[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 137 (Wednesday, September 6, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12649-S12676]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 1026, which the clerk will 
report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1996 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

       Pending: Nunn amendment No. 2425, to establish a missile 
     defense policy.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I believe we will take up some 
uncontested matters at this time.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I wonder if it would not be appropriate at 
this time to ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment, which 
is the missile defense amendment sponsored by myself and Senators 
Warner, Levin, and Cohen.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe that we are now prepared to clear 
some more amendments. The first amendment is the Warner amendment, as I 
understand it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct.


                           Amendment No. 2461

(Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate on negotiations between the 
 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy and the Governor of the 
State of Idaho regarding the shipment of spent nuclear fuel from naval 
                               reactors)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the pending 
amendment is set aside, and the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr. 
     Exon, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Craig, Mr. Cohen, Ms. 
     Snowe, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Gregg proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2461.


[[Page S 12650]]

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 570, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

     SEC. 3168. SENSE OF SENATE ON NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING 
                   SHIPMENTS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM NAVAL 
                   REACTORS.

       (a) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and 
     the Governor of the State of Idaho should continue good faith 
     negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the 
     issue of shipments of spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors.
       (b) Report.--(1) Not later than September 15, 1995, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security 
     of the House of Representatives a written report on the 
     status or outcome of the negotiations urged under subsection 
     (a).
       (2) The report shall include the following matters:
       (A) If an agreement is reached, the terms of the agreement, 
     including the dates on which shipments of spent nuclear fuel 
     from naval reactors will resume.
       (B) If an agreement is not reached--
       (i) the Secretary's evaluation of the issues remaining to 
     be resolved before an agreement can be reached;
       (ii) the likelihood that an agreement will be reached 
     before October 1, 1995; and
       (iii) the steps that must be taken regarding the shipment 
     of spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors to ensure that the 
     Navy can meet the national security requirements of the 
     United States.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment, by myself, is cosponsored 
by Senators Exon, Kempthorne, Thurmond, Craig, Cohen, Snowe, Smith, and 
Gregg. It expresses a sense of the Senate that the Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretary of Energy and the Governor of Idaho should continue 
good-faith negotiations to reach an agreement on shipments of nuclear 
fuel from naval reactors and requires a written report on the status or 
outcome of the negotiations.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to 
require all parties to continue good-faith negotiations to reach an 
agreement to permit the resumption of shipments of spent nuclear fuel 
from naval reactors to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. I 
have joined with several other Senators to reach an agreement which we 
hope will encourage the parties on both sides who are negotiating this 
issue to resolve it as soon as possible, because of the serious 
implications to our national security.
  In order to support the national security requirements of the United 
States, the Navy must be able to refuel and defuel nuclear powered 
warships. Because of an ongoing dispute between Idaho and the 
Department of Energy, shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory have been halted. This situation has 
rapidly reached a crisis level and must be resolved expeditiously. My 
amendment urges all parties to negotiate, in good faith, an agreement 
that would protect this vital component of our national security. The 
amendment also retains, if necessary, the option for Congress to take 
further actions in joint conference if warranted.
  Mr. President, this is a very serious matter. Briefly, the background 
is that the State of Idaho has been receiving shipments for 38 years 
from the U.S. Navy of its spent fuel.
  Without getting into the problem area, there are negotiations ongoing 
between the Governor of Idaho, such other officials within his 
administration, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the 
Navy. But I feel strongly obligated this morning to inform the Senate 
of the seriousness of these negotiations, and our sincere hope is that 
the matter may be resolved prior to the conference of the Armed 
Services Committees of the House and the Senate, because absent a 
resolution of this dispute between the three parties I just named, I 
feel it is incumbent upon the Congress of the United States to address 
the legislative solution.
  Why? Because, for example, the preparations for refueling the U.S.S. 
Nimitz are now 3 months delayed and increasing. The Navy has fewer than 
the needed aircraft carriers today to meet its operational 
requirements, and I know from some personal experience nothing is more 
severe to the United States Navy than prolonged deployments of ships 
beyond their schedules away from home. It impacts most severely on 
readiness. It impacts also on the family situations of our Naval 
personnel and the like.
  Likewise, the Navy is tying up commissioned ships; that is, ships 
still in commission, and requiring full manning on these ships since 
they cannot be defueled. Six ships will be tied up: Gato, Whale, 
Puffer, Bergall, Flying Fish at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and 
Bainbridge at Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
  This also impacts the yard work. The representations from the Navy 
this morning indicate that up to 2,000 shipyard workers in the States 
of Washington, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Hawaii are subject to 
layoffs unless this matter is resolved in the very immediate future.
  I thank all my colleagues for their support, especially the Senator 
from Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, for his diligent efforts in reaching 
this agreement.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator Thurmond, 
Senator Warner, Senator Craig, and Senator Exon in cosponsoring the 
pending amendment. The pending language strikes the appropriate balance 
between the legitimate national security requirements of the Navy and 
the State of Idaho's sovereign right to protect its interests.
  The amendment is a recognition that good-faith negotiations are 
currently underway and it is my hope that these talks will lead to an 
agreement that protects the interests of all the parties. I want to 
offer special praise to Governor Batt for his effort to establish 
reasonable criteria for an agreement to settle this very important 
issue.
  Mr. President, the people of Idaho have a long, successful 
relationship with the Navy. The Navy has been a good neighbor in 
southeastern Idaho for over four decades and I want to see that 
relationship continue.
  At the same time, the House and Senate at last seem to be moving 
forward with a serious plan to deal with the national problem of 
disposing of spent nuclear fuel. This is a very positive step for Idaho 
and the Nation and I want to urge my colleagues to keep working toward 
this solution.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am pleased to add my support to this 
amendment which requires all parties to negotiate in good faith 
immediately with officials of the State of Idaho in order to resolve 
the current dispute which has resulted in halting shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel from the Navy.
  I want to commend Senator Warner, Senator Kempthorne, and others for 
their diligent efforts in reaching this agreement. It is critical that 
the Navy be allowed to resume shipments of spent nuclear fuel 
immediately in order to enable the Navy to continue to defuel and 
refuel its ships. I hope that those involved in the negotiations on 
both sides of the issue will work in a spirit of cooperation which 
provides for a timely settlement because of the serious national 
security implications.
  I support this amendment, recognizing that it provides for further 
legislation in joint conference should it be necessary. I am confident, 
however, that negotiating officials, recognizing the importance of 
reaching an agreement as soon as possible will resolve this issue in 
the near future.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I rise in support and as a sponsor of the 
amendment. It is absolutely crucial that the situation that has arisen 
over the fueling and defueling of fuels from the nuclear Navy be 
resolved.
  This amendment, putting this body on record as supporting good faith 
negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of Idaho 
for the purpose of pursuing an agreement on the issue of naval spent 
nuclear fuels, is a step in the right direction.
  Idaho has always recognized the importance of a strong nuclear Navy 
defense deterrent. Idaho takes a back seat to no one when it comes to 
supporting the defense of this Nation.
  At the same time, however, Idaho will not become a de facto spent 
nuclear waste repository. The facilities at the Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory were never designed nor intended to be a 
permanent nuclear waste disposal facility. I will not stand for that to 
happen and will always fight to assure Idaho does not become a nuclear 
waste dump for the Navy and the Department of Energy.

[[Page S 12651]]

  This Nation must stand up and commit itself to addressing the final 
disposal of commercial, military, and DOE nuclear fuels. This amendment 
will go a long way to assure we reach the goal of a functioning Navy 
and Idaho does not become a permanent nuclear waste repository.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I support the amendment. I think the Senator 
from Virginia has outlined it correctly in terms of the urgency of 
trying to find some solution to this. I commend him for sponsoring this 
amendment. I agree with him. At some point, we will have to legislate 
on this subject unless the parties can agree.
  Mr. President, I believe we have a pending amendment, which is the 
Nunn-Warner-Levin-Cohen amendment. I ask unanimous consent that be 
temporarily laid aside so that we can handle these three or four 
amendments that have been worked out, at which time the pending 
amendment would then be the pending action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from 
Virginia.
  The amendment (No. 2461) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2462

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Levin, I offer an 
amendment which would authorize the Army to use leasing agreements to 
modernize its commercial utility cargo vehicle fleet. This fleet is 
past the point of economically useful life and has become a significant 
training and operational maintenance fund. This program, using 
commercial practices to require essential commercial services, is in 
keeping with the spirit of acquisition reform.
  I believe the amendment has been cleared on the other side.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. It has been 
cleared.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Levin, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2462.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate point in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.  . ENCOURAGEMENT OF USE OF LEASING AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 137 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 2316 the 
     following new section:

     ``SEC. 2317. EQUIPMENT LEASING.

       ``The Secretary of Defense is authorized to use leasing in 
     the acquisition of commercial vehicles when such leasing is 
     practicable and efficient.''
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``2317. Equipment Leasing.''

       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit a report to the congressional defense committees 
     setting forth changes in legislation that would be 
     required to facilitate the use of leases by the Department 
     of Defense in the acquisition of equipment.
       (c) Pilot Program.--The Secretary of the Army may conduct a 
     pilot program for leasing of commercial utility cargo 
     vehicles as follows:
       (1) Existing commercial utility cargo vehicles may be 
     traded-in for credit against new replacement commercial 
     utility cargo vehicle lease costs;
       (2) Quantities of commercial utility cargo vehicles to be 
     traded in and their value to be credited shall be subject to 
     negotiation between the parties;
       (3) New commercial utility cargo vehicle lease agreements 
     may be excuted with or without options to purchase at the end 
     of each lease period;
       (4) New commercial utility cargo vehicle lease periods may 
     not exceed five years;
       (5) Such leasing pilot program shall consist of replacing 
     no more than forty percent of the validated requirement for 
     commercial utility cargo vehicles but may include an option 
     or options for the remaining validated requirement which may 
     be excuted subject to the requirements of subsection (c)(8);
       (6) The Army shall enter into such pilot program only
        if the Secretary:
       (A) awards such program in accordance with the provisions 
     of section 2304 of title 10 United States Code.
       (B) has notified the congressional defense committees of 
     his plans to execute the pilot program;
       (C) has provided a report detailing the expected savings in 
     operating and support costs from retiring older commercial 
     utility cargo vehicles compared to the expected costs of 
     leasing newer commercial utility cargo vehicles; and
       (D) has allowed 30 calendar days to elapse after such 
     notification.
       (8) One year after the date of execution of an initial 
     leasing contract, the Secretary of the Army shall submit a 
     report setting forth the status of the pilot program. Such 
     report shall be based upon at least six months of operating 
     experience. The Secretary may exercise an option or options 
     for subsequent commercial utility cargo vehicles only after 
     he has allowed 60 calendar days to elapse after submitting 
     this report.
       (9) Expiration of Authority.--No lease of commercial 
     utility cargo vehicles may be entered into under the pilot 
     program after September 30, 2000.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last year Congress passed the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1995, in which we sought to reform 
Defense acquisition procedures and rely on more commercial products and 
processes for the Defense Department.
  Consistent with Defense acquisition reform, this amendment authorizes 
the Defense Department to use commercial leasing practices to acquire 
commercial vehicles for the Army.
  This will permit the Army to modernize its fleet of commercial 
utility cargo vehicles [CUCVs] without any new appropriated funds.
  The Army has an old and expensive fleet of about 45,000 CUCV's. They 
need a fleet of only about 13,000 CUCV's, and can make significant 
savings on operation and support costs if they use newer vehicles.
  The Army is short on funds for modernization of its vehicle programs, 
and has identified it as a priority area for modernization. This 
amendment could help the Army modernize its CUCV fleet at no additional 
cost.
  The amendment is also strongly supported by the Army acquisition 
executive.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the 
amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2462) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2463

 (Purpose: To place a limitation on the use of funds for former Soviet 
                        Union threat reduction)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf 
of Senator Kyl and ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Kyl, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2463.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.   . LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT 
                   REDUCTION.

       (a) Limitation.--Of the funds appropriated or otherwise 
     made available for fiscal year 1996 under the heading 
     ``Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction'' for dismantlement 
     and destruction of chemical weapons, not more than 
     $52,000,000 may be obligated or expended for that purpose 
     until the President certifies to Congress the following:
       (1) That the United States and Russia have completed a 
     joint laboratory study evaluating the proposal of Russia to 
     neutralize its chemical weapons and the United States agrees 
     with the proposal.
       (2) That Russia is in the process of preparing, with the 
     assistance of the United States (if necessary), a 
     comprehensive plan to manage the dismantlement and 
     destruction of the Russia chemical weapons stockpile. 

[[Page S 12652]]

       (3) That the United States and Russia are committed to 
     resolving outstanding issues under the 1989 Wyoming 
     Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990 Bilateral 
     Destruction Agreement.
       (b) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' 
     means the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government 
     of the United States of America and the Government of the 
     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral 
     Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to 
     Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, 
     Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
       (2) The term ``1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement'' means 
     the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on destruction and non-
     production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate 
     the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons 
     signed on June 1, 1990.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, I rise to offer an amendment to the 
Defense authorization bill concerning the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar. The purpose of this amendment is 
to require both the DOD and the Russians to get serious about chemical 
weapons destruction activities and to focus their efforts in a 
productive manner.
  Of the $371 million requested for the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program with Russia and other former States of the Soviet Union, $104 
million was requested for chemical weapons destruction.
  Reducing the chemical weapons stockpiles of both the United States 
and Russia is an important goal. Chemical weapons and nerve agents are 
among the cheapest and most effective manner to kill people. The number 
of chemical-weapons nations has tripled from 8 in 1969 to as many as 26 
today. Moreover, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
has counted 15 separate cases of recent chemical conflict in the Third 
World.
  The problem is that current CTR Program to reduce chemical weapons is 
ill defined and lacks focus.
  The first purpose of my amendment is to withhold $54 million for a 
chemical weapons destruction facility until the completion of the joint 
feasibility study. This approach is consistent with the GAO report from 
June 1995 ``Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat From the 
Former Soviet Union: An Update.'' In the report, the GAO noted,

       . . . the United States have yet to agree on the 
     applicability of a technology to be used in chemical weapons 
     destruction facility and may not do so until midway through 
     fiscal year 1996. This uncertainty raises questions as to the 
     program's need for the $104 million it is requesting in 
     fiscal year 1996, in part, to begin designing and 
     constructing the facility.

  Agreeing on a destruction technology is important because Russia is 
currently proposing using a ``neutralization'' technology which would 
blend the chemical toxin with other chemicals in an attempt to 
neutralize the toxin. This is an unproven technology and will create 
two to three times the amount of chemical waste already in the 
inventory. The United States preferred technology is incineration, 
although that is not without its problems.
  My amendment requires that the United States and Russia complete a 
joint laboratory study before the United States provides the balance of 
the $104 million for a controversial, unproven approach.
  A second aspect of my amendment is the requirement that Russia agree, 
with United States assistance, to prepare a comprehensive plan to cope 
with the Russian chemical weapons destruction program. According to the 
GAO, the administration originally proposed this approach to the 
Russians. The current plan is to develop a proposal for each individual 
which will be involved in chemical weapons destruction--there are seven 
sites in Russia.
  With a declared stockpile of 40,000 metric tonnes, the only way to 
manage the chemical weapons issue is to view the totality of the 
problem. The United States cannot be certain whether the proposals deal 
with the whole problem, unless a comprehensive, detailed plan is 
prepared. Further, the United States cannot be certain of its total 
financial obligation without a comprehensive plan.
  The third aspect of my amendment is to require the President to 
certify that the Russians are committed to resolving outstanding issues 
under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
  The Wyoming MOU was intended to build confidence between the United 
States and Russia in the chemical weapons area and thus facilitate 
completion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction. This would be done by exchanging detailed and complete 
data about their respective chemical weapons programs and by testing 
inspection procedures.
  Under the MOU, during the first phase, the countries are to exchange 
general data on their chemical weapons and make reciprocal visit to 
storage, production, and destruction facilities. In the second phase, 
the counties are to exchange detailed data on their chemical weapon 
stocks and verify this information through reciprocal on-site 
inspections. During this phase, each country is to provide the other 
with general plans for dismantling chemical weapons production 
facilities.
  The first phase of the Wyoming MOU was completed in early 1991. The 
second phase of the MOU was delayed because of disputes between the two 
countries. In a report issued to Congress in January 1995 entitled 
``U.S. Assistance and Related Programs for the New Independent States 
of the Former Soviet Union,'' the administration was more forthcoming. 
The report says:

       . . . Phase I of the [Wyoming] MOU was completed in 
     February 1991. Documents allowing for the second and final 
     phase of the MOU were agreed upon at the January 1994 Moscow 
     Summit. Russian implementation of Phase II has yielded 
     problematic results. . . . The U.S. believe that several key 
     question and concerns have not yet been resolved in Russia's 
     data declaration. . . . The U.S. continues to have 
     significant concerns about Russia implementation of the 
     Wyoming MOU. . . . Russia still must take concrete steps to 
     fulfill its commitment and resolve existing problems.

  Although not yet ratified, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement 
requires each party to undertake not to produce chemical weapons and to 
reduce their chemical weapons stockpile to 5,000 agent tonnes. The 
principle issue holding up completion of the agreement concerns the 
conversion of former chemical weapons production facilities. Russia 
missed the December 1992 original target date for starting its 
destruction program. Currently, it has no comprehensive plan defining 
when and how the weapons will be destroyed. An unclassified ACDA report 
on arms control compliances merely notes that ``questions remain on 
certain aspects of the Russian date declaration and inspections.''
  The Wyoming MOU and the Bilateral Destruct Agreement were intended to 
support and facilitate the Chemical Weapons Convention which would 
restrict members from developing, producing, acquiring stockpiling, 
retaining transferring or using chemical weapons, and require the 
destruction of those weapons within 15 years.
  Although it is in our interest to have Russia agree to a verifiable 
Chemical Weapons Convention, how can the United States have any 
confidence in the integrity of the CWC, if Russia has failed to 
implement these two agreements? For these reasons, Mr. President, it is 
my intent that the Senate send a signal to Russia and the DOD to get 
serious about putting this important chemical weapons destruction 
program in place.
                  cooperative threat reduction program

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would just like to make some general 
comments about the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, otherwise 
known as Nunn-Lugar.
  To date, close to $1.6 billion has been authorized or appropriated 
for this program. Out of this amount, less than half of the funds have 
been obligated. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense told the 
committee that they expected to obligate around $860 million of the 
previous year's funding by the end of the fiscal year.
  The committee has been supportive of this effort to help the 
Republics of the former Soviet Union dismantle and destroy their 
chemical and nuclear weapons stockpile. For various reasons, however, 
the Department has run into problems in managing the program, either 
through administrative problems on the United States side, or, as a 
result of not being able to conclude implementing agreements with 

[[Page S 12653]]
Russia and the other Republics. I believe the program has been a useful 
political tool. However, I don't believe that the program has 
accomplished as much as the Department of Defense would lead one to 
believe. The Department of Defense says that the large number of 
reductions in Russia and the Republics are as a result of the 
assistance received through this program.
  Mr. President, that can hardly be the case, when the majority of the 
funds for this program overall were not obligated until the latter part 
of 1994. I believe it is accurate to say that this program has been 
helpful in securing the reductions and return of the strategic nuclear 
weapons from the three Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 
Russia, however, achieved their reductions prior to entry into force of 
the START Treaty because it was in their economic interest to do so. By 
implementing the reductions prior to START entering into force, Russia 
was able to dismantle those items without having to declare them under 
the treaty and adhere to the dismantlement requirements of the treaty. 
A number of Members have been concerned with the slow rate of 
obligation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. For that 
reason, the committee recommended a reduction from the President's 
budget request, and also agreed with the recommendation of the Senator 
from Arizona, to place limitations on the use of the funds, pending a 
Presidential certification regarding the progress of the chemical 
weapons dismantlement program.
  Last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe 
conducted two hearings on nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The 
majority of witnesses recommended that funds for this program, as well 
as the Department of Energy's companion program be substantially 
increased.
  Mr. President, I believe that recommendation is premature, based on 
the track record of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The 
committee will continue to pay close attention to the Department's 
management and obligation rate of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that the Senator from 
Arizona had on the Defense appropriations bill. I believe it has been 
worked out. I worked with him on it. We modified some of its 
provisions.
  I urge its adoption.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment would limit the use of funds 
authorized for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program pending 
certification of the following: First, the United States and Russia 
have successfully completed a joint laboratory study evaluating the 
chemical weapons neutralization process; second, that Russia is in the 
process of preparing a comprehensive plan to dismantle and destroy its 
chemical weapons stockpile; and third, that Russia remains committed to 
resolving the outstanding issues regarding its compliance with the 1989 
Wyoming memorandum of understanding and the 1990 bilateral destruction 
agreement.
  This is a very important amendment.
  We urge its adoption.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate on the 
amendment, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2463) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2464

  (Purpose: To make various technical corrections and other technical 
               amendments to existing provisions of law)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk in behalf 
of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and 
ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     for himself and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2464.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment appears in today's Record under Amendments 
Submitted.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment, on behalf of the chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee, makes certain technical amendments to 
the existing provisions of law. The amendment has been cleared on both 
sides. I urge its adoption.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the Senate to adopt the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  So the amendment (No. 2464) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, while I commend the work of the Senators 
involved in negotiating this compromise amendment on missile defenses, 
which is certainly an improvement over what is currently in the bill, I 
cannot support the amendment. By nature, compromises are never perfect, 
but they usually take the form of something each side can live with. In 
this case, I do not believe that the language in this amendment is 
something we can afford to live with.
  Despite the changes, this proposal still commits us to the deployment 
in the near future of expensive and destabilizing missile defense 
systems. This is not the way we should be going. The time and energy 
the Senate has put into this issue would be much more wisely spent on 
ratification of the START II and chemical weapons treaties, which are 
sitting in the Foreign Relations Committee. The proponents of robust 
missile defenses argue that the end of the cold war makes obsolete arms 
control treaties negotiated in that area. I could not disagree more. 
The way to a more secure United States and a more peaceful world is 
through building on our arms control treaties, not destroying them.
  This amendment, while designed by its authors to be compliant with 
the ARM Treaty, moves us in the direction of fundamentally altering or 
even withdrawing from the treaty. The AMB Treaty is a cornerstone of 
our arms control policies, and I believe we must retain its integrity, 
especially to ensure Russian ratification and implementation of START 
II. Putting at risk this ratification makes us less safe, not more.
  I am also concerned about the costs of deploying national missile 
defenses, which has not entered into this debate to the extent it 
should. By one estimate, it could cost some $100 billion, and the way 
weapons systems go, like the B-2, it is not hard to imagine the costs 
soaring higher. Many of the proponents of this star wars-like 
deployment joined me in supporting the balanced budget amendment, but 
have not explained how they would reconcile that goal with the huge 
costs of this program.
  I recognize the choices that had to be made on this issue, and 
Senators Nunn and Warner got the best deal that they could. But when 
Senator Warner says that the amendment sets a clear path to deployment 
of national missile defenses, I have no choice but to oppose it.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend my colleagues who were involved 
in drafting this amendment on missile defense. The hard work that went 
into the crafting of this compromise is strong evidence of both the 
importance of the issue and the dedication of the members and staff who 
spent many days and nights attempting to defense common ground on this 
critical issue. Their efforts, and the several votes we have already 
had on the fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization and appropriations 
bills regarding missile defense will be viewed one day as the turning 
point in the debate on defending America and American interests against 
ballistic missile attack.
  There are elements of this compromise that I am satisfied with. For 
example, section 232(9) contains the following language: ``Due to 
limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude deployment of more than 
100 ground-based ABM interceptors at a 

[[Page S 12654]]
single site, the United States is currently prohibited from deploying a 
national missile defense system capable of defending the continental 
United States, and Hawaii against even the most limited ballistic 
missile attacks.'' While some might find virtue in being defenseless 
against even the most limited of threats--a threat not even 
contemplated during the negotiations of the ABM Treaty--I do not. This 
defenselessness can only serve as an invitation to those with interests 
that are hostile to our own to develop or acquire the capability to put 
the United States at risk from long-range ballistic missiles. That this 
amendment recognizes our inability to defend against even a limited 
threat should be regarded as progress.
  The recent revelations about Saddam Hussein's weapons program should 
teach us that we won't ever know as much about some ballistic missile 
and weapons of mass destruction programs as we think we do. Combine 
this with the cavalier export control regimes of other countries 
currently possessing these weapons and delivery systems, and the oft-
stated l10 years until the United States could be threatened by long-
range missiles sounds more like wishful thinking than dispassionate 
analysis.
  I have three major concerns with this amendment:
  First, unlike the committee-reported bill, the amendment does not 
require the deployment of a national missile defense system capable of 
defending all of the United States against even the most limited of 
threats. This must change. We have been engaged for too long in 
developing for deployment the necessary systems. Instead of committing 
to deploy an NMD system against a limited threat, this amendment 
commits to more procrastination. We've had enough of this, and anything 
short of a commitment to deploy is unacceptable.
  Second, section 238 of the amendment prohibits the use of funds to 
implement an ABM/TMD demarcation agreement with any of the states of 
the former Soviet Union which is more restrictive than that specified 
in section 238(b) without the advice and consent of the Senate or 
enactment of subsequent legislation. This funding prohibition is fine, 
as far as it goes; unfortunately, it does not go far enough. The 
amendment is silent on the possibility that the administration could 
enact a more restrictive demarcation unilaterally. In essence, the 
amendment tells the administration that if it wants to have a more 
restrictive demarcation standard than that spelled out all it has to do 
is announce the standard unilaterally, without Russian agreement. This 
amendment would not prohibit the use of funds by the administration if 
it were simply to take the current Russian proposal on demarcation and 
adopt it as the unilateral position of the United States. To go one 
step further, as written this amendment would allow both the United 
States and Russia to adopt the same Russian proposal unilaterally 
without triggering the prohibition on the use of funds in section 
238(c). If we are not willing to permit, as part of a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement, a more restrictive demarcation standard than 
that specified in the amendment, why should we be willing to allow the 
adoption of a more restrictive standard unilaterally?
  Third, prior to deployment of a national missile defense system 
capable against a limited threat, section 233(3) of the amendment 
mandates congressional review of, ``(A) the affordability and 
operational effectiveness of such a system; (B) the threat to be 
countered by such a system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with 
respect to such a system.'' In addition to the fact that section 233(3) 
(A) and (B) are unnecessary restatements of a basic purpose of each 
year's Defense authorization and appropriations bills for all defense 
programs, the requirement in section 233(3)(C) is completely backward. 
Instead of requiring review of the effect of defending America on the 
ABM Treaty, we ought to review the effect of the ABM Treaty on 
defending America. The defense of our country is more important to me 
than the defense of a treaty that puts our country at risk.
  There are other parts of the amendment in need of improvement, though 
they are of lesser importance than the problems I've already raised. 
I'll conclude by making four observations: First, notwithstanding the 
desire by some to ignore the threat posed to the United States by 
weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missile delivery 
systems, this threat is serious and we cannot continue to procrastinate 
over employing the means at hand to reduce this threat. Second, a 
national missile defense against a limited threat would in no way 
undermine United States-Russian deterrence, and would only enhance 
deterrence of rogue nations or groups with interests contrary to those 
of the United States, all of whom are limited by scarcity of funds. We 
would do well to pay close attention to what Secretary Perry said 
recently, that, ``The bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not 
provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We may be 
facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles and nuclear 
weapons at the same time in the future, and they may not buy into our 
deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD.'' Third, 
however the Russian Duma acts on the START II Treaty, its decision will 
be based on many factors, only one of which is their perception of 
United States actions with regard to the ABM Treaty. It is incorrect to 
suggest that Duma ratification of START II is based solely on our 
ballistic missile defense legislation, and the Senate cannot allow 
itself to be held hostage by threats of retaliation by the Duma. 
Fourth, the missile defense provisions in the underlying bill will not 
violate the ABM Treaty unless the administration takes no action to 
modify the treaty. Indeed, Secretary of State Christopher made this 
point in an August 14, 1995 cable, where in talking points provided for 
selected U.S. embassies he said, ``The provisions as proposed by the 
Senate Armed Services Committee call for deployment of a national, 
multiple-site missile defense that, if deployed, without treaty 
amendment, would violate the ABM Treaty.'' Secretary Christopher is 
saying that a multiple-site NMD system could be made ABM Treaty-
compliant by simply amending the treaty. The assertions that have been 
made on this floor and by administration officials that, in and of 
itself, the underlying bill violates the ABM Treaty, are wrong. If you 
don't want to take my word for it, ask Secretary Christopher.
  I think the amendment weakens the committee-reported Missile Defense 
Act of 1995, but having said that it is important to get this bill to 
conference where we will have an opportunity to improve these 
provisions.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, 1 month ago I rose to support the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995, as the Armed Services Committee reported it. It 
seemed to me to be just about the right response to the growing threat 
of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles. 
Frankly, I was a bit surprised by the vehemence with which some of my 
colleagues opposed the bill once it came to the floor.
  Many Americans are unaware that right now, America is defenseless 
against ballistic missiles. If that fact were better known, I think 
many Americans would be very angry that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 
ran into so much opposition from the Clinton administration and some of 
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
  But the fact is that our choice--the choice of those who want to 
protect America from this growing threat--was between this revised 
amendment or no bill at all. Given the other important aspects of this 
bill, and given Saddam Hussein's recent revelations, we chose to work 
things out and to take a step toward defending America--although it is 
not as big a step as we wanted. Nevertheless this amendment is a step 
forward and, let us not forget, we will have an opportunity in 
conference with the House to make modifications.
  In any case, there can be no doubt that this bill and this amendment 
take concrete steps toward establishing effective theater and national 
missile defenses.
  On the essential question of national defense, this amendment 
establishes as U.S. policy the deployment of a multiple-site national 
missile is operationally effective against limited, accidental, or 
unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United 
States--a defense system that can be augmented over time to provide a 
layered defense. The Secretary of Defense is instructed to implement 
this policy 

[[Page S 12655]]
by developing a national missile defense system--consisting of ground-
based interceptors, fixed ground-based radars, and space-based 
sensors--capable of being deployed by the end of 2003.
  Unlike some of my
   colleagues who still believe that the cold-war-era ABM Treaty 
defends America, I believe that nothing short of the development and 
deployment of an effective national missile defense system will truly 
protect America against the threats of the 21st century.

  The recent revelations by Saddam Hussein--that the Iraqis filled 
nearly 200 bombs and warheads for ballistic missiles with biological 
and toxin weapons--should drive this point home.
  With respect to the ABM Treaty, this legislation calls for a year of 
careful consideration on how to proceed with the ABM Treaty in the 
longer term. During that time the President could and should seek to 
negotiate with Russia a mutually beneficial agreement that will allow 
the United States to proceed with multiple-site deployments. 
Furthermore, this legislation prohibits the use of funds to implement 
an agreement limiting theater missile defenses--which were never 
limited by the ABM Treaty--without the advice and consent of the 
Senate. This was intended to address to the very real concern that the 
administration has not abandoned the ill-conceived course of 
negotiating changes to the ABM Treaty that would restrict theater 
missile defenses despite oft-stated and deep-seated Senate objections.
  This legislation also establishes a theater missile defense core 
program and a cruise missile initiative that focuses our resources on 
deploying effective systems that are needed right now to defend, 
American interests around the globe.
  Mr. President, this amendment does not achieve all of the objectives 
I would like to have seen achieved. However, it does take firm, 
tangible steps toward defending America--most importantly by setting a 
goal of 2003 to deploy a multiple site, effective defense of the United 
States of America. On this there cannot be and will not be any 
compromise. We will have a conference with the House. And if the 
conference report that is worked out is acceptable and is passed by the 
Congress, the responsibility will be with the President to sign this 
bill so that defending America becomes the law of the land.

                       Hans bethe warned of this

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, at a point in our history when we have 
successfully avoided the Armagedonnic catastrophe of nuclear 
confrontation and have began the sensible process of limiting nuclear 
warheads by treaty, the Senate proposes to adopt a bill that could 
resurrect the nuclear arms race, and, in the process, jeopardize 23 
years of arms control treaties. The Armed Services Committee has 
presented the Senate with a bill that proposes a national ballistic 
missile defense system. The Congressional Budget Office estimates this 
is a $48 billion proposition.
  Can we in good conscience embark on a project to doubtful feasibility 
and enormous cost, which only addresses one of many nuclear threats? 
Potential adversaries will simply channel their resources into 
producing delivery vehicles that the system could not defend against; 
submarines, cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, terrorists car bombs.
  In 1977, Prof. Han Bethe of Cornell University, one of the most 
distinguished figures of sciences in the nuclear age, during a visit to 
my home in upstate New York, warned me that such a plans would 1 day be 
presented to the Senate.
  On March 23, 1983, with little attention given to the technical 
details, President Reagan proposed an initiative which became known as 
the strategic defense initiative [SDI]. We have yet to work out the 
technical details of a national missile defense system. Yet there are 
those in this body who appear to be bent on deploying some remnant of 
the SDI, without regard to the potential threats that exist, or the 
costs involved.
  In testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee in 1992, Dr. Bethe 
elaborated on his objections to deploying such a system. I ask 
unanimous consent that an excerpt from the transcript of that hearing 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 25, 1992

       Senator Moynihan. I recall that 15 years ago, Dr. Bethe, 
     you and Mrs. Bethe very graciously came to lunch, and you 
     tried to warn me against something I never heard of. I really 
     didn't know what you were talking about. It turned out to be 
     Star Wars.6
       You described, as I recall, having me with a Soviet 
     physicist in a conference in Rome or some such place and you 
     both agreed that there were those people who thought one 
     could have a small nuclear device explode in space and send 
     out a laser beam that would zap something on the other side 
     of the universe. You both agreed
      that it was crazy but that there were plenty of crazy people 
     in both our countries and they were likely to try it. You 
     were not wrong.
       But now we are further down in our notions. Brilliant 
     Pebbles I think is the most recent formulation.
       Do you think we should pursue this kind of anti-missile 
     technology at this level? I know that you thought at the 
     grand level it would not prove coherent, and it did not. But 
     might it at a lower level? Did you have any thoughts for us 
     on this?
       Dr. Bethe. I have a strong opinion on Star Wars. I thought 
     it was misconceived from the beginning, and by now I think 
     there is no reason at all to pursue it or to pursue any 
     variation of it.
       Senator Moynihan. Or to pursue any variation of it.
       Dr. Bethe. The Brilliant Pebbles, in contrast to the X-ray 
     laser, are likely to be technically feasible. But I am 
     terribly nervous about having 1,000 such devices cruising 
     about above the atmosphere. One of them might hit an 
     asteroid. They tell me and I think they are right that they 
     have precautions against that. But I believe that the only 
     thing that should be done is research. That should continue. 
     But we should not deploy any of these devices.
       Senator Moynihan. Did I hear you correctly when you said 
     that it might hit an asteroid?
       Dr. Bethe. Yes.
       Senator Moynihan. I thought for a moment you had said 
     ``astronaut.'' But it might be both or either, for that 
     matter, if it comes to it.
       May I say to the Chairman and to my colleague, Senator 
     Robb, that in 1977, Hans Bethe on our back porch in upstate 
     New York, said one of these days some crazy scientist is 
     going to come along to you fellows in the Senate and say I 
     have a plan whereby we put these nuclear weapons in place all 
     over the atmosphere and at a certain point we detonate them 
     and they produce a laser and it goes zap. And he said it's 
     coming and when it comes, tell those people they are loony.
       Well, it came, just as he predicted. In 1945, he wrote that 
     the Soviets could have the bomb in 5 years; they got it in 4. 
     After our luncheon in 1977 we got Star Wars in 5, I think.
       We could have saved ourselves a lot of grief, it seems to 
     me, if we had listened to you in the first place. You know, 
     the people who built these bombs know
      something about how they work. Dr. Bethe, you've even 
     suggested you could go down into the basement and turn 
     uranium into reactor fuel. It is not that much of a 
     technical feat.
       But you would keep the research going on the general 
     principle that you ought to know as much physics as you can 
     but leave it on the ground and not deploy any Brilliant 
     Pebbles or Sullen Sods or whatever.
       Dr. Bethe. I think we should not deploy any of this. I 
     think even if they are effective, everybody has agreed that 
     they are no good against a strong enemy like the Soviet Union 
     used to be. I think it would be a mistake to deploy such 
     devices against accidental launch of Third World countries.
       Is that the answer you wanted?
       Senator Moynihan. Yes. I wanted your view, but that was the 
     question I wanted answered. Yes.
       Does Ambassador Nitze have a different view?
       Ambassador Nitze. I think the terms involved are very 
     confusing and are not precisely defined. With respect to the 
     interception of shorter-range ballistic missiles, for 
     instance, such as the Patriot missile, which was used during 
     the Gulf War, I think that is an important thing which one 
     should continue to develop.
       Dr. Bethe. [Nods affirmatively.]
       Senator Moynihan. I think you are getting agreement from 
     your colleague at the table. But those are ground-based or at 
     least based within the atmosphere.
       Ambassador Nitze. They are ground based, the Patriot 
     missile. I think most of the devices which might be used 
     against, for instance, shorter-range things, such as SCUDS, 
     would be ground-based. But there are some that are not.
       The man who really invented Brilliant Pebbles--I forget his 
     name--now works at Los Alamos and he believes that one ought 
     to go for something which he calls ``burros,'' being the 
     stupidest animal around. Instead of having these bright 
     interceptors, you have ones with low capability but which 
     would be very good against shorter range missiles, which 
     would be in the lower atmosphere. I think he may be right 
     about that.
       So if there are ways and means of dealing with the shorter 
     range threats, which the Saddam Husseins or the Iraqis and so 
     forth are capable of, I think we ought to be willing 

[[Page S 12656]]
     to deploy those in the event the technology works out.
       So it's a question of I want to know precisely what it is 
     that we are talking about when we say don't do it or do do 
     it.
       Senator Moynihan. Dr. Bethe does not seem to disagree with 
     that.
       Dr. Bethe. I agree that it would be good to have an 
     effective means against shorter-range missiles. Brilliant 
     Pebbles is not the right thing, and I believe some 
     knowledgeable people think that we can have such a device. 
     When we see one, I am in favor of it.
       Senator Moynihan. Thank you very much.

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, George P. Shultz recounts in his 
biography ``Turmoil and Triumph'' that SDI was President Reagan's own 
idea but that the plan was announced after a favorable endorsement from 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then Secretary of State Shultz reports that 
when Lawrence Eagleburger informed him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
had told the President that a strategic defense system could be 
developed, the Secretary responded, ``The Chiefs are not equipped to 
make this kind of proposal. They are not scientists.'' Of course, when 
the scientists were consulted, it was concluded it could not be done.
  Finally, consideration must be given to the possible response of 
Russia to our actions. The original bill would have required us to 
abrogate the ABM Treaty. If we were to break the ABM Treaty 
unilaterally, it is clear that Russia would respond by rejecting START 
II. This amendment still proposes that if the Russians do not agree to 
modify the ABM Treaty to allow us to deploy a national missile defense 
system that consideration be given to United States withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty. Russian nationalists would certainly be pleased if we would 
do so.
  My point is simply that the national missile defense system 
envisioned in this bill will only be effective against limited 
ballistic missile attacks. Limited is not defined, but it is unlikely 
that it might be referring to a capability of defending against 1,400 
ballistic missiles launched simultaneously? We can wipe out 1,400 
ballistic missiles; not with a ballistic missile defense system, but 
with a treaty. The START II Treaty. Treaties can go a long way to 
protecting us against nuclear weapons. If we jeopardize ratification of 
START II, we risk a lot for this limited ballistic missile defense 
system.
                            missile defense

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, during the August recess, I had about 
seven events each day and never passed up the opportunity to let them 
know about the most critical threat facing America today--missile 
attack. I spoke about the fact that the actions we take today will 
directly affect the kind of defense posture our country has in 5 to 7 
years.
  The danger we face is real. Yet I was surprised and shocked at the 
ambivalence and lack of understanding that exists concerning this vital 
issue. Many people simply do not realize--and are themselves shocked to 
be told--that our country today has no missile defense system in place 
capable of protecting American cities from long range missile attacks.
  I estimated that perhaps most Oklahomans were not readily aware of 
some of the basic terms of the debate currently going on in Washington 
about the important missile defense provisions of the current defense 
authorization bill.
  I would suggest that part of the reason for this has to do with the 
media, particularly the national media, most of which has either not 
adequately focused on this issue or has skewed it in such a way as to 
downgrade its importance. But there are also similar problems with the 
local media.
  For example, in Oklahoma there are two major daily newspapers, the 
daily Oklahoman and the Tulsa World. Their differences reflect similar 
disparities in the national media.
  The Tulsa World reflects a consistent liberal view of the world, one 
which favors the expansion of the role of government in almost every 
area except defense. Their left-leaning editorial view tends to distort 
the reality of significant issues such as missile defense.
  The daily Oklahoman, on the other hand, much more clearly reflects 
the conservative social and economic values of Oklahomans. It is a 
larger paper and provides a much more realistic approach to issues such 
as national defense.
  During the past month, each of these papers had major editorials on 
the threat of missile attack. There is quite a difference in their 
approach. I think it will be instructive for my colleagues to examine 
these editorials and ponder how the media is shaping the debate about 
vital issues facing our country.
  I therefore ask unanimous consent that the two editorials I mentioned 
concerning missile defense--one from the Tulsa World and one from the 
daily Oklahoman--be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed 
in the Record, as follows:
                  [From the Oklahoman, Aug. 20, 1995]

                         For the Common Defense

       The Clinton administration's attachment to a pair of 
     international agreements has the potential to weaken U.S. 
     defenses against a foreign attack.
       President Clinton last week announced the United States 
     would cease future nuclear weapons tests in hopes of 
     energizing stalled talks aimed at producing a worldwide test 
     ban.
       At the same time, Clinton's threatened veto of the defense 
     authorization bill--because it orders development of a 
     national missile defense system--is behind efforts to water 
     down the missile defense part of the bill.
       It's a double-whammy for U.S. national security.
       First, although declaring a U.S. nuclear test ban looks 
     great on television and might evoke comparisons with John F. 
     Kennedy (something Clinton wouldn't mind), it's quite a leap 
     of faith minus guarantees the Russians will do likewise.
       Also, Pentagon officials are concerned a test ban will make 
     it impossible to guarantee the reliability of America's 7,000 
     nuclear weapons. Sen. John Warner, R-Va., says doubt about 
     the U.S. arsenal could even invite a nuclear attack.
       Alarmingly, it appears Clinton cares more about reviving 
     world test ban talks than he does about protecting the United 
     States.
       Concerning national missile defense, the Senate bill 
     mandates a system to protect the country from deliberate or 
     accidental missile attack. But Clinton has threatened a veto, 
     saving it would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
     Treaty signed with the then-Soviet Union.
       Recently four senators proposed an amendment to allow 
     missile defense planning but delaying deployment pending 
     congressional review. It also would permit the president to 
     negotiate changes in the ABM treaty to allow a missile 
     defense.
       Sounds pretty good, but some analysts say the amendment, 
     which will be voted on when Congress returns from its August 
     recess, could be a subtle way to kill a missile defense 
     system.
       Baker Spring of the conservative Heritage Foundation says 
     the amendment's delaying aspects would allow Clinton, who 
     opposes missile defense, ``to strangle programs in the 
     crib.'' Spring says it seems as if ``we're saying the ABM 
     treaty comes first, the defense of the nation comes second.''
       Finally, Clinton argues two mutually exclusive ideas. 
     First, he says existing nuclear weapons can defend America, 
     making a missile defense unnecessary. Then he says the United 
     States will quit the testing that ensures the reliability of 
     current weapons systems. Huh?
       Clinton can't have it both ways. The Senate should insist 
     on moving ahead with a missile defense program.
                                                                    ____

                 [From the Tulsa World, Aug. 14, 1995]

                         Pork, Republican Style

       Right-wing Republicans in Congress are pushing a bill that 
     would force the Pentagon to develop a multi-site national 
     missile defense system by 2003. This is the latest 
     incarnation of the Star Wars program, a science-fiction anti-
     missile system that blossomed during the Reagan 
     administration.
       There are many reasons why this outrageously expensive 
     scheme should be put to sleep once and for all.
       First, it would have to work perfectly in order to protect 
     American cities and military bases from nuclear weapons. It 
     would do little good to knock down 19 out of 20 nuclear-
     tipped missiles aimed at, say, New York. The 20th bomb would 
     do the job. Anyone who works with computers and other 
     electronic equipment knows from personal experience that this 
     goal of perfect performance is impossible.
       Even if science could find a perfect way to frustrate a 
     missile weapons system with a 100-percent success rate, the 
     same science could just as easily find the means to frustrate 
     the anti-missile system. So, the next logical step would be 
     an anti-anti-missile system, a weapon to knock out or to 
     disable the anti-missile defense system. It wouldn't have to 
     be disabled completely--just enough to get a few nuclear 
     devices through the ``shield.''
       But there are more urgent reasons why this is a bad idea. 
     It would violate the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty with 
     the former Soviet Union. This pointless provocation does not 
     reduce the risk of nuclear war. It increases it.
       Finally, it is an insult to the budget-balancing process. 
     It is unbelievable that this wasteful scheme is being 
     advanced at the 

[[Page S 12657]]
     same time Americans are being asked to accept cuts in such things as 
     education, care for the elderly and medical help for the 
     poor.
       John Isaacs, spokesman for an arms control advocacy group, 
     explained part of the problem: ``Defending pork is a 
     bipartisan pastime. It is endorsed by both Democrats and 
     Republicans.''
       Star Wars is the right-wing Republican version of pork.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, some of my colleagues who have been 
complaining about the liberal eastern media should be aware that there 
are similar problems and concerns reflected in the local media in the 
very heartland of America.
  As we approach a vote on the missile defense provisions of the 
defense bill which have been worked out among our colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle, I want to commend Senators for their good-faith 
efforts to reach a compromise on this very complex and contentious 
issue.
  I supported the wording of the original bill that came out of the 
committee as a good start which recognized the threat and put us on the 
road to providing the real missile defense we need.
  While I will vote in favor of the new compromise provisions, I am not 
pleased with the weakening of language and goals that this compromise 
represents. I am very hopeful that the language can be significantly 
strengthened when we get to conference.
  We started out saying that we would deploy a national missile defense 
system.
 Now we are just going to develop for deployment a national missile 
defense.

  This compromise urges deployment of theater missile defenses to 
benefit our deployed troops and allies, but only allows a missile 
defense for the American people to be developed for deployment.
  We began by simply calling for highly effective missile defenses; we 
have now required that they be affordable missile defenses.
  No one wants to waste money. But how will affordability be defined? 
How do we put a price on defending America from missile attacks?
  The truth is that the term ``affordable'' will simply be used as a 
club by opponents of missile defense for whom the price of security is 
always too high.
  The term ``cost effective'' will just be used to fight every dollar 
that we try to spend on missile defense from now on.
  Cost effectiveness should not even be an issue--the destruction by 
one bomb of a single building in Oklahoma City cost $500 million. 
Imagine how much a limited strike by nuclear weapons will cost.
  We claim to recognize that the era of mutual assured destruction is 
over. But instead of recognizing the reality that the ABM Treaty is a 
relic of the cold war and mutual assured destruction, this compromise 
requires negotiations with the Russian Government within the context of 
the ABM Treaty before we defend the American people from attack.
  This is a much smaller step forward than it should have been. We 
should stop talking about developing options, and begin to deploy a 
national missile defense system.
  The American people must know that the threat we face in the very 
near future is real and it affects all of us. It would be the height of 
irresponsibility if we were not prepared to meet this reality.
  The challenge before us is to face the facts. Former CIA Director 
James Woolsey, who served in the Clinton administration and is no 
partisan advocate, has told us bluntly: Up to 25 nations either have or 
are developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver 
them.
  The CIA currently tells us that North Korea is now working on a long-
range missile--the Tapeo Dong II--which may be capable of reaching 
Alaska and Hawaii within 5 years.
  These are serious challenges. It is our duty to face them now and not 
blind ourselves by rationalizing that we can wait 10 more years or 20 
more years. If we do, it may well be too late.
  So it is my hope that when the defense bill gets to conference we 
will be able to strengthen the language so that we make it clear that 
we are proceeding on a course which will put in place a national 
missile defense system within 5 to 7 years.
  In my mind, this is the least we can do to meet our highest 
constitutional obligation--the one without which no other obligations 
have any meaning--to provide for the common defense--the protection of 
our people, our freedom, and our country.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, the Senate is considering the 
bipartisan compromise on ballistic missile defenses [BMD]. Although two 
key amendments by opponents of BMD were voted down by the Senate on 
August 3 and 4, the bipartisan amendment is necessary in order to 
advance the Department of Defense authorization bill and to bring it to 
a conference with the House.
  I supported the original version of the bill submitted by the Armed 
Services Committee. The original version set a proper course for 
deployment of theater and strategic ballistic missile defenses on a 
time-line commensurate with the potential threat. Additionally, the 
original language repudiated the ABM Treaty and its philosophical 
basis, mutual assured destruction, by declaring that it is the policy 
of the United States that the two are ``not a suitable basis for 
stability in a multipolar world.''
  Though I am not at all entirely pleased with the compromise language, 
the present version does preserve the fundamental principles of the 
original bill: immediate deployment of theater missile defenses; the 
possibility of multiple site national missile defense deployments; 
layered defenses; and review of the ABM Treaty. The new language 
differs from the original bill in three sections. I hope that these 
differences, which are as follows, are addressed by the conferees.
  First, the compromise calls for the United States to embark on a 
program to develop for deployment a national missile defense system. 
This characterizes the research we have undertaken for the last 12 
years and changes nothing with respect to our Nation's commitment to 
deploy defenses. The original bill clearly called for deployment of a 
national missile defense system and is a more proactive statement of 
congressional intent to deploy a national missile defense system rather 
than to conduct research forever.
  The threat facing the United States, its allies and troops abroad by 
the proliferation of ballistic missiles mandates that we move forward 
toward deploying ballistic missile defenses. In a March 1995 report, 
``The Weapons Proliferation Threat,'' the Central Intelligence Agency 
observed that at least 20 countries--nearly half of them in the Middle 
East and Asia--already have or may be developing weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five countries--
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria--pose the greatest threat 
because of the aggressive nature of their weapons of mass destruction 
program. All already have or are developing ballistic missile that 
could threaten U.S. interests.
  Second, in addressing the requirements of a layered defense system, 
the compromise language merely calls for a system that can be augmented 
over time as the threat changes. The original bill required a system 
that will be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a 
layered defense. The key issue here is whether the DOD plans now for a 
layered defense system, one potentially with space-based assets, or 
does DOD merely hold out the option for the possibility of evolving to 
a layered defense?
  I believe the commitment for layered defenses is important. Space-
based interceptors provide worldwide, instantaneous protection against 
missiles launched from anywhere in the world, and are both cheaper and 
more effective than their ground-based counterparts. Missiles 
launched--either by accident or in anger--against the United States or 
our allies and friends, could be destroyed in the early stages of their 
flight, before they release their warheads if, but only if, we have 
space-based interceptors. This is especially important with multiple 
warhead missiles or missiles with chemical or biological warheads. With 
the latter, the early intercept results in more harm to the attacking 
nation as chemical or biological agents would be dispersed over its 
territory. Another advantage of space assets is that they are always on 
station.
  Third, both the compromise and the original bill have language 
concerning the demarcation line between strategic 

[[Page S 12658]]
and theater ballistic missile defenses. This section was necessary 
because the current position of the Clinton administration constrains 
key theater missile defense systems. The effect of what the Clinton 
administration proposed was to degrade the only advanced theater 
systems in research and development in the United States. The bill and 
compromise both require the administration to submit for approval by 
the Senate any agreement it reached with the Russians on limiting 
theater missile defenses. In addition, it prohibits the expenditure of 
funds for 1 year only to implement any agreement that would limit the 
capability of our theater missile defense systems. It is my hope that 
in conference, the restriction will be made permanent.
  The compromise version, however, does not make clear that it is the 
intent of the Senate, that any unilateral limitation by the United 
States should also be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The administration has received five letters from Members of the Senate 
and has participated in countless meetings over the past 8 months on 
this subject. That the Senate takes this matter seriously and would not 
look favorably on attempts to circumvent the clear intent of the 
Senate, should be abundantly clear.
  The United States must proceed immediately with the development and 
deployment of theater ballistic missile defenses, and, at the earliest 
practical time, should deploy national missile defenses. During the 
last 4 weeks, while Congress has been on recess, information has 
surfaced concerning Iraq's military buildup of weapons of mass 
destruction. The Washington Post reported that Iraq turned over 147 
boxes and two large cargo containers containing information which 
describes a broader and more advanced effort by the country to produce 
nuclear arms, germ weapons and ballistic missiles than previously 
known. Among the new disclosures is an Iraqi admission that it had germ 
or toxin- filled shells, aircraft bombs and ballistic missile warheads 
ready for possible use during the Persian Gulf war.
  Iraq also admitted to having begun a crash program in August 1990--
the month it invaded Kuwait--aimed at producing a single nuclear weapon 
within 1 year. And, finally, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq plans 
to investigate Iraq's admission that it was capable of indigenously 
producing engines for Scud missiles and that it has made more progress 
in developing a longer range missile than it had previously stated.
  The important lesson is that we almost always know less about a 
country's program to develop weapons of mass destruction that we think 
we do. We cannot afford to be sanguine about how long it will take one 
country or another to develop a ballistic missile that can threaten the 
United States. The evidence suggests that the threat is closer than we 
think. It is time to seriously address this issue.
  In closing, Mr. President, I want to stress that my preference is to 
stick with the original bill language, and I will work with the 
conferees to reinstate some of the critical sections of that bill. 
However, in an effort to advance the DOD bill to conference, I am 
reluctantly supporting the compromise amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Nunn-Warner-Levin-
Cohen amendment. I commend my colleagues for their tireless efforts in 
developing a compromise on this issue which moves us away from some of 
the most dangerous steps called for in the committee version of the 
Missile Defense Act of 1995.
  I still have serious reservations about the compromise language, 
particularly the effect it may have on Russian ratification of the 
START II Treaty. I also question whether the greatest threat of a 
nuclear detonation in the United States comes from ballistic missiles.
  However, given the likelihood that the Defense authorization bill 
will pass, I will support the amendment before us as a way to remove 
some of the more egregiously misguided provisions in the current bill 
language on missile defense.
  I would like to discuss briefly some of the areas where I see 
improvement and to point out candidly those provisions in the amendment 
which I regard as still being problematic.
  The amendment clearly makes significant improvements over the current 
language. It moves us away from the certainty of deploying a national 
missile defense system by 2003. It narrows the focus of missile defense 
efforts from all ballistic missile threats to accidental, unauthorized, 
or limited missile attacks. It guarantees a decisive role for the 
Congress before deployment can occur. It removes restrictions on the 
President's ability to negotiate with Russia an appropriate demarcation 
standard between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses. And 
it includes the requirement that missile defenses be affordable and 
operationally effective.
  These are no small achievements. They represent significant 
substantive improvements over the current language.
  There are still several areas of weakness, however.
  As I said earlier, I am particularly concerned about the effect this 
amendment may have on the START process. While the authors of this 
amendment have done their best to move us away from a collision course 
with the ABM Treaty, and many of us believe that they have, that may 
not be a view shared in Moscow by the Russian Duma.
  I am not sure they will understand the fine distinction between 
``develop for deployment'' and ``deploy.'' I am not sure they will 
understand what we mean when we say that we will proceed in a manner 
which is consistent with the ABM Treaty, and then say that we are 
anticipating the need and providing the means to means the treaty. And 
I think they will be alarmed by references that are made to withdrawing 
from the treaty.
  I am concerned about the consequences if the Russians believe that we 
are not acting in good faith, but are intent on abrogating the ABM 
Treaty. As I said on this floor a month ago, the most likely 
consequence of our breaching the ABM Treaty would be a Russian refusal 
to ratify START II.
  Why? Because the cheapest way to defeat a missile defense system is 
to overwhelm it. So, if the Russians feel threatened by our development 
of a national missile defense system, they are likely not only to 
scratch the START II Treaty, but to begin a strategic buildup. We will 
counter with our own buildup and efforts to improve missile defenses, 
and before you know it we will be in a costly arms race, which the ABM 
Treaty was designed to prevent.
  A costly new arms race is not what Americans expected with the end of 
the cold war. But that is exactly what they will get if we are not 
careful to avoid damaging the ABM Treaty, which has been the basis for 
all strategic arms control agreements over the past two decades. I 
might add that these agreements were made without the United States 
deploying a strategic missile defense system.
  A second fundamental concern I have is whether we are correct to 
focus our resources on defending against nuclear warheads delivered by 
ballistic missiles. Even the kind of limited program the authors of 
this amendment are talking about would cost tens of billions of dollars 
to eventually deploy.
  The threat of ballistic missile attack from rogue states or 
terrorists groups is at best a questionable one, and is not likely to 
arise in the next decade, if ever.
  The more likely means of delivery of a nuclear explosive device to 
our shores, as I have said on this floor repeatedly, would be an 
innocuous ship making a regular port call in the United States. A 
determined group could assemble a device in the basement of a landmark 
such as the World Trade Tower with catastrophic results. Terrorist 
groups or outlaw states would not need a ballistic missile to reach our 
territory.
  And that is where we should be focusing our resources: On tracking 
these terrorist groups and rogue states and securing the many tons of 
fissile material now spread throughout the vast territory of Russia.
  In conclusion, let me again thank Senators Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and 
Warner for their efforts on this vital issue. They have greatly 
improved upon a piece of legislation, which unamended would have 
seriously threatened our national security.

[[Page S 12659]]

  Unfortunately, despite these improvements, I believe that the 
potential is still there to undermine the ABM Treaty and our security 
in the process. However, the choice between the two alternatives--the 
missile defense language in the bill versus the amendment before us--is 
really not a choice. I will support the amendment to avoid the more 
damaging consequences of the current bill language.
   Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the Senate has before it today two 
legislative proposals that address U.S. policy toward the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and missile defense generally. There is 
language in S. 1026 that would require the United States to deploy a 
multiple-site national missile defense system, an action that would 
violate the ABM Treaty. Its alternative, the substitute offered by my 
colleagues, Messrs. Nunn, Levin, Warner, and Cohen, would only require 
the United States to ``develop'' such a defense ``for deployment.''
   Though I am not happy with either proposal, I will vote for the 
substitute only because it does less damage to the ABM Treaty than its 
alternative. Nobody should interpret this vote, however, as a ringing 
endorsement of the policies set forth in the substitute, for reasons 
which I would like to discuss in some detail in this statement today. 
In my opinion, neither the original language in S. 1026 on missile 
defense, which was narrowly approved by a straight party vote in the 
Armed Services Committee, nor the substitute addresses my deepest 
concerns about the future of the ABM Treaty.
   I recognize the hard work that my colleagues, Messrs. Nunn, Levin, 
Warner, and Cohen, have devoted to forging a bipartisan consensus on 
this controversial issue. Yet several provisions remain in both 
proposals that jeopardize the future of the ABM Treaty and, as a 
result, the stability of the strategic relationship between the United 
States and Russia.
   Before identifying section by section my specific concerns with 
these proposals, I would like to address some broader issues.


                   Context of Missile Defense Issues

   For almost a quarter century, the ABM Treaty has helped to preserve 
the peace by guaranteeing the United States the means of retaliating in 
the event of a nuclear attack by Russia. By prohibiting Russia from 
deploying a national multiple-site strategic missile defense system, 
the treaty works to ensure the reliability of the United States nuclear 
deterrent; in performing this function, the treaty also saves the 
taxpayer the burden of supporting a robust national missile defense 
system.
   The majority in the Armed Services Committee knows all about the 
importance of protecting U.S. deterrence capabilities--during committee 
deliberations over the stockpile stewardship program, I heard a lot 
about the specter of ``structural nuclear disarmament'' and the vital 
importance of maintaining a vital nuclear second-strike capability.
   I therefore cannot explain why there is language in this bill 
referring to deterrence as a mere relic of the cold war. With thousands 
of Russian and United States nuclear weapons continuing to threaten 
each other, there is no law that Congress can pass that would repeal 
nuclear deterrence--it remains an unpleasant reality, a basic fact of 
international life. Mutual assured destruction is not so much a policy 
or a doctrine as a fundamental reality about the current strategic 
relationship between the United States and Russia.
   It is good for our security that the ABM Treaty prohibits Russia 
from developing or deploying systems to kill United States strategic 
missiles. Similarly, the lack of a strategic missile defense system in 
the United States enhances Russia's confidence in its own deterrent. As 
a result, the treaty has provided a solid foundation upon which the 
superpowers can reduce their nuclear arsenals without jeopardizing 
strategic stability. This process is now well underway with the START I 
and II treaties. It is a process that, at long last, appears to be 
actually working: the stockpiles are indeed being reduced.
   The ABM Treaty, however, is now under assault by critics who believe 
it is obsolete. They believe that recent technological developments 
offer the prospect of a safe harbor against theater and limited 
strategic missile strikes. This is, of course, not the first time that 
a technological innovation has led to great strategic instability, 
great expenditures, and great dangers to our national security. This is 
not the first time that unbounded faith in technological fixes has 
captured the imagination of defense specialists and editorial writers.
   The development of the multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicle (MIRV), for example, was once heralded as a giant technological 
innovation that would bolster U.S. national security. Yet the START II 
treaty will eliminate all ground-based MIRV's precisely because of the 
risks they pose to strategic stability. MIRV's were introduced, lest we 
forget, amid fears that Russia was deploying a missile defense system. 
The American and Russian experience with MIRV's should remind us all 
that technology must remain the tool of policy to serve the national 
interest--it must not drive that policy.
   Yet technology is very much what is driving the current debate over 
the future of the ABM Treaty. The whole debate boils down to a few 
fairly straightforward questions: One, are the gains to U.S. and 
international security from developing and deploying a national 
strategic missile defense system worth the risks? Two, are these gains 
worth the costs of acquisition, deployment, and maintenance of such a 
system? Three, will these investments address genuine threats? Four, 
are there more effective and affordable alternative ways to preserve 
national and international security than by developing missile 
defenses? Five, does the legislation before us today enhance or erode 
the national security? And six, is America in the post-cold war 
environment really best served by a go-it-alone missile defense 
strategy, or is our security more dependent upon cooperation with our 
allies and maintenance of strong military and intelligence capabilities 
against potential adversaries?
   Congress simply has not fully examined the costs we would pay from 
abandoning the ABM Treaty. When it comes to domestic regulatory 
decisions, the new congressional majority claims to favor rigorous 
cost/benefit analysis. Yet its members appear reluctant to apply such 
analysis to our national defense policy, particularly with respect to 
existing proposals to hinge America's security on star wars or its many 
sequels. Unfortunately, even the substitute missile defense amendment 
brings new risks and costs into the debate on missile defense.


                 The Fable in the First-Degree Amendment

   Let us imagine for a moment that a fictitious new party to the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [NPT], is suddenly 
swept up in a new wave of collective national paranoia. Rumors of new 
foreign threats are rampant, though always hard to pin down. 
Nevertheless, the country decides to embark on a policy to acquire an 
affordable and operationally effective nuclear weapon to serve as a 
deterrent against limited, accidental, or unauthorized foreign nuclear 
attacks. Since the legislators of country x know that the NPT contains 
a provision that permits withdrawal from the treaty on only 90 days' 
notice, these members of parliament promptly decide--after very little 
debate--to enact a new law authorizing the development for deployment 
of nuclear weapons, so long as this is accomplished within, or 
consistent with that treaty. The law then goes on to define specific 
technical characteristics of such weapons that can be developed without 
breaching the treaty. And the only weapons that are taboo under this 
new law are those that exceed these standards and that are actually 
detonated.
   On the 91st day of the international outcry over this incredible 
law, country x unveils a robust nuclear arsenal without ever having 
breached the treaty, leaving the whole world to ask, what went wrong?
   Now forget country x. Let us take some concrete examples. What if 
the Iranian parliament decides that this approach makes great sense as 
an approach to NPT implementation? What if the Russian Duma someday 
decides that this is also the way to go in insert its own most-favorite 
notions of defense policy into its laws implementing the START II 
Treaty? What if Syria becomes a party to the Biological Weapons 
Convention and passes a law 

[[Page S 12660]]
permitting the development for deployment of certain specific types of 
biological weapons for what it asserts are purely defensive purposes? 
What if Germany decides that its commitments under the Missile 
Technology Control Regime only extend to missile systems that are 
actually demonstrated or flight-tested above the standard 500 kg 
payload/300 km range guidelines? What if each of the 159 countries that 
have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention decides to enact new laws 
defining the specific technical characteristics of chemical weapons 
that are controlled under that treaty? And specifically with respect to 
the ABM Treaty, if it had been acceptable in the last decade to develop 
for deployment weapons systems and components that are banned under the 
ABM Treaty, would Russias notorious Kraysnoyarsk radar station have 
violated that treaty?
   Mr. President, I submit that this is not the way to go about 
interpreting treaties. This is not the way to stop proliferation. This 
is not the way to pursue arms control. This is not the way to enhance 
the national security interests of the United States. And this surely 
does not serve the interests of international peace and security. Yet 
this, I regret to say, is the essence of the approaches now before the 
Senate with respect to the development and deployment of missile 
defense systems that are not allowed by the ABM Treaty.
   Though I disagree with this aspect of both of these approaches, the 
substitute has the advantage of at least not requiring the immediate 
deployment of prohibited missile defense systems. It continues to 
suffer, however, from several important weaknesses. It contains vague 
and dangerously ambiguous language. For example, the term limited, as 
used in the term limited, accidental, or unauthorized, is undefined and 
hence expands significantly the scope of the national missile defense 
[NMD] scheme. It requires the development, with the express intention 
of deployment, of an NMD system that is not allowed under article I of 
the ABM Treaty. It requires the development of TMD systems, such as 
THAAD and Navy Upper Tier that have capabilities to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles, a mandate that conflicts directly with article VI 
of the ABM Treaty. It accepts the committee's one-sided and largely 
unsubstantiated assertions, or findings, about the grave imminent 
missile threat facing the United States, while ignoring several ways in 
which this threat has been attenuated in recent years. It fails to 
offer a single finding about the positive and constructive ways that 
the ABM Treaty has served key U.S. security interests. It repeals laws 
that require U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. And it places the 
U.S. Congress on formal record endorsing a unilateral U.S. definition 
of an ABM Treaty-permissible missile defense system.
   Yet despite all these serious weaknesses, the substitute is still 
marginally better for arms control and nonproliferation than the 
missile defense measure contained in S. 1026. In sum, though the 
substitute has clearly not de-fanged the missile defense proposal found 
in the bill, it has at least filed down some of its incisors.


                        From Fable to Nightmare

   I would now like to turn from the fable to the nightmare: namely, 
the missile defense language in S. 1026. On August 4, 1995, Anthony 
Lake wrote to the majority leader that ``* * * unless the unacceptable 
missile defense provisions are deleted or revised and other changes are 
made to the bill bringing it more in line with administration policy, 
the President's advisors will recommend that he veto the bill.''
  The letter addressed specific concerns over the ABM Treaty and NMD
   language. If enacted, the letter stated, these terms--

       . . . would effectively abrogate the ABM Treaty by 
     mandating development for deployment by 2003 of a non-
     compliant, multi-site NMD and unilaterally imposing a 
     solution to the on-going negotiations with Russia on 
     establishing a demarcation under the Treaty between an ABM 
     and a TMD system. The effect of such actions would in all 
     likelihood be to prompt Russia to terminate implementation of 
     the START I Treaty and shelve ratification of START II, 
     thereby leaving thousands of warheads in place that otherwise 
     would be removed from deployment under these two treaties. 
     [Emphasis added.]

  This language echoes similar views expressed by Defense Secretary 
Perry and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Shalikashvili. At issue here is not a duel between liberals or 
conservatives or Democrats and Republicans--at issue is the gain and 
loss to the national security of the United States from abandoning the 
ABM Treaty. By my reading, there is no contest.
  I do not believe that it in any way serves our national interest to 
set ourselves on a course to abrogate that treaty. It surely does not 
serve America's interests to encourage Russia--as this bill inevitably 
would--to develop its own multiple-site strategic ABM system, an action 
which would only weaken our own nuclear deterrent. The costs to cash-
strapped American taxpayers of repairing that damage could potentially 
mount into the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars.
  I cannot understand how the supporters of the bill's missile defense 
provisions can simultaneously claim to worry about what they call, 
``structural nuclear disarmament'' while they are also pushing for a 
course of action--abrogating the ABM Treaty--that would truly undercut 
the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It in no way serves 
our interests to encourage Russia to reconsider its commitments under 
the START I and START II treaties.
  And by derailing the strategic arms control process, the bill's 
missile defense language also aggravates the global threat of nuclear 
weapons proliferation. Coming on the heels of the successful permanent 
extension of the NPT, the bill's language on both missile defense and 
nuclear testing would weaken, rather than strengthen, the global 
nuclear regime based on the NPT, an outcome that would prove 
catastrophic to our global security interests.
  Few people realize that if there is no ABM Treaty, Russia will even 
be able to export its strategic missile defense capabilities, something 
that Article IX of the ABM Treaty now expressly prohibits. I doubt many 
of my colleagues are aware that the ABM Treaty is not just an arms 
control convention--it is also explicitly a nonproliferation treaty. 
Article 9 reads as follows:
  To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party 
undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside 
its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this 
Treaty.
   Note that this language does not prohibit the United States from 
assisting its friends and allies to develop and deploy TMD systems. The 
treaty does, however, prevent both Russia and the United States from 
sharing strategic missile defense capabilities with other countries. 
And in the case of Russia, those capabilities include interceptors with 
nuclear warheads.
  It seems appropriate, therefore, that before we set ourselves on a 
course of abrogating the ABM Treaty, we should carefully examine the 
full implications for U.S. defense interests around the world of 
eliminating the only international constraint on the proliferation of 
these strategic missile defense systems.
   How will such proliferation affect the ability of the United States 
to respond to regional crises that might arise around the world in the 
years ahead? How will it affect the United States ability to project 
power? I am not satisfied that anybody has seriously weighed such 
considerations.
   The treaty, furthermore, does not only ban the horizontal or 
geographic spread of such missile technology. It also helps to 
constrain both the size and sophistication of the United States and 
Russian nuclear weapon stockpiles--in short, the ABM Treaty also 
constrains the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. By banning 
the deployment of national strategic missile defense systems, the 
treaty works to protect the effectiveness and reliability of the US 
nuclear arsenal and thereby works to stabilize nuclear deterrence. 
Abandonment of the treaty will trigger a new offensive nuclear arms 
race, as leaders both here and in Russia will have to find new ways to 
defeat these new missile defense systems.
  Yet I have seen little indication in the process of reviewing this 
proposal
 
[[Page S 12661]]

that anybody here has considered how these particular side effects of 
the bill's ABM proposals--in particular the proliferation-related 
aspects of these proposals--would affect the full range of U.S. 
national security interests around the world.
   Even our allies, Britain and France, would be affected--the collapse 
of the ABM Treaty would mark an end to any hopes of encouraging these 
countries to engage in deep cuts of their nuclear stockpiles. And I 
cannot believe for a minute that China would sit by as its neighbors 
ringed its borders with strategic missile defense capabilities. Among 
China's many options to respond to such a development would be a 
dramatic expansion of its offensive nuclear capability. The next 
crisis, predictably, would be the collapse of the NPT itself as country 
after country submits its 90-day withdrawal notice--following the 
course taken by Country X.


                         Some Specific Concerns

   I would now like to outline my specific concerns with these 
proposals--concerns which I will address section by section.
   Sec. 232 (Findings): Both the bill and the compromise language on 
missile defense lack any congressional findings acknowledging the 
positive and constructive ways that the ABM Treaty has advanced 
America's arms control and nonproliferation interests. In failing to 
address these benefits of the treaty, and in failing to recognize that 
in some ways the missile threat to the United States has actually 
lessened in recent years, the proposed findings seriously 
mischaracterizes--and in my view overstates--the missile proliferation 
threat facing the United States.
   Few of us here will disagree that the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, especially nuclear weapons, jeopardizes our security. 
Many, however, would disagree that developing systems that would be in 
violation of the ABM Treaty is the right way to go about addressing 
that threat, especially when there are so many ways of delivering such 
weapons other than by missile.
   Sec. 233 Policy: With respect to the Policy section, the substitute 
is ambiguous on the fundamental issue of the U.S. intent with respect 
to compliance with the its obligations under ABM Treaty. To the limited 
extent that it addresses this issue, it focuses only on compliance with 
a particular version of the ABM Treaty, namely, the treaty's 
obligations as they are unilaterally interpreted in this bill. The 
language also sets in gear significant initiatives without any prior 
consensus among the parties to the treaty. The terminology about 
``multiple-site'' deployments will apply to systems that have 
capabilities against strategic missiles. And given that all missile 
attacks are limited by the laws of nature, it is by no means clear what 
these current proposals mean by the term ``limited'' missile attack.
   Indeed, this term ``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' combines 
the features of a wild card and an elastic clause: though precedents 
have already been set using this undefined term, I would not want 
Russia to enact legislation unilaterally defining its own 
interpretation of these terms. Changes such as these to an important 
international agreement should be made on the basis of mutual 
understandings between the parties and in accordance with the 
conventional amendment and ratification process, rather than dictated 
by statute.
   References in these proposals to the right to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty are either redundant--since this right is quite explicit in the 
treaty--or outright extortionary, since they seek to prescribe a 
specific diplomatic outcome which only negotiations can appropriately 
accomplish.
   The compromise proposal also contains language that questions the 
continued importance of nuclear deterrence as a basis of U.S. national 
security, despite considerable evidence that deterrence remains as a 
foundation of our national security and despite the lack of any viable 
alternative.
   Neither the original bill nor the compromise language addresses the 
issue of nuclear-armed BMD systems--it would surely seem to me that 
before we consider taking actions that will lead to multiple violations 
of the ABM Treaty, we should examine fully some of the consequences of 
that decision, especially with respect to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Many people forget that the ABM Treaty also prohibits the 
global spread of strategic ballistic missile defense systems. 
Considering that Russia has just such nuclear-capable systems, it 
hardly seems wise to set ourselves on a course to abandon a treaty that 
prevents the spread of just such technologies. As part of their efforts 
to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons as a basis of their 
security, both the United States and Russia might well consider 
pursuing an agreement to outlaw nuclear-armed missile defense systems.
   Sec. 234. TMD Architecture: The initial operational capability dates 
in this section and in section 235 (NMD Architecture) should be 
consistent with understandings reached between the parties to the ABM 
Treaty. THAAD and Navy Upper Tier should only be included in the Core 
Program if the parties to the ABM Treaty agree that such systems and 
their components are permissible under the treaty; the same should 
apply to space-based sensors including the Space and Missile Tracking 
System (SMTS), and to follow-on systems.
   Sec. 235. NMD Architecture: As I have already noted, the term 
``limited''--used both in the bill and the compromise to refer to 
future missile defense capabilities--is undefined in both proposals. 
Clearly, this term should not be defined only by one party to the 
treaty--if this term has a meaning which Russia does not share, it will 
only open the door to Russia legislating its own definitions of key 
terms not only in the ABM Treaty but also the START II treaty, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and possibly other important arms control, 
disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements.
   The compromise requires the development for deployment of an NMD 
system capable of being deployed at multiple sites, a policy that if 
implemented would violate the current text of the ABM Treaty. 
Development and deployment of NMD systems are matters that must be 
arranged pursuant both to negotiations and to existing treaty amendment 
procedures, including ratification.
   Similarly, space-based sensors should be developed only as agreed by 
the parties. I believe the President should at the very least be 
required to prepare a formal assessment of the arms control and 
nonproliferation implications of any systems being developed or 
deployed for purposes of NMD. References in this section to sea-based 
and space-based systems and expanded numbers of ground-based 
interceptors only invite the international community to doubt our 
willingness to live up to our ABM Treaty obligations not to develop or 
to deploy such systems.
   Sec. 236. Cruise Missile Defense Initiative: Both the compromise and 
the bill contain language addressing the dangers from the continued 
global spread of weapons of mass destruction. Yet both also fail to 
clarify that some of the most likely delivery systems for most weapons 
of mass destruction do not involve ballistic or cruise missiles. It 
seems to me that before we launch into framing defense initiatives 
around specific weapons systems, we should understand better the nature 
of the specific and anticipated threats they pose relative to other 
weapons systems.
   I can think of at least two other delivery systems that may pose a 
threat to US defense interests that is equal to or greater than the 
proliferation threat now posed from ballistic missiles--first, the 
capabilities of advanced strike aircraft (Pakistans F-16s come to mind 
here as just one example) to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and 
second, the threat coming from terrorists using such weapons. Spending 
tens and hundreds of billions on missile defense will not help us to 
address either of these clear and present dangers.
   Sec. 237. ABM Treaty: References in the compromise proposal to 
provisions of the treaty relating to the amendment and withdrawal 
process are unnecessary since such provisions are already law of the 
land. Including them only signals an intention to implement such 
rights. Neither proposal acknowledges some of the positive 
contributions the ABM Treaty has made to the national security of the 
United States. It should not be for United States
 
[[Page S 12662]]

alone, nor Russia alone, to define unilaterally key terms of this 
treaty--the process of interpretation must involve Russia and the 
normal process of making, ratifying, and amending treaties. Also the 
comprehensive review called for in the compromise proposal fails to 
include specifically an assessment of the full implications for U.S. 
diplomatic and security interests of a collapse of the ABM Treaty.
   Sec. 238. Prohibition on Funds: The velocity/range demarcation 
standard is unilateral--it has not yet been agreed by the parties. The 
implementation of the demonstrated capabilities standard should also be 
governed by mutual agreement of the parties. The specific prohibition 
on funding should only apply to systems that are not in compliance with 
the ABM Treaty as agreed by the parties. Since section 232 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 1995 remains law of the land, 
there is no need to repeat it in this bill with respect to the 
President's treaty-making powers.
   Sec. 241. Repeal of Other Laws: The current first-degree amendment 
follows the existing language in the bill by repealing outright 10 laws 
pertaining to missile defense. Some of those provisions are obsolete. 
But other parts of those laws--such as those dealing with the U.S. 
compliance with the ABM Treaty, the requirement for realistic tests, 
the importance of financial burden-sharing with our friends, the 
requirements for consultations with our allies, previous congressional 
findings about the positive value of the ABM treaty, and requirements 
for consultations between the parties to the treaty on activities 
relating to implementation.


                               Conclusion

   Thus to vote for the missile defense proposal in the bill amounts to 
a vote against the ABM Treaty, and a vote against that treaty is to 
vote for the proliferation not just of defensive missile systems, but 
for the proliferation of the strategic nuclear missiles that will be 
necessary to defeat those defenses. In a very real sense, the death of 
the ABM Treaty could well signal the deaths of both strategic nuclear 
arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. I cannot support any such 
proposal.
   I therefore urge my colleagues to oppose the committee language on 
missile defense. Let us by all means get on with the business of 
reducing external weapons threats to our country's security, a business 
the ABM Treaty makes legitimate with respect to TMD. But let us not 
retreat into a technological Fortress America as we would with the 
missile defense provisions in S. 1026.
   Today, we have before us a choice between one missile defense 
proposal that is a nightmare and another that is a fable. Given 
additional time, Congress may well have been able to construct a third 
option, one which built upon and acknowledged the important 
contributions that the ABM Treaty continues to make to our national 
security. But the schedule is such that we do not have such time. 
Accordingly, I will vote for the least bad of the two proposals before 
us.
   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at 
this point an analysis prepared by my staff of the missile defense 
provisions now before the Senate, and a table comparing key provisions 
of the ABM Treaty with the proposals found in the substitute amendment.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
Analysis of 1995 Missile Defense Proposals in the Senate (Submitted by 
                          Senator John Glenn)

       Last July, the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC) 
     reported out the FY96 defense bill (S. 1026), which contained 
     several provisions that would, if implemented, place the 
     United States in violation of the ABM Treaty (ABMT). Included 
     were provisions requiring the deployment of a multiple-site 
     national ballistic missile defense system and prescribing a 
     unilateral U.S. definition of the scope of systems subject to 
     the ABMT, thereby circumventing the ABMT formal amendment 
     process.
       Following widespread criticism of this proposal, Senators 
     Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and Warner offered in August a bipartisan 
     substitute. Though the substitute does not require immediate 
     deployment of BMD systems in violation of the ABM Treaty, the 
     substitute does not resolve several outstanding questions 
     about America's intentions with respect to its obligations 
     under the ABMT. The table in Annex 1 of this memo illustrates 
     some of the inconsistencies between the substitute and the 
     ABM Treaty.
       This memo (1) describes and analyzes the SASC missile 
     defense recommendations, and (2) describes and analyzes the 
     substitute proposal.


                             1. sasc action

       In summary, the bill moves U.S. policy: (a) away from 
     nuclear deterrence (mutual assured destruction); and (b) away 
     from several ABMT prohibitions (including: multiple-site 
     deployments, ABM systems based at sea and in space, giving 
     TMD systems capabilities to intercept strategic missiles, 
     space-based sensors useful against strategic systems, etc.). 
     The bill contains a unilateral U.S. definition of an ABMT-
     permissible system. The bill also limits the negotiating 
     flexibility of the President and prohibits the President from 
     spending funds to implement more restrictive ABM controls.
       The current text of S. 1026 was reported out of Committee 
     on July 12. Subtitle C of Title II (RDT&E) contains 11 
     sections pertaining to ``missile defense.'' The proposed 
     language covers theater missile defense (TMD) against theater 
     ballistic missiles (TBMs), national missile defense (NMD) 
     against strategic ballistic missiles (SBMs), announces 
     several findings and new national policies covering both 
     systems, alters the U.S. policy toward the ABMT, and repeals 
     10 other missile defense laws. While not quite abrogating the 
     treaty outright, the SASC language still sets the US on a 
     course out of the ABMT.

                          Findings and policy

       In S.1026, Congress ``finds'' that: missiles are posing a 
     ``significant and growing threat'' to the US; the development 
     of TMDs ``will deny'' US adversaries an option for attacking 
     the US and its allies; the intelligence community sees a 
     growing missile threat; TMDs will ``reduce the incentives'' 
     for missile proliferation; the ABMT's distinction between 
     strategic and non-strategic missile defense is ``outdated''; 
     nuclear deterrence (mutual assured destruction) is ``not a 
     suitable basis for stability''; TMD and NMD enhance strategic 
     stability by reducing incentives for first-strikes; export 
     control and arms control regimes are not alternatives to TMD 
     and NMD; and the ABMT prevents the US from establishing a 
     limited missile defense.
       In response to such findings, the SASC favors the following 
     US policies: to ``deploy as soon as possible'' TMDs; ``deploy 
     a multiple-site national missile defense system''; ``deploy 
     as soon as practical'' effective defenses against ``advanced 
     cruise missiles''; invest in R&D for follow-on BMD options; 
     employ ``streamlined acquisition procedures'' to speed BMD 
     deployments; and ``seek a cooperative transition'' away from 
     the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.

                          System Architecture

       With respect to TMD, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 
     shall establish a ``top priority core theater missile defense 
     program'' consisting of (by year of deployment) PAC-3 (1998), 
     Navy Lower Tier (1999), THAAD (2002), and Navy Upper Tier 
     (2001). These systems are to be interoperable and are to 
     exploit air and space-based sensors and battle management 
     support systems. The Corps SAM and BPI systems will be 
     terminated. The SecDef shall develop a plan for deploying 
     follow-on systems. The SecDef shall submit a report in 60 
     days specifying a plan to implement these provisions.
       With respect to NMD, the SecDef shall develop a NMD system 
     for deployment by 2003 consisting of: ground-based 
     interceptors in such locations and numbers as are necessary 
     to provide a defense of Alaska, Hawaii, and CONUS against 
     ``limited ballistic missile attacks; fixed ground-based 
     radars and space-based sensors; and battle management/
     command, control, and intelligence (BM/C3).'' SecDef shall 
     develop an ``interim'' capability by 1999 as a ``hedge 
     against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile 
     threats.'' SecDef shall use ``streamlined acquisition 
     procedures'' to expedite NMD deployment, while saving costs. 
     SecDef shall submit a report in 60 days on the implementation 
     of this law and analyzing options to improve the system, 
     including: additional ground-based interceptors or sites; 
     sea-based missile defense systems; and space-based kinetic 
     energy and directed energy systems.
       With respect to cruise missiles (CMs), SecDef shall 
     undertake ``an initiative'' to ensure effective defenses 
     against CMs. He shall submit a plan in 60 days.

                         The ABM treaty (ABMT)

       The bill offers a sense of the Congress that the Senate 
     should undertake a review of the ``value and validity'' of 
     the ABMT and should consider establishing a ``select 
     committee'' to review the ABMT and that the President should 
     cease negotiating any understandings on the ABMT until this 
     review is completed. The sense of the Congress also includes 
     a requirement for SecDef to submit a declassified negotiating 
     history of the ABMT. The bill provides a unilateral 
     demarcation line to designate permissible BMD systems: if a 
     system or component has not been ``flight tested in an ABM-
     qualifying flight test'' (defined in the bill as a flight 
     test against a missile target that is flying over a range of 
     3,500 km or at a speed of greater than 5 km/second), it is 
     not covered by the ABMT. The Senate finds, however, that 
     these parameters are ``outdated'' and hence should be 
     ``subject to change'' after the Senate review of the ABMT. 
     The bill prohibits the expenditure of funds to implement 

[[Page S 12663]]
     any lower standard. SecDef is to certify annually that no US BMD system 
     is being constrained more than as provided in this bill.

                           Budget categories

       For budgetary purposes, the bill identifies the following 
     as of the national BMD program: PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, 
     THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, Other TMD, NMD, and Follow-On and 
     Support technologies.

                         Repeal of 10 BMD Laws

       The SASC bill repeals the following, including several 
     significant provisions:
  1. In the MDA91: Congress endorsed US efforts to work with Russia on 
strengthening nuclear command and control, reduce strategic weapons, 
and strengthen nonproliferation efforts. Congress also: defined the US 
BMD system as directed against ``limited'' ballistic missile threats 
declared that this system shall be ``ABM Treaty-compliant'' and limited 
to ``100 ground-based interceptors''; urged the President to pursue 
``discussions'' with the Soviet Union to clarify what is permissible 
with respect to space-based missile defenses and to permit other 
changes in the ABMT (including adding sites, using space-based sensors, 
etc); required the SecDef to include ``burden sharing'' in a BMD 
report; clarified that the ``limited'' BMD defense capability shall 
only cover threats ``below a threshold that would bring into question 
strategic stability''; and provided $4.1 billion for SDI projects, 
including $465 million for ``space-based interceptors'' (including 
Brilliant Pebbles).
       2. In sec. 237 of the NDAA94: the SecDef was prohibited 
     from approving any TMD project unless it passed ``two 
     realistic live-fire tests.''
       3. In sec. 242 of the NDAA94: Congress sought to increase 
     burden-sharing of BMD development costs; the SecDef was to 
     prepare a plan of cooperation with allies (specifically cited 
     were NATO, Japan, Israel, and South Korea) to avoid 
     duplication and reduce costs; the section contains a sense of 
     the Congress that whenever the US deploys a TMD system to 
     defend a country that has not provided financial support for 
     that system, the US should consider ``whether it is 
     appropriate to seek reimbursement'' to cover some of the cost 
     of that deployment; the section also
      established a special ``Theater Missile Defense Cooperation 
     Account'' (subject to audit by GAO) to receive foreign 
     funds to support TMD development.
  4. In sec. 222 of the DDAA86: Congress prohibited the deployment of 
any ``strategic defense system'' unless the President first certifies 
that the system is both ``survivable'' and ``cost effective'' (i.e., 
that it ``* * * is able to maintain its effectiveness against the 
offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive 
countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to 
overcome it'').
  5. In sec. 225 of the DDAA86: Congress found that the President's 
Commission on Strategic Forces had declared in its report to the 
President dated 3/21/84 that ``One of the most successful arms control 
agreements is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972''; noted that 
the Secretary of State has stated that ``* * * the President has 
explicitly recognized that any ABM-related deployments * * * would be a 
matter for consultations and negotiation between the Parties''; and 
issued a sense of Congress that it ``fully supports the declared policy 
of the President * * * to reverse the erosion of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty of 1972,'' that Congress's support for SDI ``does not 
express or imply an intention on the part of Congress that the United 
States should abrogate, violate, or otherwise erode such treaty,'' that 
such funding ``does not express or imply any determination or 
commitment on the part of the Congress that the United States develop, 
test, or deploy ballistic missile strategic defense weaponry that would 
contravene such treaty,'' and that funds ``should not be used in a 
manner inconsistent with any of the treaties commonly known as the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space 
Treaty, or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.''
  6. In Sec. 226 of the NDAA88/89: The SecDef was prohibited from 
deploying ``any anti-ballistic missile system unless such deployment is 
specifically authorized by law after the date of enactment of this 
Act.''
  7. In Sec. 8123 of the DDApA89: This was a sense of the Congress on 
SDI. It said SDI ``should be a long-term and robust research program'' 
to provide the U.S. with ``expanded options'' to respond to a ``Soviet 
breakout'' from the ABMT and to respond to other future Soviet arms 
initiatives; such options ``can enhance'' U.S. ``leverage'' in arms 
reductions negotiations; funding levels ``must be established using 
realistic projections of available resources''; and the ``primary 
emphasis'' on SDI should be ``to explore promising new technologies, 
such as directed energy technologies, which might have long-term 
potential to defend against a responsive Soviet offensive nuclear 
threat.''
  8. In Sec. 8133 of the DDApA92: Congress here reached several 
findings about the implications for our NATO allies of modifying the 
ABMT, including--that all of our NATO allies ``have in the past been 
supportive of the objects and purposes of the ABM Treaty''; that 
``changes in the ABMT would have profound political and security 
implications'' for these allies and friends of the U.S.; and that 
before seeking to negotiate any changes in the treaty, the U.S. should 
consult with U.S. allies and ``seek a consensus on negotiating 
objectives.''
  9. In Sec. 234 of the NDAA94: Congress reached several findings, 
including that: the MDA91 ``establishes a goal for the United States to 
comply with the ABM Treaty''; DoD is ``continuing to obligate hundreds 
of millions of dollars'' on development and testing of systems before a 
determination has been made that such items would be in compliance with 
the ABMT; and the ABMT ``was not intended to'' limit systems designed 
to counter modern TBMs ``regardless of the capabilities of such 
missiles'' unless such TBMs ``are tested against or have demonstrated 
capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.'' The 
SecDef was required to conduct a review of several listed BMD systems 
to determine if such systems (including Brilliant Eyes) ``would be in 
compliance with the ABM Treaty.'' The SecDef shall immediately notify 
Congress if there is any compliance problem in pursuing advanced TMDs 
and describe the problem. The bill attached funding limitations pending 
submission of the report.
  10. In Sec. 235 of the NDAA95: This section listed 13 program 
elements for the BMDO, for budgetary purposes.

                     Analysis of the SASC Language

  The SASC language establishes a policy of deploying a multiple-site 
national ABM system--this cannot be implemented without either amending 
or abrogating the ABMT. Amending the treaty would permit the Russians 
to deploy their own multiple-site system, including enhanced BMD 
features ostensibly intended only for TMD systems but which would have 
some significant capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles. The 
measure thus focuses only on what may be potentially gained from 
expanded BMD efforts, and ignores what may be potentially lost--
including the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the ABMT 
itself, the START process, and the NPT, as the strategic arms reduction 
process comes to a halt amid new missile defense developments.
  The committee text also places into law a unilateral U.S. definition 
of systems that can be developed within the ABMT--under that treaty, 
such changes are supposed to be arranged by through an amendment 
process based on mutual agreement of the Parties. A unilateral U.S. 
definition would serve as a dangerous precedent inspiring Russia to 
insert its own ``most-favorite-notions'' of BMD into its own statute 
books. Moreover, the 5 km-second/3500 km range demarcation line is well 
above the parameters of most TBM systems today (which fly at about 2 
km/sec), yet dangerously close to the slowest SBM systems (which fly at 
between 6-7 km/sec). Thus the Committee language serves to: blur the 
distinction between strategic and theater systems; raise the risk of 
technological surprise and treaty ``break out'' activities; complicate 
treaty verification (given the greater growing ambiguity over which 
systems are strategic and which are theater); and jeopardize the 
strategic arms reduction process.
  The Committee language also repeals several laws that specifically 
required U.S. adherence to the ABMT and that required burden-sharing in 
the form of increased financial contributions from our allies for BMD 
systems.
  The premise of all the SASC proposals are the findings that the U.S. 
is now facing a serious missile threat and
 
[[Page S 12664]]

that this threat is growing. Both of these premises are open to 
question.
  There are at least six rebuttals to the proposition that the U.S. is 
now facing a ``serious and growing threat'' that requires either the 
amendment or abrogation of the ABMT to counter--
  (1) A Growing Threat? In April 1987, President Reagan announced the 
establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime to regulate 
international commerce in goods relating to missiles that are capable 
of delivering a 500 kg warhead a distance of 300 km. Since that time, 
Congress has heard Administration spokesmen repeatedly testify about 
the 15-20 countries that either now have such missiles or are 
developing them (or may have the capability to develop them). Yet the 
number of countries alleged to be developing such missiles has 
remained, to a considerable extent, constant since the MTCR was 
established.
  Arguably, the worst missile threats facing the U.S. are those that 
involve the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs, including 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) against U.S. territory, U.S. 
forces, or U.S. allies. The most potentially destructive threat comes, 
and will continue to come for the foreseeable future, from Russia's 
nuclear-tipped ICBMs--a situation that will likely persist for quite a 
while. Ironically, nothing would be more effective in encouraging 
Russia both to halt its nuclear disarmament activities and to expand 
its missile fleet than if the United States decides to deploy--or even 
prepare to deploy--a multiple-site national missile defense system in 
contravention of the ABMT. The ABMT has succeeded in permitting the 
superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals because the treaty gives 
each country high confidence in the credibility of its nuclear 
deterrent. Eliminating or watering down that treaty is thus the wrong 
way to go about alleviating the worst nuclear and missile threats now 
facing the United States.
  The worst missile threat to the U.S. is, in short, the old missile 
threat, not a new one. The U.S. has a big stake in the success of the 
START/ABM process: its success will mean that America's worst missile 
threat will be a declining threat.
       Is the global WMD proliferation threat--serious though it 
     is--growing? If not,
      then the global missile threat may not be as grave as is 
     commonly believed.
  Support for international nonproliferation regimes provides one 
indicator of the WMD proliferation threat. As of August 1995, the NPT 
has 178 parties; over 159 countries have signed the CWC and 135 
countries have ratified the BWC. Though some parties may well be in 
violation of those treaties, it is difficult to deny that these three 
treaties enjoy widespread, almost universal international support, and 
that this support is growing. The rush is on to get rid of chemical and 
biological weapons, not to acquire them. The stockpiles of the nuclear 
weapon states are going on a downward, not an upward, trend. If the 
CTBT is successfully concluded in 1996, there will be no more nuclear 
explosions anywhere for any purpose. Progress is being made on a cutoff 
of the production of fissile nuclear material for weapons or outside of 
safeguards. To point to the illicit weapons activities of a few states 
is not to suggest the existence of a new international proliferation 
norm.
  Moreover, the interest that Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and 
Israel have shown in developing long-range missile capabilities needs 
to be interpreted in light of other international trends. Over the last 
three decades, the following surface-to-surface missiles have either 
been cancelled or are going nowhere: South Korea's NHK-1; Taiwan's Chin 
Feng (``Green Bee''); Argentina's Condor II; Egypt's al-Zafir, al-
Kahir, Ar-Ra'id, and Vector; Saudi Arabia's CSS-2; Iraq's Al-Hussein; 
Iraq's Al-Abbas; Iraq's Badr-2000; Brazil's SS-300; the Israel/Iran 
``Flower'' project; the Libyan Otrag rocket program; all of the United 
States and ex-Soviet INF missiles; the disarmed and to-be-dismantled 
ICBM's in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the South African missile 
and space launch vehicle program; the China/North Korean DF-61; and 
several others. It is wrong, therefore, to declare without 
qualification that the missile threat against the United States is only 
growing--in some respects it continues to jeopardize U.S. interests, 
but in other respects the threat is arguably declining.
       (2) Clear and Present Dangers. The worst dangers come from 
     the further proliferation and use of WMDs by additional 
     countries or subnational groups. As for systems of delivering 
     such weapons, Congress's preoccupation with missiles--
     typically ballistic missiles--is baffling. The massive 
     investments called for in the legislation for TMD and NMD 
     will surely not address the worst (albeit unlikely) military 
     threat now posed to the United States involving the delivery 
     of WMD--that is, an all-out Russian strategic nuclear attack 
     on the United States. It will do little to address attacks 
     coming by means of cruise missiles and various remote piloted 
     vehicles. And it will do nothing to prevent or deter a 
     country of subnational group from deploying a weapon of mass 
     destruction in the U.S., against U.S. citizens or troops, or 
     against U.S. allies by means of any of several non-missile 
     delivery systems that would be available for such a mission, 
     at a fraction of the cost.
  Among the most attractive delivery systems--in terms of ready 
availability, cost, reliability, and potential effectiveness--are 
advanced strike aircraft. These are delivery systems that are not 
regulated by any treaty or regime. As for national policy, the United 
States continues to export nuclear-capable strike aircraft or parts for 
such aircraft without even verification measures or host-country 
commitments to guarantee non-nuclear uses. Pakistan, for example, a 
country now under U.S. nuclear sanctions, continues to make commercial 
U.S. purchases of spare parts for its F-16 nuclear weapon delivery 
vehicles. France, meanwhile, is seeking buyers for its Mirage 2000 
wherever they can be found. The F-16C aircraft has a maximum weapons 
load of 5,400 kg and a combat radius of 930 km; the Mirage 2000 has a 
maximum weapons load of 6,300 kg and a combat radius of 700 km. By 
comparison, the North Korean Nodong--now under development--will have a 
reported 1000 kg payload and a 1000 km range.
  In November 1991, Stanford University's Center for International 
Security and Arms Control issued a report entitled, ``Assessing 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control,'' authored by a panel 
of participating experts that included three senior officials now in 
the Clinton Administration, including the current Secretary of Defense, 
William Perry. The report found that: ``Advanced-strike aircraft are 
generally as capable as missiles, and in many cases more capable, for 
delivering ordnance, so it is logical to devote, at minimum, comparable 
efforts to their control.'' Yet US efforts, epitomized by the SASC bill 
and past BMD legislation, continue both to neglect this clear and 
present threat. These efforts instead focus shortsightedly on (a) the 
ballistic missile threat, (b) developing technological defenses against 
such missiles, while (c) neglecting the potentially negative military 
consequences of developing such defences, and (d) ignoring other means 
of addressing the missile proliferation threat (i.e., prevention, 
preemption, and deterrence).
  (3) Future Threats. Both the CIA and the DIA directors have recently 
testified that the U.S. will not face a new missile proliferation 
threat for at least a decade. As stated earlier, even North Korea's 
Taepodong will at best be able to reach remote U.S. island territories 
sometime in the 21st Century, assuming that country remains in 
existence and its missile development program is successful.
  Also, if the ballistic missile threat to Israel, Japan, and South 
Korea were so immediate and direct, the gravity of this threat is still 
not reflected in national funds invested by these countries in missile 
defense ventures. Though these countries have expressed interest in TMD 
systems, the United States is still paying most of the bills.
  Missiles are not the only means by which a country could attack the 
United States. A variety of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) could serve as potential delivery vehicles for WMDs, including 
nuclear weapons. For example, the Tier 2+ experimental reconnaissance 
UAV now under development in the United States, was described in the 
July 10, 1995 issue of
 
[[Page S 12665]]

Aviation Week as having the following performance characteristics: a 
14,000-mile range, a 2,000-pound payload, an ability to stay in flight 
for more than 42 hours, and a maximum altitude of 65,000 feet. The 
United States, and U.S. forces abroad, may well be facing a graver 
threat from such aircraft in the next decade than they will face from 
ballistic missiles. Smuggled or covertly deployed WMDs also remain a 
serious threat, as do WMDs deployed by means of land vehicles or a wide 
variety of ships.
       Proponents of the new legislation raise the specter of 
     North Korean missile attacks against the United States. Yet 
     North Korea is still many, many years away from having a 
     missile that could reach the continental United States, or 
     even Alaska or Hawaii--assuming it would want to launch such 
     a missile even if it had such a capability. Nevertheless, the 
     SASC's missile defense proposal would lead the United States 
     out of the ABMT (and thereby scuttle the START process), a 
     multi-billion-dollar proposal intended largely to cope with 
     the Taepodong's hypothetical worst-case capabilities in the 
     21st Century. An alternative to this approach would be to 
     concentrate more on discouraging North Korea from building 
     such missiles in the first place.
  Furthermore, certain trends in advanced conventional weaponry may 
rival or surpass the threat to U.S. forces in the years ahead that will 
come from ground-to-ground missiles--especially with respect to 
increasing accuracy and stealthiness of advanced conventional weapons.
  (4) Missiles Have Not Historically Been Decisive. From Hitler's V-2 
rocket bombardment of London, through the Iraq/Iran war of the cities, 
to the recent war in Kuwait, missiles have not proven to be a decisive 
weapon, either as an offensive weapon or as a weapon of deterrence. 
Israel's significant technological edge in nuclear and missile 
technology did not prevent it from being repeatedly attacked by 
modified Iraqi Scuds; nor did the Patriot antimissile batteries deter 
Iraq from launching repeated missile strikes on both Israel and Saudi 
Arabia. It is also not at all clear that the widespread deployment of 
TMD systems in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East would 
necessarily alleviate the nuclear weapons proliferation threat in those 
regions--it could even aggravate that threat by stimulating the search 
for new weapons designs and delivery systems.
  (5) BMD Proliferation. The ABMT is not just an arms control treaty. 
It is also a nonproliferation treaty, in two respects. First, Article 
IX prohibits Russia and the United States from exporting strategic 
missile defense systems or components covered by the treaty. If the ABM 
treaty collapsed, there would be no legal obstacle to Russia exporting 
highly-capable missile defense technology to hot spots around the 
globe, such as East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. The export 
of such systems could well foster or aggravate regional WMD and missile 
races. Some of Russia's BMD interceptors are reportedly nuclear 
capable. Others have characteristics (range, thrust, navigation 
systems, materials and coatings) very much like offensive ballistic 
missiles. The simulated offensive ballistic missile used as a
 target in testing the Israeli Arrow TMD interceptor, for example, is 
     another Arrow. Second, if horizontal (or geographical) BMD 
     proliferation becomes popular thanks to the collapse of 
     the ABMT, this will also stimulate more vertical 
     proliferation of both existing strategic nuclear weapons 
     and their delivery systems.
       (6) Alternatives to Missile Defense. To the extent that the 
     U.S. and its allies face missile proliferation threats, there 
     are more--and more effective--ways to approach this threat 
     than in searching for technological shields. The massive 
     funds that have been spent on missile defense have drained 
     valuable resources away from needed investments in 
     nonproliferation regimes, sanctions, export controls, 
     intelligence collection and sharing, active and preventive 
     diplomacy, conventional war-fighting capability, and other 
     such classic nonproliferation tools. Arguably, the U.S. 
     Marines remain today America's best ``ground mobile TMD 
     system,'' if one factors in cost, effectiveness, and treaty 
     considerations. Given past underinvestment in sharpening the 
     classic tools of nonproliferation, one should not be 
     surprised to see chronic nuclear and missile proliferation 
     threats.


               2. the nunn/levin/cohen/warner substitute

       In summary, while the substitute dulls the teeth of the 
     SASC's missile defense language, it surely does not 
     ``defang'' that language. The text still sets the U.S. on a 
     course out of the ABMT: it requires the ``development for 
     deployment'' of a multiple-site missile defense system 
     covering all U.S. territory; it accepts all the SASC findings 
     about the gravity of the missile threat; it questions the 
     value of nuclear deterrence; it establishes a provocative new 
     national policy to ``consider . . . the option of 
     withdrawing'' from the ABMT if Russia refuses to accept 
     unilateral U.S. proposed treaty amendments; it seeks the 
     accelerated development and ``streamlined'' acquisition of 
     systems that are not ABMT-compliant; it endorses the 
     ``demonstrated capabilities'' definition of an ABMT-compliant 
     system; and it endorses a unilateral U.S. definition of the 
     velocity and distance criteria for distinguishing strategic 
     from non-strategic missiles.
       The BMD provisions are broken down into the following 
     sections: findings (232); policy (233); TMD architecture 
     (234); NMD architecture (235); cruise missile defense 
     initiative (236); policy toward ABM treaty (237); spending 
     prohibition (238); BMD program elements (239); definition of 
     ABM treaty (240); and repeal of 10 laws (241). A copy of 
     these provisions appeared in the Congressional Record on 
     August 11.
       The substitute includes the following notable findings: (a) 
     the existence of a ``significant and growing'' missile threat 
     to the U.S. (later called an ``increasingly serious 
     threat''); (b) TMD can reduce incentives for proliferation; 
     (c) NMD can ``strengthen strategic stability and 
     deterrence''; (d) the doctrine of nuclear deterrence 
     (``MAD'') is ``questionable''.
       The bill would establish the following national policies 
     to: (a) deploy ``as soon as possible'' TMDs against TBMs; 
     (b)``develop for deployment'' a multiple-site NMD system (and 
     to ``consider'' withdrawing from the ABM treaty if Russia 
     refuses to agree to necessary treaty amendments); (c) develop 
     BMD ``follow-on'' options; (d) streamline the BMD acquisition 
     process; and (e) seek a ``cooperative transition'' away from 
     MAD.
       The SecDef is to report to Congress (before submitting the 
     FY 1997 defense budget) on the costs of RDT&E/deployment of 
     each BMD system (both TMD and NMD).
       The bill includes Navy Upper Tier system and THAAD within 
     TMD core program--both of which have been criticized as 
     having potential strategic ABM capabilities.
       Requires the SecDef to develop a NMD system by 2003 that 
     shall ``be capable of being deployed at multiple sites,'' 
     include space-based sensors, include a limited NMD ``hedge'' 
     capability by the year 2000 involving ``one or more'' sites. 
     SecDef shall conduct an analysis of options to improve NMD 
     effectiveness, including sea-based and space-based weapons, 
     and additional ground-based interceptors.
       The SecDef shall prepare a plan to upgrade U.S. cruise 
     missile defenses.
       The Senate should undertake a review of the ``value and 
     validity'' of the ABM treaty.
       The President cannot implement over the next fiscal year a 
     more restrictive definition of an ABM-permissible system than 
     that established in the bill--the bill establishes a 
     demarcation line at targets traveling at 3,500 km range, 5 
     km/second velocity, and the ban only covers deployment of 
     systems that are ``flight tested'' against targets fitting 
     this definition.
       The bill repeals 10 TMD/NMD-related laws (following the 
     SASC bill).

                  Analysis of the substitute proposal

       The table in Annex 1 compares this proposal with key 
     provisions of the ABMT. The most troublesome language 
     pertains to the requirement to develop for deployment a 
     multiple-site BMD system along with specific new systems 
     (e.g., space-based and sea-based) that are not now permitted 
     by the ABMT.
       There is a real danger that this language will be perceived 
     by the Russian parliament and by Russian military and 
     political leaders as a U.S. intention to abandon the treaty. 
     If this occurs, then the consequences for both arms control 
     and nonproliferation will be grave. We can expect the 
     following:
       The Start II treaty will be in jeopardy; Russia may even 
     consider withdrawing from Start I.
       The other nuclear weapon states (France, China, and 
     Britain) will be reluctant to join in the process of nuclear 
     arms reductions if Russia and the U.S. are no longer 
     constrained by the ABMT.
       Russia's reactions to the U.S. deployment of a national 
     multiple-site missile defense system could well include a 
     reversal or even an expansion of its offensive nuclear 
     arsenal and deployment of its own national multiple-site 
     defense against U.S. missiles--all of which would lead the 
     U.S. to consider following suit.
       There is adequate reason to believe that the Russians will 
     indeed interpret the U.S. policy to develop a national 
     multiple-site BMD system for deployment as an intention to 
     violate the ABMT, an action that could jeopardize the Start 
     process. Russian perceptions of the U.S. legislation will 
     have a profound impact upon the future of several strategic 
     arms control initiatives, as indicated in the following 
     statements:
       On August 17, Mikhail Demurin, a spokesman for the Russian 
     Foreign Ministry, told a wire service reporter that Russia 
     believes the legislation pending in the U.S. Senate on 
     missile defense would lead to the ``actual liquidation'' of 
     the ABMT.

[[Page S 12666]]

       On August 4, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake wrote 
     to the Senate Majority Leader that the NMD language in S. 
     1026 ``would effectively abrogate the ABM Treaty. . . . The 
     effect of such actions would in all likelihood be to prompt 
     Russia to terminate implementation of the START I Treaty and 
     shelve ratification of START II.''
       On July 28, Defense Secretary Perry wrote a letter to Sen. 
     Nunn in which he said that the SASC's BMD language would 
     ``put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty . . . 
     jeopardize Russian implementation of the START I and START II 
     Treaties . . . [and] threaten to undermine fundamental 
     national security interests of the United States.'' By 
     continuing to call for the development with the intention of 
     deploying a multiple site BMD system, the compromise language 
     keeps the U.S. on the ``pathway'' to abrogation.
       On June 28, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. 
     Shalikashvili, wrote to Sen. Levin that ``Because the 
     Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty with other 
     arms control issues--particularly ratification of START II 
     now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would deal in 
     isolation with unilateral U.S. legislation
      detailing technical parameters for ABM Treaty 
     interpretation. While we believe that START II is in both 
     countries' interests regardless of other events, we assume 
     such unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for 
     START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our 
     broader security relationship with Russia as well.''
       On June 20, Russian President Yeltsin submits the START II 
     treaty to the Russian Duma with a cover letter stating that 
     ``It goes without saying that the Treaty can be fulfilled 
     only providing the United States preserve and strictly 
     fulfill [the] bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972.''
       On April 27, Russian foreign ministry spokesman Nikita 
     Matkovskiy expressed alarm that the US has started testing 
     anti-missile defense systems that the US unilaterally claims 
     are non-strategic; Matkovskiy stated that ``In our opinion 
     the continuation of the policy of accomplished facts instead 
     of an intensive search for a mutually acceptable solution can 
     only complicate matters, if not drive them into a blind 
     alley.'' (Interfax)
       On April 23, Russian arms control expert Anton Surikov 
     stated that US BMD plans ``are in fact yet another attempt to 
     push through the back door the old Reagan SDI idea. That's 
     why they pose a considerable threat to strategic stability in 
     the world and provoke China and other `minor nuclear 
     countries' to sharply build up their nuclear missile 
     forces.'' (Itar-Tass) On August 4, Surikov specifically 
     claimed that the US Senate's BMD language ``prompts our 
     country to refrain from ratifying the START-2 Treaty and 
     reconsider some provisions under the START-1 one.'' (Itar-
     Tass)
       On March 28, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev commented on 
     prospects for Russian ratification of the START-II treaty, 
     noting that ``It is also essential that no attempts be made 
     to evade the ABM Treaty, since both treaties are closely 
     connected with each other.'' (Itar-Tass)
       On March 17, columnist Vladimir Belous wrote in Segodnya 
     that ``Some [US] senators even demand that the administration 
     stop the ABM negotiations, which can allegedly limit US 
     freedom of action. In fact the intention is to reanimate the 
     Reagan SDI program, although in a more modest form . . . It 
     must be admitted immediately that if the ABM Treaty is 
     effectively undermined, further implementation of the START I 
     Agreement will be in question.
       On March 7, Aleksander Piskunov, the vice-chairman of the 
     Duma Committee for National Defense, stated after a meeting 
     with American congressmen that ``It is absolutely obvious 
     that the discussion of the possibility of implementing the 
     ABM system will be fraught with serious consequences and will 
     tell negatively on the upcoming ratification of an agreement 
     on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons.'' 
     (Itar-Tass)
       On February 10, retired Major-General Vladimir Belous, 
     writing at length in Segodnya about ABMT-related 
     developments, concluded that each Party ``will give its own 
     interpretation to the parameters for delimitation and will be 
     guided by them, which could lead to the de facto undermining 
     of the treaty as a document of international law. Too much is 
     at stake for there to be haste or inconsistency on this 
     issue. The profound connection between strategic offensive 
     and defensive weapons must be pointed out once more. This 
     signifies at this stage that the ratification of the START-2 
     treaty by the Russian parliament is possible only when the 
     delimitation of strategic and `non-strategic' . . . has been 
     achieved and officially affirmed. And in no case before 
     that.''
       On January 18, Aleksandr Sychev wrote an article in 
     Izvestiya warning that ``The White House plan to avail itself 
     of a new ABM defense system gives rise to the suspicion that 
     the United States is trying to bypass the ABM Treaty and 
     attain military-strategic superiority.''
       On January 16, a senior Russian foreign ministry official 
     criticized a recent test of ``a tactical ABM system''; noting 
     that the test occurred ``at a time when both countries were 
     holding discussions . . . on distinctions between strategic 
     and tactical ABM systems,'' the official stated that 
     ``Washington's actions worsen the atmosphere at the 
     consultations and may have a negative effect on the entire 
     complex of security negotiations in general.'' (Interfax)
       The danger that Russia will interpret the substitute as an 
     intention to abrogate the ABMT is further aggravated by the 
     repeal in both the Committee's bill and the substitute of 
     provisions of existing law that require the United States to 
     remain in compliance with the ABMT (e.g., repeal of the 
     Missile Defense Act of 1991).
       The substitute includes in a Sense of the Senate certain 
     technical parameters to define the types of BMD systems that 
     are permissible under the ABMT: any system that has not been 
     tested against test targets flying at or above 5 km/second or 
     exceeding a 3,500 km range would be permissible. Though the 
     substitute is an improvement over the SASC bill's provision, 
     in that it is non-binding, it nevertheless places the 
     Congress in favor of adopting a BMD testing standard that has 
     not been agreed by the Parties to the ABMT. The substitute 
     also prevents the President from spending any funds in the 
     next fiscal year to implement any more restrictive standard. 
     Moreover, in establishing a US national policy that a BMD 
     system will be controlled only if it is actually flight 
     tested, the substitute departs from the ABMT's prohibition on 
     developing systems that have inherent capabilities to destroy 
     strategic ballistic missiles. The substitute language would, 
     therefore, put Russia on notice that the United States would 
     have no objection if Russia developed and even deployed 
     sophisticated strategic BMD systems as long as the systems 
     are not flight tested against the unilaterally-defined US 
     target criteria. Any subsequent Russian action to exercise 
     these options would serve to weaken the credibility of the US 
     nuclear deterrent.

           IMPACT OF THE SUBSTITUTE PROPOSAL ON THE ABM TREATY          
 [Although the text does not explicitly require the U.S. to abrogate the
  ABMT, the substitute MDA95 would require the Executive to take steps  
that would--if implemented without amending the treaty--violate both the
            letter and the spirit of that treaty. Examples:]            
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ABM Treaty (ABMT)           Missile Defense Act of 1995 (MDA95)     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preamble: considers that   The substitute effectively substitutes       
 ``effective measures to    ``expand'' and ``expansion'' for the ABMT   
 limit anti-ballistic       Preambles terms for ``limit'' and           
 missile systems would be   ``limitation.'' Sec. 232 (4) ``finds'' that 
 a substantial factor in    the deployment of ``effective defenses''    
 curbing the race in        against ballistic missiles ``of all ranges''
 strategic offensive arms   can reduce incentives for missile           
 and would lead to a        proliferation. Sec. 232 (5) refers to the   
 decrease in the risk of    difference between strategic and non-       
 outbreak of war            strategic ballistic missiles as a ``Cold War
 involving nuclear          distinction'' in need of review. Sec. 232   
 weapons''; proceeds from   (7) ``finds'' that BMD systems ``can        
 the premise that ``the     contribute to the maintenance of stability''
 limitation of anti-        as missile proliferation proceeds and as the
 ballistic missile          U.S. and the CIS ``significantly reduce the 
 systems . . . would        number of strategic forces in their         
 contribute to the          respective inventories.'' Such findings are 
 creation of more           inconsistent with the letter and spirit of  
 favorable conditions for   the preamble of the ABMT. The findings,     
 further negotiations on    moreover, are not balanced: they fail to    
 limiting strategic         address any of the strategic benefits that  
 arms''.                    the U.S. has gained from the ABMT.          
Article I: Bans the        Sec. 233 (2) establishes a policy to         
 following--deployment of   ``develop for deployment'' a ``multiple-site
 ABM systems for a          national missile defense system'' protecting
 ``defense of the           against limited missile attacks ``on the    
 territory of its           territory of the United States.'' Though    
 country,'' the provision   this language echoes a similar provision in 
 of a ``base'' for such a   sec. 231 of the Missile Defense Act of 1991,
 defense, and deployment    it omits language in that act requiring U.S.
 to cover an individual     compliance with the ABMT; indeed, the       
 region. In short, the      substitute repeals the MDA91 in its         
 ABMT allows limited        entirety. The substitute also opens up a can
 defenses against           of worms for treaty verifiers and arms      
 strategic missiles, but    control lawyers. In light of the bill's     
 they cannot be deployed    positive ``finding'' in sec. 234(4) about a 
 to protect the whole       defense against missiles ``of all ranges,'' 
 country. The treaty thus   the language could be read both to authorize
 permits missile defenses   a territorial, multi-site defense against   
 against both strategic     ``limited'' attacks involving strategic     
 and non-strategic          missiles--exactly what the treaty prohibits.
 missiles, but defenses     Note that the text does not define          
 against the former must    ``limited''--and given all missile attacks  
 be limited to one site     are in some ways limited, the language      
 (and even then, only       invites a treaty interpretation that would  
 certain types and          ultimately permit a defense against all     
 numbers of ground-based    missile attacks. If implemented without     
 interceptors are           modification of the treaty, this would      
 permissible) and           violate several key provisions of the ABMT, 
 defenses against the       including (but not limited to) the bans on: 
 latter may not be given    (1) multiple ABM sites; (2) ``development'' 
 capabilities against       of space-based and sea-based ABM components;
 strategic missiles.        (3) giving non-strategic BMD systems        
                            capabilities to counter strategic missiles; 
                            (4) developing a ``base'' for a territorial 
                            ABM defense; and (5) developing a missile   
                            defense for an individual region. The term  
                            ``territory of the United States'' covers a 
                            third of the globe, including: (in the      
                            Pacific) the Northern Mariana Islands,      
                            American Samoa, Guam, Baker and Howland     
                            Islands, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll,     
                            Kingman Reef, Midway Island, Palmyra, and   
                            Wake Island, and (in the Atlantic) the      
                            Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico--it is hard  
                            to imagine an ABM-compliant system that     
                            would be ``operationally effective'' in     
                            defending such an area without violating the
                            ABMT. Even if the scope were limited to     
                            Hawaii, Alaska, and the CONUS, this would   
                            cover an area of over 3.7 million square    
                            miles; the total area would be far greater. 
                            It would not be unreasonable to interpret   
                            this proposal as a statement of a U.S.      
                            intent to break the treaty. Indeed, the     
                            dictionary defines the preposition ``for''  
                            (as used in the phrase ``develop for        
                            deployment'') as meaning: ``with the object 
                            or purpose of.''                            
Article II: Defines a      Sec. 233 establishes a national policy of    
 strategic ABM system as    developing a NMD system that will be        
 including not just         ``operationally effective'' against limited 
 interceptors, launchers,   ballistic missile strikes (regardless of    
 and radars, but also       their origin or flight characteristics)     
 system components which    against ``the territory of the United       
 are ``undergoing           States.'' Sec. 235 defines the NMD          
 testing,'' ``undergoing    ``architecture'' and directs the SecDef to  
 . . . conversion,'' or     ``develop'' a specific system achieving this
 ``under construction.''.   goal. This provision is unilateral, given   
                            that Russia has not yet agreed to the BMD   
                            testing parameters found in the substitute. 
                            Sec. 235 (b) requires the SecDef to make use
                            of ``upgraded early warning radars'' and    
                            ``space-based sensors'' in the NMD plan.    
Article III: The ABM       Sec. 233 (2) establishes a policy to         
 system may cover only      ``develop for deployment'' a ``multiple-site
 one deployment area (of    national missile defense system'' protecting
 fixed dimensions) and      against limited attacks ``on the territory  
 consist of no more than    of the United States'' (see comments above).
 100 ABM interceptor        Such a deployment would thus violate both   
 missiles; also radar       Article III of the ABMT and Article I of the
 limitations. [This         ABM Protocol of 1974. Sec. 235 (a) requires 
 provision is pursuant to   the SecDef to ``develop'' an NMD system     
 Article I of the ABM       (covering CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii)        
 Protocol of 1974.].        involving ground-based interceptors         
                            ``capable of being deployed at multiple     
                            sites''.                                    

[[Page S 12667]]
                                                                        
Article V: Bans            Sec. 235 (a) requires the SecDef to          
 development, testing, or   ``develop'' a NMD system (covering CONUS,   
 deployment of (a) ABM      Alaska, and Hawaii) involving ground-based  
 systems or components      interceptors ``capable of being deployed at 
 which are air-based,       multiple sites''. The system is to include  
 space-based, or mobile     ``space-based sensors'' including the SMTS  
 land-based; (b) ABM        (formerly Brilliant Eyes) and BM/C3 systems.
 launchers for launching    Sec 235 (b) requires the SecDef, in         
 more than one              developing the NMD plan, to ``make use of . 
 interceptor at a time      . . one or more of the sites'' that will be 
 from each launcher; (c)    used as deployment locations. Same section  
 rapid reload ABM           requires the SecDef to prepare ``an analysis
 launchers.                 of options'' for developing NMD system that 
                            includes several systems that are not ABMT- 
                            compliant, including: ``additional''        
                            (presumably in addition to the 100          
                            authorized by the ABMT) ground-based        
                            interceptors at existing or new sites, sea- 
                            based missile systems, space-based kinetic  
                            energy interceptors, and space-based        
                            directed energy systems. This list amounts  
                            to a congressional requirement for the      
                            SecDef to evaluate ``options'' to violate   
                            the treaty--an action that could reasonably 
                            be interpreted in Moscow as a prelude to    
                            treaty abrogation.                          
Article VI: Bans giving    Sec. 235 (b) requires the SecDef to make use 
 non-strategic defensive    of ``upgraded early warning radars'' and    
 missiles, launchers, or    ``space-based sensors'' in the NMD plan. The
 radars any capabilities    purpose of the NMD system (sec. 235(a)) is  
 to counter strategic       to develop an ``operationally effective''   
 missiles, and not to       counter to a ``limited, accidental, or      
 test such missiles in an   unauthorized ballistic missile attack''--yet
 ABM mode; bans             the only systems permitted under the ABMT   
 deployment of future       that can be ``operationally effective''     
 radars for early warning   against limited/accidental/unauthorized     
 of strategic missiles      launches of strategic missiles can only be  
 except at locations        deployed at one site, cannot be deployed at 
 along the periphery of     sea/air/or mobile/or with rapid reloads,    
 its territory and          etc--none of these restrictions appears in  
 oriented outward.          the bill. Also, given that (a) the term     
                            ``limited'' missile attack is not defined,  
                            (b) every missile attack is limited in some 
                            way, and (c) there cannot be infinite       
                            missile attacks--the law effectively        
                            constitutes a green light to counter all    
                            missile attacks on all U.S. territory--just 
                            what the ABMT was created to prohibit. The  
                            substitute also distinguishes between a BMD 
                            system having an inherent capability against
                            strategic missiles and a BMD system that has
                            been ``tested against'' such missiles. This 
                            language contrasts sharply with the ABMT's  
                            ban on giving non-ABM systems capabilities  
                            to counter strategic ballistic missiles.    
Article IX: Bans           Sec 235(b) requires the SecDef to prepare    
 transferring ABM systems   ``an analysis of options'' for NMD including
 or their components to     sea-based missile systems, space-based      
 other states or            kinetic energy interceptors, and space-based
 deploying them ``outside   directed energy systems--all of these would 
 its national territory''.  presumably be ``outside the territory'' of  
                            the United States. Under a unilateral       
                            interpretation of its own obligations under 
                            the ABMT, Russia could in turn argue that it
                            is permissible for Russia to deploy its own 
                            ABM systems around the world to counter     
                            ``limited, accidental, or unauthorized''    
                            U.S. missile attacks. Russia could (if the  
                            ABMT is finally abrogated) also export whole
                            strategic NMD systems or critical components
                            to all destinations.                        
Article XIV: Allows        The amendment process provides no            
 amendments; but agreed     authorization for unilateral national       
 amendments shall enter     definitions of key terms of the treaty.     
 into force with the same   Moreover, the substitute misleadingly claims
 procedures governing the   (in sec. 237(a)(4)) that all the programs in
 entry into force of the    this bill ``can be accomplished through     
 treaty.                    processes specified within, or consistent   
                            with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the 
                            need and provides the means for amendment to
                            the Treaty.'' By the same reasoning, any non-
                            nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear   
                            Non-Proliferation Treaty could              
                            ``accomplish'' a robust nuclear weapons     
                            arsenal fully ``within'' the procedures of  
                            the NPT, simply by following the 90-day     
                            withdrawal procedure. Indeed, either the    
                            U.S. or Russia could go ahead and develop   
                            and deploy a completely impermeable,        
                            national Star Wars system fully ``within the
                            ABM Treaty'' simply by exercising that      
                            treaty's right to withdraw (or by not       
                            engaging in flight tests). The proposal thus
                            converts a prohibition into a right or even 
                            an obligation.                              
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I support the Nunn amendment identified as 
``The Missile Defense Act of 1995.'' Last week there was a curious, 
trumped up suggestion in a local newspaper that, somewhere along the 
line, I had mysteriously changed my position regarding the ABM Treaty. 
I have not, and the reporter who wrote the story knew it. I have always 
questioned the wisdom of the ABM Treaty, and I still do.
  In fact, this past April I wrote to President Clinton stating my 
belief that the current U.S. position on the ABM Treaty is rooted in 
cold war mentality. In 1972, Mr. President, neither United States nor 
Soviet negotiators had any way to envision the security environment of 
1995, characterized as it is by the rampant proliferation of ballistic 
and cruise missile technology.
  Even former Secretary of State Kissinger--one of the principal 
architects of the ABM Treaty--recently told me that he too feels that 
strategic stability in the post-Cold war world has moved beyond the 
current scope of the ABM Treaty. I use the word ``current'' because the 
ABM Treaty itself contains provisions for modification or legal 
abrogation.
  Mr. President, the national security interests of the United States 
should be our number one priority, and for that reason I have directed 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, in consultation with the Committee 
on Armed Services and other appropriate committees, to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the continuing value of the ABM Treaty for the 
purpose of providing additional policy guidance during the second 
session of the 104th Congress.
  In this regard, I reiterate my opposition to the creation of yet 
another special Select Committee replete with bureaucratic trappings, 
staff, and cost to the American taxpayer for the purpose of reviewing 
this treaty. We already have standing committees with the 
responsibility for making these determinations and recommendations, and 
we are going to do our job.
  In conclusion, I support the Nunn amendment for its foresight in 
developing a missile defense system to protect all Americans. Still, I 
confess having reservations about the amendment because I am convinced 
that it may compromise some of the decisive language and vision 
contained in the original bill.
  Mr. President, I reiterate my support for passage of the Defense 
Authorization Bill of 1995.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I intend to make a statement concluding the 
final passage of the authorization bill outlining some of the 
challenges I think we have in conference. I do think there have been a 
number of improvements made in the bill in the Chamber, most notably 
the Missile Defense Act, which I anticipate will be approved in a few 
minutes on a rollcall vote.
  There are a number of other challenges we have in conference if this 
bill is going to become law, and I will speak to that at passage of the 
authorization bill because I think it is enormously important that we 
work together in a cooperative way with the administration to make 
every effort to see that this bill will be one the President will be 
willing to sign.
  There are a number of items that are in the bill now which will not 
meet that definition according to what I have been reliably informed.
  So I will be working with my colleagues to both identify the 
administration objections and to see if those can be worked on as we go 
forward.
  I also think the committee chairman and all those who worked in good 
faith in the Chamber have a real stake in trying to make sure we get a 
bill that can become law this year, and I know we will work together in 
that regard.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my distinguished colleague, I 
know there are Senators on this side of the aisle, particularly 
Senators Kyl and Smith, who likewise feel very strongly about this 
amendment about to be voted on, so I am sure their voices will be heard 
as this matter proceeds to resolution in conference.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I was referring both to 
that matter and to other matters also. My comments were in general 
because there are a number of areas where the administration and the 
Secretary of Defense have noted they want to work to see that changes 
are made. So I was not speaking just on the Missile Defense Act but 
that was included in my remarks.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wanted to make sure I protected the 
interests of my colleagues who did work on this particular amendment 
about to be voted on.
  Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Has the time arrived now for 
the vote?


                           Amendment No. 2425

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 9:30 has 
arrived and the question now is on the Nunn amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma 
desires about 2 minutes. I suggest he be given 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
the Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.
  During the course of this recess, I averaged about seven events a day 
throughout the State of Oklahoma, and during that time I did not let an 
opportunity go by without letting the people of Oklahoma know how 
serious the threat of missile attack will be to the United States 
within just a very few years, probably as early as the year 2000.
  I also let them know that we do not have a national missile defense 
system, and probably the most significant thing we will do is to keep 
this system going so that when we have a friendlier 

[[Page S 12668]]
environment in the White House we can have this system ready to be 
deployed by the year 2000 or 2001.
  We know the threat that exists from North Korea right now. We know 
the threats that were articulated by Jim Woolsey, the chief security 
adviser to the President, when he said that we know of between 20 and 
25 nations that are working on weapons of mass destruction and the 
missile means of delivering those weapons.
  I know the negotiators worked very hard, and I commend the work 
product. However, I am a little disappointed it did not come out 
stronger. I intend to support the missile defense portion of this bill, 
but I think when we used the words that we want to deploy a national 
missile defense system and they changed it to ``develop for 
deployment,'' that is too weak. I think that when we are calling for 
highly effective missile defenses that we now have changed to 
``affordable,'' I suggest to you, Mr. President, there is nothing that 
is more significant going on right now than preparing for a national 
missile defense system.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
  The question is on agreeing to the Nunn amendment No. 2425. The yeas 
and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski] is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka] is 
absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 13, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 398 Leg.]

                                YEAS--85

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--13

     Boxer
     Bradley
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Pell
     Simon
     Smith
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Akaka
     Murkowski
       
  So the amendment (No. 2425) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am going to vote against this bill as 
I did in the Armed Services Committee. We have had a good debate on the 
Senate floor on the bill and I went into this debate hopeful that we 
would fix many of the problems I saw in the bill as reported.
  We have fixed some of those problems. For example, the Department of 
Energy provisions have been almost completely rewritten and all the 
provisions I objected to during committee deliberations have been 
corrected, with the exception of the hydronuclear testing provision 
which Senators Exon and Hatfield sought to eliminate.
  Elsewhere, unfortunately, the improvements have been modest. The 
Missile Defense Act of 1995 has not been changed enough for me to be 
able to support it. I commend Senator Nunn and Senator Levin for their 
efforts to defuse the worst features of the reported bill's missile 
defense provisions. I voted for their language as a substitute for the 
reported bill. But I believe that these provisions will still 
contribute to the unraveling of critical arms control agreements that 
would enhance our security far more than accelerating the development 
and deployment of a limited national missile defense system.
  Our current policy on missile defense, the Missile Defense Act of 
1991 as amended, makes it a goal of the United States to comply with 
the ABM Treaty while developing, and maintaining the option to deploy, 
a limited national missile defense. That is as far as we should go. We 
simply do not need to be making a several-hundred-million-dollar 
downpayment this year for a multitens of billion dollar national 
missile defense system.
  The bill has many other provisions which I oppose. Section 1082 
prohibits retirement of strategic weapons delivery systems that the 
nuclear posture review says we don't need. We cannot afford to keep 
every nuclear weapon delivery system, even those the Pentagon says we 
don't need, as bargaining chips for future arms control negotiations. 
We should not be sending the signal that we expect the START II and 
START I treaties to unravel and therefore intend to maintain the 
maximum nuclear capability possible within the START
 counting rules. If we end up with the nuclear posture review force 
structure, we will be quite adequately defended and will hardly have to 
sue for surrender if the cold war is revived.

  Mr. President, I fundamentally disagree with the need to add $7.1 
billion to the President's defense request. The weapons research and 
production funded with that money are only going to make our out-year 
defense budget problems worse. The committee has admitted that it has 
designed a defense bill that will require many billions of dollars in 
additional defense spending in future years beyond the budget 
resolution levels. Since I didn't support the first $33 billion added 
by the budget resolution, I can't support a bill that assumes even more 
spending in future years. I regret that the Kohl-Grassley effort to 
enforce budget discipline failed.
  I regret that my efforts to cut spending for unneeded antiarmor 
munitions and for an amphibious assault ship we don't need to buy 
before 2001, if then, were defeated in votes on the companion Defense 
appropriations bill. These are the tip of the iceberg of unneeded 
Member-interest spending in this bill and the companion appropriations 
bill.
  Mr. President, this bill is better than the House bill in most 
respects. The House bill has terrible provisions on discharging members 
who are HIV positive and on denying female service members and female 
dependents of service members the right to get an abortion in overseas 
military medical facilities with their own money. The House bill funds 
additional B-2 bombers with their multitens of billions of dollars out-
year funding requirement. The House bill has a fundamentally misguided 
provision that attempts to lock in the Bottom-Up Review force structure 
of 1.445 million active duty service members in permanent law. The 
House bill's combination of force structure and weapons systems 
provisions would require rapid real growth in defense spending in 
future years, even more rapid than the Senate bill's. This is simply 
not in the cards.
  Mr. President, we go to conference with two bad bills, each deserving 
a veto in my view. It's possible that we will strip the worst of both 
bills in conference and end up with a product acceptable to the 
President. But far more likely is a result that the President would 
have to veto.
  This is the first time in my 13 years in the Senate that I have voted 
against a Defense authorization bill. I do not do it lightly. I regret 
that I feel compelled to do this.
  I urge my colleagues who believe this bill spends too much money on 
unneeded and wasteful defense projects or who oppose its cold war 
revival provisions to join me in voting against this bill.
                                stratcom

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to bring to my colleagues' 
attention an important initiative by USSTRATCOM to provide the regional 
CINC's with mission-planning analysis for counterproliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM'S mission-planning analysis is of 
proven 

[[Page S 12669]]
value to regional commanders charged with responding to proliferation 
threats.
  In situations that could require putting American forces in harm's 
way, it is vital that all factors--the risks, benefits, and 
consequences of contingency plans--are thoroughly understood in 
advance. Once a crisis breaks out, it is too late to undertake the 
studies required to assess the potential threats.
  STRATCOM's unique planning analysis method gives commanders advance 
warning of danger by helping to identify and characterize current and 
emerging proliferation threats in the region. In cases when 
proliferation activities challenge U.S. interests and military 
operations, this unmatched mission-planning analysis capability allows 
defense planners to identify a variety of potential military targets; 
assess the effectiveness, consequences, and costs of military 
operations; and develop alternative contingency plans that maximize 
mission effectiveness, while minimizing the risk, cost, and collateral 
effects.
  Moreover, in the case of countries with embryonic weapons activities, 
STRATCOM's mission-planning analysis can provide the early and detailed 
alert that will allow policy makers to fashion effective export 
controls and other preventative measures to block weapons programs 
before they become a threat to the United States or other nations.
  Mr. McCAIN. I agree with Chairman Thurmond's assessment of 
USSTRATCOM'S mission-planning analysis activities and the importance of 
this program in supporting the broad spectrum of U.S. nonproliferation 
and counterproliferation goals. Unfortunately, during our markup of the 
fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, we were unaware that the 
program is not adequately funded in the budget request for STRATCOM.
  Without funding, analysis that commanders find essential for mission 
planning will at best be performed on an ad hoc basis or, worse, not at 
all. This issue is too vital and the risks of proliferation are to 
great to be ignored by the Senate.
  I hope the conferees will see fit to include the required funding for 
this program.
  disposal of obsolete and excess materials contained in the national 
                           defense stockpile

  Mr. BAUCUS. I would like to raise an issue with the manager regarding 
section 3402 of the bill. This section appears on page 587 and is 
entitled ``Disposal of Obsolete and Excess Materials Contained in the 
National Defense Stockpile.'' I understand that the purpose of this 
provision is to eliminate the strategic materials in the national 
defense stockpile with three exceptions. Is that correct?
  Mr. THURMOND. The provision recognizes that the stockpile contains 
materials which are excess to national security needs. At the direction 
of Congress, the Department of Defense conducted a thorough analysis of 
requirements and reported their findings.
  Mr. BURNS. And I understand that if the disposal of those materials 
is authorized by the Congress, the actual sales of the materials would 
be preceded by a recommendation by the Federal Market Impact Committee 
regarding the adverse domestic and foreign economic impacts on the 
private sector as a result of the proposed stockpile sales. Is that 
correct.
  Mr. THURMOND. No disposal from the stockpile may occur until the 
Market Impact Committee has analyzed the DOD plan for annual disposals. 
Congress must then concur with the annual materials plan before DOD can 
dispose of any materials. We maintain very tight control over these 
disposal and the procedures have worked very well.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Our concern is with the proposed sale of palladium and 
platinum in the stockpile. The national defense stockpile of palladium 
represents the equivalent of 20 percent of the annual demand for this 
metal, and the national defense stockpile of platinum represents 5 
percent of the national demand. The price of both of these metals is 
quite volatile. There is already some indication that just the 
recommendation for sale has had a depressive impact on the market 
price. Did the committee, when it included palladium and platinum among 
the materials to be disposed, examine the implications of disposition 
of palladium and platinum?
  Mr. THURMOND. Any disposals of those materials could only occur in 
small amounts over a very long period of time, according to market and 
impact conditions. Although no subcommittee hearing was conducted this 
year to review stockpile operations, we have been working closely with 
DOD on this matter and the final DOD report has been reviewed.
  Mr. BURNS. Historically, the National Defense Stockpile was created 
to provide a supply of strategic materials not available from domestic 
production or not available in sufficient quantities from domestic 
production to meet critical military needs. Since the palladium and 
platinum that is in the stockpile was acquired, the Stillwater Mine in 
Montana has begun production and, in fact, is the only mine in the 
world which is a primary palladium producer, platinum representing a 
secondary metal from that mine. Virtually all other palladium and 
platinum comes from South Africa and Russia.
  Mr. BAUCUS. The problem from Montana's perspective is that the 
Stillwater Mine has only recently begun to recover its costs of 
production as the price of palladium has stabilized at a level 
sufficient to justify operation of the mine. Because of the 
improvements in price, Stillwater Mining Co. has announced an intention 
to double its production of palladium beginning in mid-1997. The 
doubling of production will increase the number of high-paid 
underground mining jobs by approximately 400. In Montana, these jobs 
are extremely important to our economic health.
  Mr. BURNS. We are deeply concerned that there not be some activity 
with respect to the disposition of palladium and platinum in the 
stockpile which would undermine the basic economics of the Stillwater 
Mine and its proposed expansion. The question to the manager of the 
bill is whether the conferees, on behalf of the Senate, will support an 
amendment from the Montana delegation which will assure that disruption 
in the price of palladium and platinum not occur.
  Mr. THURMOND. I would emphasize that this legislation would not 
permit DOD to dispose of a single ounce of these materials. Any 
disposal requires approval by Congress of an annual materials plan and 
I suggest to my colleagues that the AMP is the mechanism we have 
established in law to protect domestic industry from disruption. The 
provision in this bill enables DOD to develop a plan for potential 
disposals in a manner which will not disrupt the market or disadvantage 
domestic producers. This procedure has worked very well in the past and 
any disruption has been minimized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996. In the course of debate 
on this legislation many improvements have been made to what was a 
dangerous piece of legislation.
  To mention two of these positive changes: The provisions on the 
Energy Department relating to our nuclear weapons activities have been 
greatly improved and the National Missile Defense Act of 1995 has been 
significantly altered.
  Unfortunately, these changes have not gone far enough to correct what 
I believe is still a flawed piece of legislation.
  I will oppose this legislation primarily for two reasons. First, the 
Missile Defense Act of 1995, though much improved over the original 
committee version, risks undermining the START treaties. Second, the 
bill provides for an increase of $7.1 billion in spending on programs 
that the Pentagon does want nor need.
  At this juncture, I want to make clear that I support a robust 
national defense. I do not think, though, that spending money on 
weapons systems that the military itself does not want and pursuing a 
national missile defense which could lead to a new arms race, as this 
bill does, is a good way to promote our national security.
  Senators Nunn, Levin, Cohen, and Warner worked hard to develop a 
compromise which altered some of the more egregious provisions of the 
committee-reported version of the Missile Defense Act of 1995. I 
commend them for their efforts, and I supported their amendment as a 
way to improve the original bill language.

[[Page S 12670]]

  The amendment does move us away from the original bill's commitment 
to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. Furthermore, the 
scope of the Strategic Missile Defense Program has been strictly 
limited to defending against unauthorized, accidental, and limited 
launches as opposed to a more ambitious defense against all types of 
ballistic missiles. The Congress is now guaranteed a decisive role in 
the decision to deploy any missile defenses. Finally, provisions which 
would have tied the President's hands in negotiating ABM Treaty 
amendments have been removed.
  Despite these significant changes, many problems remain with the 
Missile Defense Act of 1995. In particular, there is a real threat that 
the Russian Duma will not understand the legislative finessing we have 
engaged in to avoid a head-on collision with the ABM Treaty. The 
distinction between developing for deployment a national missile 
defense system versus deploying such a system are subtle at best. They 
may also be concerned about policy statements referring to the 
possibility of withdrawal from the AMB Treaty should negotiations not 
succeed.
  The danger is that these measures on our part will be viewed as 
violations of the ABM Treaty by the
 Russians. If the Russians believe that we are developing an effective 
national missile defense system in violation of the ABM Treaty, then 
they are likely to lose confidence in their offensive strategic 
arsenal, which has been shrinking thanks to arms control agreements 
like START I.

  To overcome that lack of confidence, they will seek to develop the 
means to counter our missile defense system. The cheapest way to do so 
is to overwhelm missile defenses. In order to retain the ability to do 
that they will stop implementing START I and refuse to ratify START II.
  The progress in arms control which accompanied the signing of the ABM 
Treaty over two decades ago will have been thrown by the wayside, and 
ironically we will have the kind of arms race in the post-cold-war 
world which we were able to avoid in the heyday of the cold war.
  Instead of focusing on a threat from ballistic missiles reaching our 
shores--a threat which we may never face--we should be concentrating 
our efforts on those areas where a realistic threat does exist. That 
threat primarily comes in the form of a rogue state or terrorist group 
gaining access to widely scattered fissile material in the former 
Soviet Union, fashioning a crude nuclear explosive device, and 
smuggling it into the United States by conventional means such as a 
boat.
  Our focus should be on securing the many tons of nuclear material in 
the former Soviet Union, and on tracking dangerous terrorist groups who 
may be potential customers for that material, not on defending against 
the remote possibility of a ballistic missile attack from outlaw states 
or groups.
  The second primary concern I have with this legislation is that it 
calls for wasteful spending. I want to repeat that I stand for a strong 
national defense. Unfortunately, the additional $7.1 billion in 
spending above the administration's request called for in this 
legislation does nothing to improve our national security.
  Not one penny of the increase is going into the operations and 
maintenance account, also known as the readiness account. The reason 
for that is that there is not a readiness problem under the Clinton 
defense budgets as some would like us to believe.
  Some of the $7.1 billion increase in spending, such as that for 
national missile defense, could lead to expenditures of tens of 
billions of dollars in future years if plans are fully carried out. 
This is an indirect way of forcing enormous increases in future defense 
budgets which are not included in current budget plans.
  At a time when many valuable programs are being subjected to 
unprecedented cuts, I find it difficult to support large increases in 
programs in the Defense bill which were not requested by the military 
and will do nothing to enhance our national security.
  For these reasons, Mr. President, I must oppose the Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the fiscal year 
1996 Defense authorization bill, as reported by the Armed Services 
Committee. This is an excellent bill, and I want to specifically 
commend the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, 
for his able leadership and tireless efforts on behalf of the men and 
women of our Armed Forces. I also want to thank Senator Nunn, the 
distinguished ranking member, for his hard work and dedication.
  Mr. President, when the 104th Congress convened in January, Senator 
Thurmond initiated a comprehensive review of our national defense 
requirements in view of the administration's future years defense plan. 
The review highlighted some serious deficiencies in military readiness, 
modernization, quality of life, and investment, and served as a basis 
for establishing a list of top priorities for the Armed Services 
Committee in this year's defense program. For the benefit of my 
colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that this list of priorities be 
inserted in the Record.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                  Armed Services Committee Priorities

       Guarantee our national security and the status of the 
     United States as the preeminent military power:
       Maintain FY 96 defense budget at FY 95 levels in real 
     terms.
       Determine outyear defense budgets based on national 
     security requirements.
       Reprioritize the President's budgets to ensure appropriate 
     balance of personnel, near-term readiness and long-term 
     readiness (modernization).
       Ensure a high quality and sufficient end-strength of 
     personnel at all grade levels through effective recruiting 
     and retention policies.
       Buy the weapons and equipment needed to fight and win 
     decisively with minimal risk to personnel.
       Eliminate defense spending that does not contribute 
     directly to the national security of the United States.
       Ensure an adequate, safe, and reliable nuclear weapons 
     capability.
       Reevaluate peacekeeping roles, policies and operations and 
     their impact on budgets, readiness and national security.
       Protect the quality of life of our military personnel and 
     their families:
       Provide equitable pay and benefits for military personnel 
     to protect against inflation.
       Restore appropriate levels of funding for construction and 
     maintenance of troop billets and family housing.
       Revitalize the readiness of our Armed Forces:
       Restore near-term readiness by providing adequate funding 
     to: reduce the backlog in maintenance and repair of 
     equipment; provide adequate training; and maintain stocks of 
     supplies, repair parts, fuels, and ammunition.
       Ensure U.S. military superiority by funding a more robust, 
     progressive modernization program to provide required 
     capabilities for the future.
       Accelerate development and deployment of missile defense 
     systems:
       Deploy as soon as possible advanced land and sea based 
     theater missile defenses.
       Clarify in law that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty does 
     not apply to modern theater missile defense systems.
       Reassess value and validity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
     Treaty to the national security of the United States.
       Accelerate development, testing and deployment of a 
     national missile defense system highly effective against 
     limited attacks of ballistic missiles.

  Mr. SMITH. The bill before us delivers on each of the priorities that 
were developed by Senator Thurmond and members of the committee. In 
fact, every element of the list is embodied in direct actions taken by
 the committee. We made a commitment, and we delivered on that 
commitment.

  The committee bill authorizes approximately $264.7 billion in budget 
authority for the National Defense Program. Although this represents an 
increase of $7 billion from the administration's grossly underfunded 
request, it still falls short of fully meeting our military 
requirements. The situation in the outyears is considerably worse.
  Both the Clinton plan and the recently passed budget resolution fail 
to fund defense at a level that even keeps pace with inflation. We are 
on track for a major train wreck between defense requirements and 
resources. If we are to maintain any semblance of a stable defense 
program we will need to maintain the spending outlined in this bill, 
and revisit future years funding levels next year.
  Mr. President, there are a number of very important initiatives 
contained in this bill, which I would like to briefly summarize for my 
colleagues. The committee bill:
  Provides a 2.4-percent pay raise for military members and a 5.2-
percent increase in basic allowance for quarters.

[[Page S 12671]]

  Equalizes dates for military and civil service retiree COLA's for 
1996 through 1998.
  Authorizes $1.3 billion to purchase the LHD-7 amphibious assault 
ship.
  Fully funds the F-22 fighter program.
  Initiates a long overdue upgrade of our airborne electronic warfare 
programs.
  Funds critical antisubmarine warfare and countermine programs.
  Provides $110 million to purchase the second of three ships under the 
Marine Corps Maritime Preposition Ship Enhancement Program.
  Provides $35 million to begin retrofitting aging Patriot missiles 
with an advanced seeker to defend against modern cruise missiles.
  Includes a provision ensuring free and fair competition between 
Electric Boat and Newport News for the new attack submarine program.
  And perhaps most important, includes the Missile Defense Act of 1995, 
a historic and long overdue refocusing of our Ballistic Missile Defense 
Program.
  Mr. President, the Missile Defense Act establishes a comprehensive 
program to counter the threats posed to our Nation by ballistic 
missiles and cruise missiles. The program has three key elements that I
 want to bring to the attention of my colleagues.

  First and foremost, the legislation accelerates the development and 
deployment of national missile defenses to protect all Americans 
against the threat of ballistic missiles. The Clinton administration 
has effectively killed the National Missile Defense Program, leaving 
the American people totally vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.
  The committee bill rejects the administration's misguided approach, 
and establishes a specific program and schedule to deploy a multiple 
site, ground based national missile defense by the year 2003.
  Second, the committee bill would codify the demarcation proposal that 
the Clinton administration offered in Geneva some 18 months ago. It 
establishes a demonstrated standard for evaluating compliance with the 
ABM Treaty.
  The bill specifies that theater missile defense systems would not be 
subject to the terms of the ABM Treaty unless they are flight tested 
against a ballistic missile with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers 
or a velocity in excess of 5 kilometers per second. This is a 
reasonable and appropriate standard that was suggested by the 
administration, and we have included it in this bill.
  Third, the committee bill establishes a cruise missile defense 
initiative to counter the threat posed by existing and emerging air 
breathing threats. The intelligence community estimates that at least 
12 countries have land-attack cruise missiles under development. 
Although the Defense Department has a variety of programs underway to 
address these threats, there is poor coordination and synergy among the 
Department's programs.
  The bill would direct the Secretary of Defense to better coordinate 
the Pentagon's cruise and ballistic missile defense programs, prepare a 
plan for prompt deployment of these systems, and provide a substantial 
increase in funding.
  In addition, Mr. President, the bill advocates a cooperative 
transition to a post-cold-war regime that is responsive to the global 
threat environment. The committee heard testimony from many different 
witnesses this year urging the United States to move away from the cold 
war doctrine of mutual assured destruction toward a more flexible 
deterrent posture that integrates both offensive and defensive weapons.
  In particular, Henry Kissinger, who was a key negotiator of the ABM 
Treaty and a proponent of mutual assured destruction, indicated to the 
committee that this doctrine has been surpassed by events, and is no 
longer relevant or constructive in
 the post-cold-war world. The committee took this testimony very 
seriously, and has recommended that we work with our Russian 
counterparts to move cooperatively away from the confrontational policy 
of mutual assured destruction toward a more multipolar oriented 
deterrent posture.

  The committee bill also recommends the establishment of a select 
committee to conduct a 1-year review on the continuing value and 
validity of the ABM Treaty. The select committee would conduct hearings 
and interviews, review all relevant documents, and carefully consider 
the full range of policy issues surrounding the treaty.
  To support this initiative, the committee bill would require that the 
ABM Treaty negotiating record be declassified. This action would be 
consistent with the classification policy that was established by 
Executive order on April 17 of this year by the Clinton administration.
  Mr. President, these initiatives on ballistic missile defense are 
responsible, measured, and necessary to protect the national security 
of the United States. The American people overwhelmingly support the 
deployment of national missile defenses and highly effective theater 
missile defenses.
  Unfortunately, the Senate now appears poised to completely rewrite 
the Missile Defense Act. Although the Senate has voted twice to 
preserve key aspects of the legislation, a so-called compromise has 
been developed which totally changes the focus and content of the bill. 
As one who has dedicated a great deal of time and effort on this issue, 
I am deeply disappointed with this sudden change of course. The Armed 
Services Committee bill was the right answer to a very complex and 
urgent problem, and I am troubled that for nothing more than 
convenience sake, it appears this body is prepared to compromise its 
principles and our Nation's security. This is a terrible mistake, and I 
will not support it.
  The truth is, that contrary to the assertions of our friends who 
oppose missile defense, nothing in the committee bill, absolutely 
nothing, would violate the ABM Treaty. It merely begins preparations 
for the eventual deployment of a system to defend all Americans against 
the threat of ballistic missiles.
  The authors of the treaty expected evolutionary changes and 
incorporated provisions that would encourage cooperative modifications 
or, if necessary, withdrawal from the treaty after a 6-month notice. 
The Armed Services Committee bill does not prejudge the results of 
negotiations to amend the treaty, nor does it advocate a unilateral 
withdrawal from the treaty. It
 merely affirms the moral and constitutional requirement to defend all 
Americans, and initiates a comprehensive program to counter threats to 
our security.

  Mr. President, that is the fundamental issue at stake here. The 
American people are totally vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. 
They have no defenses. And the Clinton administration intends to keep 
it that way. The question for Senators today is whether you believe 
that all Americans deserve to be defended, or you support the Clinton 
policy which says no Americans should be defended. You can't have it 
both ways.
  But, sadly, that is what my colleagues are trying to do with this so-
called bipartisan compromise. In an effort to prevent the President 
from vetoing the defense bill, they have agreed to water down the 
missile defense provisions, to soften the findings, to hedge on 
deployment dates, and to completely undermine the principles that were 
embodied in the committee bill.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the efforts of my colleagues to try and 
find common ground, and to seek compromise in order to build consensus. 
But national security is not something to be compromised, and I refuse 
to associate myself with a policy which perpetuates the vulnerability 
of our citizens. I will oppose the so-called bipartisan compromise on 
missile defense, and any other amendment which undermines the excellent 
work of the Armed Services Committee.
  I yield the floor.
                       Acquisition and Technology

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, as chairman of the Acquisition and 
Technology Subcommittee, I have been charged with overseeing of the 
technology base programs in the defense budget request for fiscal year 
1996. The technology base budget includes funding for the basic 
research, exploratory development, and advanced development accounts, 
the so-called 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 accounts of the budget.
  In addition the subcommittee also has responsibility for the so-
called RDT&E infrastructure accounts. These 

[[Page S 12672]]
accounts fund the maintenance of laboratories, R&D centers, and test 
and evaluation facilities. The portion of the accounts allocated to the 
Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee in fiscal year 1996 budget 
request amounted to a total of $9.5 billion.
  As the incoming subcommittee chairman, I faced a number of 
challenges. The budget request for fiscal year 1996 was already reduced 
from the amounts appropriated for these accounts in fiscal year 1995. 
Unlike other portions of the budget, the technology base programs are 
spread out among 250 separate program elements complicating a 
systematic review of the programs. Finally, it was clear that we needed 
to undertake a thorough review of each of these programs in order to 
ensure that defense relevance be the most important test for their 
continued funding. I was determined to understand the details of the 
programs under my purview.
  To aid in its review of these programs, the subcommittee conducted 
six hearings on program categories as well as on relevant policy areas. 
We began with an overview hearing on the technology programs in the 
Subcommittee's jurisdiction on March 14. This hearing yielded important 
insights into the relationship of the programs under the purview of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and those managed by the services.
  Over the past several years, there has been a distinct trend in 
technology funding shifting from service programs to programs managed 
by OSD. This trend may have serious consequences if we are robbing 
Peter to pay Paul and are thereby reducing service influence on the 
investment of our defense technology dollars.
  The importance of technology to the military in the face of the 
emerging revolution in military affairs was one of the subjects 
discussed at length during a subcommittee hearing on May 5. At that 
hearing, Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
Mr. Andrew Marshall of the DOD Office of Net Assessment presented a 
preliminary sketch of the future battlefield and the key role that 
technology, especially information technology, will play in bringing 
victory or defeat.
  The hearing underscored the need to maintain sufficient levels of 
defense technology investment to ensure that we are able to exploit the 
potential of future battlefield. Technology issues are only one aspect 
of the revolution in military affairs, and I am hopeful that the full 
committee will hold at least one hearing over the next year to examine 
the implication of this revolution for areas like organization and 
training that extend beyond the scope of any one subcommittee.
  The technology reinvestment project has become one of the more 
controversial programs under the subcommittee's jurisdiction. On May 
17, the subcommittee held a hearing to review this program and other 
so-called dual-use technology programs in the Department of Defense 
budget request. As a percentage of the budget, these programs have been 
growing since 1990. The dual-use designation refers to the fact that 
such programs involve technologies that have application in both the 
commercial as well as the defense sectors of the economy. Dual-use 
technologies will be used to an increasing extent in weapon systems as 
the electronics content of such systems continues to rise.
  In the electronics industries, for example, the commercial 
marketplace, not defense requirements, is driving the pace of 
technology development. Because the Department of Defense represents a 
shrinking share of the electronics market, DOD leverage over the market 
is decreasing.
  For that reason, the paradigm for future interaction between the 
Department of Defense and the electronics industries is a dual-use 
partnership approach in which both DOD and the industry provide funding 
for the development of technology. Such partnerships can help to make 
our acquisition process more efficient as we inject commercial 
technologies into defense weapons systems.
  I want to make clear, however, that there are dangers in placing too 
much emphasis on this approach. If programs are not managed carefully, 
we may end up doing dual-use for dual-use sake with only a limited 
emphasis on military utility. Military utility must be the driving 
factor, and a time of limited funding, we have to ensure that we are 
not raiding critical technology base programs under the guise of dual-
use development. We also need to ensure that Congress maintains the 
proper level of visibility and oversight in dual-use programs.
  At the May 17 hearing on dual-use programs, we explored these issues 
in depth with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, Paul Kaminski, and representatives of the defense industry 
and the General Accounting Office. What emerged from the testimony was 
the potential payoff of some existing dual-use programs, such as those 
underway in the technology reinvestment project, but also the need for 
improvements in management and oversight of these programs.
  An area that is directly related to our investments in technology is 
the issue of export control. Unless we have in place an effective 
process for reviewing licenses for the export of sensitive 
technologies, especially those that are dual-use in nature, we will end 
up having to spend scarce R&D dollars to counter technologies that we 
already have paid to develop. I am particularly concerned about the 
licensing for export of technologies for satellites and satellite-
related services.
  On May 31, I chaired a hearing reviewing current export license 
review procedures and the relationship among the Departments of 
Defense, State, and Commerce in this process. The hearing uncovered 
some significant problems of coordination and cooperation among the 
agencies that have directly undermined our national security. I intend 
to continue pursuing these issues in further hearings.
  Mr. President, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an 
ever growing threat to our national security. Because of this increased 
threat, I have made counterproliferation programs and policies a major 
area of new emphasis for the Subcommittee on Acquisition and 
Technology. On April 14, the subcommittee held a hearing to review the 
funding request for fiscal year 1996 for counterproliferation programs. 
The hearing revealed that additional funding would be necessary to 
accelerate development and deployment of military counterproliferation 
technologies. The bill before us addresses many significant 
deficiencies in our counterproliferation program.
  Upon completion of the hearing process in May, I began a 
comprehensive analysis of the funding requests for the 250 program 
elements in the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee. As I announced 
at the first hearing in March, my litmus test for funding a program was 
simple: if there is a defense investment, there must be a defense 
return. We put everything on the table. I carried out this review 
independent of political bias, and without any prejudice toward systems 
or technologies.
  Because high priority requirements in readiness, modernization, and 
quality of life were severely underfunded in the President's defense 
budget request, Chairman Thurmond directed me to reduce accounts under 
the jurisdiction of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee in 
areas of nondefense initiatives or lower priority activities. I agreed 
with that direction and accepted the guidance to reduce the programs 
$330 million below the President's request.
  However, in the midst of our review, the subcommittee received 
requests from Senators for additions to the bill totaling nearly $620 
million. As we clearly could not accommodate even a majority of these 
requests, I attempted to apply the same litmus test to these requests 
as I applied to the programs in the administration request: direct 
defense relevance.
  In preparing the subcommittee recommendation on the President's 
request, we endeavored to protect the core, defense relevant technology 
programs above everything else. We gave programs with defined 
technology development a higher priority than those that lacked it. The 
largest source of reductions was the technology reinvestment project, 
which we cut by $262 million. This funding would all have supported a 
new competition in fiscal year 1996 for which technology thrust areas 
have yet to even be defined.
  Mr. President, as the committee report on page 111 indicates, despite 
our 

[[Page S 12673]]
continued support of dual-use technology development programs, a new 
competition for unspecified technologies in 1996 must have a lower 
priority from a defense standpoint than funding well-defined technology 
programs in the budget request for the services. We changed the name of 
the program to the Defense Dual-use Technology Initiative and have also 
changed the statutory basis for the program to clarify the need for 
close connection between research and a military mission requirement.
  Another source of funding reductions was an undistributed cut of $90 
million to the work conducted through the federally funded research and 
development centers known as FFRDC's. The FFRDC issue has been a 
controversial one in recent years due to the perception of some that 
these institutions lack effective management oversight from the Defense 
Department. While the subcommittee is satisfied with the efforts of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to review the future role of 
the FFRDC's, our reduction was made in a manner consistent with overal 
reductions in R&D, and in anticipation of some redistribution of 
workload betwen the FFRDC's and the private sector.
  Another source of significant reductions was in the accounts 
supporting the research, development test, and evaluation 
infrastructure. One of the most disturbing trends in the technology 
budget is the greater and greater portion of R&D funding that is going, 
not to programs, but to maintaining facilities and test ranges. The 
base closure and realignment process has not dealt effectively with the 
need to consolidate laboratories, research centers and test facilities 
across the services.
  As a result, at a time when the R&D portion of the budget request has 
declined by over 10 percent from last year, the RDT&E support programs 
have declined overall less than 4 percent. In recognition of this 
trend, we reduced the infrastructure programs by $85 million. It is my 
hope that we can develop an effective process for consolidating 
facilities so that we can devote a greater share of our scarce 
resources to programs rather than maintenance. I intend to continue to 
pursue this issue vigorously next year.
  In the midst of these reductions, I am pleased to say that we were 
able to fund some critical gaps in the budget. We added $36 million to 
create a counterproliferation support program to accelerate the 
development and deployment of technologies for military 
counterproliferation. Our report details the new initiatives in such 
areas as biological agent detection, cruise missile defense, and 
proliferation of space technology. We also shifted $24 million into 
Army technology base accounts to correct some of the most serious 
shortfalls in the Army's underfunded technology budget.
  I want to thank members of the staff for all their work in helping 
out the members of the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology. 
Monica Chavez, Jon Etherton, Tom Moore, Tom Lankford, and Pamela 
Farrell provided essential support for our review. On the minority 
side, Ed McGaffigan, John Douglass, and Andy Effron were extremely 
cooperative with our staff and members in working through these issues.
  I especially want to express my appreciation for the support and 
counsel I received from the ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator 
Jeff Bingaman. I was privileged to serve as the ranking member under 
his chairmanship of the subcommittee during the last Congress where 
Senator Bingaman conducted the process with fairness, openness, and 
always in a spirit of bipartisanship. I know there were recommendations 
in this bill that trouble the Senator from New Mexico, but he has 
remained supportive and helpful throughout our process.
  In summary, Mr. President, I believe that the acquisition and 
technology portion of the defense authorization bill maintains a strong 
technology base program. The core, defense-relevant programs are funded 
at or above the requested amounts, and the bill lays a solid foundation 
on which we can build future technology investments for national 
defense.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I voted against final passage of S. 1087, 
the Department of Defense appropriations bill and S. 1026, the Defense 
authorization bill. I did not cast these votes lightly. In fact, this 
is the first time in my Senate career that I have voted against a 
defense spending measure. I supported the authorization bill in 
committee in the interest of bringing the bill before the full Senate 
with the hope that the bill's more problematic provisions could be 
eliminated by amendment.
  A number of factors contributed to my decision to vote against final 
passage.
  I have always supported a strong defense for our Nation. I have 
supported increases in defense spending beyond what has been requested 
by Presidents when I believed those programs were the interest of our 
national security. But, these spending measures add as much as $7 
billion in funding for programs that I do not support and do not 
believe represent a responsible means of spending limited taxpayer 
funds. I could have supported additional funding for some of these 
individual programs, but not the total funding package, particularly at 
a time when we are trying to balance the Federal budget and are 
considering substantial cuts in domestic funding to accomplish that.
  The bulk of the additional funds are spent for procurement programs 
for which the Pentagon made no request: close to $600 million was added 
for F/A-18's, $361 million for F-15's, $175 million for F-16's, $1.4 
billion for DDG-51, $1.3 billion for LHD-7, and close to $800 million 
for Guard and Reserve equipment.
  In addition, the two bills add $600 million above the President's 
budget request for ballistic missile defense, $300 million of which is 
for national missile defense, bringing total funding for ballistic 
missile defense to $3 billion. This level of funding exceeds our 
national requirements and undermines our commitment to the ABM Treaty, 
an agreement critical to our national security needs.
  With respect to the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon production 
complex, several significant improvements were made in the bill since 
it was reported out of committee. However, the bill still contains over 
$120 million in unrequested, unneccessary funds for plutonium pit 
manufacturing and refabrication capability. The bill also includes $50 
million for low yield, hydronuclear testing purposes, which I oppose.
  At the same time that these two bills add billions for programs the 
Pentagon claims it does not need, they leave unfunded the estimated 
$1.2 billion in costs for our current operations in Bosnia and Iraq, 
funds which the Pentagon undisputedly needs. So, while these bills 
purport to add funds in the name of long term readiness, they create an 
immediate threat to our readiness by forcing the Pentagon to siphon off 
more than a billion dollars in operations and maintenance funding to 
finance current operations.
  In addition to the funding issues, I am very disturbed by the 
provision in the authorization bill related to the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. I will address my specific concerns in this area in a 
separate statement.
     huge pentagon spending increases reflect distorted priorities

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this week I am voting against both of 
the major Department of Defense spending bills for next year. I am 
doing so for a number of reasons, including the fact that these bills 
provide about $7 billion more in defense spending than the President, 
the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have requested for next year. That's right. Congress this year will 
approve spending for about $7 billion more than the Pentagon has 
requested, or than they have indicated they will be able to responsibly 
use, next year.
  Coincidentally, perhaps, this is just about the same amount--in Pell 
grants for students, in Head Start, in substance abuse prevention, in 
employment and training, in worker protections, and many other key 
domestic areas--that was recently slashed by the House appropriators 
for next year.
  Since my perspective, these are seriously skewed priorities. And 
since polls continue to show substantial support for bringing down the 
post-cold-war defense budget, I do not believe they are 

[[Page S 12674]]
the priorities of the vast majority of Americans. Even worse, the two 
bills increase the President's request for star wars spending by 
hundreds of millions--in one case, about $770 million--which will spell 
serious trouble for future arms control negotiations.
  Following an unsuccessful bipartisan effort before the recess in 
which I joined Senator Kohl, Grassley, and others to amend the bill to 
eliminate the overall increase above the President's request, I tried 
to split the difference, offering another amendment to reduce the 
increase by only about 50 percent. It too was defeated, as were all 
other efforts to modestly scale back overall funding in the bill to 
more responsible levels.
  I also tried, through numerous other amendments offered with my 
colleagues, to scale back or eliminate spending on a number of 
unnecessary or obsolete weapons systems. Most of those efforts were 
unsuccessful. Given tight funding constraints, continued overspending 
on defense is unwise, it is irresponsible, and it is a policy which 
does not serve our real national security interests. If we fail to 
invest in our children in order to bolster post-cold-war defense 
budgets, because we were too afraid to thoroughly rethink our real 
national security needs, and retool our defense budget accordingly, we 
will regret it for at least a generation.
  I believe that a time when we are slashing budgets for hundreds of 
social programs that protect the vulnerable, preserve our lakes and 
streams, and provide for expanded opportunities for the elderly and the 
broad middle class, such as student loans, Medicare, and job 
retraining, it is wrong to increase, substantially, already bloated 
military spending.
  In defense, as elsewhere in the Federal budget, there are responsible 
ways to eliminate wasteful and unnecessary spending; by cutting 
obsolete cold war weapons systems, imposing money-saving reforms within 
the bureaucracy, and streamlining procurement policy to make the system 
more efficient and more cost effective. I have proposed a number of 
ways to do this in recent months, including scaling back bloated 
Pentagon travel budgets, which the General Accounting Office has found 
could provide substantial savings--hundreds of millions of dollars per 
year. Over and over, these attempts have either been voted down here on 
the Senate floor, or the bills to accomplish these ends have been 
bottled up in committee.
  In the end, there is almost no Pentagon streamlining, no elimination 
of waste, provided for in this bill. Instead, when faced with difficult 
choices between competing weapons systems, basic housing improvements 
for our troops, and other readiness requirements, the committee decided 
simply to buy all of the big weapons systems, ships, and planes that 
they could, larding the bill with special interest funds for defense 
contractors in Armed Services or Appropriations Committee Members' home 
States, often accelerating purchases not scheduled to be made for many 
years, if at all. In fact, the purchase of many of these extravagantly 
expensive weapons systems is actively opposed by the Pentagon, because 
they have identified higher national security priorities for the 
funding that is available.
  I also have serious concerns about the potentially catastrophic arms 
control consequences of this bill. For example, I voted against even 
the so-called compromise on the national missile defense or star wars 
system because I believe that, even though it was better than the 
original bill, the approach urged by the compromise amendment would 
seriously undermine the 1972 ABM Treaty, and is likely to jeopardize 
the nuclear weapons reductions in the START I and II treaties.
  While some have argued, I think in good faith, that this compromise 
meets basic arms control and nonproliferation requirements, I disagree. 
As a practical matter, there is no question in my mind that enactment 
of this bill would lead us toward near-term deployment of a national 
missile defense system. It is the latest version of the earlier star 
wars system that was roundly rejected by most knowledgeable scientists, 
and national security experts, as a waste of money and a fraud.
  Senator Warner has been very clear that he believes this compromise 
will move us along toward rapid deployment of such a system. Since, 
regrettably, I agree with Senator Warner that that is so, while I 
commend Senator Levin and others on our side for their efforts to 
develop the compromise, I could not support
 the final agreement. I believe that spending scores of billions of 
additional dollars to deploy an elaborate national missile defense 
system that's not likely to work effectively, and thus violating the 
ABM Treaty, to defend against a far-fetched scenario in which a 
ballistic missile is fired on the United States from a rogue terrorist 
state, is irresponsible. The more likely means that terrorists might 
use to deliver such a bomb--in a suitcase placed in some public place, 
or in a Ryder truck, or in a van parked underneath a building--is a far 
more serious threat. And that is a threat we can combat for a lot less 
than $50 to $100 billion.

  I also believe that the additional funding provided by the bill for 
hydronuclear testing in Nevada will likely have a profoundly negative 
impact on the test ban negotiations now underway in Geneva. The French 
nuclear test detonated in the South Pacific yesterday underscores the 
urgency of bringing to a successful close negotiations on a truly 
comprehensive test ban that is enforceable, and that constrains its 
signatories from further tests.
  There are a host of other serious problems with this bill, Mr. 
President, some of which we have tried to address during the debate 
through various amendments. Virtually none of them have been resolved. 
I believe that this bill in its current form spends vastly more on 
defense than we can afford, would threaten longstanding arms control 
agreements and nonproliferation efforts, and would not be in our 
national security interests. I hope the President will follow through 
on his threatened vetoes of these bills. I urge my colleagues to vote 
against these huge and unwarranted increases in defense spending, as I 
will. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to final passage of S. 
1026, the DOD authorization bill. And as was the case with the 1996 
Defense appropriations bill, I do so with a heavy heart.
  I would inform my colleagues that today marks the first time in my 15 
years of Senate service that I will vote against final passage of a 
Defense authorization bill. This is a not so much a vote of 
disagreement, but a vote of conscience.
  The 1996 Defense authorization bill contains spending instructions of 
almost $7 billion above the Pentagon's initial request. Let me clarify 
that point, neither the President nor the respective service chiefs 
have asked for these funds. The programs earmarked for these increases 
were never part of the Pentagon's original budget request. That fact 
weighs heavily in my decision today.
  I think most of my colleagues know that I have consistently supported 
prudent and necessary spending for our national defense. On more than 
one occasion in my career, I have listened carefully to the words of 
various Secretaries of Defense when the Pentagon badly needed support 
for future weapons programs. And on each of those occasions, I 
supported those requests without regard for party affiliation or 
personal politics. I did so because it was in the best interest of our 
country.
  However, this is a very different situation. This Defense 
authorization bill contains almost $7 billion in additional funding for 
Defense programs not contained in the original Pentagon request--$7 
billion is simply too much to add to a bill while entire agencies are 
eliminating programs that are crucial to working families across this 
Nation.
  As I stated earlier, Head Start, Goals 2000, and other critical 
investment programs for our Nation's youth are near extinction, while 
this bill authorizes increased Defense spending. I cannot rationalize 
that inequity.
  As a member of the Senate Budget Committee, I opposed the increases 
in the Department of Defense spending allocations. Likewise, on three 
separate occasions during floor debate, I voted to keep defense 
spending at the original levels requested by the administration. I did 
so because it was right, and because to do otherwise would be an 
endorsement of the cuts in other vital domestic programs.

[[Page S 12675]]

  Let me conclude by saying I respect the members of the committee for 
their diligent and hard work in bringing this important bill to the 
floor. But this is an issue of priorities. And I vehemently disagree 
with those priorities as presented in this bill.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this bill.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify the 
previously adopted Nunn amendment No. 2078 by striking out subsection 
(d) thereof. This has been cleared on both sides.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Are there further amendments?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for third reading of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further amendment to be 
proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the 
bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I urge passage of the bill and ask for 
the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold.
  Under the previous order, H.R. 1530 is discharged from the committee, 
and the clerk will report the bill.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 1530) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1996 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal 
     year 1996, and for other purposes.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All after the enacting clause of the bill is 
stricken, and the text of S. 1026 is inserted in lieu thereof, and the 
House bill is considered read the third time.
  The Senator may now request the yeas and nays.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on passage of H.R. 1530, as 
amended.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski] is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Akaka] is 
absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 64, nays 34, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 399 Leg.]

                                YEAS--64

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Reid
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--34

     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Glenn
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     McCain
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Pryor
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Akaka
     Murkowski
       
  So the bill (H.R. 1530), as amended, was passed, as follows:
  [The text of H.R. 1530 will appear in a future edition of the 
Record.]
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the bill was passed.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 1530, 
as amended, be printed as passed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed immediately to the consideration en bloc of the following 
bills:
  S. 1124 through S. 1126, Calendar Order Nos. 167, 168, 169; that all 
after the enacting clause of those bills be stricken and that the 
appropriate portion of H.R. 1530, as amended, be inserted in lieu 
thereof, according to the schedule as follows, which I have sent to the 
desk; that these bills be advanced to third reading and passed; that 
the motion to reconsider en bloc be laid upon the table; and that the 
above actions occur without intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  So the bill (S. 1124) was deemed read the third time and passed.
  (The text of S. 1124 will appear in a future edition of the Record.)
  So, the bill (S. 1125) was deemed read the third time and passed.
  (The text of S. 1125 will appear in a future edition of the Record.)
  So, the bill (S. 1126) was deemed read the third time and passed.
  (The text of S. 1126 will appear in a future edition of the Record.)
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, with respect to H.R. 1530, previously 
passed by the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on 
its amendment to the bill and request a conference with the House on 
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses and the Chair be authorized to 
appoint conferees; that the motion to reconsider the above-mentioned 
votes be laid upon the table; and that the foregoing occur without 
intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent with respect to 
S. 1124 through S. 1126, as just passed by the Senate, that if the 
Senate receives a message with regard to any one of these bills from 
the House of Representatives, that the Senate disagree with the House 
on its amendment or amendments to the Senate-passed bill and agree to a 
conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
and the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees and the foregoing 
occur without any intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Under the 
previous order, S. 1026 is indefinitely postponed.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have completed many long hours of 
debate on S. 1062, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 1996.
  I would like to thank the distinguished ranking member of the 
committee, Senator Nunn, for his insight, wisdom, and devotion to our 
Nation. He and I have always worked to achieve the same objective of 
providing our Armed Forces with the direction and resources necessary 
to carry out their difficult responsibilities.
  Mr. President, I want to extend my deep appreciation to the 
distinguished majority leader, Senator Dole, who has been most helpful 
in every way in bringing this bill to passage. He is a great leader of 
whom the Senate can be proud.
  I would also like to thank all the Senators from both sides of the 
committee and the entire committee staff, and I commend them for their 
dedication and support. In particular, I would like to thank personally 
my staff director, Gen. Dick Reynard, for his fine work, and Gen. 
Arnold Punaro, the staff director for the minority. I ask unanimous 
consent that a list of the committee staff be printed in the Record 
following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit No. 1.)
  Mr. THURMOND. We have achieved a number of important successes in 
this bill, and I commend my colleagues for their good judgment. Among 
these are:
  Adding $7 billion to the administration's budget request to 
revitalize the procurement, and research and development accounts which 
are the core of future readiness;

[[Page S 12676]]

  Passing the Missile Defense Act which initiates a policy to deploy a 
national missile defense system, and prohibits inaccurate 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty which would serve to limit theater 
missile defense systems;
  Correcting the erosion in nuclear weapons capabilities by reasserting 
that the primary responsibility of the Department of Energy is to 
strengthen the strategic stockpile;
  Directing improvements and modifications in nuclear weapons 
production facilities and supporting important initiatives at the 
nuclear weapons laboratories;
  Adequately funding current readiness while reducing funding for
   nondefense programs;

  Significantly improving quality of life programs for our troops and 
their families, including funds for housing, facilities, and real 
property maintenance;
  Approving a 2.4-percent pay raise for military members and a 5.2-
percent increase in basic allowance for quarters, and achieving COLA 
equity for retirees;
  Providing funding for DOD and DOE environmental programs;
  Establishing a dental insurance program for the selected reserves and 
an income protection insurance program for self-employed reservists who 
are mobilized;
  Providing funding for essential equipment for the Active, Guard, and 
Reserve components.
  Once again I thank Senator Nunn, Senator Dole, the members of the 
committee, and the staff. I thank the Chair, and yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1


                                MINORITY

       Dick Combs, Chris Cowart, Rick DeBobes, John Douglass, Andy 
     Effron, Jan Gordon, Creighton Greene, P.T. Henry, Bill Hoehn, 
     Jennifer Lambert, Mike McCord, Frank Norton, Arnold Punaro, 
     Julie Rief


                                MAJORITY

       Charlie Abell, Alec Bierbauer, Les Brownlee, Dick Caswell, 
     Monica Chavez, Chris Cimko, Greg D'Alessio, Don Deline, Marie 
     Dickinson, Jon Etherton, Pamela Farrell, Melinda Koutsoumpas, 
     Larry Lanzillotta, George Lauffer, Shelley Lauffer, Steve 
     Madey, John Miller, Ann Mittermeyer, Joe Pallone, Cindy 
     Pearson, Connie Rader, Sharen Reaves, Dick Reynard, Jason 
     Rossbach, Steve Saulnier, Cord Sterling, David Stone, Eric 
     Thoemmes, Roslyne Turner, Deasy Wagner, Jennifer Wallace

  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from South Carolina for 
his summation of this bill. As he said, there are many important 
features in this bill. I supported the bill in the final form that it 
passed. I think there have been dramatic improvements made on the 
floor.
  The Corps SAM Program has been restored, which is an important part 
of our overall theater missile defense capability. The national missile 
defense language has been, I think, made much more acceptable and 
compatible with America's security interests. That has been done on an 
amendment we passed this morning. An important program on the junior 
ROTC that had been cut has now been restored. The civil-military 
language has been modified and, in my opinion, strengthened, and some 
of the problems there have been corrected. The humanitarian and 
disaster assistance, which had been cut, has been partially restored, 
which is important. And there have been very significant changes made 
on the floor in the Department of Energy section.
  We need to ensure that the conference maintains the Senate approach 
in these areas. We also have other challenges in the conference. I 
think too much has been cut out of defense research, even in our bill. 
The TRP Program has been cut in ways that I think need to be reexamined 
in conference, in close consultation with Secretary of Defense Perry, 
who probably knows more about this program than any person in America 
and has spent an enormous amount of his Secretary of Defense time and 
energy in making sure that this program is successfully implemented.
  Also, I think there is too much micromanagement of the ballistic 
missile defense accounts in our bill and in the House bill, and that 
needs to be addressed in conference.
  We have some serious challenges on the House bill that are going to 
be difficult to work out when we get to conference, including language 
on abortion, including language on HIV, including command and control 
of U.S. forces participating in multilateral organizations, including 
peacekeeping and contingency operations, as well as some of their 
language--and perhaps, from their point of view, some of our language--
on missile defense and other programs.
  My final assessment is that we have a bill here that has been 
improved on the floor, that we have an opportunity to work on and make 
further improvements on in conference, working in good faith with the 
House. We have a lot of high hurdles to clear if we are going to have 
this bill become law this year, based not on what I have been told 
formally but on what I have heard informally from the White House and 
from the Department of Defense. But I have seen a lot of high hurdles 
in the past and I have seen those high hurdles overcome by people 
working in good faith for the national security interests of our 
country. So it is my hope that, with a cooperative spirit and a 
constructive approach, we will be able to work with our House conferees 
and with the administration to see that the Defense authorization bill 
becomes law this year. That remains a serious challenge, but I think it 
is one that we must all strive to meet.
  I thank the Senator from South Carolina and all of his staff and all 
of the staff on the Democratic side and all the members of the 
committee for a very, I think, commendable effort. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate the 
managers. This is a major piece of legislation that is always very 
difficult to bring to a conclusion. But it has been done because of the 
leadership of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Senator 
Thurmond, and the cooperation of the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia, Senator Nunn. They have worked together to bring it together, 
as have other Senators, particularly Senators Warner and Cohen on this 
side, who have just resolved a very important issue by a vote of 85 to 
13. In my view, that compromise should have been passed by that 
lopsided margin. There is still a conference. They can still make other 
changes.
  But I congratulate all the members of the committee and members of 
their staffs for what I think is an excellent bill. We just heard the 
Senator from Georgia address some of the concerns that were resolved. 
The Senator from South Carolina addressed some of the concerns earlier. 
Now it goes to conference. I think, again, it indicates we are making 
progress in the Senate. Plus the appropriations bill will be ready for 
passage as soon as the House acts on it. So as far as the defense area 
is concerned, I think we are in good shape on the Senate side.

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