[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 137 (Wednesday, September 6, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12649-S12676]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). Under the previous order, the
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 1026, which the clerk will
report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1996 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.
Pending: Nunn amendment No. 2425, to establish a missile
defense policy.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I believe we will take up some
uncontested matters at this time.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I wonder if it would not be appropriate at
this time to ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment, which
is the missile defense amendment sponsored by myself and Senators
Warner, Levin, and Cohen.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe that we are now prepared to clear
some more amendments. The first amendment is the Warner amendment, as I
understand it.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct.
Amendment No. 2461
(Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate on negotiations between the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy and the Governor of the
State of Idaho regarding the shipment of spent nuclear fuel from naval
reactors)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the pending
amendment is set aside, and the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr.
Exon, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Craig, Mr. Cohen, Ms.
Snowe, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Gregg proposes an amendment
numbered 2461.
[[Page S 12650]]
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 570, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:
SEC. 3168. SENSE OF SENATE ON NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING
SHIPMENTS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM NAVAL
REACTORS.
(a) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and
the Governor of the State of Idaho should continue good faith
negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the
issue of shipments of spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors.
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than September 15, 1995, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security
of the House of Representatives a written report on the
status or outcome of the negotiations urged under subsection
(a).
(2) The report shall include the following matters:
(A) If an agreement is reached, the terms of the agreement,
including the dates on which shipments of spent nuclear fuel
from naval reactors will resume.
(B) If an agreement is not reached--
(i) the Secretary's evaluation of the issues remaining to
be resolved before an agreement can be reached;
(ii) the likelihood that an agreement will be reached
before October 1, 1995; and
(iii) the steps that must be taken regarding the shipment
of spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors to ensure that the
Navy can meet the national security requirements of the
United States.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment, by myself, is cosponsored
by Senators Exon, Kempthorne, Thurmond, Craig, Cohen, Snowe, Smith, and
Gregg. It expresses a sense of the Senate that the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of Energy and the Governor of Idaho should continue
good-faith negotiations to reach an agreement on shipments of nuclear
fuel from naval reactors and requires a written report on the status or
outcome of the negotiations.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to
require all parties to continue good-faith negotiations to reach an
agreement to permit the resumption of shipments of spent nuclear fuel
from naval reactors to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. I
have joined with several other Senators to reach an agreement which we
hope will encourage the parties on both sides who are negotiating this
issue to resolve it as soon as possible, because of the serious
implications to our national security.
In order to support the national security requirements of the United
States, the Navy must be able to refuel and defuel nuclear powered
warships. Because of an ongoing dispute between Idaho and the
Department of Energy, shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory have been halted. This situation has
rapidly reached a crisis level and must be resolved expeditiously. My
amendment urges all parties to negotiate, in good faith, an agreement
that would protect this vital component of our national security. The
amendment also retains, if necessary, the option for Congress to take
further actions in joint conference if warranted.
Mr. President, this is a very serious matter. Briefly, the background
is that the State of Idaho has been receiving shipments for 38 years
from the U.S. Navy of its spent fuel.
Without getting into the problem area, there are negotiations ongoing
between the Governor of Idaho, such other officials within his
administration, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the
Navy. But I feel strongly obligated this morning to inform the Senate
of the seriousness of these negotiations, and our sincere hope is that
the matter may be resolved prior to the conference of the Armed
Services Committees of the House and the Senate, because absent a
resolution of this dispute between the three parties I just named, I
feel it is incumbent upon the Congress of the United States to address
the legislative solution.
Why? Because, for example, the preparations for refueling the U.S.S.
Nimitz are now 3 months delayed and increasing. The Navy has fewer than
the needed aircraft carriers today to meet its operational
requirements, and I know from some personal experience nothing is more
severe to the United States Navy than prolonged deployments of ships
beyond their schedules away from home. It impacts most severely on
readiness. It impacts also on the family situations of our Naval
personnel and the like.
Likewise, the Navy is tying up commissioned ships; that is, ships
still in commission, and requiring full manning on these ships since
they cannot be defueled. Six ships will be tied up: Gato, Whale,
Puffer, Bergall, Flying Fish at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and
Bainbridge at Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
This also impacts the yard work. The representations from the Navy
this morning indicate that up to 2,000 shipyard workers in the States
of Washington, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Hawaii are subject to
layoffs unless this matter is resolved in the very immediate future.
I thank all my colleagues for their support, especially the Senator
from Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, for his diligent efforts in reaching
this agreement.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator Thurmond,
Senator Warner, Senator Craig, and Senator Exon in cosponsoring the
pending amendment. The pending language strikes the appropriate balance
between the legitimate national security requirements of the Navy and
the State of Idaho's sovereign right to protect its interests.
The amendment is a recognition that good-faith negotiations are
currently underway and it is my hope that these talks will lead to an
agreement that protects the interests of all the parties. I want to
offer special praise to Governor Batt for his effort to establish
reasonable criteria for an agreement to settle this very important
issue.
Mr. President, the people of Idaho have a long, successful
relationship with the Navy. The Navy has been a good neighbor in
southeastern Idaho for over four decades and I want to see that
relationship continue.
At the same time, the House and Senate at last seem to be moving
forward with a serious plan to deal with the national problem of
disposing of spent nuclear fuel. This is a very positive step for Idaho
and the Nation and I want to urge my colleagues to keep working toward
this solution.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am pleased to add my support to this
amendment which requires all parties to negotiate in good faith
immediately with officials of the State of Idaho in order to resolve
the current dispute which has resulted in halting shipments of spent
nuclear fuel from the Navy.
I want to commend Senator Warner, Senator Kempthorne, and others for
their diligent efforts in reaching this agreement. It is critical that
the Navy be allowed to resume shipments of spent nuclear fuel
immediately in order to enable the Navy to continue to defuel and
refuel its ships. I hope that those involved in the negotiations on
both sides of the issue will work in a spirit of cooperation which
provides for a timely settlement because of the serious national
security implications.
I support this amendment, recognizing that it provides for further
legislation in joint conference should it be necessary. I am confident,
however, that negotiating officials, recognizing the importance of
reaching an agreement as soon as possible will resolve this issue in
the near future.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I rise in support and as a sponsor of the
amendment. It is absolutely crucial that the situation that has arisen
over the fueling and defueling of fuels from the nuclear Navy be
resolved.
This amendment, putting this body on record as supporting good faith
negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of Idaho
for the purpose of pursuing an agreement on the issue of naval spent
nuclear fuels, is a step in the right direction.
Idaho has always recognized the importance of a strong nuclear Navy
defense deterrent. Idaho takes a back seat to no one when it comes to
supporting the defense of this Nation.
At the same time, however, Idaho will not become a de facto spent
nuclear waste repository. The facilities at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory were never designed nor intended to be a
permanent nuclear waste disposal facility. I will not stand for that to
happen and will always fight to assure Idaho does not become a nuclear
waste dump for the Navy and the Department of Energy.
[[Page S 12651]]
This Nation must stand up and commit itself to addressing the final
disposal of commercial, military, and DOE nuclear fuels. This amendment
will go a long way to assure we reach the goal of a functioning Navy
and Idaho does not become a permanent nuclear waste repository.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I support the amendment. I think the Senator
from Virginia has outlined it correctly in terms of the urgency of
trying to find some solution to this. I commend him for sponsoring this
amendment. I agree with him. At some point, we will have to legislate
on this subject unless the parties can agree.
Mr. President, I believe we have a pending amendment, which is the
Nunn-Warner-Levin-Cohen amendment. I ask unanimous consent that be
temporarily laid aside so that we can handle these three or four
amendments that have been worked out, at which time the pending
amendment would then be the pending action.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from
Virginia.
The amendment (No. 2461) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2462
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Levin, I offer an
amendment which would authorize the Army to use leasing agreements to
modernize its commercial utility cargo vehicle fleet. This fleet is
past the point of economically useful life and has become a significant
training and operational maintenance fund. This program, using
commercial practices to require essential commercial services, is in
keeping with the spirit of acquisition reform.
I believe the amendment has been cleared on the other side.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. It has been
cleared.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Levin,
proposes an amendment numbered 2462.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate point in the bill, insert the following:
SEC. . ENCOURAGEMENT OF USE OF LEASING AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--(1) Chapter 137 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 2316 the
following new section:
``SEC. 2317. EQUIPMENT LEASING.
``The Secretary of Defense is authorized to use leasing in
the acquisition of commercial vehicles when such leasing is
practicable and efficient.''
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``2317. Equipment Leasing.''
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit a report to the congressional defense committees
setting forth changes in legislation that would be
required to facilitate the use of leases by the Department
of Defense in the acquisition of equipment.
(c) Pilot Program.--The Secretary of the Army may conduct a
pilot program for leasing of commercial utility cargo
vehicles as follows:
(1) Existing commercial utility cargo vehicles may be
traded-in for credit against new replacement commercial
utility cargo vehicle lease costs;
(2) Quantities of commercial utility cargo vehicles to be
traded in and their value to be credited shall be subject to
negotiation between the parties;
(3) New commercial utility cargo vehicle lease agreements
may be excuted with or without options to purchase at the end
of each lease period;
(4) New commercial utility cargo vehicle lease periods may
not exceed five years;
(5) Such leasing pilot program shall consist of replacing
no more than forty percent of the validated requirement for
commercial utility cargo vehicles but may include an option
or options for the remaining validated requirement which may
be excuted subject to the requirements of subsection (c)(8);
(6) The Army shall enter into such pilot program only
if the Secretary:
(A) awards such program in accordance with the provisions
of section 2304 of title 10 United States Code.
(B) has notified the congressional defense committees of
his plans to execute the pilot program;
(C) has provided a report detailing the expected savings in
operating and support costs from retiring older commercial
utility cargo vehicles compared to the expected costs of
leasing newer commercial utility cargo vehicles; and
(D) has allowed 30 calendar days to elapse after such
notification.
(8) One year after the date of execution of an initial
leasing contract, the Secretary of the Army shall submit a
report setting forth the status of the pilot program. Such
report shall be based upon at least six months of operating
experience. The Secretary may exercise an option or options
for subsequent commercial utility cargo vehicles only after
he has allowed 60 calendar days to elapse after submitting
this report.
(9) Expiration of Authority.--No lease of commercial
utility cargo vehicles may be entered into under the pilot
program after September 30, 2000.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last year Congress passed the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1995, in which we sought to reform
Defense acquisition procedures and rely on more commercial products and
processes for the Defense Department.
Consistent with Defense acquisition reform, this amendment authorizes
the Defense Department to use commercial leasing practices to acquire
commercial vehicles for the Army.
This will permit the Army to modernize its fleet of commercial
utility cargo vehicles [CUCVs] without any new appropriated funds.
The Army has an old and expensive fleet of about 45,000 CUCV's. They
need a fleet of only about 13,000 CUCV's, and can make significant
savings on operation and support costs if they use newer vehicles.
The Army is short on funds for modernization of its vehicle programs,
and has identified it as a priority area for modernization. This
amendment could help the Army modernize its CUCV fleet at no additional
cost.
The amendment is also strongly supported by the Army acquisition
executive.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the
amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2462) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2463
(Purpose: To place a limitation on the use of funds for former Soviet
Union threat reduction)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf
of Senator Kyl and ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Kyl,
proposes an amendment numbered 2463.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
SEC. . LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION.
(a) Limitation.--Of the funds appropriated or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 1996 under the heading
``Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction'' for dismantlement
and destruction of chemical weapons, not more than
$52,000,000 may be obligated or expended for that purpose
until the President certifies to Congress the following:
(1) That the United States and Russia have completed a
joint laboratory study evaluating the proposal of Russia to
neutralize its chemical weapons and the United States agrees
with the proposal.
(2) That Russia is in the process of preparing, with the
assistance of the United States (if necessary), a
comprehensive plan to manage the dismantlement and
destruction of the Russia chemical weapons stockpile.
[[Page S 12652]]
(3) That the United States and Russia are committed to
resolving outstanding issues under the 1989 Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding''
means the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral
Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to
Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
(2) The term ``1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement'' means
the Agreement between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on destruction and non-
production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate
the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons
signed on June 1, 1990.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, I rise to offer an amendment to the
Defense authorization bill concerning the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar. The purpose of this amendment is
to require both the DOD and the Russians to get serious about chemical
weapons destruction activities and to focus their efforts in a
productive manner.
Of the $371 million requested for the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program with Russia and other former States of the Soviet Union, $104
million was requested for chemical weapons destruction.
Reducing the chemical weapons stockpiles of both the United States
and Russia is an important goal. Chemical weapons and nerve agents are
among the cheapest and most effective manner to kill people. The number
of chemical-weapons nations has tripled from 8 in 1969 to as many as 26
today. Moreover, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
has counted 15 separate cases of recent chemical conflict in the Third
World.
The problem is that current CTR Program to reduce chemical weapons is
ill defined and lacks focus.
The first purpose of my amendment is to withhold $54 million for a
chemical weapons destruction facility until the completion of the joint
feasibility study. This approach is consistent with the GAO report from
June 1995 ``Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat From the
Former Soviet Union: An Update.'' In the report, the GAO noted,
. . . the United States have yet to agree on the
applicability of a technology to be used in chemical weapons
destruction facility and may not do so until midway through
fiscal year 1996. This uncertainty raises questions as to the
program's need for the $104 million it is requesting in
fiscal year 1996, in part, to begin designing and
constructing the facility.
Agreeing on a destruction technology is important because Russia is
currently proposing using a ``neutralization'' technology which would
blend the chemical toxin with other chemicals in an attempt to
neutralize the toxin. This is an unproven technology and will create
two to three times the amount of chemical waste already in the
inventory. The United States preferred technology is incineration,
although that is not without its problems.
My amendment requires that the United States and Russia complete a
joint laboratory study before the United States provides the balance of
the $104 million for a controversial, unproven approach.
A second aspect of my amendment is the requirement that Russia agree,
with United States assistance, to prepare a comprehensive plan to cope
with the Russian chemical weapons destruction program. According to the
GAO, the administration originally proposed this approach to the
Russians. The current plan is to develop a proposal for each individual
which will be involved in chemical weapons destruction--there are seven
sites in Russia.
With a declared stockpile of 40,000 metric tonnes, the only way to
manage the chemical weapons issue is to view the totality of the
problem. The United States cannot be certain whether the proposals deal
with the whole problem, unless a comprehensive, detailed plan is
prepared. Further, the United States cannot be certain of its total
financial obligation without a comprehensive plan.
The third aspect of my amendment is to require the President to
certify that the Russians are committed to resolving outstanding issues
under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990
Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
The Wyoming MOU was intended to build confidence between the United
States and Russia in the chemical weapons area and thus facilitate
completion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction. This would be done by exchanging detailed and complete
data about their respective chemical weapons programs and by testing
inspection procedures.
Under the MOU, during the first phase, the countries are to exchange
general data on their chemical weapons and make reciprocal visit to
storage, production, and destruction facilities. In the second phase,
the counties are to exchange detailed data on their chemical weapon
stocks and verify this information through reciprocal on-site
inspections. During this phase, each country is to provide the other
with general plans for dismantling chemical weapons production
facilities.
The first phase of the Wyoming MOU was completed in early 1991. The
second phase of the MOU was delayed because of disputes between the two
countries. In a report issued to Congress in January 1995 entitled
``U.S. Assistance and Related Programs for the New Independent States
of the Former Soviet Union,'' the administration was more forthcoming.
The report says:
. . . Phase I of the [Wyoming] MOU was completed in
February 1991. Documents allowing for the second and final
phase of the MOU were agreed upon at the January 1994 Moscow
Summit. Russian implementation of Phase II has yielded
problematic results. . . . The U.S. believe that several key
question and concerns have not yet been resolved in Russia's
data declaration. . . . The U.S. continues to have
significant concerns about Russia implementation of the
Wyoming MOU. . . . Russia still must take concrete steps to
fulfill its commitment and resolve existing problems.
Although not yet ratified, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement
requires each party to undertake not to produce chemical weapons and to
reduce their chemical weapons stockpile to 5,000 agent tonnes. The
principle issue holding up completion of the agreement concerns the
conversion of former chemical weapons production facilities. Russia
missed the December 1992 original target date for starting its
destruction program. Currently, it has no comprehensive plan defining
when and how the weapons will be destroyed. An unclassified ACDA report
on arms control compliances merely notes that ``questions remain on
certain aspects of the Russian date declaration and inspections.''
The Wyoming MOU and the Bilateral Destruct Agreement were intended to
support and facilitate the Chemical Weapons Convention which would
restrict members from developing, producing, acquiring stockpiling,
retaining transferring or using chemical weapons, and require the
destruction of those weapons within 15 years.
Although it is in our interest to have Russia agree to a verifiable
Chemical Weapons Convention, how can the United States have any
confidence in the integrity of the CWC, if Russia has failed to
implement these two agreements? For these reasons, Mr. President, it is
my intent that the Senate send a signal to Russia and the DOD to get
serious about putting this important chemical weapons destruction
program in place.
cooperative threat reduction program
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would just like to make some general
comments about the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, otherwise
known as Nunn-Lugar.
To date, close to $1.6 billion has been authorized or appropriated
for this program. Out of this amount, less than half of the funds have
been obligated. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense told the
committee that they expected to obligate around $860 million of the
previous year's funding by the end of the fiscal year.
The committee has been supportive of this effort to help the
Republics of the former Soviet Union dismantle and destroy their
chemical and nuclear weapons stockpile. For various reasons, however,
the Department has run into problems in managing the program, either
through administrative problems on the United States side, or, as a
result of not being able to conclude implementing agreements with
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Russia and the other Republics. I believe the program has been a useful
political tool. However, I don't believe that the program has
accomplished as much as the Department of Defense would lead one to
believe. The Department of Defense says that the large number of
reductions in Russia and the Republics are as a result of the
assistance received through this program.
Mr. President, that can hardly be the case, when the majority of the
funds for this program overall were not obligated until the latter part
of 1994. I believe it is accurate to say that this program has been
helpful in securing the reductions and return of the strategic nuclear
weapons from the three Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
Russia, however, achieved their reductions prior to entry into force of
the START Treaty because it was in their economic interest to do so. By
implementing the reductions prior to START entering into force, Russia
was able to dismantle those items without having to declare them under
the treaty and adhere to the dismantlement requirements of the treaty.
A number of Members have been concerned with the slow rate of
obligation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. For that
reason, the committee recommended a reduction from the President's
budget request, and also agreed with the recommendation of the Senator
from Arizona, to place limitations on the use of the funds, pending a
Presidential certification regarding the progress of the chemical
weapons dismantlement program.
Last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe
conducted two hearings on nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The
majority of witnesses recommended that funds for this program, as well
as the Department of Energy's companion program be substantially
increased.
Mr. President, I believe that recommendation is premature, based on
the track record of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The
committee will continue to pay close attention to the Department's
management and obligation rate of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that the Senator from
Arizona had on the Defense appropriations bill. I believe it has been
worked out. I worked with him on it. We modified some of its
provisions.
I urge its adoption.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment would limit the use of funds
authorized for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program pending
certification of the following: First, the United States and Russia
have successfully completed a joint laboratory study evaluating the
chemical weapons neutralization process; second, that Russia is in the
process of preparing a comprehensive plan to dismantle and destroy its
chemical weapons stockpile; and third, that Russia remains committed to
resolving the outstanding issues regarding its compliance with the 1989
Wyoming memorandum of understanding and the 1990 bilateral destruction
agreement.
This is a very important amendment.
We urge its adoption.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the
amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2463) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2464
(Purpose: To make various technical corrections and other technical
amendments to existing provisions of law)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk in behalf
of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and
ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond,
for himself and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered
2464.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The text of the amendment appears in today's Record under Amendments
Submitted.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment, on behalf of the chairman
of the Armed Services Committee, makes certain technical amendments to
the existing provisions of law. The amendment has been cleared on both
sides. I urge its adoption.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the Senate to adopt the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
So the amendment (No. 2464) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, while I commend the work of the Senators
involved in negotiating this compromise amendment on missile defenses,
which is certainly an improvement over what is currently in the bill, I
cannot support the amendment. By nature, compromises are never perfect,
but they usually take the form of something each side can live with. In
this case, I do not believe that the language in this amendment is
something we can afford to live with.
Despite the changes, this proposal still commits us to the deployment
in the near future of expensive and destabilizing missile defense
systems. This is not the way we should be going. The time and energy
the Senate has put into this issue would be much more wisely spent on
ratification of the START II and chemical weapons treaties, which are
sitting in the Foreign Relations Committee. The proponents of robust
missile defenses argue that the end of the cold war makes obsolete arms
control treaties negotiated in that area. I could not disagree more.
The way to a more secure United States and a more peaceful world is
through building on our arms control treaties, not destroying them.
This amendment, while designed by its authors to be compliant with
the ARM Treaty, moves us in the direction of fundamentally altering or
even withdrawing from the treaty. The AMB Treaty is a cornerstone of
our arms control policies, and I believe we must retain its integrity,
especially to ensure Russian ratification and implementation of START
II. Putting at risk this ratification makes us less safe, not more.
I am also concerned about the costs of deploying national missile
defenses, which has not entered into this debate to the extent it
should. By one estimate, it could cost some $100 billion, and the way
weapons systems go, like the B-2, it is not hard to imagine the costs
soaring higher. Many of the proponents of this star wars-like
deployment joined me in supporting the balanced budget amendment, but
have not explained how they would reconcile that goal with the huge
costs of this program.
I recognize the choices that had to be made on this issue, and
Senators Nunn and Warner got the best deal that they could. But when
Senator Warner says that the amendment sets a clear path to deployment
of national missile defenses, I have no choice but to oppose it.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend my colleagues who were involved
in drafting this amendment on missile defense. The hard work that went
into the crafting of this compromise is strong evidence of both the
importance of the issue and the dedication of the members and staff who
spent many days and nights attempting to defense common ground on this
critical issue. Their efforts, and the several votes we have already
had on the fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization and appropriations
bills regarding missile defense will be viewed one day as the turning
point in the debate on defending America and American interests against
ballistic missile attack.
There are elements of this compromise that I am satisfied with. For
example, section 232(9) contains the following language: ``Due to
limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude deployment of more than
100 ground-based ABM interceptors at a
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single site, the United States is currently prohibited from deploying a
national missile defense system capable of defending the continental
United States, and Hawaii against even the most limited ballistic
missile attacks.'' While some might find virtue in being defenseless
against even the most limited of threats--a threat not even
contemplated during the negotiations of the ABM Treaty--I do not. This
defenselessness can only serve as an invitation to those with interests
that are hostile to our own to develop or acquire the capability to put
the United States at risk from long-range ballistic missiles. That this
amendment recognizes our inability to defend against even a limited
threat should be regarded as progress.
The recent revelations about Saddam Hussein's weapons program should
teach us that we won't ever know as much about some ballistic missile
and weapons of mass destruction programs as we think we do. Combine
this with the cavalier export control regimes of other countries
currently possessing these weapons and delivery systems, and the oft-
stated l10 years until the United States could be threatened by long-
range missiles sounds more like wishful thinking than dispassionate
analysis.
I have three major concerns with this amendment:
First, unlike the committee-reported bill, the amendment does not
require the deployment of a national missile defense system capable of
defending all of the United States against even the most limited of
threats. This must change. We have been engaged for too long in
developing for deployment the necessary systems. Instead of committing
to deploy an NMD system against a limited threat, this amendment
commits to more procrastination. We've had enough of this, and anything
short of a commitment to deploy is unacceptable.
Second, section 238 of the amendment prohibits the use of funds to
implement an ABM/TMD demarcation agreement with any of the states of
the former Soviet Union which is more restrictive than that specified
in section 238(b) without the advice and consent of the Senate or
enactment of subsequent legislation. This funding prohibition is fine,
as far as it goes; unfortunately, it does not go far enough. The
amendment is silent on the possibility that the administration could
enact a more restrictive demarcation unilaterally. In essence, the
amendment tells the administration that if it wants to have a more
restrictive demarcation standard than that spelled out all it has to do
is announce the standard unilaterally, without Russian agreement. This
amendment would not prohibit the use of funds by the administration if
it were simply to take the current Russian proposal on demarcation and
adopt it as the unilateral position of the United States. To go one
step further, as written this amendment would allow both the United
States and Russia to adopt the same Russian proposal unilaterally
without triggering the prohibition on the use of funds in section
238(c). If we are not willing to permit, as part of a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, a more restrictive demarcation standard than
that specified in the amendment, why should we be willing to allow the
adoption of a more restrictive standard unilaterally?
Third, prior to deployment of a national missile defense system
capable against a limited threat, section 233(3) of the amendment
mandates congressional review of, ``(A) the affordability and
operational effectiveness of such a system; (B) the threat to be
countered by such a system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with
respect to such a system.'' In addition to the fact that section 233(3)
(A) and (B) are unnecessary restatements of a basic purpose of each
year's Defense authorization and appropriations bills for all defense
programs, the requirement in section 233(3)(C) is completely backward.
Instead of requiring review of the effect of defending America on the
ABM Treaty, we ought to review the effect of the ABM Treaty on
defending America. The defense of our country is more important to me
than the defense of a treaty that puts our country at risk.
There are other parts of the amendment in need of improvement, though
they are of lesser importance than the problems I've already raised.
I'll conclude by making four observations: First, notwithstanding the
desire by some to ignore the threat posed to the United States by
weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missile delivery
systems, this threat is serious and we cannot continue to procrastinate
over employing the means at hand to reduce this threat. Second, a
national missile defense against a limited threat would in no way
undermine United States-Russian deterrence, and would only enhance
deterrence of rogue nations or groups with interests contrary to those
of the United States, all of whom are limited by scarcity of funds. We
would do well to pay close attention to what Secretary Perry said
recently, that, ``The bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not
provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We may be
facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons at the same time in the future, and they may not buy into our
deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD.'' Third,
however the Russian Duma acts on the START II Treaty, its decision will
be based on many factors, only one of which is their perception of
United States actions with regard to the ABM Treaty. It is incorrect to
suggest that Duma ratification of START II is based solely on our
ballistic missile defense legislation, and the Senate cannot allow
itself to be held hostage by threats of retaliation by the Duma.
Fourth, the missile defense provisions in the underlying bill will not
violate the ABM Treaty unless the administration takes no action to
modify the treaty. Indeed, Secretary of State Christopher made this
point in an August 14, 1995 cable, where in talking points provided for
selected U.S. embassies he said, ``The provisions as proposed by the
Senate Armed Services Committee call for deployment of a national,
multiple-site missile defense that, if deployed, without treaty
amendment, would violate the ABM Treaty.'' Secretary Christopher is
saying that a multiple-site NMD system could be made ABM Treaty-
compliant by simply amending the treaty. The assertions that have been
made on this floor and by administration officials that, in and of
itself, the underlying bill violates the ABM Treaty, are wrong. If you
don't want to take my word for it, ask Secretary Christopher.
I think the amendment weakens the committee-reported Missile Defense
Act of 1995, but having said that it is important to get this bill to
conference where we will have an opportunity to improve these
provisions.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, 1 month ago I rose to support the Missile
Defense Act of 1995, as the Armed Services Committee reported it. It
seemed to me to be just about the right response to the growing threat
of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles.
Frankly, I was a bit surprised by the vehemence with which some of my
colleagues opposed the bill once it came to the floor.
Many Americans are unaware that right now, America is defenseless
against ballistic missiles. If that fact were better known, I think
many Americans would be very angry that the Missile Defense Act of 1995
ran into so much opposition from the Clinton administration and some of
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
But the fact is that our choice--the choice of those who want to
protect America from this growing threat--was between this revised
amendment or no bill at all. Given the other important aspects of this
bill, and given Saddam Hussein's recent revelations, we chose to work
things out and to take a step toward defending America--although it is
not as big a step as we wanted. Nevertheless this amendment is a step
forward and, let us not forget, we will have an opportunity in
conference with the House to make modifications.
In any case, there can be no doubt that this bill and this amendment
take concrete steps toward establishing effective theater and national
missile defenses.
On the essential question of national defense, this amendment
establishes as U.S. policy the deployment of a multiple-site national
missile is operationally effective against limited, accidental, or
unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United
States--a defense system that can be augmented over time to provide a
layered defense. The Secretary of Defense is instructed to implement
this policy
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by developing a national missile defense system--consisting of ground-
based interceptors, fixed ground-based radars, and space-based
sensors--capable of being deployed by the end of 2003.
Unlike some of my
colleagues who still believe that the cold-war-era ABM Treaty
defends America, I believe that nothing short of the development and
deployment of an effective national missile defense system will truly
protect America against the threats of the 21st century.
The recent revelations by Saddam Hussein--that the Iraqis filled
nearly 200 bombs and warheads for ballistic missiles with biological
and toxin weapons--should drive this point home.
With respect to the ABM Treaty, this legislation calls for a year of
careful consideration on how to proceed with the ABM Treaty in the
longer term. During that time the President could and should seek to
negotiate with Russia a mutually beneficial agreement that will allow
the United States to proceed with multiple-site deployments.
Furthermore, this legislation prohibits the use of funds to implement
an agreement limiting theater missile defenses--which were never
limited by the ABM Treaty--without the advice and consent of the
Senate. This was intended to address to the very real concern that the
administration has not abandoned the ill-conceived course of
negotiating changes to the ABM Treaty that would restrict theater
missile defenses despite oft-stated and deep-seated Senate objections.
This legislation also establishes a theater missile defense core
program and a cruise missile initiative that focuses our resources on
deploying effective systems that are needed right now to defend,
American interests around the globe.
Mr. President, this amendment does not achieve all of the objectives
I would like to have seen achieved. However, it does take firm,
tangible steps toward defending America--most importantly by setting a
goal of 2003 to deploy a multiple site, effective defense of the United
States of America. On this there cannot be and will not be any
compromise. We will have a conference with the House. And if the
conference report that is worked out is acceptable and is passed by the
Congress, the responsibility will be with the President to sign this
bill so that defending America becomes the law of the land.
Hans bethe warned of this
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, at a point in our history when we have
successfully avoided the Armagedonnic catastrophe of nuclear
confrontation and have began the sensible process of limiting nuclear
warheads by treaty, the Senate proposes to adopt a bill that could
resurrect the nuclear arms race, and, in the process, jeopardize 23
years of arms control treaties. The Armed Services Committee has
presented the Senate with a bill that proposes a national ballistic
missile defense system. The Congressional Budget Office estimates this
is a $48 billion proposition.
Can we in good conscience embark on a project to doubtful feasibility
and enormous cost, which only addresses one of many nuclear threats?
Potential adversaries will simply channel their resources into
producing delivery vehicles that the system could not defend against;
submarines, cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, terrorists car bombs.
In 1977, Prof. Han Bethe of Cornell University, one of the most
distinguished figures of sciences in the nuclear age, during a visit to
my home in upstate New York, warned me that such a plans would 1 day be
presented to the Senate.
On March 23, 1983, with little attention given to the technical
details, President Reagan proposed an initiative which became known as
the strategic defense initiative [SDI]. We have yet to work out the
technical details of a national missile defense system. Yet there are
those in this body who appear to be bent on deploying some remnant of
the SDI, without regard to the potential threats that exist, or the
costs involved.
In testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee in 1992, Dr. Bethe
elaborated on his objections to deploying such a system. I ask
unanimous consent that an excerpt from the transcript of that hearing
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 25, 1992
Senator Moynihan. I recall that 15 years ago, Dr. Bethe,
you and Mrs. Bethe very graciously came to lunch, and you
tried to warn me against something I never heard of. I really
didn't know what you were talking about. It turned out to be
Star Wars.6
You described, as I recall, having me with a Soviet
physicist in a conference in Rome or some such place and you
both agreed that there were those people who thought one
could have a small nuclear device explode in space and send
out a laser beam that would zap something on the other side
of the universe. You both agreed
that it was crazy but that there were plenty of crazy people
in both our countries and they were likely to try it. You
were not wrong.
But now we are further down in our notions. Brilliant
Pebbles I think is the most recent formulation.
Do you think we should pursue this kind of anti-missile
technology at this level? I know that you thought at the
grand level it would not prove coherent, and it did not. But
might it at a lower level? Did you have any thoughts for us
on this?
Dr. Bethe. I have a strong opinion on Star Wars. I thought
it was misconceived from the beginning, and by now I think
there is no reason at all to pursue it or to pursue any
variation of it.
Senator Moynihan. Or to pursue any variation of it.
Dr. Bethe. The Brilliant Pebbles, in contrast to the X-ray
laser, are likely to be technically feasible. But I am
terribly nervous about having 1,000 such devices cruising
about above the atmosphere. One of them might hit an
asteroid. They tell me and I think they are right that they
have precautions against that. But I believe that the only
thing that should be done is research. That should continue.
But we should not deploy any of these devices.
Senator Moynihan. Did I hear you correctly when you said
that it might hit an asteroid?
Dr. Bethe. Yes.
Senator Moynihan. I thought for a moment you had said
``astronaut.'' But it might be both or either, for that
matter, if it comes to it.
May I say to the Chairman and to my colleague, Senator
Robb, that in 1977, Hans Bethe on our back porch in upstate
New York, said one of these days some crazy scientist is
going to come along to you fellows in the Senate and say I
have a plan whereby we put these nuclear weapons in place all
over the atmosphere and at a certain point we detonate them
and they produce a laser and it goes zap. And he said it's
coming and when it comes, tell those people they are loony.
Well, it came, just as he predicted. In 1945, he wrote that
the Soviets could have the bomb in 5 years; they got it in 4.
After our luncheon in 1977 we got Star Wars in 5, I think.
We could have saved ourselves a lot of grief, it seems to
me, if we had listened to you in the first place. You know,
the people who built these bombs know
something about how they work. Dr. Bethe, you've even
suggested you could go down into the basement and turn
uranium into reactor fuel. It is not that much of a
technical feat.
But you would keep the research going on the general
principle that you ought to know as much physics as you can
but leave it on the ground and not deploy any Brilliant
Pebbles or Sullen Sods or whatever.
Dr. Bethe. I think we should not deploy any of this. I
think even if they are effective, everybody has agreed that
they are no good against a strong enemy like the Soviet Union
used to be. I think it would be a mistake to deploy such
devices against accidental launch of Third World countries.
Is that the answer you wanted?
Senator Moynihan. Yes. I wanted your view, but that was the
question I wanted answered. Yes.
Does Ambassador Nitze have a different view?
Ambassador Nitze. I think the terms involved are very
confusing and are not precisely defined. With respect to the
interception of shorter-range ballistic missiles, for
instance, such as the Patriot missile, which was used during
the Gulf War, I think that is an important thing which one
should continue to develop.
Dr. Bethe. [Nods affirmatively.]
Senator Moynihan. I think you are getting agreement from
your colleague at the table. But those are ground-based or at
least based within the atmosphere.
Ambassador Nitze. They are ground based, the Patriot
missile. I think most of the devices which might be used
against, for instance, shorter-range things, such as SCUDS,
would be ground-based. But there are some that are not.
The man who really invented Brilliant Pebbles--I forget his
name--now works at Los Alamos and he believes that one ought
to go for something which he calls ``burros,'' being the
stupidest animal around. Instead of having these bright
interceptors, you have ones with low capability but which
would be very good against shorter range missiles, which
would be in the lower atmosphere. I think he may be right
about that.
So if there are ways and means of dealing with the shorter
range threats, which the Saddam Husseins or the Iraqis and so
forth are capable of, I think we ought to be willing
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to deploy those in the event the technology works out.
So it's a question of I want to know precisely what it is
that we are talking about when we say don't do it or do do
it.
Senator Moynihan. Dr. Bethe does not seem to disagree with
that.
Dr. Bethe. I agree that it would be good to have an
effective means against shorter-range missiles. Brilliant
Pebbles is not the right thing, and I believe some
knowledgeable people think that we can have such a device.
When we see one, I am in favor of it.
Senator Moynihan. Thank you very much.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, George P. Shultz recounts in his
biography ``Turmoil and Triumph'' that SDI was President Reagan's own
idea but that the plan was announced after a favorable endorsement from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then Secretary of State Shultz reports that
when Lawrence Eagleburger informed him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
had told the President that a strategic defense system could be
developed, the Secretary responded, ``The Chiefs are not equipped to
make this kind of proposal. They are not scientists.'' Of course, when
the scientists were consulted, it was concluded it could not be done.
Finally, consideration must be given to the possible response of
Russia to our actions. The original bill would have required us to
abrogate the ABM Treaty. If we were to break the ABM Treaty
unilaterally, it is clear that Russia would respond by rejecting START
II. This amendment still proposes that if the Russians do not agree to
modify the ABM Treaty to allow us to deploy a national missile defense
system that consideration be given to United States withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. Russian nationalists would certainly be pleased if we would
do so.
My point is simply that the national missile defense system
envisioned in this bill will only be effective against limited
ballistic missile attacks. Limited is not defined, but it is unlikely
that it might be referring to a capability of defending against 1,400
ballistic missiles launched simultaneously? We can wipe out 1,400
ballistic missiles; not with a ballistic missile defense system, but
with a treaty. The START II Treaty. Treaties can go a long way to
protecting us against nuclear weapons. If we jeopardize ratification of
START II, we risk a lot for this limited ballistic missile defense
system.
missile defense
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, during the August recess, I had about
seven events each day and never passed up the opportunity to let them
know about the most critical threat facing America today--missile
attack. I spoke about the fact that the actions we take today will
directly affect the kind of defense posture our country has in 5 to 7
years.
The danger we face is real. Yet I was surprised and shocked at the
ambivalence and lack of understanding that exists concerning this vital
issue. Many people simply do not realize--and are themselves shocked to
be told--that our country today has no missile defense system in place
capable of protecting American cities from long range missile attacks.
I estimated that perhaps most Oklahomans were not readily aware of
some of the basic terms of the debate currently going on in Washington
about the important missile defense provisions of the current defense
authorization bill.
I would suggest that part of the reason for this has to do with the
media, particularly the national media, most of which has either not
adequately focused on this issue or has skewed it in such a way as to
downgrade its importance. But there are also similar problems with the
local media.
For example, in Oklahoma there are two major daily newspapers, the
daily Oklahoman and the Tulsa World. Their differences reflect similar
disparities in the national media.
The Tulsa World reflects a consistent liberal view of the world, one
which favors the expansion of the role of government in almost every
area except defense. Their left-leaning editorial view tends to distort
the reality of significant issues such as missile defense.
The daily Oklahoman, on the other hand, much more clearly reflects
the conservative social and economic values of Oklahomans. It is a
larger paper and provides a much more realistic approach to issues such
as national defense.
During the past month, each of these papers had major editorials on
the threat of missile attack. There is quite a difference in their
approach. I think it will be instructive for my colleagues to examine
these editorials and ponder how the media is shaping the debate about
vital issues facing our country.
I therefore ask unanimous consent that the two editorials I mentioned
concerning missile defense--one from the Tulsa World and one from the
daily Oklahoman--be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed
in the Record, as follows:
[From the Oklahoman, Aug. 20, 1995]
For the Common Defense
The Clinton administration's attachment to a pair of
international agreements has the potential to weaken U.S.
defenses against a foreign attack.
President Clinton last week announced the United States
would cease future nuclear weapons tests in hopes of
energizing stalled talks aimed at producing a worldwide test
ban.
At the same time, Clinton's threatened veto of the defense
authorization bill--because it orders development of a
national missile defense system--is behind efforts to water
down the missile defense part of the bill.
It's a double-whammy for U.S. national security.
First, although declaring a U.S. nuclear test ban looks
great on television and might evoke comparisons with John F.
Kennedy (something Clinton wouldn't mind), it's quite a leap
of faith minus guarantees the Russians will do likewise.
Also, Pentagon officials are concerned a test ban will make
it impossible to guarantee the reliability of America's 7,000
nuclear weapons. Sen. John Warner, R-Va., says doubt about
the U.S. arsenal could even invite a nuclear attack.
Alarmingly, it appears Clinton cares more about reviving
world test ban talks than he does about protecting the United
States.
Concerning national missile defense, the Senate bill
mandates a system to protect the country from deliberate or
accidental missile attack. But Clinton has threatened a veto,
saving it would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty signed with the then-Soviet Union.
Recently four senators proposed an amendment to allow
missile defense planning but delaying deployment pending
congressional review. It also would permit the president to
negotiate changes in the ABM treaty to allow a missile
defense.
Sounds pretty good, but some analysts say the amendment,
which will be voted on when Congress returns from its August
recess, could be a subtle way to kill a missile defense
system.
Baker Spring of the conservative Heritage Foundation says
the amendment's delaying aspects would allow Clinton, who
opposes missile defense, ``to strangle programs in the
crib.'' Spring says it seems as if ``we're saying the ABM
treaty comes first, the defense of the nation comes second.''
Finally, Clinton argues two mutually exclusive ideas.
First, he says existing nuclear weapons can defend America,
making a missile defense unnecessary. Then he says the United
States will quit the testing that ensures the reliability of
current weapons systems. Huh?
Clinton can't have it both ways. The Senate should insist
on moving ahead with a missile defense program.
____
[From the Tulsa World, Aug. 14, 1995]
Pork, Republican Style
Right-wing Republicans in Congress are pushing a bill that
would force the Pentagon to develop a multi-site national
missile defense system by 2003. This is the latest
incarnation of the Star Wars program, a science-fiction anti-
missile system that blossomed during the Reagan
administration.
There are many reasons why this outrageously expensive
scheme should be put to sleep once and for all.
First, it would have to work perfectly in order to protect
American cities and military bases from nuclear weapons. It
would do little good to knock down 19 out of 20 nuclear-
tipped missiles aimed at, say, New York. The 20th bomb would
do the job. Anyone who works with computers and other
electronic equipment knows from personal experience that this
goal of perfect performance is impossible.
Even if science could find a perfect way to frustrate a
missile weapons system with a 100-percent success rate, the
same science could just as easily find the means to frustrate
the anti-missile system. So, the next logical step would be
an anti-anti-missile system, a weapon to knock out or to
disable the anti-missile defense system. It wouldn't have to
be disabled completely--just enough to get a few nuclear
devices through the ``shield.''
But there are more urgent reasons why this is a bad idea.
It would violate the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty with
the former Soviet Union. This pointless provocation does not
reduce the risk of nuclear war. It increases it.
Finally, it is an insult to the budget-balancing process.
It is unbelievable that this wasteful scheme is being
advanced at the
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same time Americans are being asked to accept cuts in such things as
education, care for the elderly and medical help for the
poor.
John Isaacs, spokesman for an arms control advocacy group,
explained part of the problem: ``Defending pork is a
bipartisan pastime. It is endorsed by both Democrats and
Republicans.''
Star Wars is the right-wing Republican version of pork.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, some of my colleagues who have been
complaining about the liberal eastern media should be aware that there
are similar problems and concerns reflected in the local media in the
very heartland of America.
As we approach a vote on the missile defense provisions of the
defense bill which have been worked out among our colleagues on both
sides of the aisle, I want to commend Senators for their good-faith
efforts to reach a compromise on this very complex and contentious
issue.
I supported the wording of the original bill that came out of the
committee as a good start which recognized the threat and put us on the
road to providing the real missile defense we need.
While I will vote in favor of the new compromise provisions, I am not
pleased with the weakening of language and goals that this compromise
represents. I am very hopeful that the language can be significantly
strengthened when we get to conference.
We started out saying that we would deploy a national missile defense
system.
Now we are just going to develop for deployment a national missile
defense.
This compromise urges deployment of theater missile defenses to
benefit our deployed troops and allies, but only allows a missile
defense for the American people to be developed for deployment.
We began by simply calling for highly effective missile defenses; we
have now required that they be affordable missile defenses.
No one wants to waste money. But how will affordability be defined?
How do we put a price on defending America from missile attacks?
The truth is that the term ``affordable'' will simply be used as a
club by opponents of missile defense for whom the price of security is
always too high.
The term ``cost effective'' will just be used to fight every dollar
that we try to spend on missile defense from now on.
Cost effectiveness should not even be an issue--the destruction by
one bomb of a single building in Oklahoma City cost $500 million.
Imagine how much a limited strike by nuclear weapons will cost.
We claim to recognize that the era of mutual assured destruction is
over. But instead of recognizing the reality that the ABM Treaty is a
relic of the cold war and mutual assured destruction, this compromise
requires negotiations with the Russian Government within the context of
the ABM Treaty before we defend the American people from attack.
This is a much smaller step forward than it should have been. We
should stop talking about developing options, and begin to deploy a
national missile defense system.
The American people must know that the threat we face in the very
near future is real and it affects all of us. It would be the height of
irresponsibility if we were not prepared to meet this reality.
The challenge before us is to face the facts. Former CIA Director
James Woolsey, who served in the Clinton administration and is no
partisan advocate, has told us bluntly: Up to 25 nations either have or
are developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver
them.
The CIA currently tells us that North Korea is now working on a long-
range missile--the Tapeo Dong II--which may be capable of reaching
Alaska and Hawaii within 5 years.
These are serious challenges. It is our duty to face them now and not
blind ourselves by rationalizing that we can wait 10 more years or 20
more years. If we do, it may well be too late.
So it is my hope that when the defense bill gets to conference we
will be able to strengthen the language so that we make it clear that
we are proceeding on a course which will put in place a national
missile defense system within 5 to 7 years.
In my mind, this is the least we can do to meet our highest
constitutional obligation--the one without which no other obligations
have any meaning--to provide for the common defense--the protection of
our people, our freedom, and our country.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, the Senate is considering the
bipartisan compromise on ballistic missile defenses [BMD]. Although two
key amendments by opponents of BMD were voted down by the Senate on
August 3 and 4, the bipartisan amendment is necessary in order to
advance the Department of Defense authorization bill and to bring it to
a conference with the House.
I supported the original version of the bill submitted by the Armed
Services Committee. The original version set a proper course for
deployment of theater and strategic ballistic missile defenses on a
time-line commensurate with the potential threat. Additionally, the
original language repudiated the ABM Treaty and its philosophical
basis, mutual assured destruction, by declaring that it is the policy
of the United States that the two are ``not a suitable basis for
stability in a multipolar world.''
Though I am not at all entirely pleased with the compromise language,
the present version does preserve the fundamental principles of the
original bill: immediate deployment of theater missile defenses; the
possibility of multiple site national missile defense deployments;
layered defenses; and review of the ABM Treaty. The new language
differs from the original bill in three sections. I hope that these
differences, which are as follows, are addressed by the conferees.
First, the compromise calls for the United States to embark on a
program to develop for deployment a national missile defense system.
This characterizes the research we have undertaken for the last 12
years and changes nothing with respect to our Nation's commitment to
deploy defenses. The original bill clearly called for deployment of a
national missile defense system and is a more proactive statement of
congressional intent to deploy a national missile defense system rather
than to conduct research forever.
The threat facing the United States, its allies and troops abroad by
the proliferation of ballistic missiles mandates that we move forward
toward deploying ballistic missile defenses. In a March 1995 report,
``The Weapons Proliferation Threat,'' the Central Intelligence Agency
observed that at least 20 countries--nearly half of them in the Middle
East and Asia--already have or may be developing weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five countries--
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria--pose the greatest threat
because of the aggressive nature of their weapons of mass destruction
program. All already have or are developing ballistic missile that
could threaten U.S. interests.
Second, in addressing the requirements of a layered defense system,
the compromise language merely calls for a system that can be augmented
over time as the threat changes. The original bill required a system
that will be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a
layered defense. The key issue here is whether the DOD plans now for a
layered defense system, one potentially with space-based assets, or
does DOD merely hold out the option for the possibility of evolving to
a layered defense?
I believe the commitment for layered defenses is important. Space-
based interceptors provide worldwide, instantaneous protection against
missiles launched from anywhere in the world, and are both cheaper and
more effective than their ground-based counterparts. Missiles
launched--either by accident or in anger--against the United States or
our allies and friends, could be destroyed in the early stages of their
flight, before they release their warheads if, but only if, we have
space-based interceptors. This is especially important with multiple
warhead missiles or missiles with chemical or biological warheads. With
the latter, the early intercept results in more harm to the attacking
nation as chemical or biological agents would be dispersed over its
territory. Another advantage of space assets is that they are always on
station.
Third, both the compromise and the original bill have language
concerning the demarcation line between strategic
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and theater ballistic missile defenses. This section was necessary
because the current position of the Clinton administration constrains
key theater missile defense systems. The effect of what the Clinton
administration proposed was to degrade the only advanced theater
systems in research and development in the United States. The bill and
compromise both require the administration to submit for approval by
the Senate any agreement it reached with the Russians on limiting
theater missile defenses. In addition, it prohibits the expenditure of
funds for 1 year only to implement any agreement that would limit the
capability of our theater missile defense systems. It is my hope that
in conference, the restriction will be made permanent.
The compromise version, however, does not make clear that it is the
intent of the Senate, that any unilateral limitation by the United
States should also be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
The administration has received five letters from Members of the Senate
and has participated in countless meetings over the past 8 months on
this subject. That the Senate takes this matter seriously and would not
look favorably on attempts to circumvent the clear intent of the
Senate, should be abundantly clear.
The United States must proceed immediately with the development and
deployment of theater ballistic missile defenses, and, at the earliest
practical time, should deploy national missile defenses. During the
last 4 weeks, while Congress has been on recess, information has
surfaced concerning Iraq's military buildup of weapons of mass
destruction. The Washington Post reported that Iraq turned over 147
boxes and two large cargo containers containing information which
describes a broader and more advanced effort by the country to produce
nuclear arms, germ weapons and ballistic missiles than previously
known. Among the new disclosures is an Iraqi admission that it had germ
or toxin- filled shells, aircraft bombs and ballistic missile warheads
ready for possible use during the Persian Gulf war.
Iraq also admitted to having begun a crash program in August 1990--
the month it invaded Kuwait--aimed at producing a single nuclear weapon
within 1 year. And, finally, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq plans
to investigate Iraq's admission that it was capable of indigenously
producing engines for Scud missiles and that it has made more progress
in developing a longer range missile than it had previously stated.
The important lesson is that we almost always know less about a
country's program to develop weapons of mass destruction that we think
we do. We cannot afford to be sanguine about how long it will take one
country or another to develop a ballistic missile that can threaten the
United States. The evidence suggests that the threat is closer than we
think. It is time to seriously address this issue.
In closing, Mr. President, I want to stress that my preference is to
stick with the original bill language, and I will work with the
conferees to reinstate some of the critical sections of that bill.
However, in an effort to advance the DOD bill to conference, I am
reluctantly supporting the compromise amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Nunn-Warner-Levin-
Cohen amendment. I commend my colleagues for their tireless efforts in
developing a compromise on this issue which moves us away from some of
the most dangerous steps called for in the committee version of the
Missile Defense Act of 1995.
I still have serious reservations about the compromise language,
particularly the effect it may have on Russian ratification of the
START II Treaty. I also question whether the greatest threat of a
nuclear detonation in the United States comes from ballistic missiles.
However, given the likelihood that the Defense authorization bill
will pass, I will support the amendment before us as a way to remove
some of the more egregiously misguided provisions in the current bill
language on missile defense.
I would like to discuss briefly some of the areas where I see
improvement and to point out candidly those provisions in the amendment
which I regard as still being problematic.
The amendment clearly makes significant improvements over the current
language. It moves us away from the certainty of deploying a national
missile defense system by 2003. It narrows the focus of missile defense
efforts from all ballistic missile threats to accidental, unauthorized,
or limited missile attacks. It guarantees a decisive role for the
Congress before deployment can occur. It removes restrictions on the
President's ability to negotiate with Russia an appropriate demarcation
standard between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses. And
it includes the requirement that missile defenses be affordable and
operationally effective.
These are no small achievements. They represent significant
substantive improvements over the current language.
There are still several areas of weakness, however.
As I said earlier, I am particularly concerned about the effect this
amendment may have on the START process. While the authors of this
amendment have done their best to move us away from a collision course
with the ABM Treaty, and many of us believe that they have, that may
not be a view shared in Moscow by the Russian Duma.
I am not sure they will understand the fine distinction between
``develop for deployment'' and ``deploy.'' I am not sure they will
understand what we mean when we say that we will proceed in a manner
which is consistent with the ABM Treaty, and then say that we are
anticipating the need and providing the means to means the treaty. And
I think they will be alarmed by references that are made to withdrawing
from the treaty.
I am concerned about the consequences if the Russians believe that we
are not acting in good faith, but are intent on abrogating the ABM
Treaty. As I said on this floor a month ago, the most likely
consequence of our breaching the ABM Treaty would be a Russian refusal
to ratify START II.
Why? Because the cheapest way to defeat a missile defense system is
to overwhelm it. So, if the Russians feel threatened by our development
of a national missile defense system, they are likely not only to
scratch the START II Treaty, but to begin a strategic buildup. We will
counter with our own buildup and efforts to improve missile defenses,
and before you know it we will be in a costly arms race, which the ABM
Treaty was designed to prevent.
A costly new arms race is not what Americans expected with the end of
the cold war. But that is exactly what they will get if we are not
careful to avoid damaging the ABM Treaty, which has been the basis for
all strategic arms control agreements over the past two decades. I
might add that these agreements were made without the United States
deploying a strategic missile defense system.
A second fundamental concern I have is whether we are correct to
focus our resources on defending against nuclear warheads delivered by
ballistic missiles. Even the kind of limited program the authors of
this amendment are talking about would cost tens of billions of dollars
to eventually deploy.
The threat of ballistic missile attack from rogue states or
terrorists groups is at best a questionable one, and is not likely to
arise in the next decade, if ever.
The more likely means of delivery of a nuclear explosive device to
our shores, as I have said on this floor repeatedly, would be an
innocuous ship making a regular port call in the United States. A
determined group could assemble a device in the basement of a landmark
such as the World Trade Tower with catastrophic results. Terrorist
groups or outlaw states would not need a ballistic missile to reach our
territory.
And that is where we should be focusing our resources: On tracking
these terrorist groups and rogue states and securing the many tons of
fissile material now spread throughout the vast territory of Russia.
In conclusion, let me again thank Senators Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and
Warner for their efforts on this vital issue. They have greatly
improved upon a piece of legislation, which unamended would have
seriously threatened our national security.
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Unfortunately, despite these improvements, I believe that the
potential is still there to undermine the ABM Treaty and our security
in the process. However, the choice between the two alternatives--the
missile defense language in the bill versus the amendment before us--is
really not a choice. I will support the amendment to avoid the more
damaging consequences of the current bill language.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the Senate has before it today two
legislative proposals that address U.S. policy toward the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and missile defense generally. There is
language in S. 1026 that would require the United States to deploy a
multiple-site national missile defense system, an action that would
violate the ABM Treaty. Its alternative, the substitute offered by my
colleagues, Messrs. Nunn, Levin, Warner, and Cohen, would only require
the United States to ``develop'' such a defense ``for deployment.''
Though I am not happy with either proposal, I will vote for the
substitute only because it does less damage to the ABM Treaty than its
alternative. Nobody should interpret this vote, however, as a ringing
endorsement of the policies set forth in the substitute, for reasons
which I would like to discuss in some detail in this statement today.
In my opinion, neither the original language in S. 1026 on missile
defense, which was narrowly approved by a straight party vote in the
Armed Services Committee, nor the substitute addresses my deepest
concerns about the future of the ABM Treaty.
I recognize the hard work that my colleagues, Messrs. Nunn, Levin,
Warner, and Cohen, have devoted to forging a bipartisan consensus on
this controversial issue. Yet several provisions remain in both
proposals that jeopardize the future of the ABM Treaty and, as a
result, the stability of the strategic relationship between the United
States and Russia.
Before identifying section by section my specific concerns with
these proposals, I would like to address some broader issues.
Context of Missile Defense Issues
For almost a quarter century, the ABM Treaty has helped to preserve
the peace by guaranteeing the United States the means of retaliating in
the event of a nuclear attack by Russia. By prohibiting Russia from
deploying a national multiple-site strategic missile defense system,
the treaty works to ensure the reliability of the United States nuclear
deterrent; in performing this function, the treaty also saves the
taxpayer the burden of supporting a robust national missile defense
system.
The majority in the Armed Services Committee knows all about the
importance of protecting U.S. deterrence capabilities--during committee
deliberations over the stockpile stewardship program, I heard a lot
about the specter of ``structural nuclear disarmament'' and the vital
importance of maintaining a vital nuclear second-strike capability.
I therefore cannot explain why there is language in this bill
referring to deterrence as a mere relic of the cold war. With thousands
of Russian and United States nuclear weapons continuing to threaten
each other, there is no law that Congress can pass that would repeal
nuclear deterrence--it remains an unpleasant reality, a basic fact of
international life. Mutual assured destruction is not so much a policy
or a doctrine as a fundamental reality about the current strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia.
It is good for our security that the ABM Treaty prohibits Russia
from developing or deploying systems to kill United States strategic
missiles. Similarly, the lack of a strategic missile defense system in
the United States enhances Russia's confidence in its own deterrent. As
a result, the treaty has provided a solid foundation upon which the
superpowers can reduce their nuclear arsenals without jeopardizing
strategic stability. This process is now well underway with the START I
and II treaties. It is a process that, at long last, appears to be
actually working: the stockpiles are indeed being reduced.
The ABM Treaty, however, is now under assault by critics who believe
it is obsolete. They believe that recent technological developments
offer the prospect of a safe harbor against theater and limited
strategic missile strikes. This is, of course, not the first time that
a technological innovation has led to great strategic instability,
great expenditures, and great dangers to our national security. This is
not the first time that unbounded faith in technological fixes has
captured the imagination of defense specialists and editorial writers.
The development of the multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV), for example, was once heralded as a giant technological
innovation that would bolster U.S. national security. Yet the START II
treaty will eliminate all ground-based MIRV's precisely because of the
risks they pose to strategic stability. MIRV's were introduced, lest we
forget, amid fears that Russia was deploying a missile defense system.
The American and Russian experience with MIRV's should remind us all
that technology must remain the tool of policy to serve the national
interest--it must not drive that policy.
Yet technology is very much what is driving the current debate over
the future of the ABM Treaty. The whole debate boils down to a few
fairly straightforward questions: One, are the gains to U.S. and
international security from developing and deploying a national
strategic missile defense system worth the risks? Two, are these gains
worth the costs of acquisition, deployment, and maintenance of such a
system? Three, will these investments address genuine threats? Four,
are there more effective and affordable alternative ways to preserve
national and international security than by developing missile
defenses? Five, does the legislation before us today enhance or erode
the national security? And six, is America in the post-cold war
environment really best served by a go-it-alone missile defense
strategy, or is our security more dependent upon cooperation with our
allies and maintenance of strong military and intelligence capabilities
against potential adversaries?
Congress simply has not fully examined the costs we would pay from
abandoning the ABM Treaty. When it comes to domestic regulatory
decisions, the new congressional majority claims to favor rigorous
cost/benefit analysis. Yet its members appear reluctant to apply such
analysis to our national defense policy, particularly with respect to
existing proposals to hinge America's security on star wars or its many
sequels. Unfortunately, even the substitute missile defense amendment
brings new risks and costs into the debate on missile defense.
The Fable in the First-Degree Amendment
Let us imagine for a moment that a fictitious new party to the
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [NPT], is suddenly
swept up in a new wave of collective national paranoia. Rumors of new
foreign threats are rampant, though always hard to pin down.
Nevertheless, the country decides to embark on a policy to acquire an
affordable and operationally effective nuclear weapon to serve as a
deterrent against limited, accidental, or unauthorized foreign nuclear
attacks. Since the legislators of country x know that the NPT contains
a provision that permits withdrawal from the treaty on only 90 days'
notice, these members of parliament promptly decide--after very little
debate--to enact a new law authorizing the development for deployment
of nuclear weapons, so long as this is accomplished within, or
consistent with that treaty. The law then goes on to define specific
technical characteristics of such weapons that can be developed without
breaching the treaty. And the only weapons that are taboo under this
new law are those that exceed these standards and that are actually
detonated.
On the 91st day of the international outcry over this incredible
law, country x unveils a robust nuclear arsenal without ever having
breached the treaty, leaving the whole world to ask, what went wrong?
Now forget country x. Let us take some concrete examples. What if
the Iranian parliament decides that this approach makes great sense as
an approach to NPT implementation? What if the Russian Duma someday
decides that this is also the way to go in insert its own most-favorite
notions of defense policy into its laws implementing the START II
Treaty? What if Syria becomes a party to the Biological Weapons
Convention and passes a law
[[Page S 12660]]
permitting the development for deployment of certain specific types of
biological weapons for what it asserts are purely defensive purposes?
What if Germany decides that its commitments under the Missile
Technology Control Regime only extend to missile systems that are
actually demonstrated or flight-tested above the standard 500 kg
payload/300 km range guidelines? What if each of the 159 countries that
have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention decides to enact new laws
defining the specific technical characteristics of chemical weapons
that are controlled under that treaty? And specifically with respect to
the ABM Treaty, if it had been acceptable in the last decade to develop
for deployment weapons systems and components that are banned under the
ABM Treaty, would Russias notorious Kraysnoyarsk radar station have
violated that treaty?
Mr. President, I submit that this is not the way to go about
interpreting treaties. This is not the way to stop proliferation. This
is not the way to pursue arms control. This is not the way to enhance
the national security interests of the United States. And this surely
does not serve the interests of international peace and security. Yet
this, I regret to say, is the essence of the approaches now before the
Senate with respect to the development and deployment of missile
defense systems that are not allowed by the ABM Treaty.
Though I disagree with this aspect of both of these approaches, the
substitute has the advantage of at least not requiring the immediate
deployment of prohibited missile defense systems. It continues to
suffer, however, from several important weaknesses. It contains vague
and dangerously ambiguous language. For example, the term limited, as
used in the term limited, accidental, or unauthorized, is undefined and
hence expands significantly the scope of the national missile defense
[NMD] scheme. It requires the development, with the express intention
of deployment, of an NMD system that is not allowed under article I of
the ABM Treaty. It requires the development of TMD systems, such as
THAAD and Navy Upper Tier that have capabilities to counter strategic
ballistic missiles, a mandate that conflicts directly with article VI
of the ABM Treaty. It accepts the committee's one-sided and largely
unsubstantiated assertions, or findings, about the grave imminent
missile threat facing the United States, while ignoring several ways in
which this threat has been attenuated in recent years. It fails to
offer a single finding about the positive and constructive ways that
the ABM Treaty has served key U.S. security interests. It repeals laws
that require U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. And it places the
U.S. Congress on formal record endorsing a unilateral U.S. definition
of an ABM Treaty-permissible missile defense system.
Yet despite all these serious weaknesses, the substitute is still
marginally better for arms control and nonproliferation than the
missile defense measure contained in S. 1026. In sum, though the
substitute has clearly not de-fanged the missile defense proposal found
in the bill, it has at least filed down some of its incisors.
From Fable to Nightmare
I would now like to turn from the fable to the nightmare: namely,
the missile defense language in S. 1026. On August 4, 1995, Anthony
Lake wrote to the majority leader that ``* * * unless the unacceptable
missile defense provisions are deleted or revised and other changes are
made to the bill bringing it more in line with administration policy,
the President's advisors will recommend that he veto the bill.''
The letter addressed specific concerns over the ABM Treaty and NMD
language. If enacted, the letter stated, these terms--
. . . would effectively abrogate the ABM Treaty by
mandating development for deployment by 2003 of a non-
compliant, multi-site NMD and unilaterally imposing a
solution to the on-going negotiations with Russia on
establishing a demarcation under the Treaty between an ABM
and a TMD system. The effect of such actions would in all
likelihood be to prompt Russia to terminate implementation of
the START I Treaty and shelve ratification of START II,
thereby leaving thousands of warheads in place that otherwise
would be removed from deployment under these two treaties.
[Emphasis added.]
This language echoes similar views expressed by Defense Secretary
Perry and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Shalikashvili. At issue here is not a duel between liberals or
conservatives or Democrats and Republicans--at issue is the gain and
loss to the national security of the United States from abandoning the
ABM Treaty. By my reading, there is no contest.
I do not believe that it in any way serves our national interest to
set ourselves on a course to abrogate that treaty. It surely does not
serve America's interests to encourage Russia--as this bill inevitably
would--to develop its own multiple-site strategic ABM system, an action
which would only weaken our own nuclear deterrent. The costs to cash-
strapped American taxpayers of repairing that damage could potentially
mount into the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars.
I cannot understand how the supporters of the bill's missile defense
provisions can simultaneously claim to worry about what they call,
``structural nuclear disarmament'' while they are also pushing for a
course of action--abrogating the ABM Treaty--that would truly undercut
the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It in no way serves
our interests to encourage Russia to reconsider its commitments under
the START I and START II treaties.
And by derailing the strategic arms control process, the bill's
missile defense language also aggravates the global threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation. Coming on the heels of the successful permanent
extension of the NPT, the bill's language on both missile defense and
nuclear testing would weaken, rather than strengthen, the global
nuclear regime based on the NPT, an outcome that would prove
catastrophic to our global security interests.
Few people realize that if there is no ABM Treaty, Russia will even
be able to export its strategic missile defense capabilities, something
that Article IX of the ABM Treaty now expressly prohibits. I doubt many
of my colleagues are aware that the ABM Treaty is not just an arms
control convention--it is also explicitly a nonproliferation treaty.
Article 9 reads as follows:
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party
undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside
its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this
Treaty.
Note that this language does not prohibit the United States from
assisting its friends and allies to develop and deploy TMD systems. The
treaty does, however, prevent both Russia and the United States from
sharing strategic missile defense capabilities with other countries.
And in the case of Russia, those capabilities include interceptors with
nuclear warheads.
It seems appropriate, therefore, that before we set ourselves on a
course of abrogating the ABM Treaty, we should carefully examine the
full implications for U.S. defense interests around the world of
eliminating the only international constraint on the proliferation of
these strategic missile defense systems.
How will such proliferation affect the ability of the United States
to respond to regional crises that might arise around the world in the
years ahead? How will it affect the United States ability to project
power? I am not satisfied that anybody has seriously weighed such
considerations.
The treaty, furthermore, does not only ban the horizontal or
geographic spread of such missile technology. It also helps to
constrain both the size and sophistication of the United States and
Russian nuclear weapon stockpiles--in short, the ABM Treaty also
constrains the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. By banning
the deployment of national strategic missile defense systems, the
treaty works to protect the effectiveness and reliability of the US
nuclear arsenal and thereby works to stabilize nuclear deterrence.
Abandonment of the treaty will trigger a new offensive nuclear arms
race, as leaders both here and in Russia will have to find new ways to
defeat these new missile defense systems.
Yet I have seen little indication in the process of reviewing this
proposal
[[Page S 12661]]
that anybody here has considered how these particular side effects of
the bill's ABM proposals--in particular the proliferation-related
aspects of these proposals--would affect the full range of U.S.
national security interests around the world.
Even our allies, Britain and France, would be affected--the collapse
of the ABM Treaty would mark an end to any hopes of encouraging these
countries to engage in deep cuts of their nuclear stockpiles. And I
cannot believe for a minute that China would sit by as its neighbors
ringed its borders with strategic missile defense capabilities. Among
China's many options to respond to such a development would be a
dramatic expansion of its offensive nuclear capability. The next
crisis, predictably, would be the collapse of the NPT itself as country
after country submits its 90-day withdrawal notice--following the
course taken by Country X.
Some Specific Concerns
I would now like to outline my specific concerns with these
proposals--concerns which I will address section by section.
Sec. 232 (Findings): Both the bill and the compromise language on
missile defense lack any congressional findings acknowledging the
positive and constructive ways that the ABM Treaty has advanced
America's arms control and nonproliferation interests. In failing to
address these benefits of the treaty, and in failing to recognize that
in some ways the missile threat to the United States has actually
lessened in recent years, the proposed findings seriously
mischaracterizes--and in my view overstates--the missile proliferation
threat facing the United States.
Few of us here will disagree that the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear weapons, jeopardizes our security.
Many, however, would disagree that developing systems that would be in
violation of the ABM Treaty is the right way to go about addressing
that threat, especially when there are so many ways of delivering such
weapons other than by missile.
Sec. 233 Policy: With respect to the Policy section, the substitute
is ambiguous on the fundamental issue of the U.S. intent with respect
to compliance with the its obligations under ABM Treaty. To the limited
extent that it addresses this issue, it focuses only on compliance with
a particular version of the ABM Treaty, namely, the treaty's
obligations as they are unilaterally interpreted in this bill. The
language also sets in gear significant initiatives without any prior
consensus among the parties to the treaty. The terminology about
``multiple-site'' deployments will apply to systems that have
capabilities against strategic missiles. And given that all missile
attacks are limited by the laws of nature, it is by no means clear what
these current proposals mean by the term ``limited'' missile attack.
Indeed, this term ``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' combines
the features of a wild card and an elastic clause: though precedents
have already been set using this undefined term, I would not want
Russia to enact legislation unilaterally defining its own
interpretation of these terms. Changes such as these to an important
international agreement should be made on the basis of mutual
understandings between the parties and in accordance with the
conventional amendment and ratification process, rather than dictated
by statute.
References in these proposals to the right to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty are either redundant--since this right is quite explicit in the
treaty--or outright extortionary, since they seek to prescribe a
specific diplomatic outcome which only negotiations can appropriately
accomplish.
The compromise proposal also contains language that questions the
continued importance of nuclear deterrence as a basis of U.S. national
security, despite considerable evidence that deterrence remains as a
foundation of our national security and despite the lack of any viable
alternative.
Neither the original bill nor the compromise language addresses the
issue of nuclear-armed BMD systems--it would surely seem to me that
before we consider taking actions that will lead to multiple violations
of the ABM Treaty, we should examine fully some of the consequences of
that decision, especially with respect to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Many people forget that the ABM Treaty also prohibits the
global spread of strategic ballistic missile defense systems.
Considering that Russia has just such nuclear-capable systems, it
hardly seems wise to set ourselves on a course to abandon a treaty that
prevents the spread of just such technologies. As part of their efforts
to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons as a basis of their
security, both the United States and Russia might well consider
pursuing an agreement to outlaw nuclear-armed missile defense systems.
Sec. 234. TMD Architecture: The initial operational capability dates
in this section and in section 235 (NMD Architecture) should be
consistent with understandings reached between the parties to the ABM
Treaty. THAAD and Navy Upper Tier should only be included in the Core
Program if the parties to the ABM Treaty agree that such systems and
their components are permissible under the treaty; the same should
apply to space-based sensors including the Space and Missile Tracking
System (SMTS), and to follow-on systems.
Sec. 235. NMD Architecture: As I have already noted, the term
``limited''--used both in the bill and the compromise to refer to
future missile defense capabilities--is undefined in both proposals.
Clearly, this term should not be defined only by one party to the
treaty--if this term has a meaning which Russia does not share, it will
only open the door to Russia legislating its own definitions of key
terms not only in the ABM Treaty but also the START II treaty, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and possibly other important arms control,
disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements.
The compromise requires the development for deployment of an NMD
system capable of being deployed at multiple sites, a policy that if
implemented would violate the current text of the ABM Treaty.
Development and deployment of NMD systems are matters that must be
arranged pursuant both to negotiations and to existing treaty amendment
procedures, including ratification.
Similarly, space-based sensors should be developed only as agreed by
the parties. I believe the President should at the very least be
required to prepare a formal assessment of the arms control and
nonproliferation implications of any systems being developed or
deployed for purposes of NMD. References in this section to sea-based
and space-based systems and expanded numbers of ground-based
interceptors only invite the international community to doubt our
willingness to live up to our ABM Treaty obligations not to develop or
to deploy such systems.
Sec. 236. Cruise Missile Defense Initiative: Both the compromise and
the bill contain language addressing the dangers from the continued
global spread of weapons of mass destruction. Yet both also fail to
clarify that some of the most likely delivery systems for most weapons
of mass destruction do not involve ballistic or cruise missiles. It
seems to me that before we launch into framing defense initiatives
around specific weapons systems, we should understand better the nature
of the specific and anticipated threats they pose relative to other
weapons systems.
I can think of at least two other delivery systems that may pose a
threat to US defense interests that is equal to or greater than the
proliferation threat now posed from ballistic missiles--first, the
capabilities of advanced strike aircraft (Pakistans F-16s come to mind
here as just one example) to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and
second, the threat coming from terrorists using such weapons. Spending
tens and hundreds of billions on missile defense will not help us to
address either of these clear and present dangers.
Sec. 237. ABM Treaty: References in the compromise proposal to
provisions of the treaty relating to the amendment and withdrawal
process are unnecessary since such provisions are already law of the
land. Including them only signals an intention to implement such
rights. Neither proposal acknowledges some of the positive
contributions the ABM Treaty has made to the national security of the
United States. It should not be for United States
[[Page S 12662]]
alone, nor Russia alone, to define unilaterally key terms of this
treaty--the process of interpretation must involve Russia and the
normal process of making, ratifying, and amending treaties. Also the
comprehensive review called for in the compromise proposal fails to
include specifically an assessment of the full implications for U.S.
diplomatic and security interests of a collapse of the ABM Treaty.
Sec. 238. Prohibition on Funds: The velocity/range demarcation
standard is unilateral--it has not yet been agreed by the parties. The
implementation of the demonstrated capabilities standard should also be
governed by mutual agreement of the parties. The specific prohibition
on funding should only apply to systems that are not in compliance with
the ABM Treaty as agreed by the parties. Since section 232 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1995 remains law of the land,
there is no need to repeat it in this bill with respect to the
President's treaty-making powers.
Sec. 241. Repeal of Other Laws: The current first-degree amendment
follows the existing language in the bill by repealing outright 10 laws
pertaining to missile defense. Some of those provisions are obsolete.
But other parts of those laws--such as those dealing with the U.S.
compliance with the ABM Treaty, the requirement for realistic tests,
the importance of financial burden-sharing with our friends, the
requirements for consultations with our allies, previous congressional
findings about the positive value of the ABM treaty, and requirements
for consultations between the parties to the treaty on activities
relating to implementation.
Conclusion
Thus to vote for the missile defense proposal in the bill amounts to
a vote against the ABM Treaty, and a vote against that treaty is to
vote for the proliferation not just of defensive missile systems, but
for the proliferation of the strategic nuclear missiles that will be
necessary to defeat those defenses. In a very real sense, the death of
the ABM Treaty could well signal the deaths of both strategic nuclear
arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. I cannot support any such
proposal.
I therefore urge my colleagues to oppose the committee language on
missile defense. Let us by all means get on with the business of
reducing external weapons threats to our country's security, a business
the ABM Treaty makes legitimate with respect to TMD. But let us not
retreat into a technological Fortress America as we would with the
missile defense provisions in S. 1026.
Today, we have before us a choice between one missile defense
proposal that is a nightmare and another that is a fable. Given
additional time, Congress may well have been able to construct a third
option, one which built upon and acknowledged the important
contributions that the ABM Treaty continues to make to our national
security. But the schedule is such that we do not have such time.
Accordingly, I will vote for the least bad of the two proposals before
us.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at
this point an analysis prepared by my staff of the missile defense
provisions now before the Senate, and a table comparing key provisions
of the ABM Treaty with the proposals found in the substitute amendment.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Analysis of 1995 Missile Defense Proposals in the Senate (Submitted by
Senator John Glenn)
Last July, the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC)
reported out the FY96 defense bill (S. 1026), which contained
several provisions that would, if implemented, place the
United States in violation of the ABM Treaty (ABMT). Included
were provisions requiring the deployment of a multiple-site
national ballistic missile defense system and prescribing a
unilateral U.S. definition of the scope of systems subject to
the ABMT, thereby circumventing the ABMT formal amendment
process.
Following widespread criticism of this proposal, Senators
Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and Warner offered in August a bipartisan
substitute. Though the substitute does not require immediate
deployment of BMD systems in violation of the ABM Treaty, the
substitute does not resolve several outstanding questions
about America's intentions with respect to its obligations
under the ABMT. The table in Annex 1 of this memo illustrates
some of the inconsistencies between the substitute and the
ABM Treaty.
This memo (1) describes and analyzes the SASC missile
defense recommendations, and (2) describes and analyzes the
substitute proposal.
1. sasc action
In summary, the bill moves U.S. policy: (a) away from
nuclear deterrence (mutual assured destruction); and (b) away
from several ABMT prohibitions (including: multiple-site
deployments, ABM systems based at sea and in space, giving
TMD systems capabilities to intercept strategic missiles,
space-based sensors useful against strategic systems, etc.).
The bill contains a unilateral U.S. definition of an ABMT-
permissible system. The bill also limits the negotiating
flexibility of the President and prohibits the President from
spending funds to implement more restrictive ABM controls.
The current text of S. 1026 was reported out of Committee
on July 12. Subtitle C of Title II (RDT&E) contains 11
sections pertaining to ``missile defense.'' The proposed
language covers theater missile defense (TMD) against theater
ballistic missiles (TBMs), national missile defense (NMD)
against strategic ballistic missiles (SBMs), announces
several findings and new national policies covering both
systems, alters the U.S. policy toward the ABMT, and repeals
10 other missile defense laws. While not quite abrogating the
treaty outright, the SASC language still sets the US on a
course out of the ABMT.
Findings and policy
In S.1026, Congress ``finds'' that: missiles are posing a
``significant and growing threat'' to the US; the development
of TMDs ``will deny'' US adversaries an option for attacking
the US and its allies; the intelligence community sees a
growing missile threat; TMDs will ``reduce the incentives''
for missile proliferation; the ABMT's distinction between
strategic and non-strategic missile defense is ``outdated'';
nuclear deterrence (mutual assured destruction) is ``not a
suitable basis for stability''; TMD and NMD enhance strategic
stability by reducing incentives for first-strikes; export
control and arms control regimes are not alternatives to TMD
and NMD; and the ABMT prevents the US from establishing a
limited missile defense.
In response to such findings, the SASC favors the following
US policies: to ``deploy as soon as possible'' TMDs; ``deploy
a multiple-site national missile defense system''; ``deploy
as soon as practical'' effective defenses against ``advanced
cruise missiles''; invest in R&D for follow-on BMD options;
employ ``streamlined acquisition procedures'' to speed BMD
deployments; and ``seek a cooperative transition'' away from
the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
System Architecture
With respect to TMD, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)
shall establish a ``top priority core theater missile defense
program'' consisting of (by year of deployment) PAC-3 (1998),
Navy Lower Tier (1999), THAAD (2002), and Navy Upper Tier
(2001). These systems are to be interoperable and are to
exploit air and space-based sensors and battle management
support systems. The Corps SAM and BPI systems will be
terminated. The SecDef shall develop a plan for deploying
follow-on systems. The SecDef shall submit a report in 60
days specifying a plan to implement these provisions.
With respect to NMD, the SecDef shall develop a NMD system
for deployment by 2003 consisting of: ground-based
interceptors in such locations and numbers as are necessary
to provide a defense of Alaska, Hawaii, and CONUS against
``limited ballistic missile attacks; fixed ground-based
radars and space-based sensors; and battle management/
command, control, and intelligence (BM/C3).'' SecDef shall
develop an ``interim'' capability by 1999 as a ``hedge
against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile
threats.'' SecDef shall use ``streamlined acquisition
procedures'' to expedite NMD deployment, while saving costs.
SecDef shall submit a report in 60 days on the implementation
of this law and analyzing options to improve the system,
including: additional ground-based interceptors or sites;
sea-based missile defense systems; and space-based kinetic
energy and directed energy systems.
With respect to cruise missiles (CMs), SecDef shall
undertake ``an initiative'' to ensure effective defenses
against CMs. He shall submit a plan in 60 days.
The ABM treaty (ABMT)
The bill offers a sense of the Congress that the Senate
should undertake a review of the ``value and validity'' of
the ABMT and should consider establishing a ``select
committee'' to review the ABMT and that the President should
cease negotiating any understandings on the ABMT until this
review is completed. The sense of the Congress also includes
a requirement for SecDef to submit a declassified negotiating
history of the ABMT. The bill provides a unilateral
demarcation line to designate permissible BMD systems: if a
system or component has not been ``flight tested in an ABM-
qualifying flight test'' (defined in the bill as a flight
test against a missile target that is flying over a range of
3,500 km or at a speed of greater than 5 km/second), it is
not covered by the ABMT. The Senate finds, however, that
these parameters are ``outdated'' and hence should be
``subject to change'' after the Senate review of the ABMT.
The bill prohibits the expenditure of funds to implement
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any lower standard. SecDef is to certify annually that no US BMD system
is being constrained more than as provided in this bill.
Budget categories
For budgetary purposes, the bill identifies the following
as of the national BMD program: PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier,
THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, Other TMD, NMD, and Follow-On and
Support technologies.
Repeal of 10 BMD Laws
The SASC bill repeals the following, including several
significant provisions:
1. In the MDA91: Congress endorsed US efforts to work with Russia on
strengthening nuclear command and control, reduce strategic weapons,
and strengthen nonproliferation efforts. Congress also: defined the US
BMD system as directed against ``limited'' ballistic missile threats
declared that this system shall be ``ABM Treaty-compliant'' and limited
to ``100 ground-based interceptors''; urged the President to pursue
``discussions'' with the Soviet Union to clarify what is permissible
with respect to space-based missile defenses and to permit other
changes in the ABMT (including adding sites, using space-based sensors,
etc); required the SecDef to include ``burden sharing'' in a BMD
report; clarified that the ``limited'' BMD defense capability shall
only cover threats ``below a threshold that would bring into question
strategic stability''; and provided $4.1 billion for SDI projects,
including $465 million for ``space-based interceptors'' (including
Brilliant Pebbles).
2. In sec. 237 of the NDAA94: the SecDef was prohibited
from approving any TMD project unless it passed ``two
realistic live-fire tests.''
3. In sec. 242 of the NDAA94: Congress sought to increase
burden-sharing of BMD development costs; the SecDef was to
prepare a plan of cooperation with allies (specifically cited
were NATO, Japan, Israel, and South Korea) to avoid
duplication and reduce costs; the section contains a sense of
the Congress that whenever the US deploys a TMD system to
defend a country that has not provided financial support for
that system, the US should consider ``whether it is
appropriate to seek reimbursement'' to cover some of the cost
of that deployment; the section also
established a special ``Theater Missile Defense Cooperation
Account'' (subject to audit by GAO) to receive foreign
funds to support TMD development.
4. In sec. 222 of the DDAA86: Congress prohibited the deployment of
any ``strategic defense system'' unless the President first certifies
that the system is both ``survivable'' and ``cost effective'' (i.e.,
that it ``* * * is able to maintain its effectiveness against the
offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive
countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to
overcome it'').
5. In sec. 225 of the DDAA86: Congress found that the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces had declared in its report to the
President dated 3/21/84 that ``One of the most successful arms control
agreements is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972''; noted that
the Secretary of State has stated that ``* * * the President has
explicitly recognized that any ABM-related deployments * * * would be a
matter for consultations and negotiation between the Parties''; and
issued a sense of Congress that it ``fully supports the declared policy
of the President * * * to reverse the erosion of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty of 1972,'' that Congress's support for SDI ``does not
express or imply an intention on the part of Congress that the United
States should abrogate, violate, or otherwise erode such treaty,'' that
such funding ``does not express or imply any determination or
commitment on the part of the Congress that the United States develop,
test, or deploy ballistic missile strategic defense weaponry that would
contravene such treaty,'' and that funds ``should not be used in a
manner inconsistent with any of the treaties commonly known as the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space
Treaty, or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.''
6. In Sec. 226 of the NDAA88/89: The SecDef was prohibited from
deploying ``any anti-ballistic missile system unless such deployment is
specifically authorized by law after the date of enactment of this
Act.''
7. In Sec. 8123 of the DDApA89: This was a sense of the Congress on
SDI. It said SDI ``should be a long-term and robust research program''
to provide the U.S. with ``expanded options'' to respond to a ``Soviet
breakout'' from the ABMT and to respond to other future Soviet arms
initiatives; such options ``can enhance'' U.S. ``leverage'' in arms
reductions negotiations; funding levels ``must be established using
realistic projections of available resources''; and the ``primary
emphasis'' on SDI should be ``to explore promising new technologies,
such as directed energy technologies, which might have long-term
potential to defend against a responsive Soviet offensive nuclear
threat.''
8. In Sec. 8133 of the DDApA92: Congress here reached several
findings about the implications for our NATO allies of modifying the
ABMT, including--that all of our NATO allies ``have in the past been
supportive of the objects and purposes of the ABM Treaty''; that
``changes in the ABMT would have profound political and security
implications'' for these allies and friends of the U.S.; and that
before seeking to negotiate any changes in the treaty, the U.S. should
consult with U.S. allies and ``seek a consensus on negotiating
objectives.''
9. In Sec. 234 of the NDAA94: Congress reached several findings,
including that: the MDA91 ``establishes a goal for the United States to
comply with the ABM Treaty''; DoD is ``continuing to obligate hundreds
of millions of dollars'' on development and testing of systems before a
determination has been made that such items would be in compliance with
the ABMT; and the ABMT ``was not intended to'' limit systems designed
to counter modern TBMs ``regardless of the capabilities of such
missiles'' unless such TBMs ``are tested against or have demonstrated
capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.'' The
SecDef was required to conduct a review of several listed BMD systems
to determine if such systems (including Brilliant Eyes) ``would be in
compliance with the ABM Treaty.'' The SecDef shall immediately notify
Congress if there is any compliance problem in pursuing advanced TMDs
and describe the problem. The bill attached funding limitations pending
submission of the report.
10. In Sec. 235 of the NDAA95: This section listed 13 program
elements for the BMDO, for budgetary purposes.
Analysis of the SASC Language
The SASC language establishes a policy of deploying a multiple-site
national ABM system--this cannot be implemented without either amending
or abrogating the ABMT. Amending the treaty would permit the Russians
to deploy their own multiple-site system, including enhanced BMD
features ostensibly intended only for TMD systems but which would have
some significant capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles. The
measure thus focuses only on what may be potentially gained from
expanded BMD efforts, and ignores what may be potentially lost--
including the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the ABMT
itself, the START process, and the NPT, as the strategic arms reduction
process comes to a halt amid new missile defense developments.
The committee text also places into law a unilateral U.S. definition
of systems that can be developed within the ABMT--under that treaty,
such changes are supposed to be arranged by through an amendment
process based on mutual agreement of the Parties. A unilateral U.S.
definition would serve as a dangerous precedent inspiring Russia to
insert its own ``most-favorite-notions'' of BMD into its own statute
books. Moreover, the 5 km-second/3500 km range demarcation line is well
above the parameters of most TBM systems today (which fly at about 2
km/sec), yet dangerously close to the slowest SBM systems (which fly at
between 6-7 km/sec). Thus the Committee language serves to: blur the
distinction between strategic and theater systems; raise the risk of
technological surprise and treaty ``break out'' activities; complicate
treaty verification (given the greater growing ambiguity over which
systems are strategic and which are theater); and jeopardize the
strategic arms reduction process.
The Committee language also repeals several laws that specifically
required U.S. adherence to the ABMT and that required burden-sharing in
the form of increased financial contributions from our allies for BMD
systems.
The premise of all the SASC proposals are the findings that the U.S.
is now facing a serious missile threat and
[[Page S 12664]]
that this threat is growing. Both of these premises are open to
question.
There are at least six rebuttals to the proposition that the U.S. is
now facing a ``serious and growing threat'' that requires either the
amendment or abrogation of the ABMT to counter--
(1) A Growing Threat? In April 1987, President Reagan announced the
establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime to regulate
international commerce in goods relating to missiles that are capable
of delivering a 500 kg warhead a distance of 300 km. Since that time,
Congress has heard Administration spokesmen repeatedly testify about
the 15-20 countries that either now have such missiles or are
developing them (or may have the capability to develop them). Yet the
number of countries alleged to be developing such missiles has
remained, to a considerable extent, constant since the MTCR was
established.
Arguably, the worst missile threats facing the U.S. are those that
involve the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs, including
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) against U.S. territory, U.S.
forces, or U.S. allies. The most potentially destructive threat comes,
and will continue to come for the foreseeable future, from Russia's
nuclear-tipped ICBMs--a situation that will likely persist for quite a
while. Ironically, nothing would be more effective in encouraging
Russia both to halt its nuclear disarmament activities and to expand
its missile fleet than if the United States decides to deploy--or even
prepare to deploy--a multiple-site national missile defense system in
contravention of the ABMT. The ABMT has succeeded in permitting the
superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals because the treaty gives
each country high confidence in the credibility of its nuclear
deterrent. Eliminating or watering down that treaty is thus the wrong
way to go about alleviating the worst nuclear and missile threats now
facing the United States.
The worst missile threat to the U.S. is, in short, the old missile
threat, not a new one. The U.S. has a big stake in the success of the
START/ABM process: its success will mean that America's worst missile
threat will be a declining threat.
Is the global WMD proliferation threat--serious though it
is--growing? If not,
then the global missile threat may not be as grave as is
commonly believed.
Support for international nonproliferation regimes provides one
indicator of the WMD proliferation threat. As of August 1995, the NPT
has 178 parties; over 159 countries have signed the CWC and 135
countries have ratified the BWC. Though some parties may well be in
violation of those treaties, it is difficult to deny that these three
treaties enjoy widespread, almost universal international support, and
that this support is growing. The rush is on to get rid of chemical and
biological weapons, not to acquire them. The stockpiles of the nuclear
weapon states are going on a downward, not an upward, trend. If the
CTBT is successfully concluded in 1996, there will be no more nuclear
explosions anywhere for any purpose. Progress is being made on a cutoff
of the production of fissile nuclear material for weapons or outside of
safeguards. To point to the illicit weapons activities of a few states
is not to suggest the existence of a new international proliferation
norm.
Moreover, the interest that Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and
Israel have shown in developing long-range missile capabilities needs
to be interpreted in light of other international trends. Over the last
three decades, the following surface-to-surface missiles have either
been cancelled or are going nowhere: South Korea's NHK-1; Taiwan's Chin
Feng (``Green Bee''); Argentina's Condor II; Egypt's al-Zafir, al-
Kahir, Ar-Ra'id, and Vector; Saudi Arabia's CSS-2; Iraq's Al-Hussein;
Iraq's Al-Abbas; Iraq's Badr-2000; Brazil's SS-300; the Israel/Iran
``Flower'' project; the Libyan Otrag rocket program; all of the United
States and ex-Soviet INF missiles; the disarmed and to-be-dismantled
ICBM's in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the South African missile
and space launch vehicle program; the China/North Korean DF-61; and
several others. It is wrong, therefore, to declare without
qualification that the missile threat against the United States is only
growing--in some respects it continues to jeopardize U.S. interests,
but in other respects the threat is arguably declining.
(2) Clear and Present Dangers. The worst dangers come from
the further proliferation and use of WMDs by additional
countries or subnational groups. As for systems of delivering
such weapons, Congress's preoccupation with missiles--
typically ballistic missiles--is baffling. The massive
investments called for in the legislation for TMD and NMD
will surely not address the worst (albeit unlikely) military
threat now posed to the United States involving the delivery
of WMD--that is, an all-out Russian strategic nuclear attack
on the United States. It will do little to address attacks
coming by means of cruise missiles and various remote piloted
vehicles. And it will do nothing to prevent or deter a
country of subnational group from deploying a weapon of mass
destruction in the U.S., against U.S. citizens or troops, or
against U.S. allies by means of any of several non-missile
delivery systems that would be available for such a mission,
at a fraction of the cost.
Among the most attractive delivery systems--in terms of ready
availability, cost, reliability, and potential effectiveness--are
advanced strike aircraft. These are delivery systems that are not
regulated by any treaty or regime. As for national policy, the United
States continues to export nuclear-capable strike aircraft or parts for
such aircraft without even verification measures or host-country
commitments to guarantee non-nuclear uses. Pakistan, for example, a
country now under U.S. nuclear sanctions, continues to make commercial
U.S. purchases of spare parts for its F-16 nuclear weapon delivery
vehicles. France, meanwhile, is seeking buyers for its Mirage 2000
wherever they can be found. The F-16C aircraft has a maximum weapons
load of 5,400 kg and a combat radius of 930 km; the Mirage 2000 has a
maximum weapons load of 6,300 kg and a combat radius of 700 km. By
comparison, the North Korean Nodong--now under development--will have a
reported 1000 kg payload and a 1000 km range.
In November 1991, Stanford University's Center for International
Security and Arms Control issued a report entitled, ``Assessing
Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control,'' authored by a panel
of participating experts that included three senior officials now in
the Clinton Administration, including the current Secretary of Defense,
William Perry. The report found that: ``Advanced-strike aircraft are
generally as capable as missiles, and in many cases more capable, for
delivering ordnance, so it is logical to devote, at minimum, comparable
efforts to their control.'' Yet US efforts, epitomized by the SASC bill
and past BMD legislation, continue both to neglect this clear and
present threat. These efforts instead focus shortsightedly on (a) the
ballistic missile threat, (b) developing technological defenses against
such missiles, while (c) neglecting the potentially negative military
consequences of developing such defences, and (d) ignoring other means
of addressing the missile proliferation threat (i.e., prevention,
preemption, and deterrence).
(3) Future Threats. Both the CIA and the DIA directors have recently
testified that the U.S. will not face a new missile proliferation
threat for at least a decade. As stated earlier, even North Korea's
Taepodong will at best be able to reach remote U.S. island territories
sometime in the 21st Century, assuming that country remains in
existence and its missile development program is successful.
Also, if the ballistic missile threat to Israel, Japan, and South
Korea were so immediate and direct, the gravity of this threat is still
not reflected in national funds invested by these countries in missile
defense ventures. Though these countries have expressed interest in TMD
systems, the United States is still paying most of the bills.
Missiles are not the only means by which a country could attack the
United States. A variety of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) could serve as potential delivery vehicles for WMDs, including
nuclear weapons. For example, the Tier 2+ experimental reconnaissance
UAV now under development in the United States, was described in the
July 10, 1995 issue of
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Aviation Week as having the following performance characteristics: a
14,000-mile range, a 2,000-pound payload, an ability to stay in flight
for more than 42 hours, and a maximum altitude of 65,000 feet. The
United States, and U.S. forces abroad, may well be facing a graver
threat from such aircraft in the next decade than they will face from
ballistic missiles. Smuggled or covertly deployed WMDs also remain a
serious threat, as do WMDs deployed by means of land vehicles or a wide
variety of ships.
Proponents of the new legislation raise the specter of
North Korean missile attacks against the United States. Yet
North Korea is still many, many years away from having a
missile that could reach the continental United States, or
even Alaska or Hawaii--assuming it would want to launch such
a missile even if it had such a capability. Nevertheless, the
SASC's missile defense proposal would lead the United States
out of the ABMT (and thereby scuttle the START process), a
multi-billion-dollar proposal intended largely to cope with
the Taepodong's hypothetical worst-case capabilities in the
21st Century. An alternative to this approach would be to
concentrate more on discouraging North Korea from building
such missiles in the first place.
Furthermore, certain trends in advanced conventional weaponry may
rival or surpass the threat to U.S. forces in the years ahead that will
come from ground-to-ground missiles--especially with respect to
increasing accuracy and stealthiness of advanced conventional weapons.
(4) Missiles Have Not Historically Been Decisive. From Hitler's V-2
rocket bombardment of London, through the Iraq/Iran war of the cities,
to the recent war in Kuwait, missiles have not proven to be a decisive
weapon, either as an offensive weapon or as a weapon of deterrence.
Israel's significant technological edge in nuclear and missile
technology did not prevent it from being repeatedly attacked by
modified Iraqi Scuds; nor did the Patriot antimissile batteries deter
Iraq from launching repeated missile strikes on both Israel and Saudi
Arabia. It is also not at all clear that the widespread deployment of
TMD systems in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East would
necessarily alleviate the nuclear weapons proliferation threat in those
regions--it could even aggravate that threat by stimulating the search
for new weapons designs and delivery systems.
(5) BMD Proliferation. The ABMT is not just an arms control treaty.
It is also a nonproliferation treaty, in two respects. First, Article
IX prohibits Russia and the United States from exporting strategic
missile defense systems or components covered by the treaty. If the ABM
treaty collapsed, there would be no legal obstacle to Russia exporting
highly-capable missile defense technology to hot spots around the
globe, such as East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. The export
of such systems could well foster or aggravate regional WMD and missile
races. Some of Russia's BMD interceptors are reportedly nuclear
capable. Others have characteristics (range, thrust, navigation
systems, materials and coatings) very much like offensive ballistic
missiles. The simulated offensive ballistic missile used as a
target in testing the Israeli Arrow TMD interceptor, for example, is
another Arrow. Second, if horizontal (or geographical) BMD
proliferation becomes popular thanks to the collapse of
the ABMT, this will also stimulate more vertical
proliferation of both existing strategic nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems.
(6) Alternatives to Missile Defense. To the extent that the
U.S. and its allies face missile proliferation threats, there
are more--and more effective--ways to approach this threat
than in searching for technological shields. The massive
funds that have been spent on missile defense have drained
valuable resources away from needed investments in
nonproliferation regimes, sanctions, export controls,
intelligence collection and sharing, active and preventive
diplomacy, conventional war-fighting capability, and other
such classic nonproliferation tools. Arguably, the U.S.
Marines remain today America's best ``ground mobile TMD
system,'' if one factors in cost, effectiveness, and treaty
considerations. Given past underinvestment in sharpening the
classic tools of nonproliferation, one should not be
surprised to see chronic nuclear and missile proliferation
threats.
2. the nunn/levin/cohen/warner substitute
In summary, while the substitute dulls the teeth of the
SASC's missile defense language, it surely does not
``defang'' that language. The text still sets the U.S. on a
course out of the ABMT: it requires the ``development for
deployment'' of a multiple-site missile defense system
covering all U.S. territory; it accepts all the SASC findings
about the gravity of the missile threat; it questions the
value of nuclear deterrence; it establishes a provocative new
national policy to ``consider . . . the option of
withdrawing'' from the ABMT if Russia refuses to accept
unilateral U.S. proposed treaty amendments; it seeks the
accelerated development and ``streamlined'' acquisition of
systems that are not ABMT-compliant; it endorses the
``demonstrated capabilities'' definition of an ABMT-compliant
system; and it endorses a unilateral U.S. definition of the
velocity and distance criteria for distinguishing strategic
from non-strategic missiles.
The BMD provisions are broken down into the following
sections: findings (232); policy (233); TMD architecture
(234); NMD architecture (235); cruise missile defense
initiative (236); policy toward ABM treaty (237); spending
prohibition (238); BMD program elements (239); definition of
ABM treaty (240); and repeal of 10 laws (241). A copy of
these provisions appeared in the Congressional Record on
August 11.
The substitute includes the following notable findings: (a)
the existence of a ``significant and growing'' missile threat
to the U.S. (later called an ``increasingly serious
threat''); (b) TMD can reduce incentives for proliferation;
(c) NMD can ``strengthen strategic stability and
deterrence''; (d) the doctrine of nuclear deterrence
(``MAD'') is ``questionable''.
The bill would establish the following national policies
to: (a) deploy ``as soon as possible'' TMDs against TBMs;
(b)``develop for deployment'' a multiple-site NMD system (and
to ``consider'' withdrawing from the ABM treaty if Russia
refuses to agree to necessary treaty amendments); (c) develop
BMD ``follow-on'' options; (d) streamline the BMD acquisition
process; and (e) seek a ``cooperative transition'' away from
MAD.
The SecDef is to report to Congress (before submitting the
FY 1997 defense budget) on the costs of RDT&E/deployment of
each BMD system (both TMD and NMD).
The bill includes Navy Upper Tier system and THAAD within
TMD core program--both of which have been criticized as
having potential strategic ABM capabilities.
Requires the SecDef to develop a NMD system by 2003 that
shall ``be capable of being deployed at multiple sites,''
include space-based sensors, include a limited NMD ``hedge''
capability by the year 2000 involving ``one or more'' sites.
SecDef shall conduct an analysis of options to improve NMD
effectiveness, including sea-based and space-based weapons,
and additional ground-based interceptors.
The SecDef shall prepare a plan to upgrade U.S. cruise
missile defenses.
The Senate should undertake a review of the ``value and
validity'' of the ABM treaty.
The President cannot implement over the next fiscal year a
more restrictive definition of an ABM-permissible system than
that established in the bill--the bill establishes a
demarcation line at targets traveling at 3,500 km range, 5
km/second velocity, and the ban only covers deployment of
systems that are ``flight tested'' against targets fitting
this definition.
The bill repeals 10 TMD/NMD-related laws (following the
SASC bill).
Analysis of the substitute proposal
The table in Annex 1 compares this proposal with key
provisions of the ABMT. The most troublesome language
pertains to the requirement to develop for deployment a
multiple-site BMD system along with specific new systems
(e.g., space-based and sea-based) that are not now permitted
by the ABMT.
There is a real danger that this language will be perceived
by the Russian parliament and by Russian military and
political leaders as a U.S. intention to abandon the treaty.
If this occurs, then the consequences for both arms control
and nonproliferation will be grave. We can expect the
following:
The Start II treaty will be in jeopardy; Russia may even
consider withdrawing from Start I.
The other nuclear weapon states (France, China, and
Britain) will be reluctant to join in the process of nuclear
arms reductions if Russia and the U.S. are no longer
constrained by the ABMT.
Russia's reactions to the U.S. deployment of a national
multiple-site missile defense system could well include a
reversal or even an expansion of its offensive nuclear
arsenal and deployment of its own national multiple-site
defense against U.S. missiles--all of which would lead the
U.S. to consider following suit.
There is adequate reason to believe that the Russians will
indeed interpret the U.S. policy to develop a national
multiple-site BMD system for deployment as an intention to
violate the ABMT, an action that could jeopardize the Start
process. Russian perceptions of the U.S. legislation will
have a profound impact upon the future of several strategic
arms control initiatives, as indicated in the following
statements:
On August 17, Mikhail Demurin, a spokesman for the Russian
Foreign Ministry, told a wire service reporter that Russia
believes the legislation pending in the U.S. Senate on
missile defense would lead to the ``actual liquidation'' of
the ABMT.
[[Page S 12666]]
On August 4, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake wrote
to the Senate Majority Leader that the NMD language in S.
1026 ``would effectively abrogate the ABM Treaty. . . . The
effect of such actions would in all likelihood be to prompt
Russia to terminate implementation of the START I Treaty and
shelve ratification of START II.''
On July 28, Defense Secretary Perry wrote a letter to Sen.
Nunn in which he said that the SASC's BMD language would
``put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty . . .
jeopardize Russian implementation of the START I and START II
Treaties . . . [and] threaten to undermine fundamental
national security interests of the United States.'' By
continuing to call for the development with the intention of
deploying a multiple site BMD system, the compromise language
keeps the U.S. on the ``pathway'' to abrogation.
On June 28, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
Shalikashvili, wrote to Sen. Levin that ``Because the
Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty with other
arms control issues--particularly ratification of START II
now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would deal in
isolation with unilateral U.S. legislation
detailing technical parameters for ABM Treaty
interpretation. While we believe that START II is in both
countries' interests regardless of other events, we assume
such unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for
START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our
broader security relationship with Russia as well.''
On June 20, Russian President Yeltsin submits the START II
treaty to the Russian Duma with a cover letter stating that
``It goes without saying that the Treaty can be fulfilled
only providing the United States preserve and strictly
fulfill [the] bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972.''
On April 27, Russian foreign ministry spokesman Nikita
Matkovskiy expressed alarm that the US has started testing
anti-missile defense systems that the US unilaterally claims
are non-strategic; Matkovskiy stated that ``In our opinion
the continuation of the policy of accomplished facts instead
of an intensive search for a mutually acceptable solution can
only complicate matters, if not drive them into a blind
alley.'' (Interfax)
On April 23, Russian arms control expert Anton Surikov
stated that US BMD plans ``are in fact yet another attempt to
push through the back door the old Reagan SDI idea. That's
why they pose a considerable threat to strategic stability in
the world and provoke China and other `minor nuclear
countries' to sharply build up their nuclear missile
forces.'' (Itar-Tass) On August 4, Surikov specifically
claimed that the US Senate's BMD language ``prompts our
country to refrain from ratifying the START-2 Treaty and
reconsider some provisions under the START-1 one.'' (Itar-
Tass)
On March 28, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev commented on
prospects for Russian ratification of the START-II treaty,
noting that ``It is also essential that no attempts be made
to evade the ABM Treaty, since both treaties are closely
connected with each other.'' (Itar-Tass)
On March 17, columnist Vladimir Belous wrote in Segodnya
that ``Some [US] senators even demand that the administration
stop the ABM negotiations, which can allegedly limit US
freedom of action. In fact the intention is to reanimate the
Reagan SDI program, although in a more modest form . . . It
must be admitted immediately that if the ABM Treaty is
effectively undermined, further implementation of the START I
Agreement will be in question.
On March 7, Aleksander Piskunov, the vice-chairman of the
Duma Committee for National Defense, stated after a meeting
with American congressmen that ``It is absolutely obvious
that the discussion of the possibility of implementing the
ABM system will be fraught with serious consequences and will
tell negatively on the upcoming ratification of an agreement
on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons.''
(Itar-Tass)
On February 10, retired Major-General Vladimir Belous,
writing at length in Segodnya about ABMT-related
developments, concluded that each Party ``will give its own
interpretation to the parameters for delimitation and will be
guided by them, which could lead to the de facto undermining
of the treaty as a document of international law. Too much is
at stake for there to be haste or inconsistency on this
issue. The profound connection between strategic offensive
and defensive weapons must be pointed out once more. This
signifies at this stage that the ratification of the START-2
treaty by the Russian parliament is possible only when the
delimitation of strategic and `non-strategic' . . . has been
achieved and officially affirmed. And in no case before
that.''
On January 18, Aleksandr Sychev wrote an article in
Izvestiya warning that ``The White House plan to avail itself
of a new ABM defense system gives rise to the suspicion that
the United States is trying to bypass the ABM Treaty and
attain military-strategic superiority.''
On January 16, a senior Russian foreign ministry official
criticized a recent test of ``a tactical ABM system''; noting
that the test occurred ``at a time when both countries were
holding discussions . . . on distinctions between strategic
and tactical ABM systems,'' the official stated that
``Washington's actions worsen the atmosphere at the
consultations and may have a negative effect on the entire
complex of security negotiations in general.'' (Interfax)
The danger that Russia will interpret the substitute as an
intention to abrogate the ABMT is further aggravated by the
repeal in both the Committee's bill and the substitute of
provisions of existing law that require the United States to
remain in compliance with the ABMT (e.g., repeal of the
Missile Defense Act of 1991).
The substitute includes in a Sense of the Senate certain
technical parameters to define the types of BMD systems that
are permissible under the ABMT: any system that has not been
tested against test targets flying at or above 5 km/second or
exceeding a 3,500 km range would be permissible. Though the
substitute is an improvement over the SASC bill's provision,
in that it is non-binding, it nevertheless places the
Congress in favor of adopting a BMD testing standard that has
not been agreed by the Parties to the ABMT. The substitute
also prevents the President from spending any funds in the
next fiscal year to implement any more restrictive standard.
Moreover, in establishing a US national policy that a BMD
system will be controlled only if it is actually flight
tested, the substitute departs from the ABMT's prohibition on
developing systems that have inherent capabilities to destroy
strategic ballistic missiles. The substitute language would,
therefore, put Russia on notice that the United States would
have no objection if Russia developed and even deployed
sophisticated strategic BMD systems as long as the systems
are not flight tested against the unilaterally-defined US
target criteria. Any subsequent Russian action to exercise
these options would serve to weaken the credibility of the US
nuclear deterrent.
IMPACT OF THE SUBSTITUTE PROPOSAL ON THE ABM TREATY
[Although the text does not explicitly require the U.S. to abrogate the
ABMT, the substitute MDA95 would require the Executive to take steps
that would--if implemented without amending the treaty--violate both the
letter and the spirit of that treaty. Examples:]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABM Treaty (ABMT) Missile Defense Act of 1995 (MDA95)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preamble: considers that The substitute effectively substitutes
``effective measures to ``expand'' and ``expansion'' for the ABMT
limit anti-ballistic Preambles terms for ``limit'' and
missile systems would be ``limitation.'' Sec. 232 (4) ``finds'' that
a substantial factor in the deployment of ``effective defenses''
curbing the race in against ballistic missiles ``of all ranges''
strategic offensive arms can reduce incentives for missile
and would lead to a proliferation. Sec. 232 (5) refers to the
decrease in the risk of difference between strategic and non-
outbreak of war strategic ballistic missiles as a ``Cold War
involving nuclear distinction'' in need of review. Sec. 232
weapons''; proceeds from (7) ``finds'' that BMD systems ``can
the premise that ``the contribute to the maintenance of stability''
limitation of anti- as missile proliferation proceeds and as the
ballistic missile U.S. and the CIS ``significantly reduce the
systems . . . would number of strategic forces in their
contribute to the respective inventories.'' Such findings are
creation of more inconsistent with the letter and spirit of
favorable conditions for the preamble of the ABMT. The findings,
further negotiations on moreover, are not balanced: they fail to
limiting strategic address any of the strategic benefits that
arms''. the U.S. has gained from the ABMT.
Article I: Bans the Sec. 233 (2) establishes a policy to
following--deployment of ``develop for deployment'' a ``multiple-site
ABM systems for a national missile defense system'' protecting
``defense of the against limited missile attacks ``on the
territory of its territory of the United States.'' Though
country,'' the provision this language echoes a similar provision in
of a ``base'' for such a sec. 231 of the Missile Defense Act of 1991,
defense, and deployment it omits language in that act requiring U.S.
to cover an individual compliance with the ABMT; indeed, the
region. In short, the substitute repeals the MDA91 in its
ABMT allows limited entirety. The substitute also opens up a can
defenses against of worms for treaty verifiers and arms
strategic missiles, but control lawyers. In light of the bill's
they cannot be deployed positive ``finding'' in sec. 234(4) about a
to protect the whole defense against missiles ``of all ranges,''
country. The treaty thus the language could be read both to authorize
permits missile defenses a territorial, multi-site defense against
against both strategic ``limited'' attacks involving strategic
and non-strategic missiles--exactly what the treaty prohibits.
missiles, but defenses Note that the text does not define
against the former must ``limited''--and given all missile attacks
be limited to one site are in some ways limited, the language
(and even then, only invites a treaty interpretation that would
certain types and ultimately permit a defense against all
numbers of ground-based missile attacks. If implemented without
interceptors are modification of the treaty, this would
permissible) and violate several key provisions of the ABMT,
defenses against the including (but not limited to) the bans on:
latter may not be given (1) multiple ABM sites; (2) ``development''
capabilities against of space-based and sea-based ABM components;
strategic missiles. (3) giving non-strategic BMD systems
capabilities to counter strategic missiles;
(4) developing a ``base'' for a territorial
ABM defense; and (5) developing a missile
defense for an individual region. The term
``territory of the United States'' covers a
third of the globe, including: (in the
Pacific) the Northern Mariana Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, Baker and Howland
Islands, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll,
Kingman Reef, Midway Island, Palmyra, and
Wake Island, and (in the Atlantic) the
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico--it is hard
to imagine an ABM-compliant system that
would be ``operationally effective'' in
defending such an area without violating the
ABMT. Even if the scope were limited to
Hawaii, Alaska, and the CONUS, this would
cover an area of over 3.7 million square
miles; the total area would be far greater.
It would not be unreasonable to interpret
this proposal as a statement of a U.S.
intent to break the treaty. Indeed, the
dictionary defines the preposition ``for''
(as used in the phrase ``develop for
deployment'') as meaning: ``with the object
or purpose of.''
Article II: Defines a Sec. 233 establishes a national policy of
strategic ABM system as developing a NMD system that will be
including not just ``operationally effective'' against limited
interceptors, launchers, ballistic missile strikes (regardless of
and radars, but also their origin or flight characteristics)
system components which against ``the territory of the United
are ``undergoing States.'' Sec. 235 defines the NMD
testing,'' ``undergoing ``architecture'' and directs the SecDef to
. . . conversion,'' or ``develop'' a specific system achieving this
``under construction.''. goal. This provision is unilateral, given
that Russia has not yet agreed to the BMD
testing parameters found in the substitute.
Sec. 235 (b) requires the SecDef to make use
of ``upgraded early warning radars'' and
``space-based sensors'' in the NMD plan.
Article III: The ABM Sec. 233 (2) establishes a policy to
system may cover only ``develop for deployment'' a ``multiple-site
one deployment area (of national missile defense system'' protecting
fixed dimensions) and against limited attacks ``on the territory
consist of no more than of the United States'' (see comments above).
100 ABM interceptor Such a deployment would thus violate both
missiles; also radar Article III of the ABMT and Article I of the
limitations. [This ABM Protocol of 1974. Sec. 235 (a) requires
provision is pursuant to the SecDef to ``develop'' an NMD system
Article I of the ABM (covering CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii)
Protocol of 1974.]. involving ground-based interceptors
``capable of being deployed at multiple
sites''.
[[Page S 12667]]
Article V: Bans Sec. 235 (a) requires the SecDef to
development, testing, or ``develop'' a NMD system (covering CONUS,
deployment of (a) ABM Alaska, and Hawaii) involving ground-based
systems or components interceptors ``capable of being deployed at
which are air-based, multiple sites''. The system is to include
space-based, or mobile ``space-based sensors'' including the SMTS
land-based; (b) ABM (formerly Brilliant Eyes) and BM/C3 systems.
launchers for launching Sec 235 (b) requires the SecDef, in
more than one developing the NMD plan, to ``make use of .
interceptor at a time . . one or more of the sites'' that will be
from each launcher; (c) used as deployment locations. Same section
rapid reload ABM requires the SecDef to prepare ``an analysis
launchers. of options'' for developing NMD system that
includes several systems that are not ABMT-
compliant, including: ``additional''
(presumably in addition to the 100
authorized by the ABMT) ground-based
interceptors at existing or new sites, sea-
based missile systems, space-based kinetic
energy interceptors, and space-based
directed energy systems. This list amounts
to a congressional requirement for the
SecDef to evaluate ``options'' to violate
the treaty--an action that could reasonably
be interpreted in Moscow as a prelude to
treaty abrogation.
Article VI: Bans giving Sec. 235 (b) requires the SecDef to make use
non-strategic defensive of ``upgraded early warning radars'' and
missiles, launchers, or ``space-based sensors'' in the NMD plan. The
radars any capabilities purpose of the NMD system (sec. 235(a)) is
to counter strategic to develop an ``operationally effective''
missiles, and not to counter to a ``limited, accidental, or
test such missiles in an unauthorized ballistic missile attack''--yet
ABM mode; bans the only systems permitted under the ABMT
deployment of future that can be ``operationally effective''
radars for early warning against limited/accidental/unauthorized
of strategic missiles launches of strategic missiles can only be
except at locations deployed at one site, cannot be deployed at
along the periphery of sea/air/or mobile/or with rapid reloads,
its territory and etc--none of these restrictions appears in
oriented outward. the bill. Also, given that (a) the term
``limited'' missile attack is not defined,
(b) every missile attack is limited in some
way, and (c) there cannot be infinite
missile attacks--the law effectively
constitutes a green light to counter all
missile attacks on all U.S. territory--just
what the ABMT was created to prohibit. The
substitute also distinguishes between a BMD
system having an inherent capability against
strategic missiles and a BMD system that has
been ``tested against'' such missiles. This
language contrasts sharply with the ABMT's
ban on giving non-ABM systems capabilities
to counter strategic ballistic missiles.
Article IX: Bans Sec 235(b) requires the SecDef to prepare
transferring ABM systems ``an analysis of options'' for NMD including
or their components to sea-based missile systems, space-based
other states or kinetic energy interceptors, and space-based
deploying them ``outside directed energy systems--all of these would
its national territory''. presumably be ``outside the territory'' of
the United States. Under a unilateral
interpretation of its own obligations under
the ABMT, Russia could in turn argue that it
is permissible for Russia to deploy its own
ABM systems around the world to counter
``limited, accidental, or unauthorized''
U.S. missile attacks. Russia could (if the
ABMT is finally abrogated) also export whole
strategic NMD systems or critical components
to all destinations.
Article XIV: Allows The amendment process provides no
amendments; but agreed authorization for unilateral national
amendments shall enter definitions of key terms of the treaty.
into force with the same Moreover, the substitute misleadingly claims
procedures governing the (in sec. 237(a)(4)) that all the programs in
entry into force of the this bill ``can be accomplished through
treaty. processes specified within, or consistent
with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the
need and provides the means for amendment to
the Treaty.'' By the same reasoning, any non-
nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty could
``accomplish'' a robust nuclear weapons
arsenal fully ``within'' the procedures of
the NPT, simply by following the 90-day
withdrawal procedure. Indeed, either the
U.S. or Russia could go ahead and develop
and deploy a completely impermeable,
national Star Wars system fully ``within the
ABM Treaty'' simply by exercising that
treaty's right to withdraw (or by not
engaging in flight tests). The proposal thus
converts a prohibition into a right or even
an obligation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I support the Nunn amendment identified as
``The Missile Defense Act of 1995.'' Last week there was a curious,
trumped up suggestion in a local newspaper that, somewhere along the
line, I had mysteriously changed my position regarding the ABM Treaty.
I have not, and the reporter who wrote the story knew it. I have always
questioned the wisdom of the ABM Treaty, and I still do.
In fact, this past April I wrote to President Clinton stating my
belief that the current U.S. position on the ABM Treaty is rooted in
cold war mentality. In 1972, Mr. President, neither United States nor
Soviet negotiators had any way to envision the security environment of
1995, characterized as it is by the rampant proliferation of ballistic
and cruise missile technology.
Even former Secretary of State Kissinger--one of the principal
architects of the ABM Treaty--recently told me that he too feels that
strategic stability in the post-Cold war world has moved beyond the
current scope of the ABM Treaty. I use the word ``current'' because the
ABM Treaty itself contains provisions for modification or legal
abrogation.
Mr. President, the national security interests of the United States
should be our number one priority, and for that reason I have directed
the Committee on Foreign Relations, in consultation with the Committee
on Armed Services and other appropriate committees, to undertake a
comprehensive review of the continuing value of the ABM Treaty for the
purpose of providing additional policy guidance during the second
session of the 104th Congress.
In this regard, I reiterate my opposition to the creation of yet
another special Select Committee replete with bureaucratic trappings,
staff, and cost to the American taxpayer for the purpose of reviewing
this treaty. We already have standing committees with the
responsibility for making these determinations and recommendations, and
we are going to do our job.
In conclusion, I support the Nunn amendment for its foresight in
developing a missile defense system to protect all Americans. Still, I
confess having reservations about the amendment because I am convinced
that it may compromise some of the decisive language and vision
contained in the original bill.
Mr. President, I reiterate my support for passage of the Defense
Authorization Bill of 1995.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I intend to make a statement concluding the
final passage of the authorization bill outlining some of the
challenges I think we have in conference. I do think there have been a
number of improvements made in the bill in the Chamber, most notably
the Missile Defense Act, which I anticipate will be approved in a few
minutes on a rollcall vote.
There are a number of other challenges we have in conference if this
bill is going to become law, and I will speak to that at passage of the
authorization bill because I think it is enormously important that we
work together in a cooperative way with the administration to make
every effort to see that this bill will be one the President will be
willing to sign.
There are a number of items that are in the bill now which will not
meet that definition according to what I have been reliably informed.
So I will be working with my colleagues to both identify the
administration objections and to see if those can be worked on as we go
forward.
I also think the committee chairman and all those who worked in good
faith in the Chamber have a real stake in trying to make sure we get a
bill that can become law this year, and I know we will work together in
that regard.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my distinguished colleague, I
know there are Senators on this side of the aisle, particularly
Senators Kyl and Smith, who likewise feel very strongly about this
amendment about to be voted on, so I am sure their voices will be heard
as this matter proceeds to resolution in conference.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I was referring both to
that matter and to other matters also. My comments were in general
because there are a number of areas where the administration and the
Secretary of Defense have noted they want to work to see that changes
are made. So I was not speaking just on the Missile Defense Act but
that was included in my remarks.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wanted to make sure I protected the
interests of my colleagues who did work on this particular amendment
about to be voted on.
Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Has the time arrived now for
the vote?
Amendment No. 2425
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 9:30 has
arrived and the question now is on the Nunn amendment.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma
desires about 2 minutes. I suggest he be given 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and
the Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.
During the course of this recess, I averaged about seven events a day
throughout the State of Oklahoma, and during that time I did not let an
opportunity go by without letting the people of Oklahoma know how
serious the threat of missile attack will be to the United States
within just a very few years, probably as early as the year 2000.
I also let them know that we do not have a national missile defense
system, and probably the most significant thing we will do is to keep
this system going so that when we have a friendlier
[[Page S 12668]]
environment in the White House we can have this system ready to be
deployed by the year 2000 or 2001.
We know the threat that exists from North Korea right now. We know
the threats that were articulated by Jim Woolsey, the chief security
adviser to the President, when he said that we know of between 20 and
25 nations that are working on weapons of mass destruction and the
missile means of delivering those weapons.
I know the negotiators worked very hard, and I commend the work
product. However, I am a little disappointed it did not come out
stronger. I intend to support the missile defense portion of this bill,
but I think when we used the words that we want to deploy a national
missile defense system and they changed it to ``develop for
deployment,'' that is too weak. I think that when we are calling for
highly effective missile defenses that we now have changed to
``affordable,'' I suggest to you, Mr. President, there is nothing that
is more significant going on right now than preparing for a national
missile defense system.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
The question is on agreeing to the Nunn amendment No. 2425. The yeas
and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski] is
necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka] is
absent because of attending a funeral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 13, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 398 Leg.]
YEAS--85
Abraham
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Exon
Faircloth
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Hatfield
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Shelby
Simpson
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--13
Boxer
Bradley
Dorgan
Feingold
Harkin
Lautenberg
Leahy
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Pell
Simon
Smith
Wellstone
NOT VOTING--2
Akaka
Murkowski
So the amendment (No. 2425) was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which
the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am going to vote against this bill as
I did in the Armed Services Committee. We have had a good debate on the
Senate floor on the bill and I went into this debate hopeful that we
would fix many of the problems I saw in the bill as reported.
We have fixed some of those problems. For example, the Department of
Energy provisions have been almost completely rewritten and all the
provisions I objected to during committee deliberations have been
corrected, with the exception of the hydronuclear testing provision
which Senators Exon and Hatfield sought to eliminate.
Elsewhere, unfortunately, the improvements have been modest. The
Missile Defense Act of 1995 has not been changed enough for me to be
able to support it. I commend Senator Nunn and Senator Levin for their
efforts to defuse the worst features of the reported bill's missile
defense provisions. I voted for their language as a substitute for the
reported bill. But I believe that these provisions will still
contribute to the unraveling of critical arms control agreements that
would enhance our security far more than accelerating the development
and deployment of a limited national missile defense system.
Our current policy on missile defense, the Missile Defense Act of
1991 as amended, makes it a goal of the United States to comply with
the ABM Treaty while developing, and maintaining the option to deploy,
a limited national missile defense. That is as far as we should go. We
simply do not need to be making a several-hundred-million-dollar
downpayment this year for a multitens of billion dollar national
missile defense system.
The bill has many other provisions which I oppose. Section 1082
prohibits retirement of strategic weapons delivery systems that the
nuclear posture review says we don't need. We cannot afford to keep
every nuclear weapon delivery system, even those the Pentagon says we
don't need, as bargaining chips for future arms control negotiations.
We should not be sending the signal that we expect the START II and
START I treaties to unravel and therefore intend to maintain the
maximum nuclear capability possible within the START
counting rules. If we end up with the nuclear posture review force
structure, we will be quite adequately defended and will hardly have to
sue for surrender if the cold war is revived.
Mr. President, I fundamentally disagree with the need to add $7.1
billion to the President's defense request. The weapons research and
production funded with that money are only going to make our out-year
defense budget problems worse. The committee has admitted that it has
designed a defense bill that will require many billions of dollars in
additional defense spending in future years beyond the budget
resolution levels. Since I didn't support the first $33 billion added
by the budget resolution, I can't support a bill that assumes even more
spending in future years. I regret that the Kohl-Grassley effort to
enforce budget discipline failed.
I regret that my efforts to cut spending for unneeded antiarmor
munitions and for an amphibious assault ship we don't need to buy
before 2001, if then, were defeated in votes on the companion Defense
appropriations bill. These are the tip of the iceberg of unneeded
Member-interest spending in this bill and the companion appropriations
bill.
Mr. President, this bill is better than the House bill in most
respects. The House bill has terrible provisions on discharging members
who are HIV positive and on denying female service members and female
dependents of service members the right to get an abortion in overseas
military medical facilities with their own money. The House bill funds
additional B-2 bombers with their multitens of billions of dollars out-
year funding requirement. The House bill has a fundamentally misguided
provision that attempts to lock in the Bottom-Up Review force structure
of 1.445 million active duty service members in permanent law. The
House bill's combination of force structure and weapons systems
provisions would require rapid real growth in defense spending in
future years, even more rapid than the Senate bill's. This is simply
not in the cards.
Mr. President, we go to conference with two bad bills, each deserving
a veto in my view. It's possible that we will strip the worst of both
bills in conference and end up with a product acceptable to the
President. But far more likely is a result that the President would
have to veto.
This is the first time in my 13 years in the Senate that I have voted
against a Defense authorization bill. I do not do it lightly. I regret
that I feel compelled to do this.
I urge my colleagues who believe this bill spends too much money on
unneeded and wasteful defense projects or who oppose its cold war
revival provisions to join me in voting against this bill.
stratcom
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to bring to my colleagues'
attention an important initiative by USSTRATCOM to provide the regional
CINC's with mission-planning analysis for counterproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM'S mission-planning analysis is of
proven
[[Page S 12669]]
value to regional commanders charged with responding to proliferation
threats.
In situations that could require putting American forces in harm's
way, it is vital that all factors--the risks, benefits, and
consequences of contingency plans--are thoroughly understood in
advance. Once a crisis breaks out, it is too late to undertake the
studies required to assess the potential threats.
STRATCOM's unique planning analysis method gives commanders advance
warning of danger by helping to identify and characterize current and
emerging proliferation threats in the region. In cases when
proliferation activities challenge U.S. interests and military
operations, this unmatched mission-planning analysis capability allows
defense planners to identify a variety of potential military targets;
assess the effectiveness, consequences, and costs of military
operations; and develop alternative contingency plans that maximize
mission effectiveness, while minimizing the risk, cost, and collateral
effects.
Moreover, in the case of countries with embryonic weapons activities,
STRATCOM's mission-planning analysis can provide the early and detailed
alert that will allow policy makers to fashion effective export
controls and other preventative measures to block weapons programs
before they become a threat to the United States or other nations.
Mr. McCAIN. I agree with Chairman Thurmond's assessment of
USSTRATCOM'S mission-planning analysis activities and the importance of
this program in supporting the broad spectrum of U.S. nonproliferation
and counterproliferation goals. Unfortunately, during our markup of the
fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, we were unaware that the
program is not adequately funded in the budget request for STRATCOM.
Without funding, analysis that commanders find essential for mission
planning will at best be performed on an ad hoc basis or, worse, not at
all. This issue is too vital and the risks of proliferation are to
great to be ignored by the Senate.
I hope the conferees will see fit to include the required funding for
this program.
disposal of obsolete and excess materials contained in the national
defense stockpile
Mr. BAUCUS. I would like to raise an issue with the manager regarding
section 3402 of the bill. This section appears on page 587 and is
entitled ``Disposal of Obsolete and Excess Materials Contained in the
National Defense Stockpile.'' I understand that the purpose of this
provision is to eliminate the strategic materials in the national
defense stockpile with three exceptions. Is that correct?
Mr. THURMOND. The provision recognizes that the stockpile contains
materials which are excess to national security needs. At the direction
of Congress, the Department of Defense conducted a thorough analysis of
requirements and reported their findings.
Mr. BURNS. And I understand that if the disposal of those materials
is authorized by the Congress, the actual sales of the materials would
be preceded by a recommendation by the Federal Market Impact Committee
regarding the adverse domestic and foreign economic impacts on the
private sector as a result of the proposed stockpile sales. Is that
correct.
Mr. THURMOND. No disposal from the stockpile may occur until the
Market Impact Committee has analyzed the DOD plan for annual disposals.
Congress must then concur with the annual materials plan before DOD can
dispose of any materials. We maintain very tight control over these
disposal and the procedures have worked very well.
Mr. BAUCUS. Our concern is with the proposed sale of palladium and
platinum in the stockpile. The national defense stockpile of palladium
represents the equivalent of 20 percent of the annual demand for this
metal, and the national defense stockpile of platinum represents 5
percent of the national demand. The price of both of these metals is
quite volatile. There is already some indication that just the
recommendation for sale has had a depressive impact on the market
price. Did the committee, when it included palladium and platinum among
the materials to be disposed, examine the implications of disposition
of palladium and platinum?
Mr. THURMOND. Any disposals of those materials could only occur in
small amounts over a very long period of time, according to market and
impact conditions. Although no subcommittee hearing was conducted this
year to review stockpile operations, we have been working closely with
DOD on this matter and the final DOD report has been reviewed.
Mr. BURNS. Historically, the National Defense Stockpile was created
to provide a supply of strategic materials not available from domestic
production or not available in sufficient quantities from domestic
production to meet critical military needs. Since the palladium and
platinum that is in the stockpile was acquired, the Stillwater Mine in
Montana has begun production and, in fact, is the only mine in the
world which is a primary palladium producer, platinum representing a
secondary metal from that mine. Virtually all other palladium and
platinum comes from South Africa and Russia.
Mr. BAUCUS. The problem from Montana's perspective is that the
Stillwater Mine has only recently begun to recover its costs of
production as the price of palladium has stabilized at a level
sufficient to justify operation of the mine. Because of the
improvements in price, Stillwater Mining Co. has announced an intention
to double its production of palladium beginning in mid-1997. The
doubling of production will increase the number of high-paid
underground mining jobs by approximately 400. In Montana, these jobs
are extremely important to our economic health.
Mr. BURNS. We are deeply concerned that there not be some activity
with respect to the disposition of palladium and platinum in the
stockpile which would undermine the basic economics of the Stillwater
Mine and its proposed expansion. The question to the manager of the
bill is whether the conferees, on behalf of the Senate, will support an
amendment from the Montana delegation which will assure that disruption
in the price of palladium and platinum not occur.
Mr. THURMOND. I would emphasize that this legislation would not
permit DOD to dispose of a single ounce of these materials. Any
disposal requires approval by Congress of an annual materials plan and
I suggest to my colleagues that the AMP is the mechanism we have
established in law to protect domestic industry from disruption. The
provision in this bill enables DOD to develop a plan for potential
disposals in a manner which will not disrupt the market or disadvantage
domestic producers. This procedure has worked very well in the past and
any disruption has been minimized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996. In the course of debate
on this legislation many improvements have been made to what was a
dangerous piece of legislation.
To mention two of these positive changes: The provisions on the
Energy Department relating to our nuclear weapons activities have been
greatly improved and the National Missile Defense Act of 1995 has been
significantly altered.
Unfortunately, these changes have not gone far enough to correct what
I believe is still a flawed piece of legislation.
I will oppose this legislation primarily for two reasons. First, the
Missile Defense Act of 1995, though much improved over the original
committee version, risks undermining the START treaties. Second, the
bill provides for an increase of $7.1 billion in spending on programs
that the Pentagon does want nor need.
At this juncture, I want to make clear that I support a robust
national defense. I do not think, though, that spending money on
weapons systems that the military itself does not want and pursuing a
national missile defense which could lead to a new arms race, as this
bill does, is a good way to promote our national security.
Senators Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and Warner worked hard to develop a
compromise which altered some of the more egregious provisions of the
committee-reported version of the Missile Defense Act of 1995. I
commend them for their efforts, and I supported their amendment as a
way to improve the original bill language.
[[Page S 12670]]
The amendment does move us away from the original bill's commitment
to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. Furthermore, the
scope of the Strategic Missile Defense Program has been strictly
limited to defending against unauthorized, accidental, and limited
launches as opposed to a more ambitious defense against all types of
ballistic missiles. The Congress is now guaranteed a decisive role in
the decision to deploy any missile defenses. Finally, provisions which
would have tied the President's hands in negotiating ABM Treaty
amendments have been removed.
Despite these significant changes, many problems remain with the
Missile Defense Act of 1995. In particular, there is a real threat that
the Russian Duma will not understand the legislative finessing we have
engaged in to avoid a head-on collision with the ABM Treaty. The
distinction between developing for deployment a national missile
defense system versus deploying such a system are subtle at best. They
may also be concerned about policy statements referring to the
possibility of withdrawal from the AMB Treaty should negotiations not
succeed.
The danger is that these measures on our part will be viewed as
violations of the ABM Treaty by the
Russians. If the Russians believe that we are developing an effective
national missile defense system in violation of the ABM Treaty, then
they are likely to lose confidence in their offensive strategic
arsenal, which has been shrinking thanks to arms control agreements
like START I.
To overcome that lack of confidence, they will seek to develop the
means to counter our missile defense system. The cheapest way to do so
is to overwhelm missile defenses. In order to retain the ability to do
that they will stop implementing START I and refuse to ratify START II.
The progress in arms control which accompanied the signing of the ABM
Treaty over two decades ago will have been thrown by the wayside, and
ironically we will have the kind of arms race in the post-cold-war
world which we were able to avoid in the heyday of the cold war.
Instead of focusing on a threat from ballistic missiles reaching our
shores--a threat which we may never face--we should be concentrating
our efforts on those areas where a realistic threat does exist. That
threat primarily comes in the form of a rogue state or terrorist group
gaining access to widely scattered fissile material in the former
Soviet Union, fashioning a crude nuclear explosive device, and
smuggling it into the United States by conventional means such as a
boat.
Our focus should be on securing the many tons of nuclear material in
the former Soviet Union, and on tracking dangerous terrorist groups who
may be potential customers for that material, not on defending against
the remote possibility of a ballistic missile attack from outlaw states
or groups.
The second primary concern I have with this legislation is that it
calls for wasteful spending. I want to repeat that I stand for a strong
national defense. Unfortunately, the additional $7.1 billion in
spending above the administration's request called for in this
legislation does nothing to improve our national security.
Not one penny of the increase is going into the operations and
maintenance account, also known as the readiness account. The reason
for that is that there is not a readiness problem under the Clinton
defense budgets as some would like us to believe.
Some of the $7.1 billion increase in spending, such as that for
national missile defense, could lead to expenditures of tens of
billions of dollars in future years if plans are fully carried out.
This is an indirect way of forcing enormous increases in future defense
budgets which are not included in current budget plans.
At a time when many valuable programs are being subjected to
unprecedented cuts, I find it difficult to support large increases in
programs in the Defense bill which were not requested by the military
and will do nothing to enhance our national security.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I must oppose the Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the fiscal year
1996 Defense authorization bill, as reported by the Armed Services
Committee. This is an excellent bill, and I want to specifically
commend the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond,
for his able leadership and tireless efforts on behalf of the men and
women of our Armed Forces. I also want to thank Senator Nunn, the
distinguished ranking member, for his hard work and dedication.
Mr. President, when the 104th Congress convened in January, Senator
Thurmond initiated a comprehensive review of our national defense
requirements in view of the administration's future years defense plan.
The review highlighted some serious deficiencies in military readiness,
modernization, quality of life, and investment, and served as a basis
for establishing a list of top priorities for the Armed Services
Committee in this year's defense program. For the benefit of my
colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that this list of priorities be
inserted in the Record.
There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Armed Services Committee Priorities
Guarantee our national security and the status of the
United States as the preeminent military power:
Maintain FY 96 defense budget at FY 95 levels in real
terms.
Determine outyear defense budgets based on national
security requirements.
Reprioritize the President's budgets to ensure appropriate
balance of personnel, near-term readiness and long-term
readiness (modernization).
Ensure a high quality and sufficient end-strength of
personnel at all grade levels through effective recruiting
and retention policies.
Buy the weapons and equipment needed to fight and win
decisively with minimal risk to personnel.
Eliminate defense spending that does not contribute
directly to the national security of the United States.
Ensure an adequate, safe, and reliable nuclear weapons
capability.
Reevaluate peacekeeping roles, policies and operations and
their impact on budgets, readiness and national security.
Protect the quality of life of our military personnel and
their families:
Provide equitable pay and benefits for military personnel
to protect against inflation.
Restore appropriate levels of funding for construction and
maintenance of troop billets and family housing.
Revitalize the readiness of our Armed Forces:
Restore near-term readiness by providing adequate funding
to: reduce the backlog in maintenance and repair of
equipment; provide adequate training; and maintain stocks of
supplies, repair parts, fuels, and ammunition.
Ensure U.S. military superiority by funding a more robust,
progressive modernization program to provide required
capabilities for the future.
Accelerate development and deployment of missile defense
systems:
Deploy as soon as possible advanced land and sea based
theater missile defenses.
Clarify in law that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty does
not apply to modern theater missile defense systems.
Reassess value and validity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty to the national security of the United States.
Accelerate development, testing and deployment of a
national missile defense system highly effective against
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.
Mr. SMITH. The bill before us delivers on each of the priorities that
were developed by Senator Thurmond and members of the committee. In
fact, every element of the list is embodied in direct actions taken by
the committee. We made a commitment, and we delivered on that
commitment.
The committee bill authorizes approximately $264.7 billion in budget
authority for the National Defense Program. Although this represents an
increase of $7 billion from the administration's grossly underfunded
request, it still falls short of fully meeting our military
requirements. The situation in the outyears is considerably worse.
Both the Clinton plan and the recently passed budget resolution fail
to fund defense at a level that even keeps pace with inflation. We are
on track for a major train wreck between defense requirements and
resources. If we are to maintain any semblance of a stable defense
program we will need to maintain the spending outlined in this bill,
and revisit future years funding levels next year.
Mr. President, there are a number of very important initiatives
contained in this bill, which I would like to briefly summarize for my
colleagues. The committee bill:
Provides a 2.4-percent pay raise for military members and a 5.2-
percent increase in basic allowance for quarters.
[[Page S 12671]]
Equalizes dates for military and civil service retiree COLA's for
1996 through 1998.
Authorizes $1.3 billion to purchase the LHD-7 amphibious assault
ship.
Fully funds the F-22 fighter program.
Initiates a long overdue upgrade of our airborne electronic warfare
programs.
Funds critical antisubmarine warfare and countermine programs.
Provides $110 million to purchase the second of three ships under the
Marine Corps Maritime Preposition Ship Enhancement Program.
Provides $35 million to begin retrofitting aging Patriot missiles
with an advanced seeker to defend against modern cruise missiles.
Includes a provision ensuring free and fair competition between
Electric Boat and Newport News for the new attack submarine program.
And perhaps most important, includes the Missile Defense Act of 1995,
a historic and long overdue refocusing of our Ballistic Missile Defense
Program.
Mr. President, the Missile Defense Act establishes a comprehensive
program to counter the threats posed to our Nation by ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles. The program has three key elements that I
want to bring to the attention of my colleagues.
First and foremost, the legislation accelerates the development and
deployment of national missile defenses to protect all Americans
against the threat of ballistic missiles. The Clinton administration
has effectively killed the National Missile Defense Program, leaving
the American people totally vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.
The committee bill rejects the administration's misguided approach,
and establishes a specific program and schedule to deploy a multiple
site, ground based national missile defense by the year 2003.
Second, the committee bill would codify the demarcation proposal that
the Clinton administration offered in Geneva some 18 months ago. It
establishes a demonstrated standard for evaluating compliance with the
ABM Treaty.
The bill specifies that theater missile defense systems would not be
subject to the terms of the ABM Treaty unless they are flight tested
against a ballistic missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers
or a velocity in excess of 5 kilometers per second. This is a
reasonable and appropriate standard that was suggested by the
administration, and we have included it in this bill.
Third, the committee bill establishes a cruise missile defense
initiative to counter the threat posed by existing and emerging air
breathing threats. The intelligence community estimates that at least
12 countries have land-attack cruise missiles under development.
Although the Defense Department has a variety of programs underway to
address these threats, there is poor coordination and synergy among the
Department's programs.
The bill would direct the Secretary of Defense to better coordinate
the Pentagon's cruise and ballistic missile defense programs, prepare a
plan for prompt deployment of these systems, and provide a substantial
increase in funding.
In addition, Mr. President, the bill advocates a cooperative
transition to a post-cold-war regime that is responsive to the global
threat environment. The committee heard testimony from many different
witnesses this year urging the United States to move away from the cold
war doctrine of mutual assured destruction toward a more flexible
deterrent posture that integrates both offensive and defensive weapons.
In particular, Henry Kissinger, who was a key negotiator of the ABM
Treaty and a proponent of mutual assured destruction, indicated to the
committee that this doctrine has been surpassed by events, and is no
longer relevant or constructive in
the post-cold-war world. The committee took this testimony very
seriously, and has recommended that we work with our Russian
counterparts to move cooperatively away from the confrontational policy
of mutual assured destruction toward a more multipolar oriented
deterrent posture.
The committee bill also recommends the establishment of a select
committee to conduct a 1-year review on the continuing value and
validity of the ABM Treaty. The select committee would conduct hearings
and interviews, review all relevant documents, and carefully consider
the full range of policy issues surrounding the treaty.
To support this initiative, the committee bill would require that the
ABM Treaty negotiating record be declassified. This action would be
consistent with the classification policy that was established by
Executive order on April 17 of this year by the Clinton administration.
Mr. President, these initiatives on ballistic missile defense are
responsible, measured, and necessary to protect the national security
of the United States. The American people overwhelmingly support the
deployment of national missile defenses and highly effective theater
missile defenses.
Unfortunately, the Senate now appears poised to completely rewrite
the Missile Defense Act. Although the Senate has voted twice to
preserve key aspects of the legislation, a so-called compromise has
been developed which totally changes the focus and content of the bill.
As one who has dedicated a great deal of time and effort on this issue,
I am deeply disappointed with this sudden change of course. The Armed
Services Committee bill was the right answer to a very complex and
urgent problem, and I am troubled that for nothing more than
convenience sake, it appears this body is prepared to compromise its
principles and our Nation's security. This is a terrible mistake, and I
will not support it.
The truth is, that contrary to the assertions of our friends who
oppose missile defense, nothing in the committee bill, absolutely
nothing, would violate the ABM Treaty. It merely begins preparations
for the eventual deployment of a system to defend all Americans against
the threat of ballistic missiles.
The authors of the treaty expected evolutionary changes and
incorporated provisions that would encourage cooperative modifications
or, if necessary, withdrawal from the treaty after a 6-month notice.
The Armed Services Committee bill does not prejudge the results of
negotiations to amend the treaty, nor does it advocate a unilateral
withdrawal from the treaty. It
merely affirms the moral and constitutional requirement to defend all
Americans, and initiates a comprehensive program to counter threats to
our security.
Mr. President, that is the fundamental issue at stake here. The
American people are totally vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.
They have no defenses. And the Clinton administration intends to keep
it that way. The question for Senators today is whether you believe
that all Americans deserve to be defended, or you support the Clinton
policy which says no Americans should be defended. You can't have it
both ways.
But, sadly, that is what my colleagues are trying to do with this so-
called bipartisan compromise. In an effort to prevent the President
from vetoing the defense bill, they have agreed to water down the
missile defense provisions, to soften the findings, to hedge on
deployment dates, and to completely undermine the principles that were
embodied in the committee bill.
Mr. President, I appreciate the efforts of my colleagues to try and
find common ground, and to seek compromise in order to build consensus.
But national security is not something to be compromised, and I refuse
to associate myself with a policy which perpetuates the vulnerability
of our citizens. I will oppose the so-called bipartisan compromise on
missile defense, and any other amendment which undermines the excellent
work of the Armed Services Committee.
I yield the floor.
Acquisition and Technology
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, as chairman of the Acquisition and
Technology Subcommittee, I have been charged with overseeing of the
technology base programs in the defense budget request for fiscal year
1996. The technology base budget includes funding for the basic
research, exploratory development, and advanced development accounts,
the so-called 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 accounts of the budget.
In addition the subcommittee also has responsibility for the so-
called RDT&E infrastructure accounts. These
[[Page S 12672]]
accounts fund the maintenance of laboratories, R&D centers, and test
and evaluation facilities. The portion of the accounts allocated to the
Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee in fiscal year 1996 budget
request amounted to a total of $9.5 billion.
As the incoming subcommittee chairman, I faced a number of
challenges. The budget request for fiscal year 1996 was already reduced
from the amounts appropriated for these accounts in fiscal year 1995.
Unlike other portions of the budget, the technology base programs are
spread out among 250 separate program elements complicating a
systematic review of the programs. Finally, it was clear that we needed
to undertake a thorough review of each of these programs in order to
ensure that defense relevance be the most important test for their
continued funding. I was determined to understand the details of the
programs under my purview.
To aid in its review of these programs, the subcommittee conducted
six hearings on program categories as well as on relevant policy areas.
We began with an overview hearing on the technology programs in the
Subcommittee's jurisdiction on March 14. This hearing yielded important
insights into the relationship of the programs under the purview of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and those managed by the services.
Over the past several years, there has been a distinct trend in
technology funding shifting from service programs to programs managed
by OSD. This trend may have serious consequences if we are robbing
Peter to pay Paul and are thereby reducing service influence on the
investment of our defense technology dollars.
The importance of technology to the military in the face of the
emerging revolution in military affairs was one of the subjects
discussed at length during a subcommittee hearing on May 5. At that
hearing, Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Mr. Andrew Marshall of the DOD Office of Net Assessment presented a
preliminary sketch of the future battlefield and the key role that
technology, especially information technology, will play in bringing
victory or defeat.
The hearing underscored the need to maintain sufficient levels of
defense technology investment to ensure that we are able to exploit the
potential of future battlefield. Technology issues are only one aspect
of the revolution in military affairs, and I am hopeful that the full
committee will hold at least one hearing over the next year to examine
the implication of this revolution for areas like organization and
training that extend beyond the scope of any one subcommittee.
The technology reinvestment project has become one of the more
controversial programs under the subcommittee's jurisdiction. On May
17, the subcommittee held a hearing to review this program and other
so-called dual-use technology programs in the Department of Defense
budget request. As a percentage of the budget, these programs have been
growing since 1990. The dual-use designation refers to the fact that
such programs involve technologies that have application in both the
commercial as well as the defense sectors of the economy. Dual-use
technologies will be used to an increasing extent in weapon systems as
the electronics content of such systems continues to rise.
In the electronics industries, for example, the commercial
marketplace, not defense requirements, is driving the pace of
technology development. Because the Department of Defense represents a
shrinking share of the electronics market, DOD leverage over the market
is decreasing.
For that reason, the paradigm for future interaction between the
Department of Defense and the electronics industries is a dual-use
partnership approach in which both DOD and the industry provide funding
for the development of technology. Such partnerships can help to make
our acquisition process more efficient as we inject commercial
technologies into defense weapons systems.
I want to make clear, however, that there are dangers in placing too
much emphasis on this approach. If programs are not managed carefully,
we may end up doing dual-use for dual-use sake with only a limited
emphasis on military utility. Military utility must be the driving
factor, and a time of limited funding, we have to ensure that we are
not raiding critical technology base programs under the guise of dual-
use development. We also need to ensure that Congress maintains the
proper level of visibility and oversight in dual-use programs.
At the May 17 hearing on dual-use programs, we explored these issues
in depth with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, Paul Kaminski, and representatives of the defense industry
and the General Accounting Office. What emerged from the testimony was
the potential payoff of some existing dual-use programs, such as those
underway in the technology reinvestment project, but also the need for
improvements in management and oversight of these programs.
An area that is directly related to our investments in technology is
the issue of export control. Unless we have in place an effective
process for reviewing licenses for the export of sensitive
technologies, especially those that are dual-use in nature, we will end
up having to spend scarce R&D dollars to counter technologies that we
already have paid to develop. I am particularly concerned about the
licensing for export of technologies for satellites and satellite-
related services.
On May 31, I chaired a hearing reviewing current export license
review procedures and the relationship among the Departments of
Defense, State, and Commerce in this process. The hearing uncovered
some significant problems of coordination and cooperation among the
agencies that have directly undermined our national security. I intend
to continue pursuing these issues in further hearings.
Mr. President, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an
ever growing threat to our national security. Because of this increased
threat, I have made counterproliferation programs and policies a major
area of new emphasis for the Subcommittee on Acquisition and
Technology. On April 14, the subcommittee held a hearing to review the
funding request for fiscal year 1996 for counterproliferation programs.
The hearing revealed that additional funding would be necessary to
accelerate development and deployment of military counterproliferation
technologies. The bill before us addresses many significant
deficiencies in our counterproliferation program.
Upon completion of the hearing process in May, I began a
comprehensive analysis of the funding requests for the 250 program
elements in the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee. As I announced
at the first hearing in March, my litmus test for funding a program was
simple: if there is a defense investment, there must be a defense
return. We put everything on the table. I carried out this review
independent of political bias, and without any prejudice toward systems
or technologies.
Because high priority requirements in readiness, modernization, and
quality of life were severely underfunded in the President's defense
budget request, Chairman Thurmond directed me to reduce accounts under
the jurisdiction of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee in
areas of nondefense initiatives or lower priority activities. I agreed
with that direction and accepted the guidance to reduce the programs
$330 million below the President's request.
However, in the midst of our review, the subcommittee received
requests from Senators for additions to the bill totaling nearly $620
million. As we clearly could not accommodate even a majority of these
requests, I attempted to apply the same litmus test to these requests
as I applied to the programs in the administration request: direct
defense relevance.
In preparing the subcommittee recommendation on the President's
request, we endeavored to protect the core, defense relevant technology
programs above everything else. We gave programs with defined
technology development a higher priority than those that lacked it. The
largest source of reductions was the technology reinvestment project,
which we cut by $262 million. This funding would all have supported a
new competition in fiscal year 1996 for which technology thrust areas
have yet to even be defined.
Mr. President, as the committee report on page 111 indicates, despite
our
[[Page S 12673]]
continued support of dual-use technology development programs, a new
competition for unspecified technologies in 1996 must have a lower
priority from a defense standpoint than funding well-defined technology
programs in the budget request for the services. We changed the name of
the program to the Defense Dual-use Technology Initiative and have also
changed the statutory basis for the program to clarify the need for
close connection between research and a military mission requirement.
Another source of funding reductions was an undistributed cut of $90
million to the work conducted through the federally funded research and
development centers known as FFRDC's. The FFRDC issue has been a
controversial one in recent years due to the perception of some that
these institutions lack effective management oversight from the Defense
Department. While the subcommittee is satisfied with the efforts of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to review the future role of
the FFRDC's, our reduction was made in a manner consistent with overal
reductions in R&D, and in anticipation of some redistribution of
workload betwen the FFRDC's and the private sector.
Another source of significant reductions was in the accounts
supporting the research, development test, and evaluation
infrastructure. One of the most disturbing trends in the technology
budget is the greater and greater portion of R&D funding that is going,
not to programs, but to maintaining facilities and test ranges. The
base closure and realignment process has not dealt effectively with the
need to consolidate laboratories, research centers and test facilities
across the services.
As a result, at a time when the R&D portion of the budget request has
declined by over 10 percent from last year, the RDT&E support programs
have declined overall less than 4 percent. In recognition of this
trend, we reduced the infrastructure programs by $85 million. It is my
hope that we can develop an effective process for consolidating
facilities so that we can devote a greater share of our scarce
resources to programs rather than maintenance. I intend to continue to
pursue this issue vigorously next year.
In the midst of these reductions, I am pleased to say that we were
able to fund some critical gaps in the budget. We added $36 million to
create a counterproliferation support program to accelerate the
development and deployment of technologies for military
counterproliferation. Our report details the new initiatives in such
areas as biological agent detection, cruise missile defense, and
proliferation of space technology. We also shifted $24 million into
Army technology base accounts to correct some of the most serious
shortfalls in the Army's underfunded technology budget.
I want to thank members of the staff for all their work in helping
out the members of the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology.
Monica Chavez, Jon Etherton, Tom Moore, Tom Lankford, and Pamela
Farrell provided essential support for our review. On the minority
side, Ed McGaffigan, John Douglass, and Andy Effron were extremely
cooperative with our staff and members in working through these issues.
I especially want to express my appreciation for the support and
counsel I received from the ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator
Jeff Bingaman. I was privileged to serve as the ranking member under
his chairmanship of the subcommittee during the last Congress where
Senator Bingaman conducted the process with fairness, openness, and
always in a spirit of bipartisanship. I know there were recommendations
in this bill that trouble the Senator from New Mexico, but he has
remained supportive and helpful throughout our process.
In summary, Mr. President, I believe that the acquisition and
technology portion of the defense authorization bill maintains a strong
technology base program. The core, defense-relevant programs are funded
at or above the requested amounts, and the bill lays a solid foundation
on which we can build future technology investments for national
defense.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I voted against final passage of S. 1087,
the Department of Defense appropriations bill and S. 1026, the Defense
authorization bill. I did not cast these votes lightly. In fact, this
is the first time in my Senate career that I have voted against a
defense spending measure. I supported the authorization bill in
committee in the interest of bringing the bill before the full Senate
with the hope that the bill's more problematic provisions could be
eliminated by amendment.
A number of factors contributed to my decision to vote against final
passage.
I have always supported a strong defense for our Nation. I have
supported increases in defense spending beyond what has been requested
by Presidents when I believed those programs were the interest of our
national security. But, these spending measures add as much as $7
billion in funding for programs that I do not support and do not
believe represent a responsible means of spending limited taxpayer
funds. I could have supported additional funding for some of these
individual programs, but not the total funding package, particularly at
a time when we are trying to balance the Federal budget and are
considering substantial cuts in domestic funding to accomplish that.
The bulk of the additional funds are spent for procurement programs
for which the Pentagon made no request: close to $600 million was added
for F/A-18's, $361 million for F-15's, $175 million for F-16's, $1.4
billion for DDG-51, $1.3 billion for LHD-7, and close to $800 million
for Guard and Reserve equipment.
In addition, the two bills add $600 million above the President's
budget request for ballistic missile defense, $300 million of which is
for national missile defense, bringing total funding for ballistic
missile defense to $3 billion. This level of funding exceeds our
national requirements and undermines our commitment to the ABM Treaty,
an agreement critical to our national security needs.
With respect to the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon production
complex, several significant improvements were made in the bill since
it was reported out of committee. However, the bill still contains over
$120 million in unrequested, unneccessary funds for plutonium pit
manufacturing and refabrication capability. The bill also includes $50
million for low yield, hydronuclear testing purposes, which I oppose.
At the same time that these two bills add billions for programs the
Pentagon claims it does not need, they leave unfunded the estimated
$1.2 billion in costs for our current operations in Bosnia and Iraq,
funds which the Pentagon undisputedly needs. So, while these bills
purport to add funds in the name of long term readiness, they create an
immediate threat to our readiness by forcing the Pentagon to siphon off
more than a billion dollars in operations and maintenance funding to
finance current operations.
In addition to the funding issues, I am very disturbed by the
provision in the authorization bill related to the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. I will address my specific concerns in this area in a
separate statement.
huge pentagon spending increases reflect distorted priorities
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this week I am voting against both of
the major Department of Defense spending bills for next year. I am
doing so for a number of reasons, including the fact that these bills
provide about $7 billion more in defense spending than the President,
the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have requested for next year. That's right. Congress this year will
approve spending for about $7 billion more than the Pentagon has
requested, or than they have indicated they will be able to responsibly
use, next year.
Coincidentally, perhaps, this is just about the same amount--in Pell
grants for students, in Head Start, in substance abuse prevention, in
employment and training, in worker protections, and many other key
domestic areas--that was recently slashed by the House appropriators
for next year.
Since my perspective, these are seriously skewed priorities. And
since polls continue to show substantial support for bringing down the
post-cold-war defense budget, I do not believe they are
[[Page S 12674]]
the priorities of the vast majority of Americans. Even worse, the two
bills increase the President's request for star wars spending by
hundreds of millions--in one case, about $770 million--which will spell
serious trouble for future arms control negotiations.
Following an unsuccessful bipartisan effort before the recess in
which I joined Senator Kohl, Grassley, and others to amend the bill to
eliminate the overall increase above the President's request, I tried
to split the difference, offering another amendment to reduce the
increase by only about 50 percent. It too was defeated, as were all
other efforts to modestly scale back overall funding in the bill to
more responsible levels.
I also tried, through numerous other amendments offered with my
colleagues, to scale back or eliminate spending on a number of
unnecessary or obsolete weapons systems. Most of those efforts were
unsuccessful. Given tight funding constraints, continued overspending
on defense is unwise, it is irresponsible, and it is a policy which
does not serve our real national security interests. If we fail to
invest in our children in order to bolster post-cold-war defense
budgets, because we were too afraid to thoroughly rethink our real
national security needs, and retool our defense budget accordingly, we
will regret it for at least a generation.
I believe that a time when we are slashing budgets for hundreds of
social programs that protect the vulnerable, preserve our lakes and
streams, and provide for expanded opportunities for the elderly and the
broad middle class, such as student loans, Medicare, and job
retraining, it is wrong to increase, substantially, already bloated
military spending.
In defense, as elsewhere in the Federal budget, there are responsible
ways to eliminate wasteful and unnecessary spending; by cutting
obsolete cold war weapons systems, imposing money-saving reforms within
the bureaucracy, and streamlining procurement policy to make the system
more efficient and more cost effective. I have proposed a number of
ways to do this in recent months, including scaling back bloated
Pentagon travel budgets, which the General Accounting Office has found
could provide substantial savings--hundreds of millions of dollars per
year. Over and over, these attempts have either been voted down here on
the Senate floor, or the bills to accomplish these ends have been
bottled up in committee.
In the end, there is almost no Pentagon streamlining, no elimination
of waste, provided for in this bill. Instead, when faced with difficult
choices between competing weapons systems, basic housing improvements
for our troops, and other readiness requirements, the committee decided
simply to buy all of the big weapons systems, ships, and planes that
they could, larding the bill with special interest funds for defense
contractors in Armed Services or Appropriations Committee Members' home
States, often accelerating purchases not scheduled to be made for many
years, if at all. In fact, the purchase of many of these extravagantly
expensive weapons systems is actively opposed by the Pentagon, because
they have identified higher national security priorities for the
funding that is available.
I also have serious concerns about the potentially catastrophic arms
control consequences of this bill. For example, I voted against even
the so-called compromise on the national missile defense or star wars
system because I believe that, even though it was better than the
original bill, the approach urged by the compromise amendment would
seriously undermine the 1972 ABM Treaty, and is likely to jeopardize
the nuclear weapons reductions in the START I and II treaties.
While some have argued, I think in good faith, that this compromise
meets basic arms control and nonproliferation requirements, I disagree.
As a practical matter, there is no question in my mind that enactment
of this bill would lead us toward near-term deployment of a national
missile defense system. It is the latest version of the earlier star
wars system that was roundly rejected by most knowledgeable scientists,
and national security experts, as a waste of money and a fraud.
Senator Warner has been very clear that he believes this compromise
will move us along toward rapid deployment of such a system. Since,
regrettably, I agree with Senator Warner that that is so, while I
commend Senator Levin and others on our side for their efforts to
develop the compromise, I could not support
the final agreement. I believe that spending scores of billions of
additional dollars to deploy an elaborate national missile defense
system that's not likely to work effectively, and thus violating the
ABM Treaty, to defend against a far-fetched scenario in which a
ballistic missile is fired on the United States from a rogue terrorist
state, is irresponsible. The more likely means that terrorists might
use to deliver such a bomb--in a suitcase placed in some public place,
or in a Ryder truck, or in a van parked underneath a building--is a far
more serious threat. And that is a threat we can combat for a lot less
than $50 to $100 billion.
I also believe that the additional funding provided by the bill for
hydronuclear testing in Nevada will likely have a profoundly negative
impact on the test ban negotiations now underway in Geneva. The French
nuclear test detonated in the South Pacific yesterday underscores the
urgency of bringing to a successful close negotiations on a truly
comprehensive test ban that is enforceable, and that constrains its
signatories from further tests.
There are a host of other serious problems with this bill, Mr.
President, some of which we have tried to address during the debate
through various amendments. Virtually none of them have been resolved.
I believe that this bill in its current form spends vastly more on
defense than we can afford, would threaten longstanding arms control
agreements and nonproliferation efforts, and would not be in our
national security interests. I hope the President will follow through
on his threatened vetoes of these bills. I urge my colleagues to vote
against these huge and unwarranted increases in defense spending, as I
will. I yield the floor.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to final passage of S.
1026, the DOD authorization bill. And as was the case with the 1996
Defense appropriations bill, I do so with a heavy heart.
I would inform my colleagues that today marks the first time in my 15
years of Senate service that I will vote against final passage of a
Defense authorization bill. This is a not so much a vote of
disagreement, but a vote of conscience.
The 1996 Defense authorization bill contains spending instructions of
almost $7 billion above the Pentagon's initial request. Let me clarify
that point, neither the President nor the respective service chiefs
have asked for these funds. The programs earmarked for these increases
were never part of the Pentagon's original budget request. That fact
weighs heavily in my decision today.
I think most of my colleagues know that I have consistently supported
prudent and necessary spending for our national defense. On more than
one occasion in my career, I have listened carefully to the words of
various Secretaries of Defense when the Pentagon badly needed support
for future weapons programs. And on each of those occasions, I
supported those requests without regard for party affiliation or
personal politics. I did so because it was in the best interest of our
country.
However, this is a very different situation. This Defense
authorization bill contains almost $7 billion in additional funding for
Defense programs not contained in the original Pentagon request--$7
billion is simply too much to add to a bill while entire agencies are
eliminating programs that are crucial to working families across this
Nation.
As I stated earlier, Head Start, Goals 2000, and other critical
investment programs for our Nation's youth are near extinction, while
this bill authorizes increased Defense spending. I cannot rationalize
that inequity.
As a member of the Senate Budget Committee, I opposed the increases
in the Department of Defense spending allocations. Likewise, on three
separate occasions during floor debate, I voted to keep defense
spending at the original levels requested by the administration. I did
so because it was right, and because to do otherwise would be an
endorsement of the cuts in other vital domestic programs.
[[Page S 12675]]
Let me conclude by saying I respect the members of the committee for
their diligent and hard work in bringing this important bill to the
floor. But this is an issue of priorities. And I vehemently disagree
with those priorities as presented in this bill.
I urge my colleagues to reject this bill.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify the
previously adopted Nunn amendment No. 2078 by striking out subsection
(d) thereof. This has been cleared on both sides.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for third reading of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further amendment to be
proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the
bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I urge passage of the bill and ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold.
Under the previous order, H.R. 1530 is discharged from the committee,
and the clerk will report the bill.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (H.R. 1530) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1996 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal
year 1996, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All after the enacting clause of the bill is
stricken, and the text of S. 1026 is inserted in lieu thereof, and the
House bill is considered read the third time.
The Senator may now request the yeas and nays.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on passage of H.R. 1530, as
amended.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski] is
necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka] is
absent because of attending a funeral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 64, nays 34, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 399 Leg.]
YEAS--64
Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Faircloth
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kerrey
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McConnell
Mikulski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Reid
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--34
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Bumpers
Byrd
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Glenn
Harkin
Hatfield
Jeffords
Johnston
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
McCain
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Pell
Pryor
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Wellstone
NOT VOTING--2
Akaka
Murkowski
So the bill (H.R. 1530), as amended, was passed, as follows:
[The text of H.R. 1530 will appear in a future edition of the
Record.]
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which
the bill was passed.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 1530,
as amended, be printed as passed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed immediately to the consideration en bloc of the following
bills:
S. 1124 through S. 1126, Calendar Order Nos. 167, 168, 169; that all
after the enacting clause of those bills be stricken and that the
appropriate portion of H.R. 1530, as amended, be inserted in lieu
thereof, according to the schedule as follows, which I have sent to the
desk; that these bills be advanced to third reading and passed; that
the motion to reconsider en bloc be laid upon the table; and that the
above actions occur without intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
So the bill (S. 1124) was deemed read the third time and passed.
(The text of S. 1124 will appear in a future edition of the Record.)
So, the bill (S. 1125) was deemed read the third time and passed.
(The text of S. 1125 will appear in a future edition of the Record.)
So, the bill (S. 1126) was deemed read the third time and passed.
(The text of S. 1126 will appear in a future edition of the Record.)
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, with respect to H.R. 1530, previously
passed by the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on
its amendment to the bill and request a conference with the House on
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses and the Chair be authorized to
appoint conferees; that the motion to reconsider the above-mentioned
votes be laid upon the table; and that the foregoing occur without
intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent with respect to
S. 1124 through S. 1126, as just passed by the Senate, that if the
Senate receives a message with regard to any one of these bills from
the House of Representatives, that the Senate disagree with the House
on its amendment or amendments to the Senate-passed bill and agree to a
conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
and the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees and the foregoing
occur without any intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Under the
previous order, S. 1026 is indefinitely postponed.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have completed many long hours of
debate on S. 1062, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 1996.
I would like to thank the distinguished ranking member of the
committee, Senator Nunn, for his insight, wisdom, and devotion to our
Nation. He and I have always worked to achieve the same objective of
providing our Armed Forces with the direction and resources necessary
to carry out their difficult responsibilities.
Mr. President, I want to extend my deep appreciation to the
distinguished majority leader, Senator Dole, who has been most helpful
in every way in bringing this bill to passage. He is a great leader of
whom the Senate can be proud.
I would also like to thank all the Senators from both sides of the
committee and the entire committee staff, and I commend them for their
dedication and support. In particular, I would like to thank personally
my staff director, Gen. Dick Reynard, for his fine work, and Gen.
Arnold Punaro, the staff director for the minority. I ask unanimous
consent that a list of the committee staff be printed in the Record
following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit No. 1.)
Mr. THURMOND. We have achieved a number of important successes in
this bill, and I commend my colleagues for their good judgment. Among
these are:
Adding $7 billion to the administration's budget request to
revitalize the procurement, and research and development accounts which
are the core of future readiness;
[[Page S 12676]]
Passing the Missile Defense Act which initiates a policy to deploy a
national missile defense system, and prohibits inaccurate
interpretation of the ABM Treaty which would serve to limit theater
missile defense systems;
Correcting the erosion in nuclear weapons capabilities by reasserting
that the primary responsibility of the Department of Energy is to
strengthen the strategic stockpile;
Directing improvements and modifications in nuclear weapons
production facilities and supporting important initiatives at the
nuclear weapons laboratories;
Adequately funding current readiness while reducing funding for
nondefense programs;
Significantly improving quality of life programs for our troops and
their families, including funds for housing, facilities, and real
property maintenance;
Approving a 2.4-percent pay raise for military members and a 5.2-
percent increase in basic allowance for quarters, and achieving COLA
equity for retirees;
Providing funding for DOD and DOE environmental programs;
Establishing a dental insurance program for the selected reserves and
an income protection insurance program for self-employed reservists who
are mobilized;
Providing funding for essential equipment for the Active, Guard, and
Reserve components.
Once again I thank Senator Nunn, Senator Dole, the members of the
committee, and the staff. I thank the Chair, and yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
MINORITY
Dick Combs, Chris Cowart, Rick DeBobes, John Douglass, Andy
Effron, Jan Gordon, Creighton Greene, P.T. Henry, Bill Hoehn,
Jennifer Lambert, Mike McCord, Frank Norton, Arnold Punaro,
Julie Rief
MAJORITY
Charlie Abell, Alec Bierbauer, Les Brownlee, Dick Caswell,
Monica Chavez, Chris Cimko, Greg D'Alessio, Don Deline, Marie
Dickinson, Jon Etherton, Pamela Farrell, Melinda Koutsoumpas,
Larry Lanzillotta, George Lauffer, Shelley Lauffer, Steve
Madey, John Miller, Ann Mittermeyer, Joe Pallone, Cindy
Pearson, Connie Rader, Sharen Reaves, Dick Reynard, Jason
Rossbach, Steve Saulnier, Cord Sterling, David Stone, Eric
Thoemmes, Roslyne Turner, Deasy Wagner, Jennifer Wallace
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from South Carolina for
his summation of this bill. As he said, there are many important
features in this bill. I supported the bill in the final form that it
passed. I think there have been dramatic improvements made on the
floor.
The Corps SAM Program has been restored, which is an important part
of our overall theater missile defense capability. The national missile
defense language has been, I think, made much more acceptable and
compatible with America's security interests. That has been done on an
amendment we passed this morning. An important program on the junior
ROTC that had been cut has now been restored. The civil-military
language has been modified and, in my opinion, strengthened, and some
of the problems there have been corrected. The humanitarian and
disaster assistance, which had been cut, has been partially restored,
which is important. And there have been very significant changes made
on the floor in the Department of Energy section.
We need to ensure that the conference maintains the Senate approach
in these areas. We also have other challenges in the conference. I
think too much has been cut out of defense research, even in our bill.
The TRP Program has been cut in ways that I think need to be reexamined
in conference, in close consultation with Secretary of Defense Perry,
who probably knows more about this program than any person in America
and has spent an enormous amount of his Secretary of Defense time and
energy in making sure that this program is successfully implemented.
Also, I think there is too much micromanagement of the ballistic
missile defense accounts in our bill and in the House bill, and that
needs to be addressed in conference.
We have some serious challenges on the House bill that are going to
be difficult to work out when we get to conference, including language
on abortion, including language on HIV, including command and control
of U.S. forces participating in multilateral organizations, including
peacekeeping and contingency operations, as well as some of their
language--and perhaps, from their point of view, some of our language--
on missile defense and other programs.
My final assessment is that we have a bill here that has been
improved on the floor, that we have an opportunity to work on and make
further improvements on in conference, working in good faith with the
House. We have a lot of high hurdles to clear if we are going to have
this bill become law this year, based not on what I have been told
formally but on what I have heard informally from the White House and
from the Department of Defense. But I have seen a lot of high hurdles
in the past and I have seen those high hurdles overcome by people
working in good faith for the national security interests of our
country. So it is my hope that, with a cooperative spirit and a
constructive approach, we will be able to work with our House conferees
and with the administration to see that the Defense authorization bill
becomes law this year. That remains a serious challenge, but I think it
is one that we must all strive to meet.
I thank the Senator from South Carolina and all of his staff and all
of the staff on the Democratic side and all the members of the
committee for a very, I think, commendable effort. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate the
managers. This is a major piece of legislation that is always very
difficult to bring to a conclusion. But it has been done because of the
leadership of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Senator
Thurmond, and the cooperation of the distinguished Senator from
Georgia, Senator Nunn. They have worked together to bring it together,
as have other Senators, particularly Senators Warner and Cohen on this
side, who have just resolved a very important issue by a vote of 85 to
13. In my view, that compromise should have been passed by that
lopsided margin. There is still a conference. They can still make other
changes.
But I congratulate all the members of the committee and members of
their staffs for what I think is an excellent bill. We just heard the
Senator from Georgia address some of the concerns that were resolved.
The Senator from South Carolina addressed some of the concerns earlier.
Now it goes to conference. I think, again, it indicates we are making
progress in the Senate. Plus the appropriations bill will be ready for
passage as soon as the House acts on it. So as far as the defense area
is concerned, I think we are in good shape on the Senate side.
____________________