[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 136 (Tuesday, September 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12546-S12550]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 2429

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on the Exon amendment No. 
2429.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to clarify the intent of section 
3135 of the Senate's 1996 National Defense Authorization Act which 
provides $50 million for the preparation of hydronuclear experiments 
below a 4 pound TNT explosive equivalent at the Nevada test site. This 
provision does 

[[Page S 12547]]
not authorize hydronuclear experiments. So there is no problem with 
this part of Senator Exon's amendment.
  Furthermore, this provision does not amend or repeal the requirements 
of section 507 of Public Law 102-377, which is also known as the 
Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment on nuclear weapon testing.
  The amendment proposed by Senator Exon basically invokes the 
restrictions of the 1992 Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment on U.S. 
nuclear weapons testing. It is my understanding that the Hatfield 
amendment was not meant to encompass hydronuclear experiments under 4 
pounds.
  Therefore, as long as the proposed Exon amendment is not construed to 
make low yield hydronuclear experiments subject to the Hatfield 
amendment's ban on all nuclear weapons testing after September 30, 
1996, I would have no problem with the second portion of Senator Exon's 
amendment.
  I would like to make some further remarks pertaining to section 3135. 
The Senate passed this provision as an element of the Thurmond-Domenici 
amendment to the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act on August 4, 
1995. On that same day, after vigorous debate, the Senate rejected an 
attempt to remove this provision from the bill by a vote of 56 to 44. I 
maintained then, and I maintain now, that this was a prudent decision. 
I do so in spite of the fact that 1 week after the Senate vote on this 
subject, the President called for a zero yield comprehensive test ban 
treaty. I say this because hydronuclear experiments are the single 
remaining tool available to the United States that is relevant to 
assessing potential safety problems which may arise in the fission 
trigger, or primary stage, of our nuclear weapons as they approach and 
exceed their original design lifetimes. These are not tests of nuclear 
weapons output. These are not tests aimed at development of new 
weapons. They are experiments aimed at primarily assessing the safety 
of he unboosted implosion of the fissle core assembly from a nuclear 
weapon.
  Now, during our debate on this subject, the executive summary of a 
report of hydronuclear experiments by the JASON committee came up and 
was reported into the Record. This report has been represented to be a 
purely scientific study, but a careful reading shows that its 
conclusions are based on preconceived politics and policy. The report 
concludes that we don't need to do hydronuclear experiments under 4 
pounds. Although the JASON report says that low yield hydronuclears 
were useful for safety assessments, it concludes that we don't need to 
do hydronuclears because the JASON's don't anticipate safety problems 
with the current stockpile. This is simply an unsupported assertion.
  We found out some other interesting things about the JASON report 
after the debate. First, we asked DOE for the full classified JASON 
report. We were told that it was not finished and that it would be 
available in 3 or 4 weeks. Evidently, the nuclear weapons laboratory 
officials with the ultimate responsibility for the stockpile were not 
given an opportunity to review the JASON report before the President's 
announcement on a zero yield comprehensive test ban treaty. Second, we 
found out that the individuals selected for this JASON committee were 
not experts in nuclear weapons and that they called on the services of 
four current and former nuclear weapons laboratory experts to serve as 
consultants to the JASON members. Why did DOE not go to its own experts 
to begin with? So we talked to the two lab experts who dealt with the 
JASON's. They both agreed that tests in the 500 ton range would be of 
greatest value to the U.S. nuclear weapons program. On hydronuclear 
experiments below 4 pounds, these two had a genuine technical 
disagreement. The expert who found hydronuclear experiments to be of 
value told us that his material was dropped from the report by the 
JASON's chairman. He told us that his material ``wound up on the 
cutting room floor.''
  Upon further inquiry we found that the chairman of this particular 
JASON committee is an expert in high energy physics. His resume also 
says that he is an arms control specialist. In fact, he has been a 
Director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. He is a 
close adviser to Secretary O'Leary. Why should the nuclear weapons 
experts from our Government-owned laboratories have to have their work 
filtered through individuals with a clear track record in the arms 
control arena? This has not been the case in the 50-year history of the 
U.S. nuclear weapons program. Last year I alerted this body to my 
concerns about the fact that the Secretary of Energy had surrounded 
herself with many career anti- nuclear advocates. Nothing seems to have 
changed.
  Mr. President, this Senator does not believe that this is an 
objective way to form a committee nor to elucidate expert opinions on a 
subject of such import to national security.
  We then asked DOE for the results of the DOE stockpile confidence 
meeting that took place at STRATCOM in Omaha from the 1st to the 3d of 
June of this year with the nuclear weapons laboratories participating. 
It turns out that the position of the nuclear weapons laboratories at 
this meeting concluded that good confidence in the safety and 
reliability of the enduring stockpile could be maintained with a 
combination of 500-ton tests and the science based stockpile 
stewardship and management program. If 500-ton tests were excluded, 
then we could retain good confidence in weapon safety with hydronuclear 
experiments and the science based stockpile stewardship and management 
program. Without 500-ton tests and hydronuclears, the laboratories 
concluded that there would be a period of vulnerability in our 
stockpile confidence between the end of testing and the realization of 
the goals of the science based stewardship and management program . You 
will not see these conclusions discussed publicly by the 
administration.
  I caution my colleagues to watch this situation closely and not to 
allow the administration to trade real declines in stockpile confidence 
for potential gains on the arms control area. This concludes my 
remarks.
  Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that this amendment be 
adopted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 2429) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to reconsider the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend for a moment? Was the 
Senator referring to Exon amendment No. 2429?
  Mr. THURMOND. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, what is the item before the Senate at this 
point? What is the business of the Senate at this point?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The business before the Senate now is Brown 
amendment No. 2428.


                    Amendment No. 2428, As Modified

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I have been in conversation with both 
Members of our side of the aisle and the Democratic side of the aisle. 
Senator Glenn has had some positive suggestions for my amendment.
  At this point, I send a modification of my amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is 
so modified.
  The amendment (No. 2428), as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC.  . SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING FITZSIMONS ARMY 
                   MEDICAL CENTER, COLORADO.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Aurora, Colorado has 
     been recommended for closure in 1995 under the Defense Base 
     Closure and Realignment Act of 1990;
       (2) The University of Colorado Health Sciences Center and 
     the University of Colorado Hospital Authority are in urgent 
     need of space to maintain their ability to deliver health 
     care to meet the growing demand for their services;
       (3) Reuse of the Fitzsimons facility at the earliest 
     opportunity would provide significant benefit to the cities 
     of Aurora and Denver; and

[[Page S 12548]]

       (4) Reuse of the Fitzsimons facility by the local community 
     ensures that the property is fully utilized by providing a 
     benefit to the community.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--Therefore, it is the sense of 
     Congress that upon acceptance of the Base Closure list--
       (1) The federal screening process for all military 
     installations, including Fitzsimons Army Medical Center 
     should be accomplished at the earliest opportunity;
       (2) To the extent possible, the Secretary of the military 
     departments should consider on an expedited basis 
     transferring appropriate facilities to Local Redevelopment 
     Authorities while still operational to ensure continuity of 
     use to all parties concerned, in particular, the Secretary of 
     the Army should consider an expedited transfer of Fitzsimons 
     Army Medical Center because of significant preparations 
     underway by the Local Redevelopment Authority;
       (3) The Secretaries should not enter into leases with Local 
     Redevelopment Authorities until the Secretary concerned has 
     established that the lease falls within the categorical 
     exclusions established by the Military Departments pursuant 
     to the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et 
     seq.);
       (4) This section is in no way intended to circumvent the 
     decisions of the 1995 BRAC or other applicable laws;
       (c) Report.--180 days after the enactment of this Act the 
     Secretary of the Army shall provide a report to the 
     appropriate committees of the Congress on the Fitzsimons Army 
     Medical Center that covers--
       (1) The results of the federal screening process for 
     Fitzsimons and any actions that have been taken to expedite 
     the review;
       (2) Any impediments raised during the federal screening 
     process to the transfer or lease of Fitzsimons Army Medical 
     Center;
       (3) Any actions taken by the Secretary of the Army to lease 
     the Fitzsimons Army Medical Center to the local redevelopment 
     authority;
       (4) The results of any environmental reviews under the 
     National Environmental Policy Act in which such a lease would 
     fall into the categorical exclusions established by the 
     Secretary of the Army; and
       (5) The results of the environmental baseline survey and a 
     finding of suitability or nonsuitability.

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, this modification incorporates the 
suggestions of the distinguished Senator from Ohio, Senator Glenn. It 
clarifies some of the aspects of the sense of the Congress relating to 
Fitzsimons and broadens some of the sense of the Congress measures 
included therein, including a wish that the procedures involved in 
disposing of facilities be expedited for not just Fitzsimons, but other 
facilities as well, when it is appropriate.
  Mr. President, it is my understanding that this amendment has the 
approval of both sides. I ask at this time for its adoption.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I understand it is acceptable on both 
sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as modified.
  The amendment (No. 2428), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BROWN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, again, I urge all Senators who have 
amendments to the defense authorization bill to come to the floor and 
offer those amendments. We want to finish this bill today. We do not 
want to stay here until 12, 1, or 2 o'clock tonight. I urge all 
Senators--and I hope the staffs will tell them if they are here, and I 
hope the offices will listen and let the Senators know--to come and 
offer their amendments, if they have any.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I compliment the work of Senator Thurmond. 
I have great respect for him, as well as the work of Senator Nunn, the 
ranking member. I agree with much of what they do in their work in the 
Senate. I think both of them have a good grasp of defense issues.
  Therefore, it is with reluctance I take the floor today to say I am 
going to be voting against both the Defense authorization bill and the 
Defense appropriations bill.
  Again, let me say that I think much of the work they do is work that 
is extraordinarily important for our country and for the defense of our 
country, but there are some things in this legislation that give me 
some real pause, one of which I simply cannot overcome. That is the 
issue of star wars. I call it star wars; I know others will call it the 
antiballistic missile system or other names.
  No matter what you call it--an ABM system; star wars; or SDI, space 
defense initiative--it is in this legislation, an initiative at this 
time when we are up to our neck in debt in this country, when we have 
very serious fiscal policy problems, and when we are tightening our 
belt and cutting back on job training, saying we will make it more 
expensive for people to send their kids to college because we will cut 
back on student loans, we will make deep cuts in Medicare and Medicaid. 
We are told we do not have the money. At that very moment we now say, 
by the way, all of that concern about spending, do not pay much 
attention to what we were saying there. In this legislation, the 
authorization and appropriations for defense, we say we want to spend 
more. We want to spend more money than the Secretary of Defense asks 
for. In fact, this legislation says we say we want to buy more trucks 
than the Secretary of Defense says he needs. We want to buy more jet 
fighters than the Secretary of Defense says he wants. We want to buy 
more submarines than the Secretary of Defense says are necessary--more 
than are necessary for the defense of this country. This bill says we 
want to spend $7 billion more than the Secretary of Defense has asked 
for. It also says we want to commit ourselves to a star wars program, 
or ABM program, that, according to the Congressional Budget Office, 
will cost between $40 and $48 billion.
  So this legislation says let us initiate a star wars program and 
spend $300 million more just this year for this program to require an 
early deployment--an initial deployment by 1999 and full deployment by 
the year 2003 of a multiple-site national missile defense program.
  This, after the Soviet Union has largely vanished. There is no Soviet 
Union. This, at a time when Russia and others are now destroying 
warheads and missiles as part of our arms control agreement. In fact, 
START I and START II, which, when fully ratified, will mean there will 
be 6,000 fewer warheads in the Russian arsenal, warheads that used to 
be aimed at America--American cities, American population centers--
6,000 fewer warheads because they will be destroyed under START I and 
START II.
  However, this legislation says, even while all this is going on, let 
us begin a new weapons program. Let us begin a new arms race. Let us 
spend $48 billion we do not have on something this country does not 
need.
  The so-called bipartisan agreement is an agreement that changes a few 
words that create, for me, a distinction without any difference at all. 
It says in this agreement,

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as 
     possible, affordable and operationally effective theater 
     missile defenses capable of countering existing and emerging 
     theater ballistic missiles and developing for deployment a 
     multiple site national missile defense system.
  Then it says, ``initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as 
necessary to provide for this national missile defense system,'' 
because they acknowledge the so-called star wars program would violate 
the ABM Treaty so they would have to negotiate with the Russians to 
change the treaty so we can build a multiple-site system, ``and to 
consider,'' they say, ``if these negotiations with Russia fail, the 
option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.''
  The ABM Treaty is the foundation on which all of the arms control 
agreements we have are based. We sat for years with a policy in which 
we had a nuclear triad with nuclear warheads aimed at our adversary--in 
this case the Soviet Union--and they with their nuclear triad with 
nuclear weapons aimed at us. The beginning of the end 

[[Page S 12549]]
of the cold war was the agreements by which, with ABM and START I and 
START II, we now have circumstances where missiles and warheads are 
being dismantled and destroyed, warheads and missiles that previously 
were in silos aimed at the United States are now being destroyed and 
dismantled.
  This legislation says that the very agreement upon which those 
reductions in missiles and warheads is based will be renegotiated and 
changed and destroyed, effectively, because we say we are not 
satisfied. We now want to build a national missile defense system. 
Against whom are we going to deploy a national missile defense system? 
And for what?
  As always seems to be the case when you debate defense spending 
issues on the Senate floor--when you are talking, on the one hand, 
about spending for a hot lunch program, for a feeding program, for a 
nutrition program, for college education help, for financial aid, for 
Medicare, for Medicaid--what we have is a bunch of arm wavers in this 
Chamber who shout and wave their arms and say that those on this side 
of the Chamber are a bunch of big spenders, wild-eyed big spenders on 
some drunken spending spree; every day in every way all they want to do 
is spend the taxpayers' money.
  Now things have changed. This is not about milk. It is not about 
nutrition for kids. This is not about health care. This is about 
building a brand new star wars program. Now the big spenders are on the 
other side of the room. They say: We do not care what the Secretary of 
Defense says, we want to build it. We do not care what the Department 
of Defense says, we need it. We do not care what the intelligence 
experts claim, we think it is necessary. So they say: Let us build a 
brand new, gold-plated boondoggle called the star wars program at the 
very time that we have spent months trying to figure out how to balance 
the Federal budget.
  I do not know all the answers on how you balance the Federal budget. 
But I do know this. You do not start by continuing digging. You know 
the old southern expression, when you find yourself in a hole, stop 
digging. Apparently, some in this Chamber think the solution is you 
start passing out shovels. You do not solve the deficit problems by 
deciding to embark on these kinds of weapons programs. If I felt the 
security needs of the country required this be built, it would not 
matter to me what it cost, then we ought to build it. If it were 
essential to the security of this country that the star wars program be 
built in order to defend America, then there is not any logical 
question left; this country would have to proceed. But there is no 
credible evidence, not a shred of evidence anywhere that I have seen 
that justifies this project.
  People say, ``It is Saddam Hussein. It is North Korea. It is some 
ayatollah in Iran.'' Does anybody seriously believe that the risk from 
Saddam Hussein, or a terrorist country, is a risk that they will get 
hold of an intercontinental ballistic missile with which they will 
launch a nuclear warhead against the United States? Does not everyone 
here, in a thoughtful moment, at least, understand the far more 
credible threat is with a truck bomb, as was evidenced by a couple of 
nut cases who built a bomb, put it in a rental truck, and parked it in 
front of a Federal building?
  Is it not more likely that we will see nuclear terrorism by a 
suitcase nuclear bomb, by a nuclear bomb placed in the trunk of a rusty 
car parked by a dock in New York City? Is that not the far more likely 
threat of nuclear terrorism? Everyone understands that. It is even more 
unlikely that you would see a terrorist nation, if it were inclined to 
launch a nuclear attack against the United States, as ill-advised as 
that would be to do, to do so with an intercontinental ballistic 
missile. It would be with a cruise missile, which would be easier to 
obtain; certainly easier to build. This star wars program is not a 
defense against cruise missiles. No one here, I think, would stand and 
claim it is.
  No, this is, unclothed, a jobs program. It is like every single other 
weapons program I have ever seen here in Congress. It gets life because 
somebody believes it is important to their State and it will create 
jobs.
  The fact is, the first site under this will be built in North Dakota, 
likely, although I think there is also a potential that those who want 
multiple sites, probably, down the road foresee changing the ABM system 
so they will not have to build a site in North Dakota. But the fact is, 
whether it is built in North Dakota or not, I do not think we ought to 
have it, I do not think the country needs it. I do not think the 
country can afford it. I think it is preposterous for us, at this 
point, to be debating, in a defense authorization bill, whether we 
ought to build a $48 billion star wars program.
  The time has passed. This was a 1983 proposal by President Reagan at 
the height of the cold war when the Soviet Union represented our arch 
enemy. The cold war is over. The Soviet Union does not exist. Russia 
now, by agreement with us, is reducing its nuclear arsenal by the 
thousands, destroying and dismantling. Now we have this proposal? It is 
completely out of step with reality, in my judgment. But it is not 
alone. It is simply the biggest and, I think, the most serious problem 
in this bill.
  As I said, this bill builds trucks which the Defense Department did 
not ask for. It builds planes which the Defense Department does not 
need. It builds submarines which the Defense Department does not want. 
In fact, the authorization bill on page 125 says the committee 
recommends $60 million to begin the development of an airship and 
missions system that is militarily significant in scope which is 
operationally capable of developing a counter-cruise-missile 
capability. What this does not quite say--because legislative language 
is always artfully drafted so you cannot understand exactly what they 
are talking about--is on page 125, the $60 million is actually intended 
to buy blimps. Yes, blimps.
  So there is more than one focus of hot air in Washington. Some say it 
is only in the Chamber of the U.S. Senate. It is on page 125. Lighter-
than-air air service--$60 million for blimps. With no hearings, no 
discussion, let us just spend $60 million on blimps. It is, in my 
judgment, the hood ornament on bad judgment: star wars, blimps, trucks, 
planes, and ships that were not asked for and were not needed.
  I would be happy to vote for the bulk of this legislation to provide 
for the defense needs of this country, to provide the kind of equipment 
and to provide for the salaries and benefits of the men and women in 
the Armed Forces that we need to make sure America is strong and free. 
But I will not be part of an effort to decide we should write another 
$7 billion in to buy equipment the Secretary of Defense says he does 
not need. And I certainly will not be a part of those who now decide 
they want to abrogate the ABM Treaty and they reach a compromise in 
language that is a distinction without a difference in which they talk 
about developing for deployment.
  You see, the bill's original language said we are going to deploy 
star wars. So we have a bunch of meetings and people exhaust 
themselves. And after hours and days and weeks, they come up with their 
master compromise. Do you know what the master compromise is? They say, 
``Well, instead of saying we are going to deploy a multiple-site 
national missile system,'' they say, ``We are going to develop for 
deployment a national multiple-site missile system.''
  I am sorry, I went to a school that was small. I graduated from a 
high school class in which I was in the top five. But, you know, it was 
a small school. I guess I have never quite understood with that 
education the niceties or the subtleties of legislative language that 
allows someone to believe after they have negotiated an agreement to 
say, ``Well, it used to say we are deploying it now,'' and in which 
they simply have said, ``We are developing for deployment.'' And there 
is a difference. There is no difference. They are still talking about 
initial development in 1999. They are still talking about full 
deployment in the year 2003 and still requiring that the ABM Treaty be 
renegotiated with the Russians. There is no difference here. A 
distinction maybe. Yes. But a distinction, in my judgment, without a 
difference.
  So I regret to, in a longer fashion than I had intended, say again 
today that I will not be voting for the appropriations or the 
authorization bill. I hope that one of these days when we have another 
discussion about who the wild-eyed spenders are, who the big 

[[Page S 12550]]
spenders are in the Congress, that we can discuss who really wants to 
spend billions that were not asked for, who wants to spend billions 
writing in special projects, who wants to start a star wars program.
  I also hope maybe we can ask them, ``Where are you going to get the 
money? Who are you going to ask to pay for these, or is this going to 
be charged to the taxpayers' credit card like so much of the spending 
is?
  Mr. President, I, if no one else is seeking the floor, ask to be 
allowed to speak for 5 minutes in morning business on a subject 
unrelated to the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.

                          ____________________