[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 139 (Friday, September 8, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8685-H8704]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   DISAPPROVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND 
                         REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 2908 of Public Law 101-
510 and by direction of the Committee on National Security, I call up 
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 102) disapproving the recommendations 
of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and ask 
unanimous consent for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  The text of House Joint Resolution 102 is as follows:

                             H.J. Res. 102

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress 
     disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure 
     and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on 
     July 13, 1995.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2908 of the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda] will each be 
recognized for 1 hour.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, today, the House will consider whether to disapprove the 
recommendations of the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission to close 28 major military installations and realign the 
mission at another 77 bases. I rise in opposition to House Joint 
Resolution 102, which would disapprove the Commission's 
recommendations, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.
  We are currently in the fourth round of base closures since 1989, and 
the third and final round under the Commission's present charter. We 
all recognize that base closures are a reality in the post-cold-war 
world, particularly in view of the reductions in force structure that 
have taken place over the past 6 years.
  The Department of Defense is counting on the savings resulting from 
base closure and realignment to fund currently underfunded 
modernization and infrastructure improvements late this decade and into 
the next century. According to the Commission, implementation of their 
recommendations would result in one-time costs of approximately $3.6 
billion. However, the Commission expects $1.6 billion in annual savings 
and net present value savings of $19.3 billion over the next 20 years 
to result from the 1995 base closure recommendations.
  Personally, I am concerned about ongoing force structure reductions 
as well as the closing of a number of installations already in the 
works under BRAC. At least some of these bases are unique national 
assets that we will never reconstitute even if needed in the future.
  A number of Members, including myself, have been skeptical when it 
comes to the rosy projections that have been made in previous base 
closure rounds concerning the savings that will accrue 

[[Page H 8686]]
to the military services. To date, savings have fallen well short of 
expectations while the up-front costs of closures have soared beyond 
initial estimates and remain underfunded. Reluctantly, however, I 
realize that with the
 growing pressures on defense resources we simply cannot afford to keep 
all the installations and facilities open that I believe our military 
may one day need again.

  Speaking from experience, I understand the pain and dislocation that 
a base closure or major realignment can inflict on a community, even a 
region. In the past, even if I was not supportive of the closing of 
bases, I was at least satisfied that the Commission and the closure 
process had essentially worked as intended--that politics had not been 
the determining factor in the development of the administration's or 
the Commission's numerous recommendations.
  In this sense, I was especially concerned about the administration's 
handling of the Commission's recommendations. There is no question that 
Presidential politics were paramount in the White House's very public 
and tortured consideration of the Commission's recommendations. The 
veneer of a national security justification for rejection of the list 
was dropped as politics quickly took center stage. Fortunately, common 
sense prevailed over politics and the administration ultimately backed 
down and allowed the process to proceed. For the sake of the process, I 
am nonetheless relieved that the President finally opted to allow 
substance and process to prevail over politics in his decision to 
submit the Commission's recommendations to the Congress.
  However, I remain concerned about recent comments made by senior 
administration officials implying that the White House will find a way 
to assist a select few installations in politically sensitive States by 
``privatizing in place.'' Some have gone so far as to guarantee 
employment to workers at installations scheduled to be closed--a 
guarantee that everyone knows will be nearly impossible to honor.
  While I am sympathetic to the desire to preserve defense skills and 
jobs, it is clear that the Commission was seriously concerned about the 
cost of maintaining excess capacity at several types of installations, 
particularly Air Force depots. Privatization of workloads at these 
particular installations was only one of several options recommended by 
the Commission. Contrary to the assertions of some, Congress ultimately 
will retain the authority to determine how and if privatization in 
place makes sense.
  Mr. Speaker, the National Security Committee considered the 
recommendations of the Commission very carefully. While some Members 
expressed concern with individual recommendations contained in the 
Commission's report, the committee decided to support the Commission's 
findings. The committee voted 43 to 10 to report House Joint Resolution 
102 adversely. In the committee's judgment, this resolution should be 
defeated. I urge a ``no'' vote to my colleagues.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to divide my 1 hour 
of debate so the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] is able to 
control 20 minutes of that time and I will control 40 minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda] will 
be recognized for 40 minutes, and the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Fazio] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda].
  (Mr. TEJEDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this resolution represents the end of a long and painful 
process for many communities and their citizens. While these 
communities are now turning their attention toward reuse efforts and 
planning for the future, we have this final opportunity to overturn the 
Base Closure Commission's recommendations.
  In my opinion, the base Closure Commission made a mistake in voting 
to close two of the Air Force's air logistics centers. These depots are 
located in San Antonio, TX and Sacramento, CA. My colleagues from San 
Antonio and Sacramento will speak to this decision in a few minutes, so 
I will not add to that specific debate yet.
  It should come as no surprise, then, that the San Antonio and 
Sacramento delegations introduced resolutions of disapproval. This 
issue is not a partisan issue. Base closures and economic losses cut 
across party lines. I stand here before the House because my 
constituents and my district, in fact this Nation, does not deserve the 
closure of Kelly Air Force Base. I do not believe that
 closure of Kelly Air Force Base is in the best interest of our 
national security. If there is a way to keep Kelly open, we will fight 
that fight, and this is what this resolution of disapproval is all 
about.

  I expect nothing less from my colleagues across the Nation who also 
lose bases and jobs in this process. And we will hear from them. In 
contrast, I expect those whose districts stand to gain from these 
recommendations to voice their strong support for the Base Closure 
Commission's recommendations.
  I have no illusions about the final outcome of this matter. It is the 
bottom of the ninth and we are behind by a lot of runs. But this does 
not mean we give up and walk off the field. There are important issues 
which need to be addressed, and I look forward to a lively discussion 
during the next 2 hours.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from 
Texas sharing his time with me, and I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the BRAC Commission's 
1995 base closure list and in support of this resolution. I do so for 
the first time. While this is the fourth round of base closure, it is 
the first time that I have risen in opposition, despite the fact that 
it is the third of four rounds that have impacted the community, 
Sacramento, CA, that I represent along with several of my colleagues 
who will appear later today.
  I want to join with the comments that my friend, Mr. Tejeda, of San 
Antonio has made with reference to my particular opposition to the 
decision to close two of the five Air Logistics Centers under the 
Materiel Command based in Dayton, OH. I strongly supported the position 
that the Air Force and DOD took to downsize in place. I think that was 
the right decision, both in terms of keeping capacity available for any 
international emergency that would have required surge capability.
  I regret the decision, which was very hard fought
   within the Commission, to close the two facilities that now will 
undergo privatization. As my friend from San Antonio said, we will hear 
a good deal from people who expected to gain a great deal from the 
closure of our two bases, who are troubled by the report of the DOD 
Commission on Roles and Missions which has advocated strongly the 
privatization of our heretofore public Air Force Logistics Centers.

  I know what I am engaging in here today is probably under the rubric 
of a primal scream. I understand that I am probably engaging in a 
fruitless protest, and I have seen others whose bases have closed do so 
in prior discussions of resolutions to, in effect, reverse the 
decisions of the BRAC process of the Commission. But I think I have 
justification in using this last opportunity to express my measure of 
protest, because in fact nowhere in the United States has the BRAC had 
such a devastating impact as it has had in the Sacramento area.
  In all four rounds of the BRAC, the Sacramento area has shouldered 
well over a quarter of all the jobs lost in California due to BRAC. In 
fact, the Sacramento area standing alone has absorbed more base closure 
losses in terms of direct and indirect jobs than any other State in the 
Nation. In fact, the same could be said of the Sacramento as well as 
San Francisco Bay area individually.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. 

[[Page H 8687]]

  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 102 and I 
urge my colleagues to vote against it.
  I supported the establishment of the current base closure process in 
1990. I believed then, and I continue to believe, that the disposal of 
unneeded military infrastructure and overhead would save scarce 
resources. I think we have come a long way in that regard.
  Frankly we have closed bases through this process that I never 
thought would ever be closed--and we have closed some that we may 
ultimately wish we had not. Personally, I was opposed to the closure in 
previous rounds of facilities such as Lowry Air Force Base and Pueblo 
Army Depot in Colorado. I fought to keep them from closing, but when 
faced with the decision to accept or reject the entire list produced by 
the
 Commission, I concluded that the Commission had acted appropriately, 
and that in an era of declining defense dollars the national interest 
had been served. This year I feel the same way, even though Fitzsimons 
Army Medical Center is on the list.

  I want to briefly say a word about the ultimate reuse for facilities 
such as Fitzsimons. One of our goals throughout this process has been 
to get installations slated for closure as quickly as possible into 
reuse by the local community. I have been impressed with the speed and 
dedication with which the city of Aurora has approached redevelopment. 
Working with the University of Colorado, an impressive reuse plan is 
already taking shape for Fitzsimons. I want to encourage the Department 
of Defense, particularly the Department of the Army, to do what it can 
to facilitate a rapid transition of the facility and related property 
to the local redevelopment authority so that the people of Aurora and 
Colorado can benefit from reuse as soon as possible.
  Mr. Speaker, since the first round of base closures in 1988, over 100 
major U.S.-based facilities have closed, and plant replacement value 
has been reduced by 21 percent. The Commission's 1995 recommendations 
will raise the number of major U.S.-based installations closed to about 
130, and plant replacement value will have been reduced by another 6 
percent or so.
  Although not covered by BRAC, unneeded overseas infrastructure has 
also been reduced substantially. During the BRAC period, the services 
have closed or reduced operations at over 950 bases overseas--a plant 
replacement value reduction of 43 percent.
  Despite all the rhetoric from some quarters, including from some in 
the administration who periodically suggest that we have not done 
enough, I believe this process has resulted in a significant downsizing 
of our military infrastructure. In my judgment, the military services 
need to adjust to the sharp base and installation reductions they will 
have to absorb.
  As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and 
Facilities, I have been approached about the possibility of authorizing 
another round of base closures in 6 years of so. Indeed, that was one 
of the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. There may be a need in the future to resurrect this 
process, but I believe that authorizing another round now would be a 
mistake.
  The services need time to adjust to a post-BRAC environment. Some 
units have moved as many as three times throughout the final phases of 
BRAC. Once force structure and installations infrastructure have 
stabilized, and once we have a clear understanding of the actual costs 
and savings balance from BRAC, Congress will be in a better position to 
assess whether any further rounds of base closure are necessary. While 
I have great respect for the Commissioners, particularly Chairman Alan 
Dixon, I would not support authorization of a future round at this 
time.
  There is no doubt that there are problems in the BRAC process. It is 
clear that the upfront costs of base closures and realignments have 
been substantially more than anyone expected. It is also true that 
revenues from disposal have not been realized, and realized savings 
have fallen far short of original estimates. This does not mean that 
the process has not worked or that it has collapsed. It is an 
indication of just how difficult the implementation of BRAC, with its 
huge upfront costs and hidden environmental cleanup costs, has proven 
to be in practice.
  Mr. Speaker, the first hearing the Subcommittee on Military 
Installations and Facilities held in this session concerned the BRAC 
process. I want to assure the House that the subcommittee will continue 
its commitment to oversight of BRAC implementation even after the 
formal Commission process ends this year.
  The Secretary of Defense estimates that $40 billion will be saved as 
a result of action taken in all four phases of base closure. He may be 
right. I hope he is; but even if savings fall short of expectations, 
there is no question that we must complete the process we began 7 years 
ago. I urge my colleagues to support the judgment of the National 
Security Committee and vote ``no'' on the resolution of disapproval.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Sacramento, CA [Mr. Matsui], who has 
worked so long and hard to build McClellan Air Force Base into the 
modern entity it is today.

                              {time}  0920

  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Fazio], but first of all, I would like to take a moment 
to first of all thank both the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Doolittle] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo] for the hard 
work they did in trying to pursue our efforts to save McClellan Air 
Force Base. We had a very strong bipartisan effort in northern 
California an without their help, I do not believe we could have gotten 
as far as we did.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to spend a few moments to talk about my 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio], who is adjacent 
to me in Sacramento County. The gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] 
and I have worked over the years to get $400 million of construction 
programs for McClellan in the last decade and a half. This is because 
the Air Force has suggested that we should do this to maintain 
McClellan as a viable, strong base of the five maintenance depots.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman, over the last 8 or 9 months in 
particular, did a tremendous job in doing whatever he could to save 
McClellan Air Force Base. I think the final recommendation, that is the 
privatization of this base, would not have occurred without his able 
assistance and his ability to put together this package in a coalition.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I say to the gentleman from California, on behalf of 
my constituents in the Fifth Congressional District, I want to thank 
him very much for his help, because I think we will be able to maintain 
a level of employment at that base now that will not create economic 
disruption. So I just want to pay my respects for the gentleman's 
efforts over the last 8 months to a year.
  Mr. Speaker, I would also like to acknowledge the President's 
activities in this. As you know, the Air Force, the Pentagon, and the 
President did not want to close McClellan Air Force Base. He wanted to 
basically keep the five logistic depots open and downsize all five of 
them for the purpose of future possible national international crises.
  Those are the five probably most important depots in the country. 
When these five depots are compared to the Army or the Navy, we always 
come out ahead, because we have become technologically the most 
proficient. Obviously, we have one of the best work forces in the 
entire Federal Government and, as a result of that, I believe the long-
range plans of this administration, but particularly of the people that 
are running on a long-term basis the Pentagon, have felt if we ever 
went into interservicing, these bases should be the ones to preserve.
  As my colleagues know, the President attempted to save these bases 
for that future possibility. Unfortunately, the Commission, in its own 
wisdom, decided to close two bases, one in Texas and the McClellan Air 
Force Base in California. This was against the strenuous objection of 
the administration, the Pentagon, and the Air Force.
  I have to say that the reason I am going to vote in favor of this 
resolution, and against the recommendations 

[[Page H 8688]]
of this Commission, is because originally this process was to be 
nonpolitical. It was to be an objective process. We have had two prior 
closings and we had two bases in my district that closed as a result of 
those two prior Commissions. Mr. Speaker, I voted to close those bases, 
even though there was a total of 10,000 employees, because I thought 
the process was fair and objective.
  But I have to tell my colleagues that this
   process was the most outrageous process around. Those Commissioners, 
not all of them, but many of them, had their own agenda. One who was a 
high-ranking Army official, for example, not only during his 
discussions showed significant bias, but he was actually outwardly 
favoring Army depots saying all his experience with the Army led him to 
believe that we should save these bases. That is not the way this 
process was supposed to work.

  In fact the irony of all of this is when Sacramento Army Depot in my 
district closed, we were able to get the last Commission to allow 
certain functions to be bid out and McClellan was one of the bidders, 
along with Tobyhanna and some other Army bases. Believe it or not, 
McClellan Air Force Base was the one that actually prevailed over the 
Army bases to get an Army contract. Now that contract is going to be 
going to an Army base, even though they were less efficient.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I am going to be voting for this resolution because 
I felt that the process was unfair.
  Mr. Speaker, in conclusion I would like to make one further 
observation. To the employees of Sacramento County who over the years 
have just done a tremendous job, I want to thank them for their efforts 
on behalf of the national defense of this country. We are going to do 
everything we can to make sure this privatization plan that the 
President and the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] put together 
will work.
  And I want to make an admonition. I am going to be one of the 
strongest proponents of privatization of depots in the future. And if, 
in fact, we are able to pursue this and make progress in this area, it 
is my opinion that those bases that were protected for political 
reasons, not for substantive reasons, and some were protected for 
substantive reasons, but those that were protected for political 
reasons will find that they are the most in jeopardy as we go into the 
21st century.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am amazed, especially at my California 
colleagues. When they vote for a $177 billion cut in defense, and 
California is the leader in the defense industry and most of our bases 
are in California, what did they expect? What did they expect?
  They vote for a Clinton tax package and $177 billion cut, after Colin 
Powell, Dick Cheney, and then-candidate Clinton said that anything 
above a $50 billion cut would put us into a hollow force. And then I 
hear that the President wanted to save California bases. Yes, 
California is important in a 1996 election. Sure, he would like to save 
them.
  But I think we need to look at why we are closing those bases in the 
first place. Who called for an additional base closure round? The very 
same people now that are saying that the President wants to save those 
bases. Give me a break.
  Mr. Speaker, in committee they used the analogy of a fisherman and 
they said take the analogy of a catfish that has now been cut and we 
are going to skin him alive, gut him, and eat him. Well, do not expect 
us to sit there and take it. If my colleagues voted for the defense 
cuts and they are from California,
 they are not the fish; they are the in the role os a fisherman. They 
caused the problem.

  I take a look at what we have gone through and why many of us are 
fighting against the continued assaults on DOD spending. I look at the 
increase in nondefense spending by 261 percent by Members and, yes, 
even some of the Members on our own committee in this House.
  I take a look at the extension of Somalia, which cost us billions of 
dollars, and Haiti, which has cost us billions of dollars, and what 
they want to do is delay this process. And right now, DOD is having to 
eat the overhead, because we have not funded BRAC.
  Mr. Speaker, if families are from El Toro and they are have to move, 
or Miramar and having to move to Fallon, Nevada, NTC, all over the 
State of California, those families are being disrupted and they are 
losing their jobs, defense jobs with the military and associated jobs. 
We lost a million jobs in the State of California.
  But as Paul Harvey said, the rest of the story is look at who caused 
it. And they say that the President wants to save those bases. 
Absolutely, he caused it.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, as I said in my comments, I supported the 
last two closings, including bases in my district. No one is suggesting 
the downsizing should not occur. It is the process that is extremely 
important in this particular effort.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I disagree.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah 
[Mr. Hansen].
  (Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to House 
Joint Resolution 102 and in support of the recommendations of the BRAC 
Commission.
  I know BRAC is painful. The First District of Utah has lost a base in 
each round of BRAC and will lose Defense Depot Ogden if this list is 
accepted. While I may not agree with every decision, I believe the BRAC 
process is fair and must remain independent. That is why I will vote 
against this resolution.
  Now, after the game has been fairly played, the President wants to go 
back and change the rules. Under Public Law 101-510, the President had 
two choices: Either send the list back to the Commission with 
recommended changes or accept the list in total. The President instead 
decided to play outside the law, and forward the list to Congress with 
two substantial changes.
  The President's unprecedented direction to the Pentagon to privatize 
in place the majority of jobs at the McClellan and Kelly Air Logistics 
Centers is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the independent 
BRAC process for the political expediency of satisfying northern 
California.
  The administration has continued to play fast and lose with the law. 
On a recent visit to McClellan, White House Chief of Staff, Leon 
Panetta, issued the following threat:

       If there is any action in Congress or by any other depots 
     to try to inhibit the privatization effort, the President has 
     made it clear that we will consider that a breach of process 
     and he will order the McClellan be kept open.

  I find that kind of blatant disregard for the law offensive and 
contemptuous of the law and of Congress. I want to be very clear, I do 
not consider the President's letter, directing privatization inplace, 
to be part of the BRAC recommendations we will approve here today.
  I also want to point out that any plan to do so would clearly violate 
at least five sections of title 10, United States Code. The President 
simply cannot ignore current law to solve his own political problems. 
Our country has found, several times in our history, that no one is 
above the law.
  It appears the President has once again come up with a lose-lose-lose 
compromise by worrying about political repercussions instead of leading 
the Nation.
  This plan to privatize inefficient excess capacity and guarantee jobs 
is bad for the Department of Defense because it does not address the 
fundamental excess capacity questions in the depot system and will only 
result in higher maintenance costs and substantially lower savings.
  It is bad for the country because it undermines the integrity of a 
process designed to be free from this kind of political tampering.
  And it is bad for many of the workers at McClellan and Kelly who will 
now lose the option to follow their Federal job to another DOD depot.
  This recommendation ignores the BRAC Commission findings that ``the 
closure of McClellan AFB, and the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, 
permits 

[[Page H 8689]]
significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduces 
DOD operating costs.'' The closure was deemed a necessity given the 
significant amount of excess depot capacity and limited defense 
resources.
  I have already joined with other Members of Congress to raise these 
objections to the Pentagon. It is obvious that all bases, would prefer 
a second chance to save the majority of the jobs through privatization 
in place. Support of this option for political expediency at McClellan, 
will endanger the entire BRAC process and the $19 billion in savings it 
represents.
  I urge all my colleagues to vote against this resolution and to join 
me in holding the President, and Department of Defense, accountable for 
compliance with the law of the land.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn].
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the closure process is an attempt to be 
objective. By and large it has been objective. It is not a generally 
partisan process. However, it is an intense process within the services 
and between the services where there are very high partisan rivalries.
  In the case of the Navy, it is a matter of the air wing versus the 
surface fleet versus the underseas fleet. What happened in the case of 
the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the only shipyard that 
has ever returned, consistently, money to the Treasury; the most 
efficient one, if you listen to the former commander of the Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard, Captain Bowman, when he was on the 1993 Base Closure 
Commission. He said that everyone in the Navy knows that Long Beach has 
been 4 years ahead of every single yard, both in efficiency and 
effectiveness.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to put in the Record at this point various 
material to back up that and other statements.
                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, June 13, 1995.
     Hon. Alan J. Dixon,
     The Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1700 North Moore 
         Street, Suite 1425, Arlington, VA.
       Dear Chairman Dixon: I am writing to address several issues 
     which are crucial to the deliberations the 1995 Defense Base 
     Closure and Realignment Commission will soon be undertaking 
     concerning the potential closure of naval shipyards. As you 
     are aware, The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
     1990 (Public Law 101-510) and subsequent changes made by the 
     Congress (Public Law 102-311 and Public Law 102-484) were 
     designed to provide a fair and impartial process for the 
     timely closure and realignment of domestic military 
     installations. Under the provisions of this legislation, 
     specific criteria were established under which the Department 
     of Defense recommends a military installation for closure. 
     The law specifically states that these recommendations must 
     be based on the future force structure plan and 
     preestablished final selection criteria.
       Public Law 101-510 specifically states that the Defense 
     Base Closure and Realignment Commission can make changes in 
     the recommendations made by the Department of Defense only if 
     the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated 
     substantially from the future force-structure plan and final 
     selection criteria. (See Attachment A, Sec. 2903(d)(2)(B) and 
     (C) of Public Law 101-501.)
       It has been proven conclusively that in recommending Long 
     Beach Naval Shipyard for closure, the Department of Defense 
     substantially deviated from the future force structure plan 
     and the preestablished final selection criteria. A summary of 
     the evidence and rationale for this conclusion is presented 
     in Attachment B.
       If the Commission concludes that the Department of Defense 
     substantially deviated from the criteria established in 
     Public Law 101-510 then, under this law, this consideration, 
     and this consideration alone, is sufficient grounds to change 
     the Secretary of Defense's recommendation.
       Representatives of the City of Long Beach and I have had 
     several meetings with Commission staff where we have 
     presented the arguments which prove that there has been 
     substantial deviation. It is my belief that Commission staff 
     is generally in agreement with our position. However, there 
     seems to be a concern that since so much overcapacity exists, 
     some closures will have to occur.
       In this regard, the technical case to keep the Portsmouth 
     Naval Shipyard open appears to rest heavily on nuclear 
     issues, rather than on the future force structure plan and 
     the preestablished final selection criteria. Based on the 
     criteria established in Public Law 101-510, if overcapacity 
     considerations argue for the closure of a naval shipyard, the 
     data clearly favor keeping the Long Beach Naval Shipyard 
     open. In addition, closing the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has 
     a much greater effect on reducing excess capacity. Based on 
     the data presented by Commission staff at the Commission 
     ``add'' hearing on May 10, 1995, public naval shipyard 
     nuclear excess capacity is currently 37 percent; conventional 
     non nuclear excess capacity is 16 percent.
       Closing conventional shipyards such as SRF Guam and the 
     Long Beach Naval Shipyard does not change the Navy's excess 
     capacity at nuclear shipyards. That remains untouched at its 
     current level of 37 percent. However, this closure would 
     result in a shortage of non nuclear shipyard capacity of 
     minus 17 percent. The irony is that with the exception of a 
     few aircraft carriers and submarines, the Navy's future ships 
     will be conventionally powered. In brief, the future of the 
     Navy seems to be non nuclear. Closing SRF Guam and the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would reduce nuclear excess 
     capacity to 14 percent, and reduce non-nuclear excess 
     capacity to 7 percent (See Attachment C, the bar charts 
     prepared by Commission staff).
       Thus, in terms of attaining the objective of reducing 
     excess capacity, if one of these shipyards has to be closed, 
     the numbers show that the Commission should close the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
       On another related but relevant issue, it is my 
     understanding that a primary consideration in the decision 
     not to close McClellan Air Force Base in 1993 was the cost of 
     environmental clean-up. Moreover, the presentation made by 
     community representatives at the Wednesday, May 24, 1995 
     regional hearing heavily emphasized the high cost of 
     environmental restoration in the case to keep McClellan Air 
     Force Base open.
       As you are aware, legislation and the Department of Defense 
     guidelines preclude consideration of the costs of 
     environmental clean-up in the installation closure decision 
     making process. However, if the potential environmental 
     clean-up costs are used as a justification not to close 
     anyone particular installation, these criteria should be 
     applied equally to all other installations being considered 
     for closure.
       I would like to make one final comment. It appears that 
     many of the actions in defense of the Portsmouth Naval 
     Shipyard may have been driven by the upcoming New Hampshire 
     Presidential Primary, as opposed to the cr4iterai established 
     by Public Law 101-510. A month before the base closure 
     recommendations were made by the Secretary of Defense, 
     President Clinton publicly stated that he did not believe the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would be on the list of 
     installations recommended by the Navy and the Department of 
     Defense for closure. More recently, the President spoke over 
     four New Hampshire radio stations as follows: ``I support the 
     Secretary of Defense's recommendations and I believe that 
     they will be upheld.''
       The Navy sent its most senior officials to the Portsmouth 
     site visit and regional hearing. Included were Assistant 
     Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment 
     Robert B. Pirie, Jr.; Chief of Naval Operations Jeremy M. 
     Boorda; Director of Naval
      Reactors Admiral Bruce DeMars; and the Commander of the 
     Naval Sea Systems Command, Vice Admiral George Sterner. 
     This is unprecedented. Never in the history of the base 
     closure process have such senior members of any military 
     service attended a site visit and regional hearing for the 
     express purpose of advocating that a particular 
     installation remain open.
       I am confident that the Commission will do all it can to 
     assure that any decisions made regarding the closure of 
     either the Portsmouth or the Long Beach Naval Shipyard will 
     be fair and impartial--and made outside of the political 
     arena--in accordance with the procedures established in 
     Public Law 101-510. The injection of politics at the highest 
     level is, I believe, unfortunate and has made more difficult 
     the already considerable challenge of convincing affected 
     communities that political considerations are not a factor in 
     the BRAC decision making process. Your efforts to assure the 
     integrity of the process are appreciated.
       Thank you for considering these very important issues.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Stephen Horn,
     U.S. Representative.
                                                                    ____


                              Attachment A


           Sec. 2903 (d)(2)(B) and (C) of Public Law 101-510

       ``(B)'' Subject to subparagraph (C), in making ``its 
     recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of 
     the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission 
     determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the 
     force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in 
     subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.
       ``(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) 
     in the recommendations made by the Secretary, the Commission 
     may make the change only if the Commission--
       ``(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B);
       ``(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the 
     force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in 
     subsection (c)(1);
       ``(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the 
     Federal Register not less than 30 days before transmitting 
     its recommendations to the president pursuant to paragraph 
     (2); and
       ``(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change.''
                                                                    ____


[[Page H 8690]]


                              Attachment B


                       long beach naval shipyard

       Examples of Where the Navy/Department of Defense 
     Substantially Deviated from the Future Force Structure Plan 
     and the Preestablished Final Selection Criteria:
       1. The Navy predetermined the fate of the Long Beach Naval 
     Shipyard (Long Beach NSY).
       Shifting critical workload away.
       Ignored a $100 million offer by the Port of Long Beach to 
     consolidate facilities from the Naval Station for Shipyard 
     convenience. Why?
       Studied feasibility of bringing a floating drydock from 
     Hawaii to San Diego (The Machinist).
       Never included the Long Beach NSY in the Regional 
     Maintenance Center concept, but did include the Puget Sound 
     and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards.
       Has postponed the transfer of surplus Naval Station 
     property from BRAC 91 to BRAC 95. Is there a connection?
       2. The Navy states future uncertainties of the force 
     structure prevent the closure of the Portsmouth Naval 
     Shipyard (Portsmouth NSY).
       Public Law 101-510 clearly states that the force structure 
     plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 be the basis for 
     making recommendations for base closures and realignments.
       The Navy argues, that the uncertainty of the future 
     submarine force (including future proposed new construction) 
     including beyond 2001 is a valid and essential consideration.
       This is clearly outside the future force structure plan 
     parameters established by Public Law 101-510.
       3. Using the new force structure as the reason not to need 
     Drydock #1.
       In BRAC 1992 and BRAC 1993, the Navy stated that Drydock #1 
     was essential for conventional aircraft carrier (CV) and 
     nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) emergent docking on the west 
     coast.
       Additionally, in BRAC 1991 and BRAC 1993 the Navy stated 
     unequivocally that it could not fulfill its pacific Fleet 
     mission requirements without Drydock #1.
       There are still twelve aircraft carriers in the Fleet with 
     six homeported in the Pacific area.
       The percentage of large deck ships in the new force 
     structure is increasing.
       Drydock #1 is one of two drydocks on the entire west coast 
     capable of docking EVERY SHIP IN THE NAVY including CVNs and 
     submarines. Once this asset is lost, its lost forever.
       4. The Navy used different economic data and thresholds in 
     its analysis of installations considered for closure.
       The Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance in the BRAC 
     process stipulates that economic impact is to be assessed at 
     the economic area level (metropolitan statistical area or 
     county).
       The Navy evaluated the potential impact of closing the Long 
     Beach NSY based on this criteria.
       Four California installations were removed by the Navy due 
     to cumulative total direct and
      indirect job change, even though military value 
     considerations presented them as viable candidates for 
     closure.
       Long Beach's cumulative total direct and indirect job 
     change is higher than three of these installations.
       Thus, the Navy applied economic impact criteria differently 
     between the Long Beach NSY and the other four Navy 
     installations. Again, the Navy/Department of Defense 
     substantially deviated from the final selection criteria.
       5. The Navy recommended the closure of the Long Beach NSY 
     and not the Portsmouth NSY.
       The military value of the Long Beach NSY was higher than 
     the Portsmouth NSY.
       The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria are weighted heavily 
     toward military value.
       The Navy contends that nuclear issues significantly 
     outweigh the established selection criteria, therefore the 
     Portsmouth NSY should not be closed.
       This is a substantial deviation from the final selection 
     criteria.
       Therefore, if the Portsmouth NSY remains open, the Long 
     Beach NSY should also remain open due to substantial 
     deviation in the final selection criteria.
       6. The Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) developed data 
     call scenarios, military value criteria and their evaluation 
     criteria in a manner that was prejudicial and caused the Long 
     Beach NSY to obtain lower scores.
       This accounts for the Long Beach NSY having a military 
     value of 48.7 in 1993 and 38.04 in 1995.
       The Department of Defense did not establish new final 
     selection criteria between 1993 and 1995. Thus, based on the 
     final selection criteria, the relative rankings of the 
     military value of shipyards should not have changed.
       Thus, there was a substantial deviation from the 
     established final selection criteria.
       7. The Navy used different and possibly non-existent 
     selection criteria in its consideration of private shipyards 
     on the east coast and the west coast.
       The Navy has stated on the record that regardless of 
     whether technical capabilities or capacity exist, the private 
     sector on the east coast can not and should not absorb 
     transferred workload from east coast public shipyards. 
     Ironically, both Newport News and Electric Boat have the 
     capability and capacity to handle any transferred workload 
     from the Portsmouth NSY.
       The Navy contends that it is acceptable for the majority of 
     the Long Beach NSY's transferred workload to be absorbed by 
     the west coast private shipyards. However, the small private 
     shipyards on the west coast do not have the capability to 
     handle large deck ships.
       The 1995 BRAC process does not list the quantitation of 
     private sector capabilities as a part of the final selection 
     criteria.
       8. The Navy badly underestimated the cost of closure 
     ($74.53 million).
       The Navy's cost of closure budget submitted to Naval Sea 
     Systems Command (NAVSEA) is $433 million. Some sources have 
     indicated that NAVSEA considers this estimate too low. [See 
     attached letter from Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 
     dated May 17, 1995.]
       Over $500 million of additional workman's compensation 
     costs over a 20 year period were not included.
       Thus, the cost of closure is understated by $858 million. 
     If the costs of homeporting CVNs at North Island as opposed 
     to the Long Beach NSY are properly calculated and included, 
     Long Beach NSY closure costs may exceed $1 billion.
       9. The Navy calculates a 20 year Return on Investment of at 
     least $1.948 billion. The Navy says this is due to workload 
     shifting to other shipyards. Independent estimates, based on 
     the workload planning for the Long Beach NSY for fiscal years 
     1996 through 2001, show that performing this work at other 
     locations will cost about $450 million less than at the Long 
     Beach NSY. The result is a break even point of about 40 years 
     rather than the Navy's claim of an immediate return on 
     investment. The workman's compensation included in the Long 
     Beach NSY costs, which must be paid whether the Long Beach 
     NSY closes or not, will wipe out the $450 million savings.
       10. The data call scenarios and military value criteria 
     established by the BSAT included many factors intended to 
     address nuclear issues. Yet, the Navy now argues that the 
     nuclear issues alone are sufficient grounds to keep the 
     Portsmouth NSY open and close the Long Beach NSY. The Navy 
     now contends;
       No nuclear shipyard should be closed.
       All non-nuclear work can be done in nuclear shipyards, but 
     nuclear work can only be done in nuclear shipyards.
       However, nuclear issues always seem to be unclear. The 
     facts are that the only components on any nuclear ship that 
     are ``nuclear'' are the reactor compartment, the cooling 
     systems, and the propulsion systems. Nuclear certification is 
     required to work on these, and only these components.
       It is estimated that 85% of a nuclear ship work package is 
     conventional work and can be done in non-nuclear shipyards.
       The Long Beach NSY with its nuclear certified drydock could 
     work on any nuclear ship with the assistance of tiger teams 
     from a nuclear shipyard.
       Is the BRAC Commission prepared to:
       Balance the true cost of keeping this strategic waterfront 
     ship repair facility against the unknown future needs of our 
     Navy and our national defense.
       Lose the capability and the strategic location of the Long 
     Beach NSY's Drydock #1. Once closed, Drydock #1 will be lost 
     forever.
       Close the one public shipyard that complied with Department 
     of Defense guidance to install more efficient management, 
     right-sized, and has returned money to the taxpayer six years 
     in a row. Long Beach NSY is the only public shipyard 
     operating in the black. What kind of a message does this send 
     to other federal facilities that are attempting to become 
     more efficient to ensure their long-term survival.
                                                                    ____

                                           Department of the Navy,


                                    Long Beach Naval Shipyard,

                                     Long Beach, CA, May 17, 1995.
     From: Commander, Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
     To: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 97E).
     Subject: FY96 Budget Submission.
     Enclosure: (1) Overview Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget. (2) 
         Long Beach Naval Shipyard Base Closure Budget.
       1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted as the Overview 
     Data for the FY96 DBOF Budget and the Long Beach Naval 
     Shipyard Base Closure Budget.
                                                   J.A. Pickering.


[[Page H 8691]]
               EXHIBIT BCIV-02--BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (1995) COMMISSION--FINANCIAL SUMMARY               
                                            [In thousands of dollars]                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Fiscal year                             
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             1996      1997      1998      1999      2000      2001      Total  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity: Long Beach Naval Complex                                                                              
UIC:                                                                                                            
                  Funded                                                                                        
                                                                                                                
One-time implementation costs:                                                                                  
    Military construction................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Family housing.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Construction.....................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Operations.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Environmental........................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Studies..........................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Compliance.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Restoration......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Operation and maintenance............    13,980    60,550  ........  ........  ........  ........    74,530 
    Military personnel--PCS..............  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    HAP..................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Other................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total..............................    13,980    60,550  ........  ........  ........  ........    74,530 
                                          ======================================================================
                 Unfunded                                                                                       
                                                                                                                
One-time implementation costs:                                                                                  
    Military construction................     3,100     9,300  ........  ........  ........  ........    12,400 
    Family housing.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Construction.....................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Operations.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Environmental........................    15,597    17,455  ........  ........  ........  ........    33,052 
        Studies..........................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Compliance.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Restoration......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Operation and maintenance............    73,460   135,499    20,739    15,695    15,729    15,765   276,887 
    Military personnel--PCS..............  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    HAP..................................  ........    36,383  ........  ........  ........  ........    36,363 
    Other................................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total..............................    92,157   198,617    20,739    15,695    15,729    15,765   358,702 
                                          ======================================================================
            Total Requirement                                                                                   
                                                                                                                
One-time implementation costs:                                                                                  
    Military construction................     3,100     9,300  ........  ........  ........  ........    12,400 
    Family housing.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Construction.....................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Operations.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Environmental........................    15,597    17,455  ........  ........  ........  ........    33,052 
        Studies..........................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Compliance.......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
        Restoration......................  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Operation and maintenance............    87,440   196,049    20,739    15,695    15,729    15,765   351,417 
    Military personnel--PCS..............  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  .........
    Other................................  ........    36,363  ........  ........  ........  ........    36,363 
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total..............................   106,137   259,167    20,739    15,695    15,729    15,765   433,232 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


   [Memorandum from U.S. Representative Stephen Horn, June 20, 1995]

   Presidential Politics and the 1995 Round of Military Base Closures

       The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 
     (Public Law 101-510) and subsequent changes made by the 
     Congress (Public Law 102-311 and Public Law 102-484) were 
     designed to provide a fair and impartial process for the 
     timely closure and realignment of domestic military 
     installations. One of the primary objectives of this 
     legislation was to move the closure of military installations 
     outside of the political arena, and to base installation 
     closure actions on the future force structure plan and 
     preestablished final selection criteria.
       Most of the actions which have been taken by the Department 
     of Defense and past Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commissions appear to have fulfilled these objectives. 
     However, the actions taken by the Navy, the Department of 
     Defense, the President, and certain Republican Presidential 
     candidates in regard to attempting to prevent the closure of 
     one military installation in New Hampshire appear to violate 
     the spirit and intent of the law and are unprecedented. It 
     appears that the actions being taken to save the Portsmouth 
     Naval Shipyard are driven by the 1996 New Hampshire 
     Presidential Primary as opposed to the criteria established 
     in Public Law 101-510.
       In regard to the Navy's actions in developing the data base 
     which resulted in the Department of Defense not recommending 
     the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for closure, a few examples are 
     relevant.
       1. The Navy deviated from the future force structure plan 
     parameters established in Public Law 101-510 in an attempt to 
     prevent closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
       Public Law 101-510 clearly states that the Force Structure 
     Plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 be the basis for 
     making recommendations for base closures and realignments.
       The Navy argues that the uncertainty of the future 
     submarine force (including future proposed new construction) 
     including beyond 2001 is a valid and essential consideration.
       This is outside the force structure parameters established 
     by Public law 101-510.
       2. The Navy recommended that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
     remain open and that another shipyard with a higher military 
     value be closed. The BRAC 1995 final selection criteria is 
     weighted heavily toward military value. Thus, there is a 
     substantial deviation from the established selection 
     criteria.
       3. The Navy attempted to develop their data call scenarios 
     and military value criteria in a manner that was prejudicial 
     and would result in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard obtaining a 
     higher score.
       Many factors were included which addressed nuclear issues.
       The weighing of military value components was changed to 
     favor the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
       The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was still ranked the second 
     lowest in military value.
       The Navy now contends that nuclear issues alone are 
     sufficient grounds to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
     open, regardless of the fact that they were adequately 
     considered in the calculation of military value. This is a 
     substantial deviation from the established final selection 
     criteria.
       There is also evidence that the Department of Defense took 
     certain actions in an attempt to assure that the Portsmouth 
     Naval Shipyard would remain open. The Department of Defense 
     established a Joint Cross-Service Group to review base 
     closure recommendations in regard to inter-servicing. The 
     Joint Cross Services Group analyzed and reviewed six primary 
     scenarios for naval shipyard closures. Only one of these 
     options concluded that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard should 
     remain open. Yet, when the Department of Defense made its 
     final recommendations, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was not 
     among the military installations that it recommended for 
     closure.
       In late January, President Clinton told a Manchester, New 
     Hampshire radio station audience that he did not believe the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard would be on the list of military 
     installations the Navy and Department of Defense would be 
     recommending for closure. This was about a month before the 
     Department of Defense recommendations were released. These 
     kinds of statements by the President certainly must have had 
     some effect on Navy and Department of Defense officials who 
     were in the process of making the final decisions on which 
     installations to recommend for closure.
       After the Department of Defense made their final base 
     closure recommendations, the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Commission technical staff conducted an extensive 
     analysis of whether the recommendation not to close the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard conformed to the legislated future 
     force structure plan and final selection criteria 
     requirements. The technical staff then made the 
     recommendation to add the Portsmouth 

[[Page H 8692]]
     Naval Shipyard to those military installations being considered for 
     closure. On May 10, 1995, the Commission voted six to two to 
     add the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list of bases being 
     considered for closure. It is interesting that the two 
     members of the Commission who voted against adding the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list were appointed to the 
     Commission by Senator Robert Dole, a 1996 Republican 
     Presidential candidate.
       Adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for consideration 
     caused President Clinton to conduct interviews with four New 
     Hampshire radio stations stating he did not believe that the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard will be shut down by the Commission 
     and that he stands behind the Pentagon's original list of 
     base closures. ``I support the Secretary of Defense's 
     recommendations, and I believe that they will be upheld.''
       Although such behavior, while not appropriate, is expected 
     of politicians, one might not expect that the White House 
     would ask the Navy and Department of Defense to go outside 
     the guidelines established by Public Law 101-510 to attempt 
     to unduly influence and intimidate the Defense Base Closure 
     and Realignment Commission. There was so much political heat 
     that all eight Commissioners decided that they had better 
     attend the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard site visit and regional 
     hearing. In the entire history of the base closure and 
     realignment process, all of the Commissioners have never 
     attended a site visit and regional hearing for one particular 
     installation.
       Perhaps one of the reasons all eight Commissioners decided 
     to attend was because they knew the Navy was sending its 
     ``Big Guns'' to shepherd these events. Conducting the site 
     visit were Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations 
     and Environment Robert B. Pirrie, Chief of Naval Operations 
     Jeremy M. Boorda, and the Director of Naval Reactors Admiral 
     Bruce DeMars. This is unprecedented. Never in the entire 
     history of the base closure process, have such senior members 
     of a military service attended an installation site visit. In 
     addition, Vice Admiral George Sterner, Commander of the Naval 
     Sea Systems Command, testified in support of the Portsmouth 
     Naval Shipyard at the regional hearing. Again, this has never 
     happened in conjunction with any potential base closure and 
     is unprecedented.
       No supportable analytical data was presented by the Navy or 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard advocates at the regional hearing. 
     Instead, the Navy simply said over and over again that the 
     Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was absolutely essential for the 
     Navy to continue its mission, and regardless of the lower 
     military value ranking and discrepancies in the data base, 
     the Navy's judgement should be upheld by the Commission. At 
     one point in the hearing Senator William Cohen lectured the 
     Commission and implied that the Commissioners did not have 
     the technical expertise to question subjective judgements 
     made by the Navy. One can only wonder if all of these high 
     level Federal officials were ordered to the site visit and 
     the regional hearing in an attempt to intimidate the Defense 
     Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
       At this point, one might ask:
       Why was the Navy and Department of Defense willing to 
     deviate substantially from the future force structure plan 
     and the preestablished final selection criteria and recommend 
     that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard remain open?
       Why did the Commissioners appointed by Senator Robert Dole 
     vote against adding the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the list 
     of military installations the Commission is considering for 
     closure?
       What is so important about the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard?
       The importance of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is that the 
     vast majority of its personnel live in New Hampshire, the 
     State that has the first 1996 presidential primary. President 
     Clinton, Governor Wilson, and Senator Dole all want a strong 
     showing. The fact that three incumbent presidents, Johnson 
     Carter, and Bush, all lost their presidencies in part due to 
     an early challenge from within their own parties has not been 
     lost on President Clinton and his advisors. The fact that 
     should the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard close, New Hampshire 
     voters might take their frustration out on Republican 
     candidates who they thought could and should have been able 
     to save it, has not been lost on Governor Wilson or Senator 
     Dole.
       This all makes good sense if you are a Presidential 
     candidate, but how about:
       Good government?
       Circumventing the spirit and intent of legislation that was 
     expressly passed to insure a fair and impartial base closure 
     process?
       Should the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard be held to the same 
     standards as other military installations which will be 
     closed?
       What about the families and workers who lose their jobs due 
     to base closures because their State does not have the first 
     presidential primary?
       The real message in the 1994 elections was not a shift from 
     the Democratic to the Republican party. What the American 
     Public was trying to tell its elected officials is that it is 
     tired of a government which does not work, and makes 
     decisions based on political considerations instead of the 
     merits of the situation. The situation created by the intense 
     political effort to keep the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard open 
     and the upcoming 1996 New Hampshire Presidential Primary is 
     exactly what the American Public voted against in 1994. 
     Hopefully, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commission will make its ultimate decision based on the 
     merits rather than politics.
  Mr. HORN. The politics of the services seem to be overriding. This 
year Admiral Boorda walked into a meeting and said, ``Let's save all 
the nuclear shipyards.'' There is only one nonnuclear shipyard and that 
is the one that is the most efficient: Long Beach. So that was Death 
Knell I for Long Beach Naval Shipyard.
  Mr. Speaker, it was the wrong way to go about it. Admiral Boorda 
looked me in the eye a month before the decision was made and said, 
``Gee, I was sort of out of the loop. I didn't have anything to do with 
it.'' I thought that was a little strange for the Chief of Naval 
Operations, but so be it.
  But then we had the President in Connecticut asked about Portsmouth. 
There is something that goes on in New Hampshire every 4 years that I 
guess guided this answer. He was not alone. He had Republican 
candidates say just what he said. ``Aw, shucks, I sure hope that they 
keep Portsmouth open,'' was the attitude. That was a month before the 
decision was made in the Navy. That was Death Knell II.
  Mr. Speaker, naval political appointees are not stupid. When the boss 
says keep one open, it meant the death knell of the other one who had 
been ahead of Portsmouth, and even though they juggled the numbers and 
tried to make it the other way, was still one-tenth of a point ahead of 
Portsmouth on what really counts and that is the military value.
  We can argue all the disasters to unemployment, and indeed they are. 
Long Beach as a city has suffered more than 46 States in base closure. 
In 1991, we had the naval station and the hospital close. In 1995, the 
shipyard.
  As I said, this is not partisan and does not affect seniority here. 
My colleagues will remember the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums], the distinguished former chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services, Mare Island and Alameda were closed. The gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
National Security, ranking Republican then, Charleston was closed.
  My predecessor, Glenn Anderson, two decades in Congress, a committee 
chairman; the naval station and naval hospital were closed.
  What bothers me though is that partisan politics got into it with 
reference to New Hampshire, and yet the President made an impassioned 
speech that morning, and later in the day he simply signed the 
recommendations of the defense bureaucrats and politicians and sent 
them to Congress.
  And, finally, there was the former Senator from Illinois, Mr. Alan 
Dixon, who was the President's choice for chairman of the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission. Never have I seen such an arbitrary 
chairman. He remains unmatched in my mind as I compare him to some of 
the well-known autocratic chairs that existed in the House and the 
Senate over the last half century.
  Before the Commission's own staff presentation on the Long Beach 
Naval Shipyard was completed, Chairman Dixon arbitrarily shut if off, 
refused to delay the vote until after lunch, and generally harangued 
his colleagues. That was Death Knell III.
  And so a great naval shipyard--the youngest, born in 1943; the most 
modern; the most efficient and effective of any shipyard will be no 
more. No longer will 70 percent of the surface ships in the Pacific 
Fleet be within 100 miles of this great facility. Those vessels will 
have to travel 1,600 to 2,600 miles to secure comparable service. No 
longer will a great work force of 3,000 dedicated men and women, a 60-
percent minority and women work force be available to serve well the 
Navy and the Nation. This is indeed a sad day in the military history 
of our country.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution, in 
favor of the Base Closure Commission recommendations.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not an easy process. It is often painful. But, 
Mr. Speaker, it is a very necessary process for us to go through.
  We like to point out that we have a wonderful military, and the 
military 

[[Page H 8693]]
did its job during the cold war. It was necessary during that era to 
have an extremely large and strong multibased, multipost military 
within our country.
  We won the cold war, and to those who are losing installations in 
their area, they nevertheless should take pride in the fact that they 
did their job. The men and women, civilian, military, at those 
particular posts, installations, did an excellent job in protecting 
freedom through the years.
  But this process is one that I have watched. I had the opportunity to 
testify in front of the Base Closure Commission. I found them to be 
fair. I found them to listen. I found them to read and understand the 
facts. They also visited the various installations throughout the 
country.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope that this body will give a strong vote of support 
for the Base Closure Commission, voting against this resolution, 
because this is the only process available to save money so that we 
will have those dollars to modernize our military; to take care of the 
needs, the family needs, the family housing; to make sure we do not cut 
our military too small. Mr. Speaker, these Base Closure Commission 
savings will help us do that.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut [Ms. DeLauro].
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution 
to reject the recommendations of the Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission.
  I support the base closure and realignment process and believe it has 
led to the orderly downsizing of our Nation's defense infrastructure, 
given the end of the cold war. The Department of Defense and the 
Commission have made a tremendous effort to carefully examine every 
base during this and prior base closure rounds.
  Nonetheless, I continue to believe the Commission made a shortsighted 
decision when it voted to close the Stratford, CT, Army Engine Plant. I 
believe that the Army has substantially understated the military value 
of the Stratford plant, and it has substantially underestimated the 
cost of closing the facility and reconstituting its capabilities 
elsewhere.
  The Stratford Army Engine Plant is the only place in the country 
where we build the AGT1500 tank engines and critical spare parts that 
will be used in the Abrams tank for the next 30 years. In my view, it 
is a tremendous risk to national security to close this plant and lose 
its unique capabilities. With no new tank engine in development, we 
need the Stratford plant to extend the life of the engines now in use; 
to build critical spares; to provide field expertise to resolve 
problems that arise in battlefield situations; and to quickly build new 
engines should that be required by a military emergency.
  I also remain skeptical about the feasibility of the Army's plan to 
reconstitute the dual-use technology that the Stratford plant has used 
to produce top quality engines for tanks, helicopters, hovercraft and 
commercial jets.
  The Army has proposed moving the helicopter work to Corpus Christi, 
TX and the tank work to Anniston, AL. But this is much simpler said 
than done. The same equipment and the same work force teams at the 
plant produce military and commercial products for both aviation and 
ground use. All but 2 of 11 manufacturing cells are dual-use, as is the 
vast majority of machines. Recreating this capability elsewhere will be 
expensive and time consuming.
  I also believe the Army has substantially underestimated the cost of 
closing the plant.
  This year, the Army itself recognized that our Nation's tank engine 
industrial base would benefit from continued operation of the Stratford 
plant as a dual-use manufacturing facility. In February, the Army 
announced that it would invest $47.5 million to downsize the facility, 
enhance engine durability, and initiate a Service Life Extension 
Program. The employees of the plant, the union members, and the 
management joined together to make this plan work--they are cutting 
costs, improving productivity, and diversifying the product line into 
the commercial marketplace.
  This dual-use approach would maintain the vital military value of the 
Stratford Army Engine Plant, while reducing costs to the Army by 
expanding commercial use of the plant. This would be the best option 
for national security and the best option for the taxpayer.
  It is hard to understand why the Stratford Army Engine Plant was 
recommended for closure when a promising plan for downsizing and dual-
use manufacturing was already in place. I was disappointed by the Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendation to close the 
Stratford site and joined the plant's workers and management, and the 
community in making our case to the Commission. I still believe 
maintaining military and commercial production at Stratford would serve 
our country best.
  I urge my colleagues to support the resolution of disapproval.
                              {time}  0940

  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Doolittle]. He is from an adjoining 
district to mine who has fought staunchly for McClellan Air Force Base.
  (Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I have in the past supported the BRAC 
Commission process, viewing it as a reasonable way to effect the 
necessary downsizing of excess capacity.
  As the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] mentioned, I have been 
very involved with him, the gentleman from California [Mr. Matsui], the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo], the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Herger], and others from our region in fighting for McClellan Air 
Force Base. I can tell you that the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen] 
was right last year or the year before when he proposed cutting off the 
process after the first three rounds. I am sorry that we have gone to 
the fourth round. The fourth round has disappointed me.
  The idea that we somehow remove politics from the BRAC process, in my 
opinion, did not turn out to be the case. In fact, it reminds me of the 
method for selecting judges advocated by the American Bar Association 
throughout the country where all they do is shift the politics from the 
more open forum of the Governor, et cetera, and move it back behind 
closed doors where intense logrolling and politicking is going on. We 
should have had cross-servicing. That would have saved McClellan Air 
Force Base. It is a modern base capable of doing the job. But, no, 
despite the fact that every major panel has recommended cross-
servicing, we do not have it. It is not part of our defense policy. It 
is a tragedy, Mr. Speaker.
  We should pass this resolution. We should go back to the drawing 
boards. We should get cross-servicing in as part of this, and if we are 
going to have politics in the process, then let us get it out in the 
open.
  Mr. Speaker, I must add I am disappointed in the President. The 
President told the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] and me of his 
keen awareness of how California has had 15 percent of the military 
personnel around the country and suffered 85 percent of the personnel 
reductions, and yet when the time came, when the one person that could 
have intervened to make a difference here could have exercised that, he 
did not.
  With the privatization we have got, even that is slipping. I intend 
to fight for that. I urge approval of this resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose the 
resolution and to ask our colleagues to support the recommendations of 
the BRAC Commission.
  I cannot help but note the irony of today's debate. Where are our 
colleagues who yesterday were on the House floor saying that we have 
not cut defense; where are they today? Are they hiding in their 
offices? We heard all of these Members stand up and say we are not 
doing enough to cut defense. We need to the defense budget more and 
more. Where are they today as we are about to decide to close a number 
of additional installations that will affect ultimately over 1 million 
American people in both the services, the uniforms, 

[[Page H 8694]]

and the industrial segment of our community and society who supports 
the military?
  Why are these cuts occurring? They are occurring because we have been 
on a dramatic downsizing of the military, unlike any other period in 
the history of this country, down to 3 percent of our GNP, and 16 cents 
of every Federal dollar, when you compare it to John Kennedy's tenure 
where we were spending 9 percent of our GNP and 55 cents of every 
Federal dollar on the military.
  We have made dramatic cuts. You are seeing the results of those cuts 
partially today.
  I think the BRAC Commission did a commendable job. I am not happy 
with everything they did. I have been trying for 8 years to close a 
facility in my old hometown. I testified three times before the 
commission, ``Close this Army facility down. We don't want it. The town 
doesn't want it. The county doesn't want it.'' Again, it is not on the 
list for closure. So I do not like that, and I will be happy to be back 
again next year either legislatively or before the BRAC Commission to 
close it again.
  I can tell you this Commission accepted a higher percentage of 
Pentagon recommendations than any other commission, and despite what 
President Clinton said, this Commission came up with more savings than 
what the administration had.
  But what really outrages me, what really outrages me as a member of 
the Committee on National Security and as someone who is going to, at 
the end of this month, see the last of 13,000 workers leave the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard, the Philadelphia Navy Base, and before that, 
the Philadelphia naval hospital, is to see this President play partisan 
politics with the lives of people in the military. It is an absolutely 
disgusting outrage. Again, this President wants to have it both ways. 
He does not have the backbone or the guts to stand up and disapprove 
the list and send it back for a reconsideration of McClellan or Kelly. 
What does he do? He signs it and then sends a letter down saying, ``I 
really don't want to sign it.''
  Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely outrageous. But that is what this 
President did.
  I would like to, at this point in time, ask the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, is it your 
distinguished interpretation that that letter has absolutely no legal 
standing whatsoever in this process?
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.
  Mr. HEFLEY. I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] I 
absolutely agree with him.
  It has no legal standing as far as we can determine. Our committee 
did consider this, and let me just quote from the committee report just 
a moment:

       In our judgment, the letter of the President of July 13, 
     1995, communicating his approval of the recommendations of 
     the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Committee, has no 
     standing beyond certification. Public Law 101-510 does not 
     provide for any such communication to contain assumptions 
     about the implementation of the recommendations of the 
     Commission.

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the chairman for that comment.
  I would add it is the feeling of this committee that that letter has 
no standing whatsoever. It is a political document.
  But I would say to the President, Where is your letter for the 13,000 
Philadelphia, PA, tri-State workers that are going to be laid off at 
the end of this month? Where is your letter of concern for them? Where 
is your letter of concern for all of those other bases, or are we just 
pandering to one State because of the electoral votes there?
  Mr. Speaker, I am absolutely outraged at, again, the lowness of the 
depths that this President would take in this process. He has demeaned 
the Commission. He has demeaned the process. But somehow that does not 
surprise me.
  Vote ``no.''
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Evans].
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the 
resolution of disapproval. I must do this because I am deeply disturbed 
by the base closure process. In the rush to close installations there 
has been a failure to analyze all of the facts carefully. This is 
obvious from the recommendation made by the Commission concerning the 
Savanna Army depot activity.
  In the case of Savanna, the Commission ignored a number of important 
factors. For example, closing the installation would result in the loss 
of important and hard to replicate capabilities, increase costs above 
the Army estimate to close the base and move its functions, and reduce 
ammo storage capability below critical military needs.
  For instance, the Commission failed to consider that Savanna is one 
of the most efficient facilities in the Army. During Desert Storm, 
Savanna had the highest outloading rate of any depot. It is also one of 
the few with adequate rail service to shipping centers. These national 
assets would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.
  In addition, the estimate of the cost of closing Savanna and 
relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School [USADACS] 
is too low. DOD stated that it would cost $38 million to close the 
installation and relocate functions. However, the Savanna Army depot 
realignment task force estimates that the cost of closing the facility 
and moving the school is much higher--as much as $88 million. This 
includes new construction that will have to take place at McAlester to 
complete the move.
  Even more important, the decision to close ammunition storage 
facilities failed to take into account storage needs. The Army's 1993 
Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with 
11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside storage will be 
needed to match our Nation's future ammunition stockpile. This could 
indicate that the ammunition study is flawed. Because of this decision, 
we may not have enough space to meet future storage needs.
  Our ammunition depots are a national asset that will be needed to 
meet future mobilization needs. The Commission's recommendation will 
mean the loss of an important part of this irreplaceable asset.
  I believe that we must reject the recommendations made by the 
Commission. From the errors I have seen made in just the case of the 
Savanna Army depot activity, I am concerned that other mistakes may 
have been made that will force us to make poor choices concerning our 
Nation's defense infrastructure and unnecessarily eliminate the jobs of 
thousands of civilian employees who have served our Nation proudly. I 
hope my colleagues will join me in opposing these recommendations.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam 
[Mr. Underwood].
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, as I have pointed out on several occasions previously, 
no community is more negatively affected on a per capita basis by the 
BRAC 1955 decisions than Guam. We are losing a ship repair facility and 
a fleet industrial supply center, the only such facilities on U.S. soil 
on the other side of the international dateline, and potentially some 
10 percent of our total work force on Guam will be affected.
  My community, small and loyal, will be suffering. But my point here 
in standing in support of House Joint Resolution 102 is not just to 
bemoan the effects of the BRAC process on a small island 9,000 miles 
away, with no electoral votes to give and no vote to cast on this 
floor. My purpose is to draw attention to the disjunctures in the BRAC 
process, to point out that the forward positioning of U.S. forces in 
Asia is benefiting foreign countries over U.S. communities.
  On the very day the BRAC process was announced, riggers at the ship 
repair facility on Guam were offered positions at the Yokosuka ship 
repair facility
 in Japan, and to point out that America's war fighting capacity in 
Asia is overly dependent upon the stationing of forces in foreign 
countries when U.S. soil is available, and to point out that the BRAC 
process ignored the sound advice of people in uniform and favored the 
bean counters, the so-called men in suits in the Pentagon.

  For the record, I would like to point out that even as BRAC put forth 
a disagreeable decision, Guam is determined to make the best of it and 
to 

[[Page H 8695]]
survive. In this, I have asked the Department of Defense and the 
administration to give Guam the same consideration that other 
communities are apparently receiving. In short, we are asking for the 
best arrangements possible, a kind of most-favored-base closing 
treatment.
  I recognize that the resolution may not pass, and I do not intend to 
confound the laws which govern the BRAC process and which have served 
the country generally well. But consider casting a symbolic vote to 
send a message regarding the 1995 process.
  Support the Tejeda resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution now 
pending before us.
  Last year I joined with those who supported postponing the 1995 base 
closure round. But the amendment to postpone it was opposed by the 
Defense Department, which argued that it needed these savings for 
systems modernization and other recapitalization efforts, and this 
effort was soundly defeated.
  Thus, the 1995 base closure deliberations proceeded. Ultimately, the 
Base Closure Commission recommended the closure or realignment of 132 
installations, including 123 of the Secretary of Defense's 146 
recommendations. The projected savings total $19.3 billion over 20 
years.
  I do not agree with every one of these decisions, and I sympathize 
deeply with those of my colleagues who lost facilities in the 1995 BRAC 
process. Northeast Florida will lose thousands of military billets as a 
result of the 1993 base closure round, so I am quite familiar with that 
pain.
  But the Commission, the Pentagon, and the GAO did a huge amount of 
work to reach their conclusions in this round. They worked in good 
faith. The national security calculations were made. The savings are 
now budgeted. It makes no sense to dismiss this enormous effort now. We 
should vote down this resolution.
  Having said that, I must register my grave concern about the manner 
in which the President responded to the Commission's recommendations. 
It is my strong view that he has sought to interject politics into this 
process by calling for the privatization in place of two major Air 
Force logistics facilities that the Commission ordered closed.
  In doing so, he has articulated a plan that undermines the entire 
purpose behind base closure law, which is to reduce the Pentagon's 
excess capacity. By privatizing in place, the administration not only 
fails to eliminate this excess capacity, but it exacerbates the current 
excess capacity problems at those facilities that the Commission 
deemed, after a careful review of objective criteria, to be our most 
efficient.
  Instead of performing America's essential military maintenance 
functions at those facilities the Commission preserved, the 
administration would perform them at the facilities deemed least 
deserving. It would then further subject these mission critical 
functions to a very risky new private management scheme.
  To top it off, his plan would violate current law if carried to 
fruition.
  I urge a no vote on this resolution, but more important, I hope my 
colleagues will oppose the administration's attempts to subvert the 
BRAC process for political gain.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Pombo], a gentleman who has worked very 
closely with us since his arrival in Congress to save McClellan Air 
Force Base.
  (Mr. POMBO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. POMBO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this resolution, and in 
strong opposition to the 1995 defense base closure recommendations 
forwarded to Congress by the President.
  I oppose this list for reasons both broad and specific. Specifically, 
the inclusion of McClellan AFB on this list is wholly unacceptable. The 
Sacramento area of California has already suffered through two previous 
rounds of base closures resulting in the total loss of over 28,000 
jobs. The closure of McClellan will add another 13,000 direct, and many 
more indirect, jobs to that figure.
  This BRAC list calls for the closure of McClellan and Kelly Air Force 
Bases. This represents the costliest, most disruptive way to eliminate 
excess capacity in the Air Force depot system--and will have the worst 
impact on military mission support capabilities.
  More broadly, however, I am concerned that we are cutting muscle, and 
not just fat, with this round of closures. After extensive visits and 
consultations, I am convinced that there are serious questions of 
national security arising from this BRAC list.
  Once we close a military facility, we will never get it back. 
Therefore, it is common sense that we must be cautious and discerning 
about each and every facility we close.
  At issue here is, first and foremost, an issue of America's military 
preparedness, and of our ability to influence and shape global affairs 
into the next century. I have not yet seen a serious, detailed, and 
integrated plan for our future security requirements that analyzes base 
closures in light of the needs of our 21st century military. I believe 
that such a plan must be produced and debated prior to closing scores 
of military bases, and most especially before consideration is given to 
closing McClellan Air Force Base.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Watts].

                              {time}  1000

  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, President Harry Truman once said, 
``Every segment of our population and every individual has the right to 
expect from our Government a fair deal.''
  Mr. Speaker, the BRAC process was a fair deal for every individual in 
this country. Before the BRAC process, bases did not close, downsizing 
was simply a theory, and the American taxpayer was charged with 
unnecessary bills for the maintenance of excess capacity in our Army, 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
  The BRAC process closes unneeded military installations. Military 
facilities across the land compete on a level playing field. Some win, 
some lose, but the fight is fair and without the political influence of 
the Congress or the President. The victors should be honored and now is 
the time to stand up and do what is right for this country and her 
people. This BRAC has left some in the executive branch with a message 
they could not politically swallow. They are now attempting to corrupt 
a fair process that estimates a savings of more than $19 billion. Well, 
this Congressman and many who sit on both sides of the aisle simply 
will not tolerate that and will fight to make certain the BRAC process 
remains as apolitical as was originally intended.
  BRAC is a proven process and to dismantle that process by 
disapproving the list would, in the words of Chairman Alan Dixon, 
``destroy the BRAC process forever and fail to save an estimated 19 
billion dollars.'' That is simply not an acceptable course of action.
  Disagreements between how the BRAC list will be implemented will lead 
to heated discussions throughout this Congress. I am especially upset 
about the President's decision to privatize-in-place at McClellan and 
Kelly Air Force Bases. The President's decision to accept the BRAC list 
with a privatize-in-place option is a play that wasn't in the play book 
or within the rules of the game. He has taken an apolitical process and 
turned it into a zero-sum-game. If this Congress allows the Department 
of Defense to privatize-in-place, we will never achieve the savings 
that were clearly identified by the BRAC's recommendation, nor will the 
BRAC process retain the credibility it has worked so hard to achieve.
  But that fight is for another day. Today, we face the question of 
rejecting the BRAC list. This question has but one answer--``No.''
  Today, we must do what it takes to deliver on our promise for a fair 
deal to those we represent. To do this there is only one reasonable 
action; accept the BRAC recommendation by voting down the resolution to 
disapprove recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission.
  I ask you to do the right thing and cast your vote against the 
resolution to disapprove the BRAC recommendation.

[[Page H 8696]]

  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject the BRAC 
Commission's recommendation because they violated not only the spirit 
of the law, but the letter of the law that empowers them to close bases 
in the first place, and, as an example of that I am deeply disturbed by 
the conduct of the BRAC Commission with respect to the Military Ocean 
Terminal, Bayonne, NJ, specifically with regard to the recommendation 
to eliminate dedicated military ocean terminals. Never before has the 
Commission decided, on its own initiative, to virtually eliminate an 
entire military mission. Ironically, the Commission found precisely 
what I had alleged--that the Secretary had substantially deviated from 
the selection criteria in its recommendation to close MOTBY which is 
grounds for removal from the list. However, the Commission far exceeded 
its statutory charter by expanding the scope of realignments and 
eliminated the entire military ocean terminal mission.
  Let me outline the numerous legal and factual errors that the BRAC 
failed to take into account in their sloppy, haphazard proceedings.
  First, a fatally flawed recommendation from the Secretary to close 
the Army portion of MOTBY without regard for the cross service 
assessment of the Navy Military Sealift Command, leaving this agency 
stranded, required removal of the base from the list.
  Second, this legal error was further tainted by a legally invalid 
attempt to rescue the first recommendation by closing and not enclaving 
MSC. This is an unlawful expansion of the scope of realignment because 
the BRAC failed to add the MSC enclave at the legal deadline for the 
consideration of additional bases.
  Third, the BRAC, Navy and DoD have violated the letter and intent of 
the BRAC statute by increasing the scope of activities to be realigned 
away from Bayonne 1 week away from the Commission's final round of 
hearings. This left the community with no time to respond to the 
proposed revisions.
  Fourth, the BRAC on its own motion realigned activities away from 
MOTBY to a so-called Base X. This is a violation of its own selection 
criteria 2, regarding the availability and condition of land and 
facilities at potential receiving locations. The Commission has failed 
to follow its own rules. By randomly assigning missions to mythical 
bases, the cost and manpower implications of criteria 4 become 
infinite.
  Fifth, although the BRAC has limited judicial review of its actions, 
it is clear that this is a major abuse of discretion in two areas. The 
BRAC's actions are ultra vires and wildly beyond the bounds of its 
enabling statute and the Commission has completely failed to follow its 
own regulations.
  I do not want to seem to be calling sour grapes over this decision. I 
want to establish a record because in the next few weeks legislation, 
which is equally ill conceived, and proves my case today. This 
legislation greatly threatens the military and economic security of the 
United States. The Ocean Shipping Reform Act, when combined with the 
closure of the dedicated military ocean terminals at both Bayonne and 
Oakland, poses the most serious threat to our Nation's ability to 
mobilize in this century.
  There are compelling military value reasons to reject MOTBY's 
closure. MOTBY is a unique strategic asset. No other port on the east 
or gulf coasts, commercial or military, can duplicate its combination 
of advantages in the support of power projection from the continental 
United States without the disruption of commercial port activities. 
This was amply demonstrated during the Gulf war and our recent 
operations in Somalia and Haiti.
  Having investigated and documented this matter fully, it was shocking 
to see the assortment of half truths and mischaracterizations that was 
paraded before the Commission as analysis, without an opportunity for 
rebuttal. For example, the
 staff alleged that MOTBY was only used to mobilize the 10th Mountain 
Light Infantry Division when, in fact, dozens of units shipped through 
MOTBY as well as outsized cargo such as M1A2 tanks from as far as Fort 
Hood, TX.

  Bayonne sits astride the huge, highly developed, multimodal 
transportation network of the American Northeast Corridor. Once cargo 
arrives at Bayonne, it can be placed directly into vast covered 
warehouses or uncovered--and fully secure--staging areas. All types of 
cargo, from heavy, outsized weapons like the M1A2 tank and the Patriot 
antimissile system, to the full range of munitions available to our 
fighting forces can be loaded by Bayonne's specially trained union 
force using state of the art, dedicated rail lines using every type of 
roll-on/roll-off vessel in the MSC inventory. Bayonne has the best 
steaming times to Europe, a full day's advantage over any other U.S. 
port, military or civilian.
  Nowhere in the staff presentation was there any reflection of the 
shortcomings of commercial ports. For example, since most ports are 
containerized, there are no commercial ports which can lift the 70 tons 
of the M1A2 Abrams. If forced to rely on roll-on/roll-off ships in the 
MSC inventory, the number of useable commercial ports plummets and even 
the tiny, remaining Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, NC, an 
ammunition depot, quickly becomes unusable.
  Finally as operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia and Haiti have 
proven beyond doubt, MOTBY's unique heavy sealift capabilities are 
always available to us in a crisis. The Pentagon's recommendation that 
Bayonne be closed is based on the untested premise that commercial 
ports on the east and gulf coasts will be both willing and able to 
forego their profitable contracts to accommodate time sensitive 
military cargo. The exact opposite of this premise was experienced with 
the ports of Houston and Portland during the Gulf war. Indeed, the 
director of port operations of the Port of New York and New Jersey, 
Lillian Liburdi, an acknowledged expert on military cargo management, 
testified that no commercial port on the east or gulf coast could 
substitute for MOTBY. DoD has acknowledged this by contracting with 
MARAD and Louisiana State University to study this very issue of 
commercial port availability should Bayonne be closed--a study that 
should have preceded any closure recommendation.
  Past BRACs have wrestled with the depot issue and this BRAC has 14 
boxes of studies on depots. It is extremely reckless to leap ahead with 
the unstudied and untested assumptions that commercial ports can 
replace dedicated military ports in all war fighting scenarios. It 
threatens the soldier waiting for resupply on the beach and it 
threatens the economy whose ports may be subjected to commandeering at 
short notice. The role of MOTBY is essential. If it is closed, we will 
be forced to recreate it, at enormous cost, every time we mobilize even 
the smallest forces.
  Finally, I have taken this time to go into great detail in rebutting 
the Commission's finding point by point because of my great policy 
concern about maritime commerce. In its ignorance the Commission found, 
``six ports capable of deploying an infantry division within 1 day's 
rail movement of Bayonne.'' As I warned the Commission in their 
regional hearing, legislation deregulating of the maritime industry, in 
the form of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, has already been reported 
out of the Committee on Transportation. Maritime deregulation will have 
powerful shakeouts for ports, much as airline deregulation had for 
airports.
  Our former colleague, Helen Bentley, who had vast experience in the 
maritime industry, has warned that deregulation will create megaports 
like airline hubs. Mrs. Bentley warned that deregulation could reduce 
the number of ports serving the Nation to as few as four. Most small 
seaports will vanish. There is precedence. Just as Halifax has 
decimated Great Lakes ports, the passage of NAFTA and maritime 
deregulation could spell extinction for gulf coast ports from 
competition via Veracruz. Ninety-five percent of American export 
commerce moves by ship. If maritime deregulation occurs, there will be 
a vast reduction in port capacity. There will be even less willingness 
by the new megaports to disrupt commercial traffic by accepting 
military cargo on a short term basis. The military cargo charges will 
be at an enormous premium. Even the sloppy staff work done by the 
Commission showed 

[[Page H 8697]]
port operators becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee priority to 
military cargo required by port planning orders. In some cases they 
desire 12-14 days to clear staging and berthing areas.
  Unfortunately, port legal counsel on the BRAC staff failed to 
appreciate that the military cannot compel commercial operators to give 
priority to military deployments during contingency situations. Under 
the third and fourth amendments of the Constitution, there is no 
authority to disrupt commercial ports in the absence of a declared 
emergency. By that time it may be long after the need to mobilize and 
use ports. The Kuwaiti invasion was in August 1990. Congress authorized 
the use of force months later. Port planning orders and port allocation 
orders are no guarantee port access on a timely basis. The only reason 
these orders have worked at all in the past is the delicate balance 
struck in the Shipping Act of 1984 between military and necessity and 
good commercial practice, which tolerated excess capacity in our ports.
  Today, I urge you to reject the BRAC recommendations. The Commission 
has far exceeded its authority into roles and missions. Moreover, they 
have seriously jeopardized the military readiness of the Nation. It 
will cost more than huge sums of money, it will cost soldiers' lives.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Chambliss].
  (Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Members of the House 
recognize the importance of supporting and preserving the integrity of 
the BRAC process. In it, Congress has created the most politically 
neutral means possible of reducing our military's excessive 
infrastructure. Although we may not agree with individual decisions, we 
must support the process.
  With respect to the process, however, I would like to address a 
situation that has arisen from the recommendations of this most recent 
Commission. Specifically, I refer to the President's plans for the 
future of our air logistics depot structure.
  As my colleagues are aware, the Commission determined the Air Force 
maintains excess capacity in its air depots. As a result, commissioners 
voted to close two depots based on the objective base closure criteria.
  As with all individual base closure decisions before, the two depots 
slated for closure would be phased out over a 5-year period. This would 
solve the two primary problems the BRAC was created to eliminate: 
excess capacity and infrastructure.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, the Pentagon has come to inform Congress that under 
direction of this administration and the President, another plan is in 
the works for the two air force depots to be closed.
  Mr. Speaker, it seems the President has concluded that the loss of 
over 10,000 jobs in each of the very electoral-vote-rich States of 
California and Texas demands special attention. In order to save those 
jobs, and presumably those votes, the President has instructed the 
Secretary of Defense to devise a plan to privatize in place, in effect 
maintaining all depot jobs in San Antonio and Sacramento.
  What the President is saying here, Mr. Speaker, is that the BRAC 
process is political, that an otherwise objective process is necessary 
until it affects his chances of reelection. The deliberate end-run this 
President is making around the process should offend each and every 
Member of this Congress that has worked within the limits of the 
process and every Member that has accepted the four rounds of BRAC 
recommendations.
 You know, it is not very often that this Congress agrees on a 
politics-free solution to the problems we face, but in this case the 
process must be preserved and defended.

  Mr. Speaker, this President's decision to privatize in place the work 
performed at Sacramento and San Antonio air logistics centers nullifies 
the very difficult decisions made by the BRAC. The BRAC took its charge 
very seriously: to assess and repair a military scheme that maintained 
excess depot capacity and infrastructure that was out of proportion 
with the force structure demanded in this post-cold war world.
  The commissioners accomplished their task, and by privatizing in 
place, the Pentagon will be overriding the commissioners' decision and 
embracing our status quo of excess capacity.
  Let me make one point perfectly clear, to my colleagues, but more 
important to the President and this administration. The President's 
acceptance of this Commission's recommendations is just that: 
``acceptance.'' The Commission has not recommended privatization in 
place, or any other concoction designed to save political hides, 
regardless of how desperate the President is to amend the 
recommendations.
  The President's acceptance is unconditional, and our rejection here 
today of the resolution before us will signal our support for this very 
difficult process.
  I ask my colleagues to reject the joint resolution before you. The 
BRAC process has been many things, but it has not been political.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Farr].
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the resolution of 
disapproval.
  I do so because I am concerned about the manner in which the BRAC 
Commission carried out its mission. I support downsizing the military 
and cutting the budget. But I believe it needs to be done in a manner 
that is logical, fair, and honest, with the emphasis, Mr. Speaker, on 
honest.
  In my district, the BRAC recommended that Fort Hunter Liggett be 
realigned. The Army told BRAC publicly and on the record, that it would 
only cost $6.7 million to move the mission of Fort Hunter Liggett to 
Fort Bliss, TX.
  The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that internal Army documents which I have 
obtained show a different story. Internal Army documents show that it 
will, in fact, cost three times that amount to move the Fort Hunter 
Liggett mission.
  The Army told BRAC publicly and on the record, that savings of $12.7 
million would be realized from the realignment of Fort Hunter Liggett. 
But internal Army documents state, ``There are no savings to be 
realized in this action.''
  I am not whining about having a base realigned in my district. As 
everyone knows, my district is the site of the largest base closure so 
far, that of Fort Ord. And I know from experience that as traumatic an 
experience as base closure can be, there is a way to turn closure into 
successful economic redevelopment. President Clinton was at Fort Ord 
just this past weekend to celebrate Fort Ord's transformation into a 
major educational center. So, I do not necessarily oppose base closure 
or realignment. What I oppose is the deliberate manipulation of the 
numbers by the Army and the BRAC to make their case.
  The BRAC method above all must be fair and honest. I do not believe 
this round of closures met those criteria and that is why I support 
this resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Lucas].
  Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Speaker, I know what an emotional issue this is, for I 
have been very involved in the BRAC process. I, too, had base on the 
closure list, Vance Air Force Base in Enid, OK. And many of my 
constituents work for Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. I was 
fortunate, my bases are not slated for closure, but I remember the 
stress I felt when commissioners visited the base and when I was 
waiting for the final closure list.
  None of us want to lose something so valuable as a base in our 
district.
  That is why the 101st Congress created BRAC. They knew that base 
closures would best be handled by an unbiased, nonpartisan group. They 
knew that when politics are involved, base worthiness and cost-
effectiveness fall by the wayside, as was demonstrated by the President 
earlier this year. It would be nearly impossible for Congress and the 
President to decide objectively which bases to close.
  Sure the BRAC process has flaws, but it has worked well thus far. I 
do not think any of us can argue that this process was not fair and 
open. We each had ample opportunity to participate and to validate the 
information used.

[[Page H 8698]]

  Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to finish this process 
and vote ``no'' on the resolution of disapproval.
                              {time}  1015

  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Ortiz].
  Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, as the ranking minority member and long time 
participant on the Military Installations Subcommittee, I have always 
been skeptical of the current base closure process.
  I am concerned that the process has not yielded the expected savings 
and I believe that Congress should at a minimum have the opportunity to 
amend the list.
  I believe that the members of the Base Closure Commission worked in 
good faith and appreciate the enormity of their task.
  Additionally, I support the vast majority of the recommendations of 
the Commission.
  However, I believe that for national security reasons the Congress 
should overturn the closure recommendations as submitted by the 
President.
  We have reduced our Nation's defense too much and too fast.
  I believe that the closure of the Kelly Air Logistics Center at San 
Antonio, TX, will result in a severe degradation of readiness that 
cannot be overlooked.
  The costs, both financially and militarily, will be enormous.
  Therefore, I will support the resolution of my colleague from Texas, 
Congressman Tejeda.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama [Mr. Browder].
  Mr. BROWDER. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to note what is happening 
today. A lot of us think that this process has gone awry, and we are 
speaking up about it. That does not mean that we are not trying to save 
money. We are honestly trying to challenge decisions that impact 
negatively, not only on our districts but on the national defense.
  Let me say something strange, though, for someone who is opposed to 
one of the base closure decisions. I think that the base closure 
process that we have is about as fair a process as we are going to get. 
It is designed to close bases over objections of people who want them 
to stay open. So I think it is about as fair a process as we are going 
to get. It is a fair process. But sometimes mistakes are made.
  Mr. Speaker, I am here today to call attention to one of these 
mistakes and to ask that a future Congress come back and take a look at 
what happened in this decision. I know Fort McClellan in Alabama is 
going to close, which is in my district. We are not going to cry over 
spilled milk. Fort McClellan is the home of the Army Chemical School 
and the only place in the world where we can train with live agent 
chemical weapons on the place. Experts all over the country and 
internationally have testified that not only is it a mistake in these 
times to close Fort McClellan, but it will disrupt our capability for 
up to a decade. Everybody agrees on the increasing threat, not only in 
the world from our military enemies, but also from terrorists here 
domestically. This is the only place where we can prepare for this.
  Now, I know they say they can move it somewhere else, but just this 
move experts testify will disrupt the capability for up to 10 years. 
Our men and women are required to be able to survive a fight in a 
chemical environment. This will disrupt that.
  Mr. Speaker, I just want to cite one example. Back in June, the Army 
testified to the Base Closure Commission that the one-time closing cost 
of Fort McClellan was $231 million. The next month, according to a BRAC 
1995 information briefing, these are the Army's own documents, the 
closing costs had increased 70 percent, to $393 million. I wish the 
BRAC Commission had had the real numbers.
  This BRAC document has closing costs, net closing costs; that is, 
minus savings, that testified before the Commission in June, $110 
million. Now they say the closing costs are $377 million. That is a 243 
percent increase. Savings over 20 years, they said in June it was $287 
million, and now they say they are not available. The answer to it, in 
our newspaper which got this document, says the answer from the Army is 
we are not going to talk specific figures. It is too early.
  No, Mr. Speaker, it is too late. They tortured the numbers and closed 
this base. It will hurt our military men and women in the future. At 
some point, Mr. Speaker, in the future something is going to happen 
with chemical weapons, an incident akin to the Beirut barracks bombing 
of the past, at which time there were investigations about why that was 
allowed to happen. Mr. Speaker, at some time in the future, we are 
probably going to have a chemical weapons incident, a tragedy akin to 
that. When we do, I hope this Congress will come back and investigate 
and will hold people accountable for why they not only witnessed, but 
accepted, and even participated in the distortion of numbers and the 
overriding of all of our military experts who said this is a major 
mistake.
  Mr. Speaker, I feel somewhat like a friend of
   mine, Claude Harris, a former member of this body, who told me one 
time about a catfish, and the fisherman that caught that catfish was 
about to clean him and he said now, hold still, Mr. Catfish. This is 
not going to hurt you too much. All I am going to do is skin you and 
gut you. Mr. Speaker, that is what is happening here.

  We are going to protest. I urge support of this resolution, but I do 
not think this resolution will pass, and in some cases, such as this, 
the men and women who fight in our military are going to be the ones 
who suffer.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Gonzalez].
  Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution to 
disapprove the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission.
  In the first place, I believe the process involved is simply a sham 
and evasion of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress. The 
Commission concept is simply a way of delegating to others not only our 
responsibility to determine what military forces to establish and 
maintain, but our fundamental legislative responsibility as well. No 
matter how politically easy and attractive the Commission concept is, 
we cannot escape the reality that when we embraced this idea, we 
effectively said, Congress does not want to exercise its constitutional 
mandate with respect to establishing and regulating the military forces 
of the United States--we don't even want to legislate when it comes 
down to issues of reducing military establishments. Therefore the 
process itself is one that is inimical to the vitality, the relevance, 
and the plain duty of the Congress. But that is an argument for a 
different occasion; the fact is, the Commission concept was established 
and in place; it will be for a future Congress to decide whether or not 
to embrace the idea again.
  This resolution ought to be approved, because the work of the 
Commission is flawed, certainly with regard to the logistics support 
system of the Air Force.
  In the past, commissions did not deviate very much from the plans and 
recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, but in this case the 
Commission made wholesale revisions. This is a dangerous precedent; it 
is not a Commission that must shoulder responsibility in the event of 
war; it is the Congress and the President. It is not a Commission that 
plans forces to meet contingencies, it is the President and the 
Secretary of Defense. It is not a Commission that votes the funds, it 
is the Congress. But this Commission went far afield, and made changes 
that fundamentally affect the ability of this country to adequately 
support its air forces. The fact is, if this resolution fails and the 
Commission recommendations take effect, the Air Force will have almost 
no reserve capacity for the maintenance of aircraft engines, and very 
little reserve capacity to maintain its aircraft. The Commission is, in 
effect, placing all the support needs of the Air Force in a single 
basket, for each major item. If any one of those places suffers an 
accident, there can easily be grave effects on the ability of the Air 
Force to perform its basic mission.
  I am not speaking of a far-fetched notion.

[[Page H 8699]]

  Under the Commission plan, every single military aircraft engine 
would be overhauled at a single place. Just a few years ago, that very 
building suffered a disastrous fire that shut it down for over a year. 
Luckily for the Air Force, the workload at Tinker Air Force Base could 
be diverted to the engine facility at Kelly Air Force Base, and 
readiness did not suffer.
  But the Commission recommended that the logistics functions at Kelly 
be shut down--leaving the Air Force not only no reserve capacity to 
repair engines, and very little for aircraft in the event of any 
conflict lasting more than a few days; but depriving it of any ability 
to shift workload in the event a major facility is shut down by 
accident or some catastrophic misfortune.
  The Air Force recommendation, supported by the Secretary of Defense, 
was to keep five Air Force logistics centers, but to reduce each of 
them in size, in effect, mothballing capacity that could rapidly be 
brought into action in the event of need. This would have saved money 
and provided a considerable margin of safety as well. But the 
Commission rejected the idea of maintaining such a margin of safety, 
even though the Air Force plan would have saved almost as much money as 
the Commission plan.
  Not only did the Commission reject the idea of maintaining reserve 
capacity while saving money, it compounded this double error by 
electing to shut down Kelly Air Force Base, which is the cheapest and 
most reliable of the Air Logistics Centers. The work that is done at 
Kelly is of the highest quality, unsurpassed by any; and its cost per 
hour is the lowest in the service. How can it make sense to close down 
the lowest cost, highest quality producer? But this is what happened.
  The President clearly does not want to lose the capacity that is 
available at Kelly Air Force Base, so he has opted to try privatizing 
the major facilities there, so as to keep them in being, and keeping at 
least some of the trained personnel in place. In other words, the 
Commission's basic premise is so flawed that it has been rejected, as a 
practical matter. But I do not believe we should accept a half-measure 
that on its face accepts the recommendation, but at the same time 
rejects its premise, which is where we stand today. I would rather 
reject the Commission report outright, and I urge that the House do so 
by supporting this resolution. Let us say frankly that we want reserve 
capacity; let us say honestly that we want flexibility and emergency 
response ability; and let us reject a report and recommendation that 
flies in the face of sound policy and even good sense. Vote for the 
resolution.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Montgomery].
  (Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose House 
Joint Resolution 102, a motion of disapproval, and ask my colleagues to 
vote no.
   Mr. Speaker, I am a little hesitant about getting up here this 
morning, because I was fortunate that I had two bases on the Base 
Closure Commission list and those bases came off. But I want to point 
out to my colleagues, I have also in the past had units that were put 
on the Base Closure Commission that did not come off.
   Mr. Speaker, it should be pointed out that the members of the 1995 
Base Closure Commission represented a broad section of this country. 
The chairman was Alan Dixon, a former Member from Illinois, and, 
incidentally, he voted to close my bases. Then you had Mr. Al Cornella 
of South Dakota, a private businessman, and Ms. Rebecca Cox, who served 
on the Commission before private enterprise forced out our Air Force 
Gen. J.B. Davis, very qualified, Mr. Lee Kling, a banker from St. 
Louis, MO, private enterprise. You had Adm. Ben Montoya, who is very 
capable and who had been in the Navy.

                              {time}  1030

  And then you had Maj. Gen. Joe Robles who served as a base commander 
and knew a lot about base closure. And then you had Miss Wendi Steele 
who served on the staff here in Washington on the Senate side. So, Mr. 
Speaker, these were qualified people. I guess I spent more time at the 
Base Closure Commission meetings and I was impressed.
  Now, the staff worked hard. They were highly qualified. Some had been 
on the board in previous base closure rounds. They knew the bases and 
the process. These men and women, as far as I know, this Commission 
spent more time on the job flying around the country. They went 
thousands and thousands of miles looking at the different bases. So the 
process was open from start to finish. You could talk to the 
commissioners, you could talk to staff.
   Mr. Speaker, they made themselves available to all of us. It is the 
toughest job I think you could give civilians, and that is one reason I 
wanted to get up here this morning to commend these commissioners for 
taking on a job like this. There are no compliments to it. It was a 
heartache to them. They did not like what they had to do, but they 
served our country well. I think they did a very thorough and fair job, 
and I hope the House will reject the motion for disapproval and accept 
the recommendations of this Commission.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Bonilla].
  (Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of a strong 
national defense, a vigilant America, and a secure, peaceful future. I 
support this resolution, of which I am an original sponsor, to 
disapprove the misguided recommendations of the Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission. Closing vital military facilities, like Kelly 
Air Force Base, leaves America weaker. Ask my colleagues to put aside 
parochial interests and vote for a strong Armed Forces. Reject the BRAC 
proposals.
  Ronald Reagan clearly understood the necessity of a policy of peace 
through strength. That policy brought us triumph in the cold war. In 
contrast, policies of unilateral disarmament in the past only served to 
embolden aggressors and set the stage for World War II. I am afraid 
these BRAC recommendations reflect a pattern of disarmament which 
threatens our future security.
  Our military leaders and the Commander-in-Chief have recognized the 
serious negative implications of the BRAC recommendations for our 
military security. However, President Clinton failed to reject these 
dangerous proposals. I urge my colleagues to reject these proposals and 
please vote for a strong defense and for this resolution.
  I would be remiss if I failed to note that the BRAC did get some 
things right. This BRAC recognized the importance and quality of 
Laughlin Air Force Base. Its facilities remain second to none and the 
BRAC Commissioners had no choice but to recognize that fact. Brooks Air 
Force Base's excellence was recognized as well. However, the 
recommendation to close Kelly remains irresponsible and dangerous.
  I also want to take a moment to comment on the human dimension of 
this recommendation. The BRAC proposal will have a devastating impact 
on affected communities costing tens of thousands of jobs and hurting 
tens of thousands of families. Closing Kelly Air Force Base in San 
Antonio will slam the door on thousands of hard working patriotic 
Americans. It will ignore their sacrifices. I know that the spirit and 
the dedication of the Kelly worker cannot be crushed and that 
ultimately San Antonio will overcome this setback. But our military 
will clearly be weakened and the lives of Kelly's workers will be 
disrupted and their financial security jeopardized. Please vote for 
this resolution and let Kelly's workers know we are in their corner.
  If you support the visions of Ronald Reagan's peace through strength, 
if you support our U.S. Air Force, if you support the plan of 
preserving freedom and liberty going into the next century, please vote 
for this resolution.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my friend, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Smith].
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and friend and 
neighbor from San Antonio for yielding me time.
  On June 16, 1995, 35,000 San Antonians lined the streets of our 
hometown to 

[[Page H 8700]]
demonstrate ``Kelly Pride.'' The purpose of this huge demonstration in 
``Military City'' was to inform the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission why Kelly Air Force Base should not be closed. It wasn't 
only the people of San Antonio who recognized the importance of Kelly 
to defending the freedom that Americans cherish. Military leaders 
understood the importance of Kelly and recommended that BRAC not close 
Kelly. Because the BRAC Commission ignored this view and decided to 
close Kelly anyway, I support the Tejada resolution and will vote to 
disapprove the BRAC Commission list.
  Our military leaders recommended that Kelly stay open for good 
reason. The pride of San Antonio has made Kelly into one of the 
Nation's premier Air Force bases, an essential player in the free 
world's fight against nazism, fascism, communism, and in the recently 
successful campaign in the Persian Gulf.
  You can see the pride of San Antonio in the work of the generations 
of San Antonians who have made Kelly Air Logistics Center synonymous 
with high quality, top efficiency, and unmatched productivity.
  You can see the pride of San Antonio as another C-5 or C-5A rolls out 
of one of the enormous hangers where it has been expertly serviced and 
prepared to do its part in our Nation's defense.
  You can see the pride of San Antonio as its military and civilian 
communities rallied together to support airlifts in Operation Desert 
Storm and all recent major conflicts and humanitarian missions.
  The Air Force recognized the indispensable contributions of Kelly and 
that is why they recommended that this depot remain open. Because BRAC 
rejected the recommendations of our military experts, I will vote for 
the motion to disapprove the recommendations of the Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission out of protest against the loss of resources and 
services that the Kelly community contributes to our Nation's defense.
  Kelly's proud tradition is confirmed not only by the Air Force's 
recommendation that Kelly stay open but also by the decision of the 
Commission and the administration to recommend that ``Privatization in 
place'' be implemented at Kelly. I am encouraged and hopeful that this 
plan will secure our Nation's defense. Our community's leaders, the 
city of San Antonio, and the Kelly community will join together to work 
with the Federal Government to ensure that this transition is as smooth 
as possible.
  I know that our community will show the hard work, patriotism, and 
commitment that it has always shown in its work for our Nation's 
military. I am optimistic that you will continue to see San Antonio's 
pride as future generations of workers demonstrate their excellence, as 
another C-5 rolls out of the hanger, and as we support the missions of 
our Nation's armed services in future crises. ``Kelly Pride'' will 
sustain our community through this transition, just as thoroughly as it 
has sustained our Nation's Air Force for so many years.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona [Mr. Pastor].
  (Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, the Hispanic Caucus has been a very active 
participant throughout the BRAC process. Our concern has been the 
closure of Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio.
  We have worked in a bipartisan manner with out colleagues from San 
Antonio in order to ensure that the economic viability of San Antonio 
continues. As you heard this morning, and studies have shown, on the 
merits Kelly Air Force Base deserves to continue its mission. It has 
been very effective. It has been efficient and plays a vital role in 
the defense of this country. So on the merits alone, Kelly Air Force 
Base deserves to continue its mission.
  One of the concerns that we have as the Hispanic Caucus is that Kelly 
Air Force Base has been a long-time employer of the Hispanic community 
in San Antonio. To date, over 60 percent of the civilian employment 
base in Kelly is of Mexican-American descent. Kelly Air Force Base has 
had a long history in the Hispanic community. It has provided 
employment and in turn has provided opportunities for Hispanic families 
to better themselves.
  If Kelly Air Force Base is closed according to the BRAC 
recommendation, it will have a devastating effect in the Hispanic 
community of San Antonio, high unemployment, lack of opportunity for 
families to better themselves.
  Mr. Speaker, Kelly Air Force Base deserves to stay open, continue its 
mission on the merits, but it also needs to continue in order to ensure 
the well-being of San Antonians in Texas.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. Kolbe). The gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Tejeda] has 3 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Fazio] has 4 minutes remaining.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Waters].
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution 
of disapproval. The 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
recommendations have missed the mark. This year's report uses that I 
believe to be faulty methodology, underestimated costs, and optimistic 
savings assumptions. As I have stated previously in writing to 
President Clinton, in light of the problems associated with this 
report, we should declare a moratorium on all base closures, pending a 
reexamination of the true savings associated with closing the specified 
bases.
  Obviously, my primary frame of reference for this issue is in the 
State of California. California has already lost 22 bases--more than 
any other State. If the current closings go into effect, the cumulative 
loss for California would total 200,000 jobs and $7 billion in economic 
activity. Closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, in Long Beach, CA, as 
this report would do, is unnecessary, militarily risky, and it would 
exacerbate the deteriorating industrial base of our region of the 
country.
  Without question, these recommendations are bad for California, but 
they are bad for the military as well. Many of the savings envisioned 
from this report are illusory. There is no guarantee we can save money 
and no real assurances that jobs lost can be replaced. Previous 
attempts to contract for lost jobs have been less than successful. In 
conclusion, let's start this process over and do it right. Let's 
support this resolution, and disapprove the Base Closing Commission 
report.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  (Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, the result of this year's round of BRAC 
decisions adversely affected my own district in Indiantown Gap, 
heretofore a vital part of our national defense structure, which has 
been modified downward, downsized, as it were, by the decision. You 
would think then that I would stand here and support with all my heart 
and vigor the resolution that is at hand, but I take the opposite view.
  I supported the initial concept of BRAC and its initial coming into 
being and voted for it. It is unseemly now of me to say that, because 
it has affected perhaps adversely my own back yard, that the concept is 
wrong, that the decisionmaking was flawed, that the concept is 
inappropriate. I believe very strongly that the people in my district 
who were affected by this latest decision of the BRAC are going to be 
able to rally to the cause of softening the blow and of finding 
alternative ways of continuing the enterprises in which they were 
involved in support of some of the activities of the Indiantown Gap 
facility.
  In short, they will be resilient enough to understand that we cannot 
have a nationwide concept of downsizing our bases across the Nation and 
across the world except for our own. Therefore, I will vote against 
this resolution.

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I just want to simply sum up by saying a few things 
here. I think the gentleman from California [Mr. Doolittle] said it 
correctly when he said BRAC was a political entity. It simply takes the 
politics out of Congress and perhaps out of the Pentagon, and puts it 
in the hands of a number of decent and perhaps well-intentioned 

[[Page H 8701]]
people, but people who do bring biases. We have seen this debate go on, 
as others have in the past, and those who dodge the BRAC bullet are 
here to praise the Commission, and those who were impacted by it are 
here to deride them.
  The bottom line is, for California, as we have heard from many 
Members, we have had an overwhelming impact. Fourteen percent of all 
DOD personnel in our State, from 60 direct to 85 indirect percentage of 
all jobs lost through the 4 BRAC rounds in one State. There is no 
question, if we had moved across services and forced the military 
entities to compete with each other, we could have done a much better 
job of saving the taxpayers money and preserving the best of our 
infrastructure, but privatization is also important. We have heard 
people come to the floor today and deride privatization. Whether it is 
the Defense Science Board or the Joint Chiefs or the Commission on 
Roles and Missions, all of them are pushing us in the direction of 
privatization. The President pushes for it, the BRAC itself in its 
report allows it, and I call my colleagues to read the letter from the 
President to the Commission, from the Commission to the President, all 
of the legal authority in the view of all the various general counsel 
and all the agencies makes clear that privatization can take place at 
McClellan and Kelly Air Force Base, despite the critics, who would like 
to take our workload and would like to take our jobs to their own 
bases.
  Let me be very clear. We will be dipping into readiness to pay for 
this foolish reduction in our capability. We will not be able to make 
the numbers work out. This BRAC round is predicated on phony bean 
counting, and in my view, we will pay for it, not only with turbulence 
in our military repair area, particularly for aircraft in the Air Force 
arsenal, but we will also pay for it by draining our readiness funds to 
pay for base closure, something that is supposed to save the taxpayers 
money.
  Sacramento will survive. We will pull it together and we will come 
back, despite these heavy hits, but I do believe that my opposition and 
my support for this resolution is firmly based on the hit on American 
military readiness, so I would urge my colleagues to join us in perhaps 
what is a protest vote, but still a symbolic and important symbol of 
our opposition.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield my remaining 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Tejeda].
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  (Mr. TEJEDA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank very much the 
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Hefley], our chairman on the Subcommittee 
on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on National 
Security, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], our full 
committee chairman, for their cooperation and understanding on this 
issue.
  Mr. Speaker, Kelly has the best quality record with the lowest defect 
rate and the fewest customer complaints of all ALCs. Kelly has the best 
educated Air Force, and nowhere else in the Nation will we find 
employees who are as involved in their community than in San Antonio.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Base Closure Commission has cut right 
through the fat and into the bone and muscle of our Air Force. Keep in 
mind that California was essential to the success of Operation Just 
Cause and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, 17 million pounds of munitions and 64 percent 
of items for airlift support were shipped through Kelly. The Air Force 
recommendation to the Commission on Depots was the product of a 
thorough, year-long study conducted by professional military analysts. 
The Base Closure Commission's recommendation on the ALCs followed only 
6 weeks of study, during which time they were also attempting to focus 
on hundreds of other Air Force, Army, and Navy installations.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the final opportunity to right the wrongs made 
by the Commission. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of 
disapproval.
  Mr. Speaker, I fully recognize that the post-cold-war drawdown of 
military infrastructure has lagged behind the personnel reductions. 
Nobody said that there would be easy choices in this round of base 
closures.
  I feel strongly, however, that the Base Closure Commission 
overstepped its bounds and placed our military readiness at risk in the 
event of a national crisis. Never before in previous base closure 
rounds has a Commission deviated so substantially from the Defense 
Department's recommendations.
  It should come as no surprise that my objection to this base closure 
list rests with the recommended closure of two Air Force logistics 
centers, or ALCs. Although Kelly AFB is not in my district, I do 
represent many of the outstanding and dedicated workers there and I 
recognize that the work they do is second to none in the Department of 
Defense.
  In fact, Kelly has the best quality record, with the lowest defect 
rate and fewest customer complaints, of all ALCs. Kelly has the best 
educated work force, and nowhere else in the Nation will you find 
employees who are as involved in their community than in San Antonio.
  In March, the Air Force and the Department of Defense proposed to the 
Base Closure Commission that the five existing ALCs downsize in place 
rather than close one of the depots. To reach this commonsense 
proposal, the Air Force focussed on being financially responsible, 
reducing excess capacity, and satisfying its current and projected 
needs.
  In testimony before the Base Closure Commission, Secretary of the Air 
Force Widnall stated that the cost to close one Air Force depot would 
nearly equal the entire Air Force budget for the next 6 years for all 
of its 1995 closures and realignments. So what does the Commission do? 
It votes to close not only two depots, but it votes to close the most 
cost-effective and productive depot at Kelly AFB.
  The original Air Force recommendation of downsizing would have 
eliminated more than one depot equivalent worth of excess capacity 
without losing the many unique facilities and capabilities at any of 
the depots. In voting to close two, the Commission disregarded the 
value and cost-effectiveness of these unique facilities,
 particularly with respect to the C-5 at Kelly AFB.

  There is only one depot in the Defense Department which can support 
the C-5. Kelly has the only hangar in the DOD which can hold six C-5s, 
and it is the only depot able to test and repair the C-5 engine. With 
23 years of C-5 management and maintenance experience, Kelly is the 
heart of DOD strategic airlift.
  During Commission hearings, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ron 
Fogleman stated:

       It is clear that we have excess capacity. It is equally 
     clear, in my view, that our approach reduces that capacity in 
     the manner that best serves the total operational mission of 
     the Air Force. I believe it is the only responsible approach 
     to this issue.

  The day before the Commission's vote on the ALCs, Secretary Widnall 
and General Fogleman wrote to Commission Chairman Alan Dixon. I will 
not read the letter, but I think it is significant and include it in 
the Record at this point of the debate.
  The material referred to is as follows:
                                   Secretary of the Air Force,

                                    Washington, DC, June 21, 1995.
     Hon. Alan J. Dixon,
     Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 
         1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425, Arlington, VA
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Air Force approach to the depots is 
     prudent because it saves money for the taxpayers and protects 
     military readiness. It is also the product of exhaustive 
     analysis by military professionals and senior leadership who 
     have been working the proposal for over a year.
       Our depot proposal is simple. Building on the personnel 
     reductions that have already been taken from the Air Logistic 
     Centers and depots during the last five years (over 26,000 
     people), the pending air Force proposal would reduce and 
     realign the depots by an additional 1,987 jobs (with a net 
     present value of $975 million). While there would be some 
     disruption, the business of the Air Force--flying combat and 
     transport aircraft, and maintaining our command and control 
     and space network--would continue unimpeded. This total air 
     Force depot reduction of 28,000 jobs is almost two and a half 
     times the total depot reduction achieved by all other DoD 
     components in all four BRAC rounds combined.
       On the other hand, the staff generated BRAC proposal 
     described to us will cost the Air Force hundreds of millions 
     of additional dollars (in excess of $1 billion in 
     environmental and military construction costs) during the 
     next five years; disrupt military readiness because of the 
     total restructuring of the Air Force logistics and depot 
     system; preclude the Air Force from carrying through on vital 
     readiness and modernization programs; and have a devastating 
     impact on as many as 25,000 DoD employees in Texas and 
     California who would lose their jobs or have to relocate to 
     other Air Force installations at great personal and public 
     expense.
       Most importantly, the essential business of the Air Force--
     operations, logistics, and budget dollars that are critical 
     to future modernization--would be greatly disrupted. Since 
     the end of the cold war, the Air Force 

[[Page H 8702]]
     has reduced its budget by more than $20 billion and reduced personnel 
     by over 200,000 people. Some further reductions and savings 
     are necessary; however, they must be taken in a way that 
     permits the Air Force to continue to carry out its essential 
     mission. The Department of Defense proposal does that; the 
     Commission staff alternative does not.
           Sincerely,
     Ronald R. Fogleman,
                                     General, USAF Chief of Staff.
     Shiela E. Widnall,
                                       Secretary of the Air Force.

  Mr. Speaker, in essence, they warned that the staff-generated BRAC 
proposal to close ALC's would severely disrupt military readiness and 
the essential operations of the Air Force.
  As I sat in the hearing room during the Commission's deliberations on 
the ALC's, I was stunned by the blatant agenda being advanced by the 
Commission's staff--to portray Kelly AFB in the worst possible light 
and provide for the closure of two ALC's.
  Commissioner J.B. Davis, a retired Air Force general, acknowledged 
during the Commission's vote that the staff seemed to be focused on the 
excess capacity figures. He concurred with General Fogleman that some 
overcapacity helps. It is that overcapacity, surge capacity, that 
services need in times of a crisis. He stated: ``Closing depots * * * 
can severely disrupt that service and the Air Force's wartime 
capability.''
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Base Closure Commission has cut right 
through the fat and into the bone and muscle of our Air Force. Keep in 
mind that Kelly was essential to the success of operation just cause 
and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During Desert Shield/
Desert Storm, 17 million pounds of munitions and 64 percent of items 
for airlift support were shipped through Kelly.
  The Air Force recommendation to the Commission on Depots was the 
product of a thorough year-long study conducted by professional 
military analysts. The Base Closure Commission's recommendations on the 
ALC's followed only 6 weeks of study, during which time they were also 
attempting to focus on hundreds of other Air Force, Army and Navy 
installations.
  This is the final opportunity to right the wrongs made by the 
Commission. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of 
disapproval.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Tejeda] 
and the gentleman from California, [Mr. Fazio] for the way in which 
they have conducted themselves during this debate. I have tremendous 
empathy for the fight they are engaged in over there. Heck, I have the 
same problem. I do not want to see Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center 
closed, either. I think it is a mistake to do that.
  I have a little less empathy with the parade of people who have come 
up here who voted yesterday for an across-the-board cut in the Defense 
budget who are now crying because a base in their area is being 
affected. That seems a little disingenuous to me.
  This is not an easy process. I think sometimes this process does make 
wrong decisions. I think some of these decisions we will regret down 
the line when we have national emergencies. I know this is agonizing 
for communities across this country, and it is not easy for the various 
branches of the services who are going through this, and having to 
recommend closing things that we would really rather not, in many 
cases, because they do not think it makes good sense. I am very 
disappointed that the President of the United States injected 
Presidential politics into this process. I think that is very 
disappointing.
  This is not a perfect process, but it is the only process we have to 
get at this. We had not closed a base in this country since the 1970's 
until this process started. Congress did not have the ability to close 
bases. There are some bases that we do need to close. I reject the idea 
that to vote against this resolution is to vote against a strong 
national defense. It is this administration that is driving the depth 
at which we have to cut back on defense in this country. It is the most 
anti-Defense administration, I think, in the last 50 years, and that is 
what is driving the deep cuts that we have to make.
  With these deep cuts, we have to use every single Defense dollar we 
have the most effective way possible, so yes, we are having to give up 
some facilities that I wish we were not giving up. However, this is the 
process we have set up. This is the end of this round of base closure.
  I would encourage my colleagues to vote against this resolution, 
support the Base Closure Commission, and let us now move on to 
solidifying what we have with our defense structure across this 
country, and make sure that we have a strong defense with what we have 
left.
  Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, I am compelled to vote in support of the 
resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission [BRAC]. I approve of the BRAC process, but 
in my district the Army has taken action under BRAC 95 that simply does 
not make sense, and I cannot support it.
  The Army, in its closure submittal to the BRAC, has proposed moving 
the 400 military and civilian personnel and equipment of the Army's 
Information Systems Software Development Center [ISSC] from leased 
space in Fairfax County to Government space on Fort Meade, MD. It is 
ostensibly an in-area move and personnel will be transferred to the new 
facility at Fort Meade without layoffs. With the pressure on the 
services to move out of leased space, it looks like a good move. But, 
this is a bad decision for the Army and the Government, and though I 
have urged the Army and the BRAC to reconsider this decision, today we 
still find this facility slated for transfer in this BRAC 
recommendation.
  The Army ISSC has been in Fairfax County for over 20 years. When the 
Army looked to move ISSC from outdated leased facilities in Fairfax, 
VA, it asked the General Services Administration [GSA] to rent space 
for ISSC in northern Virginia. The Army even specified the boundaries 
of an area in which they wanted to rent--a location close to its Fort 
Belvoir and Pentagon customers and close to where most of its employees 
had settled over the past 20 years. This was the Crown Ridge building 
located at the junction of I-66 and the Fairfax County Parkway in my 
district.
  GSA, at the request of the Army, signed a lease with Crown Ridge 
Associates for 6 years. That lease started a little over a year ago and 
runs through May 28, 2000. A total of $7.2 million was spent by Crown 
Ridge, GSA, and the Army to upgrade the building to meet the unique 
requirements of Army ISSC. Crown spent $1.3 million, GSA $2.9 million, 
and DOD spent $3.0 million to get this building ready. And in fact, 
they are still in the process of upgrading and moving into the space.
  After spending all this money, the Army proposed in this BRAC to move 
ISSC to Fort Meade, MD. The Army believes that it will save $8 million 
over 20 years. Under the Army lease with GSA, it can move out of the 
space without penalty if appropriate notice is given.
  Unfortunately for GSA and the American taxpayer, GSA is still 
obligated for the 6-year term of the lease. If the Army moves out, GSA 
is stuck with an empty building. Not only that, but this will not be an 
easy space for the GSA to find government customers for. Traditionally, 
GSA would look for locations in some proximity to mass transit--the 
subway, trains, and bus lines. This location is well beyond the subway 
and there are no easy connections to mass transit. To quote GSA 
regarding Army plans to move out of this building,

       .  .  . the building was leased specifically for the Army, 
     and was altered to suit their specific needs. Other federal 
     agencies have not expressed interest in the location, and the 
     building might be difficult to market.

  In addition, the Army is going to have to convert or build facilities 
at Fort Meade. The Cobra model figures used by the Army indicate that 
it will have to spend roughly $5 million to renovate space at Fort 
Meade and moves ISSC. So, at a minimum, the Government spends $11 
million in renovation and moving costs and ISSC has to go through two 
moves in 3 years. But, the Government also will be stuck with a $3 
million per year lease for a building which may sit empty for 3 years--
another $9 million.
  This is not how Congress intended the BRAC process to work--the 
objective is to reduce costs for the Government, not just the military 
services. Clearly, the Army should have made this move before it asked 
GSA to sign a 6-year lease. Now, however, the lease has been signed, 
and the Government is on the hook even if the Army moves out. I 
understand the pressure on the Army to move out of leased space, but 
this is a bad deal for the Government and the American taxpayer.
  For this reason, I cannot support the BRAC recommendations.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Joint 
Resolution 102, to disapprove the recommendations of the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Commission.
  It is with great reluctance that I oppose the resolution of 
disapproval. I do so despite the fact that the Commission accepted a 
flawed Army recommendation to close the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant in 
my district.
  In my judgment, the Army mishandled this matter. All other issues 
aside, the most fundamental shortcoming of the Army's recommendation is 
the lack of a credible estimate of the cost of closing the tank plant.

[[Page H 8703]]

  The Army's original claim was that closing the tank plant would 
result in a one-time cost of only $1.4 million. When I asked the Army 
how it arrived at this figure, the Army told me the estimate was based 
on a standard formula that sets building closing costs at $1.25 per 
square foot.
  A buck and a quarter per square foot isn't going to do the job. 
Unlike most Army installations, the Detroit Tank Plant is an industrial 
facility that has been manufacturing tanks for nearly 50 years. I 
sincerely doubt $1.4 million will be enough to close the facility and 
move the work to other locations.
  During her site visit to the tank plant last April, Commissioner 
Steele heard a broad range of testimony from myself and others that 
raised serious problems with the Army's original closing cost estimate. 
After hearing the evidence, Commissioner Steele asked the Army to 
prepare a revised cost estimate by mid-May.
  The Army never presented a revised cost estimate. The Army's Tank 
Automotive and Armaments Command [TACOM] in Warren, MI, requested and 
received detailed closing cost data from the contractor at the plant. 
Using this data, TACOM prepared a revised closing cost estimate. At the 
11th hour, I was informed that the Army rejected the new cost study and 
decided to stick with its original estimate of $1.4 million.
  While the Army was unwilling to accept new cost data from the people 
who actually run the plant, my office received reports that the true 
closing costs, as calculated by the contractor at the plant and TACOM, 
are at least 25 times higher than the Army's original calculations.
  It is being increasingly suggested that the Army desires to transfer 
the tank plant's work from the private sector to the Government-run 
Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois. This would be contrary to OMB circular 
No. A-76, which states that it is the official policy of United States 
that ``the Government should not compete with its citizens.'' It also 
would be contrary to the recent recommendations of the Commission on 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. These jobs should remain in the 
private sector and in Michigan.
  So why am I opposing the resolution to disapprove the base closure 
list? I do so for the simple reason that the Nation cannot afford to 
spend billions of dollars ever year for unneeded defense installations 
around the country. At the end of the day, the independent base closure 
process is the only means we have to close unneeded military 
facilities.
  The base closure process is painful. The process sometimes results in 
the wrong military facilities being closed, as the closure of the 
Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant demonstrates. The one virtue of the base 
closure process is that it is unbiased and immune from politics. At the 
end of the day, it's about as fair a process as we're going to get.
  I did everything I could to save the tank plant; however, I largely 
agree with the balance of the Base Closure Commissions recommendations 
to close or realign 103 other bases and military facilities. Closing 
these bases is expected to save more than $19 billion over 20 years. I 
will therefore oppose the resolution of disapproval.
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, I support the resolution of disapproval. I 
must do this because I am deeply disturbed by the base closure process. 
In the rush to close installations there has been a failure to analyze 
all of the facts carefully. This is obvious in the recommendations made 
by the Commission concerning the Savanna Army Depot Activity and the 
O'Hare Reserve Station.
  In the case of the Savanna Army Depot Activity, the Commission 
ignored a number of important factors. For example, closing the 
installation would result in the loss of important and hard-to-
replicate capabilities, increase costs above the Army estimate to close 
the base and move its functions, and reduce ammo storage capability 
below critical military needs.
  For instance, the Commission failed to consider that Savanna is one 
of the most efficient facilities in the Army. During Desert Storm, 
Savanna had the highest outloading rate of any depot. It is also one of 
the few with adequate rail service to shipping centers. These national 
assets would be hard to replace in a nationwide mobilization.
  In addition, the estimate of the cost of closing Savanna and 
relocating the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School [USADACS] 
is too low. DOD stated that it would cost $38 million to close the 
installation and relocate functions. However, the Savanna Army Depot 
Realignment Task Force estimates that the cost of closing the facility 
and moving the school is much higher--as much as $88 million. This 
includes new construction that will have to take place at McAlester to 
complete the move.
  Even more importantly, the decision to close ammunition storage 
facilities failed to take into account storage needs. The Army's 1993 
Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program study indicated that even with 
11 depots, as much as 6 million square feet of outside storage will be 
needed to match our Nation's future ammunition stockpile. This could 
indicate that the ammunition study is flawed. Because of this decision, 
we may not have enough space to meet future storage needs.
  Our ammunition depots are a national asset that will be needed to 
meet future mobilization needs. The Commission's recommendation will 
mean the loss of an important part of this irreplaceable asset.
  Regarding the Commission's recommendation on the O'Hare Air Reserve 
Station, I am deeply disappointed that the Commission chose a course of 
action that will eliminate an entire unit within the State and also 
move the remaining KC135 unit to Scott AFB. The latter recommendation 
was made without an analysis of the costs to the Government or how long 
it will take the units to return to operational status.
  The closure of the station and its C-130 unit would be a blow to 
Illinois and a sad chapter in one of our Nation's finest military 
units. The 928th Airlift Wing has one of the most distinguished records 
of any Reserve unit in the country. A highlight of this is the 46 years 
and over 166,000 hours of flying without an accident, the longest 
stretch of accident-free flying by any civilian or military 
organization in the country. We should preserve this record and keep 
the unit in one of the communities in Illinois willing to host it. 
Unfortunately, the Commission's recommendation will eliminate this 
effective and efficient fighting asset.
  I am also disappointed that the Commission decided to change last 
year's recommendation concerning moving the 126th Air Refueling Wing. 
Instead of allowing the process to fully progress, the Commission 
arbitrarily chose to relocate the unit to Scott Air Force Base. This 
move was done without any analysis of how long it would take the unit 
to reach full operational capability due to recruiting and retention 
concerns. Without this analysis, this recommendation is shortsighted 
and did not include a thoughtful consideration of other potential sites 
in the State of Illinois. I therefore cannot support this 
recommendation.
  I believe that we should reject the recommendations of the 
Commission. From the errors I have seen made in just these two 
examples, I am concerned that other mistakes may have been made that 
will force us to make poor choices concerning our Nation's defense 
infrastructure and unnecessarily eliminate the jobs of thousands of 
civilian employees who have served our Nation proudly. I hope my 
colleagues will join me in opposing these recommendations.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired. Pursuant to section 
2908 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the 
question is on passage of the joint resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. TEJEDA. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the grounds that a 
quorum is not present and I make the point of order that a quorum is 
not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant of Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 75, 
nays 343, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 647]

                                YEAS--75

     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Bentsen
     Bevill
     Bonilla
     Borski
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Bryant (TX)
     Chapman
     Clay
     Coleman
     Combest
     Costello
     Davis
     de la Garza
     DeLauro
     Dixon
     Doolittle
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Ford
     Fox
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gonzalez
     Goodling
     Green
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Kennelly
     Kim
     Lantos
     Lewis (CA)
     Lofgren
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCollum
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Murtha
     Myers
     Ortiz
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Pombo
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Scarborough
     Schroeder
     Seastrand
     Shuster
     Smith (TX)
     Talent
     Tejeda
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Waters
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                               NAYS--343

     Abercrombie
     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot

[[Page H 8704]]

     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooley
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Flake
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Funderburk
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luther
     Manton
     Markey
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Mink
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rush
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wyden
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Becerra
     Dingell
     Jefferson
     Maloney
     McDade
     McKinney
     Moakley
     Moran
     Morella
     Paxon
     Reynolds
     Sisisky
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Tucker
     Waldholtz

                              {time}  1122

  Messrs. OWENS, McINTOSH, FIELDS of Louisiana, KENNEDY of 
Massachusetts, and Mrs. CHENOWETH changed their vote from ``yea'' to 
``nay.''
  Messrs. TORRICELLI, ROYCE, and GILCHREST changed their vote from 
``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the joint resolution was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  

                          ____________________