[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 136 (Tuesday, September 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12579-S12604]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1996 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction and for defense activities
of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths
for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Georgia.
Amendment No. 2425
(Purpose: To amend subtitle C of title II of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe there is an amendment, No. 2425,
which is an amendment to the Missile Defense Act, pending at the desk.
I ask that amendment be reported.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] for himself, Mr.
Warner, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Cohen, proposes an amendment
numbered 2425.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 49, strike out line 15 and all that follows through
line 9 on page 69 and insert the following in lieu thereof:
Subtitle C--Missile Defense
SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Missile Defense Act of
1995''.
SEC. 232. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The threat that is posed to the national security of
the United States by the proliferation of ballistic and
cruise missiles is significant and growing, both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
(2) The deployment of effective Theater Missile Defense
systems can deny potential adversaries the option of
escalating a conflict by threatening or attacking United
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States forces, coalition partners of the United States, or allies of
the United States with ballistic missiles armed with weapons
of mass destruction to offset the operational and technical
advantages of the United States and its coalition partners
and allies.
(3) The intelligence community of the United States has
estimated that (A) the missile proliferation trend is toward
longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles, (B)
North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile
capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 5 years, and (C)
although a new indigenously developed ballistic missile
threat to the continental United States is not forecast
within the next 10 years there is a danger that determined
countries will acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in
the near future and with little warning by means other than
indigenous development.
(4) The deployment by the United States and its allies of
effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges,
as well as against cruise missiles, can reduce the incentives
for countries to acquire such missiles or to augment existing
missile capabilities.
(5) The Cold War distinction between strategic ballistic
missiles and nonstrategic ballistic missiles and, therefore,
the ABM Treaty's distinction between strategic defense and
nonstrategic defense, has changed because of technological
advancements and should be reviewed.
(6) The concept of mutual assured destruction, which was
one of the major philosophical rationales for the ABM Treaty,
is now questionable as a basis for stability in a multipolar
world in which the United States and the states of the former
Soviet Union are seeking to normalize relations and eliminate
Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
(7) Theater and national missile defenses can contribute to
the maintenance of stability as missile threats proliferate
and as the United States and the former Soviet Union
significantly reduce the number of strategic nuclear forces
in their respective inventories.
(8) Although technology control regimes and other forms of
international arms control can contribute to
nonproliferation, such measures alone are inadequate for
dealing with missile proliferation, and should not be viewed
as alternatives to missile defenses and other active and
passive defenses.
(9) Due to limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude
deployment of more than 100 ground-based ABM interceptors at
a single site, the United States is currently prohibited from
deploying a national missile defense system capable of
defending the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii
against even the most limited ballistic missile attacks.
SEC. 233. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) deploy as soon as possible affordable and operationally
effective theater missile defenses capable of countering
existing and emerging theater ballistic missiles;
(2)(A) develop for deployment a multiple-site national
missile defense system that: (i) is affordable and
operationally effective against limited, accidental, and
unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of
the United States, and (ii) can be augmented over time as the
threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited,
accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats;
(B) initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as
necessary to provide for the national missile defense systems
specified in section 235; and
(C) consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, subject to
consultations between the President and the Senate;
(3) ensure congressional review, prior to a decision to
deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph
(2), of: (A) the affordability and operational effectiveness
of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such a
system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to
such a system;
(4) improve existing cruise missile defenses and deploy as
soon as practical defenses that are affordable and
operationally effective against advanced cruise missiles;
(5) pursue a focused research and development program to
provide follow-on ballistic missile defense options;
(6) employ streamlined acquisition procedures to lower the
cost and accelerate the pace of developing and deploying
theater missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, and
national missile defenses;
(7) seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not
feature mutual assured destruction and an offense-only form
of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability; and
(8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of
subtitle C of title II of this Act through processes
specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which
anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to
the Treaty.
SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Establishment of Core Program.--To implement the policy
established in section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall
establish a top priority core theater missile defense program
consisting of the following systems:
(1) The Patriot PAC-3 system, with a first unit equipped
(FUE) in fiscal year 1998.
(2) The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system, with a user
operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal
year 1997 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in
fiscal year 1999.
(3) The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system,
with a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability
in fiscal year 1997 and an initial operational capability
(IOC) no later than fiscal year 2002.
(4) The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system, with a user
operational evaluation system (UOES) capability in fiscal
year 1999 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in
fiscal year 2001.
(b) Interoperability and Support of Core Systems.--To
maximize effectiveness and flexibility, the Secretary of
Defense shall ensure that core theater missile defense
systems are interoperable and fully capable of exploiting
external sensor and battle management support from systems
such as the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC), the Army's Battlefield Integration Center (BIC),
air and space-based sensors including, in particular, the
Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS).
(c) Termination of Programs.--The Secretary of Defense
shall terminate the Boost Phase Interceptor (BPI) program.
(d) Follow-On Systems.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall
develop an affordable development plan for follow-on theater
missile defense systems which leverages existing systems,
technologies, and programs, and focuses investments to
satisfy military requirements not met by the core program.
(2) Before adding new theater missile defense systems to
the core program from among the follow-on activities, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report describing--
(A) the requirements for the program and the specific
threats to be countered;
(B) how the new program will relate to, support, and
leverage off existing core programs;
(C) the planned acquisition strategy; and
(D) a preliminary estimate of total program cost and
budgetary impact.
(e) Report.--(1) Not later than the date on which the
President submits the budget for fiscal year 1997 under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report detailing the Secretary's plans for
implementing the guidance specified in this section.
(2) For each deployment date for each system described in
subsection (a), the report required by paragraph (1) of this
subsection shall include the funding required for research,
development, testing, evaluation, and deployment for each
fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 through the end
of the fiscal year in which deployment is projected under
subsection (a).
SEC. 235. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.
(a) In General.--To implement the policy established in
section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall develop an
affordable and operationally effective national missile
defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or
unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable
of attaining initial operational capability (IOC) by the end
of 2003. Such system shall include the following:
(1) Ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at
multiple sites, the locations and numbers of which are to be
determined so as to optimize the defensive coverage of the
continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against
limited, accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile
attacks.
(2) Fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors,
including the Space and Missile Tracking system, the mix,
siting and numbers of which are to be determined so as to
optimize sensor support and minimize total system cost.
(3) Battle management, command, control, and communications
(BM/C3).
(b) Interim Operational Capability.--To provide a hedge
against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile threats
against the United States and to support the development and
deployment of the objective system specified in subsection
(a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop an interim
national missile defense plan that would give the United
States the ability to field a limited operational capability
by the end of 1999 if required by the threat. In developing
this plan the Secretary shall make use of--
(1) developmental, or user operational evaluation system
(UOES) interceptors, radars, and battle management, command,
control, and communications (BM/C3), to the extent that such
use directly supports, and does not significantly increase
the cost of, the objective system specified in subsection
(a);
(2) one or more of the sites that will be used as
deployment locations for the objective system specified in
subsection (a);
(3) upgraded early warning radars; and
(4) space-based sensors.
(c) Use of Streamlined Acquisition Procedures.--The
Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and use streamlined
acquisition procedures to--
(1) reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of
developing the national missile defense system specified in
subsection (a); and
(2) ensure that any interim national missile defense
capabilities developed pursuant to subsection (b) are
operationally effective and on a path to fulfill the
technical requirements and schedule of the objective system.
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(d) Additional Cost Saving Measures.--In addition to the
procedures prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the
Secretary of Defense shall employ cost saving measures that
do not decrease the operational effectiveness of the systems
specified in subsections (a) and (b), and which do not pose
unacceptable technical risk. The cost saving measures should
include the following:
(1) The use of existing facilities and infrastructure.
(2) The use, where appropriate, of existing or upgraded
systems and technologies, except that Minuteman boosters may
not be used as part of a National Missile Defense
architecture.
(3) Development of systems and components that do not rely
on a large and permanent infrastructure and are easily
transported, emplaced, and moved.
(e) Report on Plan for Deployment.--Not later than the date
on which the President submits the budget for fiscal year
1997 under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report containing the following matters:
(1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this section.
(2) For each deployment date in subsections (a) and (b),
the report shall include the funding required for research,
development, testing, evaluation, and deployment for each
fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 through the end
of the fiscal year in which deployment is projected under
subsection (a) or (b). The report shall also describe the
specific threat to be countered and provide the Secretary's
assessment as to whether deployment is affordable and
operationally effective.
(3) An analysis of options for supplementing or modifying
the national missile defense architecture specified in
subsection (a) before attaining initial operational
capability, or evolving such architecture in a building block
manner after attaining initial operational capability, to
improve the cost-effectiveness or the operational
effectiveness of such system by adding one or a combination
of the following:
(A) Additional ground-based interceptors at existing or new
sites.
(B) Sea-based missile defense systems.
(C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
(D) Space-based directed energy systems.
SEC. 236. CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall undertake
an initiative to coordinate and strengthen the cruise missile
defense programs, projects, and activities of the military
departments, the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to ensure that the
United States develops and deploys affordable and
operationally effective defenses against existing and future
cruise missile threats.
(b) Actions of the Secretary of Defense.--In carrying out
subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that--
(1) to the extent practicable, the ballistic missile
defense and cruise missile defense efforts of the Department
of Defense are coordinated and mutually reinforcing;
(2) existing air defense systems are adequately upgraded to
provide an affordable and operationally effective defense
against existing and near-term cruise missile threats; and
(3) the Department of Defense undertakes a high priority
and well coordinated technology development program to
support the future deployment of systems that are affordable
and operationally effective against advanced cruise missiles,
including cruise missiles with low observable features.
(c) Implementation Plan.--Not later than the date on which
the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1997 under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a detailed plan, in unclassified and classified
forms, as necessary, for carrying out this section. The plan
shall include an assessment of--
(1) the systems that currently have cruise missile defense
capabilities, and existing programs to improve these
capabilities;
(2) the technologies that could be deployed in the near- to
mid-term to provide significant advances over existing cruise
missile defense capabilities, and the investments that would
be required to ready the technologies for deployment;
(3) the cost and operational tradeoffs, if any, between
upgrading existing air and missile defense systems and
accelerating follow-on systems with significantly improved
capabilities against advanced cruise missiles; and
(4) the organizational and management changes that would
strengthen and further coordinate the cruise missile defense
efforts of the Department of Defense, including the
disadvantages, if any, of implementing such changes.
SEC. 237. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible
changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on
the provisions of this treaty''.
(2) Articles XIII and XIV of the ABM Treaty establish means
for the Parties to amend the Treaty, and the Parties have
employed these means to amend the Treaty.
(3) Article XV of the ABM Treaty establishes the means for
a party to withdraw from the Treaty, upon 6 months notice,
``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests.''
(4) The policies, programs, and requirements of subtitle C
of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes
specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which
anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to
the Treaty.
(b) Sense of Congress.--In light of the findings and
policies provided in this subtitle, it is the sense of
Congress that--
(1) given the fundamental responsibility of the Government
of the United States to protect the security of the United
States, the increasingly serious threat posed to the United
States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile technology, and the effect this threat
could have on the options of the United States to act in a
time of crisis--
(A) it is in the vital national security interest of the
United States to defend itself from the threat of a limited,
accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack,
whatever its source; and
(B) the deployment of a national missile defense system, in
accord with section 233, to protect the territory of the
United States against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized
missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and
deterrence; and
(2)(A) the Senate should undertake a comprehensive review
of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty with
the intent of provided additional policy guidance on the
future of the ABM Treaty during the second session of the
104th Congress; and
(B) upon completion of the review, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, in consultation with the Committee on Armed
Services and other appropriate committees, should report its
findings to the Senate.
SEC. 238. PROHIBITION ON FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT AN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT CONCERNING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
SYSTEMS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994 provides that the ABM Treaty does not
apply to or limit research, development, testing, or
deployment of missile defense systems, system upgrades, or
system components that are designed to counter modern theater
ballistic missiles, regardless of the capabilities of such
missiles, unless those systems, system upgrades, or system
components are tested against or have demonstrated
capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.
(2) Section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 provides that the United States shall
not be bound by any international agreement that would
substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is
entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the
President under the Constitution.
(3) The demarcation standard described in subsection (b)(1)
is based upon current technology.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) unless a missile defense system, system upgrade, or
system component, including one that exploits data from
space-based or other external sensors, is flight tested
against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of
3,500 kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second,
such missile defense system, system upgrade, or system
component has not been tested in an ABM mode nor deemed to
have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic
missiles, and
(2) any international agreement that would limit the
research, development, testing, or deployment of
missile defense systems, system upgrades, or system
components that are designed to counter modern theater
ballistic missiles in a manner that would be more
restrictive than the criteria in paragraph (1) should be
entered into only pursuant to the treaty making powers of
the President under the Constitution.
(c) Prohibition on Funding.--Funds appropriated or
otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 1996 may not be obligated or expended to
implement an agreement with any of the independent states of
the former Soviet Union entered into after January 1, 1995
that would establish a demarcation between theater missile
defense systems and anti-ballistic missile systems for
purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the
performance, operation, or deployment of United States
theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent
provided in an act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to
implement that portion of any such agreement that implements
the criteria in subsection (b)(1); or (3) to implement any
such agreement that is entered into pursuant to the treaty
making power of the President under the Constitution.
SEC. 239. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM ELEMENTS.
(a) Elements Specified.--In the budget justification
materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department
of Defense budget for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1996
(as submitted in the budget of the President under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code), the amount
requested for activities of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization shall be set forth in accordance with the
following program elements:
(1) The Patriot system.
(2) The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system.
(3) The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
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(4) The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system.
(5) Other Theater Missile Defense Activities.
(6) National Missile Defense.
(7) Follow-On and Support Technologies.
(b) Treatment of Non-Core TMD in Other Theater Missile
Defense Activities Element.--Funding for theater missile
defense programs, projects, and activities, other than core
theater missile defense programs, shall be covered in the
``Other Theater Missile Defense Activities'' program element.
(c) Treatment of Core Theater Missile Defense Programs.--
Funding for core theater missile defense programs specified
in section 234, shall be covered in individual, dedicated
program elements and shall be available only for activities
covered by those program elements.
(d) BM/C3I Programs.--Funding for programs, projects, and
activities involving battle management, command, control,
communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I) shall be covered in
the ``Other Theater Missile Defense Activities'' program
element or the ``National Missile Defense'' program element,
as determined on the basis of the primary objectives
involved.
(e) Management and Support.--Each program element shall
include requests for the amounts necessary for the management
and support of the programs, projects, and activities
contained in that program element.
SEC. 240. ABM TREATY DEFINED.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``ABM Treaty''
means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972,
and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow
on July 3, 1974.
SEC. 241. REPEAL OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROVISIONS.
The following provisions of law are repealed:
(1) The Missile Defense Act of 1991 (part C of title II of
Public Law 102-190; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
(2) Section 237 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
(3) Section 242 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
(4) Section 222 of the Department of Defense Authorization
Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 613; 10 U.S.C. 2431
note).
(5) Section 225 of the Department of Defense Authorization
Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 614).
(6) Section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180; 101 Stat.
1057; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
(7) Section 8123 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-463; 102 Stat. 2270-
40).
(8) Section 8133 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1992 (Public Law 102-172; 105 Stat.
1211).
(9) Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1595; 10
U.S.C. 2431 note).
(10) Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2701; 10
U.S.C. 221 note).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 3 hours of debate scheduled on this
amendment, 2 for the Senator from Georgia, 1 for the Senator from South
Carolina.
The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need at
this point, and I do not intend to make long remarks at this point to
give each of my colleagues a chance to lay down their views and to make
their remarks on this amendment, which is a very important amendment.
Then I will conclude with other remarks as we proceed through this
debate.
Mr. President, at the request of the majority and minority leaders,
Senators Cohen, Levin, Warner, and I spent the better part of the week
preceding the August recess meeting intensively addressing issues
raised by the proposed Missile Defense Act of 1995, as set forth in S.
1026, the pending Defense authorization bill.
The goal of our effort was to develop an amendment establishing a
missile defense policy that could be supported by a broad bipartisan
group of Senators. On Friday, August 11, we filed a bipartisan
substitute amendment reflecting our best efforts to meet the objective,
and I hope that all Members have had an opportunity during the recess
to review this bipartisan amendment.
I want to express my thanks to my three colleagues, Senator Warner,
Senator Cohen, and Senator Levin, for the diligence, tolerance, and
good will each of them showed throughout the long and at times very
difficult negotiations that occurred over a very intensive period of
about a week that led to the agreement embodied in the substitute
amendment that is now reported and pending.
I believe the amendment is a significant improvement to the version
in the bill, and I support its adoption.
Mr. President, the revised version of the Missile Defense Act of
1995, if passed in this amendment as set forth in this substitute,
serves three very important functions. First, it clarifies the intent
of the United States with respect to decisions about future missile
defenses. Second, it diffuses a potential constitutional contest and
confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. And,
third, it makes clear to the international community our policy toward
the ABM Treaty.
Under the bipartisan substitute, the policy is no longer stated as a
binding commitment to deploy a missile defense system. That is a
decision that will be made in the future. Instead, the national missile
defense policy, and section 232 of this substitute, is to ``develop for
deployment.'' The substitute adds several important qualifiers such as
the system must be ``affordable and operationally effective.'' This
requirement appears in section 232 and is reemphasized throughout the
amendment. And the system is limited to addressing only ``accidental,
unauthorized or limited attacks.'' That qualification, which is set
forth in section 232, is repeated throughout the amendment.
One of the most important qualifications under the substitute is the
requirement in section 2333 for ``congressional review, prior to a
decision to deploy the system, of development or deployment of (a) the
affordability and operational effectiveness of such a system, (b) the
threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM Treaty
considerations with respect to such a system.''
These vital issues will all be considered before we take a step in
the future to authorize and appropriate funds for deployment of a
national missile defense system.
Mr. President, perhaps the most important qualification, both in
terms of arms control and the separation of powers, is section 2338,
which requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out the policies,
programs, and requirements of the entire Missile Defense Act ``through
processes specified within or consistent with the ABM Treaty which
anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the
treaty.''
Mr. President, finally, let me address the theater missile
demarcation provision briefly. Section 238 of the bill as reported
would have established in permanent law a specific demarcation between
theater and strategic missile defenses and would have prohibited the
President from negotiations or other actions concerning the
clarification or interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the line between
theater and strategic missile defenses. The bipartisan substitute
amendment strikes all of section 238 and provides in the bipartisan
substitute a limited funding restriction with the following provisions
concerning the demarcation or the definitional distinction between
theater and national missile defenses.
First, the funding restriction applies only to fiscal year 1996.
Second, this substitute restriction applies only to the
implementation of agreement with the successor states in the Soviet
Union, should one be reached, concerning a demarcation between theater
and strategic defenses for the purposes of the ABM Treaty and
additional restrictions on theater missile defenses going beyond those
in the demarcation.
In addition to being limited to 1 year, the substitute funding
limitation in section 238 has three exceptions. The limitation does not
apply ``to the extent provided in a subsequent act'' to implement that
portion of any such agreement that implements specific terms of the
demarcation set forth in the amendment, to implement an agreement that
is entered into pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President
under the Constitution.
Mr. President, there are many other changes that improve the overall
thrust of this subject matter in the bipartisan substitute. I believe
that the bipartisan substitute amendment provides a useful statement of
congressional policy and is intended to be presented in a framework
that makes clear that we seek a negotiated set of changes with the
Russian Federation
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to allow for more effective defenses against limited missile attacks
than either side is permitted today.
I believe the bipartisan substitute amendment is not, and should not
be seen by Russia as, a threat by the United States either to abandon
the ABM Treaty or to reinterpret a treaty unilaterally to our
advantage. Both we and Russia face the threat of ballistic missile
attacks. It is not simply the United States; it is also Russia. The
threats may be somewhat different, but the need for defenses should be
clear to both sides.
What we have to do is arrange for both sides to be able to deploy
more effective defenses than in use today against accidental,
unauthorized, and limited attacks while maintaining overall strategic
stability and while making it plain that neither side seeks to combine
offensive capability with defensive capability thereby giving either
side what has for years been feared as a first-strike capability. Some
people use that term in connection and synonymously with the term
``strategic stability.'' Some people use the term ``strategic
stability'' in a broader context.
But, nevertheless, it is my view that, if we are going to proceed to
enjoy the benefits of 20 years of work and negotiations to reduce
nuclear weapons under the treaties that have been entered into, like
the START I Treaty or treaties now pending like the START II Treaty, it
is very important that both sides understand that strategic stability
is being maintained, that neither side is intending to combine
offensive striking power with defensive abilities so that either side
would be tempted at any point in the future--whatever developed--to
develop anything resembling a first-strike capability.
That is the scenario that the ABM Treaty was originally designed to
prevent. It has some relevance today. But it needs changing in some
very important but modest aspects.
Mr. President, it is important that whatever we do with defenses--and
I favor going forward with both the theater missile system and also a
national missile system against limited and unauthorized attacks and
third-country attack--whatever we do we should make sure that we
continue to carry out the reductions of the armaments that have been
most threatening against the United States for the last 20 years, the
heavy missiles. And those missiles are part of both START I and START
II reductions.
It is enormously important that we not send signals to the Russian
Parliament, the Russian leadership, to the Russian people that they in
any way should fear for their own security and that they, therefore,
should not go forward with the reductions of the missiles that they
have either agreed to or that are pending in the START II agreement.
Mr. President, that is what this is all about. I know there will be
some who will agree with the changes. There will be some who may not
agree with the changes. But this does represent the best effort that
Senator Levin and I on the Democratic side, together with Senator
Warner and Senator Cohen on the Republican side, were able to put
together in an effort to achieve these goals that I have enumerated.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. NUNN. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. I will later address this pending amendment. But I would
like to ask a question of my distinguished colleague. I think we
concur, the four of us, Senator Thurmond, Senator Cohen, myself, and
Senator Levin and also our distinguished ranking member. It would be my
hope that the Senator from Georgia would have an opportunity to make
some assessment as to how the administration views this amendment. I
wondered if the Senator would share with the Senate what he has.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia that I talked to Secretary
of Defense Perry about this amendment, and I think it is fair to say
that he believes it is a dramatic improvement over the original
version.
I would not be able to portray to the Senator from Virginia that I
conveyed this or that I have discussed it in any kind of detail with
the White House. And I cannot give any message about how they view
either this authorization bill or the appropriations bill which was
passed. There are a number of other areas that do not concern this that
have been of concern to the White House and the Secretary of Defense,
including, in the bill we just passed, the appropriation bill, the
elimination of some very important funding that the Secretary of
Defense had undertaken under the Nunn-Lugar program for working to
reduce the Russian military establishment.
That is a concern to Secretary Perry; it also is a concern to me,
that funding was eliminated both in the appropriations bill in the
House and Senate. But as far as this particular provision is concerned,
I have no doubt that Secretary Perry feels it is a great improvement,
and I would assume, without having directly talked with the President
about it, that he would also view it in that way.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague, but I
hope the administration would view this as an effort to reconcile
important differences and that it is a work product worthy of support
by the Senate and by the administration.
Mr. NUNN. It is also my hope that would be their view. I would say to
my friend, I know there are other provisions in this bill and the
appropriations bill that concern both the White House and the Secretary
of Defense. So I can make no statement here that indicates their
feeling on the overall product we now have. I am sure they will be
heard from as we move into conference.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. Thurmond addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to support the bipartisan missile
defense amendment which was worked out prior to the August recess.
While I continue to believe that the missile defense provisions in
the bill reported to the Senate by the Armed Services Committee are
sound and reasonable, I also agree that the compromise is a positive
step away from the status quo.
The compromise amendment does not include everything that I wanted,
but it does not fundamentally undermine any of the policies or
initiatives that I viewed as critical. In my view, it is an adequate
position to take to conference. The House defense authorization bill
differs in several ways from the Senate compromise missile defense
amendment. Obviously, there will be considerable discussion before a
consensus is reached between the two Chambers.
Let me again thank all those who worked so hard prior to the August
recess. And I especially wish to thank Senator Warner, Senator Cohen,
Senator Nunn, and Senator Levin. Also, let me thank the leaders for
their cooperation.
Finally, I would like to draw to the attention of the Senate an
article by the Republican leader, Senator Dole, in today's Washington
Times which addresses the subject of missile defense. This is an
excellent piece for which I commend the Republican leader. I ask
unanimous consent that a copy of the article be printed in the Record
following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. THURMOND. In closing, Mr. President, let me once again urge my
colleagues to support the bipartisan compromise on missile defense. It
is a positive step that all Members should be able to endorse.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
A Timely Reminder From Iraq
(By Robert Dole)
When Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and former chief of mass
destruction bolted, apparently threatening to tell all, the
Iraqi director preempted and sent us the loudest wake-up call
we are likely to get on the growing threat of weapons of mass
destruction. As we finish up the Department of Defense
Authorization Bill, it's time to heed that call.
According to their belated admission, the Iraqis filled
nearly 200 bombs and warheads for ballistic missiles with
botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and aflatoxin. In addition to
the shockingly advanced nuclear weapons program already
revealed, Iraq now says it ran a second program to develop a
nuclear weapon by April 1991 with material diverted from
nuclear power reactors.
[[Page S 12584]]
The latest revelations from Baghdad underscore four points.
First, arms control treaties and export controls did not
prevent Iraq from pursuing its deadly aims. Don't get me
wrong--diplomatic efforts increase the cost, time and
technical challenge required to acquire weapons to mass
destruction. We should press on with them. The point is
simply that diplomacy does not prevent malevolent countries
like Iraq from acquiring these weapons and there are a number
of countries of Iraq's ilk out there.
Second, Iraq managed to conceal a good part of its
activities from the rest of the world, even after post-Gulf
War U.N. sanctions made it the most inspected country on
earth. Clearly, absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence. The lesson is that we no longer have the luxury of
waiting for our intelligence bureaucracy to gather reams of
evidence before ``validating'' a threat. Our own defense
programs need to start anticipating emerging threats.
Third, what makes these weapons truly menacing is the
prospect of their delivery with ballistic missiles, which
allow countries that never before wielded such power to vault
themselves onto the world stage. Imagine trying to put
together the coalition for Desert Storm if Cairo, Ankara,
Rome or London had believed they were vulnerable to missiles
loaded with anthrax. And let's not forget that the United
States and its key allies may soon be a target. In just three
to five years, the North Korean Taepo-Dong II
intercontinental ballistic missile could reach American soil.
Those lacking in imagination about what that implies
should recall the words of Saddam Hussein: ``Our missiles
cannot reach Washington. If they could reach Washington,
we would strike it if the need rose.''
Fourth, the Clinton administration and its allies hobble
America's missile defense efforts by clinging to the 1972 ABM
Treaty with the now defunct Soviet Union. They have even
tried to drag our theater missile defense programs, never
covered by the ABM Treaty, under new limits that the
administration has hatched from ever-burgeoning
interpretations of that treaty.
It's time to defend ourselves in the multipolar world of
the 21st century. It's time to change the regime established
by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which currently leaves the American
people vulnerable to missile attack from any country capable
of developing or buying a long-range missile, I think there
are ways we can cooperate with Russia on missile defenses,
but that is partly up to them. Our job on the defense bill is
to lay out what is necessary for America's defense. We now
have a defense bill which takes important steps in that
direction.
First, it establishes a Cruise Missile Defense Initiative,
the need for which was just underscored by Iraq's admission
that it was experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles,
cousins of the cruise missile, to deliver biological agents.
Second, it establishes a theater missile defense ``core
program'' to ensure that we stay focused and move toward
deployment of those systems that are clearly needed as soon
as possible, adding the crucial Navy Upper Tier system to the
core. This system will allow our Navy to take missile
defenses wherever in the world American interests are
threatened.
Third, it precludes arms control zealots from dragging
theater missile defense systems which are not covered by the
ABM Treaty into a web of new limitations. It calls for a year
of careful consideration on how to proceed with the ABM
Treaty in the longer term. During that time, the president
should seek to negotiate with Russia a mutually beneficial
agreement that will allow the United States to proceed with
its multiple-site deployments.
Most important, it establishes U.S. policy to develop for
deployment by 2003 ground-based interceptors at multiple
sites, fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors for
a defense of the United States of America.
Mr. President, it's time to defend America.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. President, let me thank Senator Thurmond for his confidence in
asking Senator Warner and me to represent the Republican side in the
negotiations with Senator Nunn and also Senator Levin.
The four of us have enjoyed working together over our years of
service on the Armed Services Committee, and it was a special privilege
for me to be able to sit down for hours and hours, well into the night,
in fact, on several occasions, working from at least 5 in the afternoon
until midnight on at least two occasions, but the issues that were
involved were serious. They required that kind of attention to detail.
Notwithstanding some of the comments that were made earlier today by
some of our colleagues, words do make a difference. Poets are not the
only individuals who pinch words until they hurt. Arms controllers do
as well.
Words within the field of arms control carry specific meaning, and it
was very important that we took great care as we tried to hammer out a
compromise between our respective positions, in making sure that we
would not do damage to longstanding precedents and longstanding
interpretations. Notwithstanding the fact there has been some criticism
leveled at this bipartisan proposal, we believe the care which we have
taken to describe in some detail, with some great sensitivity, I might
add, the meaning of the words that were used, carries significant
implications for arms control and national security.
We have to remind our colleagues again and again we are not seeking
to rekindle the debate over star wars, some sort of astrodomic system
that is going to hover over the United States and protect this county
from an all-out assault from the former Soviet Union or any major power
that may emerge in the future. We could not do that. We do not envision
that. We agree, in light of the proliferation of missile technology
that we are agreed upon, that there is a grave danger of missile
technology proliferating at an ever and ever faster rate that poses a
threat to the United States, also to the former Soviet Union. They also
should have great concern about the proliferation of this kind of
technology.
How do we quantify it? How great is that threat? I do not think any
of us are in a position to make a judgment. But we do not want to be in
the position 3 or 4 or 5 years down the road of having some accidental
launch, an unauthorized launch, or a limited attack against the United
States and all the President of the United States could do would be to
tell the people targeted: ``Sorry, we will do the best to clean up the
thousands if not millions of dead after the missile hits. We have no
means of protecting you. And, yes, we understand what 5 o'clock traffic
is in Washington, New York, and every major city and the chances are
you will not be able to get out of the city on 30 minutes' notice, and
so all we can do is hope to minimize the slaughter that will take place
by sending in our rescue teams, assuming they survive the blast.''
That is an untenable position, and so we have to have some means of
defending against these types of limited, accidental, or unauthorized
launches, and there should be no dissent on that. This is not a matter
of partisanship. There is no dissent that we need to have that
capability.
In June, when the Armed Services Committee marked up the Defense
authorization bill, the committee voted to put the United States on the
path to deployment of a highly effective system to defend the American
people against limited missile attacks.
Because we want to and must defend all Americans, not just those in a
particular region of the country, we called for a multiple-site
defense. And, because we can expect the threat to evolve to become ever
more sophisticated, we called for a defensive system that would also
evolve and a research-and-development program to provide options for
the future. Since the National Missile Defense Program approved by the
committee goes beyond that being pursued by the administration, we
added $300 million above the $371 million requested.
We also called for deployment of highly effective systems to defend
our forward deployed forces and key allies and, to ensure this result,
reorganized the administration's theater missile defense effort. A
related matter involved negotiations being conducted with Moscow to
define the line distinguishing TMD from ABM systems.
Over the last year and a half, the Clinton administration has drifted
toward accepting Russian proposals to limit TMD systems in unacceptable
ways--in effect, to subject TMD systems to the ABM Treaty, which was
never intended to cover theater defenses. The committee addressed this
troubling situation with two steps. First, we voted to write into law
the Clinton administration's initial negotiating position on what
constitutes an ABM system. And second, we adopted
[[Page S 12585]]
bill language to prevent the administration from implementing any
agreement that would have the effect of applying ABM Treaty
restrictions to TMD systems.
Last month, when the Defense authorization act came to the floor, the
committee's judgment was challenged. One amendment was offered to
delete the additional $300 million provided for national missile
defense. And another amendment was offered eliminate the policy to
deploy a multiple-site national defense system, eliminate the statutory
demarcation between TMD and ABM systems, and eliminate the ban on
applying the ABM Treaty to TMD systems.
As was the case during the committee's mark-up, these efforts failed
in relatively close votes.
Mr. President, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since 1979
and have spent some of that time in the majority. It has not been our
practice for the majority to use its position to impose its views on
the minority. Instead, we have usually sought to develop as broad a
consensus as possible on important issues of national security.
In this spirit, Members of the majority also offered amendments on
the floor to move beyond close, partisan votes toward a broader
consensus.
Senator Kyl offered an amendment expressing ``the sense of the Senate
that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or
limited ballistic missile attack.'' His amendment setting forth this
basic principle, which was the basis for the Armed Services Committee's
action, was approved overwhelming, 94-5.
And to address the concerns of some Senators that the committee was
advocating abrogation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment
affirming that the multiple-site defense we endorsed can be deployed in
accordance with mechanisms provided for in the ABM Treaty--such as
negotiating an amendment--and urging the President to negotiate with
Moscow to obtain the necessary treaty amendment. My amendment was also
approved by a very large margin, 69-26.
I highlight that vote margin because the bipartisan amendment we have
negotiated would change even the language of the Cohen amendment, which
was adopted overwhelmingly by the full Senate. I think this is a clear
indication of how far the majority has been willing to go in
accommodating the minority in order to build a broader consensus.
the bipartisan amendment
The result of the negotiations that have occurred is the bipartisan
amendment, which is being cosponsored by the four Senators designated
by the two leaders to attempt to resolve this issue. In order to reach
agreement on this amendment, both sides made concessions, although it
should be noted that many of the agreed upon changes are less
concessions than clarifications of the Armed Services Committee's
intent.
Senators interested in this matter can read the bipartisan amendment
and compare it to current text of the bill. Our negotiations involved
debate over almost every single word in subtitle C. For reasons of
time, I will merely try to summarize the most important issues.
missile defense policy
In section 233, which addresses missile defense policy, we have made
a number of changes to clarify the intent of the committee's language.
The bipartisan text states that ``it is the policy of the United
States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile
defense system.'' The difference with the original text is that it
substitutes the words ``develop for deployment'' for the word
``deploy.''
This change is consistent with the fact that what we are funding in
this bill is research and development on national missile defense, not
procurement. There will be a number of authorization and appropriations
bills to be acted upon before we begin to fund the actual deployment of
the system. I would note that the words ``develop for deployment'' were
in the committee-approved bill, in the NMD architecture section, and so
this clarification is consistent with the committee's intent.
Moreover, I would emphasize that the policy section clearly states--
as did the committee bill--that the system we are pursuing is a
multiple-site system. As the findings make clear, a multiple-site
system is essential if we are to defend all of the United States and
not just part of the country. This is also made clear in the NMD
architecture section, which states that the system must be optimized to
defend all 50 States against limited, accidental, or unauthorized
ballistic missile attacks.
This is further bolstered by the new language inserted by the
compromise at various places that the system must be ``affordable and
operationally effective.'' An NMD system confined to a single ground-
based site would not be operationally effective, as noted in the ninth
finding.
The bipartisan text also states in the policy section that the NMD
system will be one that ``can be augmented over time as the threat
changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or
unauthorized ballistic missile threats.'' This passage was of great
importance to many Members on this side who are concerned about the
ability of the system to remain effective in the face of an evolving
threat.
The committee-approved language stated that the NMD system ``will be
augmented over time to provide a layered defense.'' There were strong
feelings on our side about the words ``will be augmented.'' In the end,
we agreed to change this to ``can be augmented.'' Again, while the
committee's language had much to commend it, funding for deployment of
other defensive layers will not be appropriated for several years.
The other changes to this passage, such as the inclusion of the words
``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' clarify the ballistic missile
threat for which a layered defense would be required, reflect the
intent of the committee's bill.
At the suggestion of the other side, a new paragraph was added to the
policy calling for congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy
the NMD system. This is fully consistent with the committee's intent
and the realities of the congressional budget process. Funds to begin
deployment of the NMD system are not in the bill before the Senate.
Thus, when such funds are requested, that request will pass through the
regular process of committee hearings and mark-ups, floor
consideration, and conference action.
Another change to the policy section was the inclusion of several
portions of the amendment that I offered and that was approved by the
Senate last month. This states that it is U.S. policy to ``carry out
the policies, programs and requirements of (the Missile Defense Act of
1995) through processes specified within, or consistent with the ABM
Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment
to the Treaty.''
It also states that it is United States policy to initiate
negotiations with the Russian Federation as necessary to provide for
the NMD systems specified in the NMD architecture section. At the
urging of Congress in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, President Bush
initiated such negotiations with Moscow.
It is my understanding that tentative agreement was reached to
provide for the deployment of ground-based multiple-site NMD systems.
But the Clinton administration discontinued those negotiations. Under
this legislation, it would be U.S. policy to once again engage Moscow
in negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty or otherwise allow for
multiple-site NMD systems.
The policy section then states that ``it is the policy of the U.S. to
* * * consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing
from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of
the Treaty, subject to consultations between the President and the
Senate.''
I would note that both amendment to the treaty, as provided for in
articles XIII and XIV, and withdrawal from the treaty, as provided for
in article XV, are ``processes specified within the ABM Treaty.''
Contrary to the concerns of some, the Armed Services Committee never
advocated abrogation of the treaty and the bill reported out by the
committee neither required nor supported abrogation. The debate that
took place during the committee mark-up made it clear that there was
absolutely no intent to abrogate.
These provisions regarding the ABM Treaty and negotiations with
Moscow
[[Page S 12586]]
taken from the Cohen amendment and incorporated into the bipartisan
amendment reaffirm what was always the intent of the committee.
Mr. President, I want to emphasize that these provisions and the
other language in the section 233 clearly state that these policies are
``the policy of the United States.'' Not the policy of the Senate or
the policy of the Congress. I say this because I have heard that an
administration official has said that, once this bill becomes law, the
administration will declare that these statements of U.S. policy are
not its policy but merely the sense of the Congress.
The bill makes a clear distinction between statements of U.S. policy
and expressions of the sense of Congress. We have spent a great deal of
effort negotiating exactly what statements will fall into the policy
section and which will be in the form of sense of the Congress. In
fact, these negotiations began with Senator Nunn urging that the Cohen
amendment be strengthened from being the sense of the Congress to a
statement of U.S. policy.
Mr. President, I would merely note the obvious fact that once the
bill becomes U.S. law, then the bill's statements of policy are U.S.
policy.
nmd architecture
The bipartisan amendment also provides changes and clarifications in
section 235, regarding the architecture of the national missile defense
system.
The committee's bill stated that the NMD system ``will attain initial
operational capability by the end of 2003.'' The bipartisan amendment
states that the NMD system will be ``capable of attaining initial
operational capability by the end of 2003.'' This is a useful
clarification because while Congress can mandate many things, we cannot
dictate with certainty that engineers will accomplish specific tasks
within a specific period of time.
Section 235 also states that the NMD ``system shall include * * *
ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at multiple sites,
the locations and numbers of which are to be determined so as to
optimize the defensive coverage of the continental United States,
Alaska, and Hawaii against limited, accidental, or unauthorized
ballistic missile attacks.'' The committee's version of this provision
was identical except that the bipartisan amendment inserted the words
``capable of being.''
I found this suggestion from the other side to be acceptable because
I do not think it really changes the meaning of the original text.
Interceptors are inherently ``capable of being deployed at multiple
sites.'' I cannot conceive of any technical reason that an interceptor
would be incapable of being deployed at multiple sites. Accordingly,
``capable of being deployed at multiple sites'' does not, as far as I
can tell, in any way limit the NMD system proposed by the committee.
Indeed, one could argue that the only way that ground based
interceptors are ``capable of being deployed at multiple sites'' is if
there are multiple sites.
So, I am pleased that this change helped to produce a bipartisan
resolution to this matter, even if I cannot find any substantive result
of this change.
In subsection (b) of section 235, our side did make a concession. The
committee's bill directed the Secretary of Defense ``to develop an
interim NMD capability to be operational by the end of 1999.'' In order
to achieve agreement with the other side, we have modified this to
require the Secretary ``to develop an interim NMD plan that would give
the U.S. the ability to field a limited operational capability by the
end of 1999 if required by the threat.'' In both versions, the interim
capability would have to not interfere with deployment of the full up
NMD system by 2003.
Mr. President, I would also note that the bipartisan amendment
retains the portion of section 235 that calls for a report by the
Secretary of Defense analyzing ``options for supplementing or modifying
the NMD system by adding one or a combination of sea-based missile
defense systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, or space-
based directed energy systems.'' As I discussed earlier, such options
for layered defenses are of considerable interest to many Members.
To summarize, Mr. President, the bipartisan amendment both clarifies
and changes the committee bill's provisions on national missile
defense. It keeps us on the path toward a ground-based, multiple-site
NMD system with options for layered defenses as the threat changes. But
it recognizes that requests for NMD procurement funds will not be made
for several years.
tmd demarcation
The other issue that required much discussion was what is commonly
referred to as the theater missile defense demarcation question. I
would like to summarize the resolution that was achieved in section
238, which was completely rewritten with the assistance of many
Senators.
The section has findings noting that the ABM Treaty ``does not apply
to or limit'' theater missile defense systems. The findings also note
that ``the U.S. shall not be bound by any international agreement that
would substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is
entered into pursuant to the treaty making powers of the President
under the Constitution.'' What this means is that any agreement that
would have the effect of applying limits on TMD systems under the ABM
Treaty must be approved as a treaty by the Senate.
Section 238 then states the sense of Congress that a defensive system
has been tested in an ABM mode, and therefore is subject to the ABM
Treaty, only if it has been tested against a ballistic missile target
that has a range in excess of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity in excess
of 5 kilometers per second. This threshold is the one defined by the
administration and proposed in its talks with Moscow on this subject.
Finally, section 238 has a binding provision that prohibits
implementation during fiscal year 1996 of an agreement with the
countries of the former Soviet Union that would restrict theater
missile defenses. This prohibition would not apply to the portion of an
agreement that implements the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-per-second
criteria nor to an agreement that is approved as a treaty by the
Senate.
But it would apply to all portions of an agreement that sought to
impose any restrictions other than the 3,500 kilometer or 5-kilometer-
per-second criteria. Various other potential restrictions have been
discussed, such as limits on the number of TMD systems or system
components, geographical restrictions on where TMD systems can be
deployed, restrictions on the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles, and
restrictions on the volume of TMD interceptors missiles. Under section
238 of the bipartisan amendment, during fiscal year 1996, the
administration is barred from implementing any of these potential
restrictions or any other restrictions on the performance, operation,
or deployment of TMD systems, system components, or system upgrades.
At the same time, Mr. President, there are no constraints on the
ability of the President to engage in negotiations on the demarcation
issue, which I know was an issue of concern to some. What section 238
controls is the implementation of any restrictions on TMD systems.
Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the efforts of the many Senators
who contributed to the drafting of this amendment. Every member of the
Armed Services Committee played a role, as did the two leaders, and key
Senators off the committee. Senator Kyl played a very constructive
role, offering language that formed the basis for the resolution on
section 238 and providing useful suggestions on the NMD portions of the
bill. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is to be especially
commended for providing strong guidance to the negotiators and the
committee, as a whole, and facilitating the talks along the way.
I want to commend Senator Nunn, once again, and Senator Levin and
Senator Warner for the many, many hours that were spent negotiating
over specific words. As I mentioned before, words matter a great deal
when we are talking about arms control.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could take a minute.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator
from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I just want to take 30
seconds to thank my distinguished colleague from
[[Page S 12587]]
Maine. He ended up on a very important note, ``use of words.'' I can
assure you, when we were sitting around, time and time again, we
referred to him as the master craftsman for the use of words, the
placement of a comma and the prose that flows. Make no mistake about
that. If this thing ever has to go to court, it is your fault.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields the Senator time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Michigan such time
as he may desire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Within reason.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if we can get a parliamentary interpretation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is exactly 1 hour and 50 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I definitely thank the Chair, and I think I thank my
friend from Georgia.
Mr. President, first let me echo the words of those who have already
spoken about the process just for a minute. The four of us have worked
together now many, many years in this Senate, particularly on the Armed
Services Committee, but on other matters as well. We know each other,
like each other a great deal, respect each other as individuals and
also for the depths of our beliefs and our feelings.
It was a true pleasure to work with Senators Nunn, Warner and Cohen
as we crafted this substitute. There is a lot in here representing each
of us. Most important, I believe this substitute reflects a wise course
relative to national missile defense.
I agree fully with what Senator Warner just said about Senator Cohen.
No one is a greater crafter of words around this place than Senator
Cohen. He is not just a poet, but he is a writer of fiction as well,
and some darned good nonfiction, too.
Mr. President, first, I want to start with what the law currently is.
There is a lot of misconception, I think, in this body about what the
current law is relative to national missile defense. We are not
starting with a clean slate here called a bill and then adding a
substitute for consideration by the Senate. We are starting with an
existing law on national missile defense, then there is a bill, then
there is a substitute.
The existing law already provides that it is a goal of the United
States to develop the option to deploy an antiballistic missile system
that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United
States against limited attacks from ballistic missiles.
So that is the ground on which we are starting, that we already have
in law a goal of the United States to develop the option to deploy this
national missile defense system that we are talking about.
The bill that is before us, to which many of us had strong
objections, goes way beyond saying that we should develop an option to
deploy and then at some future time decide whether to exercise the
option. The bill that we have before us says that we ``shall deploy''
and that is what gets us into great difficulty. It gets us into great
difficulty in terms of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the deployment
of certain systems, antiballistic missile systems, at multiple sites.
The section of the bill before us, section 233, says that it is ``the
policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-site national missile
defense system.''
No ifs, no ands, no buts. That is the policy of the United States in
the bill. The trouble with that is we have a number of impediments to
that policy being a wise one. We have the question of what the threat
is, what the cost effectiveness is, what the military effectiveness of
such a system is, and we have an agreement with the Russians called the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which President Nixon entered into and
which has helped to create some major stability in the relationship
between the two countries when there was a cold war. And now that the
cold war is over, we must figure out how to deal with a new Russia who
is a partner, a friend, an ally hopefully, not an adversary of the
United States.
When the bill says that we will deploy a system which the ABM Treaty
says we cannot, what the bill does is set us on a course of action
which is not only unwise but is reckless.
We received letters from both General Shalikashvili, who is our
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary Perry, in strong opposition to the bill because of what it
does to the ABM Treaty but, most important, because of the jeopardy in
which it places the Start II Treaty that we are hoping to ratify. That
treaty will reduce significantly the number of nuclear warheads on both
sides, and that is really the issue.
The issue here is the impact of the action of the Senate on the
reduction of offensive nuclear weapons which threaten us. Surely it is
not in our national interest to be trashing an agreement relative to
antiballistic missile systems if, by undermining that agreement, we are
then going to end up facing thousands more warheads on ballistic
missiles which Russia would insist on keeping if we unilaterally pull
out of the ABM Treaty. That is why General Shalikashvili said:
While we believe that START II is in both countries'
interest, regardless of other events, that we must assume
that unilateral U.S. legislation could harm prospects for
START II ratification by the Duma and probably impact our
broader security relationship with Russia as well.
That letter was dated June 28, 1995.
And in a letter dated July 28, 1995, Secretary Perry said:
Certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be very
damaging to U.S. security interests. By mandating actions
that would lead us to violate or disregard U.S. treaty
obligations, such as establishing a deployment date of a
multiple-site NMD system, the bill would jeopardize Russian
implementation of the START I and START II treaties which
involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic
nuclear weapons.
We tried to modify the language in the bill pursuant to the amendment
process prior to the recess. We tried to strike language which
committed us to a course of action which would, by violating the ABM
Treaty, jeopardize the reductions in the numbers of offensive nuclear
weapons on the side of the Russians. We failed to do that by a couple
votes.
Let me put some numbers on this. If the Russians see us violating a
treaty which has allowed us to negotiate reductions in offensive
nuclear weapons, the likelihood is that we are going to face 8,000
Russian nuclear weapons instead of about 3,000. To put this in very
specific numbers, that is what we are talking about. That is what the
stakes are here, and that is why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretary of Defense expressed such grave doubts about
the language in this bill.
There were a number of problems which we confronted and which, we
hope, we resolved in a sensible way. One problem which was in the bill
which we have attempted to address was the unilateral declaration as to
what the dividing line is between theater missile defenses and
strategic missile defenses. It is clear that the ABM agreement does not
cover theater missile defenses. I think everybody would agree to that.
I think everyone would also agree, at least I hope they would, that
in the event of a substantial modification of the ABM Treaty, that the
President then must submit that modification to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification. As a matter of fact, this substitute
amendment refers to section 232 of the Fiscal Year 1995 National
Defense Authorization Act which provided exactly that. That is existing
law; it says that:
The United States shall not be bound by any international
agreement that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty
unless the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty-
making power of the President under the Constitution.
That is the law regardless of this bill. That is the law of the land.
You cannot substantially modify a treaty unless you get advice and
consent to ratification by the Senate, which previously approved that
treaty. That is the law, with or without our statute saying that. We
already have a statute which repeats that law, and we made reference to
that statute.
But unless this substitute language is adopted, the bill declares
what the dividing line is between these strategic and theater missile
defense systems, declares the specific dividing line and says to the
President in the bill, you cannot negotiate any other dividing line.
You cannot sit down with the
[[Page S 12588]]
Russians and come up with any dividing line between strategic and
theater missile defense systems other than the one we are unilaterally
declaring in this bill. That makes the Senate the negotiator, not the
President of the United States.
While we can advise and consent to ratification, we are not the party
that negotiates the treaty. It was a mistake in this bill to attempt to
put that dividing line between strategic missile defensive systems
covered by the ABM Treaty, and the theater missile defense systems not
covered, into law. We have corrected that. We have indicated what we
believe the correct dividing line is. We have now told the President,
in effect, that you are free to negotiate, but if you negotiate a
different demarcation, do not use the funds that we provide in the
appropriation bill to implement that without giving Congress the
opportunity to approve or to disapprove. That is very different. That
is strikingly different from what was in the bill itself.
Following these efforts to amend the language in the bill prior to
the recess, we entered into lengthy discussions at the request of the
majority leader and Senator Daschle, the Democratic leader. The four of
us spent many days, as has been outlined, in devising the substitute
which is before us. This substitute corrects the major defects and many
of the smaller defects in the original language. It basically returns
us to the approach in current law. The approach in current law is that
we want an option to deploy. We are not committed to deploy, but we
want an option.
The approach in the substitute is that we want to develop for
deployment a national missile defense system, but what we say in the
substitute is that we are not deciding to deploy that here and now.
That is very explicitly left to a later decision. We also say that
decision should follow consideration of a number of things: Cost
effectiveness, military effectiveness, the threat, and the impact on
the ABM Treaty. That is the vital difference between the bill's
language and the substitute.
In section 233 of the substitute, we explicitly state that the policy
of the United States is to develop for deployment a multiple-site
national missile defense system. And then we go into the ifs, ands, and
the buts. The bill said ``deploy''--no ifs, ands, or buts. The
substitute says ``develop for deployment'', but with these ifs, these
ands, and these buts. The critical ones, again, are to be cost
effective, militarily effective, consistent with the threat, and not
adversely affect the ABM Treaty, or at least, if we are going to decide
to deploy, do so in a way which is through processes that are specified
within or consistent with the ABM Treaty.
The critical language here is that we say explicitly that it is the
policy of the United States to ``ensure congressional review prior to a
decision to deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph
2 of (a) the affordability and operational effectiveness of such a
system, (b) the threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM
Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.''
Mr. President, again, I want to thank our colleagues for their long
and very arduous discussions. It has produced a substitute which I can,
in good conscience, support, because we have removed the objectionable
language in the bill which committed us to deploy a system which, by
violating the ABM Treaty, would have almost certainly led to our facing
thousands of more offensive nuclear warheads than we otherwise would be
facing. We have attempted to carry out the thoughts of General
Shalikashvili and his caution to us about the importance of our
relationship with Russia and trying to maintain it in a stable way and
not to be unilaterally declaring that we are going to abrogate
agreements we have entered into with their predecessor. We have done so
in a bipartisan way. I hope that we have done so in a constructive and
a thoughtful way which will command the broad support of Members of
this body.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a
number of documents, including the letters referred to from General
Shalikashvili, Secretary Perry, a side-by-side comparison of the bill
and the substitute language relative to the ABM Treaty, as well as a
further amplification of my statement.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: I write to register my strong opposition
to the missile defense provisions of the SASC's Defense
Authorization bill, which would institute Congressional
micromanagement of the Administration's missile defense
program and put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM Treaty.
The Administration is committed to respond to ballistic
missile threats to our forces, allies, and territory. We will
not permit the capability of the defenses we field to meet
those threats to be compromised.
The bill's provisions would add nothing to DoD's ability to
pursue our missile defense programs, and would needlessly
cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks.
The bill would require the US to make a decision now on
developing a specific national missile defense for deployment
by 2003, with interim operational capability in 1999, despite
the fact that a valid strategic missile threat has not
emerged. Our NMD program is designed to give us the
capability for a deployment decision in three years, when we
will be in a much better position to assess the threat and
deploy the most technologically advanced systems available.
The bill would also terminate valuable elements of our TMD
program, the Boost Phase Intercept and MEADS/Corp SAM
systems. MEADS is not only a valuable defense system but is
an important test of future trans-Atlantic defense
cooperation.
In addition, certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty
would be very damaging to US security reasons. By mandating
actions that would lead us to violate or disregard US Treaty
obligations--such as establishing a deployment date of a
multiple-site NMD system--the bill would jeopardize Russian
implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, which
involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic
nuclear weapons. The bill's unwarranted imposition, through
funding restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation
interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions,
and would raise significant international legal issues as
well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the
President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.
These serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed
Senate review of the ABM Treaty before considering such
drastic and far-reaching measures.
Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly
modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national
security interests of the United States. I will continue to
do everything possible to work with the Senate to see that
these priorities are not compromised.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
____
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, June 28, 1995.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin. Thank you for your letter and the
opportunity to express my views concerning the impact of
Senator Warner's proposed language for the FY 1996 Defense
Authorization Bill on current theater missile defense (TMD)
programs.
Because the Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty
with other arms control issues--particularly ratification of
START II now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would
deal in isolation with unilateral US legislation detailing
technical parameters for ABM Treaty interpretation. While we
believe that START II is in both countries' interests
regardless of other events, we must assume such unilateral US
legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification by
the Duma and probably impact our broader security
relationship with Russia as well.
We are continuing to work on TMD systems. The ongoing
testing of THAAD through the demonstration/validation program
has been certified ABM Treaty compliant as has the Navy Upper
Tier program. Thus, progress on these programs is not
restricted by the lack of a demarcation agreement. We have no
plans and do not desire to test THAAD or other TMD systems in
an ABM mode.
Even though testing and development of TMD systems is
underway now, we believe it is useful to continue discussions
with the Russians to seek resolution of the ABM/TMD issue in
a way which preserves our security equities. Were such
dialogue to be prohibited, we might eventually find ourselves
forced to choose between giving up elements of our TMD
development programs or proceeding unilaterally in a manner
which could undermine the ABM Treaty and our broader security
relationship with Russia. Either alternative would impose
security costs and risks which we are seeking to avoid.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
[[Page S 12589]]
Missile Defense Act of 1995: Substitute Amendment
Side-by-side comparison of the Missile Defense Act in S.
1026 and the substitute amendment of August 10, 1995.
sec. 233. policy
The bill asserted that the policy of the U.S. was:
To ``deploy a multiple site'' national missile defense
system that ``will be'' augmented to provide a larger defense
in the future.
The substitute amendment has as the policy:
To develop for deployment a national missile defense system
that can be augmented.
To negotiate with Russia to provide for such a system,
based on the ABM Treaty.
To consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.
The purpose of the system is to defend only against
limited, accidental and unauthorized missile attacks.
A new provision in the substitute amendment states the
policy that:
Congress shall review the affordability, the operational
effectiveness and the threat to be countered by the national
missile defense system, and ABM Treaty considerations, prior
to deciding whether to deploy the system.
The last new policy provision:
To carry out the policies, programs and requirements of the
Missile Defense Act through processes specified in or
consistent with the ABM Treaty.
sec. 234. theater missile architecture
The bill requires the Pentagon to meet certain dates for
the specified programs.
The substitute amendment:
Relaxes the requirement to meet those dates,
Requires a report for each program/date explaining the cost
and technical risk of meeting those dates,
And requires a report on the specific threats to be
countered by each TMD system.
sec. 235. national missile defense architecture
The Bill requires the Pentagon to develop a national
missile defense system which will be operational first in
2003. It requires the system to include ground-based
interceptors ``deployed at multiple sties''.
The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a
national missile defense system that is capable of being
first operational by the end of 2003. It states that the
system shall include ground-based interceptors capable of
being deployed at multiple sites.
Interim capability: The bill required the Pentagon to
develop an interim capability to be operational by 1999.
The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a
plan instead of a capability, and that it would give the U.S.
the ability to have such an interim capability in place by
1999 if required by the threat.
The substitute amendment also requires a report that would
include information on the cost of the program, the specific
threat to be countered, and the Defense Secretary's
assessment of whether deployment is affordable and
operationally effective.
sec. 237. policy regarding the abm treaty
The Bill has sense of Congress language that:
The Senate should conduct a review of the ABM Treaty.
The Senate should consider establishing a Select Committee
to conduct the review, and
The President should cease all efforts to ``modify,
clarify, or otherwise alter'' our obligations under the ABM
Treaty.
The Bill requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a
declassified record of the ABM Treaty negotiations.
The substitute amendment adds findings related to the ABM
Treaty, including that the policies, programs and
requirements of the Missile Defense Act can be accomplished
in accordance or consistent with the ABM Treaty.
The substitute amendment:
Strikes the proposal to establish a Select Committee.
Strikes the proposal that the President cease all efforts
to modify or clarify our obligations under the ABM Treaty.
Strikes the entire provision calling for a declassified
treaty negotiating record.
States that the Foreign Relations and Armed Services
committees should conduct the review of the Treaty.
Sec. 238. Prohibition on Funds to Implement a TMD Demarcation Agreement
The Bill:
States the policy that ``unless and until'' a missile
defense system is tested against a target missile with a
range greater than 3,500 km or a velocity greater than 5 km
per second, it has not been tested ``in an ABM mode'' nor
``been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic
missiles'' (both of which are prohibited by the ABM Treaty),
and therefore is not subject to ABM Treaty application or
restrictions.
Prohibits any appropriated funds from being obligated or
expended by any official of the federal government to apply
the ABM Treaty to TMD systems, or for ``taking any other
action'' to have the ABM Treaty apply to TMD systems. (This
would prevent any discussion or negotiation by federal
officials with the Russians to consider any other demarcation
than the one specified in the bill.)
The substitute amendment strikes Sec. 238 and replaces it
with:
Two findings that restate items from previous Acts.
Sense of the Congress language defining the TMD demarcation
(3,500 km/ 5kps), and stating that unless a TMD system is
tested above the demarcation threshold, the system has not
been tested in an ABM mode, nor deemed to have been given
capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles''.
Sense of Congress language saying that any agreement with
Russia that would be more restrictive than the demarcation
provided should require ratification.
Binding prohibition on funding: FY 96 DOD funds cannot be
used to implement a demarcation agreement unless: provided in
a subsequent act (majority vote), or if the agreement goes
through the ratification process.
Mr. LEVIN. Again, I thank my good friends from Georgia, Virginia, and
Maine for their hard work. I thank the chairman for his support of this
effort, and I thank, also, Senator Daschle, who has spent so much time
on this effort to make sure that we come up with a solution which
satisfies the basic principles that we set out to achieve.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the able Senator
from Virginia, Senator Warner.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. COHEN. Would the Senator from Virginia be willing to delete from
the Record the depositing of any legal responsibility on my doorstep?
Mr. NUNN. I will object to any such deletion, Mr. President. I think
the responsibility is clearly established.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think that brief exchange underlines
what has been said by all of my colleagues preceding me regarding the
four of us having been associated now more than 17 years together on
this committee, under the tutelage of Senators like Senator Thurmond,
Senator Stennis, Senator Tower, and Senator Jackson. These were great
teachers. We had the opportunity to learn from them. I hope that today
in our service to the Senate as members of this committee, we can
achieve some of the goals that those great Senators contributed to
legislation for the national security of the United States.
Mr. President, as I listened to these remarks, it occurs to me that
if we were walking down Main Street America today and we were to be
stopped and questioned by any of our constituents, candidly, I say to
the Senate, they would think this system is in place today.
It is inconceivable after the billions and billions and billions of
dollars we have spent on our national defense over the last, really,
two decades, that a series of Presidents and a series of Congresses
have not put in place for the basic protection of the American citizen
something to interdict the accidental or unintended firing of an
intercontinental missile.
This is not star wars. I will ask unanimous consent, Mr. President,
to have printed in the Record following my remarks an article that
appeared today in the Washington Post, in which I and other Members
were interviewed to talk about this particular piece of legislation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. WARNER. It took me some time to try to get home to the reporter,
and indeed I think he grasped it rather readily, that the biggest
burden we had is to overcome the lingering apprehension that what we
are doing in this amendment is laying the foundation for another star
wars program. That is not the case. It is a very limited defense. It is
precisely as described by those who have spoken previously, a system
for limited purposes.
It is in the interest of the former Soviet Union, and particularly
Russia, that this be put in place because should an accidental firing
occur, perhaps the first focus of attention would be turned to Russia.
I am hopeful that this technology that will be developed could be used
by Russia to install their own system. We do not fear in this country
Russia putting in a system comparable to this. It is in the mutual
benefit of both nations to have such a system.
I am happy to have joined with my colleagues. Someone mentioned it is
like the old four horsemen getting together once again to resolve a
situation which for a period of time appeared to be unresolvable.
I want to say that Senator Cohen and I particularly value the advice
and
[[Page S 12590]]
counsel we received from the distinguished chairman of the committee,
Senator Thurmond, Senator Lott, Senator Smith, and Senator Kyl. Each of
these Senators have spent a number of years studying this question.
Particularly in the House, Senator Kyl was well known for his knowledge
on this subject. He was particularly helpful in the course of our
negotiations.
Prior to taking the position Senator Cohen and I worked up with our
colleagues to its final stage, Senator Thurmond convened the full Armed
Services Committee. Every single member was present. They looked it
over very carefully. Then we sat down and finalized it with our
distinguished colleagues and friends of long standing, the Senator from
Georgia and the Senator from Michigan.
It is a significant step forward. I was extremely heartened tonight
when Senator Nunn said he had an opportunity to speak with the
Secretary of Defense. I think this Nation is fortunate to have such a
fine man as Secretary Perry to take on that heavy and, indeed in many
respects, thankless responsibility. This is an area in which he has
worked for many, many years. All four of us that negotiated this have
worked with the Aspen Institute when he was one of the leaders of that
discussion forum, and we covered many times--many times--issues
relating to the intercontinental missile systems, the deterrence, and
the several treaties. Given his background, I hope that he can be
persuasive to the President and other members of the administration so
that this amendment can be accepted. Indeed, not only accepted, but
perhaps supported.
Neither side gained everything they want. That is the essence of a
negotiation. The result of this effort is a Missile Defense Act of
1995, a substitute for the original one in the bill which sets a clear
path for deployment. That is the way I would like to state it--a clear
path to deployment.
We in the United States cannot--particularly the legislative branch
of Government--dictate that a certain system will be deployed. Frankly,
we do not even know that it will work, we say with considerable candor.
The technology is unfolding so rapidly, we do not know exactly whether
it can work.
There is also a very serious element of the cost associated with this
system. These are things that have to be worked out in the future. But
we have set, in this amendment, the United States of America on a clear
path of deployment. Let there be no mistake about that, no wavering--I
can certainly speak for this side of the aisle--no wavering of the
intents of the present composition of the U.S. Senate on this side of
the aisle as to the ultimate goal of deploying such a system.
Why? Because it is in the mutual interests of ourselves and Russia
and other nations of the world; and secondly, the American public not
only demands it, they think it is its place right now. They would
expect no less of a President or series of Presidents and a series of
Congresses.
In the course of our deliberations, there were many concerned with
the issue of why now? Why must we press this on now? If we start
tonight on developing this system, it might well be to the year 2003 or
later--7, 8, 9, 10 years--before the system can be developed; that is,
research and development completed and in place to protect the American
citizen--perhaps a decade.
In the same period of time, there are estimates that those nations
apart from Russia and our allies who particularly want to develop for
themselves the missile system, they will have in all likelihood systems
of their own in place. Many of the nations that we fear most today have
this as a top agenda item, to build this type of system.
My point is, there is a coincidence in time of the defensive system
that we want to put in place and the offensive systems being developed
by other nations, call them rogue nations, who very much desire to
threaten the United States some day with a missile.
The revised Missile Defense Act of 1995 establishes a policy of
development for deployment of a multiple-site national missile defense
system capable of defending the United States--that is, from the
limited attack--and prohibits any final effort by the administration to
impose limitations without the consent of the U.S. Senate pursuant to
the Constitution of the United States on the development and deployment
of a U.S. theater missile defense system by virtue of new
interpretations of the ABM Treaty of 1972.
I was extremely heartened to hear my distinguished colleague from
Michigan say unequivocally that that treaty does not cover short-range
ballistic missile systems. That is important. I would rejoin by saying,
but the technology advances that have taken place since 1972 force now
this type of legislation which is intended to maintain an operation
between the theater systems and the intercontinental systems and
maintain that separation in a way that will not undermine the
fundamental goals of the ABM Treaty.
The principle focus of my remarks today is on the changes made to
section 238 of the Missile Defense Act of 1995. That is a section that
I worked on as a member of the Armed Services Committee and an
amendment which I put forth in that committee which was eventually
incorporated into the bill as now written. And that amendment of mine
is being revised by this amendment, which is the subject of the
discussion for the moment.
As it originally appeared in my amendment, section 238 used the
Senate's power of the purse to impose a broad and absolute prohibition
on the administration's ability to take any action which imposed ABM
Treaty restrictions on the development and deployment of theater
missile defense systems. These systems are urgently needed to protect
the lives of the men and women of the armed services and our allies in
their forward-deployed situations.
How well we know that. Senator Nunn recounted, in the course of our
last debate, how Senator Nunn, Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and I
were in Tel Aviv when the last Scud missile fell and we saw firsthand
the use of that system, not for military purposes but for purposes of
sheer terrorism. Saddam Hussein leveled that system on Tel Aviv for no
other purpose than to terrorize those people. The Patriot, as best it
could--the best defense we had at that period of time--I think in a
credible manner interdicted a number of those missiles. That is why we
are here tonight to lay the foundation to move ahead in the technology
so that we can employ all of the brains, all the technology without any
restriction imposed by the ABM Treaty on developing the future systems
to interdict the short-range ballistic missiles that were encountered
during the gulf war.
The bipartisan amendment, which we urge the Senate to adopt, achieves
our goal, namely to prohibit the administration from implementing any
agreement with Russia which would impose limitations including
performance, operation or deployment limitations on theater missile
systems unless the Senate exercised, pursuant to a Presidential
submission of such agreement, its constitutional right of advice and
consent.
The 1972 ABM Treaty never intended, never envisioned the theater
systems. I was in the Department of the Navy at that time. I was in
Moscow in 1972, when ABM was signed, as a part of President Nixon's
delegation. My duties then were related primarily to naval matters, but
all of us in the Department of Defense watched with great interest how
this treaty, the ABM Treaty, was developed.
Dr. John Foster, who was then the Director of Research and
Development in the Pentagon, was one of the key individuals. I recently
consulted him about his recollection with respect to the ABM Treaty,
and he confirmed what I believed was true then, as I do today, that the
negotiators never had in mind the theater systems which we must employ
now in our defense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask if I may have a few more minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator may
require for further debate.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman.
As I said before the Senate went on recess, during the original
debate on this amendment, I have long believed that we must accelerate
the development and then the deployment of operationally effective
theater missile systems for our troops, defenses that are not
improperly constrained by the
[[Page S 12591]]
ABM Treaty. This amendment does that. Likewise, we must, in the
interests of the American people, make a clear statement of our
national determination to proceed to a national defense system to
protect against the threats enunciated in this bipartisan amendment.
The threat that theater missiles propose to our forces is clear.
Thirty nations have short-range theater ballistic missile systems, and
more and more each day are acquiring the same capability.
The gulf war should have caused all Americans to unite behind the
missile defense effort. What can be more terrifying than the thought of
U.S. citizens, both at home and deployed overseas, defenseless against
this type of weapon of terror, once used by Saddam Hussein, and which
could be used in the future by others. Yet, here we are, 5 years after
that conflict in the gulf, and our troops are still not adequately, in
my judgment, protected from ballistic missile attacks. And there are
those who still resist efforts to move forward in this area.
Fortunately, I think, as a result of this compromise, we now have
gained sufficient strength in the U.S. Senate to move this amendment
tomorrow in a positive way.
Mr. President, it became evident to me, earlier this year, that our
crucial effort to develop and deploy the most capable theater missile
defense systems was in danger of being unacceptably hampered by the
administration's desire to achieve a demarcation agreement with the
Russians. They were actively negotiating toward that goal. Several of
the negotiating positions either proposed or accepted by the
administration would have severely limited the technological
development of U.S. theater missile defense systems, and would have
resulted in an international agreement imposing major new limitations
on the United States. Consequently, I have taken actions in 1994 and
now in 1995 to prohibit such actions by the administration.
Mr. President, previously I have tried other avenues to have the
Senate's voice heard on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation. My preferred
option--and the one which I tried last year--was simply to require the
President to present to the Senate for advice and consent any
demarcation agreement which would substantially modify the ABM Treaty.
The Congress adopted my views and made them part of the fiscal year
1995 Defense Authorization Act.
However, despite that legal requirement, the administration has made
it abundantly clear that it does not intend to submit any such
demarcation agreement, pursuant to the Constitution, to the Senate for
advice and consent. Although the administration was negotiating an
agreement that would, in effect, make the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty,
administration officials believed that there was no need for the Senate
to exercise its constitutional right to provide advice and consent to
that agreement.
It was clear that a new approach was needed. Therefore, I focused on
the Congress' power of the purse to ensure that the views of the Senate
were considered in the demarcation negotiations.
The bipartisan missile defense amendment preserves this approach.
Section 238 prohibits the expenditure of funds for fiscal year 1996 to
implement an agreement that would establish a demarcation between
theater missile defense systems and ABM systems or that would restrict
the performance, operation or deployment of U.S. theater missile
defense systems, unless that agreement is entered into pursuant to the
treaty-making powers of the President, or to the extent provided in an
act subsequently enacted by the Congress. In other words, for the
coming fiscal year the prohibition stands unless the Senate takes an
affirmative act to change or remove that prohibition.
In addition, this provision establishes as a sense of the Congress
the generally accepted demarcation standard between TMD and ABM
systems. Section 238(b)(1) states that ``unless a missile defense
system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that
exploits data from space-based or other external sensors, if flight
tested against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of 3,500
kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second, such missile
defense system, system upgrade, or system component has not been tested
in an ABM mode nor deemed to have been given capabilities to counter
strategic ballistic missiles.'' This was the standard used by the
Clinton administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations
in November 1993. The administration would be well-advised to return to
that standard.
Mr. President, I would have preferred a prohibition that would have
remained in effect for more than 1 fiscal year. I would have preferred
a demarcation standard adopted in a binding form, rather than as a
sense of the Congress. But I believe that the essence of my original
amendment was preserved in this compromise package.
This legislation represents a significant step forward in the effort
to provide the men and women of the Armed Forces with the most
effective theater missile defense systems that our great nation is
capable of producing. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Finally Mr. President, I wish to acknowledge my special appreciation
and respect for Senator Cohen's very valuable contribution to the
negotiations leading up to the bipartisan amendment. We have worked
together for 17 years on the Armed Services Committee, and I value his
advise and counsel.
Exhibit 1
Congress to Push For a National Missile Defense
By Bradley Graham
Two years after the Clinton administration placed the
program on a back burner, Congress is about to redouble U.S.
efforts to build a national system against ballistic missile
attack, putting it at odds with the White House and at risk
of confrontation with the Kremlin.
Republicans leading the initiative stress their plan is not
a return to the ``Star Wars'' dream of President Ronald
Reagan, who envisioned a space-based shield that would make
the United States impenetrable to a massive launch of enemy
missiles. Rather, the stated aim now is to erect a more
modest, ground-based system that would protect the country
against accidental launch or limited attack at a time when
more nations are coming into the possession of ballistic
missiles.
But opponents regard even this scaled-back effort as
dubious technologically and not urgent strategically since
little immediate threat exists. They say the program is a
waste of the billions of dollars that the House and Senate
appear ready to pour into it over the next few years.
Moreover, administration officials worry that a hellbent
congressional effort to develop a missile defense system,
coupled with renewed Republican talk of undoing the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, will upset relations
with Moscow and scuttle the planned elimination of thousands
of nuclear warheads.
When the Senate returns from its August recess today, it is
scheduled to debate a compromise measure hammered out by a
four-man bipartisan group to avoid breaching the ABM Treaty
while still calling for accelerated development of a national
missile defense system.
In attempting to establish a policy that can be supported
by a broad majority of senators, however, the measure
effectively postpones the day of political reckoning between
proponents and opponents of a national system and between
Washington and Moscow.
The measure would direct the Pentagon to ``develop for
deployment'' a multisite missile defense system capable of
being operational by 2003. But the decision to deploy would
be put off until an unspecified time and subjected to
considerations of affordability, effectiveness, threat
assessment and treaty implications.
``I am not opposed to having an option to deploy providing
we don't move toward it in a hasty way,'' said Carl M. Levin
(D-Mich.), a liberal whose involvement in negotiating the
compromise was key. ``What I strongly oppose is doing it in a
way that would undermine the relationship with Russia and the
whole planned dismantlement of nuclear weapons.''
For the Republicans who won control of Congress last
November, revival of the missile defense issue seemed at
first a simple way of dramatizing their general appeal for a
stronger defense, while also addressing their real concern
about the growing number of rogue states with access to
ballistic missiles.
The GOP's ``Contract With America'' called for faster
deployment of a national missile defense system. Many
Republicans have sought to frame the political debate around
the fact that the United States has no system to fend off
even a single incoming ballistic missile. Opinion polls show
that most Americans are surprise to learn the country lacks
such a system.
But wrangles over the continued relevance of the ABM Treaty
have complicated the debate. So has a related dispute about
where to
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draw the line between a national defense system, which is covered by
the treaty, and increasingly powerful ``theater'' systems for
guarding against shorter-range missile attack, which do not
come under the treaty's purview.
The 23-year-old ABM pact was meant to block Washington and
Moscow from building nationwide defenses against ballistic
missile attack, on the premise that as long as each country
is vulnerable to the other's nuclear arsenal, neither will
attack the other. The accord allows each side to establish a
single-site system with no more than 100 interceptor
missiles.
Administration officials say the treaty remains a
cornerstone of international arms control efforts and
abrogating it would jeopardize plans to cut U.S. and Russian
nuclear arsenals to 3,000 warheads and possibly fewer
under strategic arms reduction treaties. Such arms control
agreements, not antimissile weapons systems, offer the
more reliable protection for U.S. interests, say missile
defense skeptics.
``No one will reduce their strategic forces if there's a
buildup in strategic defense,'' said Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr.,
director of the Arms Control Association. ``If we lose all of
this for a system that might kill only a handful of missiles,
it's madness. We'll soon find much of the Defense
Department's procurement budget going into this Fortress
America.''
But some key Republican players have questioned the
relevance of the ABM Treaty in today's security environment,
arguing that Cold War logic does not hold in a world no
longer dominated by U.S.-Soviet tensions and now menaced by
less familiar adversaries.
``Frankly, we think the ABM Treaty has to be renegotiated,
so I'm not too concerned about bumping up against it,'' said
Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.). ``We've pretty much established the
need to revise it, so we might as well face up to that.''
A month ago, Senate Republicans were backing language in
the 1996 defense authorization bill that required deployment
of a multisite missile defense system by 2003. Arguing that
such a move would violate the ABM Treaty, Democrats prepared
to filibuster and the Clinton administration threatened to
veto the bill if it passed.
After nearly a week of intensive talks in early August,
Sens. Levin, Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), John W. Warner (R-Va.) and
William S. Cohen (R-Maine) offered a compromise substitute
amendment--expected to win floor approval this week--that
promises to avert a showdown with the White House for now and
clear the way for passage of a defense authorization bill.
The measure reaffirms that U.S. policy is to act
consistently with the ABM Treaty but also approves
negotiations with the Russians on the admissibility of the
planned U.S. system. If those talks fail, the amendment
asserts, the United States can consider withdrawing from the
treaty.
The House already has approved a 1996 defense bill calling
for deployment ``as soon as practical'' of a national missile
defense system, without specifying the number of sites. And
both the House and Senate are proposing to add several
hundred million dollars to the Clinton administration program
in fiscal 1996 for work on a national missile defense system.
The Clinton administration is not opposed to developing a
system capable of protecting U.S. territory. It budgeted
nearly $400 million for 1996 to pursue technologies for a
ground-based system, beefing up the program a bit in view of
congressional interest to include a deployment contingency
early next century.
But when it took office in 1993, the administration
drastically reordered the priorities of the Pentagon's
missile defense effort, shrinking work on a national system,
renaming the supervising agency, and concentrating about 80
percent of the funds of what is now called the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization on fielding theater defense
systems to protect U.S. troops in combat zones abroad.
The rationale for the shift was the belief that the spread
of shorter-range ballistic missiles poses a more immediate
threat than the possibility of hostile nations developing
intercontinental missiles that can strike the United States.
Currently, more than 15 Third World nations have ballistic
missiles and 77 have cruise missiles, according to U.S.
intelligence reports. By contrast, only several former Soviet
states and China possess missiles capable of reaching the
continental United States, and the U.S. intelligence
community sees no new country developing the capability to
hit the United States with a long-range missile for the next
decade.
Administration officials also contend the likelihood of
accidental launch by Russia or China is decreasing due to the
elimination of many nuclear warheads in the former Soviet
states and more reliable command and control procedures for
Russian and Chinese forces. Moreover, they argue that with
rapid advances occurring in information technologies,
premature deployment of a U.S. system would limit the
technical options and risk saddling the United States with an
overly costly and quickly outdated system.
Other critics of a national system note that the country
has been trying off and on for several decades to build one,
without much success. More than $38 billion went into
Reagan's Star Wars program alone.
``People are talking as if we've never tried this before,''
said Stephen I. Schwartz, director of the Brookings
Institution's U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project. ``We
don't seem to learn from the fact that we spent a lot of
money before and didn't get much for it.''
But many Republican legislators worry the administration is
underestimating how quickly the threat of ballistic missile
attacks from rogue countries may materialize. They cite
development of North Korea's Taepo Dong-2 missile, capable of
reaching Alaska or parts of Hawaii, and the potential sale to
Third World countries of Russia's SS-25 as a space launch
vehicle.
In fact, the U.S. intelligence community has been slow to
provide a current estimate of the emerging missile threat to
the United States. Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, who heads the
Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said in an
interview that he has been waiting more than eight months for
an update measuring the degree of uncertainty in the U.S.
prediction.
Advocates of a national system, mindful of past failures to
achieve their dream, contend the technology is now within
reach.
``This is not Star Wars, this is not an umbrella system,''
asserted Warner, the Virginia senator. This is a bare bones
effort to build a system to intercept missiles launched
accidentally in limited number.''
Some of the more hawkish proponents still argue for a more
ambitious setup, criticizing the Pentagon's current focus on
ground-based interceptors. A study earlier this year by the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank recommended
concentrating instead on a Navy plan to deploy ship-based
interceptors within three or four years, and then move to a
space-based system by early in the next decade.
One area in which Republicans and Democrats generally agree
is on the need for effective theater missile defense systems,
with the GOP eager to add even more money to development
efforts there as well. But the growing sophistication of
theater systems, is posing an ABM Treaty problem.
Some of the theater systems under development by the
Pentagon may prove powerful enough to thwart ballistic
missiles, meaning the Russians may view them as a national
defense system and thus a circumvention of the ABM Treaty.
Administration efforts to negotiate with Moscow a
distinction between defenses against long-range strategic
missiles and short-range theater missiles have drawn
Republican concern that the administration may be willing to
accept too many limits on development of theater defenses,
particularly on the speed of interceptors.
Accusing the administration of trying to apply the ABM
Treaty to theater systems, Senate Republicans originally
moved to include in the 1996 defense bill a unilateral
declaration of the dividing line between strategic and
theater weapons and a ban on the president negotiating any
other demarcation.
Administration officials protested that a unilateral
interpretation of the demarcation line was unwarranted
because the ABM Treaty is not constraining theater programs,
and unwise because enactment would threaten ratification of
the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and set a
dangerous precedent.
The Senate compromise includes a nonbinding ``sense of
Congress'' provision reasserting what has been the
demarcation standard, which would exempt the Pentagon's
fastest, longest-range theater antimissile systems from ABM
coverage as long as they were not tested against a missile
with a range greater than 3,500 kilometers (or about 2,174
miles) or a velocity greater than 5 kilometers (about 3
miles) per second. But the measure also would permit the
president to negotiate an alternative demarcation line
between strategic and theater missiles, provided he sought
congressional ratification of any new agreement with Moscow--
a condition the administration has been reluctant to accept.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the bill as reported set forth the proposed
policy for future missile defense as outlined here on the floor this
evening. It also proposed the demarcation between theater and anti-
ballistic-missile defenses, and I am talking about the underlying bill,
not the substitute. In my judgment, however, and that of many other
Senators, the proposal addressed these vital issues in a manner that
unnecessarily presented major difficulties in terms of arms control and
constitutional considerations.
As Senator Levin pointed out so well, what we want to do is move
forward with a missile defense against limited, unauthorized, third-
country-type attacks, but what we do not want to do in the process of
trying to accomplish that goal, that important goal, we do not want to
end up inadvertently and unintentionally ending the reduction of
missiles pointing at us that have already been agreed to. It would be
the supreme irony if, in dealing with a future threat, we ended up
basically negating 20 years of efforts to reduce the current threat,
which is, of course, the continuation of very large numbers of
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multiwarhead missiles pointing at the United States by Russia, which we
have agreed to dramatically reduce both in START I, which has been
entered into, and START II, which is now pending and which we hope at
some point the Russian Duma, or legislative body, will, indeed, agree
to.
So, in my floor statement on August 3, I outlined five major problems
with the version of the bill that this substitute is intended to
correct and I believe does correct. This is the underlying bill.
First, I said on August 3, it abandons U.S. adherence to the ABM
Treaty. What I meant by that, and what I would mean by that now, is it
is an anticipatory breach, the way the original underlying bill is
worded.
Second, abandoning adherence to that ABM Treaty now is unnecessary.
We can conduct an effective missile defense program, developing for
deployment, as the substitute called for in the near term, while
continuing our adherence to the ABM Treaty. We do not have to make that
choice now. So why risk the very large reductions of the threat now
aimed toward us that are underway in order to accomplish a goal where
we do not have to make that move at this point in time?
Third, abandoning adherence now to the ABM Treaty is likely to impose
huge costs on us if Russia declines to carry out some of its legal
obligations and in response to our anticipatory breach.
Fourth, the Senate Armed Service Committee bill abandons adherence by
stealth rather than directing the administration to use the legal
withdrawal procedures contained in the treaty.
Mr. President, if we decide that the ABM Treaty is no longer in our
interest--we may get to that point at some point in the future because
we may find that we cannot negotiate the modest amendments required to
provide for this national defense. I hope that we can because I think
it is in the mutual interest of the United States and Russia. But if we
get to that point, then we ought to do what the ABM Treaty calls for,
and that is to use legal withdrawal proceedings in our national
interest, supreme national interest. Of course, we can do that. I
believe the timeframe is 6 months.
We have the right under that treaty to state that in our supreme
national interest, it is no longer in our supreme national interest to
be a part of that treaty, and then we withdraw from the treaty in
accordance with the terms of treaty. That is the way to do it if we
ever have to move in that direction or feel that it is in our interest
to move in that direction.
Fifth, by failing to use the legal option under the treaty, the
Senate would be compelling the executive branch to abandon adherence to
the ABM Treaty by usurping certain powers of the executive branch over
the conduct of foreign policy, a move that certainly would raise
serious constitutional issues.
So, Mr. President, this is the underlying bill and the problem with
the underlying bill. That is what we are basically correcting with this
substitute amendment.
Mr. President, again, I thank my colleague from Michigan, who did a
superb job on this. I thank my colleague from Virginia and my colleague
from Maine, Senator Warner and Senator Cohen, who are indeed not only
knowledgeable but they are skillful in their negotiating ability and in
their discerning ability to understand the fundamental issues as
opposed to some of the rhetorical issues. I think that is the reason we
were able to work this out.
I thank the Senator from South Carolina, because he was the one who
came up with the idea of getting the four of us to work on this
proposal and to try to find a way to reach a consensus. He also not
only instigated this effort but discussed it with the majority leader
and the minority leader. He also constantly gave us both the
encouragement and support, and indeed some very timely prodding to get
this agreement worked out.
So I appreciate the Senator from South Carolina and his leadership.
Mr. President, I believe that there are no other remarks after the
Senator from Michigan, who may want to conclude. I believe we are about
to wrap up the debate. I believe the Senator from Texas wants to take
some remarks.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a
brief question on this matter.
During the course of my remarks, I opined that I thought this
amendment as currently drawn would be in the mutual interest of the
United States and Russia. Should an accidental firing occur, I think
all attention would instantly focus on Russia as being the origin. And,
therefore, it seems to me, whether it was from Russia or wherever the
missile was fired from, I think the initial reaction of the American
public would be, well, they are the ones that have it, because many do
not understand in the years immediately preceding other nations have
come forward now and have made fundamental investment in the system.
So I just ask if my distinguished colleague concurs with my view that
it is in the mutual interest of both Russia and the United States.
Mr. NUNN. I do. I say to my friend from Virginia that I think it is
in the interest of the United States and Russia to both move forward
with modest adjustments to the ABM Treaty so both can protect their
countries against accidental unauthorized launch or third-country
launch.
As the Senator from Virginia well knows, I first posed this question
to the then head of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Dick Ellis, a
wonderful and fine Air Force general, now deceased. But that was in the
early 1980's. I asked him the question, I said, ``General Ellis, what
basically is our ability to detect the origin of some limited attack
against the United States? Could we know for sure where that attack
originated? We would not have the ability to defend against it, and
would we know for sure the origin of that attack?'' He said he needed
to study that.
He did study it. He and his whole team studied it for almost a year
and came to the conclusion that the United States, while we had some
capability of determining the origin of attack, it was not nearly as
good as it should be and the Russians' ability was not as good as ours.
Most of that study remains classified.
But I came out with a profound not only sense of unease about our
ability and their ability to detect the origin of attack, let us say
from an underwater submarine which could be from a third country, but
we would both assume it was coming, if we were struck, from the other
superpower in terms of nuclear arms. I came to the conclusion that
neither of us had the capability that we needed in that regard.
But more importantly, I came to the conclusion that we both had a
mutual stake in the ability of each to be able to detect the origin of
an attack and also to be able to defend against that kind of an attack
so that we never got into an inadvertent war that no one intended by
mistake or by accident. And I still have that conclusion even though
the circumstances between the United States and Russia have now changed
dramatically. We are no longer in this confrontation. We still have
nuclear arms that will be with us for years to come even after we
reduce under START I and START II.
So that is a long answer to the Senator's underlying question, but I
think it is a very important question. And the answer is, yes, I do
believe Russia has a similar interest. I think we have many mutual
interests. In fact, our interest in terms of nuclear arms, in terms of
destruction, the safety, the handling, the prevention of leakage of
this kind of material, both nuclear, chemical, biological, as well as
technology and the scientists, we have a tremendous mutual type of
security interest now with Russia more than perhaps any other nation
because we are the two that have these nuclear weapons and the awesome
responsibility to deal with them responsibly so that we never, God
forbid, have nuclear disaster, not only in this country but in Russia
or in the world.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. I
conclude that I, too, remember General Ellis very well. He was a highly
decorated fighter pilot in World War II. He was head of the Strategic
Air Command. And, as my colleague will recall, he was appointed to the
standing consultative commission, which, Mr. President, is that body
that is entrusted with resolving underlying questions with respect to
the framework of arms control treaties, including the ABM.
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And he discharged that responsibility with great distinction.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the able Senator from
Georgia for his kind remarks.
I now yield to the able Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, such
time as she may require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I, too, want to commend the
chairman of the committee, the ranking member from Georgia, and the
group that got together and worked long into the night before the
summer recess in an attempt to reach an accommodation that would allow
everyone to feel comfortable about how we are treating theater missile
defense.
Mr. President, I want to speak because I believe that we have only
settled this issue in a very temporary way this year. But I want to say
that it is very important for us to look at this for the future because
this is going to be one of the major policy decisions that we are going
to have to make, not only today but for the future. I think the Senator
from Georgia was correct when he said that we may have to make some
adjustments in the ABM Treaty. It may well be not only in our best
interest to do so, but it may be in the best interest of Russia as
well.
We are continuing to make adjustments in the post-cold war era. We do
not live in a bipolar world anymore. We now live in a multipolar world,
but we have treaties that were based on the bipolar world. We have many
other concerns that were addressed in a bipolar context. We know now
that technology exists for ballistic missiles in more than 10 countries
around the world.
No longer is the threat just from the missiles that we know are in
Russia and some of the former republics of the Soviet Union that are
now independent countries. We now recognize that there are capabilities
in many other nations around the world and that in the future the
technology will likely proliferate to such an extent that many
countries may soon have the capability of launching ballistic missiles
that could threaten our Nation.
So it is incumbent on us as leaders of our country to prepare, and we
must have the time to do that and we must start looking at some of
these policy issues that must be addressed in this new multipolar
world.
As many of us who have traveled into some of the central European
countries and into the republics of the former Soviet Union know, this
is an unstable world.
We are seeing ethnic conflicts. We are seeing border disputes. We are
seeing turf wars. I think the United States is going to have to step
back and decide, what our role should be in this new world? When are
our armed forces going to be needed? When do we have a U.S. interest
and when is that interest a vital U.S. security interest?
I think it is clear just from what has happened in the last 2 weeks
that the world is looking to America for leadership. If there is one
thing America is--and it is probably the consensus in the world--we are
the beacon for a democracy that has worked and that has created the
strongest Nation in the history of the world. Because of that, many
countries are looking to us for leadership, and we must determine how
much leadership we can give, how much is monetary, and how much is
security oriented. And I think that is going to have to set the stage
for how we prepare to be the world's superpower and yet maintain our
strength and protect our shores.
The greatest lesson of all is that the cold war was ended; we
obtained that peace through strength. We did not end the cold war
through weakness. Other countries in the world knew that we had the
capacity and the commitment to protect our interests. We must never
veer from that fundamental principle that we are a superpower that will
protect ourselves. We must not allow unilateral disarmament of any
kind, of any type.
When you talk about a treaty that was made in a bipolar world between
the two preeminent powers at the time you cannot have any confidence
that those who wrote that treaty could envision all of the things that
could happen in the world today. No treaty at that time could ever
envision the technologies available to many countries today that have
rendered the treaty outdated, outmoded, and no longer a strong approach
for us to take. So we are going to have to look at our strategic
interests, and in doing that we are going to have to determine what we
must do as the leaders of our country to make sure we will have
appropriate defenses against any missile that could ever come into our
borders.
That is something we are going to have to debate this year, and we
are going to have to continue our vigilance to make sure our young
people know they can be assured of the strength of our country and that
we have the foresight and the vision to maintain that strength.
I am going to support the compromise that has been reached, but I do
have reservations that we are not as a group looking to what we must do
to make sure we have the strength to withstand any kind of attack that
technology has the capability to deliver to our shores. And I think we
are going to have to continue our debates, continue our studies,
continue our technological advances, and under no circumstances at any
time should we say we are not going to defend our shores, that we are
not going to make sure that our nuclear stockpile, which is dormant, is
nevertheless still capable. Unilateral disarmament is not anything we
can consider in any manner if we are going to remain the greatest and
only superpower left in the world.
So I commend my colleagues for coming to this conclusion. But it is
merely the beginning of a very important policy debate that I think is
going to be more important as we learn more of the technologies and the
intelligence about what is happening around the world in the area of
defense and security.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from South
Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
After the debate is concluded on this matter, then we will have a wrap-
up tonight. I have asked Senator Warner if he would conduct the wrap-up
on this side. He has agreed to do so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Michigan has some
concluding remarks and I would yield him such time as he may desire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Georgia.
Mr. President, I will be very brief, indeed.
Section 232 of Title X, which is the current law, reads as follows:
that the goal of the United States is ``to develop and maintain the
option to deploy an antiballistic missile system that is capable of
providing a highly effective defense of the United States against
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.''
So the current law is to develop the option to deploy, but to decide
at a future time whether or not to deploy, depending on the
circumstances at that time, including the threats at the time, and the
cost and military effectiveness of such a system. The bill says deploy.
The current law says develop with an option to deploy. The bill says
deploy.
The substitute amendment goes back to the fundamental approach of the
existing law, which is to develop so that we can deploy, but then makes
it very clear that we will make the decision on whether to deploy at a
future date and specifies what the criteria are for consideration at
the time of that decision.
Section 233 of our bill says that it is the policy of the United
States, in subsection 3, to ``ensure congressional review prior to a
decision to deploy the system developed for deployment, under paragraph
2'', of four things: the affordability and operational effectiveness of
such a system, the threat to be countered by such a system, and fourth,
ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a system.
In doing this, this substitute recognizes the importance of the ABM
Treaty to our security. The ABM Treaty has been one of the reasons we
have been able to reduce the number of offensive nuclear weapons that
face us.
We are going to be facing a small percentage of the nuclear weapons
that used to confront us because, the Russians have told us over and
over again,
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we have adhered to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That has allowed
them to agree to these very drastic reductions in the numbers of their
offensive weapons. And so we are on the threshold of seeing continuing
significant reduction in offensive weapons that we face, or that we
could theoretically face, no longer from an adversary but now from
someone with whom we are having a growing and a deepening partnership.
It is not just the current law that we should develop technology for
a national missile defense--that is the law I read--it is also the
policy of this administration to develop that technology in a way that
we could deploy it in time to counter any ballistic missile threat that
emerges to the United States. So we have a law that says develop and we
have a current policy that says develop. But both by current law and
current policy the decision whether to deploy is left for a future
time.
That is the approach which this substitute restores; develop, but
leave the decision to deploy for a future time based on criteria which
will be considered at that time to help us make a decision which makes
sense for the security of this Nation.
So the road to reductions is dependent in part on the existence of an
ABM Treaty. That treaty still continues to serve our national interest.
This substitute in a number of ways explicitly and otherwise recognizes
the importance of that treaty to this relationship and to the
continuing reductions in the number of offensive weapons.
So I do hope that our colleagues will find favor with this substitute
and will support this substitute. Again, I want to thank all the
colleagues who participated in the formulation of it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. If I could ask for a minute.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield such time as the able Senator from Virginia
shall require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the concluding remarks by our colleague
from Michigan, I think, set the tone when he seeks to reassure the
Senate that this legislation is in the best interest of our Nation and
that he is hopeful that we will gain the support of other Senators,
because no single Senator fought harder for certain changes in this
amendment than did the Senator from Michigan. And I think we conclude
debate on a very positive note.
With that statement, I yield the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the amendment offered by the
Senator from Georgia, but I continue to have strong reservations about
the remaining aspects of the Missile Defense Act. The amendment makes
an unwise provision better, and I commend Senators Nunn, Levin, Warner,
and Cohen for their effective work in achieving this compromise. It
fails, however, to do what is necessary to serve the best interests of
our national security.
The remaining shortcomings in the Missile Defense Act become clear
when we consider the principal threats that the United States faces
from nuclear missile attack, and the more effective way these threats
are addressed by current administration policy, which is also
longstanding bipartisan policy under both Republican and Democratic
administrations.
One of the threats we face is clearly from nations which now lack
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, but which may
develop them in the near future. Proponents of building a national
missile defense argue that the prospect of such a threat is sufficient
grounds for deploying a defensive system as soon as possible.
The weakness in this argument, however, is revealed in the undisputed
testimony of Lt. Gen. James Clapper before the Armed Services Committee
last January. General Clapper at that time was the head of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. He stated that:
We see no interest in or capability of any new country
reaching the continental United States with a long range
missile for at least the next decade.
The missile threat from a new nuclear power is neither real nor
imminent, and it will not materialize for at least ten years. The
Defense Department's missile defense plan calls for a research and
development program that will enable us to build and deploy a national
defense rapidly if unforeseen threats materialize. The Clinton defense
plan will keep us safe from ballistic missile threats from new nuclear
powers.
A more serious threat comes from existing nuclear arsenals of
potential adversaries. There is a very low likelihood in the current
world situation that we will be subject to nuclear attack from Russia
or China. But such a possibility is the most serious potential threat
to the security of the United States, and therefore merits careful
consideration.
Russia, and to a lesser extent China, possess nuclear arsenals that
threaten the security of the United States. This fact is nothing new.
The arsenal controlled by Moscow has posed this threat to our Nation
for roughly 40 years. Yet, we were able to ensure the security of the
United States over this period, in spite of the tensions and
conflicting interests of the cold war. We did so by maintaining a
nuclear arsenal that could deter the use of nuclear weapons against us
by any adversary. Mutual deterrence guaranteed our security from
nuclear attack throughout the nuclear age, and it is still our best
guarantee.
Now, in the post-cold-war era, the stability and effectiveness of
this deterrent relationship is even greater than it was during the cold
war, and it is just as important. Russia is no longer our adversary,
and therefore the likelihood of conflict between us has greatly
diminished. We have signed the START I and START II Treaties which, if
implemented, will create stable deterrence at reduced levels of nuclear
weapons.
In his famous phrase, President Reagan called on us to trust but
verify. Now, the increased trust between our nations has magnified our
ability to verify. The START Treaties provide for verification with
extensive and effective monitoring that was not possible during the
cold war. As the political and military leaders of Russia confirm, the
deterrent relationship that has long existed remains the centerpiece of
nuclear safety for our two nations. And we can achieve even greater
safeguards in the future by maintaining that cooperative relationship.
It makes no sense to take unilateral actions that would jeopardize that
relationship, as the missile defense advocates would do.
Mutual deterrence is the foundation of the United States-Russian
strategic relationship, and the ABM Treaty is the basis for mutual
deterrence. For over two decades, the ABM Treaty has insured that the
superpowers' nuclear arsenals continue to be effective as deterrents,
which is the necessary condition for strategic stability. The Russians
themselves have reaffirmed the importance of this longstanding treaty
to cooperation in arms reduction.
The proponents of the Missile Defense Act place too little value on
the improved strategic relationship between the United States and
Russia, and the essential role of the ABM Treaty as the heart of that
relationship. Deploying a multisite missile defense would violate the
ABM Treaty as it currently stands.
The Russians have clearly stated that they will not ratify START II
if the United States violates or withdraws from the ABM Treaty. In my
view, the United States is safer facing a Russian arsenal of 3,000
weapons under START II, than if we possess several hundred ABM
interceptors while facing the present Russian arsenal of 10,000
weapons.
Deploying a national missile defense system will also impair the
cooperative threat reduction programs, under which Russia is accepting
United States funds to help dismantle their nuclear weapons.
In addition, withdrawing from the ABM Treaty may also cause the
Russians to put their nuclear arsenal on a higher state of alert,
increasing the risk of accidental launch against the United States.
The course set by this bill may also lead the Russians to reverse the
negotiated step, achieved in 1994, whereby we agreed not to target each
other's territory with the missiles deployed in silos and on
submarines. If the Russians retarget their missiles, the threat
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of catastrophic damage to the United States from accidental or
unauthorized attack will clearly rise.
The proponents of the Missile Defense Act ignore all of these
considerations. They are proposing a more dangerous course for our
national security which Congress should not follow.
The Nunn/Levin/Warner/Cohen amendment will improve the bill compared
to its present terms, and I urge adoption of the amendment. But I also
urge my colleagues to support the administration's more sensible course
on the development of missile defenses. President Clinton's policy is
designed to explore the new avenues of nuclear safety opened to us by
the end of the cold war, without sacrificing the solid foundation of
our security--the mutual deterrence established and supported by
Democratic and Republican administrations alike over the past four
decades.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not know if anyone is going to want to
speak any more on this one on either side. I do not have any more
requests on the Democratic side.
Mr. President, does the Senator from Michigan know of anyone else who
would like to speak on this?
Mr. LEVIN. No.
Mr. NUNN. As I understand the time agreement, we will have the vote
on this at 9:30 tomorrow morning.
Does the Senator from South Carolina know when we will be coming in
on the bill? Should we reserve any time in case anyone wants to speak
in the morning?
Mr. THURMOND. We will be coming in at 9:25 in the morning, and we
will get on the bill by 9:30.
Mr. NUNN. Then we will vote at 9:30.
Mr. THURMOND. We are supposed to vote at 9:30.
I am prepared to yield back my time, Mr. President.
Mr. NUNN. I think, just in case there is a minute or two someone
wants to speak in the morning, we ought to probably reserve 2 minutes
on each side and give back the remainder of the time. That would give
us a chance if somebody else wants a minute to be heard.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are agreeable to that.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would yield back all of my time except 2
minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. The same here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the time is yielded back
with the exception of 2 minutes on each side.
Mr. NUNN. I know the Senator from South Carolina would like us to
handle several amendments that have been agreed to before we conclude
the debate on this Missile Defense Act of 1995 substitute. And, again,
I want to thank my friend from Michigan, who did a superb job, and my
friend from Virginia and my friend from Maine, who did, I think, a very
good job in terms of negotiating what is a consensus, I think a
positive step forward, as the Senator from Virginia said, for our
Nation.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my colleague with respect to all
the efforts that were made. Indeed, it was a monumental task. I think
the result will be accepted strongly by the Senate tomorrow.
Mr. President, I wonder, if I can have the attention of the
distinguished chairman and the ranking member of the committee, if I
could bring up another point. That is, Mr. Chairman, I think it is
imperative that the Senate receive a briefing from the administration
on the situation as it exists in Bosnia today.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have already made the request.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished chairman, because I have
written a memorandum to the chairman. It would not be on his desk until
tomorrow morning.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we have 5
minutes each in the morning. I have a closing statement I would like to
make in the morning just before we vote on this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, all time will be yielded
back with the exception of 5 minutes on each side.
Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous consent that--I understand I probably
would make that after the bill passes, and so just as to say 2 minutes
to each side before that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, could I inquire of the Chair as to the time
agreement now?
I understand that we have the Missile Defense Act to be voted on at
9:30.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. NUNN. Could the Chair inform the Senate of what takes place after
that amendment has been voted on and disposed of? It is my
understanding we have several other possible amendments, including an
amendment by the Senator from South Carolina that is relevant and an
amendment by the Senator from Georgia, myself, that is relevant, as
well as a Levin amendment which may or may not be required to be voted
on. We will have time for remarks before final passage of the bill. I
believe that is what the Senator from South Carolina has made reference
to.
I do not believe the Senator is going to need more time for speaking
on this amendment which we vote on at 9:30. I think we will have other
time on the bill before that is concluded.
Mr. THURMOND. That is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator would yield for a comment. We believe we
worked out the Levin amendment which you referred to, and that it will
not require a rollcall vote. We have not agreed yet on the final
language, but we have agreed on the principle of an amendment. So we do
not expect a rollcall will be necessary on the Levin amendment.
Mr. NUNN. We will have other amendments that have to be accepted
tomorrow morning. We have not worked them out. We will not be able to
conclude all of those. We are going to have to have some time--I hope
it will not be a lot of time--after the passage of this Missile Defense
Act, assuming it passes, before we vote on final passage.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection to that.
I hope we can wrap everything up tonight as much as possible and have
as few things to do tomorrow before we vote.
Mr. NUNN. I believe we are prepared to have some of the amendments
that have been agreed to now propounded to the Senate.
THE BROWN AMENDMENT CONCERNING THE REUSE OF FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL
CENTER
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I agreed to accept the amendment of the
Senator from Colorado which states congressional support for the timely
reuse of military installations approved for closure or realignment.
The Senator from Colorado is particularly interested in expediting the
reuse of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Colorado. While I understand
the Senator's support for the reuse of Fitzsimons, I believe expedited
reuse should hold true for all military installations impacted by base
realignment and closure.
Over the last few years, Congress has enacted legislation to improve
base disposal procedures by expediting the overall process and giving
greater power to Local Redevelopment Authorities [LRAs] in making
disposal and reuse decisions.
Current law prescribes time-lines for screening and disposal of
former military installations. From the time an installation is
approved for closure or realignment, the following must occur:
0-6 months--Military department identifies DOD and Federal property
needs, makes excess and surplus determinations, and commences
environmental impact analysis process.
6-18 months--LRA solicits and considers notices of interests,
conducts outreach, considers homeless assistance needs, and consults
with military departments regarding surplus property uses.
18-33 months--LRA prepares redevelopment plan and homeless submission
and submits to DOD and HUD; military department reports property to
Federal sponsoring agencies for public benefit conveyances, completes
environmental impact analysis, and makes disposal decisions.
33+ months--Military department conveys property and LRA implements
redevelopment plan.
It should be noted that turning property over to LRAs could occur
much
[[Page S 12597]]
sooner than 33 months--in fact, transfer could occur as soon as 20
months if reuse plans are developed and approved early in disposal
process. LRAs that act expeditiously in developing and adopting reuse
plans should be commended as this is not an easy task. Accordingly, the
military services should do all in their power within the letter of the
law to convey appropriate property to LRAs that have fulfilled all
necessary requirements and are ready and able to accept these
properties for reuse.
Mr. President, my point is that expedited reuse is the goal for all
installations impacted by base closure and realignment decisions.
HYDRONUCLEAR TESTS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the Exon amendment to clarify
the meaning of this bill regarding nuclear weapons testing. This
amendment will bring the bill into closer agreement with President
Clinton's policy seeking prompt achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
On August 11, President Clinton took a pathbreaking step by
announcing his intention to seek a true comprehensive test ban. The new
U.S. policy is to ban all nuclear tests of any size, including the
hydronuclear tests addressed in this bill.
President Clinton's action supports our Nation's commitment, made in
May at the conference on the permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, that the United States will seek prompt
negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Many of the 178 nations
who are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conditioned
their support for the treaty's permanent extension on the prompt
achievement of a comprehensive test ban. The test ban is an essential
part of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is
one of the highest security priorities of the United States.
A ban on nuclear tests will serve our non-proliferation goals,
without jeopardizing the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear
stockpile. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all support the President's new
policy. They agree that it provides for effective maintenance of our
nuclear arsenal.
The Exon amendment would ensure that this bill takes no action to
violate the President's policy, or the testing moratorium enacted into
law in 1992. It will clear the way for us to sign a comprehensive test
ban, and begin a new era of nuclear security and non-proliferation for
the entire world. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I inquire of the Senator from Georgia
[Senator Nunn], if I may ask him a question about a provision of the
fiscal year 1995 Department of Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. NUNN. I would be pleased to answer the questions of the Senator
from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Section 816 of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization
Act authorized a demonstration project in Monterey County, CA, which
would permit the Department of Defense to purchase fire-fighting,
police, public works, utility, and other municipal services from
Government agencies located in Monterey when such services are needed
for operating Department of Defense assets in the county.
Mr. NUNN. I am familiar with this section. It allowed such municipal
services to be purchased notwithstanding section 2465 of title 10,
United States Code.
Mrs. BOXER. I would ask the Senator, was it the committee's intent to
require an OMB Circular A-76 study before the demonstration program
could begin?
Mr. NUNN. The purpose of the provision was to expedite the
demonstration project, and it is therefore my view that to proceed
without conducting an A-76 study would be consistent with section 816
of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization Act.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Amendment No. 2452
(Purpose: Relating to testing of theater missile defense interceptors)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Pryor, I offer an
amendment which will establish testing requirements for theater missile
defense interceptor missiles. This amendment is supported by both the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation in the Pentagon.
I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Pryor,
proposes an amendment numbered 2452.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 49, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
SEC. 224. TESTING OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS.
(a) The Secretary of Defense may not approve a theater
missile defense interceptor program proceeding beyond the
low-rate initial production acquisition stage until the
Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees
that such program has successfully completed initial
operational test and evaluation, and is found to be a
suitable and effective system.
(b) In order to be certified under subsection (a) as having
been successfully completed, the initial operational test and
evaluation conducted with respect to an interceptor program
must have included flight tests--
(1) that were conducted with multiple interceptors and
multiple targets in the presence of realistic
countermeasures; and
(2) the results of which demonstrate the achievement by the
interceptors of the baseline performance thresholds.
(c) For purposes of this section, the baseline performance
thresholds with respect to a program are the weapons systems
performance thresholds specified in the baseline description
for the system established (pursuant to section 2435(a)(1) of
title 10, United States Code) before the program entered the
engineering and manufacturing development stage.
(d) The number of flight tests described in subsection (b)
that are required in order to make the certification under
subsection (a) shall be a number determined by the Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation to be sufficient for the
purposes of this section.
(e) The Secretary may augment flight testing to demonstrate
weapons system performance goals for purposes of the
certification under subsection (a) through the use of
modeling and simulation that is validated by ground and
flight testing.
(f) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization shall include in their
annual reports to Congress plans to adequately test theater
missile defense interceptor programs throughout the
acquisition process. As these theater missile defense systems
progress through the acquisition process, the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation and Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization shall include in their annual reports to
Congress an assessment of how these programs satisfy planned
test objectives.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of
Senator Nunn, Senator Bingaman, and myself to restore some common sense
to the Missile Defense Act of 1995.
As my colleagues know, the Missile Defense Act of 1995 contains an
aggressive program to develop and deploy theater missile defenses in
the form of sophisticated missile interceptors.
I say to my colleagues--if we want to protect ourselves from the
threat of theater missile attacks, let's make sure the interceptors are
capable of destroying incoming missiles!
I was disappointed that this bill deleted a provision passed by
Congress 2 years ago that would help us monitor these programs through
a series of live-fire tests.
I believe it would be dangerous for the Senate to show a lack of
interest in monitoring the progress of our theater missile defense
interceptors. Our primary concern should be in making sure they are
maturing properly.
Mr. President, I am pleased that the Director of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization [BMDO] and the Pentagon's Director of
Operational Testing agreed to work together in an effort to help us
properly emphasize the importance of testing our TMD interceptor
programs.
[[Page S 12598]]
I applaud the Director of the BMDO, Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, and the
Director of Operational Testing, Phil Coyle, for working cooperatively
in this effort.
Mr. President, this is a responsible amendment that asks the Pentagon
to periodically assess the maturity of each interceptor program, and to
advise Congress on the progress we're making. It also asks the
Secretary of Defense to certify to Congress that these programs work
properly before they enter into full-rate production. Finally, this
amendment will help prevent the wasteful practice of building weapon
systems that do not work as expected.
This concept, Mr. President, is commonly referred to as fly before
you buy. Fly before you buy means that new weapons must demonstrate
their progress and maturity in operational testing so that we do not
waste money buying systems that do not work.
I am proud to say, Mr. President, that with this amendment, the
weapon developers in the BMDO office and the Pentagon's testers have
worked together to reach an agreement on the proposed language.
This is a remarkable accomplishment that the entire U.S. Senate
should applaud.
This is exactly the type of productive cooperation that Senator
Grassley, Senator Roth and I envisioned when we wrote the legislation
creating the independent testing office back in 1983. Developers and
testers working together for a common goal. Unfortunately, for many
years, the developers have refused to allow operational testers to
monitor their progress. Too often in the Pentagon, the word ``test'' is
considered a four-letter word.
This is exactly the scenario we should avoid with our interceptor
programs.
We have already spent over $5 billion on theater missile defense
interceptors. In this bill, an additional $2 billion is authorized for
these programs. And the total costs are projected to exceed $22
billion!
As we continue spending more and more on ballistic missile defenses,
let us not forget the most basic and most important element of these
programs--making sure they work.
I wish to once again thank Gen. Malcolm O'Neill for his cooperation.
Also, special thanks to Mr. Phil Coyle for his outstanding leadership
as the Pentagon's testing czar. Thanks also to Larry Miller of Mr.
Coyle's staff for his tremendous efforts in helping to prepare this
amendment.
Mr. President, I thank the managers of this bill for accepting this
amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment is acceptable. The Senator
is correct, we support the amendment and urge its adoption.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2452) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2453
(Purpose: To make certain technical corrections)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf
of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond. It is a
technical amendment which makes certain corrections to S. 1026.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment. We
support it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond,
proposes an amendment numbered 2453.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 133, line 25, strike out ``such Act'' and insert in
lieu thereof'' the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965''.
On page 195, line 15, insert ``(1)'' after ``(d)''.
On page 195, line 15, strike out ``it is a'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``it is an affirmative''.
On page 195, line 17, strike out ``(1)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(A)''.
On page 195, line 21, strike out ``(2)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(B)''.
On page 195, line 23, strike out the end quotation marks
and second period.
On page 195, after line 23, insert the following:
``(2) The accused has the burden of proving a defense under
paragraph (1) by a preponderance of the evidence.''.
On page 250, beginning on line 20, strike out ``Not later
than December 15, 1996, the'' and insert in lieu thereof
``The''.
On page 375, strike out lines 11 through 15.
On page 375, line 16, strike out ``(p)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(o)''.
On page 375, line 20, strike out ``(q)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(p)''.
On page 376, line 1, strike out ``(r)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(q)''.
On page 376, line 7, strike out ``(s)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(r)''.
On page 376, line 13, strike out ``(t)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(s)''.
On page 376, line 22, strike out ``(u)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(t)''.
On page 377, line 3, strike out ``(v)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(u)''.
On page 378, between line 23 and 24, insert the following:
(c) Public Law 100-180 Requirement for Selected Acquisition
Reports for ATB, ACM, and ATA Programs.--Section 127 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989 (10 U.S.C. 2432 note) is repealed.
On page 378, line 24, strike out ``(c)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(d)''.
On page 379, line 5, strike out ``(d)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(e)''.
On page 379, line 14, strike out ``(e)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(f)''.
On page 379, line 20, strike out ``(f)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(g)''.
Beginning on page 379, line 24, strike out ``106 Stat.
2370;'' and all that follows through page 380, line 2, and
insert in lieu thereof ``106 Stat. 2368; 10 U.S.C. 301 note)
is amended by striking out paragraphs (4) and (5).''.
On page 380, line 3, strike out ``(g)'' and insert in lieu
thereof ``(h)''.
Mr. WARNER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2453) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2454
(Purpose: To set aside $2,000,000 for the Allegany Ballistics
Laboratory for essential safety functions)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, the Senator from
West Virginia, I offer an amendment which would authorize the Navy to
use operation and maintenance funds up to a total of $2 million to
address essential safety concerns at a Government-owned, contractor-
operated weapons facility.
I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment. I believe the other side
has cleared this amendment.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct. This is an amendment originally
considered in the course of the markup of the Senate Armed Services
Committee. I was awaiting further information. That information, to my
understanding, has been received and, therefore, the amendment is
worthy of consideration and support by the Senate.
Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Byrd, proposes
an amendment numbered 2454.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 137, after line 24, insert the following:
SEC. 389. ALLEGANY BALLISTICS LABORATORY.
Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under section
301(2), $2,000,000 shall be available for the Allegany
Ballistics Laboratory for essential safety functions.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the amendment that I offer addresses
immediate safety concerns associated with the Allegany Ballistics
Laboratory. The Allegany Ballistics Laboratory is the leading producer
of tactical missile propulsion systems and conventional warheads for
the Department of Defense,
[[Page S 12599]]
currently producing rocket motors, sensor fuzed weapons, a variety of
state-of-the-art missiles, warheads for the Maverick and more.
Additionally, the Allegany Ballistics Lab is developing motors and
warheads for the next generation of smart precision guided weapons.
Of great concern to me are the many significant safety violations,
due to the age of the facility. Originally acquired by the Army in
1941, the Navy was given custody of the site in 1945. In fiscal year
1994, the Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA] requested restoration of
the 50-year-old plant over a 5-year period. Now, in what would be its
third year of restoration, the plant lacks programmed funding for the
ongoing restoration plan. This year's programmed restoration costs
would be $38.5 million, of which the Senate Appropriations Committee
has provided $30 million. Due to an unfortunate oversight during the
Armed Services Committee preparation of this bill, the authorization
bill does not include language supporting the safety upgrades at this
facility.
Because of the potentially hazardous circumstances that might develop
due to neglected safety precautions at this antiquated weapons-
producing facility, my amendment would ensure the authorization for a
minimal $2 million to provide for the essential safety measures
required for the continuing operations of this plant.
The laboratory provides and services munitions for all the military
services. Its programs include Naval propulsion technologies,
Sidewinder, and Sea Sparrow missiles; for the Army, solid propulsion
technologies, special munitions technologies, jointly produced rocket
engines; rocket and laser systems for the Air Force; and a variety of
motor and generator technologies for ballistic, cruise, and tactical
missiles.
A facility of this magnitude and importance to national security
requires, at a minimum, the funding for essential safety measures to
avert a potential disaster. If these needs are not met, we risk not
only plant security and safety, but we risk the loss of our Defense
Department's ability to provide adequate munitions to our fighting
forces.
Mr. President, safe operations of the plant and safe function of the
weapons and defense conversion products depend on competent structural
and hazards testing capability. Facilities currently being used are
over 40 years old. Needed are safe, efficient control rooms for
Insensitive Munitions, hazards and warhead testing to replace the
obsolete facilities.
I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment, that will help
keep a portion of our defense industry free from the occurrence or risk
of injury or loss.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2454) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2455
(Purpose: To revise for fiscal and technical purposes the provisions
relating to military construction projects authorizations)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf
of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond, and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond,
proposes an amendment numbered 2455.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 69, line 20, strike out ``$18,086,206,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$18,073,206,000''.
On page 69, line 21, strike out ``$21,356,960,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$21,343,960,000''.
On page 69, line 23, strike out ``$18,237,893,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$18,224,893,000''.
On page 69, line 25, strike out ``$10,060,162,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$10,046,162,000''.
On page 407, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
SEC. 2105. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS.
Section 2105(a) of the Military Construction Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public Law 102-190;
105 Stat. 1511), as amended by section 2105(b)(2)(A) of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
(division B of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1859), is
further amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by
striking out ``$2,571,974,000'' and insert in lieu thereof
``$2,565,729,000''.
On page 417, in the table preceding line 1, in the amount
column of the item relating to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany,
strike out ``$8,300,000'' and insert in lieu thereof
``$8,380,000''.
On page 419, line 24, strike out ``$49,450,000'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``$49,400,000''.
On page 420, after line 21, add the following:
SEC 2305. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS.
Section 2305(a) of the Military Construction Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public Law 102-190;
105 Stat. 1525), as amended by section 2308(a)(2)(A) of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993
(division B of Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2598) and by
section 2305(a)(3)(A) of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (division B of Public
Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1871), is further amended in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out
``$2,033,833,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``$2,017,828,000''.
On page 424, line 22, strike out ``$4,565,533,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$4,466,783,000.''
On page 425, line 9, strike out ``$47,950,000'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``$47,900,000''.
On page 426, line 13, strike out ``$3,897,892,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$3,799,192,000''.
On page 427, after line 25, add the following:
SEC. 2407. REDUCTION IN AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED
FOR PRIOR YEAR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.
(a) Fiscal Year 1991 Authorizations.--Section 2405(a) of
the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991 (division B of Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1779), as
amended by section 2409(b)(1) of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public
Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1991), is further amended in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out
``$1,644,478,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``$1,641,244,000''.
(b) Fiscal Year 1992 Authorizations.--Section 2404(a) of
the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1992 (105 Stat. 1531), as amended by section 2404(b)(1)(A) of
the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994 (division B of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1877), is
further amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by
striking out ``$1,665,440,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``$1,658,640,000''.
(c) Fiscal Year 1993 Authorizations.--Section 2403(a) of
the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 (division B of Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2600) is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking out
``$2,567,146,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``$2,558,556,000''.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on August 2, the Senate adopted an
amendment authorizing $228.0 million for military constructions
projects that were appropriated in the military construction
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996. The amendment I am offering
today identifies offsets that will be used to pay for these additional
projects. Specific amounts are as follows:
$30.0 million from a reduction to the foreign currency fluctuation
account previously made by the Senate.
$98.7 million from construction projects that are no longer required
due to the recommended closures by the Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. These reductions were taken from a list compiled by the
Department of Defense.
$49.0 million from prior year funds for projects that resulted in
contract savings or were previously approved and now are no longer
needed. This action mirrors the action taken by the Senate MILCON
Appropriations Subcommittee.
$53.0 million from the $161.0 million request for the Pentagon
renovation. The fiscal year 1996 request included $53.0 million for
construction of wedge 1 of the project, which has been delayed for 1
year pending a comprehensive review of the $1.2 billion renovation
project.
Mr. President, the reductions to the various programs will not impair
the progress of these programs. On the other hand, the additional
military construction projects funded by these offsets will enhance the
readiness of our Armed Forces and provide for the
[[Page S 12600]]
welfare of the men and women who serve in the uniform of this Nation.
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment provides offsets for the
military construction projects authorized by the Senate earlier in its
deliberations on this bill.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment, and
this side has cleared the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2455) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2456
(Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance, Naval Communications Station,
Stockton, California)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Feinstein, the Senator
from California, I offer an amendment which authorizes the Secretary of
the Navy, upon concurrence of both the General Services Administration
and HUD, to convey 1,450 acres of property at the Naval Communications
Station, Stockton, CA, to the Port of Stockton.
This amendment also allows for all existing leases involving Federal
agencies located on the site to remain under existing terms and
conditions.
Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other
side.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Feinstein,
proposes an amendment numbered 2456.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 487, below line 24, add the following:
SEC. 2838. LAND CONVEYANCE, NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION,
STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA.
(a) Authority To Convey.--The Secretary of the Navy may,
upon the concurrence of the Administrator of General Services
and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, convey to
the Port of Stockton (in this section referred to as the
``Port''), all right, title, and interest of the United
States in and to a parcel of real property, including any
improvements thereon, consisting of approximately 1,450 acres
at the Naval Communication Station, Stockton, California.
(b) Interim Lease.--Until such time as the real property
described in subsection (a) is conveyed by deed, the
Secretary may lease the property, along with improvements
thereon, to the Port under terms and conditions satisfactory
to the Secretary.
(c) Consideration.--The conveyance may be as a public
benefit conveyance for port development as defined in Section
203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949, (40 U.S.C. 484), as amended, provided the Port
satisfies the criteria in section 203 and such regulations as
the Administrator of General Services may prescribe to
implement that section. Should the Port fail to qualify for a
public benefit conveyance and still desire to acquire the
property, then the Port shall, as consideration for the
conveyance, pay to the United States an amount equal to the
fair market value of the property to be conveyed, as
determined by the Secretary.
(d) Federal Lease of Conveyed Property.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, as a condition for transfer of
this property under subparagraph (a), the Secretary may
require that the Port agree to lease all or a part of the
property currently under federal use at the time of
conveyance to the United States for use by the Department of
Defense or any other federal agency under the same terms and
conditions now presently in force. Such terms and conditions
will continue to include payment (to the Port) for
maintenance of facilities leased to the Federal Government.
Such maintenance of the Federal premises shall be to the
reasonable satisfaction of the United States, or as required
by all applicable Federal, State and local laws and
ordinances.
(e) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the property to be conveyed under subsection
(a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the
Secretary. The cost of such survey shall be borne by Port.
(f) Additional Terms.--The Secretary may require such
additional terms and conditions in connection with the
conveyance under subsection (a) or the lease under subsection
(b) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the
interests of the United States.
(g) Environmental Quality of Property.--Any contract for
sale, deed, or other transfer of real property under this
section shall be carried out in compliance with section
120(h) of the CERCLA (42USC9620(h)) and other environmental
laws.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of an amendment that
conveys the right, title and interest of the Naval Communications
Station at Rough and Ready Island in Stockton, California, from the
Navy to the Port of Stockton.
This conveyance is a win-win for California and the Navy. The
transfer of this property will result in the creation of thousands of
jobs in my state and further solidify the Stockton Ship Deepwater
Channel as one of the premier international shipping hubs in
California. In addition, the Navy will be able to reduce infrastructure
that it no longer needs nor is able to maintain. But the Navy and the
Port of Stockton support this amendment.
The Port of Stockton's Rough and Ready Island is located 75 nautical
miles east of the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. The island
consists of approximately 1,450 acres, of which roughly half is
dedicated to general purpose warehousing.
Since 1944, Rough and Ready Island has been home to the Navy and
played a prominent role in our nation's defense during war and peace
alike. Currently Rough and Ready is the site of a U.S. Naval
Communication Station (NAVCOMSTA). While the NAVCOMSTA will continue to
maintain its presence on the island indefinitely, the Navy has made it
clear that continued ownership of such a facility, with its
considerable infrastructure, is not consistent with ongoing military
realignment objectives.
In addition to the NAVCOMSTA, the Department of Defense houses its
regional distribution center on the island. Other Federal agencies that
lease space include the General Services Administration, the U.S.
Postal Service, and the U.S. Border Patrol.
However, while part of Rough and Ready Island houses a number of
Federal tenants, a significant percentage of the island has fallen in
disrepair. If it is to be used to its fullest capacity, a number of
improvements such as ameliorating and expanding the docks, deepening
the waterways, and upgrading the railroad tracks are essential. The
only private entity able and willing to adequately execute such an
enormous effort is the Port of Stockton.
The Port of Stockton, which operates a 600 acre complex contiguous to
Rough and Ready Island, is ready to assume the host position and make
the necessary improvements. The Stockton Port District, which was
formed in 1927, functions as a nonprofit municipal corporation and is
empowered by the California Harbors and Navigation Code to acquire real
property by grant or gift in order to promote Maritime and Commercial
Interests.
The Port of Stockton is the local sponsor for the Stockton Ship
Channel which is one of the busiest interior industrial water ways in
the United States. Because it is the only deep-water cargo Port that
handles bulk, between 3.5 million and 4 million tons of cargo travel
through the Channel every year.
The Port of Stockton will receive the property through a public
benefit conveyance. Further, the Port of Stockton has repeatedly
offered to honor any long-term leases that are currently operative on
Rough and Ready Island with the Navy, Federal agencies, and other
tenants.
In addition to the benefits to the Navy, this land conveyance could
also create thousands of new jobs in an area that has traditionally
suffered from double digit unemployment.
Currently, Cost Plus, a major retailer, occupies 400,000 square foot
of warehouse space of the Port of Stockton. Although the Port has
received inquiries from other large businesses eager to establish
distribution centers of similar size, it is unable to accommodate these
requests because it simply does not have the space. The consolidation
of Rough and Ready Island with the Port of Stockton will provide more
opportunity to fulfill these requests for more space and in turn
provide more jobs for the residents of the area.
The Port of Stockton estimates that in the long term, the potential
for
[[Page S 12601]]
large and small businesses utilizing the expanded warehousing, a
proposed 92,000 square foot boat storage complex and new dock
facilities will result in as many as 2,000 new jobs in the area.
Mr. President, allowing the transfer of Rough and Ready Island is a
good deal for California and good deal for the Navy. Not only does this
transfer give the Navy an opportunity to relinquish itself of land that
is in considerable need of improvement, but it will create economic
opportunities for many Californians.
I thank my colleagues for supporting this amendment.
Mr. NUNN. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2456) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2457
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Iowa, Senator
Harkin, and the Senator from California, Senator Boxer, I send an
amendment to the desk that provides that cost-type contract DOD
reimbursement of contract executive compensation would be capped at
$200,000. This is similar to the amendment the Senate adopted on the
DOD appropriations bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Harkin, for
himself and Mrs. Boxer, proposes an amendment numbered 2457.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new section:
``SEC. . RESTRICTION ON REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS.
``(a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in
this Act for fiscal year 1996 may be obligated for payment on
new contracts on which allowable costs charged to the
government include payments for individual compensation
(including bonuses and other incentives) at a rate in excess
of $250,000.
``(b) It is the Sense of the Senate that the Congress
should consider extending the restriction described in
section (a) permanently.''
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on this amendment, this is the first
opportunity this Senator has had to review it. The chairman of the
committee has instructed me to accept the amendment.
I must say, it causes me some initial concern, but as I understand
it, it is part of the DOD appropriations bill at the present time.
Speaking only for myself, I will reexamine this amendment in the course
of the conference deliberation on the bill.
So for the present time, I indicate that it is acceptable on this
side for the chairman of the committee.
Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senators Harkin and Boxer, I urge its
adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2457) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2458
(Purpose: To improve the management of environmental restoration and
waste management activities authorized under this Act)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of
Mr. Johnston and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Johnston,
proposes an amendment numbered 2458.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 535, at the end of subtitle A, add the following
new sections:
``SEC. . STANDARDIZATION OF ETHICS AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
WITH GOVERNMENT-WIDE STANDARDS.
``(a) Repeals.--(1) Part A of title VI of the Department of
Energy Organization Act and its catchline (42 U.S.C. 7211,
7212, and 7218) are repealed.
``(2) Section 308 of the Energy Research and Development
Administration Appropriation Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1977 (42 U.S.C. 5816a) is repealed.
``(3) Section 522 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(42 U.S.C. 6392) is repealed.
``(b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The table of contents for
the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by
striking out the items relating to part A of title VI
including sections 601 through 603.
``(2) The table of contents for the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act is amended by striking out the matter
relating to section 522.''.
``SEC. . CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION REQUIREMENTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
``(1) No individual acting within the scope of that
individual's employment with a Federal agency or department
shall be personally subject to civil or criminal sanctions,
for any failure to comply with an environmental cleanup
requirement under the Solid Waste Disposal Act or the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act or an analogous requirement under comparable
Federal, State, or local laws, where the failure to comply is
due to lack of funds requested or appropriated to carry out
such requirement. Federal and State enforcement authorities
shall refrain from enforcement action in such circumstances.
``(2) If appropriations by the Congress for fiscal year
1996 or any subsequent fiscal year are insufficient to fund
any such environmental cleanup requirements, the Committees
of Congress with jurisdiction shall examine the issue, elicit
the views of Federal agencies, affected States, and the
public, and consider appropriate statutory amendments to
address personal criminal liability, and any related issues
pertaining to potential liability of any Federal agency or
department or its contractors.''
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the amendment that I have offered
addresses two crucial management issues for the defense-related
environmental restoration and waste management programs authorized in
this bill. The first issue is the continued existence of obsolete
conflict-of-interest and financial reporting requirements at the
Department of Energy that conflict with governmentwide standards. These
requirements result in unnecessary duplication of effort and have
deterred outstanding individuals from accepting managerial positions
within the Department. The second issue is the impending imposition of
criminal liability for Federal managers of environmental cleanup
activities in the case of a funding shortfall that prevents full
compliance with the law. Action on these management issues is
essential, if defense environmental restoration and waste management
programs are to succeed.
My amendment will remove the first of these two obstacles and express
the sense of the Congress on the the second.
The first part of my amendment repeals three sections of the
Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91, that were
enacted in 1977 and that deal with conflict-of-interest requirement for
departmental employees. It also repeals two other free-standing
financial reporting requirements enacted as parts of other legislation
in 1977. All of these requirements were enacted prior to passage of
governmentwide ethics requirements in the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, and in some sense served as a prototype for these requirements.
Since the passage of the Ethics in Government Act and the Ethics Reform
Act of 1989, though, the need for specific ethics and financial
reporting requirements in DOE that are different from governmentwide
requirements has disappeared.
Adoption of this provision would not affect the applicability of
governmentwide conflict-of-interest and financial reporting
requirements to DOE employees. These restrictions, codified in 18
U.S.C. 207 and 208, 41 U.S.C. 423, and 5 CFR 2634 are not affected by
the amendment and would remain fully in force for DOE employees.
The Senate has, on four different occasions during the last two
Congresses, approved language to repeal these requirements--in the
Energy Policy and
[[Page S 12602]]
Conservation Act Amendments of 1994, S. 2251, the Department of Energy
Laboratory Partnership Act of 1994, S. 473, the fiscal year 1994
Department of Defense authorization bill S. 1298, and the fiscal year
1992-93 Department of Defense authorization bill. In addition, Congress
has twice enacted into law temporary suspensions affecting the sections
of the Department of Energy Organization Act that would be repealed by
this amendment.
The Department of Energy and the administration strongly support this
part of my amendment. Repeal of these provisions has also been
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences in its 1992 report on
``Science and Technology Leadership in American Government: Ensuring
the Best Presidential Appointments.''
I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the administration
transmitting the text of this part of the amendment and supporting the
repeal of these provisions be printed in the Record following my
statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the second part of my amendment provides
the sense of the Congress on an issue that, if unresolved, will greatly
increase the difficulty of attracting and retaining the best managers
possible for cleanup activities. Under the Federal Facility Compliance
Act of 1992, beginning on this October 6, Federal managers in the DOD
and DOE cleanup programs will incur criminal liability for instances of
noncompliance resulting from funding shortfalls. They literally can be
sent to jail under State or Federal law if the appropriations acts do
not contain enough funding to satisfy every last requirement of every
State and local solid or hazardous waste law. No manager, scientist, or
engineer worth having in a cleanup program can be expected to be
attracted to a job in which they are exposed to this sort of criminal
sanction.
This potential criminal liability problem may become very real very
soon, depending on the outcome of the conference on the Energy and
Water Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1996. The Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, of which I
am the ranking member, reported a bill that was passed by the Senate
and that fully funded the President's budget request for the Department
of Energy environmental management program for fiscal year 1996. We
will strongly support the Senate position in conference against a House
mark for this program that is far smaller. I hope that we prevail. In
any case, it is clear that the problem of appropriating funds to meet
the expanding requirements of the DOE environmental management program
will become increasingly acute over the next several years. I strongly
believe that we should start thinking about this problem now, in a
deliberative manner, rather than wait for a crisis.
My amendment provides the sense of Congress that--
(1) individuals acting within the scope of their employment
shall not be personally subject to civil or criminal sanction
for any failure to comply with environmental cleanup
requirements under the Solid Waste Disposal Act or the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, or an analogous requirement under comparable
Federal, State, or local laws, where the noncompliance is due
to lack of funds; and
(2) if appropriations are insufficient to fund
environmental cleanup requirements, the Congress shall
consider appropriate statutory amendments to address
potential liability issues for Federal agencies and
contractors, after an examination by the appropriate
Committees, and after affected Federal agencies, States, and
the public have had an opportunity to express their views.
This amendment has been cleared on both sides by the Committee on
Environment and Public Works and the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
I urge its adoption.
Exhibit 1
The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC, April 28, 1995.
The Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker. Enclosed is proposed legislation that
would place employees of the Department of Energy on the same
basis as most other government employees with respect to
restrictions on holding financial interests that have the
potential to conflict with official responsibilities, and
with respect to financial disclosure requirements.
The legislation would repeal the divestiture provision of
the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOE Act) and
related disclosure statutes that were enacted in the mid-
seventies. The criminal conflict of interest statutes, the
standardized financial disclosure rules under the Ethics in
Government Act, and the executive branch standards of conduct
which are now in place make these provisions no longer
necessary.
More specifically, the enclosed proposal would repeal the
divestiture provision in part A of title VI of the DOE Act
and also would repeal disclosure provisions in other laws
that were superseded but not repeated by part A when it was
enacted. The divestiture provision was the only conflict-of-
interest provision of the DOE Act not repealed by section
3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-160). That Act repealed several
obsolete conflict-of-interest requirements concerning
financial disclosure, post-employment restrictions, and
participation restrictions, and was a significant step in
ensuring consistency in the application of conflict-of-
interest requirements throughout the executive branch.
In addition to repealing most of the Department's obsolete
conflict-of-interest provisions, section 3161 required the
enclosed report on the divestiture provision. The Department
submitted this report to Congress on April 8, 1994, after its
review by the Office of Government Ethics which has no
objection to repeal of the divestiture provision. The report
affirms our earlier conclusion that the divestiture
requirement is obsolete, overly broad, and unnecessary, and
our recommendation that it should be repealed.
The Department of Energy has been and continues to be
strongly committed to the highest ethnical standards. Every
employee of the Department is expected to follow not only the
letter of the conflict-of-interest laws and regulations, but
also their spirit. Elimination of the Department of Energy
divestiture provision that, more often than not, requires
divestiture when there is no actual conflict-of-interest,
would lessen employee perception that the conflict-of-
interest rules are arbitrary and unfair. Approval of this
proposal would be a significant step in ensuring consistency
in the application of conflict-of-interest requirements
throughout the executive branch, and we request its prompt
consideration.
If these provisions are eliminated, the conflict-of-
interest concerns underlying the divestiture provision will
continue to be addressed by a statute and regulations
applicable to all executive branch employees. These
regulations were promulgated by the Office of Government
Ethics (Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the
Executive Branch, 5 CFR Pan 2635) and provide a mechanism for
the Department to issue supplemental regulations that would
prohibit or restrict the acquisition or holding of a
financial interest or a class of financial interests by
agency employees, or any category of agency employees, based
on the agency's determination that the acquisition or holding
of such financial interests would cause a reasonable person
to question the impartiality and objectivity with which
agency programs are administered. If needed, regulations to
this effect will be pursued.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that from
the standpoint of the President's program there is no
objection to the submission of this proposal.
Sincerely,
Hazel R. O'Leary.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as stated by Senator Johnston, the
proposed amendment was cleared by both sides. I would like to briefly
comment on the amendment. First, I feel that the conflict of interest
provisions are consistent with past Senate efforts to eliminate agency-
specific requirements that are no longer necessary. Second, the Sense
of the Senate related to environmental restoration addresses concerns
related to civil and criminal liability of individual Federal employees
acting within the scope of their employment. The sense of the Senate
specifically provides that Federal employees shall not be held
personally liable for a failure to fulfill an environmental cleanup
requirement that is the result of insufficient congressional
appropriations. I support the amendment, as offered by Senator
Johnston.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would repeal conflict of
interest laws applicable only to DOE and not other agencies. It sets
forth a sense of the Senate that executive branch officials should not
be held criminally liable for failure to implement an environmental
cleanup requirement where the failure is attributable to insufficient
funding.
I believe this has been cleared by the majority.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2458) was agreed to.
[[Page S 12603]]
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2459
(Purpose: To authorize the conveyance of the William Langer Jewel
Bearing Plant to the Job Development Authority of the City of Rolla,
North Dakota)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of
Senators Dorgan and Conrad and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Dorgan, for
himself, and Mr. Conrad, proposes an amendment numbered 2459.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 487, after line 24, add the following:
SEC. 2838. LAND CONVEYANCE, WILLIAM LANGER JEWEL BEARING
PLANT, ROLLA, NORTH DAKOTA.
(a) Authority To Convey.--The Administrator of General
Services may convey, without consideration, to the Job
Development Authority of the City of Rolla, North Dakota (in
this section referred to as the ``Authority''), all right,
title, and interest of the United States in and to a parcel
of real property, with improvements thereon and all
associated personal property, consisting of approximately
9.77 acres and comprising the William Langer Jewel Bearing
Plant in Rolla, North Dakota.
(b) Condition of Conveyance.--The conveyance authorized
under subsection (a) shall be subject to the condition that
the Authority--
(1) use the real and personal property and improvements
conveyed under that subsection for economic development
relating to the jewel bearing plant;
(2) enter into an agreement with an appropriate public or
private entity or person to lease such property and
improvements to that entity or person for such economic
development; or
(3) enter into an agreement with an appropriate public or
private entity or person to sell such property and
improvements to that entity or person for such economic
development.
(c) Preference for Domestic Disposal of Jewel Bearings.--
(1) In offering to enter into agreements pursuant to any
provision of law for the disposal of jewel bearings from the
National Defense Stockpile, the President shall give a right
of first refusal on all such offers to the Authority or to
the appropriate public or private entity or person with which
the Authority enters into an agreement under subsection (b).
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term ``National
Defense Stockpile'' means the stockpile provided for in
section 4 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock
Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98(c)).
(d) Availability of Funds for Maintenance and Conveyance of
Plant.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
available in fiscal year 1995 for the maintenance of the
William Langer Jewel Bearing Plant in Public Law 103-335
shall be available for the maintenance of that plant in
fiscal year 1996, pending conveyance, and for the conveyance
of that plant under this section.
(e) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the property conveyed under this section shall
be determined by a survey satisfactory to the Administrator.
The cost of such survey shall be borne by the Administrator.
(f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Administrator may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance under this section as the Administrator
determines appropriate to protect the interests of the United
States.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to the
defense authorization bill. I would like to take a bit of time to
describe my amendment.
My amendment would expedite the conveyance of the William Langer
Jewel Bearing Plant in Rolla, ND, to the Job Development Authority of
the city of Rolla. The amendment would enable the General Services
Administration to transfer the plant to the authority more quickly, and
in a way that would enable the plant to continue as a going enterprise.
My senior colleague from North Dakota, Senator Conrad, is cosponsoring
this amendment, and the Defense Department and the General Services
Administration have no objection to the amendment.
Let me just give my colleagues a bit of background on the Langer
Plant. The Langer Plant has roots in the Cold War. Back in the 1950's,
when we were in the depths of the cold war, the Congress and the
administration took a long look at our defense industrial base. Our
defense leadership realized that we at that point lacked the ability to
produce jewel bearings, which are finely machined bits of carborundum.
These bearings were crucial components in military avionics systems.
The Congress located the plant in North Dakota because of our
strategic location. The idea was to put this crucial facility in the
middle of our country, where enemies could not easily reach it. It
seems a startling consideration, but it is the way people were thinking
at the time. So the William Langer Jewel Bearing Plant has been making
jewel bearings for the Federal Government since the 1950s.
My colleagues should also know that the plant is a few miles from the
Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Of the plant's hundred or so
employees remaining after a downsizing, about 60 percent are Native
American. The Langer Plant brings crucial skilled jobs to an
economically depressed area.
Since the plant's founding, Bulova Corp. has run the plant for the
Pentagon on a Government-owned, contractor-operated basis. However,
changing technology has led the Defense Logistics Agency to declare the
plant excess to the Defense Department's needs. The National Defense
Stockpile no longer needs to buy jewel bearings. So the Defense
Department has reported the plant to the General Services
Administration as excess property.
Last year, the Senate Appropriations Committee's report on the
Defense Appropriations Act for this fiscal year provided funding to
ensure that the plant succeed in its transition from a Government-owned
military supplier to a more commercially oriented firm that also
remains a viable part of the defense industrial base. This amendment
will help complete the plant's transition to commercial operation.
Those of my colleagues who are dealing with base closures and defense
downsizing know that Rolla faces a crisis and an opportunity with
regard to this plant. The future of this factory depends on its ability
to become a commercial manufacturer. While the plant has always sold
jewel bearings and related items in the commercial market, it is
redoubling its efforts. Its chief commercial products are ferrules,
which connect fiber optic cables. Japanese firms dominate volume
production of ferrules, but the plant is establishing itself as a
supplier of specialty ferrules in niche markets.
I would also note that while the Federal Government no longer needs
jewel bearings, it does require the kind of unique micromanufacturing
capability that the William Langer Plant provides.
The plant also manufactures dosimeters, which measure doses of
nuclear radiation. Dosimeters are vital to the military, to commercial
utilities that operate nuclear reactors, and to FEMA's emergency
preparedness programs. FEMA has indicated that it will work with new
ownership and management of the plant to maintain the plant's
capability to manufacture dosimeters. So the plant's employees have
several reasons to hope that the plant will survive in the long run.
However, the plant badly needs legislative help in the short run. The
normal excess property procedure would require the GSA to sell the
plant for fair market value. The problem is that no local entity can
afford the plant, which has an original cost of $4.2 million. The plant
itself is not now healthy enough in a business sense to finance its own
acquisition by a new management team. My amendment's provision that the
GSA may convey the plant without consideration is therefore vital to
the plant's ability to make a successful transition from Government
contracts to commercial operations.
I would like to stress to my colleagues that the Rolla community, the
State of North Dakota, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa, and the
local business community have been working hard to ensure that the
plant makes a successful transition to the private sector. The local
community is united behind the plan to transfer the plant to the Job
Development Authority of the city of Rolla. Under my amendment, the
authority will be able to lease the plant for economic development
purposes. The intent of the amendment is to provide both flexibility
for commercializing the plant and
[[Page S 12604]]
accountability to the Federal Government for the plant's future.
Mr. President, to sum up, I would simply say to my colleagues that
this amendment tries to give a helping hand to the Langer plant and the
city of Rolla, while relieving the Federal Government of a facility
that it no longer needs.
I understand that the amendment will be accepted unanimously, and I
thank the managers on both sides, Senators Thurmond and Nunn, and the
senior Senator from Ohio, Senator Glenn, for their support of this
amendment, as well as their staffs for their assistance with this
amendment.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes the administrator
of the General Services Administration to convey the William Langer
Jewel Bearing Plant, 9.77 acres of real property, to the city of Rolla,
ND. DOD declared the property in excess to its needs in July. GSA
conducted a screening of the property and found there are no other
Federal interests in the facility. I believe this has been cleared on
the other side.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this particular amendment has the support
of this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2459) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2460
(Purpose: To authorize a land exchange, U.S. Army Reserve Center,
Gainesville, GA)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment
numbered 2460.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 487, below line 24, add the following:
SEC. 2838 LAND EXCHANGE, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE CENTER,
GAINESVILLE, GEORGIA.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Army may convey to
the City of Gainesville, Georgia (in this section referred to
as the ``City''), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to a parcel of real property (together
with any improvements thereeon) consisting of approximately
4.2 acres located on Shallowford Road, in the City of
Gainesville, Georgia.
(b) Consideration.--As consideration for the conveyance
authorized by subsection (a), the City shall--
(1) convey to the United States all right, title, and
interest in and to a parcel of real property consisting of
approximately 8 acres of land, acceptable to the Secretary,
in the Atlas Industrial Park, Gainesville, Georgia;
(2) design and construct on such real property suitable
replacement facilities in accordance with the requirements of
the Secretary, for the training activities of the Unites
States Army Reserve;
(3) fund and perform any environmental and cultural
resource studies, analysis, documentation that may be
required in connection with the land exchange and
construction considered by this section;
(4) reimburse the Secretary for the costs of relocating the
United States Army Reserve units from the real property to be
conveyed under subsection (a) to the replacement facilities
to be constructed by the City under subsection (b)(2). The
Secretary shall deposit such funds in the same account used
to pay for the relocation;
(5) pay to the United States an amount as may be necessary
to ensure that the fair market value of the consideration
provided by the City under this subsection is not less than
fair market value of the parcel of real property conveyed
under subsection (a); and
(6) assume all environmental liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)) for the real property to be
conveyed under subsection (b)(1).
(c) Determination of Fair Market Value.--(1) The
determination of the Secretary regarding the fair market
value of the real property to be conveyed pursuant to
subsection (a), and of any other consideration provided by
the City under subsection (b), shall be final.
(d) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the parcels of real property to be conveyed
under subsections (a) and (b) shall be determined by surveys
satisfactory to the Sectretary. The cost of such surveys
shall be borne by the City.
(e) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require any additional terms and conditions in connection
with the coneyances under this section that the Secretary
considers appropriate to protect the interest of the United
States.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes the Secretary of
the Army to convey 4.2 acres of real property at an Army Reserve
facility in Gainesville, GA, in exchange for an 8 acres of land in the
Atlas Industrial Park, Gainesville, GA. The exchange is for fair market
value.
I believe this has been cleared. It is an important amendment to the
people in Gainesville, GA, as well as to the Army Reserve, which is
going to get a larger piece of land and also a new reserve facility in
exchange for an existing piece of land at fair market value.
I urge its adoption.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment has the support of this
side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2460) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my understanding is that we will not
conclude the list of amendments which have been agreed to. We will
finish that in the morning. Among those will be one by the Senator from
Virginia that relates to the spent nuclear fuel issue. I will,
beforehand--I repeat, beforehand--have contacted Senators Kempthorne
and Craig for their views. Today, I received a series of telephone
calls, and it was explained that negotiations are still going on with
the Governor of Idaho.
Also, I must say to my colleagues that this is an issue of very
serious concern to the U.S. Navy, because it is impacting on the future
refueling of our naval ships and consequently impacts on their
deployment. It also impacts on the rotation of work among the several
shipyards in handling the refueling and other naval work.
Therefore, I am hopeful that this can be worked out satisfactorily
between the administration and the State of Idaho and the U. S.
Department of Defense. But I am concerned that the progress thus far
leaves this Senator--and I just speak for myself--somewhat
disheartened. Therefore, I will continue to monitor and address this
issue. I may have further remarks on it tomorrow after consultation
with my colleagues, the Senators from that State. But I wish to alert
Senators of the concern of this Senator on this matter.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe that amendment is being worked on
by staff. I think it is either worked out or very close to being worked
out. So I anticipate that we will be in a position to deal with it
tomorrow.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think we will turn to the conclusion of
the Senate's business, unless the Senator has further comments. He is
beating a hasty retreat. It is my lifetime opportunity to do what I
want in the U.S. Senate.
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