had for
airports.
Our former colleague, Helen Bentley, who had vast experience in the
maritime industry, has warned that deregulation will create megaports
like airline hubs. Mrs. Bentley warned that deregulation could reduce
the number of ports serving the Nation to as few as four. Most small
seaports will vanish. There is precedence. Just as Halifax has
decimated Great Lakes ports, the passage of NAFTA and maritime
deregulation could spell extinction for gulf coast ports from
competition via Veracruz. Ninety-five percent of American export
commerce moves by ship. If maritime deregulation occurs, there will be
a vast reduction in port capacity. There will be even less willingness
by the new megaports to disrupt commercial traffic by accepting
military cargo on a short term basis. The military cargo charges will
be at an enormous premium. Even the sloppy staff work done by the
Commission showed
[[Page H 8697]]
port operators becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee priority to
military cargo required by port planning orders. In some cases they
desire 12-14 days to clear staging and berthing areas.
Unfortunately, port legal counsel on the BRAC staff failed to
appreciate that the military cannot compel commercial operators to give
priority to military deployments during contingency situations. Under
the third and fourth amendments of the Constitution, there is no
authority to disrupt commercial ports in the absence of a declared
emergency. By that time it may be long after the need to mobilize and
use ports. The Kuwaiti invasion was in August 1990. Congress authorized
the use of force months later. Port planning orders and port allocation
orders are no guarantee port access on a timely basis. The only reason
these orders have worked at all in the past is the delicate balance
struck in the Shipping Act of 1984 between military and necessity and
good commercial practice, which tolerated excess capacity in our ports.
Today, I urge you to reject the BRAC recommendations. The Commission
has far exceeded its authority into roles and missions. Moreover, they
have seriously jeopardized the military readiness of the Nation. It
will cost more than huge sums of money, it will cost soldiers' lives.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Chambliss].
(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Members of the House
recognize the importance of supporting and preserving the integrity of
the BRAC process. In it, Congress has created the most politically
neutral means possible of reducing our military's excessive
infrastructure. Although we may not agree with individual decisions, we
must support the process.
With respect to the process, however, I would like to address a
situation that has arisen from the recommendations of this most recent
Commission. Specifically, I refer to the President's plans for the
future of our air logistics depot structure.
As my colleagues are aware, the Commission determined the Air Force
maintains excess capacity in its air depots. As a result, commissioners
voted to close two depots based on the objective base closure criteria.
As with all individual base closure decisions before, the two depots
slated for closure would be phased out over a 5-year period. This would
solve the two primary problems the BRAC was created to eliminate:
excess capacity and infrastructure.
Now, Mr. Speaker, the Pentagon has come to inform Congress that under
direction of this administration and the President, another plan is in
the works for the two air force depots to be closed.
Mr. Speaker, it seems the President has concluded that the loss of
over 10,000 jobs in each of the very electoral-vote-rich States of
California and Texas demands special attention. In order to save those
jobs, and presumably those votes, the President has instructed the
Secretary of Defense to devise a plan to privatize in place, in effect
maintaining all depot jobs in San Antonio and Sacramento.
What the President is saying here, Mr. Speaker, is that the BRAC
process is political, that an otherwise objective process is necessary
until it affects his chances of reelection. The deliberate end-run this
President is making around the process should offend each and every
Member of this Congress that has worked within the limits of the
process and every Member that has accepted the four rounds of BRAC
recommendations.
You know, it is not very often that this Congress agrees on a
politics-free solution to the problems we face, but in this case the
process must be preserved and defended.
Mr. Speaker, this President's decision to privatize in place the work
performed at Sacramento and San Antonio air logistics centers nullifies
the very difficult decisions made by the BRAC. The BRAC took its charge
very seriously: to assess and repair a military scheme that maintained
excess depot capacity and infrastructure that was out of proportion
with the force structure demanded in this post-cold war world.
The commissioners accomplished their task, and by privatizing in
place, the Pentagon will be overriding the commissioners' decision and
embracing our status quo of excess capacity.
Let me make one point perfectly clear, to my colleagues, but more
important to the President and this administration. The President's
acceptance of this Commission's recommendations is just that:
``acceptance.'' The Commission has not recommended privatization in
place, or any other concoction designed to save political hides,
regardless of how desperate the President is to amend the
recommendations.
The President's acceptance is unconditional, and our rejection here
today of the resolution before us will signal our support for this very
difficult process.
I ask my colleagues to reject the joint resolution before you. The
BRAC process has been many things, but it has not been political.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Farr].
Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the resolution of
disapproval.
I do so because I am concerned about the manner in which the BRAC
Commission carried out its mission. I support downsizing the military
and cutting the budget. But I believe it needs to be done in a manner
that is logical, fair, and honest, with the emphasis, Mr. Speaker, on
honest.
In my district, the BRAC recommended that Fort Hunter Liggett be
realigned. The Army told BRAC publicly and on the record, that it would
only cost $6.7 million to move the mission of Fort Hunter Liggett to
Fort Bliss, TX.
The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that internal Army documents which I have
obtained show a different story. Internal Army documents show that it
will, in fact, cost three times that amount to move the Fort Hunter
Liggett mission.
The Army told BRAC publicly and on the record, that savings of $12.7
million would be realized from the realignment of Fort Hunter Liggett.
But internal Army documents state, ``There are no savings to be
realized in this action.''
I am not whining about having a base realigned in my district. As
everyone knows, my district is the site of the largest base closure so
far, that of Fort Ord. And I know from experience that as traumatic an
experience as base closure can be, there is a way to turn closure into
successful economic redevelopment. President Clinton was at Fort Ord
just this past weekend to celebrate Fort Ord's transformation into a
major educational center. So, I do not necessarily oppose base closure
or realignment. What I oppose is the deliberate manipulation of the
numbers by the Army and the BRAC to make their case.
The BRAC method above all must be fair and honest. I do not believe
this round of closures met those criteria and that is why I support
this resolution.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. Lucas].
Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I know what an emotional issue this is, for I
have been very involved in the BRAC process. I, too, had base on the
closure list, Vance Air Force Base in Enid, OK. And many of my
constituents work for Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. I was
fortunate, my bases are not slated for closure, but I remember the
stress I felt when commissioners visited the base and when I was
waiting for the final closure list.
None of us want to lose something so valuable as a base in our
district.
That is why the 101st Congress created BRAC. They knew that base
closures would best be handled by an unbiased, nonpartisan group. They
knew that when politics are involved, base worthiness and cost-
effectiveness fall by the wayside, as was demonstrated by the President
earlier this year. It would be nearly impossible for Congress and the
President to decide objectively which bases to close.
Sure the BRAC process has flaws, but it has worked well thus far. I
do not think any of us can argue that this process was not fair and
open. We each had ample opportunity to participate and to validate the
information used.
[[Page H 8698]]
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to finish this process
and vote ``no'' on the resolution of disapproval.
{time} 1015
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Ortiz].
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, as the ranking minority member and long time
participant on the Military Installations Subcommittee, I have always
been skeptical of the current base closure process.
I am concerned that the process has not yielded the expected savings
and I believe that Congress should at a minimum have the opportunity to
amend the list.
I believe that the members of the Base Closure Commission worked in
good faith and appreciate the enormity of their task.
Additionally, I support the vast majority of the recommendations of
the Commission.
However, I believe that for national security reasons the Congress
should overturn the closure recommendations as submitted by the
President.
We have reduced our Nation's defense too much and too fast.
I believe that the closure of the Kelly Air Logistics Center at San
Antonio, TX, will result in a severe degradation of readiness that
cannot be overlooked.
The costs, both financially and militarily, will be enormous.
Therefore, I will support the resolution of my colleague from Texas,
Congressman Tejeda.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama [Mr. Browder].
Mr. BROWDER. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to
me.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to note what is happening
today. A lot of us think that this process has gone awry, and we are
speaking up about it. That does not mean that we are not trying to save
money. We are honestly trying to challenge decisions that impact
negatively, not only on our districts but on the national defense.
Let me say something strange, though, for someone who is opposed to
one of the base closure decisions. I think that the base closure
process that we have is about as fair a process as we are going to get.
It is designed to close bases over objections of people who want them
to stay open. So I think it is about as fair a process as we are going
to get. It is a fair process. But sometimes mistakes are made.
Mr. Speaker, I am here today to call attention to one of these
mistakes and to ask that a future Congress come back and take a look at
what happened in this decision. I know Fort McClellan in Alabama is
going to close, which is in my district. We are not going to cry over
spilled milk. Fort McClellan is the home of the Army Chemical School
and the only place in the world where we can train with live agent
chemical weapons on the place. Experts all over the country and
internationally have testified that not only is it a mistake in these
times to close Fort McClellan, but it will disrupt our capability for
up to a decade. Everybody agrees on the increasing threat, not only in
the world from our military enemies, but also from terrorists here
domestically. This is the only place where we can prepare for this.
Now, I know they say they can move it somewhere else, but just this
move experts testify will disrupt the capability for up to 10 years.
Our men and women are required to be able to survive a fight in a
chemical environment. This will disrupt that.
Mr. Speaker, I just want to cite one example. Back in June, the Army
testified to the Base Closure Commission that the one-time closing cost
of Fort McClellan was $231 million. The next month, according to a BRAC
1995 information briefing, these are the Army's own documents, the
closing costs had increased 70 percent, to $393 million. I wish the
BRAC Commission had had the real numbers.
This BRAC document has closing costs, net closing costs; that is,
minus savings, that testified before the Commission in June, $110
million. Now they say the closing costs are $377 million. That is a 243
percent increase. Savings over 20 years, they said in June it was $287
million, and now they say they are not available. The answer to it, in
our newspaper which got this document, says the answer from the Army is
we are not going to talk specific figures. It is too early.
No, Mr. Speaker, it is too late. They tortured the numbers and closed
this base. It will hurt our military men and women in the future. At
some point, Mr. Speaker, in the future something is going to happen
with chemical weapons, an incident akin to the Beirut barracks bombing
of the past, at which time there were investigations about why that was
allowed to happen. Mr. Speaker, at some time in the future, we are
probably going to have a chemical weapons incident, a tragedy akin to
that. When we do, I hope this Congress will come back and investigate
and will hold people accountable for why they not only witnessed, but
accepted, and even participated in the distortion of numbers and the
overriding of all of our military experts who said this is a major
mistake.
Mr. Speaker, I feel somewhat like a friend of
mine, Claude Harris, a former member of this body, who told me one
time about a catfish, and the fisherman that caught that catfish was
about to clean him and he said now, hold still, Mr. Catfish. This is
not going to hurt you too much. All I am going to do is skin you and
gut you. Mr. Speaker, that is what is happening here.
We are going to protest. I urge support of this resolution, but I do
not think this resolution will pass, and in some cases, such as this,
the men and women who fight in our military are going to be the ones
who suffer.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Gonzalez].
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution to
disapprove the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission.
In the first place, I believe the process involved is simply a sham
and evasion of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress. The
Commission concept is simply a way of delegating to others not only our
responsibility to determine what military forces to establish and
maintain, but our fundamental legislative responsibility as well. No
matter how politically easy and attractive the Commission concept is,
we cannot escape the reality that when we embraced this idea, we
effectively said, Congress does not want to exercise its constitutional
mandate with respect to establishing and regulating the military forces
of the United States--we don't even want to legislate when it comes
down to issues of reducing military establishments. Therefore the
process itself is one that is inimical to the vitality, the relevance,
and the plain duty of the Congress. But that is an argument for a
different occasion; the fact is, the Commission concept was established
and in place; it will be for a future Congress to decide whether or not
to embrace the idea again.
This resolution ought to be approved, because the work of the
Commission is flawed, certainly with regard to the logistics support
system of the Air Force.
In the past, commissions did not deviate very much from the plans and
recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, but in this case the
Commission made wholesale revisions. This is a dangerous precedent; it
is not a Commission that must shoulder responsibility in the event of
war; it is the Congress and the President. It is not a Commission that
plans forces to meet contingencies, it is the President and the
Secretary of Defense. It is not a Commission that votes the funds, it
is the Congress. But this Commission went far afield, and made changes
that fundamentally affect the ability of this country to adequately
support its air forces. The fact is, if this resolution fails and the
Commission recommendations take effect, the Air Force will have almost
no reserve capacity for the maintenance of aircraft engines, and very
little reserve capacity to maintain its aircraft. The Commission is, in
effect, placing all the support needs of the Air Force in a single
basket, for each major item. If any one of those places suffers an
accident, there can easily be grave effects on the ability of the Air
Force to perform its basic mission.
I am not speaking of a far-fetched notion.
[[Page H 8699]]
Under the Commission plan, every single military aircraft engine
would be overhauled at a single place. Just a few years ago, that very
building suffered a disastrous fire that shut it down for over a year.
Luckily for the Air Force, the workload at Tinker Air Force Base could
be diverted to the engine facility at Kelly Air Force Base, and
readiness did not suffer.
But the Commission recommended that the logistics functions at Kelly
be shut down--leaving the Air Force not only no reserve capacity to
repair engines, and very little for aircraft in the event of any
conflict lasting more than a few days; but depriving it of any ability
to shift workload in the event a major facility is shut down by
accident or some catastrophic misfortune.
The Air Force recommendation, supported by the Secretary of Defense,
was to keep five Air Force logistics centers, but to reduce each of
them in size, in effect, mothballing capacity that could rapidly be
brought into action in the event of need. This would have saved money
and provided a considerable margin of safety as well. But the
Commission rejected the idea of maintaining such a margin of safety,
even though the Air Force plan would have saved almost as much money as
the Commission plan.
Not only did the Commission reject the idea of maintaining reserve
capacity while saving money, it compounded this double error by
electing to shut down Kelly Air Force Base, which is the cheapest and
most reliable of the Air Logistics Centers. The work that is done at
Kelly is of the highest quality, unsurpassed by any; and its cost per
hour is the lowest in the service. How can it make sense to close down
the lowest cost, highest quality producer? But this is what happened.
The President clearly does not want to lose the capacity that is
available at Kelly Air Force Base, so he has opted to try privatizing
the major facilities there, so as to keep them in being, and keeping at
least some of the trained personnel in place. In other words, the
Commission's basic premise is so flawed that it has been rejected, as a
practical matter. But I do not believe we should accept a half-measure
that on its face accepts the recommendation, but at the same time
rejects its premise, which is where we stand today. I would rather
reject the Commission report outright, and I urge that the House do so
by supporting this resolution. Let us say frankly that we want reserve
capacity; let us say honestly that we want flexibility and emergency
response ability; and let us reject a report and recommendation that
flies in the face of sound policy and even good sense. Vote for the
resolution.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose House
Joint Resolution 102, a motion of disapproval, and ask my colleagues to
vote no.
Mr. Speaker, I am a little hesitant about getting up here this
morning, because I was fortunate that I had two bases on the Base
Closure Commission list and those bases came off. But I want to point
out to my colleagues, I have also in the past had units that were put
on the Base Closure Commission that did not come off.
Mr. Speaker, it should be pointed out that the members of the 1995
Base Closure Commission represented a broad section of this country.
The chairman was Alan Dixon, a former Member from Illinois, and,
incidentally, he voted to close my bases. Then you had Mr. Al Cornella
of South Dakota, a private businessman, and Ms. Rebecca Cox, who served
on the Commission before private enterprise forced out our Air Force
Gen. J.B. Davis, very qualified, Mr. Lee Kling, a banker from St.
Louis, MO, private enterprise. You had Adm. Ben Montoya, who is very
capable and who had been in the Navy.
{time} 1030
And then you had Maj. Gen. Joe Robles who served as a base commander
and knew a lot about base closure. And then you had Miss Wendi Steele
who served on the staff here in Washington on the Senate side. So, Mr.
Speaker, these were qualified people. I guess I spent more time at the
Base Closure Commission meetings and I was impressed.
Now, the staff worked hard. They were highly qualified. Some had been
on the board in previous base closure rounds. They knew the bases and
the process. These men and women, as far as I know, this Commission
spent more time on the job flying around the country. They went
thousands and thousands of miles looking at the different bases. So the
process was open from start to finish. You could talk to the
commissioners, you could talk to staff.
Mr. Speaker, they made themselves available to all of us. It is the
toughest job I think you could give civilians, and that is one reason I
wanted to get up here this morning to commend these commissioners for
taking on a job like this. There are no compliments to it. It was a
heartache to them. They did not like what they had to do, but they
served our country well. I think they did a very thorough and fair job,
and I hope the House will reject the motion for disapproval and accept
the recommendations of this Commission.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bonilla].
(Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of a strong
national defense, a vigilant America, and a secure, peaceful future. I
support this resolution, of which I am an original sponsor, to
disapprove the misguided recommendations of the Base Closure and
Realignment Commission. Closing vital military facilities, like Kelly
Air Force Base, leaves America weaker. Ask my colleagues to put aside
parochial interests and vote for a strong Armed Forces. Reject the BRAC
proposals.
Ronald Reagan clearly understood the necessity of a policy of peace
through strength. That policy brought us triumph in the cold war. In
contrast, policies of unilateral disarmament in the past only served to
embolden aggressors and set the stage for World War II. I am afraid
these BRAC recommendations reflect a pattern of disarmament which
threatens our future security.
Our military leaders and the Commander-in-Chief have recognized the
serious negative implications of the BRAC recommendations for our
military security. However, President Clinton failed to reject these
dangerous proposals. I urge my colleagues to reject these proposals and
please vote for a strong defense and for this resolution.
I would be remiss if I failed to note that the BRAC did get some
things right. This BRAC recognized the importance and quality of
Laughlin Air Force Base. Its facilities remain second to none and the
BRAC Commissioners had no choice but to recognize that fact. Brooks Air
Force Base's excellence was recognized as well. However, the
recommendation to close Kelly remains irresponsible and dangerous.
I also want to take a moment to comment on the human dimension of
this recommendation. The BRAC proposal will have a devastating impact
on affected communities costing tens of thousands of jobs and hurting
tens of thousands of families. Closing Kelly Air Force Base in San
Antonio will slam the door on thousands of hard working patriotic
Americans. It will ignore their sacrifices. I know that the spirit and
the dedication of the Kelly worker cannot be crushed and that
ultimately San Antonio will overcome this setback. But our military
will clearly be weakened and the lives of Kelly's workers will be
disrupted and their financial security jeopardized. Please vote for
this resolution and let Kelly's workers know we are in their corner.
If you support the visions of Ronald Reagan's peace through strength,
if you support our U.S. Air Force, if you support the plan of
preserving freedom and liberty going into the next century, please vote
for this resolution.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my friend, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Smith].
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and friend and
neighbor from San Antonio for yielding me time.
On June 16, 1995, 35,000 San Antonians lined the streets of our
hometown to
[[Page H 8700]]
demonstrate ``Kelly Pride.'' The purpose of this huge demonstration in
``Military City'' was to inform the Base Realignment and Closure
Commission why Kelly Air Force Base should not be closed. It wasn't
only the people of San Antonio who recognized the importance of Kelly
to defending the freedom that Americans cherish. Military leaders
understood the importance of Kelly and recommended that BRAC not close
Kelly. Because the BRAC Commission ignored this view and decided to
close Kelly anyway, I support the Tejada resolution and will vote to
disapprove the BRAC Commission list.
Our military leaders recommended that Kelly stay open for good
reason. The pride of San Antonio has made Kelly into one of the
Nation's premier Air Force bases, an essential player in the free
world's fight against nazism, fascism, communism, and in the recently
successful campaign in the Persian Gulf.
You can see the pride of San Antonio in the work of the generations
of San Antonians who have made Kelly Air Logistics Center synonymous
with high quality, top efficiency, and unmatched productivity.
You can see the pride of San Antonio as another C-5 or C-5A rolls out
of one of the enormous hangers where it has been expertly serviced and
prepared to do its part in our Nation's defense.
You can see the pride of San Antonio as its military and civilian
communities rallied together to support airlifts in Operation Desert
Storm and all recent major conflicts and humanitarian missions.
The Air Force recognized the indispensable contributions of Kelly and
that is why they recommended that this depot remain open. Because BRAC
rejected the recommendations of our military experts, I will vote for
the motion to disapprove the recommendations of the Base Closure and
Realignment Commission out of protest against the loss of resources and
services that the Kelly community contributes to our Nation's defense.
Kelly's proud tradition is confirmed not only by the Air Force's
recommendation that Kelly stay open but also by the decision of the
Commission and the administration to recommend that ``Privatization in
place'' be implemented at Kelly. I am encouraged and hopeful that this
plan will secure our Nation's defense. Our community's leaders, the
city of San Antonio, and the Kelly community will join together to work
with the Federal Government to ensure that this transition is as smooth
as possible.
I know that our community will show the hard work, patriotism, and
commitment that it has always shown in its work for our Nation's
military. I am optimistic that you will continue to see San Antonio's
pride as future generations of workers demonstrate their excellence, as
another C-5 rolls out of the hanger, and as we support the missions of
our Nation's armed services in future crises. ``Kelly Pride'' will
sustain our community through this transition, just as thoroughly as it
has sustained our Nation's Air Force for so many years.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona [Mr. Pastor].
(Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, the Hispanic Caucus has been a very active
participant throughout the BRAC process. Our concern has been the
closure of Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio.
We have worked in a bipartisan manner with out colleagues from San
Antonio in order to ensure that the economic viability of San Antonio
continues. As you heard this morning, and studies have shown, on the
merits Kelly Air Force Base deserves to continue its mission. It has
been very effective. It has been efficient and plays a vital role in
the defense of this country. So on the merits alone, Kelly Air Force
Base deserves to continue its mission.
One of the concerns that we have as the Hispanic Caucus is that Kelly
Air Force Base has been a long-time employer of the Hispanic community
in San Antonio. To date, over 60 percent of the civilian employment
base in Kelly is of Mexican-American descent. Kelly Air Force Base has
had a long history in the Hispanic community. It has provided
employment and in turn has provided opportunities for Hispanic families
to better themselves.
If Kelly Air Force Base is closed according to the BRAC
recommendation, it will have a devastating effect in the Hispanic
community of San Antonio, high unemployment, lack of opportunity for
families to better themselves.
Mr. Speaker, Kelly Air Force Base deserves to stay open, continue its
mission on the merits, but it also needs to continue in order to ensure
the well-being of San Antonians in Texas.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. Kolbe). The gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Tejeda] has 3 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr.
Fazio] has 4 minutes remaining.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California [Ms. Waters].
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution
of disapproval. The 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission
recommendations have missed the mark. This year's report uses that I
believe to be faulty methodology, underestimated costs, and optimistic
savings assumptions. As I have stated previously in writing to
President Clinton, in light of the problems associated with this
report, we should declare a moratorium on all base closures, pending a
reexamination of the true savings associated with closing the specified
bases.
Obviously, my primary frame of reference for this issue is in the
State of California. California has already lost 22 bases--more than
any other State. If the current closings go into effect, the cumulative
loss for California would total 200,000 jobs and $7 billion in economic
activity. Closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, in Long Beach, CA, as
this report would do, is unnecessary, militarily risky, and it would
exacerbate the deteriorating industrial base of our region of the
country.
Without question, these recommendations are bad for California, but
they are bad for the military as well. Many of the savings envisioned
from this report are illusory. There is no guarantee we can save money
and no real assurances that jobs lost can be replaced. Previous
attempts to contract for lost jobs have been less than successful. In
conclusion, let's start this process over and do it right. Let's
support this resolution, and disapprove the Base Closing Commission
report.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, the result of this year's round of BRAC
decisions adversely affected my own district in Indiantown Gap,
heretofore a vital part of our national defense structure, which has
been modified downward, downsized, as it were, by the decision. You
would think then that I would stand here and support with all my heart
and vigor the resolution that is at hand, but I take the opposite view.
I supported the initial concept of BRAC and its initial coming into
being and voted for it. It is unseemly now of me to say that, because
it has affected perhaps adversely my own back yard, that the concept is
wrong, that the decisionmaking was flawed, that the concept is
inappropriate. I believe very strongly that the people in my district
who were affected by this latest decision of the BRAC are going to be
able to rally to the cause of softening the blow and of finding
alternative ways of continuing the enterprises in which they were
involved in support of some of the activities of the Indiantown Gap
facility.
In short, they will be resilient enough to understand that we cannot
have a nationwide concept of downsizing our bases across the Nation and
across the world except for our own. Therefore, I will vote against
this resolution.
{time} 1045
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I just want to simply sum up by saying a few things
here. I think the gentleman from California [Mr. Doolittle] said it
correctly when he said BRAC was a political entity. It simply takes the
politics out of Congress and perhaps out of the Pentagon, and puts it
in the hands of a number of decent and perhaps well-intentioned
[[Page H 8701]]
people, but people who do bring biases. We have seen this debate go on,
as others have in the past, and those who dodge the BRAC bullet are
here to praise the Commission, and those who were impacted by it are
here to deride them.
The bottom line is, for California, as we have heard from many
Members, we have had an overwhelming impact. Fourteen percent of all
DOD personnel in our State, from 60 direct to 85 indirect percentage of
all jobs lost through the 4 BRAC rounds in one State. There is no
question, if we had moved across services and forced the military
entities to compete with each other, we could have done a much better
job of saving the taxpayers money and preserving the best of our
infrastructure, but privatization is also important. We have heard
people come to the floor today and deride privatization. Whether it is
the Defense Science Board or the Joint Chiefs or the Commission on
Roles and Missions, all of them are pushing us in the direction of
privatization. The President pushes for it, the BRAC itself in its
report allows it, and I call my colleagues to read the letter from the
President to the Commission, from the Commission to the President, all
of the legal authority in the view of all the various general counsel
and all the agencies makes clear that privatization can take place at
McClellan and Kelly Air Force Base, despite the critics, who would like
to take our workload and would like to take our jobs to their own
bases.
Let me be very clear. We will be dipping into readiness to pay for
this foolish reduction in our capability. We will not be able to make
the numbers work out. This BRAC round is predicated on phony bean
counting, and in my view, we will pay for it, not only with turbulence
in our military repair area, particularly for aircraft in the Air Force
arsenal, but we will also pay for it by draining our readiness funds to
pay for base closure, something that is supposed to save the taxpayers
money.
Sacramento will survive. We will pull it together and we will come
back, despite these heavy hits, but I do believe that my opposition and
my support for this resolution is firmly based on the hit on American
military readiness, so I would urge my colleagues to join us in perhaps
what is a protest vote, but still a symbolic and important symbol of
our opposition.
Mr. Speaker, I yield my remaining 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Tejeda].
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
(Mr. TEJEDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank very much the
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley], our chairman on the Subcommittee
on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on National
Security, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], our full
committee chairman, for their cooperation and understanding on this
issue.
Mr. Speaker, Kelly has the best quality record with the lowest defect
rate and the fewest customer complaints of all ALCs. Kelly has the best
educated Air Force, and nowhere else in the Nation will we find
employees who are as involved in their community than in San Antonio.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Base Closure Commission has cut right
through the fat and into the bone and muscle of our Air Force. Keep in
mind that California was essential to the success of Operation Just
Cause and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, 17 million pounds of munitions and 64 percent
of items for airlift support were shipped through Kelly. The Air Force
recommendation to the Commission on Depots was the product of a
thorough, year-long study conducted by professional military analysts.
The Base Closure Commission's recommendation on the ALCs followed only
6 weeks of study, during which time they were also attempting to focus
on hundreds of other Air Force, Army, and Navy installations.
Mr. Speaker, this is the final opportunity to right the wrongs made
by the Commission. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of
disapproval.
Mr. Speaker, I fully recognize that the post-cold-war drawdown of
military infrastructure has lagged behind the personnel reductions.
Nobody said that there would be easy choices in this round of base
closures.
I feel strongly, however, that the Base Closure Commission
overstepped its bounds and placed our military readiness at risk in the
event of a national crisis. Never before in previous base closure
rounds has a Commission deviated so substantially from the Defense
Department's recommendations.
It should come as no surprise that my objection to this base closure
list rests with the recommended closure of two Air Force logistics
centers, or ALCs. Although Kelly AFB is not in my district, I do
represent many of the outstanding and dedicated workers there and I
recognize that the work they do is second to none in the Department of
Defense.
In fact, Kelly has the best quality record, with the lowest defect
rate and fewest customer complaints, of all ALCs. Kelly has the best
educated work force, and nowhere else in the Nation will you find
employees who are as involved in their community than in San Antonio.
In March, the Air Force and the Department of Defense proposed to the
Base Closure Commission that the five existing ALCs downsize in place
rather than close one of the depots. To reach this commonsense
proposal, the Air Force focussed on being financially responsible,
reducing excess capacity, and satisfying its current and projected
needs.
In testimony before the Base Closure Commission, Secretary of the Air
Force Widnall stated that the cost to close one Air Force depot would
nearly equal the entire Air Force budget for the next 6 years for all
of its 1995 closures and realignments. So what does the Commission do?
It votes to close not only two depots, but it votes to close the most
cost-effective and productive depot at Kelly AFB.
The original Air Force recommendation of downsizing would have
eliminated more than one depot equivalent worth of excess capacity
without losing the many unique facilities and capabilities at any of
the depots. In voting to close two, the Commission disregarded the
value and cost-effectiveness of these unique facilities,
particularly with respect to the C-5 at Kelly AFB.
There is only one depot in the Defense Department which can support
the C-5. Kelly has the only hangar in the DOD which can hold six C-5s,
and it is the only depot able to test and repair the C-5 engine. With
23 years of C-5 management and maintenance experience, Kelly is the
heart of DOD strategic airlift.
During Commission hearings, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ron
Fogleman stated:
It is clear that we have excess capacity. It is equally
clear, in my view, that our approach reduces that capacity in
the manner that best serves the total operational mission of
the Air Force. I believe it is the only responsible approach
to this issue.
The day before the Commission's vote on the ALCs, Secretary Widnall
and General Fogleman wrote to Commission Chairman Alan Dixon. I will
not read the letter, but I think it is significant and include it in
the Record at this point of the debate.
The material referred to is as follows:
Secretary of the Air Force,
Washington, DC, June 21, 1995.
Hon. Alan J. Dixon,
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission,
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425, Arlington, VA
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Air Force approach to the depots is
prudent because it saves money for the taxpayers and protects
military readiness. It is also the product of exhaustive
analysis by military professionals and senior leadership who
have been working the proposal for over a year.
Our depot proposal is simple. Building on the personnel
reductions that have already been taken from the Air Logistic
Centers and depots during the last five years (over 26,000
people), the pending air Force proposal would reduce and
realign the depots by an additional 1,987 jobs (with a net
present value of $975 million). While there would be some
disruption, the business of the Air Force--flying combat and
transport aircraft, and maintaining our command and control
and space network--would continue unimpeded. This total air
Force depot reduction of 28,000 jobs is almost two and a half
times the total depot reduction achieved by all other DoD
components in all four BRAC rounds combined.
On the other hand, the staff generated BRAC proposal
described to us will cost the Air Force hundreds of millions
of additional dollars (in excess of $1 billion in
environmental and military construction costs) during the
next five years; disrupt military readiness because of the
total restructuring of the Air Force logistics and depot
system; preclude the Air Force from carrying through on vital
readiness and modernization programs; and have a devastating
impact on as many as 25,000 DoD employees in Texas and
California who would lose their jobs or have to relocate to
other Air Force installations at great personal and public
expense.
Most importantly, the essential business of the Air Force--
operations, logistics, and budget dollars that are critical
to future modernization--would be greatly disrupted. Since
the end of the cold war, the Air Force
[[Page H 8702]]
has reduced its budget by more than $20 billion and reduced personnel
by over 200,000 people. Some further reductions and savings
are necessary; however, they must be taken in a way that
permits the Air Force to continue to carry out its essential
mission. The Department of Defense proposal does that; the
Commission staff alternative does not.
Sincerely,
Ronald R. Fogleman,
General, USAF Chief of Staff.
Shiela E. Widnall,
Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. Speaker, in essence, they warned that the staff-generated BRAC
proposal to close ALC's would severely disrupt military readiness and
the essential operations of the Air Force.
As I sat in the hearing room during the Commission's deliberations on
the ALC's, I was stunned by the blatant agenda being advanced by the
Commission's staff--to portray Kelly AFB in the worst possible light
and provide for the closure of two ALC's.
Commissioner J.B. Davis, a retired Air Force general, acknowledged
during the Commission's vote that the staff seemed to be focused on the
excess capacity figures. He concurred with General Fogleman that some
overcapacity helps. It is that overcapacity, surge capacity, that
services need in times of a crisis. He stated: ``Closing depots * * *
can severely disrupt that service and the Air Force's wartime
capability.''
Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Base Closure Commission has cut right
through the fat and into the bone and muscle of our Air Force. Keep in
mind that Kelly was essential to the success of operation just cause
and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert Shield/
Desert Storm, 17 million pounds of munitions and 64 percent of items
for airlift support were shipped through Kelly.
The Air Force recommendation to the Commission on Depots was the
product of a thorough year-long study conducted by professional
military analysts. The Base Closure Commission's recommendations on the
ALC's followed only 6 weeks of study, during which time they were also
attempting to focus on hundreds of other Air Force, Army and Navy
installations.
This is the final opportunity to right the wrongs made by the
Commission. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of
disapproval.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda]
and the gentleman from California, [Mr. Fazio] for the way in which
they have conducted themselves during this debate. I have tremendous
empathy for the fight they are engaged in over there. Heck, I have the
same problem. I do not want to see Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center
closed, either. I think it is a mistake to do that.
I have a little less empathy with the parade of people who have come
up here who voted yesterday for an across-the-board cut in the Defense
budget who are now crying because a base in their area is being
affected. That seems a little disingenuous to me.
This is not an easy process. I think sometimes this process does make
wrong decisions. I think some of these decisions we will regret down
the line when we have national emergencies. I know this is agonizing
for communities across this country, and it is not easy for the various
branches of the services who are going through this, and having to
recommend closing things that we would really rather not, in many
cases, because they do not think it makes good sense. I am very
disappointed that the President of the United States injected
Presidential politics into this process. I think that is very
disappointing.
This is not a perfect process, but it is the only process we have to
get at this. We had not closed a base in this country since the 1970's
until this process started. Congress did not have the ability to close
bases. There are some bases that we do need to close. I reject the idea
that to vote against this resolution is to vote against a strong
national defense. It is this administration that is driving the depth
at which we have to cut back on defense in this country. It is the most
anti-Defense administration, I think, in the last 50 years, and that is
what is driving the deep cuts that we have to make.
With these deep cuts, we have to use every single Defense dollar we
have the most effective way possible, so yes, we are having to give up
some facilities that I wish we were not giving up. However, this is the
process we have set up. This is the end of this round of base closure.
I would encourage my colleagues to vote against this resolution,
support the Base Closure Commission, and let us now move on to
solidifying what we have with our defense structure across this
country, and make sure that we have a strong defense with what we have
left.
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, I am compelled to vote in support of the
resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission [BRAC]. I approve of the BRAC process, but
in my district the Army has taken action under BRAC 95 that simply does
not make sense, and I cannot support it.
The Army, in its closure submittal to the BRAC, has proposed moving
the 400 military and civilian personnel and equipment of the Army's
Information Systems Software Development Center [ISSC] from leased
space in Fairfax County to Government space on Fort Meade, MD. It is
ostensibly an in-area move and personnel will be transferred to the new
facility at Fort Meade without layoffs. With the pressure on the
services to move out of leased space, it looks like a good move. But,
this is a bad decision for the Army and the Government, and though I
have urged the Army and the BRAC to reconsider this decision, today we
still find this facility slated for transfer in this BRAC
recommendation.
The Army ISSC has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. When the
Army looked to move ISSC from outdated leased facilities in Fairfax,
VA, it asked the General Services Administration [GSA] to rent space
for ISSC in northern Virginia. The Army even specified the boundaries
of an area in which they wanted to rent--a location close to its Fort
Belvoir and Pentagon customers and close to where most of its employees
had settled over the past 20 years. This was the Crown Ridge building
located at the junction of I-66 and the Fairfax County Parkway in my
district.
GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease with Crown Ridge
Associates for 6 years. That lease started a little over a year ago and
runs through May 28, 2000. A total of $7.2 million was spent by Crown
Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the building to meet the unique
requirements of Army ISSC. Crown spent $1.3 million, GSA $2.9 million,
and DOD spent $3.0 million to get this building ready. And in fact,
they are still in the process of upgrading and moving into the space.
After spending all this money, the Army proposed in this BRAC to move
ISSC to Fort Meade, MD. The Army believes that it will save $8 million
over 20 years. Under the Army lease with GSA, it can move out of the
space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.
Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer, GSA is still
obligated for the 6-year term of the lease. If the Army moves out, GSA
is stuck with an empty building. Not only that, but this will not be an
easy space for the GSA to find government customers for. Traditionally,
GSA would look for locations in some proximity to mass transit--the
subway, trains, and bus lines. This location is well beyond the subway
and there are no easy connections to mass transit. To quote GSA
regarding Army plans to move out of this building,
. . . the building was leased specifically for the Army,
and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal
agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the
building might be difficult to market.
In addition, the Army is going to have to convert or build facilities
at Fort Meade. The Cobra model figures used by the Army indicate that
it will have to spend roughly $5 million to renovate space at Fort
Meade and moves ISSC. So, at a minimum, the Government spends $11
million in renovation and moving costs and ISSC has to go through two
moves in 3 years. But, the Government also will be stuck with a $3
million per year lease for a building which may sit empty for 3 years--
another $9 million.
This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process to work--the
objective is to reduce costs for the Government, not just the military
services. Clearly, the Army should have made this move before it asked
GSA to sign a 6-year lease. Now, however, the lease has been signed,
and the Government is on the hook even if the Army moves out. I
understand the pressure on the Army to move out of leased space, but
this is a bad deal for the Government and the American taxpayer.
For this reason, I cannot support the BRAC recommendations.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint
Resolution 102, to disapprove the recommendations of the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission.
It is with great reluctance that I oppose the resolution of
disapproval. I do so despite the fact that the Commission accepted a
flawed Army recommendation to close the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant in
my district.
In my judgment, the Army mishandled this matter. All other issues
aside, the most fundamental shortcoming of the Army's recommendation is
the lack of a credible estimate of the cost of closing the tank plant.
[[Page H 8703]]
The Army's original claim was that closing the tank plant would
result in a one-time cost of only $1.4 million. When I asked the Army
how it arrived at this figure, the Army told me the estimate was based
on a standard formula that sets building closing costs at $1.25 per
square foot.
A buck and a quarter per square foot isn't going to do the job.
Unlike most Army installations, the Detroit Tank Plant is an industrial
facility that has been manufacturing tanks for nearly 50 years. I
sincerely doubt $1.4 million will be enough to close the facility and
move the work to other locations.
During her site visit to the tank plant last April, Commissioner
Steele heard a broad range of testimony from myself and others that
raised serious problems with the Army's original closing cost estimate.
After hearing the evidence, Commissioner Steele asked the Army to
prepare a revised cost estimate by mid-May.
The Army never presented a revised cost estimate. The Army's Tank
Automotive and Armaments Command [TACOM] in Warren, MI, requested and
received detailed closing cost data from the contractor at the plant.
Using this data, TACOM prepared a revised closing cost estimate. At the
11th hour, I was informed that the Army rejected the new cost study and
decided to stick with its original estimate of $1.4 million.
While the Army was unwilling to accept new cost data from the people
who actually run the plant, my office received reports that the true
closing costs, as calculated by the contractor at the plant and TACOM,
are at least 25 times higher than the Army's original calculations.
It is being increasingly suggested that the Army desires to transfer
the tank plant's work from the private sector to the Government-run
Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois. This would be contrary to OMB circular
No. A-76, which states that it is the official policy of United States
that ``the Government should not compete with its citizens.'' It also
would be contrary to the recent recommendations of the Commission on
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. These jobs should remain in the
private sector and in Michigan.
So why am I opposing the resolution to disapprove the base closure
list? I do so for the simple reason that the Nation cannot afford to
spend billions of dollars ever year for unneeded defense installations
around the country. At the end of the day, the independent base closure
process is the only means we have to close unneeded military
facilities.
The base closure process is painful. The process sometimes results in
the wrong military facilities being closed, as the closure of the
Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant demonstrates. The one virtue of the base
closure process is that it is unbiased and immune from politics. At the
end of the day, it's about as fair a process as we're going to get.
I did everything I could to save the tank plant; however, I largely
agree with the balance of the Base Closure Commissions recommendations
to close or realign 103 other bases and military facilities. Closing
these bases is expected to save more than $19 billion over 20 years. I
will therefore oppose the resolution of disapproval.
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I support the resolution of disapproval. I
must do this because I am deeply disturbed by the base closure process.
In the rush to close installations there has been a failure to analyze
all of the facts carefully. This is obvious in the recommendations made
by the Commission concerning the Savanna Army Depot Activity and the
O'Hare Reserve Station.
In the case of the Savanna Army Depot Activity, the Commission
ignored a number of important factors. For example, closing the
installation would result in the loss of important and hard-to-
replicate capabilities, increase costs above the Army estimate to close
the base and move its functions, and reduce ammo storage capability
below critical military needs.
For instance, the Commission failed to consider that Savanna is one
of the most efficient facilities in the Army. During Desert Storm,
Savanna had the highest outloading rate of any depot. It is also one of
the few with adequate rail service to shipping centers. These national
assets would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.
In addition, the estimate of the cost of closing Savanna and
relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School [USADACS]
is too low. DOD stated that it would cost $38 million to close the
installation and relocate functions. However, the Savanna Army Depot
Realignment Task Force estimates that the cost of closing the facility
and moving the school is much higher--as much as $88 million. This
includes new construction that will have to take place at McAlester to
complete the move.
Even more importantly, the decision to close ammunition storage
facilities failed to take into account storage needs. The Army's 1993
Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with
11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside storage will be
needed to match our Nation's future ammunition stockpile. This could
indicate that the ammunition study is flawed. Because of this decision,
we may not have enough space to meet future storage needs.
Our ammunition depots are a national asset that will be needed to
meet future mobilization needs. The Commission's recommendation will
mean the loss of an important part of this irreplaceable asset.
Regarding the Commission's recommendation on the O'Hare Air Reserve
Station, I am deeply disappointed that the Commission chose a course of
action that will eliminate an entire unit within the State and also
move the remaining KC135 unit to Scott AFB. The latter recommendation
was made without an analysis of the costs to the Government or how long
it will take the units to return to operational status.
The closure of the station and its C-130 unit would be a blow to
Illinois and a sad chapter in one of our Nation's finest military
units. The 928th Airlift Wing has one of the most distinguished records
of any Reserve unit in the country. A highlight of this is the 46 years
and over 166,000 hours of flying without an accident, the longest
stretch of accident-free flying by any civilian or military
organization in the country. We should preserve this record and keep
the unit in one of the communities in Illinois willing to host it.
Unfortunately, the Commission's recommendation will eliminate this
effective and efficient fighting asset.
I am also disappointed that the Commission decided to change last
year's recommendation concerning moving the 126th Air Refueling Wing.
Instead of allowing the process to fully progress, the Commission
arbitrarily chose to relocate the unit to Scott Air Force Base. This
move was done without any analysis of how long it would take the unit
to reach full operational capability due to recruiting and retention
concerns. Without this analysis, this recommendation is shortsighted
and did not include a thoughtful consideration of other potential sites
in the State of Illinois. I therefore cannot support this
recommendation.
I believe that we should reject the recommendations of the
Commission. From the errors I have seen made in just these two
examples, I am concerned that other mistakes may have been made that
will force us to make poor choices concerning our Nation's defense
infrastructure and unnecessarily eliminate the jobs of thousands of
civilian employees who have served our Nation proudly. I hope my
colleagues will join me in opposing these recommendations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired. Pursuant to section
2908 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the
question is on passage of the joint resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the grounds that a
quorum is not present and I make the point of order that a quorum is
not present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant of Arms will notify absent Members.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 75,
nays 343, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 647]
YEAS--75
Ackerman
Andrews
Bentsen
Bevill
Bonilla
Borski
Browder
Brown (CA)
Bryant (TX)
Chapman
Clay
Coleman
Combest
Costello
Davis
de la Garza
DeLauro
Dixon
Doolittle
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Ford
Fox
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gonzalez
Goodling
Green
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Herger
Hilliard
Holden
Horn
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Kennelly
Kim
Lantos
Lewis (CA)
Lofgren
Manzullo
Martinez
Matsui
McCollum
Menendez
Mica
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Murtha
Myers
Ortiz
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Pombo
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Scarborough
Schroeder
Seastrand
Shuster
Smith (TX)
Talent
Tejeda
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Waters
Williams
Woolsey
Wynn
NAYS--343
Abercrombie
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Beilenson
Bereuter
Berman
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonior
Bono
Boucher
Brewster
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
[[Page H 8704]]
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Cooley
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Dellums
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Doggett
Dooley
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fattah
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Frost
Funderburk
Furse
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gibbons
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Heineman
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lowey
Lucas
Luther
Manton
Markey
Martini
Mascara
McCarthy
McCrery
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Metcalf
Meyers
Mfume
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reed
Regula
Richardson
Riggs
Rivers
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Rush
Sabo
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stockman
Studds
Stump
Stupak
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wyden
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--16
Becerra
Dingell
Jefferson
Maloney
McDade
McKinney
Moakley
Moran
Morella
Paxon
Reynolds
Sisisky
Stenholm
Stokes
Tucker
Waldholtz
{time} 1122
Messrs. OWENS, McINTOSH, FIELDS of Louisiana, KENNEDY of
Massachusetts, and Mrs. CHENOWETH changed their vote from ``yea'' to
``nay.''
Messrs. TORRICELLI, ROYCE, and GILCHREST changed their vote from
``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the joint resolution was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
____________________