[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 136 (Tuesday, September 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12605-S12608]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST ASIA
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, while we were out of session over the last
three weeks there were a number of important developments in Asia--
specifically Vietnam, Cambodia and China --to which I, as the Chairman
of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, would like to
draw my colleagues' attention.
First, the human rights situation in Vietnam continues to be of great
concern. The weekend of August 12, barely a week after Secretary of
State Christopher opened the newly-established U.S. embassy in Hanoi, a
Vietnamese court convicted two Vietnamese-born U.S. citizens and seven
Vietnamese nationals accused of being counter-revolutionaries and
acting to ``overthrow the people's administration.'' The group, allied
with the banned political party Tan Dai Viet, was apparently trying to
organize a conference in Ho Chi Minh City (the former Saigon) to
discuss human rights and democracy in Vietnam. After their first
attempt failed, they tried to set up another meeting but were arrested
10 days before it was held. Radio Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, in somewhat
characteristic rhetoric, described their ``crimes'' as follows:
Taking advantage of our party's renovation policy, they
used the pretext of democracy and human rights to distort the
truth of history, smear the Vietnamese communist party and
state, instigate bad elements at home, and contact hostile
forces abroad to feverishly oppose our state in an attempt to
set up a people-betraying and nation-harming regime. A check
of their personal backgrounds indicated that they spent
almost all their lives serving the enemy of our people and
giving a helping hand to the aggressors' attempts to oppose
our country.
The administration warned them and used educational
measures on them after it discovered their sabotage scheme.
Nonetheless, they stubbornly contacted reactionary forces
abroad and carried on their scheme aimed at opposing and
overthrowing the people's administration. Their activities
posed a particular danger to society and was detrimental to
national security.
Americans Nguyen Tan Tri and Tran Quang Liem received a 7-year and 4-
year prison sentence respectively.
In addition, the Vietnamese government's persecution of Buddhist
leaders continues unabated. On August 15, a Vietnamese court sentenced
a leader of a banned Buddhist church to five years in prison for
criticizing Communist rule and maintaining an independent (i.e.,
outside direct Communist control) Buddhist church. The court convicted
Thich Quang Do, secretary general of the Unified Buddhist Church of
Vietnam (UBCV), and five other activists in a 1-day trial. Thich Quang
was accused of publishing a criticism of the Communist Party and
sending two faxes to overseas Buddhists accusing the Vietnamese
Government of obstructing a church-sponsored flood-relief mission in
1994. The other five were arrested for participating in that mission.
Vietnamese authorities also recently announced that the government
would soon try the acting head of the UBCV Thich Huyen Quang, who is
under house arrest at the Quang Phuoc Shrine in Quang Ngai; and Thich
Long Tri, UBCV's third highest official, who is under house arrest at
the Vien Giac Pagoda in Hoi An, Quang Nam. The announcement is
especially ironic given that since last year the government has
systematically denied that Thich Huyen had ever been placed under
arrest. On December 29, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry announced that
reports of Thich Huyen's arrest were fabrications and that he had
simply been ``moved to another pagoda at the requests of other monks.''
Mr. President, these are not isolated incidents, but part of a
systematic denial of even the most basic human rights on the part of
the Vietnamese government. Let me list just a few others:
Thich Tri Tuu, the senior monk of the Linh Mu pagoda in Hue
and a close disciple of the late Supreme Patriarch of the
UBCV, is serving a four-year sentence on charges of ``public
disorder'' at the Ba Sao prison camp, Nam Ha, Phu Ly
province, in conjunction with the May 1993 protest in Hue. At
the time of the demonstration, Thich Tri was being held in
police custody, and police refused to let Buddhist monks who
began the protests see him or talk to him. The crowd later
saw him slumped in the back of a police vehicle, stopped the
vehicle and extracted him from it--he had apparently
fainted. He was placed, unconscious, into a cyclo-pousse
which carried him back to his temple as the protest
continued and certain persons in the crowd set the police
vehicle on fire. Also still imprisoned at the Ba Sao camp
on public disorder charges stemming from this protest are
Thich Hai Tang and Thich Hai Thinh. Thich Hai Chanh was
released, but not allowed to return to his residence at
the Linh Mu pagoda in Hue and has been obliged to move to
a pagoda in Quang Tri province.
Thich Hanh Duc, appointed by the state-sponsored church to
be abbot of the Son Linh Pagoda of Ba Ria-Vung Tau in 1982,
was arrested in July 1993 when police attempted to enter the
pagoda and a violent confrontation ensued. The Fatherland
Front and the provincial people's committee issued an
eviction order against Thich Hanh and other monks after the
senior monk publicly read an oration of Thich Huyen Quang and
expressed support for the restoration of the Unified Buddhist
Church. In February 1993, the provincial committee of the
state-sponsored church expelled him from the church for
``violating the principles of Vietnamese Buddhism.'' Thich
Hanh Duc was ultimately sentenced to three years of
imprisonment for ``crimes against on-duty officials'' and
``handing out documents hostile to the socialist government
of Vietnam;'' he was last known to be detained at the Phuoc
Co prison in Ba Ria-Vung Tau.
Do Trung Hieu, formerly a Communist Party cadre in charge
of religious affairs in Ho Chi Minh City and now a private
businessman, was detained by police in Ho Chi Minh City on
June 14, 1995. Hieu had written and circulated an
autobiographical essay describing the Party's efforts to
dismantle the Unified Buddhist Church after the war out of
fear that its influence and following would spread throughout
Vietnam. Hieu has reportedly been transferred to Hanoi for
questioning, but his whereabouts have not been confirmed.
Hoang Minh Chinh, a well-known communist intellectual, was
also detained in Hanoi on June 14 this year. This was his
third detention for criticizing Party policy; he had
previously been arrested for advocating ``revisionist'' lines
in 1967 and 1981. The cause of the latest detention appears
to be petitions he sent to the highest levels of the Party
demanding that his name be cleared for his previous jailings,
and his questioning the propriety of the constitutional
provision that enshrines the leading role of the Vietnam
Communist Party.
Doan Thanh Liem, a law professor who was educated in the
United States, is serving a twelve-year sentence for
``counter revolutionary propaganda''--that is, notes he had
prepared on constitutional reform. He was arrested in April
1990 for his association with Michael Morrow, Dick Hughes and
Don Luce. He knew all three Americans from his participation
in a well-known Saigon charity, the Shoeshine Boys. Liem,
held in the Ham Tan camp, has developed a serious pulmonary
condition in prison that is often associated with
tuberculosis. Senator Harkin's request to meet with Liem was
denied during his July 1995 visit.
Nguyen Tri, also known as Truong Hung Thai, was sentenced
to eight years at the trial of Doan Thanh Liem for having
helped Liem purchase a typewriter and having received from
Liem two documents the official press described as ``anti-
communist.''
Doan Viet Hoat, one of Vietnam's most prominent political
prisoners, was transferred abruptly among three different
prisons last year, ending up in the Thanh Cam camp, a
facility for common criminals in a remote and malarial part
of Thanh Hoa province. Arrested in November 1990, Dr. Hoat
was given a fifteen-year sentence on charges of ``attempting
to overthrow the government'' for producing the reformist
newsletter Freedom Forum. His transfers seem to have come in
reaction to public statements which he has periodically been
able to release since his initial detention. The move to
Thanh Cam has isolated him from the outside world, and he is
allowed only limited communication with his family.
Pham Duc Kham, also tried for the Freedom Forum affair, was
sentenced to sixteen years of imprisonment (later reduced to
just under twelve years) for his participation. He was
transferred in November 1994 from the Xuan Phuoc labor camp
in Phu Yen province
[[Page S 12606]]
to the Cam Thuy camp Number 5, not far from the Thanh Cam camp in a
remote part of Thanh Hoa province.
Le Duc Vuong, tried for the Freedom Forum affair, was
sentenced to a five-year term. He was last known to be
performing hard labor at the A-20 camp in Xuan Phuoc.
Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, an endocrinologist who was sentenced in
1991 to twenty years of imprisonment on charges of
``attempting to overthrow the government'' for publicly
signing a declaration calling for political reform and
respect for human rights, is reported to be in fair health,
having received some medication for a kidney stone. He has
been held in isolation at Xuan Loc prison camp for nearly two
years, following the Vietnamese government's unwillingness to
allow our colleague Senator Robb to meet him.
Do Van Thac was arrested with five other members of the
opposition Dai Viet Duy Dan (People's Party) on July 9, 1991.
In January 1992, a court in Hanoi sentenced Do Van Thac to
fourteen years' imprisonment--later commuted to twelve
years--on charges of ``attempting to overthrow the
government,'' apparently for circulating writings describing
the People's Party and calling for political and economic
reform.
Vu Thanh, Dat Hai, Paul Nguyen Chau Dat, and five other
members of the Congregation of the Mother Co-Redemptrix
remain in prison. On May 15, 1987, these persons, along with
Father Dominic Tran Dinh Thu and approximately sixty other
Catholic clergy and laypersons were arrested when authorities
raided the compound of the order founded by Father Dominic.
During the raid, authorities seized rice stocks from the
community and religious literature, causing people from the
surrounding area to defend the congregation (and their rice
stocks) with improvised arms. Vu Thanh, Dat Hai, Paul Nguyen
Chau Dat and twenty others were tried on October 30, 1987 and
convicted of ``sowing disunity between the people and the
government.'' Vu Thanh Dat Hai was sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment and three years of suppression of civil rights,
and is now in the Long Khanh prison camp. Paul Nguyen Chau
Dat was given a twenty-year term, which he is also serving in
Long Khanh. Nguyen Van Thin Quan is serving a sixteen-year
sentence in the Ham tan camp; Mai Duc Chuong Nghi is serving
an eighteen-year term in a Thanh Hoa province labor camp;
Dinh Viet Hieu Thuc is serving a fourteen-year sentence in
the Long Khanh prison camp; Pham Ngoc Lien Tri is serving a
twenty-year term at the Long Khanh camp, and Nguyen Thien
Phung Huan is also serving a twenty-year term at Long Khanh.
Pastor Nguyen Duc Loi and Pastor Nguyen Van Vui are
reported to have been arrested on November 20, 1994 when
proselytizing among the ethnic Hre minority in Quang Ngai
province. According to unconfirmed local sources, the two
have been accused of pursuing political activities under the
guise of religion, and after their arrest officials ordered
local Christians to cease all religious activities, including
prayer meetings.
Mr. President, in all the controversy surrounding the Clinton
administration's recent questionable decision to normalize relations
with Vietnam, the emotional and unresolved POW-MIA issue, and the blind
headlong rush of United States business to enter the expanding
Vietnamese market regardless, I believe that some Americans have lost
sight of an important fact: the Vietnamese Government is a textbook
Communist dictatorship to which the idea of basic human rights is
simply a nuisance. No amount of talk about their modernizing their
economy or welcoming American investment will change that fact. I am
already seriously disinclined to support the establishment of a United
States ambassador in Hanoi, or the granting of most favored nation
status or OPIC funding for Vietnam because, unlike the administration,
I do not believe that the Vietnamese have been as forthcoming as they
could be on the POW-MIA issue; their human rights record makes me even
less so.
Moving on to Cambodia, Mr. President, following closely on the
unfortunate expulsion of Sam Rainsy from the Cambodian legislature the
government of that country has once again taken steps which call into
serious question its commitment to its nascent democracy. Over the past
year and a half, the frequency of the government's mistreatment of the
domestic media and its suppression of the freedoms we have embodied in
our First Amendment has become alarming; journalists critical of the
government have been arrested and prosecuted and newspapers have been
shut down.
Just recently, the government charged the Phnom Penh Post and Michael
Hayes, its American publisher, with violations of Article LXII of the
Cambodian Criminal Code and is seeking to fine the publisher and close
down the paper. Article LXII provides for a fine and up to 3 years
imprisonment for publishing false or falsely attributed information in
bad faith and with malicious intent when the publication has disturbed
or is likely to disturb the public peace. In order to convict, the
government must prove all three elements--falsity, malicious intent,
and public disturbance. The story in question is an article by Nate
Thayer in the March 24/April 6 edition entitled ``Security Jitters
While PM's Away.'' The article detailed alleged security threats and
measures taken by the government while the two Prime Ministers
attended the April 1995 meeting of the country's principal aid donors.
In reporting about the threats, Mr. Thayer clearly notes that many of
the reported assertions were ``rumor'' or opinions or statements
attributed to unnamed third parties. The article went on to cite
``human rights officials'' as saying that recent government actions
against the press, the U.N. Center for Human Rights, and M.P. Sam
Rainsy are the beginning of an official effort to put an end to
criticism of the government that leaders say undermines its image at
home and abroad as a democratic country.
Despite the fact that from the particulars of the case I doubt very
much that the government could actually prove a violation of Art. LXII,
they have decided to proceed with the case. The purpose of that
decision is clearly is two-fold. First and foremost, there is the
chilling effect bringing a criminal prosecution has on other like-
minded journalists; the threat of jail or a fine--even simply the
threat of criminal litigation--can make even the most serious and
accurate journalist skittish. The reason for picking on a foreign-owned
paper is also clear; as a U.N. worker recently noted:
The cases against the Khmer press are in a slightly
different category because they have been persecuted for
articles that are mostly opinion. The Phnom Penh Post and
other Western--style newspapers are more troubling to the
government because they deal with facts that can be proved
true. They bring to light the inner workings of government
and that bother [the government] far more than opinions that
are sometimes insulting.
Second, the government seeks to use the law to discover the
identities of Mr. Thayer's sources. To prevent the government from
proving the first element of an Art. LXII offense in court--false
attribution--Thayer would be forced to disclose his sources. Any forced
compromise of journalistic sources severely curtails the ability of a
free press to report on, and the people's right to be informed about,
matters of public interest. This is especially true in instances
involving such issues as government corruption, where the power of the
wrongdoers makes those knowledgeable about the wrongdoing hesitant to
come forward.
This is far from being the only time that the Cambodian Government
has initiated an Art. LXII prosecution on flimsy grounds. Two Cambodian
journalists have already been convicted under that provision for
articles that, in my view, plainly reported opinions--which are by
definition subjective rather than objective--rather than facts. On May
19, the editor of Oddom K'tek Khmer, Thun Bunly, was sentenced to a
fine of R5,000,000 ($2,000) or one year in jail for printing a letter
to the editor entitled ``Stop Barking Samdech Prime Ministers.'' The
following day, Hen Vipheak was sentenced to a fine of R5,000,000 or two
years in jail for a cartoon and satire of the three branches of
government. Most recently, Thun Bunly was tried again, this time for
expressing opinions highly critical of the government; he described
certain government officials as greedy dictators. His paper was shut
down and he was sentenced to a fine of R10,000,000 or two years in
jail.
Unfortunately, this blatant intimidation shows no signs of abating.
Last week the Ministry of Information announced that the government is
seeking prosecution on unspecified charges of between two and five
newspapers. One of them, Samleng Yu Vachuon Khmer, has already received
a court summons. In addition, the government has adopted a new press
law that would allow criminal prosecutions where the published material
affects national security and political stability--as nebulous a
standard as I have seen--and permits the Ministries of the Interior and
Information to confiscate publications they find objectionable or
temporarily suspend publications without the
[[Page S 12607]]
approval or oversight of an independent court. Although the measure has
yet to be signed into law by King Sihanouk and therefore is not legally
in effect, it is being used to bring charges against the media.
The repeated pattern of these prosecutions, as well as the fact that
all of the alleged offenders have all stepped on the government's toes,
leads me and groups like Human Rights Watch/Asia to conclude that the
government has embarked on a program of intimidation aimed at quelling
its detractors. That perception is not helped by statements such as
those by Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh last month that foreign
newspapers are distorting the current situation in Cambodia and that
the Western brand of democracy and freedom of the press is not
applicable to Cambodia. The Prince needs to be reminded, however, that
the freedoms embodied in the Paris Accords are not Western, but
universal, and as such were supported by each of Cambodia's political
parties. In addition, they are embodied in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights to which Cambodia is a signatory.
The Cambodian Government may believe that no one is watching, or that
no one outside Cambodia cares, or that their actions are somehow
excused by the nascent nature of their democracy; they could not be
more wrong. Mr. President, we and the other donor countries are
watching and we care. It is precisely because Cambodia's democracy is
in its infancy that it is impor- tant to avoid the tendency towards
this type of abuse; otherwise, Cambodia risks institutionalizing the
behavior. If the Cambodian Government is unwilling to protect these
universally recognized rights, and to protect journalists and others
who peacefully advocate dissenting political views, then we and the
other donor nations will ensure that there is literally a price to be
paid.
Last, but certainly not least, there were a number of developments in
China which are noteworthy. First, on the brighter side, there appears
to have been a slight warming in our bilateral relationship. On August
24, the Wuhan People's Court sentenced Harry Wu to a 15-year jail term
and expelled him from the country, thus removing a serious obstacle to
the resumption of friendly relations between us. A number of
encouraging signs have followed. The Chinese have indicated that they
will be sending back to Washington their ambassador, Li Daoyu, who was
recalled after our decision to admit Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui
for a private visit. Having previously broken off all high-level
governmental contacts, the Chinese agreed to a 3-day visit by United
States Undersecretary of State Tarnoff to discuss a variety of
bilateral issues. In addition, on September 1, Li Xilin, the Guangzhou
Military Area Commander of the People's Liberation Army, attended a
ceremony in Honolulu marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World
War II as the representative of Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian.
There is also talk of an October summit meeting between President
Clinton and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin. These contacts are
important because they provide a venue for dialog and dialog keeps
parties from misunderstanding each other.
I am very pleased that it appears that the dip in our bilateral
relationship has reached its nadir and is on the upswing. That is not
to say, of course, that everything has returned to normal. Reports in
the Chinese media, and statements from the Foreign Ministry, indicate
that that government is still adhering to the unacceptable position
that the United States is solely responsible for the current problems
in Sino-U.S. relations; Washington should take all the blame for the
problems. Mr. President, the PRC should be mindful of the adage that
when you point the finger of blame at someone, three fingers are
pointing back at you. If the Chinese were to indulge in one of their
favorite political pastimes--self-criticism--then perhaps they would
realize that it is they that may be at fault: their overreaction to
President Lee's visit, technology transfers to Pakistan and Iran,
failure to enforce its obligations in regards to intellectual property
and arbitral conventions--the list goes on. The Chinese need to get
over the blame game and get down to constructive dialog and
constructive actions.
Despite my generally optimistic feeling about the general trend in
our relationship, however, there have been a number of developments
there which are troubling to me. First, on August 17 China conducted
its second underground nuclear test this year at its facility at Lop
Nor--its fourth in the past 14 months. This test concerns me, and
others, for the same reason as the proposed French tests in Mururoa; I
believe that conducting these tests is damaging to international
efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In May of this
year, the world's five acknowledged nuclear powers persuaded the rest
of the world to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty. To win that consensus, the five countries promised to sign a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] by the end of the year. The
continuation of Chinese testing though, only 4 months after China
signed the agreement, calls into question that country's commitment to
the CTBT and consequently undermines these international efforts to
curb nuclear proliferation. What possible incentive do other nuclear
countries have to refrain from testing if others continue to test?
I am not alone in my disappointment at this decision. Many countries
in the region, including Australia and Japan, have been very vocal in
their opposition. In fact, on August 30 Japan announced it will freeze
most of its grant aid--about $81.2 million in fiscal year 1995--because
of China's testing. Foreign Minister Kono Yohei told a news conference:
``We have decided to freeze aid to China with the exception of a
portion that is provided for emergency relief measures and humanitarian
aid--until China says it will stop nuclear tests.''
I would hope that Beijing would reconsider this course, not because
we disapprove, or other countries disapprove, but because of the
benefits that will accrue to the world as a whole as a result.
Another issue, Mr. President, is the unfortunate Chinese decision to
deny a visa to Hong Kong political leader Martin Lee Chu-ming. Lee is
the Chairman of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong, a principal voice of
support for democracy in the colony; in that role, he has been a
frequent critic of the communist government in Beijing. Lee needed the
visa to attend the LawAsia conference in Beijing, to which he had been
officially invited. But before he could apply, Zou Yu, the head of the
local coordinating body the China Law Society, said there was no place
[here] for people like him because he was one of the founding members
of the subversive Hong Kong Alliance in Support of a Patriotic
Democratic Movement. Ironically, Lee has a letter of invitation to the
conference, which delegates had been told would be enough to have a
visa issued on presentation, signed by Mr. Zou.
Before I hear it from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, I will state at
the outset that I fully recognize that who the PRC does or does not
admit within its borders is purely an internal matter in which third
countries have no right to interfere. Certainly, Lee's statements in
support of democracy are not music to the senior cadres' ears and if
they choose to exclude him on that basis so be it. However, I believe
that it would have been in China's best interests to admit him. Such a
move would have been greatly reassuring to Hong Kong--to both its
citizenry and business interests--and would have gone a long way to
bolster China's stature worldwide. As it stands though the Chinese move
seems petty and vindictive, and calls into question both its post-1997
commitment to the continuation of democracy in Hong Kong and its
ability to impartially host international conferences.
The PRC has a disturbing habit of seeking to host these conferences
in an effort to boost its international image, only to then heap a
host of conditions on the attendees to ensure that nothing comes up at
the conference which might embarrass China by, say, openly discussing
its abysmal human rights record. The LawAsia Conference and Martin Lee
are one example; another is the present U.N. women's conference in
Beijing. When it became clear to the Chinese authorities that the
participants in the conference's NGO forum are prone to spontaneous
demonstrations and statements in support of a
[[Page S 12608]]
variety of causes the regime finds threatening--democracy, opposition
to coerced abortion, the role of women in society--the forum suddenly
found itself moved a substantial distance outside Beijing to the small
village of Huairou. The official reason was that the Beijing stadium
originally planned to hold the forum was structurally unsound--despite
the fact that only 2 weeks ago the Chinese held a major event there.
The unofficial reason is clear to everyone; Chinese authorities are
doing their best to make sure that the flood of delegates does not
contaminate China or its citizenry with foreign ideas and open dialog.
Official statements to the contrary aside, the Chinese are fooling no
one. As the Chinese themselves are fond of saying: ``Actions speak
louder than words.'' Once Beijing began to prepare for the conference,
the patterns of isolating delegates and imposing censorship became
clear. Delegates with views with which China disagrees were denied
visas. Groups representing Tibetan and Taiwanese women were unfairly
denied accreditation, lest they embarrass the host country. Thirty
delegates from Niger were denied visas; ostensibly because their
paperwork was not entirely in order, but more likely--as almost
everyone believes--because Niger diplomatically recognizes Taiwan.
Delegates who were allowed in were warned that Chinese customs
officials would confiscate any printed material China deemed
objectionable, including Bibles. Buses that were promised to run every
20 minutes from Huairou to Beijing have dwindled to one per day,
effectively isolating the delegates at Huairou even more. The U.N.
designated ``newspaper of record'' for the forum--chronicling the
meetings and seminars and reporting on the day's events--has been
unable to publish because the Chinese firm with which they contracted
is suddenly and inexplicably ``too busy with other printing work.''
I think one of the especially telling examples of this trend is the
creation of an ``official protest site'' for the conference.
Predictably sited outside of Beijing in Huairou, the official spot is
located on a middle-school athletic field within the confines of the
forum, where an extra 5,000 police officers will be on duty. There,
separated from the Chinese people by an artificially imposed chasm, the
delegates are free to protest to their hearts content-with one
exception. Vice Minister of Public Security Tian Qiyu has announced
that ``Inside the site, NGO's are permitted to have demonstrations and
processions, but these should not infringe on the sovereignty of the
host country and should not slander or attack [its] leaders.'' In other
words, say what you want just don't criticize China. So much for an
open forum.
The actions of the Chinese Government became so oppressive that they
threatened to scuttle the entire forum. Complaints from a large number
of delegates about the omnipresence of Chinese security police hovering
over them grew with each passing day of the forum, and for good reason.
Both uniformed and plainclothes police monitored meetings and
discussions, and videotaped participants. Security officers have
searched hotel rooms, followed delegates, rifled through personal
papers and tried to restrict the movement of people who have come to
take part in the conferences. On August 31, following a screening of a
video about Tibet entitled ``Voices in Exile,'' police snatched the
video cassette and attempted to confiscate it, only to have it snatched
back by the attendees. Another group of delegates protesting China's
treatment of Tibetan women were surrounded by Chinese plainclothes
police and shouted down; one Canadian woman, the adoptive mother of a
Tibetan child, was even physically assaulted. Although the Chinese
denied such an assault took place, it was captured on video and
broadcast here by CNN. A session held by Australian NGO's was disrupted
when security officials seized microphones and video equipment and
ordered the groups to disband; the Australian Government lodged a
formal protest in response. In another incident, police tried to seize
a Chinese woman who chatted with delegates on the street. When the
woman was surrounded by delegates, though, the police retreated. The
Chinese moves are especially galling because under the agreement signed
by the Chinese the forum site is considered to be under U.N., rather
than Chinese, jurisdiction for the duration of the conference, much
like embassies are considered to be.
Things got so bad that on September 3, the leaders of the forum
issued an ultimatum to the Chinese demanding that China stop its heavy-
handed security measures by noon on that day. In response, the Chinese
grudgingly replaced some uniformed officers with plainclothesmen and
scaled back some of the surveillance. Despite the changes, though,
clashes between police and delegates continue. Just this last weekend
Islamic women demonstrators were physically prevented by police from
marching out of the forum site into Huairou.
Given this somewhat ironic Chinese penchant for actively seeking to
host international conferences dealing with human rights and the free
exchange of ideas only to trample those very rights, I would not be at
all surprised if the next time the PRC seeks to host such a meeting the
participants think twice; and the Chinese--although they will certainly
try--will have no one to blame but themselves. As I have pointed out
previously, if China wants to assume a place at the international
table, then it must respect international rules and norms of behavior--
in trade, in diplomacy and military affairs, in nonproliferation, and
not least in domestic practice.
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