[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 136 (Tuesday, September 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12579-S12604]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1996 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction and for defense activities 
     of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths 
     for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Georgia.


                           Amendment No. 2425

   (Purpose: To amend subtitle C of title II of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe there is an amendment, No. 2425, 
which is an amendment to the Missile Defense Act, pending at the desk. 
I ask that amendment be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] for himself, Mr. 
     Warner, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Cohen, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2425.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 49, strike out line 15 and all that follows through 
     line 9 on page 69 and insert the following in lieu thereof:

                      Subtitle C--Missile Defense

     SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Missile Defense Act of 
     1995''.

     SEC. 232. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The threat that is posed to the national security of 
     the United States by the proliferation of ballistic and 
     cruise missiles is significant and growing, both 
     quantitatively and qualitatively.
       (2) The deployment of effective Theater Missile Defense 
     systems can deny potential adversaries the option of 
     escalating a conflict by threatening or attacking United 

[[Page S 12580]]
     States forces, coalition partners of the United States, or allies of 
     the United States with ballistic missiles armed with weapons 
     of mass destruction to offset the operational and technical 
     advantages of the United States and its coalition partners 
     and allies.
       (3) The intelligence community of the United States has 
     estimated that (A) the missile proliferation trend is toward 
     longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles, (B) 
     North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile 
     capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years, and (C) 
     although a new indigenously developed ballistic missile 
     threat to the continental United States is not forecast 
     within the next 10 years there is a danger that determined 
     countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in 
     the near future and with little warning by means other than 
     indigenous development.
       (4) The deployment by the United States and its allies of 
     effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges, 
     as well as against cruise missiles, can reduce the incentives 
     for countries to acquire such missiles or to augment existing 
     missile capabilities.
       (5) The Cold War distinction between strategic ballistic 
     missiles and nonstrategic ballistic missiles and, therefore, 
     the ABM Treaty's distinction between strategic defense and 
     nonstrategic defense, has changed because of technological 
     advancements and should be reviewed.
       (6) The concept of mutual assured destruction, which was 
     one of the major philosophical rationales for the ABM Treaty, 
     is now questionable as a basis for stability in a multipolar 
     world in which the United States and the states of the former 
     Soviet Union are seeking to normalize relations and eliminate 
     Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
       (7) Theater and national missile defenses can contribute to 
     the maintenance of stability as missile threats proliferate 
     and as the United States and the former Soviet Union 
     significantly reduce the number of strategic nuclear forces 
     in their respective inventories.
       (8) Although technology control regimes and other forms of 
     international arms control can contribute to 
     nonproliferation, such measures alone are inadequate for 
     dealing with missile proliferation, and should not be viewed 
     as alternatives to missile defenses and other active and 
     passive defenses.
       (9) Due to limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude 
     deployment of more than 100 ground-based ABM interceptors at 
     a single site, the United States is currently prohibited from 
     deploying a national missile defense system capable of 
     defending the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii 
     against even the most limited ballistic missile attacks.

     SEC. 233. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) deploy as soon as possible affordable and operationally 
     effective theater missile defenses capable of countering 
     existing and emerging theater ballistic missiles;
       (2)(A) develop for deployment a multiple-site national 
     missile defense system that: (i) is affordable and 
     operationally effective against limited, accidental, and 
     unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of 
     the United States, and (ii) can be augmented over time as the 
     threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited, 
     accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats;
       (B) initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as 
     necessary to provide for the national missile defense systems 
     specified in section 235; and
       (C) consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of 
     withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the 
     provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, subject to 
     consultations between the President and the Senate;
       (3) ensure congressional review, prior to a decision to 
     deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph 
     (2), of: (A) the affordability and operational effectiveness 
     of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such a 
     system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to 
     such a system;
       (4) improve existing cruise missile defenses and deploy as 
     soon as practical defenses that are affordable and 
     operationally effective against advanced cruise missiles;
       (5) pursue a focused research and development program to 
     provide follow-on ballistic missile defense options;
       (6) employ streamlined acquisition procedures to lower the 
     cost and accelerate the pace of developing and deploying 
     theater missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, and 
     national missile defenses;
       (7) seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not 
     feature mutual assured destruction and an offense-only form 
     of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability; and
       (8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of 
     subtitle C of title II of this Act through processes 
     specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which 
     anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to 
     the Treaty.

     SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) Establishment of Core Program.--To implement the policy 
     established in section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     establish a top priority core theater missile defense program 
     consisting of the following systems:
       (1) The Patriot PAC-3 system, with a first unit equipped 
     (FUE) in fiscal year 1998.
       (2) The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system, with a user 
     operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal 
     year 1997 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in 
     fiscal year 1999.
       (3) The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, 
     with a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability 
     in fiscal year 1997 and an initial operational capability 
     (IOC) no later than fiscal year 2002.
       (4) The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system, with a user 
     operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal 
     year 1999 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in 
     fiscal year 2001.
       (b) Interoperability and Support of Core Systems.--To 
     maximize effectiveness and flexibility, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall ensure that core theater missile defense 
     systems are interoperable and fully capable of exploiting 
     external sensor and battle management support from systems 
     such as the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability 
     (CEC), the Army's Battlefield Integration Center (BIC), 
     air and space-based sensors including, in particular, the 
     Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS).
       (c) Termination of Programs.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall terminate the Boost Phase Interceptor (BPI) program.
       (d) Follow-On Systems.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall 
     develop an affordable development plan for follow-on theater 
     missile defense systems which leverages existing systems, 
     technologies, and programs, and focuses investments to 
     satisfy military requirements not met by the core program.
       (2) Before adding new theater missile defense systems to 
     the core program from among the follow-on activities, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report describing--
       (A) the requirements for the program and the specific 
     threats to be countered;
       (B) how the new program will relate to, support, and 
     leverage off existing core programs;
       (C) the planned acquisition strategy; and
       (D) a preliminary estimate of total program cost and 
     budgetary impact.
       (e) Report.--(1) Not later than the date on which the 
     President submits the budget for fiscal year 1997 under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a report detailing the Secretary's plans for 
     implementing the guidance specified in this section.
       (2) For each deployment date for each system described in 
     subsection (a), the report required by paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection shall include the funding required for research, 
     development, testing, evaluation, and deployment for each 
     fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 through the end 
     of the fiscal year in which deployment is projected under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 235. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) In General.--To implement the policy established in 
     section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall develop an 
     affordable and operationally effective national missile 
     defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or 
     unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable 
     of attaining initial operational capability (IOC) by the end 
     of 2003. Such system shall include the following:
       (1) Ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at 
     multiple sites, the locations and numbers of which are to be 
     determined so as to optimize the defensive coverage of the 
     continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against 
     limited, accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile 
     attacks.
       (2) Fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors, 
     including the Space and Missile Tracking system, the mix, 
     siting and numbers of which are to be determined so as to 
     optimize sensor support and minimize total system cost.
       (3) Battle management, command, control, and communications 
     (BM/C3).
       (b) Interim Operational Capability.--To provide a hedge 
     against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile threats 
     against the United States and to support the development and 
     deployment of the objective system specified in subsection 
     (a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop an interim 
     national missile defense plan that would give the United 
     States the ability to field a limited operational capability 
     by the end of 1999 if required by the threat. In developing 
     this plan the Secretary shall make use of--
       (1) developmental, or user operational evaluation system 
     (UOES) interceptors, radars, and battle management, command, 
     control, and communications (BM/C3), to the extent that such 
     use directly supports, and does not significantly increase 
     the cost of, the objective system specified in subsection 
     (a);
       (2) one or more of the sites that will be used as 
     deployment locations for the objective system specified in 
     subsection (a);
       (3) upgraded early warning radars; and
       (4) space-based sensors.
       (c) Use of Streamlined Acquisition Procedures.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and use streamlined 
     acquisition procedures to--
       (1) reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of 
     developing the national missile defense system specified in 
     subsection (a); and
       (2) ensure that any interim national missile defense 
     capabilities developed pursuant to subsection (b) are 
     operationally effective and on a path to fulfill the 
     technical requirements and schedule of the objective system.

[[Page S 12581]]

       (d) Additional Cost Saving Measures.--In addition to the 
     procedures prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the 
     Secretary of Defense shall employ cost saving measures that 
     do not decrease the operational effectiveness of the systems 
     specified in subsections (a) and (b), and which do not pose 
     unacceptable technical risk. The cost saving measures should 
     include the following:
       (1) The use of existing facilities and infrastructure.
       (2) The use, where appropriate, of existing or upgraded 
     systems and technologies, except that Minuteman boosters may 
     not be used as part of a National Missile Defense 
     architecture.
       (3) Development of systems and components that do not rely 
     on a large and permanent infrastructure and are easily 
     transported, emplaced, and moved.
       (e) Report on Plan for Deployment.--Not later than the date 
     on which the President submits the budget for fiscal year 
     1997 under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report containing the following matters:
       (1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this section.
       (2) For each deployment date in subsections (a) and (b), 
     the report shall include the funding required for research, 
     development, testing, evaluation, and deployment for each 
     fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 through the end 
     of the fiscal year in which deployment is projected under 
     subsection (a) or (b). The report shall also describe the 
     specific threat to be countered and provide the Secretary's 
     assessment as to whether deployment is affordable and 
     operationally effective.
       (3) An analysis of options for supplementing or modifying 
     the national missile defense architecture specified in 
     subsection (a) before attaining initial operational 
     capability, or evolving such architecture in a building block 
     manner after attaining initial operational capability, to 
     improve the cost-effectiveness or the operational 
     effectiveness of such system by adding one or a combination 
     of the following:
       (A) Additional ground-based interceptors at existing or new 
     sites.
       (B) Sea-based missile defense systems.
       (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
       (D) Space-based directed energy systems.

     SEC. 236. CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall undertake 
     an initiative to coordinate and strengthen the cruise missile 
     defense programs, projects, and activities of the military 
     departments, the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the 
     Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to ensure that the 
     United States develops and deploys affordable and 
     operationally effective defenses against existing and future 
     cruise missile threats.
       (b) Actions of the Secretary of Defense.--In carrying out 
     subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that--
       (1) to the extent practicable, the ballistic missile 
     defense and cruise missile defense efforts of the Department 
     of Defense are coordinated and mutually reinforcing;
       (2) existing air defense systems are adequately upgraded to 
     provide an affordable and operationally effective defense 
     against existing and near-term cruise missile threats; and
       (3) the Department of Defense undertakes a high priority 
     and well coordinated technology development program to 
     support the future deployment of systems that are affordable 
     and operationally effective against advanced cruise missiles, 
     including cruise missiles with low observable features.
       (c) Implementation Plan.--Not later than the date on which 
     the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1997 under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a detailed plan, in unclassified and classified 
     forms, as necessary, for carrying out this section. The plan 
     shall include an assessment of--
       (1) the systems that currently have cruise missile defense 
     capabilities, and existing programs to improve these 
     capabilities;
       (2) the technologies that could be deployed in the near- to 
     mid-term to provide significant advances over existing cruise 
     missile defense capabilities, and the investments that would 
     be required to ready the technologies for deployment;
       (3) the cost and operational tradeoffs, if any, between 
     upgrading existing air and missile defense systems and 
     accelerating follow-on systems with significantly improved 
     capabilities against advanced cruise missiles; and
       (4) the organizational and management changes that would 
     strengthen and further coordinate the cruise missile defense 
     efforts of the Department of Defense, including the 
     disadvantages, if any, of implementing such changes.

     SEC. 237. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

       (a) Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible 
     changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on 
     the provisions of this treaty''.
       (2) Articles XIII and XIV of the ABM Treaty establish means 
     for the Parties to amend the Treaty, and the Parties have 
     employed these means to amend the Treaty.
       (3) Article XV of the ABM Treaty establishes the means for 
     a party to withdraw from the Treaty, upon 6 months notice, 
     ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
     subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
     interests.''
       (4) The policies, programs, and requirements of subtitle C 
     of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes 
     specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which 
     anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to 
     the Treaty.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--In light of the findings and 
     policies provided in this subtitle, it is the sense of 
     Congress that--
       (1) given the fundamental responsibility of the Government 
     of the United States to protect the security of the United 
     States, the increasingly serious threat posed to the United 
     States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
     and ballistic missile technology, and the effect this threat 
     could have on the options of the United States to act in a 
     time of crisis--
       (A) it is in the vital national security interest of the 
     United States to defend itself from the threat of a limited, 
     accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack, 
     whatever its source; and
       (B) the deployment of a national missile defense system, in 
     accord with section 233, to protect the territory of the 
     United States against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
     missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and 
     deterrence; and
       (2)(A) the Senate should undertake a comprehensive review 
     of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty with 
     the intent of provided additional policy guidance on the 
     future of the ABM Treaty during the second session of the 
     104th Congress; and
       (B) upon completion of the review, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, in consultation with the Committee on Armed 
     Services and other appropriate committees, should report its 
     findings to the Senate.

     SEC. 238. PROHIBITION ON FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT AN INTERNATIONAL 
                   AGREEMENT CONCERNING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 
                   SYSTEMS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 provides that the ABM Treaty does not 
     apply to or limit research, development, testing, or 
     deployment of missile defense systems, system upgrades, or 
     system components that are designed to counter modern theater 
     ballistic missiles, regardless of the capabilities of such 
     missiles, unless those systems, system upgrades, or system 
     components are tested against or have demonstrated 
     capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.
       (2) Section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995 provides that the United States shall 
     not be bound by any international agreement that would 
     substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is 
     entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the 
     President under the Constitution.
       (3) The demarcation standard described in subsection (b)(1) 
     is based upon current technology.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) unless a missile defense system, system upgrade, or 
     system component, including one that exploits data from 
     space-based or other external sensors, is flight tested 
     against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of 
     3,500 kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second, 
     such missile defense system, system upgrade, or system 
     component has not been tested in an ABM mode nor deemed to 
     have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic 
     missiles, and
       (2) any international agreement that would limit the 
     research, development, testing, or deployment of 
     missile defense systems, system upgrades, or system 
     components that are designed to counter modern theater 
     ballistic missiles in a manner that would be more 
     restrictive than the criteria in paragraph (1) should be 
     entered into only pursuant to the treaty making powers of 
     the President under the Constitution.
       (c) Prohibition on Funding.--Funds appropriated or 
     otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for 
     fiscal year 1996 may not be obligated or expended to 
     implement an agreement with any of the independent states of 
     the former Soviet Union entered into after January 1, 1995 
     that would establish a demarcation between theater missile 
     defense systems and anti-ballistic missile systems for 
     purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the 
     performance, operation, or deployment of United States 
     theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent 
     provided in an act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to 
     implement that portion of any such agreement that implements 
     the criteria in subsection (b)(1); or (3) to implement any 
     such agreement that is entered into pursuant to the treaty 
     making power of the President under the Constitution.

     SEC. 239. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM ELEMENTS.

       (a) Elements Specified.--In the budget justification 
     materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department 
     of Defense budget for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1996 
     (as submitted in the budget of the President under section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code), the amount 
     requested for activities of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Organization shall be set forth in accordance with the 
     following program elements:
       (1) The Patriot system.
       (2) The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system.
       (3) The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

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       (4) The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system.
       (5) Other Theater Missile Defense Activities.
       (6) National Missile Defense.
       (7) Follow-On and Support Technologies.
       (b) Treatment of Non-Core TMD in Other Theater Missile 
     Defense Activities Element.--Funding for theater missile 
     defense programs, projects, and activities, other than core 
     theater missile defense programs, shall be covered in the 
     ``Other Theater Missile Defense Activities'' program element.
       (c) Treatment of Core Theater Missile Defense Programs.--
     Funding for core theater missile defense programs specified 
     in section 234, shall be covered in individual, dedicated 
     program elements and shall be available only for activities 
     covered by those program elements.
       (d) BM/C3I Programs.--Funding for programs, projects, and 
     activities involving battle management, command, control, 
     communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I) shall be covered in 
     the ``Other Theater Missile Defense Activities'' program 
     element or the ``National Missile Defense'' program element, 
     as determined on the basis of the primary objectives 
     involved.
       (e) Management and Support.--Each program element shall 
     include requests for the amounts necessary for the management 
     and support of the programs, projects, and activities 
     contained in that program element.

     SEC. 240. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

       For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``ABM Treaty'' 
     means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 
     Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, 
     and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow 
     on July 3, 1974.

     SEC. 241. REPEAL OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROVISIONS.

       The following provisions of law are repealed:
       (1) The Missile Defense Act of 1991 (part C of title II of 
     Public Law 102-190; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
       (2) Section 237 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
       (3) Section 242 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
       (4) Section 222 of the Department of Defense Authorization 
     Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 613; 10 U.S.C. 2431 
     note).
       (5) Section 225 of the Department of Defense Authorization 
     Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 614).
       (6) Section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180; 101 Stat. 
     1057; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
       (7) Section 8123 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-463; 102 Stat. 2270-
     40).
       (8) Section 8133 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1992 (Public Law 102-172; 105 Stat. 
     1211).
       (9) Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1595; 10 
     U.S.C. 2431 note).
       (10) Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2701; 10 
     U.S.C. 221 note).

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 3 hours of debate scheduled on this 
amendment, 2 for the Senator from Georgia, 1 for the Senator from South 
Carolina.
  The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need at 
this point, and I do not intend to make long remarks at this point to 
give each of my colleagues a chance to lay down their views and to make 
their remarks on this amendment, which is a very important amendment. 
Then I will conclude with other remarks as we proceed through this 
debate.
  Mr. President, at the request of the majority and minority leaders, 
Senators Cohen, Levin, Warner, and I spent the better part of the week 
preceding the August recess meeting intensively addressing issues 
raised by the proposed Missile Defense Act of 1995, as set forth in S. 
1026, the pending Defense authorization bill.
  The goal of our effort was to develop an amendment establishing a 
missile defense policy that could be supported by a broad bipartisan 
group of Senators. On Friday, August 11, we filed a bipartisan 
substitute amendment reflecting our best efforts to meet the objective, 
and I hope that all Members have had an opportunity during the recess 
to review this bipartisan amendment.
  I want to express my thanks to my three colleagues, Senator Warner, 
Senator Cohen, and Senator Levin, for the diligence, tolerance, and 
good will each of them showed throughout the long and at times very 
difficult negotiations that occurred over a very intensive period of 
about a week that led to the agreement embodied in the substitute 
amendment that is now reported and pending.
  I believe the amendment is a significant improvement to the version 
in the bill, and I support its adoption.
  Mr. President, the revised version of the Missile Defense Act of 
1995, if passed in this amendment as set forth in this substitute, 
serves three very important functions. First, it clarifies the intent 
of the United States with respect to decisions about future missile 
defenses. Second, it diffuses a potential constitutional contest and 
confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. And, 
third, it makes clear to the international community our policy toward 
the ABM Treaty.
  Under the bipartisan substitute, the policy is no longer stated as a 
binding commitment to deploy a missile defense system. That is a 
decision that will be made in the future. Instead, the national missile 
defense policy, and section 232 of this substitute, is to ``develop for 
deployment.'' The substitute adds several important qualifiers such as 
the system must be ``affordable and operationally effective.'' This 
requirement appears in section 232 and is reemphasized throughout the 
amendment. And the system is limited to addressing only ``accidental, 
unauthorized or limited attacks.'' That qualification, which is set 
forth in section 232, is repeated throughout the amendment.
  One of the most important qualifications under the substitute is the 
requirement in section 2333 for ``congressional review, prior to a 
decision to deploy the system, of development or deployment of (a) the 
affordability and operational effectiveness of such a system, (b) the 
threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM Treaty 
considerations with respect to such a system.''
  These vital issues will all be considered before we take a step in 
the future to authorize and appropriate funds for deployment of a 
national missile defense system.
  Mr. President, perhaps the most important qualification, both in 
terms of arms control and the separation of powers, is section 2338, 
which requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out the policies, 
programs, and requirements of the entire Missile Defense Act ``through 
processes specified within or consistent with the ABM Treaty which 
anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the 
treaty.''
  Mr. President, finally, let me address the theater missile 
demarcation provision briefly. Section 238 of the bill as reported 
would have established in permanent law a specific demarcation between 
theater and strategic missile defenses and would have prohibited the 
President from negotiations or other actions concerning the 
clarification or interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the line between 
theater and strategic missile defenses. The bipartisan substitute 
amendment strikes all of section 238 and provides in the bipartisan 
substitute a limited funding restriction with the following provisions 
concerning the demarcation or the definitional distinction between 
theater and national missile defenses.
  First, the funding restriction applies only to fiscal year 1996.
  Second, this substitute restriction applies only to the 
implementation of agreement with the successor states in the Soviet 
Union, should one be reached, concerning a demarcation between theater 
and strategic defenses for the purposes of the ABM Treaty and 
additional restrictions on theater missile defenses going beyond those 
in the demarcation.
  In addition to being limited to 1 year, the substitute funding 
limitation in section 238 has three exceptions. The limitation does not 
apply ``to the extent provided in a subsequent act'' to implement that 
portion of any such agreement that implements specific terms of the 
demarcation set forth in the amendment, to implement an agreement that 
is entered into pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President 
under the Constitution.
  Mr. President, there are many other changes that improve the overall 
thrust of this subject matter in the bipartisan substitute. I believe 
that the bipartisan substitute amendment provides a useful statement of 
congressional policy and is intended to be presented in a framework 
that makes clear that we seek a negotiated set of changes with the 
Russian Federation 

[[Page S 12583]]
to allow for more effective defenses against limited missile attacks 
than either side is permitted today.
  I believe the bipartisan substitute amendment is not, and should not 
be seen by Russia as, a threat by the United States either to abandon 
the ABM Treaty or to reinterpret a treaty unilaterally to our 
advantage. Both we and Russia face the threat of ballistic missile 
attacks. It is not simply the United States; it is also Russia. The 
threats may be somewhat different, but the need for defenses should be 
clear to both sides.
  What we have to do is arrange for both sides to be able to deploy 
more effective defenses than in use today against accidental, 
unauthorized, and limited attacks while maintaining overall strategic 
stability and while making it plain that neither side seeks to combine 
offensive capability with defensive capability thereby giving either 
side what has for years been feared as a first-strike capability. Some 
people use that term in connection and synonymously with the term 
``strategic stability.'' Some people use the term ``strategic 
stability'' in a broader context.
  But, nevertheless, it is my view that, if we are going to proceed to 
enjoy the benefits of 20 years of work and negotiations to reduce 
nuclear weapons under the treaties that have been entered into, like 
the START I Treaty or treaties now pending like the START II Treaty, it 
is very important that both sides understand that strategic stability 
is being maintained, that neither side is intending to combine 
offensive striking power with defensive abilities so that either side 
would be tempted at any point in the future--whatever developed--to 
develop anything resembling a first-strike capability.
  That is the scenario that the ABM Treaty was originally designed to 
prevent. It has some relevance today. But it needs changing in some 
very important but modest aspects.
  Mr. President, it is important that whatever we do with defenses--and 
I favor going forward with both the theater missile system and also a 
national missile system against limited and unauthorized attacks and 
third-country attack--whatever we do we should make sure that we 
continue to carry out the reductions of the armaments that have been 
most threatening against the United States for the last 20 years, the 
heavy missiles. And those missiles are part of both START I and START 
II reductions.
  It is enormously important that we not send signals to the Russian 
Parliament, the Russian leadership, to the Russian people that they in 
any way should fear for their own security and that they, therefore, 
should not go forward with the reductions of the missiles that they 
have either agreed to or that are pending in the START II agreement.
  Mr. President, that is what this is all about. I know there will be 
some who will agree with the changes. There will be some who may not 
agree with the changes. But this does represent the best effort that 
Senator Levin and I on the Democratic side, together with Senator 
Warner and Senator Cohen on the Republican side, were able to put 
together in an effort to achieve these goals that I have enumerated.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. NUNN. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I will later address this pending amendment. But I would 
like to ask a question of my distinguished colleague. I think we 
concur, the four of us, Senator Thurmond, Senator Cohen, myself, and 
Senator Levin and also our distinguished ranking member. It would be my 
hope that the Senator from Georgia would have an opportunity to make 
some assessment as to how the administration views this amendment. I 
wondered if the Senator would share with the Senate what he has.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia that I talked to Secretary 
of Defense Perry about this amendment, and I think it is fair to say 
that he believes it is a dramatic improvement over the original 
version.
  I would not be able to portray to the Senator from Virginia that I 
conveyed this or that I have discussed it in any kind of detail with 
the White House. And I cannot give any message about how they view 
either this authorization bill or the appropriations bill which was 
passed. There are a number of other areas that do not concern this that 
have been of concern to the White House and the Secretary of Defense, 
including, in the bill we just passed, the appropriation bill, the 
elimination of some very important funding that the Secretary of 
Defense had undertaken under the Nunn-Lugar program for working to 
reduce the Russian military establishment.
  That is a concern to Secretary Perry; it also is a concern to me, 
that funding was eliminated both in the appropriations bill in the 
House and Senate. But as far as this particular provision is concerned, 
I have no doubt that Secretary Perry feels it is a great improvement, 
and I would assume, without having directly talked with the President 
about it, that he would also view it in that way.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague, but I 
hope the administration would view this as an effort to reconcile 
important differences and that it is a work product worthy of support 
by the Senate and by the administration.
  Mr. NUNN. It is also my hope that would be their view. I would say to 
my friend, I know there are other provisions in this bill and the 
appropriations bill that concern both the White House and the Secretary 
of Defense. So I can make no statement here that indicates their 
feeling on the overall product we now have. I am sure they will be 
heard from as we move into conference.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. Thurmond addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to support the bipartisan missile 
defense amendment which was worked out prior to the August recess.
  While I continue to believe that the missile defense provisions in 
the bill reported to the Senate by the Armed Services Committee are 
sound and reasonable, I also agree that the compromise is a positive 
step away from the status quo.
  The compromise amendment does not include everything that I wanted, 
but it does not fundamentally undermine any of the policies or 
initiatives that I viewed as critical. In my view, it is an adequate 
position to take to conference. The House defense authorization bill 
differs in several ways from the Senate compromise missile defense 
amendment. Obviously, there will be considerable discussion before a 
consensus is reached between the two Chambers.
  Let me again thank all those who worked so hard prior to the August 
recess. And I especially wish to thank Senator Warner, Senator Cohen, 
Senator Nunn, and Senator Levin. Also, let me thank the leaders for 
their cooperation.
  Finally, I would like to draw to the attention of the Senate an 
article by the Republican leader, Senator Dole, in today's Washington 
Times which addresses the subject of missile defense. This is an 
excellent piece for which I commend the Republican leader. I ask 
unanimous consent that a copy of the article be printed in the Record 
following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. THURMOND. In closing, Mr. President, let me once again urge my 
colleagues to support the bipartisan compromise on missile defense. It 
is a positive step that all Members should be able to endorse.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                      A Timely Reminder From Iraq

                            (By Robert Dole)

       When Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and former chief of mass 
     destruction bolted, apparently threatening to tell all, the 
     Iraqi director preempted and sent us the loudest wake-up call 
     we are likely to get on the growing threat of weapons of mass 
     destruction. As we finish up the Department of Defense 
     Authorization Bill, it's time to heed that call.
       According to their belated admission, the Iraqis filled 
     nearly 200 bombs and warheads for ballistic missiles with 
     botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and aflatoxin. In addition to 
     the shockingly advanced nuclear weapons program already 
     revealed, Iraq now says it ran a second program to develop a 
     nuclear weapon by April 1991 with material diverted from 
     nuclear power reactors.

[[Page S 12584]]

       The latest revelations from Baghdad underscore four points.
       First, arms control treaties and export controls did not 
     prevent Iraq from pursuing its deadly aims. Don't get me 
     wrong--diplomatic efforts increase the cost, time and 
     technical challenge required to acquire weapons to mass 
     destruction. We should press on with them. The point is 
     simply that diplomacy does not prevent malevolent countries 
     like Iraq from acquiring these weapons and there are a number 
     of countries of Iraq's ilk out there.
       Second, Iraq managed to conceal a good part of its 
     activities from the rest of the world, even after post-Gulf 
     War U.N. sanctions made it the most inspected country on 
     earth. Clearly, absence of evidence is not evidence of 
     absence. The lesson is that we no longer have the luxury of 
     waiting for our intelligence bureaucracy to gather reams of 
     evidence before ``validating'' a threat. Our own defense 
     programs need to start anticipating emerging threats.
       Third, what makes these weapons truly menacing is the 
     prospect of their delivery with ballistic missiles, which 
     allow countries that never before wielded such power to vault 
     themselves onto the world stage. Imagine trying to put 
     together the coalition for Desert Storm if Cairo, Ankara, 
     Rome or London had believed they were vulnerable to missiles 
     loaded with anthrax. And let's not forget that the United 
     States and its key allies may soon be a target. In just three 
     to five years, the North Korean Taepo-Dong II 
     intercontinental ballistic missile could reach American soil. 
     Those lacking in imagination about what that implies 
     should recall the words of Saddam Hussein: ``Our missiles 
     cannot reach Washington. If they could reach Washington, 
     we would strike it if the need rose.''
       Fourth, the Clinton administration and its allies hobble 
     America's missile defense efforts by clinging to the 1972 ABM 
     Treaty with the now defunct Soviet Union. They have even 
     tried to drag our theater missile defense programs, never 
     covered by the ABM Treaty, under new limits that the 
     administration has hatched from ever-burgeoning 
     interpretations of that treaty.
       It's time to defend ourselves in the multipolar world of 
     the 21st century. It's time to change the regime established 
     by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which currently leaves the American 
     people vulnerable to missile attack from any country capable 
     of developing or buying a long-range missile, I think there 
     are ways we can cooperate with Russia on missile defenses, 
     but that is partly up to them. Our job on the defense bill is 
     to lay out what is necessary for America's defense. We now 
     have a defense bill which takes important steps in that 
     direction.
       First, it establishes a Cruise Missile Defense Initiative, 
     the need for which was just underscored by Iraq's admission 
     that it was experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles, 
     cousins of the cruise missile, to deliver biological agents.
       Second, it establishes a theater missile defense ``core 
     program'' to ensure that we stay focused and move toward 
     deployment of those systems that are clearly needed as soon 
     as possible, adding the crucial Navy Upper Tier system to the 
     core. This system will allow our Navy to take missile 
     defenses wherever in the world American interests are 
     threatened.
       Third, it precludes arms control zealots from dragging 
     theater missile defense systems which are not covered by the 
     ABM Treaty into a web of new limitations. It calls for a year 
     of careful consideration on how to proceed with the ABM 
     Treaty in the longer term. During that time, the president 
     should seek to negotiate with Russia a mutually beneficial 
     agreement that will allow the United States to proceed with 
     its multiple-site deployments.
       Most important, it establishes U.S. policy to develop for 
     deployment by 2003 ground-based interceptors at multiple 
     sites, fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors for 
     a defense of the United States of America.
       Mr. President, it's time to defend America.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding.
  Mr. President, let me thank Senator Thurmond for his confidence in 
asking Senator Warner and me to represent the Republican side in the 
negotiations with Senator Nunn and also Senator Levin.
  The four of us have enjoyed working together over our years of 
service on the Armed Services Committee, and it was a special privilege 
for me to be able to sit down for hours and hours, well into the night, 
in fact, on several occasions, working from at least 5 in the afternoon 
until midnight on at least two occasions, but the issues that were 
involved were serious. They required that kind of attention to detail.
  Notwithstanding some of the comments that were made earlier today by 
some of our colleagues, words do make a difference. Poets are not the 
only individuals who pinch words until they hurt. Arms controllers do 
as well.
  Words within the field of arms control carry specific meaning, and it 
was very important that we took great care as we tried to hammer out a 
compromise between our respective positions, in making sure that we 
would not do damage to longstanding precedents and longstanding 
interpretations. Notwithstanding the fact there has been some criticism 
leveled at this bipartisan proposal, we believe the care which we have 
taken to describe in some detail, with some great sensitivity, I might 
add, the meaning of the words that were used, carries significant 
implications for arms control and national security.
  We have to remind our colleagues again and again we are not seeking 
to rekindle the debate over star wars, some sort of astrodomic system 
that is going to hover over the United States and protect this county 
from an all-out assault from the former Soviet Union or any major power 
that may emerge in the future. We could not do that. We do not envision 
that. We agree, in light of the proliferation of missile technology 
that we are agreed upon, that there is a grave danger of missile 
technology proliferating at an ever and ever faster rate that poses a 
threat to the United States, also to the former Soviet Union. They also 
should have great concern about the proliferation of this kind of 
technology.
  How do we quantify it? How great is that threat? I do not think any 
of us are in a position to make a judgment. But we do not want to be in 
the position 3 or 4 or 5 years down the road of having some accidental 
launch, an unauthorized launch, or a limited attack against the United 
States and all the President of the United States could do would be to 
tell the people targeted: ``Sorry, we will do the best to clean up the 
thousands if not millions of dead after the missile hits. We have no 
means of protecting you. And, yes, we understand what 5 o'clock traffic 
is in Washington, New York, and every major city and the chances are 
you will not be able to get out of the city on 30 minutes' notice, and 
so all we can do is hope to minimize the slaughter that will take place 
by sending in our rescue teams, assuming they survive the blast.''
  That is an untenable position, and so we have to have some means of 
defending against these types of limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
launches, and there should be no dissent on that. This is not a matter 
of partisanship. There is no dissent that we need to have that 
capability.
  In June, when the Armed Services Committee marked up the Defense 
authorization bill, the committee voted to put the United States on the 
path to deployment of a highly effective system to defend the American 
people against limited missile attacks.
  Because we want to and must defend all Americans, not just those in a 
particular region of the country, we called for a multiple-site 
defense. And, because we can expect the threat to evolve to become ever 
more sophisticated, we called for a defensive system that would also 
evolve and a research-and-development program to provide options for 
the future. Since the National Missile Defense Program approved by the 
committee goes beyond that being pursued by the administration, we 
added $300 million above the $371 million requested.
  We also called for deployment of highly effective systems to defend 
our forward deployed forces and key allies and, to ensure this result, 
reorganized the administration's theater missile defense effort. A 
related matter involved negotiations being conducted with Moscow to 
define the line distinguishing TMD from ABM systems.
  Over the last year and a half, the Clinton administration has drifted 
toward accepting Russian proposals to limit TMD systems in unacceptable 
ways--in effect, to subject TMD systems to the ABM Treaty, which was 
never intended to cover theater defenses. The committee addressed this 
troubling situation with two steps. First, we voted to write into law 
the Clinton administration's initial negotiating position on what 
constitutes an ABM system. And second, we adopted 

[[Page S 12585]]
bill language to prevent the administration from implementing any 
agreement that would have the effect of applying ABM Treaty 
restrictions to TMD systems.
  Last month, when the Defense authorization act came to the floor, the 
committee's judgment was challenged. One amendment was offered to 
delete the additional $300 million provided for national missile 
defense. And another amendment was offered eliminate the policy to 
deploy a multiple-site national defense system, eliminate the statutory 
demarcation between TMD and ABM systems, and eliminate the ban on 
applying the ABM Treaty to TMD systems.
  As was the case during the committee's mark-up, these efforts failed 
in relatively close votes.
  Mr. President, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since 1979 
and have spent some of that time in the majority. It has not been our 
practice for the majority to use its position to impose its views on 
the minority. Instead, we have usually sought to develop as broad a 
consensus as possible on important issues of national security.
  In this spirit, Members of the majority also offered amendments on 
the floor to move beyond close, partisan votes toward a broader 
consensus.
  Senator Kyl offered an amendment expressing ``the sense of the Senate 
that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or 
limited ballistic missile attack.'' His amendment setting forth this 
basic principle, which was the basis for the Armed Services Committee's 
action, was approved overwhelming, 94-5.
  And to address the concerns of some Senators that the committee was 
advocating abrogation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment 
affirming that the multiple-site defense we endorsed can be deployed in 
accordance with mechanisms provided for in the ABM Treaty--such as 
negotiating an amendment--and urging the President to negotiate with 
Moscow to obtain the necessary treaty amendment. My amendment was also 
approved by a very large margin, 69-26.
  I highlight that vote margin because the bipartisan amendment we have 
negotiated would change even the language of the Cohen amendment, which 
was adopted overwhelmingly by the full Senate. I think this is a clear 
indication of how far the majority has been willing to go in 
accommodating the minority in order to build a broader consensus.


                        the bipartisan amendment

  The result of the negotiations that have occurred is the bipartisan 
amendment, which is being cosponsored by the four Senators designated 
by the two leaders to attempt to resolve this issue. In order to reach 
agreement on this amendment, both sides made concessions, although it 
should be noted that many of the agreed upon changes are less 
concessions than clarifications of the Armed Services Committee's 
intent.
  Senators interested in this matter can read the bipartisan amendment 
and compare it to current text of the bill. Our negotiations involved 
debate over almost every single word in subtitle C. For reasons of 
time, I will merely try to summarize the most important issues.


                         missile defense policy

  In section 233, which addresses missile defense policy, we have made 
a number of changes to clarify the intent of the committee's language.
  The bipartisan text states that ``it is the policy of the United 
States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile 
defense system.'' The difference with the original text is that it 
substitutes the words ``develop for deployment'' for the word 
``deploy.''
  This change is consistent with the fact that what we are funding in 
this bill is research and development on national missile defense, not 
procurement. There will be a number of authorization and appropriations 
bills to be acted upon before we begin to fund the actual deployment of 
the system. I would note that the words ``develop for deployment'' were 
in the committee-approved bill, in the NMD architecture section, and so 
this clarification is consistent with the committee's intent.
  Moreover, I would emphasize that the policy section clearly states--
as did the committee bill--that the system we are pursuing is a 
multiple-site system. As the findings make clear, a multiple-site 
system is essential if we are to defend all of the United States and 
not just part of the country. This is also made clear in the NMD 
architecture section, which states that the system must be optimized to 
defend all 50 States against limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
ballistic missile attacks.
  This is further bolstered by the new language inserted by the 
compromise at various places that the system must be ``affordable and 
operationally effective.'' An NMD system confined to a single ground-
based site would not be operationally effective, as noted in the ninth 
finding.
  The bipartisan text also states in the policy section that the NMD 
system will be one that ``can be augmented over time as the threat 
changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or 
unauthorized ballistic missile threats.'' This passage was of great 
importance to many Members on this side who are concerned about the 
ability of the system to remain effective in the face of an evolving 
threat.
  The committee-approved language stated that the NMD system ``will be 
augmented over time to provide a layered defense.'' There were strong 
feelings on our side about the words ``will be augmented.'' In the end, 
we agreed to change this to ``can be augmented.'' Again, while the 
committee's language had much to commend it, funding for deployment of 
other defensive layers will not be appropriated for several years.
  The other changes to this passage, such as the inclusion of the words 
``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' clarify the ballistic missile 
threat for which a layered defense would be required, reflect the 
intent of the committee's bill.
  At the suggestion of the other side, a new paragraph was added to the 
policy calling for congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy 
the NMD system. This is fully consistent with the committee's intent 
and the realities of the congressional budget process. Funds to begin 
deployment of the NMD system are not in the bill before the Senate. 
Thus, when such funds are requested, that request will pass through the 
regular process of committee hearings and mark-ups, floor 
consideration, and conference action.
  Another change to the policy section was the inclusion of several 
portions of the amendment that I offered and that was approved by the 
Senate last month. This states that it is U.S. policy to ``carry out 
the policies, programs and requirements of (the Missile Defense Act of 
1995) through processes specified within, or consistent with the ABM 
Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment 
to the Treaty.''
  It also states that it is United States policy to initiate 
negotiations with the Russian Federation as necessary to provide for 
the NMD systems specified in the NMD architecture section. At the 
urging of Congress in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, President Bush 
initiated such negotiations with Moscow.
  It is my understanding that tentative agreement was reached to 
provide for the deployment of ground-based multiple-site NMD systems. 
But the Clinton administration discontinued those negotiations. Under 
this legislation, it would be U.S. policy to once again engage Moscow 
in negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty or otherwise allow for 
multiple-site NMD systems.
  The policy section then states that ``it is the policy of the U.S. to 
* * * consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing 
from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of 
the Treaty, subject to consultations between the President and the 
Senate.''
  I would note that both amendment to the treaty, as provided for in 
articles XIII and XIV, and withdrawal from the treaty, as provided for 
in article XV, are ``processes specified within the ABM Treaty.''
  Contrary to the concerns of some, the Armed Services Committee never 
advocated abrogation of the treaty and the bill reported out by the 
committee neither required nor supported abrogation. The debate that 
took place during the committee mark-up made it clear that there was 
absolutely no intent to abrogate.
  These provisions regarding the ABM Treaty and negotiations with 
Moscow 

[[Page S 12586]]
taken from the Cohen amendment and incorporated into the bipartisan 
amendment reaffirm what was always the intent of the committee.
  Mr. President, I want to emphasize that these provisions and the 
other language in the section 233 clearly state that these policies are 
``the policy of the United States.'' Not the policy of the Senate or 
the policy of the Congress. I say this because I have heard that an 
administration official has said that, once this bill becomes law, the 
administration will declare that these statements of U.S. policy are 
not its policy but merely the sense of the Congress.

  The bill makes a clear distinction between statements of U.S. policy 
and expressions of the sense of Congress. We have spent a great deal of 
effort negotiating exactly what statements will fall into the policy 
section and which will be in the form of sense of the Congress. In 
fact, these negotiations began with Senator Nunn urging that the Cohen 
amendment be strengthened from being the sense of the Congress to a 
statement of U.S. policy.
  Mr. President, I would merely note the obvious fact that once the 
bill becomes U.S. law, then the bill's statements of policy are U.S. 
policy.


                            nmd architecture

  The bipartisan amendment also provides changes and clarifications in 
section 235, regarding the architecture of the national missile defense 
system.
  The committee's bill stated that the NMD system ``will attain initial 
operational capability by the end of 2003.'' The bipartisan amendment 
states that the NMD system will be ``capable of attaining initial 
operational capability by the end of 2003.'' This is a useful 
clarification because while Congress can mandate many things, we cannot 
dictate with certainty that engineers will accomplish specific tasks 
within a specific period of time.
  Section 235 also states that the NMD ``system shall include * * * 
ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at multiple sites, 
the locations and numbers of which are to be determined so as to 
optimize the defensive coverage of the continental United States, 
Alaska, and Hawaii against limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
ballistic missile attacks.'' The committee's version of this provision 
was identical except that the bipartisan amendment inserted the words 
``capable of being.''
  I found this suggestion from the other side to be acceptable because 
I do not think it really changes the meaning of the original text. 
Interceptors are inherently ``capable of being deployed at multiple 
sites.'' I cannot conceive of any technical reason that an interceptor 
would be incapable of being deployed at multiple sites. Accordingly, 
``capable of being deployed at multiple sites'' does not, as far as I 
can tell, in any way limit the NMD system proposed by the committee. 
Indeed, one could argue that the only way that ground based 
interceptors are ``capable of being deployed at multiple sites'' is if 
there are multiple sites.

  So, I am pleased that this change helped to produce a bipartisan 
resolution to this matter, even if I cannot find any substantive result 
of this change.
  In subsection (b) of section 235, our side did make a concession. The 
committee's bill directed the Secretary of Defense ``to develop an 
interim NMD capability to be operational by the end of 1999.'' In order 
to achieve agreement with the other side, we have modified this to 
require the Secretary ``to develop an interim NMD plan that would give 
the U.S. the ability to field a limited operational capability by the 
end of 1999 if required by the threat.'' In both versions, the interim 
capability would have to not interfere with deployment of the full up 
NMD system by 2003.
  Mr. President, I would also note that the bipartisan amendment 
retains the portion of section 235 that calls for a report by the 
Secretary of Defense analyzing ``options for supplementing or modifying 
the NMD system by adding one or a combination of sea-based missile 
defense systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, or space-
based directed energy systems.'' As I discussed earlier, such options 
for layered defenses are of considerable interest to many Members.
  To summarize, Mr. President, the bipartisan amendment both clarifies 
and changes the committee bill's provisions on national missile 
defense. It keeps us on the path toward a ground-based, multiple-site 
NMD system with options for layered defenses as the threat changes. But 
it recognizes that requests for NMD procurement funds will not be made 
for several years.


                            tmd demarcation

  The other issue that required much discussion was what is commonly 
referred to as the theater missile defense demarcation question. I 
would like to summarize the resolution that was achieved in section 
238, which was completely rewritten with the assistance of many 
Senators.
  The section has findings noting that the ABM Treaty ``does not apply 
to or limit'' theater missile defense systems. The findings also note 
that ``the U.S. shall not be bound by any international agreement that 
would substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is 
entered into pursuant to the treaty making powers of the President 
under the Constitution.'' What this means is that any agreement that 
would have the effect of applying limits on TMD systems under the ABM 
Treaty must be approved as a treaty by the Senate.

  Section 238 then states the sense of Congress that a defensive system 
has been tested in an ABM mode, and therefore is subject to the ABM 
Treaty, only if it has been tested against a ballistic missile target 
that has a range in excess of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity in excess 
of 5 kilometers per second. This threshold is the one defined by the 
administration and proposed in its talks with Moscow on this subject.
  Finally, section 238 has a binding provision that prohibits 
implementation during fiscal year 1996 of an agreement with the 
countries of the former Soviet Union that would restrict theater 
missile defenses. This prohibition would not apply to the portion of an 
agreement that implements the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-per-second 
criteria nor to an agreement that is approved as a treaty by the 
Senate.
  But it would apply to all portions of an agreement that sought to 
impose any restrictions other than the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-
per-second criteria. Various other potential restrictions have been 
discussed, such as limits on the number of TMD systems or system 
components, geographical restrictions on where TMD systems can be 
deployed, restrictions on the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles, and 
restrictions on the volume of TMD interceptors missiles. Under section 
238 of the bipartisan amendment, during fiscal year 1996, the 
administration is barred from implementing any of these potential 
restrictions or any other restrictions on the performance, operation, 
or deployment of TMD systems, system components, or system upgrades.
  At the same time, Mr. President, there are no constraints on the 
ability of the President to engage in negotiations on the demarcation 
issue, which I know was an issue of concern to some. What section 238 
controls is the implementation of any restrictions on TMD systems.
  Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the efforts of the many Senators 
who contributed to the drafting of this amendment. Every member of the 
Armed Services Committee played a role, as did the two leaders, and key 
Senators off the committee. Senator Kyl played a very constructive 
role, offering language that formed the basis for the resolution on 
section 238 and providing useful suggestions on the NMD portions of the 
bill. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is to be especially 
commended for providing strong guidance to the negotiators and the 
committee, as a whole, and facilitating the talks along the way.
  I want to commend Senator Nunn, once again, and Senator Levin and 
Senator Warner for the many, many hours that were spent negotiating 
over specific words. As I mentioned before, words matter a great deal 
when we are talking about arms control.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could take a minute.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator 
from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I just want to take 30 
seconds to thank my distinguished colleague from 

[[Page S 12587]]
Maine. He ended up on a very important note, ``use of words.'' I can 
assure you, when we were sitting around, time and time again, we 
referred to him as the master craftsman for the use of words, the 
placement of a comma and the prose that flows. Make no mistake about 
that. If this thing ever has to go to court, it is your fault.
  [Laughter.]
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields the Senator time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Michigan such time 
as he may desire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Within reason.
  [Laughter.]
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if we can get a parliamentary interpretation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is exactly 1 hour and 50 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I definitely thank the Chair, and I think I thank my 
friend from Georgia.
  Mr. President, first let me echo the words of those who have already 
spoken about the process just for a minute. The four of us have worked 
together now many, many years in this Senate, particularly on the Armed 
Services Committee, but on other matters as well. We know each other, 
like each other a great deal, respect each other as individuals and 
also for the depths of our beliefs and our feelings.
  It was a true pleasure to work with Senators Nunn, Warner and Cohen 
as we crafted this substitute. There is a lot in here representing each 
of us. Most important, I believe this substitute reflects a wise course 
relative to national missile defense.
  I agree fully with what Senator Warner just said about Senator Cohen. 
No one is a greater crafter of words around this place than Senator 
Cohen. He is not just a poet, but he is a writer of fiction as well, 
and some darned good nonfiction, too.
  Mr. President, first, I want to start with what the law currently is. 
There is a lot of misconception, I think, in this body about what the 
current law is relative to national missile defense. We are not 
starting with a clean slate here called a bill and then adding a 
substitute for consideration by the Senate. We are starting with an 
existing law on national missile defense, then there is a bill, then 
there is a substitute.
  The existing law already provides that it is a goal of the United 
States to develop the option to deploy an antiballistic missile system 
that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United 
States against limited attacks from ballistic missiles.
  So that is the ground on which we are starting, that we already have 
in law a goal of the United States to develop the option to deploy this 
national missile defense system that we are talking about.
  The bill that is before us, to which many of us had strong 
objections, goes way beyond saying that we should develop an option to 
deploy and then at some future time decide whether to exercise the 
option. The bill that we have before us says that we ``shall deploy'' 
and that is what gets us into great difficulty. It gets us into great 
difficulty in terms of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the deployment 
of certain systems, antiballistic missile systems, at multiple sites.
  The section of the bill before us, section 233, says that it is ``the 
policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-site national missile 
defense system.''
  No ifs, no ands, no buts. That is the policy of the United States in 
the bill. The trouble with that is we have a number of impediments to 
that policy being a wise one. We have the question of what the threat 
is, what the cost effectiveness is, what the military effectiveness of 
such a system is, and we have an agreement with the Russians called the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which President Nixon entered into and 
which has helped to create some major stability in the relationship 
between the two countries when there was a cold war. And now that the 
cold war is over, we must figure out how to deal with a new Russia who 
is a partner, a friend, an ally hopefully, not an adversary of the 
United States.
  When the bill says that we will deploy a system which the ABM Treaty 
says we cannot, what the bill does is set us on a course of action 
which is not only unwise but is reckless.
  We received letters from both General Shalikashvili, who is our 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary Perry, in strong opposition to the bill because of what it 
does to the ABM Treaty but, most important, because of the jeopardy in 
which it places the Start II Treaty that we are hoping to ratify. That 
treaty will reduce significantly the number of nuclear warheads on both 
sides, and that is really the issue.
  The issue here is the impact of the action of the Senate on the 
reduction of offensive nuclear weapons which threaten us. Surely it is 
not in our national interest to be trashing an agreement relative to 
antiballistic missile systems if, by undermining that agreement, we are 
then going to end up facing thousands more warheads on ballistic 
missiles which Russia would insist on keeping if we unilaterally pull 
out of the ABM Treaty. That is why General Shalikashvili said:

       While we believe that START II is in both countries' 
     interest, regardless of other events, that we must assume 
     that unilateral U.S. legislation could harm prospects for 
     START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our 
     broader security relationship with Russia as well.

  That letter was dated June 28, 1995.
  And in a letter dated July 28, 1995, Secretary Perry said:

       Certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be very 
     damaging to U.S. security interests. By mandating actions 
     that would lead us to violate or disregard U.S. treaty 
     obligations, such as establishing a deployment date of a 
     multiple-site NMD system, the bill would jeopardize Russian 
     implementation of the START I and START II treaties which 
     involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic 
     nuclear weapons.

  We tried to modify the language in the bill pursuant to the amendment 
process prior to the recess. We tried to strike language which 
committed us to a course of action which would, by violating the ABM 
Treaty, jeopardize the reductions in the numbers of offensive nuclear 
weapons on the side of the Russians. We failed to do that by a couple 
votes.
  Let me put some numbers on this. If the Russians see us violating a 
treaty which has allowed us to negotiate reductions in offensive 
nuclear weapons, the likelihood is that we are going to face 8,000 
Russian nuclear weapons instead of about 3,000. To put this in very 
specific numbers, that is what we are talking about. That is what the 
stakes are here, and that is why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Secretary of Defense expressed such grave doubts about 
the language in this bill.
  There were a number of problems which we confronted and which, we 
hope, we resolved in a sensible way. One problem which was in the bill 
which we have attempted to address was the unilateral declaration as to 
what the dividing line is between theater missile defenses and 
strategic missile defenses. It is clear that the ABM agreement does not 
cover theater missile defenses. I think everybody would agree to that.
  I think everyone would also agree, at least I hope they would, that 
in the event of a substantial modification of the ABM Treaty, that the 
President then must submit that modification to the Senate for advice 
and consent to ratification. As a matter of fact, this substitute 
amendment refers to section 232 of the Fiscal Year 1995 National 
Defense Authorization Act which provided exactly that. That is existing 
law; it says that:

       The United States shall not be bound by any international 
     agreement that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty 
     unless the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty-
     making power of the President under the Constitution.

  That is the law regardless of this bill. That is the law of the land. 
You cannot substantially modify a treaty unless you get advice and 
consent to ratification by the Senate, which previously approved that 
treaty. That is the law, with or without our statute saying that. We 
already have a statute which repeats that law, and we made reference to 
that statute.
  But unless this substitute language is adopted, the bill declares 
what the dividing line is between these strategic and theater missile 
defense systems, declares the specific dividing line and says to the 
President in the bill, you cannot negotiate any other dividing line. 
You cannot sit down with the 

[[Page S 12588]]
Russians and come up with any dividing line between strategic and 
theater missile defense systems other than the one we are unilaterally 
declaring in this bill. That makes the Senate the negotiator, not the 
President of the United States.
  While we can advise and consent to ratification, we are not the party 
that negotiates the treaty. It was a mistake in this bill to attempt to 
put that dividing line between strategic missile defensive systems 
covered by the ABM Treaty, and the theater missile defense systems not 
covered, into law. We have corrected that. We have indicated what we 
believe the correct dividing line is. We have now told the President, 
in effect, that you are free to negotiate, but if you negotiate a 
different demarcation, do not use the funds that we provide in the 
appropriation bill to implement that without giving Congress the 
opportunity to approve or to disapprove. That is very different. That 
is strikingly different from what was in the bill itself.
  Following these efforts to amend the language in the bill prior to 
the recess, we entered into lengthy discussions at the request of the 
majority leader and Senator Daschle, the Democratic leader. The four of 
us spent many days, as has been outlined, in devising the substitute 
which is before us. This substitute corrects the major defects and many 
of the smaller defects in the original language. It basically returns 
us to the approach in current law. The approach in current law is that 
we want an option to deploy. We are not committed to deploy, but we 
want an option.
  The approach in the substitute is that we want to develop for 
deployment a national missile defense system, but what we say in the 
substitute is that we are not deciding to deploy that here and now. 
That is very explicitly left to a later decision. We also say that 
decision should follow consideration of a number of things: Cost 
effectiveness, military effectiveness, the threat, and the impact on 
the ABM Treaty. That is the vital difference between the bill's 
language and the substitute.
  In section 233 of the substitute, we explicitly state that the policy 
of the United States is to develop for deployment a multiple-site 
national missile defense system. And then we go into the ifs, ands, and 
the buts. The bill said ``deploy''--no ifs, ands, or buts. The 
substitute says ``develop for deployment'', but with these ifs, these 
ands, and these buts. The critical ones, again, are to be cost 
effective, militarily effective, consistent with the threat, and not 
adversely affect the ABM Treaty, or at least, if we are going to decide 
to deploy, do so in a way which is through processes that are specified 
within or consistent with the ABM Treaty.
  The critical language here is that we say explicitly that it is the 
policy of the United States to ``ensure congressional review prior to a 
decision to deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph 
2 of (a) the affordability and operational effectiveness of such a 
system, (b) the threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM 
Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.''
  Mr. President, again, I want to thank our colleagues for their long 
and very arduous discussions. It has produced a substitute which I can, 
in good conscience, support, because we have removed the objectionable 
language in the bill which committed us to deploy a system which, by 
violating the ABM Treaty, would have almost certainly led to our facing 
thousands of more offensive nuclear warheads than we otherwise would be 
facing. We have attempted to carry out the thoughts of General 
Shalikashvili and his caution to us about the importance of our 
relationship with Russia and trying to maintain it in a stable way and 
not to be unilaterally declaring that we are going to abrogate 
agreements we have entered into with their predecessor. We have done so 
in a bipartisan way. I hope that we have done so in a constructive and 
a thoughtful way which will command the broad support of Members of 
this body.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a 
number of documents, including the letters referred to from General 
Shalikashvili, Secretary Perry, a side-by-side comparison of the bill 
and the substitute language relative to the ABM Treaty, as well as a 
further amplification of my statement.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                         Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: I write to register my strong opposition 
     to the missile defense provisions of the SASC's Defense 
     Authorization bill, which would institute Congressional 
     micromanagement of the Administration's missile defense 
     program and put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty. 
     The Administration is committed to respond to ballistic 
     missile threats to our forces, allies, and territory. We will 
     not permit the capability of the defenses we field to meet 
     those threats to be compromised.
       The bill's provisions would add nothing to DoD's ability to 
     pursue our missile defense programs, and would needlessly 
     cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks. 
     The bill would require the US to make a decision now on 
     developing a specific national missile defense for deployment 
     by 2003, with interim operational capability in 1999, despite 
     the fact that a valid strategic missile threat has not 
     emerged. Our NMD program is designed to give us the 
     capability for a deployment decision in three years, when we 
     will be in a much better position to assess the threat and 
     deploy the most technologically advanced systems available. 
     The bill would also terminate valuable elements of our TMD 
     program, the Boost Phase Intercept and MEADS/Corp SAM 
     systems. MEADS is not only a valuable defense system but is 
     an important test of future trans-Atlantic defense 
     cooperation.
       In addition, certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty 
     would be very damaging to US security reasons. By mandating 
     actions that would lead us to violate or disregard US Treaty 
     obligations--such as establishing a deployment date of a 
     multiple-site NMD system--the bill would jeopardize Russian 
     implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, which 
     involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic 
     nuclear weapons. The bill's unwarranted imposition, through 
     funding restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation 
     interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions, 
     and would raise significant international legal issues as 
     well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the 
     President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs. 
     These serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed 
     Senate review of the ABM Treaty before considering such 
     drastic and far-reaching measures.
       Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly 
     modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national 
     security interests of the United States. I will continue to 
     do everything possible to work with the Senate to see that 
     these priorities are not compromised.
           Sincerely,
     William J. Perry.
                                                                    ____



                              Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                    Washington, DC, June 28, 1995.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin. Thank you for your letter and the 
     opportunity to express my views concerning the impact of 
     Senator Warner's proposed language for the FY 1996 Defense 
     Authorization Bill on current theater missile defense (TMD) 
     programs.
       Because the Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty 
     with other arms control issues--particularly ratification of 
     START II now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would 
     deal in isolation with unilateral US legislation detailing 
     technical parameters for ABM Treaty interpretation. While we 
     believe that START II is in both countries' interests 
     regardless of other events, we must assume such unilateral US 
     legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification by 
     the Duma and probably impact our broader security 
     relationship with Russia as well.
       We are continuing to work on TMD systems. The ongoing 
     testing of THAAD through the demonstration/validation program 
     has been certified ABM Treaty compliant as has the Navy Upper 
     Tier program. Thus, progress on these programs is not 
     restricted by the lack of a demarcation agreement. We have no 
     plans and do not desire to test THAAD or other TMD systems in 
     an ABM mode.
       Even though testing and development of TMD systems is 
     underway now, we believe it is useful to continue discussions 
     with the Russians to seek resolution of the ABM/TMD issue in 
     a way which preserves our security equities. Were such 
     dialogue to be prohibited, we might eventually find ourselves 
     forced to choose between giving up elements of our TMD 
     development programs or proceeding unilaterally in a manner 
     which could undermine the ABM Treaty and our broader security 
     relationship with Russia. Either alternative would impose 
     security costs and risks which we are seeking to avoid.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                                                    ____

                                  
[[Page S 12589]]


           Missile Defense Act of 1995: Substitute Amendment

       Side-by-side comparison of the Missile Defense Act in S. 
     1026 and the substitute amendment of August 10, 1995.


                            sec. 233. policy

       The bill asserted that the policy of the U.S. was:
       To ``deploy a multiple site'' national missile defense 
     system that ``will be'' augmented to provide a larger defense 
     in the future.
       The substitute amendment has as the policy:
       To develop for deployment a national missile defense system 
     that can be augmented.
       To negotiate with Russia to provide for such a system, 
     based on the ABM Treaty.
       To consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of 
     withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.
       The purpose of the system is to defend only against 
     limited, accidental and unauthorized missile attacks.
       A new provision in the substitute amendment states the 
     policy that:
       Congress shall review the affordability, the operational 
     effectiveness and the threat to be countered by the national 
     missile defense system, and ABM Treaty considerations, prior 
     to deciding whether to deploy the system.
       The last new policy provision:
       To carry out the policies, programs and requirements of the 
     Missile Defense Act through processes specified in or 
     consistent with the ABM Treaty.


                 sec. 234. theater missile architecture

       The bill requires the Pentagon to meet certain dates for 
     the specified programs.
       The substitute amendment:
       Relaxes the requirement to meet those dates,
       Requires a report for each program/date explaining the cost 
     and technical risk of meeting those dates,
       And requires a report on the specific threats to be 
     countered by each TMD system.


            sec. 235. national missile defense architecture

       The Bill requires the Pentagon to develop a national 
     missile defense system which will be operational first in 
     2003. It requires the system to include ground-based 
     interceptors ``deployed at multiple sties''.
       The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a 
     national missile defense system that is capable of being 
     first operational by the end of 2003. It states that the 
     system shall include ground-based interceptors capable of 
     being deployed at multiple sites.
       Interim capability: The bill required the Pentagon to 
     develop an interim capability to be operational by 1999.
       The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a 
     plan instead of a capability, and that it would give the U.S. 
     the ability to have such an interim capability in place by 
     1999 if required by the threat.
       The substitute amendment also requires a report that would 
     include information on the cost of the program, the specific 
     threat to be countered, and the Defense Secretary's 
     assessment of whether deployment is affordable and 
     operationally effective.


               sec. 237. policy regarding the abm treaty

       The Bill has sense of Congress language that:
       The Senate should conduct a review of the ABM Treaty.
       The Senate should consider establishing a Select Committee 
     to conduct the review, and
       The President should cease all efforts to ``modify, 
     clarify, or otherwise alter'' our obligations under the ABM 
     Treaty.
       The Bill requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a 
     declassified record of the ABM Treaty negotiations.
       The substitute amendment adds findings related to the ABM 
     Treaty, including that the policies, programs and 
     requirements of the Missile Defense Act can be accomplished 
     in accordance or consistent with the ABM Treaty.
       The substitute amendment:
       Strikes the proposal to establish a Select Committee.
       Strikes the proposal that the President cease all efforts 
     to modify or clarify our obligations under the ABM Treaty.
       Strikes the entire provision calling for a declassified 
     treaty negotiating record.
       States that the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
     committees should conduct the review of the Treaty.


Sec. 238. Prohibition on Funds to Implement a TMD Demarcation Agreement

       The Bill:
       States the policy that ``unless and until'' a missile 
     defense system is tested against a target missile with a 
     range greater than 3,500 km or a velocity greater than 5 km 
     per second, it has not been tested ``in an ABM mode'' nor 
     ``been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic 
     missiles'' (both of which are prohibited by the ABM Treaty), 
     and therefore is not subject to ABM Treaty application or 
     restrictions.
       Prohibits any appropriated funds from being obligated or 
     expended by any official of the federal government to apply 
     the ABM Treaty to TMD systems, or for ``taking any other 
     action'' to have the ABM Treaty apply to TMD systems. (This 
     would prevent any discussion or negotiation by federal 
     officials with the Russians to consider any other demarcation 
     than the one specified in the bill.)
       The substitute amendment strikes Sec. 238 and replaces it 
     with:
       Two findings that restate items from previous Acts.
       Sense of the Congress language defining the TMD demarcation 
     (3,500 km/ 5kps), and stating that unless a TMD system is 
     tested above the demarcation threshold, the system has not 
     been tested in an ABM mode, nor deemed to have been given 
     capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles''.
       Sense of Congress language saying that any agreement with 
     Russia that would be more restrictive than the demarcation 
     provided should require ratification.
       Binding prohibition on funding: FY 96 DOD funds cannot be 
     used to implement a demarcation agreement unless: provided in 
     a subsequent act (majority vote), or if the agreement goes 
     through the ratification process.
  Mr. LEVIN. Again, I thank my good friends from Georgia, Virginia, and 
Maine for their hard work. I thank the chairman for his support of this 
effort, and I thank, also, Senator Daschle, who has spent so much time 
on this effort to make sure that we come up with a solution which 
satisfies the basic principles that we set out to achieve.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator 
from Virginia, Senator Warner.
  Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. COHEN. Would the Senator from Virginia be willing to delete from 
the Record the depositing of any legal responsibility on my doorstep?
  Mr. NUNN. I will object to any such deletion, Mr. President. I think 
the responsibility is clearly established.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think that brief exchange underlines 
what has been said by all of my colleagues preceding me regarding the 
four of us having been associated now more than 17 years together on 
this committee, under the tutelage of Senators like Senator Thurmond, 
Senator Stennis, Senator Tower, and Senator Jackson. These were great 
teachers. We had the opportunity to learn from them. I hope that today 
in our service to the Senate as members of this committee, we can 
achieve some of the goals that those great Senators contributed to 
legislation for the national security of the United States.
  Mr. President, as I listened to these remarks, it occurs to me that 
if we were walking down Main Street America today and we were to be 
stopped and questioned by any of our constituents, candidly, I say to 
the Senate, they would think this system is in place today.
  It is inconceivable after the billions and billions and billions of 
dollars we have spent on our national defense over the last, really, 
two decades, that a series of Presidents and a series of Congresses 
have not put in place for the basic protection of the American citizen 
something to interdict the accidental or unintended firing of an 
intercontinental missile.
  This is not star wars. I will ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, 
to have printed in the Record following my remarks an article that 
appeared today in the Washington Post, in which I and other Members 
were interviewed to talk about this particular piece of legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. It took me some time to try to get home to the reporter, 
and indeed I think he grasped it rather readily, that the biggest 
burden we had is to overcome the lingering apprehension that what we 
are doing in this amendment is laying the foundation for another star 
wars program. That is not the case. It is a very limited defense. It is 
precisely as described by those who have spoken previously, a system 
for limited purposes.
  It is in the interest of the former Soviet Union, and particularly 
Russia, that this be put in place because should an accidental firing 
occur, perhaps the first focus of attention would be turned to Russia. 
I am hopeful that this technology that will be developed could be used 
by Russia to install their own system. We do not fear in this country 
Russia putting in a system comparable to this. It is in the mutual 
benefit of both nations to have such a system.
  I am happy to have joined with my colleagues. Someone mentioned it is 
like the old four horsemen getting together once again to resolve a 
situation which for a period of time appeared to be unresolvable.
  I want to say that Senator Cohen and I particularly value the advice 
and 

[[Page S 12590]]
counsel we received from the distinguished chairman of the committee, 
Senator Thurmond, Senator Lott, Senator Smith, and Senator Kyl. Each of 
these Senators have spent a number of years studying this question. 
Particularly in the House, Senator Kyl was well known for his knowledge 
on this subject. He was particularly helpful in the course of our 
negotiations.
  Prior to taking the position Senator Cohen and I worked up with our 
colleagues to its final stage, Senator Thurmond convened the full Armed 
Services Committee. Every single member was present. They looked it 
over very carefully. Then we sat down and finalized it with our 
distinguished colleagues and friends of long standing, the Senator from 
Georgia and the Senator from Michigan.
  It is a significant step forward. I was extremely heartened tonight 
when Senator Nunn said he had an opportunity to speak with the 
Secretary of Defense. I think this Nation is fortunate to have such a 
fine man as Secretary Perry to take on that heavy and, indeed in many 
respects, thankless responsibility. This is an area in which he has 
worked for many, many years. All four of us that negotiated this have 
worked with the Aspen Institute when he was one of the leaders of that 
discussion forum, and we covered many times--many times--issues 
relating to the intercontinental missile systems, the deterrence, and 
the several treaties. Given his background, I hope that he can be 
persuasive to the President and other members of the administration so 
that this amendment can be accepted. Indeed, not only accepted, but 
perhaps supported.
  Neither side gained everything they want. That is the essence of a 
negotiation. The result of this effort is a Missile Defense Act of 
1995, a substitute for the original one in the bill which sets a clear 
path for deployment. That is the way I would like to state it--a clear 
path to deployment.
  We in the United States cannot--particularly the legislative branch 
of Government--dictate that a certain system will be deployed. Frankly, 
we do not even know that it will work, we say with considerable candor. 
The technology is unfolding so rapidly, we do not know exactly whether 
it can work.
  There is also a very serious element of the cost associated with this 
system. These are things that have to be worked out in the future. But 
we have set, in this amendment, the United States of America on a clear 
path of deployment. Let there be no mistake about that, no wavering--I 
can certainly speak for this side of the aisle--no wavering of the 
intents of the present composition of the U.S. Senate on this side of 
the aisle as to the ultimate goal of deploying such a system.
  Why? Because it is in the mutual interests of ourselves and Russia 
and other nations of the world; and secondly, the American public not 
only demands it, they think it is its place right now. They would 
expect no less of a President or series of Presidents and a series of 
Congresses.
  In the course of our deliberations, there were many concerned with 
the issue of why now? Why must we press this on now? If we start 
tonight on developing this system, it might well be to the year 2003 or 
later--7, 8, 9, 10 years--before the system can be developed; that is, 
research and development completed and in place to protect the American 
citizen--perhaps a decade.
  In the same period of time, there are estimates that those nations 
apart from Russia and our allies who particularly want to develop for 
themselves the missile system, they will have in all likelihood systems 
of their own in place. Many of the nations that we fear most today have 
this as a top agenda item, to build this type of system.
  My point is, there is a coincidence in time of the defensive system 
that we want to put in place and the offensive systems being developed 
by other nations, call them rogue nations, who very much desire to 
threaten the United States some day with a missile.
  The revised Missile Defense Act of 1995 establishes a policy of 
development for deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense 
system capable of defending the United States--that is, from the 
limited attack--and prohibits any final effort by the administration to 
impose limitations without the consent of the U.S. Senate pursuant to 
the Constitution of the United States on the development and deployment 
of a U.S. theater missile defense system by virtue of new 
interpretations of the ABM Treaty of 1972.
  I was extremely heartened to hear my distinguished colleague from 
Michigan say unequivocally that that treaty does not cover short-range 
ballistic missile systems. That is important. I would rejoin by saying, 
but the technology advances that have taken place since 1972 force now 
this type of legislation which is intended to maintain an operation 
between the theater systems and the intercontinental systems and 
maintain that separation in a way that will not undermine the 
fundamental goals of the ABM Treaty.
  The principle focus of my remarks today is on the changes made to 
section 238 of the Missile Defense Act of 1995. That is a section that 
I worked on as a member of the Armed Services Committee and an 
amendment which I put forth in that committee which was eventually 
incorporated into the bill as now written. And that amendment of mine 
is being revised by this amendment, which is the subject of the 
discussion for the moment.
  As it originally appeared in my amendment, section 238 used the 
Senate's power of the purse to impose a broad and absolute prohibition 
on the administration's ability to take any action which imposed ABM 
Treaty restrictions on the development and deployment of theater 
missile defense systems. These systems are urgently needed to protect 
the lives of the men and women of the armed services and our allies in 
their forward-deployed situations.
  How well we know that. Senator Nunn recounted, in the course of our 
last debate, how Senator Nunn, Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and I 
were in Tel Aviv when the last Scud missile fell and we saw firsthand 
the use of that system, not for military purposes but for purposes of 
sheer terrorism. Saddam Hussein leveled that system on Tel Aviv for no 
other purpose than to terrorize those people. The Patriot, as best it 
could--the best defense we had at that period of time--I think in a 
credible manner interdicted a number of those missiles. That is why we 
are here tonight to lay the foundation to move ahead in the technology 
so that we can employ all of the brains, all the technology without any 
restriction imposed by the ABM Treaty on developing the future systems 
to interdict the short-range ballistic missiles that were encountered 
during the gulf war.
  The bipartisan amendment, which we urge the Senate to adopt, achieves 
our goal, namely to prohibit the administration from implementing any 
agreement with Russia which would impose limitations including 
performance, operation or deployment limitations on theater missile 
systems unless the Senate exercised, pursuant to a Presidential 
submission of such agreement, its constitutional right of advice and 
consent.
  The 1972 ABM Treaty never intended, never envisioned the theater 
systems. I was in the Department of the Navy at that time. I was in 
Moscow in 1972, when ABM was signed, as a part of President Nixon's 
delegation. My duties then were related primarily to naval matters, but 
all of us in the Department of Defense watched with great interest how 
this treaty, the ABM Treaty, was developed.
  Dr. John Foster, who was then the Director of Research and 
Development in the Pentagon, was one of the key individuals. I recently 
consulted him about his recollection with respect to the ABM Treaty, 
and he confirmed what I believed was true then, as I do today, that the 
negotiators never had in mind the theater systems which we must employ 
now in our defense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask if I may have a few more minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator may 
require for further debate.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman.
  As I said before the Senate went on recess, during the original 
debate on this amendment, I have long believed that we must accelerate 
the development and then the deployment of operationally effective 
theater missile systems for our troops, defenses that are not 
improperly constrained by the 

[[Page S 12591]]
ABM Treaty. This amendment does that. Likewise, we must, in the 
interests of the American people, make a clear statement of our 
national determination to proceed to a national defense system to 
protect against the threats enunciated in this bipartisan amendment.
  The threat that theater missiles propose to our forces is clear. 
Thirty nations have short-range theater ballistic missile systems, and 
more and more each day are acquiring the same capability.
  The gulf war should have caused all Americans to unite behind the 
missile defense effort. What can be more terrifying than the thought of 
U.S. citizens, both at home and deployed overseas, defenseless against 
this type of weapon of terror, once used by Saddam Hussein, and which 
could be used in the future by others. Yet, here we are, 5 years after 
that conflict in the gulf, and our troops are still not adequately, in 
my judgment, protected from ballistic missile attacks. And there are 
those who still resist efforts to move forward in this area.
  Fortunately, I think, as a result of this compromise, we now have 
gained sufficient strength in the U.S. Senate to move this amendment 
tomorrow in a positive way.
  Mr. President, it became evident to me, earlier this year, that our 
crucial effort to develop and deploy the most capable theater missile 
defense systems was in danger of being unacceptably hampered by the 
administration's desire to achieve a demarcation agreement with the 
Russians. They were actively negotiating toward that goal. Several of 
the negotiating positions either proposed or accepted by the 
administration would have severely limited the technological 
development of U.S. theater missile defense systems, and would have 
resulted in an international agreement imposing major new limitations 
on the United States. Consequently, I have taken actions in 1994 and 
now in 1995 to prohibit such actions by the administration.
  Mr. President, previously I have tried other avenues to have the 
Senate's voice heard on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation. My preferred 
option--and the one which I tried last year--was simply to require the 
President to present to the Senate for advice and consent any 
demarcation agreement which would substantially modify the ABM Treaty. 
The Congress adopted my views and made them part of the fiscal year 
1995 Defense Authorization Act.
  However, despite that legal requirement, the administration has made 
it abundantly clear that it does not intend to submit any such 
demarcation agreement, pursuant to the Constitution, to the Senate for 
advice and consent. Although the administration was negotiating an 
agreement that would, in effect, make the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty, 
administration officials believed that there was no need for the Senate 
to exercise its constitutional right to provide advice and consent to 
that agreement.
  It was clear that a new approach was needed. Therefore, I focused on 
the Congress' power of the purse to ensure that the views of the Senate 
were considered in the demarcation negotiations.
  The bipartisan missile defense amendment preserves this approach. 
Section 238 prohibits the expenditure of funds for fiscal year 1996 to 
implement an agreement that would establish a demarcation between 
theater missile defense systems and ABM systems or that would restrict 
the performance, operation or deployment of U.S. theater missile 
defense systems, unless that agreement is entered into pursuant to the 
treaty-making powers of the President, or to the extent provided in an 
act subsequently enacted by the Congress. In other words, for the 
coming fiscal year the prohibition stands unless the Senate takes an 
affirmative act to change or remove that prohibition.
  In addition, this provision establishes as a sense of the Congress 
the generally accepted demarcation standard between TMD and ABM 
systems. Section 238(b)(1) states that ``unless a missile defense 
system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that 
exploits data from space-based or other external sensors, if flight 
tested against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of 3,500 
kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second, such missile 
defense system, system upgrade, or system component has not been tested 
in an ABM mode nor deemed to have been given capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles.'' This was the standard used by the 
Clinton administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations 
in November 1993. The administration would be well-advised to return to 
that standard.
  Mr. President, I would have preferred a prohibition that would have 
remained in effect for more than 1 fiscal year. I would have preferred 
a demarcation standard adopted in a binding form, rather than as a 
sense of the Congress. But I believe that the essence of my original 
amendment was preserved in this compromise package.
  This legislation represents a significant step forward in the effort 
to provide the men and women of the Armed Forces with the most 
effective theater missile defense systems that our great nation is 
capable of producing. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Finally Mr. President, I wish to acknowledge my special appreciation 
and respect for Senator Cohen's very valuable contribution to the 
negotiations leading up to the bipartisan amendment. We have worked 
together for 17 years on the Armed Services Committee, and I value his 
advise and counsel.

                               Exhibit 1

            Congress to Push For a National Missile Defense

                           By Bradley Graham

       Two years after the Clinton administration placed the 
     program on a back burner, Congress is about to redouble U.S. 
     efforts to build a national system against ballistic missile 
     attack, putting it at odds with the White House and at risk 
     of confrontation with the Kremlin.
       Republicans leading the initiative stress their plan is not 
     a return to the ``Star Wars'' dream of President Ronald 
     Reagan, who envisioned a space-based shield that would make 
     the United States impenetrable to a massive launch of enemy 
     missiles. Rather, the stated aim now is to erect a more 
     modest, ground-based system that would protect the country 
     against accidental launch or limited attack at a time when 
     more nations are coming into the possession of ballistic 
     missiles.
       But opponents regard even this scaled-back effort as 
     dubious technologically and not urgent strategically since 
     little immediate threat exists. They say the program is a 
     waste of the billions of dollars that the House and Senate 
     appear ready to pour into it over the next few years.
       Moreover, administration officials worry that a hellbent 
     congressional effort to develop a missile defense system, 
     coupled with renewed Republican talk of undoing the 1972 
     Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, will upset relations 
     with Moscow and scuttle the planned elimination of thousands 
     of nuclear warheads.
       When the Senate returns from its August recess today, it is 
     scheduled to debate a compromise measure hammered out by a 
     four-man bipartisan group to avoid breaching the ABM Treaty 
     while still calling for accelerated development of a national 
     missile defense system.
       In attempting to establish a policy that can be supported 
     by a broad majority of senators, however, the measure 
     effectively postpones the day of political reckoning between 
     proponents and opponents of a national system and between 
     Washington and Moscow.
       The measure would direct the Pentagon to ``develop for 
     deployment'' a multisite missile defense system capable of 
     being operational by 2003. But the decision to deploy would 
     be put off until an unspecified time and subjected to 
     considerations of affordability, effectiveness, threat 
     assessment and treaty implications.
       ``I am not opposed to having an option to deploy providing 
     we don't move toward it in a hasty way,'' said Carl M. Levin 
     (D-Mich.), a liberal whose involvement in negotiating the 
     compromise was key. ``What I strongly oppose is doing it in a 
     way that would undermine the relationship with Russia and the 
     whole planned dismantlement of nuclear weapons.''
       For the Republicans who won control of Congress last 
     November, revival of the missile defense issue seemed at 
     first a simple way of dramatizing their general appeal for a 
     stronger defense, while also addressing their real concern 
     about the growing number of rogue states with access to 
     ballistic missiles.
       The GOP's ``Contract With America'' called for faster 
     deployment of a national missile defense system. Many 
     Republicans have sought to frame the political debate around 
     the fact that the United States has no system to fend off 
     even a single incoming ballistic missile. Opinion polls show 
     that most Americans are surprise to learn the country lacks 
     such a system.
       But wrangles over the continued relevance of the ABM Treaty 
     have complicated the debate. So has a related dispute about 
     where to 

[[Page S 12592]]
     draw the line between a national defense system, which is covered by 
     the treaty, and increasingly powerful ``theater'' systems for 
     guarding against shorter-range missile attack, which do not 
     come under the treaty's purview.
       The 23-year-old ABM pact was meant to block Washington and 
     Moscow from building nationwide defenses against ballistic 
     missile attack, on the premise that as long as each country 
     is vulnerable to the other's nuclear arsenal, neither will 
     attack the other. The accord allows each side to establish a 
     single-site system with no more than 100 interceptor 
     missiles.
       Administration officials say the treaty remains a 
     cornerstone of international arms control efforts and 
     abrogating it would jeopardize plans to cut U.S. and Russian 
     nuclear arsenals to 3,000 warheads and possibly fewer 
     under strategic arms reduction treaties. Such arms control 
     agreements, not antimissile weapons systems, offer the 
     more reliable protection for U.S. interests, say missile 
     defense skeptics.
       ``No one will reduce their strategic forces if there's a 
     buildup in strategic defense,'' said Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., 
     director of the Arms Control Association. ``If we lose all of 
     this for a system that might kill only a handful of missiles, 
     it's madness. We'll soon find much of the Defense 
     Department's procurement budget going into this Fortress 
     America.''
       But some key Republican players have questioned the 
     relevance of the ABM Treaty in today's security environment, 
     arguing that Cold War logic does not hold in a world no 
     longer dominated by U.S.-Soviet tensions and now menaced by 
     less familiar adversaries.
       ``Frankly, we think the ABM Treaty has to be renegotiated, 
     so I'm not too concerned about bumping up against it,'' said 
     Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.). ``We've pretty much established the 
     need to revise it, so we might as well face up to that.''
       A month ago, Senate Republicans were backing language in 
     the 1996 defense authorization bill that required deployment 
     of a multisite missile defense system by 2003. Arguing that 
     such a move would violate the ABM Treaty, Democrats prepared 
     to filibuster and the Clinton administration threatened to 
     veto the bill if it passed.
       After nearly a week of intensive talks in early August, 
     Sens. Levin, Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), John W. Warner (R-Va.) and 
     William S. Cohen (R-Maine) offered a compromise substitute 
     amendment--expected to win floor approval this week--that 
     promises to avert a showdown with the White House for now and 
     clear the way for passage of a defense authorization bill.
       The measure reaffirms that U.S. policy is to act 
     consistently with the ABM Treaty but also approves 
     negotiations with the Russians on the admissibility of the 
     planned U.S. system. If those talks fail, the amendment 
     asserts, the United States can consider withdrawing from the 
     treaty.
       The House already has approved a 1996 defense bill calling 
     for deployment ``as soon as practical'' of a national missile 
     defense system, without specifying the number of sites. And 
     both the House and Senate are proposing to add several 
     hundred million dollars to the Clinton administration program 
     in fiscal 1996 for work on a national missile defense system.
       The Clinton administration is not opposed to developing a 
     system capable of protecting U.S. territory. It budgeted 
     nearly $400 million for 1996 to pursue technologies for a 
     ground-based system, beefing up the program a bit in view of 
     congressional interest to include a deployment contingency 
     early next century.
       But when it took office in 1993, the administration 
     drastically reordered the priorities of the Pentagon's 
     missile defense effort, shrinking work on a national system, 
     renaming the supervising agency, and concentrating about 80 
     percent of the funds of what is now called the Ballistic 
     Missile Defense Organization on fielding theater defense 
     systems to protect U.S. troops in combat zones abroad.
       The rationale for the shift was the belief that the spread 
     of shorter-range ballistic missiles poses a more immediate 
     threat than the possibility of hostile nations developing 
     intercontinental missiles that can strike the United States.
       Currently, more than 15 Third World nations have ballistic 
     missiles and 77 have cruise missiles, according to U.S. 
     intelligence reports. By contrast, only several former Soviet 
     states and China possess missiles capable of reaching the 
     continental United States, and the U.S. intelligence 
     community sees no new country developing the capability to 
     hit the United States with a long-range missile for the next 
     decade.
       Administration officials also contend the likelihood of 
     accidental launch by Russia or China is decreasing due to the 
     elimination of many nuclear warheads in the former Soviet 
     states and more reliable command and control procedures for 
     Russian and Chinese forces. Moreover, they argue that with 
     rapid advances occurring in information technologies, 
     premature deployment of a U.S. system would limit the 
     technical options and risk saddling the United States with an 
     overly costly and quickly outdated system.
       Other critics of a national system note that the country 
     has been trying off and on for several decades to build one, 
     without much success. More than $38 billion went into 
     Reagan's Star Wars program alone.
       ``People are talking as if we've never tried this before,'' 
     said Stephen I. Schwartz, director of the Brookings 
     Institution's U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project. ``We 
     don't seem to learn from the fact that we spent a lot of 
     money before and didn't get much for it.''
       But many Republican legislators worry the administration is 
     underestimating how quickly the threat of ballistic missile 
     attacks from rogue countries may materialize. They cite 
     development of North Korea's Taepo Dong-2 missile, capable of 
     reaching Alaska or parts of Hawaii, and the potential sale to 
     Third World countries of Russia's SS-25 as a space launch 
     vehicle.
       In fact, the U.S. intelligence community has been slow to 
     provide a current estimate of the emerging missile threat to 
     the United States. Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, who heads the 
     Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said in an 
     interview that he has been waiting more than eight months for 
     an update measuring the degree of uncertainty in the U.S. 
     prediction.
       Advocates of a national system, mindful of past failures to 
     achieve their dream, contend the technology is now within 
     reach.
       ``This is not Star Wars, this is not an umbrella system,'' 
     asserted Warner, the Virginia senator. This is a bare bones 
     effort to build a system to intercept missiles launched 
     accidentally in limited number.''
       Some of the more hawkish proponents still argue for a more 
     ambitious setup, criticizing the Pentagon's current focus on 
     ground-based interceptors. A study earlier this year by the 
     Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank recommended 
     concentrating instead on a Navy plan to deploy ship-based 
     interceptors within three or four years, and then move to a 
     space-based system by early in the next decade.
       One area in which Republicans and Democrats generally agree 
     is on the need for effective theater missile defense systems, 
     with the GOP eager to add even more money to development 
     efforts there as well. But the growing sophistication of 
     theater systems, is posing an ABM Treaty problem.
       Some of the theater systems under development by the 
     Pentagon may prove powerful enough to thwart ballistic 
     missiles, meaning the Russians may view them as a national 
     defense system and thus a circumvention of the ABM Treaty.
       Administration efforts to negotiate with Moscow a 
     distinction between defenses against long-range strategic 
     missiles and short-range theater missiles have drawn 
     Republican concern that the administration may be willing to 
     accept too many limits on development of theater defenses, 
     particularly on the speed of interceptors.
       Accusing the administration of trying to apply the ABM 
     Treaty to theater systems, Senate Republicans originally 
     moved to include in the 1996 defense bill a unilateral 
     declaration of the dividing line between strategic and 
     theater weapons and a ban on the president negotiating any 
     other demarcation.
       Administration officials protested that a unilateral 
     interpretation of the demarcation line was unwarranted 
     because the ABM Treaty is not constraining theater programs, 
     and unwise because enactment would threaten ratification of 
     the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and set a 
     dangerous precedent.
       The Senate compromise includes a nonbinding ``sense of 
     Congress'' provision reasserting what has been the 
     demarcation standard, which would exempt the Pentagon's 
     fastest, longest-range theater antimissile systems from ABM 
     coverage as long as they were not tested against a missile 
     with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers (or about 2,174 
     miles) or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers (about 3 
     miles) per second. But the measure also would permit the 
     president to negotiate an alternative demarcation line 
     between strategic and theater missiles, provided he sought 
     congressional ratification of any new agreement with Moscow--
     a condition the administration has been reluctant to accept.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the bill as reported set forth the proposed 
policy for future missile defense as outlined here on the floor this 
evening. It also proposed the demarcation between theater and anti-
ballistic-missile defenses, and I am talking about the underlying bill, 
not the substitute. In my judgment, however, and that of many other 
Senators, the proposal addressed these vital issues in a manner that 
unnecessarily presented major difficulties in terms of arms control and 
constitutional considerations.
  As Senator Levin pointed out so well, what we want to do is move 
forward with a missile defense against limited, unauthorized, third-
country-type attacks, but what we do not want to do in the process of 
trying to accomplish that goal, that important goal, we do not want to 
end up inadvertently and unintentionally ending the reduction of 
missiles pointing at us that have already been agreed to. It would be 
the supreme irony if, in dealing with a future threat, we ended up 
basically negating 20 years of efforts to reduce the current threat, 
which is, of course, the continuation of very large numbers of 

[[Page S 12593]]
multiwarhead missiles pointing at the United States by Russia, which we 
have agreed to dramatically reduce both in START I, which has been 
entered into, and START II, which is now pending and which we hope at 
some point the Russian Duma, or legislative body, will, indeed, agree 
to.
  So, in my floor statement on August 3, I outlined five major problems 
with the version of the bill that this substitute is intended to 
correct and I believe does correct. This is the underlying bill.
  First, I said on August 3, it abandons U.S. adherence to the ABM 
Treaty. What I meant by that, and what I would mean by that now, is it 
is an anticipatory breach, the way the original underlying bill is 
worded.
  Second, abandoning adherence to that ABM Treaty now is unnecessary. 
We can conduct an effective missile defense program, developing for 
deployment, as the substitute called for in the near term, while 
continuing our adherence to the ABM Treaty. We do not have to make that 
choice now. So why risk the very large reductions of the threat now 
aimed toward us that are underway in order to accomplish a goal where 
we do not have to make that move at this point in time?
  Third, abandoning adherence now to the ABM Treaty is likely to impose 
huge costs on us if Russia declines to carry out some of its legal 
obligations and in response to our anticipatory breach.
  Fourth, the Senate Armed Service Committee bill abandons adherence by 
stealth rather than directing the administration to use the legal 
withdrawal procedures contained in the treaty.
  Mr. President, if we decide that the ABM Treaty is no longer in our 
interest--we may get to that point at some point in the future because 
we may find that we cannot negotiate the modest amendments required to 
provide for this national defense. I hope that we can because I think 
it is in the mutual interest of the United States and Russia. But if we 
get to that point, then we ought to do what the ABM Treaty calls for, 
and that is to use legal withdrawal proceedings in our national 
interest, supreme national interest. Of course, we can do that. I 
believe the timeframe is 6 months.
  We have the right under that treaty to state that in our supreme 
national interest, it is no longer in our supreme national interest to 
be a part of that treaty, and then we withdraw from the treaty in 
accordance with the terms of treaty. That is the way to do it if we 
ever have to move in that direction or feel that it is in our interest 
to move in that direction.
  Fifth, by failing to use the legal option under the treaty, the 
Senate would be compelling the executive branch to abandon adherence to 
the ABM Treaty by usurping certain powers of the executive branch over 
the conduct of foreign policy, a move that certainly would raise 
serious constitutional issues.
  So, Mr. President, this is the underlying bill and the problem with 
the underlying bill. That is what we are basically correcting with this 
substitute amendment.
  Mr. President, again, I thank my colleague from Michigan, who did a 
superb job on this. I thank my colleague from Virginia and my colleague 
from Maine, Senator Warner and Senator Cohen, who are indeed not only 
knowledgeable but they are skillful in their negotiating ability and in 
their discerning ability to understand the fundamental issues as 
opposed to some of the rhetorical issues. I think that is the reason we 
were able to work this out.
  I thank the Senator from South Carolina, because he was the one who 
came up with the idea of getting the four of us to work on this 
proposal and to try to find a way to reach a consensus. He also not 
only instigated this effort but discussed it with the majority leader 
and the minority leader. He also constantly gave us both the 
encouragement and support, and indeed some very timely prodding to get 
this agreement worked out.
  So I appreciate the Senator from South Carolina and his leadership.
  Mr. President, I believe that there are no other remarks after the 
Senator from Michigan, who may want to conclude. I believe we are about 
to wrap up the debate. I believe the Senator from Texas wants to take 
some remarks.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a 
brief question on this matter.
  During the course of my remarks, I opined that I thought this 
amendment as currently drawn would be in the mutual interest of the 
United States and Russia. Should an accidental firing occur, I think 
all attention would instantly focus on Russia as being the origin. And, 
therefore, it seems to me, whether it was from Russia or wherever the 
missile was fired from, I think the initial reaction of the American 
public would be, well, they are the ones that have it, because many do 
not understand in the years immediately preceding other nations have 
come forward now and have made fundamental investment in the system.
  So I just ask if my distinguished colleague concurs with my view that 
it is in the mutual interest of both Russia and the United States.
  Mr. NUNN. I do. I say to my friend from Virginia that I think it is 
in the interest of the United States and Russia to both move forward 
with modest adjustments to the ABM Treaty so both can protect their 
countries against accidental unauthorized launch or third-country 
launch.
  As the Senator from Virginia well knows, I first posed this question 
to the then head of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Dick Ellis, a 
wonderful and fine Air Force general, now deceased. But that was in the 
early 1980's. I asked him the question, I said, ``General Ellis, what 
basically is our ability to detect the origin of some limited attack 
against the United States? Could we know for sure where that attack 
originated? We would not have the ability to defend against it, and 
would we know for sure the origin of that attack?'' He said he needed 
to study that.
  He did study it. He and his whole team studied it for almost a year 
and came to the conclusion that the United States, while we had some 
capability of determining the origin of attack, it was not nearly as 
good as it should be and the Russians' ability was not as good as ours. 
Most of that study remains classified.
  But I came out with a profound not only sense of unease about our 
ability and their ability to detect the origin of attack, let us say 
from an underwater submarine which could be from a third country, but 
we would both assume it was coming, if we were struck, from the other 
superpower in terms of nuclear arms. I came to the conclusion that 
neither of us had the capability that we needed in that regard.
  But more importantly, I came to the conclusion that we both had a 
mutual stake in the ability of each to be able to detect the origin of 
an attack and also to be able to defend against that kind of an attack 
so that we never got into an inadvertent war that no one intended by 
mistake or by accident. And I still have that conclusion even though 
the circumstances between the United States and Russia have now changed 
dramatically. We are no longer in this confrontation. We still have 
nuclear arms that will be with us for years to come even after we 
reduce under START I and START II.
  So that is a long answer to the Senator's underlying question, but I 
think it is a very important question. And the answer is, yes, I do 
believe Russia has a similar interest. I think we have many mutual 
interests. In fact, our interest in terms of nuclear arms, in terms of 
destruction, the safety, the handling, the prevention of leakage of 
this kind of material, both nuclear, chemical, biological, as well as 
technology and the scientists, we have a tremendous mutual type of 
security interest now with Russia more than perhaps any other nation 
because we are the two that have these nuclear weapons and the awesome 
responsibility to deal with them responsibly so that we never, God 
forbid, have nuclear disaster, not only in this country but in Russia 
or in the world.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. I 
conclude that I, too, remember General Ellis very well. He was a highly 
decorated fighter pilot in World War II. He was head of the Strategic 
Air Command. And, as my colleague will recall, he was appointed to the 
standing consultative commission, which, Mr. President, is that body 
that is entrusted with resolving underlying questions with respect to 
the framework of arms control treaties, including the ABM. 

[[Page S 12594]]
And he discharged that responsibility with great distinction.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the able Senator from 
Georgia for his kind remarks.
  I now yield to the able Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, such 
time as she may require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I, too, want to commend the 
chairman of the committee, the ranking member from Georgia, and the 
group that got together and worked long into the night before the 
summer recess in an attempt to reach an accommodation that would allow 
everyone to feel comfortable about how we are treating theater missile 
defense.
  Mr. President, I want to speak because I believe that we have only 
settled this issue in a very temporary way this year. But I want to say 
that it is very important for us to look at this for the future because 
this is going to be one of the major policy decisions that we are going 
to have to make, not only today but for the future. I think the Senator 
from Georgia was correct when he said that we may have to make some 
adjustments in the ABM Treaty. It may well be not only in our best 
interest to do so, but it may be in the best interest of Russia as 
well.
  We are continuing to make adjustments in the post-cold war era. We do 
not live in a bipolar world anymore. We now live in a multipolar world, 
but we have treaties that were based on the bipolar world. We have many 
other concerns that were addressed in a bipolar context. We know now 
that technology exists for ballistic missiles in more than 10 countries 
around the world.
  No longer is the threat just from the missiles that we know are in 
Russia and some of the former republics of the Soviet Union that are 
now independent countries. We now recognize that there are capabilities 
in many other nations around the world and that in the future the 
technology will likely proliferate to such an extent that many 
countries may soon have the capability of launching ballistic missiles 
that could threaten our Nation.
  So it is incumbent on us as leaders of our country to prepare, and we 
must have the time to do that and we must start looking at some of 
these policy issues that must be addressed in this new multipolar 
world.
  As many of us who have traveled into some of the central European 
countries and into the republics of the former Soviet Union know, this 
is an unstable world.
  We are seeing ethnic conflicts. We are seeing border disputes. We are 
seeing turf wars. I think the United States is going to have to step 
back and decide, what our role should be in this new world? When are 
our armed forces going to be needed? When do we have a U.S. interest 
and when is that interest a vital U.S. security interest?
  I think it is clear just from what has happened in the last 2 weeks 
that the world is looking to America for leadership. If there is one 
thing America is--and it is probably the consensus in the world--we are 
the beacon for a democracy that has worked and that has created the 
strongest Nation in the history of the world. Because of that, many 
countries are looking to us for leadership, and we must determine how 
much leadership we can give, how much is monetary, and how much is 
security oriented. And I think that is going to have to set the stage 
for how we prepare to be the world's superpower and yet maintain our 
strength and protect our shores.
  The greatest lesson of all is that the cold war was ended; we 
obtained that peace through strength. We did not end the cold war 
through weakness. Other countries in the world knew that we had the 
capacity and the commitment to protect our interests. We must never 
veer from that fundamental principle that we are a superpower that will 
protect ourselves. We must not allow unilateral disarmament of any 
kind, of any type.
  When you talk about a treaty that was made in a bipolar world between 
the two preeminent powers at the time you cannot have any confidence 
that those who wrote that treaty could envision all of the things that 
could happen in the world today. No treaty at that time could ever 
envision the technologies available to many countries today that have 
rendered the treaty outdated, outmoded, and no longer a strong approach 
for us to take. So we are going to have to look at our strategic 
interests, and in doing that we are going to have to determine what we 
must do as the leaders of our country to make sure we will have 
appropriate defenses against any missile that could ever come into our 
borders.
  That is something we are going to have to debate this year, and we 
are going to have to continue our vigilance to make sure our young 
people know they can be assured of the strength of our country and that 
we have the foresight and the vision to maintain that strength.
  I am going to support the compromise that has been reached, but I do 
have reservations that we are not as a group looking to what we must do 
to make sure we have the strength to withstand any kind of attack that 
technology has the capability to deliver to our shores. And I think we 
are going to have to continue our debates, continue our studies, 
continue our technological advances, and under no circumstances at any 
time should we say we are not going to defend our shores, that we are 
not going to make sure that our nuclear stockpile, which is dormant, is 
nevertheless still capable. Unilateral disarmament is not anything we 
can consider in any manner if we are going to remain the greatest and 
only superpower left in the world.
  So I commend my colleagues for coming to this conclusion. But it is 
merely the beginning of a very important policy debate that I think is 
going to be more important as we learn more of the technologies and the 
intelligence about what is happening around the world in the area of 
defense and security.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. 
After the debate is concluded on this matter, then we will have a wrap-
up tonight. I have asked Senator Warner if he would conduct the wrap-up 
on this side. He has agreed to do so.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Michigan has some 
concluding remarks and I would yield him such time as he may desire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Georgia.
  Mr. President, I will be very brief, indeed.
  Section 232 of Title X, which is the current law, reads as follows: 
that the goal of the United States is ``to develop and maintain the 
option to deploy an antiballistic missile system that is capable of 
providing a highly effective defense of the United States against 
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.''
  So the current law is to develop the option to deploy, but to decide 
at a future time whether or not to deploy, depending on the 
circumstances at that time, including the threats at the time, and the 
cost and military effectiveness of such a system. The bill says deploy. 
The current law says develop with an option to deploy. The bill says 
deploy.
  The substitute amendment goes back to the fundamental approach of the 
existing law, which is to develop so that we can deploy, but then makes 
it very clear that we will make the decision on whether to deploy at a 
future date and specifies what the criteria are for consideration at 
the time of that decision.
  Section 233 of our bill says that it is the policy of the United 
States, in subsection 3, to ``ensure congressional review prior to a 
decision to deploy the system developed for deployment, under paragraph 
2'', of four things: the affordability and operational effectiveness of 
such a system, the threat to be countered by such a system, and fourth, 
ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.
  In doing this, this substitute recognizes the importance of the ABM 
Treaty to our security. The ABM Treaty has been one of the reasons we 
have been able to reduce the number of offensive nuclear weapons that 
face us.
  We are going to be facing a small percentage of the nuclear weapons 
that used to confront us because, the Russians have told us over and 
over again, 

[[Page S 12595]]
we have adhered to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That has allowed 
them to agree to these very drastic reductions in the numbers of their 
offensive weapons. And so we are on the threshold of seeing continuing 
significant reduction in offensive weapons that we face, or that we 
could theoretically face, no longer from an adversary but now from 
someone with whom we are having a growing and a deepening partnership.
  It is not just the current law that we should develop technology for 
a national missile defense--that is the law I read--it is also the 
policy of this administration to develop that technology in a way that 
we could deploy it in time to counter any ballistic missile threat that 
emerges to the United States. So we have a law that says develop and we 
have a current policy that says develop. But both by current law and 
current policy the decision whether to deploy is left for a future 
time.
  That is the approach which this substitute restores; develop, but 
leave the decision to deploy for a future time based on criteria which 
will be considered at that time to help us make a decision which makes 
sense for the security of this Nation.
  So the road to reductions is dependent in part on the existence of an 
ABM Treaty. That treaty still continues to serve our national interest. 
This substitute in a number of ways explicitly and otherwise recognizes 
the importance of that treaty to this relationship and to the 
continuing reductions in the number of offensive weapons.
  So I do hope that our colleagues will find favor with this substitute 
and will support this substitute. Again, I want to thank all the 
colleagues who participated in the formulation of it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. If I could ask for a minute.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield such time as the able Senator from Virginia 
shall require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the concluding remarks by our colleague 
from Michigan, I think, set the tone when he seeks to reassure the 
Senate that this legislation is in the best interest of our Nation and 
that he is hopeful that we will gain the support of other Senators, 
because no single Senator fought harder for certain changes in this 
amendment than did the Senator from Michigan. And I think we conclude 
debate on a very positive note.
  With that statement, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Georgia, but I continue to have strong reservations about 
the remaining aspects of the Missile Defense Act. The amendment makes 
an unwise provision better, and I commend Senators Nunn, Levin, Warner, 
and Cohen for their effective work in achieving this compromise. It 
fails, however, to do what is necessary to serve the best interests of 
our national security.
  The remaining shortcomings in the Missile Defense Act become clear 
when we consider the principal threats that the United States faces 
from nuclear missile attack, and the more effective way these threats 
are addressed by current administration policy, which is also 
longstanding bipartisan policy under both Republican and Democratic 
administrations.
  One of the threats we face is clearly from nations which now lack 
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, but which may 
develop them in the near future. Proponents of building a national 
missile defense argue that the prospect of such a threat is sufficient 
grounds for deploying a defensive system as soon as possible.
  The weakness in this argument, however, is revealed in the undisputed 
testimony of Lt. Gen. James Clapper before the Armed Services Committee 
last January. General Clapper at that time was the head of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. He stated that:

       We see no interest in or capability of any new country 
     reaching the continental United States with a long range 
     missile for at least the next decade.

  The missile threat from a new nuclear power is neither real nor 
imminent, and it will not materialize for at least ten years. The 
Defense Department's missile defense plan calls for a research and 
development program that will enable us to build and deploy a national 
defense rapidly if unforeseen threats materialize. The Clinton defense 
plan will keep us safe from ballistic missile threats from new nuclear 
powers.
  A more serious threat comes from existing nuclear arsenals of 
potential adversaries. There is a very low likelihood in the current 
world situation that we will be subject to nuclear attack from Russia 
or China. But such a possibility is the most serious potential threat 
to the security of the United States, and therefore merits careful 
consideration.
  Russia, and to a lesser extent China, possess nuclear arsenals that 
threaten the security of the United States. This fact is nothing new. 
The arsenal controlled by Moscow has posed this threat to our Nation 
for roughly 40 years. Yet, we were able to ensure the security of the 
United States over this period, in spite of the tensions and 
conflicting interests of the cold war. We did so by maintaining a 
nuclear arsenal that could deter the use of nuclear weapons against us 
by any adversary. Mutual deterrence guaranteed our security from 
nuclear attack throughout the nuclear age, and it is still our best 
guarantee.
  Now, in the post-cold-war era, the stability and effectiveness of 
this deterrent relationship is even greater than it was during the cold 
war, and it is just as important. Russia is no longer our adversary, 
and therefore the likelihood of conflict between us has greatly 
diminished. We have signed the START I and START II Treaties which, if 
implemented, will create stable deterrence at reduced levels of nuclear 
weapons.
  In his famous phrase, President Reagan called on us to trust but 
verify. Now, the increased trust between our nations has magnified our 
ability to verify. The START Treaties provide for verification with 
extensive and effective monitoring that was not possible during the 
cold war. As the political and military leaders of Russia confirm, the 
deterrent relationship that has long existed remains the centerpiece of 
nuclear safety for our two nations. And we can achieve even greater 
safeguards in the future by maintaining that cooperative relationship. 
It makes no sense to take unilateral actions that would jeopardize that 
relationship, as the missile defense advocates would do.
  Mutual deterrence is the foundation of the United States-Russian 
strategic relationship, and the ABM Treaty is the basis for mutual 
deterrence. For over two decades, the ABM Treaty has insured that the 
superpowers' nuclear arsenals continue to be effective as deterrents, 
which is the necessary condition for strategic stability. The Russians 
themselves have reaffirmed the importance of this longstanding treaty 
to cooperation in arms reduction.
  The proponents of the Missile Defense Act place too little value on 
the improved strategic relationship between the United States and 
Russia, and the essential role of the ABM Treaty as the heart of that 
relationship. Deploying a multisite missile defense would violate the 
ABM Treaty as it currently stands.
  The Russians have clearly stated that they will not ratify START II 
if the United States violates or withdraws from the ABM Treaty. In my 
view, the United States is safer facing a Russian arsenal of 3,000 
weapons under START II, than if we possess several hundred ABM 
interceptors while facing the present Russian arsenal of 10,000 
weapons.
  Deploying a national missile defense system will also impair the 
cooperative threat reduction programs, under which Russia is accepting 
United States funds to help dismantle their nuclear weapons.
  In addition, withdrawing from the ABM Treaty may also cause the 
Russians to put their nuclear arsenal on a higher state of alert, 
increasing the risk of accidental launch against the United States.
  The course set by this bill may also lead the Russians to reverse the 
negotiated step, achieved in 1994, whereby we agreed not to target each 
other's territory with the missiles deployed in silos and on 
submarines. If the Russians retarget their missiles, the threat 

[[Page S 12596]]
of catastrophic damage to the United States from accidental or 
unauthorized attack will clearly rise.
  The proponents of the Missile Defense Act ignore all of these 
considerations. They are proposing a more dangerous course for our 
national security which Congress should not follow.
  The Nunn/Levin/Warner/Cohen amendment will improve the bill compared 
to its present terms, and I urge adoption of the amendment. But I also 
urge my colleagues to support the administration's more sensible course 
on the development of missile defenses. President Clinton's policy is 
designed to explore the new avenues of nuclear safety opened to us by 
the end of the cold war, without sacrificing the solid foundation of 
our security--the mutual deterrence established and supported by 
Democratic and Republican administrations alike over the past four 
decades.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not know if anyone is going to want to 
speak any more on this one on either side. I do not have any more 
requests on the Democratic side.
  Mr. President, does the Senator from Michigan know of anyone else who 
would like to speak on this?
  Mr. LEVIN. No.
  Mr. NUNN. As I understand the time agreement, we will have the vote 
on this at 9:30 tomorrow morning.
  Does the Senator from South Carolina know when we will be coming in 
on the bill? Should we reserve any time in case anyone wants to speak 
in the morning?
  Mr. THURMOND. We will be coming in at 9:25 in the morning, and we 
will get on the bill by 9:30.
  Mr. NUNN. Then we will vote at 9:30.
  Mr. THURMOND. We are supposed to vote at 9:30.
  I am prepared to yield back my time, Mr. President.
  Mr. NUNN. I think, just in case there is a minute or two someone 
wants to speak in the morning, we ought to probably reserve 2 minutes 
on each side and give back the remainder of the time. That would give 
us a chance if somebody else wants a minute to be heard.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are agreeable to that.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would yield back all of my time except 2 
minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. The same here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the time is yielded back 
with the exception of 2 minutes on each side.
  Mr. NUNN. I know the Senator from South Carolina would like us to 
handle several amendments that have been agreed to before we conclude 
the debate on this Missile Defense Act of 1995 substitute. And, again, 
I want to thank my friend from Michigan, who did a superb job, and my 
friend from Virginia and my friend from Maine, who did, I think, a very 
good job in terms of negotiating what is a consensus, I think a 
positive step forward, as the Senator from Virginia said, for our 
Nation.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my colleague with respect to all 
the efforts that were made. Indeed, it was a monumental task. I think 
the result will be accepted strongly by the Senate tomorrow.
  Mr. President, I wonder, if I can have the attention of the 
distinguished chairman and the ranking member of the committee, if I 
could bring up another point. That is, Mr. Chairman, I think it is 
imperative that the Senate receive a briefing from the administration 
on the situation as it exists in Bosnia today.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have already made the request.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished chairman, because I have 
written a memorandum to the chairman. It would not be on his desk until 
tomorrow morning.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we have 5 
minutes each in the morning. I have a closing statement I would like to 
make in the morning just before we vote on this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, all time will be yielded 
back with the exception of 5 minutes on each side.
  Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous consent that--I understand I probably 
would make that after the bill passes, and so just as to say 2 minutes 
to each side before that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, could I inquire of the Chair as to the time 
agreement now?
  I understand that we have the Missile Defense Act to be voted on at 
9:30.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. NUNN. Could the Chair inform the Senate of what takes place after 
that amendment has been voted on and disposed of? It is my 
understanding we have several other possible amendments, including an 
amendment by the Senator from South Carolina that is relevant and an 
amendment by the Senator from Georgia, myself, that is relevant, as 
well as a Levin amendment which may or may not be required to be voted 
on. We will have time for remarks before final passage of the bill. I 
believe that is what the Senator from South Carolina has made reference 
to.
  I do not believe the Senator is going to need more time for speaking 
on this amendment which we vote on at 9:30. I think we will have other 
time on the bill before that is concluded.
  Mr. THURMOND. That is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator would yield for a comment. We believe we 
worked out the Levin amendment which you referred to, and that it will 
not require a rollcall vote. We have not agreed yet on the final 
language, but we have agreed on the principle of an amendment. So we do 
not expect a rollcall will be necessary on the Levin amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. We will have other amendments that have to be accepted 
tomorrow morning. We have not worked them out. We will not be able to 
conclude all of those. We are going to have to have some time--I hope 
it will not be a lot of time--after the passage of this Missile Defense 
Act, assuming it passes, before we vote on final passage.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection to that.
  I hope we can wrap everything up tonight as much as possible and have 
as few things to do tomorrow before we vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I believe we are prepared to have some of the amendments 
that have been agreed to now propounded to the Senate.


  THE BROWN AMENDMENT CONCERNING THE REUSE OF FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL 
                                 CENTER

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I agreed to accept the amendment of the 
Senator from Colorado which states congressional support for the timely 
reuse of military installations approved for closure or realignment. 
The Senator from Colorado is particularly interested in expediting the 
reuse of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Colorado. While I understand 
the Senator's support for the reuse of Fitzsimons, I believe expedited 
reuse should hold true for all military installations impacted by base 
realignment and closure.
  Over the last few years, Congress has enacted legislation to improve 
base disposal procedures by expediting the overall process and giving 
greater power to Local Redevelopment Authorities [LRAs] in making 
disposal and reuse decisions.
  Current law prescribes time-lines for screening and disposal of 
former military installations. From the time an installation is 
approved for closure or realignment, the following must occur:
  0-6 months--Military department identifies DOD and Federal property 
needs, makes excess and surplus determinations, and commences 
environmental impact analysis process.
  6-18 months--LRA solicits and considers notices of interests, 
conducts outreach, considers homeless assistance needs, and consults 
with military departments regarding surplus property uses.
  18-33 months--LRA prepares redevelopment plan and homeless submission 
and submits to DOD and HUD; military department reports property to 
Federal sponsoring agencies for public benefit conveyances, completes 
environmental impact analysis, and makes disposal decisions.
  33+ months--Military department conveys property and LRA implements 
redevelopment plan.
  It should be noted that turning property over to LRAs could occur 
much 

[[Page S 12597]]
sooner than 33 months--in fact, transfer could occur as soon as 20 
months if reuse plans are developed and approved early in disposal 
process. LRAs that act expeditiously in developing and adopting reuse 
plans should be commended as this is not an easy task. Accordingly, the 
military services should do all in their power within the letter of the 
law to convey appropriate property to LRAs that have fulfilled all 
necessary requirements and are ready and able to accept these 
properties for reuse.
  Mr. President, my point is that expedited reuse is the goal for all 
installations impacted by base closure and realignment decisions.


                           HYDRONUCLEAR TESTS

   Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the Exon amendment to clarify 
the meaning of this bill regarding nuclear weapons testing. This 
amendment will bring the bill into closer agreement with President 
Clinton's policy seeking prompt achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.
   On August 11, President Clinton took a pathbreaking step by 
announcing his intention to seek a true comprehensive test ban. The new 
U.S. policy is to ban all nuclear tests of any size, including the 
hydronuclear tests addressed in this bill.
   President Clinton's action supports our Nation's commitment, made in 
May at the conference on the permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, that the United States will seek prompt 
negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Many of the 178 nations 
who are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conditioned 
their support for the treaty's permanent extension on the prompt 
achievement of a comprehensive test ban. The test ban is an essential 
part of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is 
one of the highest security priorities of the United States.
   A ban on nuclear tests will serve our non-proliferation goals, 
without jeopardizing the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear 
stockpile. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all support the President's new 
policy. They agree that it provides for effective maintenance of our 
nuclear arsenal.
   The Exon amendment would ensure that this bill takes no action to 
violate the President's policy, or the testing moratorium enacted into 
law in 1992. It will clear the way for us to sign a comprehensive test 
ban, and begin a new era of nuclear security and non-proliferation for 
the entire world. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I inquire of the Senator from Georgia 
[Senator Nunn], if I may ask him a question about a provision of the 
fiscal year 1995 Department of Defense Authorization Act.
  Mr. NUNN. I would be pleased to answer the questions of the Senator 
from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Section 816 of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization 
Act authorized a demonstration project in Monterey County, CA, which 
would permit the Department of Defense to purchase fire-fighting, 
police, public works, utility, and other municipal services from 
Government agencies located in Monterey when such services are needed 
for operating Department of Defense assets in the county.
  Mr. NUNN. I am familiar with this section. It allowed such municipal 
services to be purchased notwithstanding section 2465 of title 10, 
United States Code.
  Mrs. BOXER. I would ask the Senator, was it the committee's intent to 
require an OMB Circular A-76 study before the demonstration program 
could begin?
  Mr. NUNN. The purpose of the provision was to expedite the 
demonstration project, and it is therefore my view that to proceed 
without conducting an A-76 study would be consistent with section 816 
of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization Act.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2452

 (Purpose: Relating to testing of theater missile defense interceptors)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Pryor, I offer an 
amendment which will establish testing requirements for theater missile 
defense interceptor missiles. This amendment is supported by both the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and Director of Operational Test 
and Evaluation in the Pentagon.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Pryor, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2452.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 49, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:

     SEC. 224. TESTING OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS.

       (a) The Secretary of Defense may not approve a theater 
     missile defense interceptor program proceeding beyond the 
     low-rate initial production acquisition stage until the 
     Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees 
     that such program has successfully completed initial 
     operational test and evaluation, and is found to be a 
     suitable and effective system.
       (b) In order to be certified under subsection (a) as having 
     been successfully completed, the initial operational test and 
     evaluation conducted with respect to an interceptor program 
     must have included flight tests--
       (1) that were conducted with multiple interceptors and 
     multiple targets in the presence of realistic 
     countermeasures; and
       (2) the results of which demonstrate the achievement by the 
     interceptors of the baseline performance thresholds.
       (c) For purposes of this section, the baseline performance 
     thresholds with respect to a program are the weapons systems 
     performance thresholds specified in the baseline description 
     for the system established (pursuant to section 2435(a)(1) of 
     title 10, United States Code) before the program entered the 
     engineering and manufacturing development stage.
       (d) The number of flight tests described in subsection (b) 
     that are required in order to make the certification under 
     subsection (a) shall be a number determined by the Director 
     of Operational Test and Evaluation to be sufficient for the 
     purposes of this section.
       (e) The Secretary may augment flight testing to demonstrate 
     weapons system performance goals for purposes of the 
     certification under subsection (a) through the use of 
     modeling and simulation that is validated by ground and 
     flight testing.
       (f) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and 
     Ballistic Missile Defense Organization shall include in their 
     annual reports to Congress plans to adequately test theater 
     missile defense interceptor programs throughout the 
     acquisition process. As these theater missile defense systems 
     progress through the acquisition process, the Director of 
     Operational Test and Evaluation and Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Organization shall include in their annual reports to 
     Congress an assessment of how these programs satisfy planned 
     test objectives.

  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of 
Senator Nunn, Senator Bingaman, and myself to restore some common sense 
to the Missile Defense Act of 1995.
  As my colleagues know, the Missile Defense Act of 1995 contains an 
aggressive program to develop and deploy theater missile defenses in 
the form of sophisticated missile interceptors.
  I say to my colleagues--if we want to protect ourselves from the 
threat of theater missile attacks, let's make sure the interceptors are 
capable of destroying incoming missiles!
  I was disappointed that this bill deleted a provision passed by 
Congress 2 years ago that would help us monitor these programs through 
a series of live-fire tests.
  I believe it would be dangerous for the Senate to show a lack of 
interest in monitoring the progress of our theater missile defense 
interceptors. Our primary concern should be in making sure they are 
maturing properly.
  Mr. President, I am pleased that the Director of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization [BMDO] and the Pentagon's Director of 
Operational Testing agreed to work together in an effort to help us 
properly emphasize the importance of testing our TMD interceptor 
programs.

[[Page S 12598]]

  I applaud the Director of the BMDO, Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, and the 
Director of Operational Testing, Phil Coyle, for working cooperatively 
in this effort.
  Mr. President, this is a responsible amendment that asks the Pentagon 
to periodically assess the maturity of each interceptor program, and to 
advise Congress on the progress we're making. It also asks the 
Secretary of Defense to certify to Congress that these programs work 
properly before they enter into full-rate production. Finally, this 
amendment will help prevent the wasteful practice of building weapon 
systems that do not work as expected.
  This concept, Mr. President, is commonly referred to as fly before 
you buy. Fly before you buy means that new weapons must demonstrate 
their progress and maturity in operational testing so that we do not 
waste money buying systems that do not work.
  I am proud to say, Mr. President, that with this amendment, the 
weapon developers in the BMDO office and the Pentagon's testers have 
worked together to reach an agreement on the proposed language.
  This is a remarkable accomplishment that the entire U.S. Senate 
should applaud.
  This is exactly the type of productive cooperation that Senator 
Grassley, Senator Roth and I envisioned when we wrote the legislation 
creating the independent testing office back in 1983. Developers and 
testers working together for a common goal. Unfortunately, for many 
years, the developers have refused to allow operational testers to 
monitor their progress. Too often in the Pentagon, the word ``test'' is 
considered a four-letter word.
  This is exactly the scenario we should avoid with our interceptor 
programs.
  We have already spent over $5 billion on theater missile defense 
interceptors. In this bill, an additional $2 billion is authorized for 
these programs. And the total costs are projected to exceed $22 
billion!
  As we continue spending more and more on ballistic missile defenses, 
let us not forget the most basic and most important element of these 
programs--making sure they work.
  I wish to once again thank Gen. Malcolm O'Neill for his cooperation. 
Also, special thanks to Mr. Phil Coyle for his outstanding leadership 
as the Pentagon's testing czar. Thanks also to Larry Miller of Mr. 
Coyle's staff for his tremendous efforts in helping to prepare this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I thank the managers of this bill for accepting this 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment is acceptable. The Senator 
is correct, we support the amendment and urge its adoption.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2452) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2453

            (Purpose: To make certain technical corrections)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf 
of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond. It is a 
technical amendment which makes certain corrections to S. 1026.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment. We 
support it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2453.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 133, line 25, strike out ``such Act'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof'' the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
     1965''.
       On page 195, line 15, insert ``(1)'' after ``(d)''.
       On page 195, line 15, strike out ``it is a'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``it is an affirmative''.
       On page 195, line 17, strike out ``(1)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(A)''.
       On page 195, line 21, strike out ``(2)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(B)''.
       On page 195, line 23, strike out the end quotation marks 
     and second period.
       On page 195, after line 23, insert the following:
       ``(2) The accused has the burden of proving a defense under 
     paragraph (1) by a preponderance of the evidence.''.
       On page 250, beginning on line 20, strike out ``Not later 
     than December 15, 1996, the'' and insert in lieu thereof 
     ``The''.
       On page 375, strike out lines 11 through 15.
       On page 375, line 16, strike out ``(p)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(o)''.
       On page 375, line 20, strike out ``(q)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(p)''.
       On page 376, line 1, strike out ``(r)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(q)''.
       On page 376, line 7, strike out ``(s)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(r)''.
       On page 376, line 13, strike out ``(t)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(s)''.
       On page 376, line 22, strike out ``(u)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(t)''.
       On page 377, line 3, strike out ``(v)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(u)''.
       On page 378, between line 23 and 24, insert the following:
       (c) Public Law 100-180 Requirement for Selected Acquisition 
     Reports for ATB, ACM, and ATA Programs.--Section 127 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 
     1989 (10 U.S.C. 2432 note) is repealed.
       On page 378, line 24, strike out ``(c)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(d)''.
       On page 379, line 5, strike out ``(d)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(e)''.
       On page 379, line 14, strike out ``(e)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(f)''.
       On page 379, line 20, strike out ``(f)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(g)''.
       Beginning on page 379, line 24, strike out ``106 Stat. 
     2370;'' and all that follows through page 380, line 2, and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``106 Stat. 2368; 10 U.S.C. 301 note) 
     is amended by striking out paragraphs (4) and (5).''.
       On page 380, line 3, strike out ``(g)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(h)''.

  Mr. WARNER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2453) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2454

     (Purpose: To set aside $2,000,000 for the Allegany Ballistics 
               Laboratory for essential safety functions)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, the Senator from 
West Virginia, I offer an amendment which would authorize the Navy to 
use operation and maintenance funds up to a total of $2 million to 
address essential safety concerns at a Government-owned, contractor-
operated weapons facility.
  I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment. I believe the other side 
has cleared this amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct. This is an amendment originally 
considered in the course of the markup of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. I was awaiting further information. That information, to my 
understanding, has been received and, therefore, the amendment is 
worthy of consideration and support by the Senate.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Byrd, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 2454.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 137, after line 24, insert the following:

     SEC. 389. ALLEGANY BALLISTICS LABORATORY.

       Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under section 
     301(2), $2,000,000 shall be available for the Allegany 
     Ballistics Laboratory for essential safety functions.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the amendment that I offer addresses 
immediate safety concerns associated with the Allegany Ballistics 
Laboratory. The Allegany Ballistics Laboratory is the leading producer 
of tactical missile propulsion systems and conventional warheads for 
the Department of Defense, 

[[Page S 12599]]
currently producing rocket motors, sensor fuzed weapons, a variety of 
state-of-the-art missiles, warheads for the Maverick and more. 
Additionally, the Allegany Ballistics Lab is developing motors and 
warheads for the next generation of smart precision guided weapons.
  Of great concern to me are the many significant safety violations, 
due to the age of the facility. Originally acquired by the Army in 
1941, the Navy was given custody of the site in 1945. In fiscal year 
1994, the Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA] requested restoration of 
the 50-year-old plant over a 5-year period. Now, in what would be its 
third year of restoration, the plant lacks programmed funding for the 
ongoing restoration plan. This year's programmed restoration costs 
would be $38.5 million, of which the Senate Appropriations Committee 
has provided $30 million. Due to an unfortunate oversight during the 
Armed Services Committee preparation of this bill, the authorization 
bill does not include language supporting the safety upgrades at this 
facility.
  Because of the potentially hazardous circumstances that might develop 
due to neglected safety precautions at this antiquated weapons-
producing facility, my amendment would ensure the authorization for a 
minimal $2 million to provide for the essential safety measures 
required for the continuing operations of this plant.
  The laboratory provides and services munitions for all the military 
services. Its programs include Naval propulsion technologies, 
Sidewinder, and Sea Sparrow missiles; for the Army, solid propulsion 
technologies, special munitions technologies, jointly produced rocket 
engines; rocket and laser systems for the Air Force; and a variety of 
motor and generator technologies for ballistic, cruise, and tactical 
missiles.
  A facility of this magnitude and importance to national security 
requires, at a minimum, the funding for essential safety measures to 
avert a potential disaster. If these needs are not met, we risk not 
only plant security and safety, but we risk the loss of our Defense 
Department's ability to provide adequate munitions to our fighting 
forces.
  Mr. President, safe operations of the plant and safe function of the 
weapons and defense conversion products depend on competent structural 
and hazards testing capability. Facilities currently being used are 
over 40 years old. Needed are safe, efficient control rooms for 
Insensitive Munitions, hazards and warhead testing to replace the 
obsolete facilities.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment, that will help 
keep a portion of our defense industry free from the occurrence or risk 
of injury or loss.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2454) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2455

 (Purpose: To revise for fiscal and technical purposes the provisions 
       relating to military construction projects authorizations)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf 
of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond, and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2455.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 69, line 20, strike out ``$18,086,206,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$18,073,206,000''.
       On page 69, line 21, strike out ``$21,356,960,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$21,343,960,000''.
       On page 69, line 23, strike out ``$18,237,893,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$18,224,893,000''.
       On page 69, line 25, strike out ``$10,060,162,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$10,046,162,000''.
       On page 407, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

     SEC. 2105. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED 
                   FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 
                   PROJECTS.

       Section 2105(a) of the Military Construction Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public Law 102-190; 
     105 Stat. 1511), as amended by section 2105(b)(2)(A) of the 
     Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 
     (division B of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1859), is 
     further amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by 
     striking out ``$2,571,974,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
     ``$2,565,729,000''.
       On page 417, in the table preceding line 1, in the amount 
     column of the item relating to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, 
     strike out ``$8,300,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
     ``$8,380,000''.
       On page 419, line 24, strike out ``$49,450,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$49,400,000''.
       On page 420, after line 21, add the following:

     SEC 2305. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED 
                   FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 
                   PROJECTS.

       Section 2305(a) of the Military Construction Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public Law 102-190; 
     105 Stat. 1525), as amended by section 2308(a)(2)(A) of the 
     Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 
     (division B of Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2598) and by 
     section 2305(a)(3)(A) of the Military Construction 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (division B of Public 
     Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1871), is further amended in the 
     matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out 
     ``$2,033,833,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``$2,017,828,000''.
       On page 424, line 22, strike out ``$4,565,533,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$4,466,783,000.''
       On page 425, line 9, strike out ``$47,950,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$47,900,000''.
       On page 426, line 13, strike out ``$3,897,892,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$3,799,192,000''.
       On page 427, after line 25, add the following:

     SEC. 2407. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED 
                   FOR PRIOR YEAR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

       (a) Fiscal Year 1991 Authorizations.--Section 2405(a) of 
     the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1991 (division B of Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1779), as 
     amended by section 2409(b)(1) of the Military Construction 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public 
     Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1991), is further amended in the 
     matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out 
     ``$1,644,478,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``$1,641,244,000''.
       (b) Fiscal Year 1992 Authorizations.--Section 2404(a) of 
     the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1992 (105 Stat. 1531), as amended by section 2404(b)(1)(A) of 
     the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1994 (division B of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1877), is 
     further amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by 
     striking out ``$1,665,440,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``$1,658,640,000''.
       (c) Fiscal Year 1993 Authorizations.--Section 2403(a) of 
     the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     1993 (division B of Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2600) is 
     amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out 
     ``$2,567,146,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``$2,558,556,000''.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on August 2, the Senate adopted an 
amendment authorizing $228.0 million for military constructions 
projects that were appropriated in the military construction 
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996. The amendment I am offering 
today identifies offsets that will be used to pay for these additional 
projects. Specific amounts are as follows:
  $30.0 million from a reduction to the foreign currency fluctuation 
account previously made by the Senate.
  $98.7 million from construction projects that are no longer required 
due to the recommended closures by the Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission. These reductions were taken from a list compiled by the 
Department of Defense.
  $49.0 million from prior year funds for projects that resulted in 
contract savings or were previously approved and now are no longer 
needed. This action mirrors the action taken by the Senate MILCON 
Appropriations Subcommittee.
  $53.0 million from the $161.0 million request for the Pentagon 
renovation. The fiscal year 1996 request included $53.0 million for 
construction of wedge 1 of the project, which has been delayed for 1 
year pending a comprehensive review of the $1.2 billion renovation 
project.
  Mr. President, the reductions to the various programs will not impair 
the progress of these programs. On the other hand, the additional 
military construction projects funded by these offsets will enhance the 
readiness of our Armed Forces and provide for the 

[[Page S 12600]]
welfare of the men and women who serve in the uniform of this Nation. 
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment provides offsets for the 
military construction projects authorized by the Senate earlier in its 
deliberations on this bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment, and 
this side has cleared the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2455) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2456

(Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance, Naval Communications Station, 
                         Stockton, California)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Feinstein, the Senator 
from California, I offer an amendment which authorizes the Secretary of 
the Navy, upon concurrence of both the General Services Administration 
and HUD, to convey 1,450 acres of property at the Naval Communications 
Station, Stockton, CA, to the Port of Stockton.
  This amendment also allows for all existing leases involving Federal 
agencies located on the site to remain under existing terms and 
conditions.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other 
side.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Feinstein, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2456.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 487, below line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 2838. LAND CONVEYANCE, NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION, 
                   STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA.

       (a) Authority To Convey.--The Secretary of the Navy may, 
     upon the concurrence of the Administrator of General Services 
     and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, convey to 
     the Port of Stockton (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Port''), all right, title, and interest of the United 
     States in and to a parcel of real property, including any 
     improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 1,450 acres 
     at the Naval Communication Station, Stockton, California.
       (b) Interim Lease.--Until such time as the real property 
     described in subsection (a) is conveyed by deed, the 
     Secretary may lease the property, along with improvements 
     thereon, to the Port under terms and conditions satisfactory 
     to the Secretary.
       (c) Consideration.--The conveyance may be as a public 
     benefit conveyance for port development as defined in Section 
     203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 
     of 1949, (40 U.S.C. 484), as amended, provided the Port 
     satisfies the criteria in section 203 and such regulations as 
     the Administrator of General Services may prescribe to 
     implement that section. Should the Port fail to qualify for a 
     public benefit conveyance and still desire to acquire the 
     property, then the Port shall, as consideration for the 
     conveyance, pay to the United States an amount equal to the 
     fair market value of the property to be conveyed, as 
     determined by the Secretary.
       (d) Federal Lease of Conveyed Property.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, as a condition for transfer of 
     this property under subparagraph (a), the Secretary may 
     require that the Port agree to lease all or a part of the 
     property currently under federal use at the time of 
     conveyance to the United States for use by the Department of 
     Defense or any other federal agency under the same terms and 
     conditions now presently in force. Such terms and conditions 
     will continue to include payment (to the Port) for 
     maintenance of facilities leased to the Federal Government. 
     Such maintenance of the Federal premises shall be to the 
     reasonable satisfaction of the United States, or as required 
     by all applicable Federal, State and local laws and 
     ordinances.
       (e) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the property to be conveyed under subsection 
     (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the 
     Secretary. The cost of such survey shall be borne by Port.
       (f) Additional Terms.--The Secretary may require such 
     additional terms and conditions in connection with the 
     conveyance under subsection (a) or the lease under subsection 
     (b) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the 
     interests of the United States.
       (g) Environmental Quality of Property.--Any contract for 
     sale, deed, or other transfer of real property under this 
     section shall be carried out in compliance with section 
     120(h) of the CERCLA (42USC9620(h)) and other environmental 
     laws.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of an amendment that 
conveys the right, title and interest of the Naval Communications 
Station at Rough and Ready Island in Stockton, California, from the 
Navy to the Port of Stockton.
  This conveyance is a win-win for California and the Navy. The 
transfer of this property will result in the creation of thousands of 
jobs in my state and further solidify the Stockton Ship Deepwater 
Channel as one of the premier international shipping hubs in 
California. In addition, the Navy will be able to reduce infrastructure 
that it no longer needs nor is able to maintain. But the Navy and the 
Port of Stockton support this amendment.
  The Port of Stockton's Rough and Ready Island is located 75 nautical 
miles east of the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. The island 
consists of approximately 1,450 acres, of which roughly half is 
dedicated to general purpose warehousing.
  Since 1944, Rough and Ready Island has been home to the Navy and 
played a prominent role in our nation's defense during war and peace 
alike. Currently Rough and Ready is the site of a U.S. Naval 
Communication Station (NAVCOMSTA). While the NAVCOMSTA will continue to 
maintain its presence on the island indefinitely, the Navy has made it 
clear that continued ownership of such a facility, with its 
considerable infrastructure, is not consistent with ongoing military 
realignment objectives.
  In addition to the NAVCOMSTA, the Department of Defense houses its 
regional distribution center on the island. Other Federal agencies that 
lease space include the General Services Administration, the U.S. 
Postal Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol.
  However, while part of Rough and Ready Island houses a number of 
Federal tenants, a significant percentage of the island has fallen in 
disrepair. If it is to be used to its fullest capacity, a number of 
improvements such as ameliorating and expanding the docks, deepening 
the waterways, and upgrading the railroad tracks are essential. The 
only private entity able and willing to adequately execute such an 
enormous effort is the Port of Stockton.
  The Port of Stockton, which operates a 600 acre complex contiguous to 
Rough and Ready Island, is ready to assume the host position and make 
the necessary improvements. The Stockton Port District, which was 
formed in 1927, functions as a nonprofit municipal corporation and is 
empowered by the California Harbors and Navigation Code to acquire real 
property by grant or gift in order to promote Maritime and Commercial 
Interests.
  The Port of Stockton is the local sponsor for the Stockton Ship 
Channel which is one of the busiest interior industrial water ways in 
the United States. Because it is the only deep-water cargo Port that 
handles bulk, between 3.5 million and 4 million tons of cargo travel 
through the Channel every year.
  The Port of Stockton will receive the property through a public 
benefit conveyance. Further, the Port of Stockton has repeatedly 
offered to honor any long-term leases that are currently operative on 
Rough and Ready Island with the Navy, Federal agencies, and other 
tenants.
  In addition to the benefits to the Navy, this land conveyance could 
also create thousands of new jobs in an area that has traditionally 
suffered from double digit unemployment.
  Currently, Cost Plus, a major retailer, occupies 400,000 square foot 
of warehouse space of the Port of Stockton. Although the Port has 
received inquiries from other large businesses eager to establish 
distribution centers of similar size, it is unable to accommodate these 
requests because it simply does not have the space. The consolidation 
of Rough and Ready Island with the Port of Stockton will provide more 
opportunity to fulfill these requests for more space and in turn 
provide more jobs for the residents of the area.
  The Port of Stockton estimates that in the long term, the potential 
for 

[[Page S 12601]]
large and small businesses utilizing the expanded warehousing, a 
proposed 92,000 square foot boat storage complex and new dock 
facilities will result in as many as 2,000 new jobs in the area.
  Mr. President, allowing the transfer of Rough and Ready Island is a 
good deal for California and good deal for the Navy. Not only does this 
transfer give the Navy an opportunity to relinquish itself of land that 
is in considerable need of improvement, but it will create economic 
opportunities for many Californians.
  I thank my colleagues for supporting this amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2456) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2457

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Iowa, Senator 
Harkin, and the Senator from California, Senator Boxer, I send an 
amendment to the desk that provides that cost-type contract DOD 
reimbursement of contract executive compensation would be capped at 
$200,000. This is similar to the amendment the Senate adopted on the 
DOD appropriations bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Harkin, for 
     himself and Mrs. Boxer, proposes an amendment numbered 2457.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     ``SEC.   . RESTRICTION ON REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS.

       ``(a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in 
     this Act for fiscal year 1996 may be obligated for payment on 
     new contracts on which allowable costs charged to the 
     government include payments for individual compensation 
     (including bonuses and other incentives) at a rate in excess 
     of $250,000.
       ``(b) It is the Sense of the Senate that the Congress 
     should consider extending the restriction described in 
     section (a) permanently.''

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on this amendment, this is the first 
opportunity this Senator has had to review it. The chairman of the 
committee has instructed me to accept the amendment.
  I must say, it causes me some initial concern, but as I understand 
it, it is part of the DOD appropriations bill at the present time. 
Speaking only for myself, I will reexamine this amendment in the course 
of the conference deliberation on the bill.
  So for the present time, I indicate that it is acceptable on this 
side for the chairman of the committee.
  Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senators Harkin and Boxer, I urge its 
adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2457) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2458

 (Purpose: To improve the management of environmental restoration and 
         waste management activities authorized under this Act)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Mr. Johnston and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Johnston, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2458.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 535, at the end of subtitle A, add the following 
     new sections:

     ``SEC.   . STANDARDIZATION OF ETHICS AND REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
                   WITH GOVERNMENT-WIDE STANDARDS.

       ``(a) Repeals.--(1) Part A of title VI of the Department of 
     Energy Organization Act and its catchline (42 U.S.C. 7211, 
     7212, and 7218) are repealed.
       ``(2) Section 308 of the Energy Research and Development 
     Administration Appropriation Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1977 (42 U.S.C. 5816a) is repealed.
       ``(3) Section 522 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 6392) is repealed.
       ``(b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The table of contents for 
     the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by 
     striking out the items relating to part A of title VI 
     including sections 601 through 603.
       ``(2) The table of contents for the Energy Policy and 
     Conservation Act is amended by striking out the matter 
     relating to section 522.''.

     ``SEC.   . CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION REQUIREMENTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       ``(1) No individual acting within the scope of that 
     individual's employment with a Federal agency or department 
     shall be personally subject to civil or criminal sanctions, 
     for any failure to comply with an environmental cleanup 
     requirement under the Solid Waste Disposal Act or the 
     Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
     Liability Act or an analogous requirement under comparable 
     Federal, State, or local laws, where the failure to comply is 
     due to lack of funds requested or appropriated to carry out 
     such requirement. Federal and State enforcement authorities 
     shall refrain from enforcement action in such circumstances.
       ``(2) If appropriations by the Congress for fiscal year 
     1996 or any subsequent fiscal year are insufficient to fund 
     any such environmental cleanup requirements, the Committees 
     of Congress with jurisdiction shall examine the issue, elicit 
     the views of Federal agencies, affected States, and the 
     public, and consider appropriate statutory amendments to 
     address personal criminal liability, and any related issues 
     pertaining to potential liability of any Federal agency or 
     department or its contractors.''

  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the amendment that I have offered 
addresses two crucial management issues for the defense-related 
environmental restoration and waste management programs authorized in 
this bill. The first issue is the continued existence of obsolete 
conflict-of-interest and financial reporting requirements at the 
Department of Energy that conflict with governmentwide standards. These 
requirements result in unnecessary duplication of effort and have 
deterred outstanding individuals from accepting managerial positions 
within the Department. The second issue is the impending imposition of 
criminal liability for Federal managers of environmental cleanup 
activities in the case of a funding shortfall that prevents full 
compliance with the law. Action on these management issues is 
essential, if defense environmental restoration and waste management 
programs are to succeed.
  My amendment will remove the first of these two obstacles and express 
the sense of the Congress on the the second.
  The first part of my amendment repeals three sections of the 
Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91, that were 
enacted in 1977 and that deal with conflict-of-interest requirement for 
departmental employees. It also repeals two other free-standing 
financial reporting requirements enacted as parts of other legislation 
in 1977. All of these requirements were enacted prior to passage of 
governmentwide ethics requirements in the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978, and in some sense served as a prototype for these requirements. 
Since the passage of the Ethics in Government Act and the Ethics Reform 
Act of 1989, though, the need for specific ethics and financial 
reporting requirements in DOE that are different from governmentwide 
requirements has disappeared.
  Adoption of this provision would not affect the applicability of 
governmentwide conflict-of-interest and financial reporting 
requirements to DOE employees. These restrictions, codified in 18 
U.S.C. 207 and 208, 41 U.S.C. 423, and 5 CFR 2634 are not affected by 
the amendment and would remain fully in force for DOE employees.
  The Senate has, on four different occasions during the last two 
Congresses, approved language to repeal these requirements--in the 
Energy Policy and 

[[Page S 12602]]
Conservation Act Amendments of 1994, S. 2251, the Department of Energy 
Laboratory Partnership Act of 1994, S. 473, the fiscal year 1994 
Department of Defense authorization bill S. 1298, and the fiscal year 
1992-93 Department of Defense authorization bill. In addition, Congress 
has twice enacted into law temporary suspensions affecting the sections 
of the Department of Energy Organization Act that would be repealed by 
this amendment.
  The Department of Energy and the administration strongly support this 
part of my amendment. Repeal of these provisions has also been 
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences in its 1992 report on 
``Science and Technology Leadership in American Government: Ensuring 
the Best Presidential Appointments.''
  I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the administration 
transmitting the text of this part of the amendment and supporting the 
repeal of these provisions be printed in the Record following my 
statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the second part of my amendment provides 
the sense of the Congress on an issue that, if unresolved, will greatly 
increase the difficulty of attracting and retaining the best managers 
possible for cleanup activities. Under the Federal Facility Compliance 
Act of 1992, beginning on this October 6, Federal managers in the DOD 
and DOE cleanup programs will incur criminal liability for instances of 
noncompliance resulting from funding shortfalls. They literally can be 
sent to jail under State or Federal law if the appropriations acts do 
not contain enough funding to satisfy every last requirement of every 
State and local solid or hazardous waste law. No manager, scientist, or 
engineer worth having in a cleanup program can be expected to be 
attracted to a job in which they are exposed to this sort of criminal 
sanction.
  This potential criminal liability problem may become very real very 
soon, depending on the outcome of the conference on the Energy and 
Water Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1996. The Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, of which I 
am the ranking member, reported a bill that was passed by the Senate 
and that fully funded the President's budget request for the Department 
of Energy environmental management program for fiscal year 1996. We 
will strongly support the Senate position in conference against a House 
mark for this program that is far smaller. I hope that we prevail. In 
any case, it is clear that the problem of appropriating funds to meet 
the expanding requirements of the DOE environmental management program 
will become increasingly acute over the next several years. I strongly 
believe that we should start thinking about this problem now, in a 
deliberative manner, rather than wait for a crisis.
  My amendment provides the sense of Congress that--

       (1) individuals acting within the scope of their employment 
     shall not be personally subject to civil or criminal sanction 
     for any failure to comply with environmental cleanup 
     requirements under the Solid Waste Disposal Act or the 
     Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
     Liability Act, or an analogous requirement under comparable 
     Federal, State, or local laws, where the noncompliance is due 
     to lack of funds; and
       (2) if appropriations are insufficient to fund 
     environmental cleanup requirements, the Congress shall 
     consider appropriate statutory amendments to address 
     potential liability issues for Federal agencies and 
     contractors, after an examination by the appropriate 
     Committees, and after affected Federal agencies, States, and 
     the public have had an opportunity to express their views.

  This amendment has been cleared on both sides by the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works and the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
I urge its adoption.

                               Exhibit 1 


                                       The Secretary of Energy

                                   Washington, DC, April 28, 1995.
     The Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker of the House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker. Enclosed is proposed legislation that 
     would place employees of the Department of Energy on the same 
     basis as most other government employees with respect to 
     restrictions on holding financial interests that have the 
     potential to conflict with official responsibilities, and 
     with respect to financial disclosure requirements.
       The legislation would repeal the divestiture provision of 
     the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOE Act) and 
     related disclosure statutes that were enacted in the mid-
     seventies. The criminal conflict of interest statutes, the 
     standardized financial disclosure rules under the Ethics in 
     Government Act, and the executive branch standards of conduct 
     which are now in place make these provisions no longer 
     necessary.
       More specifically, the enclosed proposal would repeal the 
     divestiture provision in part A of title VI of the DOE Act 
     and also would repeal disclosure provisions in other laws 
     that were superseded but not repeated by part A when it was 
     enacted. The divestiture provision was the only conflict-of-
     interest provision of the DOE Act not repealed by section 
     3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-160). That Act repealed several 
     obsolete conflict-of-interest requirements concerning 
     financial disclosure, post-employment restrictions, and 
     participation restrictions, and was a significant step in 
     ensuring consistency in the application of conflict-of-
     interest requirements throughout the executive branch.
       In addition to repealing most of the Department's obsolete 
     conflict-of-interest provisions, section 3161 required the 
     enclosed report on the divestiture provision. The Department 
     submitted this report to Congress on April 8, 1994, after its 
     review by the Office of Government Ethics which has no 
     objection to repeal of the divestiture provision. The report 
     affirms our earlier conclusion that the divestiture 
     requirement is obsolete, overly broad, and unnecessary, and 
     our recommendation that it should be repealed.
       The Department of Energy has been and continues to be 
     strongly committed to the highest ethnical standards. Every 
     employee of the Department is expected to follow not only the 
     letter of the conflict-of-interest laws and regulations, but 
     also their spirit. Elimination of the Department of Energy 
     divestiture provision that, more often than not, requires 
     divestiture when there is no actual conflict-of-interest, 
     would lessen employee perception that the conflict-of-
     interest rules are arbitrary and unfair. Approval of this 
     proposal would be a significant step in ensuring consistency 
     in the application of conflict-of-interest requirements 
     throughout the executive branch, and we request its prompt 
     consideration.
       If these provisions are eliminated, the conflict-of-
     interest concerns underlying the divestiture provision will 
     continue to be addressed by a statute and regulations 
     applicable to all executive branch employees. These 
     regulations were promulgated by the Office of Government 
     Ethics (Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the 
     Executive Branch, 5 CFR Pan 2635) and provide a mechanism for 
     the Department to issue supplemental regulations that would 
     prohibit or restrict the acquisition or holding of a 
     financial interest or a class of financial interests by 
     agency employees, or any category of agency employees, based 
     on the agency's determination that the acquisition or holding 
     of such financial interests would cause a reasonable person 
     to question the impartiality and objectivity with which 
     agency programs are administered. If needed, regulations to 
     this effect will be pursued.
       The Office of Management and Budget has advised that from 
     the standpoint of the President's program there is no 
     objection to the submission of this proposal.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Hazel R. O'Leary.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as stated by Senator Johnston, the 
proposed amendment was cleared by both sides. I would like to briefly 
comment on the amendment. First, I feel that the conflict of interest 
provisions are consistent with past Senate efforts to eliminate agency-
specific requirements that are no longer necessary. Second, the Sense 
of the Senate related to environmental restoration addresses concerns 
related to civil and criminal liability of individual Federal employees 
acting within the scope of their employment. The sense of the Senate 
specifically provides that Federal employees shall not be held 
personally liable for a failure to fulfill an environmental cleanup 
requirement that is the result of insufficient congressional 
appropriations. I support the amendment, as offered by Senator 
Johnston.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would repeal conflict of 
interest laws applicable only to DOE and not other agencies. It sets 
forth a sense of the Senate that executive branch officials should not 
be held criminally liable for failure to implement an environmental 
cleanup requirement where the failure is attributable to insufficient 
funding.
  I believe this has been cleared by the majority.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2458) was agreed to.
  
[[Page S 12603]]

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2459

   (Purpose: To authorize the conveyance of the William Langer Jewel 
 Bearing Plant to the Job Development Authority of the City of Rolla, 
                             North Dakota)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Senators Dorgan and Conrad and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Dorgan, for 
     himself, and Mr. Conrad, proposes an amendment numbered 2459.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 487, after line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 2838. LAND CONVEYANCE, WILLIAM LANGER JEWEL BEARING 
                   PLANT, ROLLA, NORTH DAKOTA.

       (a) Authority To Convey.--The Administrator of General 
     Services may convey, without consideration, to the Job 
     Development Authority of the City of Rolla, North Dakota (in 
     this section referred to as the ``Authority''), all right, 
     title, and interest of the United States in and to a parcel 
     of real property, with improvements thereon and all 
     associated personal property, consisting of approximately 
     9.77 acres and comprising the William Langer Jewel Bearing 
     Plant in Rolla, North Dakota.
       (b) Condition of Conveyance.--The conveyance authorized 
     under subsection (a) shall be subject to the condition that 
     the Authority--
       (1) use the real and personal property and improvements 
     conveyed under that subsection for economic development 
     relating to the jewel bearing plant;
       (2) enter into an agreement with an appropriate public or 
     private entity or person to lease such property and 
     improvements to that entity or person for such economic 
     development; or
       (3) enter into an agreement with an appropriate public or 
     private entity or person to sell such property and 
     improvements to that entity or person for such economic 
     development.
       (c) Preference for Domestic Disposal of Jewel Bearings.--
     (1) In offering to enter into agreements pursuant to any 
     provision of law for the disposal of jewel bearings from the 
     National Defense Stockpile, the President shall give a right 
     of first refusal on all such offers to the Authority or to 
     the appropriate public or private entity or person with which 
     the Authority enters into an agreement under subsection (b).
       (2) For the purposes of this section, the term ``National 
     Defense Stockpile'' means the stockpile provided for in 
     section 4 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock 
     Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98(c)).
       (d) Availability of Funds for Maintenance and Conveyance of 
     Plant.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
     available in fiscal year 1995 for the maintenance of the 
     William Langer Jewel Bearing Plant in Public Law 103-335 
     shall be available for the maintenance of that plant in 
     fiscal year 1996, pending conveyance, and for the conveyance 
     of that plant under this section.
       (e) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the property conveyed under this section shall 
     be determined by a survey satisfactory to the Administrator. 
     The cost of such survey shall be borne by the Administrator.
       (f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Administrator may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance under this section as the Administrator 
     determines appropriate to protect the interests of the United 
     States.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to the 
defense authorization bill. I would like to take a bit of time to 
describe my amendment.
  My amendment would expedite the conveyance of the William Langer 
Jewel Bearing Plant in Rolla, ND, to the Job Development Authority of 
the city of Rolla. The amendment would enable the General Services 
Administration to transfer the plant to the authority more quickly, and 
in a way that would enable the plant to continue as a going enterprise. 
My senior colleague from North Dakota, Senator Conrad, is cosponsoring 
this amendment, and the Defense Department and the General Services 
Administration have no objection to the amendment.
  Let me just give my colleagues a bit of background on the Langer 
Plant. The Langer Plant has roots in the Cold War. Back in the 1950's, 
when we were in the depths of the cold war, the Congress and the 
administration took a long look at our defense industrial base. Our 
defense leadership realized that we at that point lacked the ability to 
produce jewel bearings, which are finely machined bits of carborundum. 
These bearings were crucial components in military avionics systems.
  The Congress located the plant in North Dakota because of our 
strategic location. The idea was to put this crucial facility in the 
middle of our country, where enemies could not easily reach it. It 
seems a startling consideration, but it is the way people were thinking 
at the time. So the William Langer Jewel Bearing Plant has been making 
jewel bearings for the Federal Government since the 1950s.
  My colleagues should also know that the plant is a few miles from the 
Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Of the plant's hundred or so 
employees remaining after a downsizing, about 60 percent are Native 
American. The Langer Plant brings crucial skilled jobs to an 
economically depressed area.
  Since the plant's founding, Bulova Corp. has run the plant for the 
Pentagon on a Government-owned, contractor-operated basis. However, 
changing technology has led the Defense Logistics Agency to declare the 
plant excess to the Defense Department's needs. The National Defense 
Stockpile no longer needs to buy jewel bearings. So the Defense 
Department has reported the plant to the General Services 
Administration as excess property.
  Last year, the Senate Appropriations Committee's report on the 
Defense Appropriations Act for this fiscal year provided funding to 
ensure that the plant succeed in its transition from a Government-owned 
military supplier to a more commercially oriented firm that also 
remains a viable part of the defense industrial base. This amendment 
will help complete the plant's transition to commercial operation.
  Those of my colleagues who are dealing with base closures and defense 
downsizing know that Rolla faces a crisis and an opportunity with 
regard to this plant. The future of this factory depends on its ability 
to become a commercial manufacturer. While the plant has always sold 
jewel bearings and related items in the commercial market, it is 
redoubling its efforts. Its chief commercial products are ferrules, 
which connect fiber optic cables. Japanese firms dominate volume 
production of ferrules, but the plant is establishing itself as a 
supplier of specialty ferrules in niche markets.
  I would also note that while the Federal Government no longer needs 
jewel bearings, it does require the kind of unique micromanufacturing 
capability that the William Langer Plant provides.
  The plant also manufactures dosimeters, which measure doses of 
nuclear radiation. Dosimeters are vital to the military, to commercial 
utilities that operate nuclear reactors, and to FEMA's emergency 
preparedness programs. FEMA has indicated that it will work with new 
ownership and management of the plant to maintain the plant's 
capability to manufacture dosimeters. So the plant's employees have 
several reasons to hope that the plant will survive in the long run.
  However, the plant badly needs legislative help in the short run. The 
normal excess property procedure would require the GSA to sell the 
plant for fair market value. The problem is that no local entity can 
afford the plant, which has an original cost of $4.2 million. The plant 
itself is not now healthy enough in a business sense to finance its own 
acquisition by a new management team. My amendment's provision that the 
GSA may convey the plant without consideration is therefore vital to 
the plant's ability to make a successful transition from Government 
contracts to commercial operations.
  I would like to stress to my colleagues that the Rolla community, the 
State of North Dakota, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa, and the 
local business community have been working hard to ensure that the 
plant makes a successful transition to the private sector. The local 
community is united behind the plan to transfer the plant to the Job 
Development Authority of the city of Rolla. Under my amendment, the 
authority will be able to lease the plant for economic development 
purposes. The intent of the amendment is to provide both flexibility 
for commercializing the plant and 

[[Page S 12604]]
accountability to the Federal Government for the plant's future.
  Mr. President, to sum up, I would simply say to my colleagues that 
this amendment tries to give a helping hand to the Langer plant and the 
city of Rolla, while relieving the Federal Government of a facility 
that it no longer needs.
  I understand that the amendment will be accepted unanimously, and I 
thank the managers on both sides, Senators Thurmond and Nunn, and the 
senior Senator from Ohio, Senator Glenn, for their support of this 
amendment, as well as their staffs for their assistance with this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes the administrator 
of the General Services Administration to convey the William Langer 
Jewel Bearing Plant, 9.77 acres of real property, to the city of Rolla, 
ND. DOD declared the property in excess to its needs in July. GSA 
conducted a screening of the property and found there are no other 
Federal interests in the facility. I believe this has been cleared on 
the other side.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this particular amendment has the support 
of this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2459) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2460

   (Purpose: To authorize a land exchange, U.S. Army Reserve Center, 
                            Gainesville, GA)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2460.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 487, below line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 2838 LAND EXCHANGE, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE CENTER, 
                   GAINESVILLE, GEORGIA.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Army may convey to 
     the City of Gainesville, Georgia (in this section referred to 
     as the ``City''), all right, title, and interest of the 
     United States in and to a parcel of real property (together 
     with any improvements thereeon) consisting of approximately 
     4.2 acres located on Shallowford Road, in the City of 
     Gainesville, Georgia.
       (b) Consideration.--As consideration for the conveyance 
     authorized by subsection (a), the City shall--
       (1) convey to the United States all right, title, and 
     interest in and to a parcel of real property consisting of 
     approximately 8 acres of land, acceptable to the Secretary, 
     in the Atlas Industrial Park, Gainesville, Georgia;
       (2) design and construct on such real property suitable 
     replacement facilities in accordance with the requirements of 
     the Secretary, for the training activities of the Unites 
     States Army Reserve;
       (3) fund and perform any environmental and cultural 
     resource studies, analysis, documentation that may be 
     required in connection with the land exchange and 
     construction considered by this section;
       (4) reimburse the Secretary for the costs of relocating the 
     United States Army Reserve units from the real property to be 
     conveyed under subsection (a) to the replacement facilities 
     to be constructed by the City under subsection (b)(2). The 
     Secretary shall deposit such funds in the same account used 
     to pay for the relocation;
       (5) pay to the United States an amount as may be necessary 
     to ensure that the fair market value of the consideration 
     provided by the City under this subsection is not less than 
     fair market value of the parcel of real property conveyed 
     under subsection (a); and
       (6) assume all environmental liability under the 
     Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
     Liability Act (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)) for the real property to be 
     conveyed under subsection (b)(1).
       (c) Determination of Fair Market Value.--(1) The 
     determination of the Secretary regarding the fair market 
     value of the real property to be conveyed pursuant to 
     subsection (a), and of any other consideration provided by 
     the City under subsection (b), shall be final.
       (d) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the parcels of real property to be conveyed 
     under subsections (a) and (b) shall be determined by surveys 
     satisfactory to the Sectretary. The cost of such surveys 
     shall be borne by the City.
       (e) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require any additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the coneyances under this section that the Secretary 
     considers appropriate to protect the interest of the United 
     States.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes the Secretary of 
the Army to convey 4.2 acres of real property at an Army Reserve 
facility in Gainesville, GA, in exchange for an 8 acres of land in the 
Atlas Industrial Park, Gainesville, GA. The exchange is for fair market 
value.
  I believe this has been cleared. It is an important amendment to the 
people in Gainesville, GA, as well as to the Army Reserve, which is 
going to get a larger piece of land and also a new reserve facility in 
exchange for an existing piece of land at fair market value.
  I urge its adoption.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment has the support of this 
side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2460) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my understanding is that we will not 
conclude the list of amendments which have been agreed to. We will 
finish that in the morning. Among those will be one by the Senator from 
Virginia that relates to the spent nuclear fuel issue. I will, 
beforehand--I repeat, beforehand--have contacted Senators Kempthorne 
and Craig for their views. Today, I received a series of telephone 
calls, and it was explained that negotiations are still going on with 
the Governor of Idaho.
  Also, I must say to my colleagues that this is an issue of very 
serious concern to the U.S. Navy, because it is impacting on the future 
refueling of our naval ships and consequently impacts on their 
deployment. It also impacts on the rotation of work among the several 
shipyards in handling the refueling and other naval work.
  Therefore, I am hopeful that this can be worked out satisfactorily 
between the administration and the State of Idaho and the U. S. 
Department of Defense. But I am concerned that the progress thus far 
leaves this Senator--and I just speak for myself--somewhat 
disheartened. Therefore, I will continue to monitor and address this 
issue. I may have further remarks on it tomorrow after consultation 
with my colleagues, the Senators from that State. But I wish to alert 
Senators of the concern of this Senator on this matter.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe that amendment is being worked on 
by staff. I think it is either worked out or very close to being worked 
out. So I anticipate that we will be in a position to deal with it 
tomorrow.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think we will turn to the conclusion of 
the Senate's business, unless the Senator has further comments. He is 
beating a hasty retreat. It is my lifetime opportunity to do what I 
want in the U.S. Senate.

                          ____________________