[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 136 (Tuesday, September 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12530-S12531]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I first want to say, when I was in the House 
of Representatives, I supported the nuclear freeze. I also want to say 
initially, I think the problem in the world today is not nuclear 
testing, but nuclear weapons.
  Having said that, I feel it is appropriate for me to comment on the 
most 

[[Page S 12531]]
recent issue of the National Journal, the September 2 issue, wherein 
there was a discussion of a recent debate that occurred on this floor. 
The debate was on hydronuclear testing and the need for additional 
funds to support the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons 
stockpile. Mr. President, the Senate ultimately voted to sustain those 
funds, and I am a strong supporter of the decision that the Senate 
made.
  The National Journal noted that the proponents of a strong nuclear 
deterrent stated that the JASON study team supported some of the 
experiments that were at issue in the Senate debate.
  The article also noted that some of my colleagues and the chairman of 
the JASON study committee believe its findings had been misrepresented.
  I am not a Ph.D. scientist and I may not be a weapons expert, but I 
can read English, and I read it very well. If the JASON study findings 
do not reflect the panel's intent, then the authors did not do a very 
good job of making their views clear. As I said earlier, we need to get 
on with treaty compliant experiments, not nuclear tests. The JASON 
study clearly endorsed treaty compliant experiments. I would not 
generally look to the JASON's for guidance on nuclear testing or 
stockpile stewardship issues. This is not their area of expertise, and 
they have not had a credible track record in this area.
  I do want to say, however, that since the proponents of hydronuclear 
experiments or treaty compliant experiments have relied heavily on the 
JASON's to push their agenda, it seems appropriate to use their experts 
to challenge their position.
  Since the debate, I have looked into this matter more deeply. I now 
understand the views of some of the experts on the committee and of the 
experts who provided data to the committee more clearly than I did a 
month ago. I have found that the JASON report has been used to 
misrepresent the views of some of the experts and some of the study 
group members. This is not surprising in a highly political report that 
is trying to reach consensus. Sometimes the only way to reach consensus 
is to be unclear, and that lack of clarity can then be used by both 
sides to press their interpretations.
  I assure you that although there are some in the study group that 
oppose hydronuclear experiments, there are also some who support 
hydronuclear experiments.
  Many of the experts who provided input to the study would disagree 
with some of its conclusions. I understand that. Nevertheless, the 
report did clearly support the subcritical experiments with real 
nuclear material, experiments that some have characterized as 
hydronuclear experiments, experiments that fall within the range of 
experiments being debated that day on the floor of the Senate.
  Mr. President, for those who still question the issues, let me again 
quote from the report. I am reading directly verbatim from the report. 
This is a quote:

       Underground testing of nuclear weapons at any yield level 
     below that required to initiate boosting is of limited value 
     to the United States. However, experiments involving high 
     explosives and fissionable material that do not reach 
     criticality are useful in improving our understanding of the 
     behavior of weapons materials under relevant physical 
     conditions. They should be included among treaty consistent 
     activities that are discussed more fully in the text.

  Mr. President, that is as clear as the English language can be. If 
people on the committee want to disagree with the report as it is 
written, that is their privilege. But I read from the report a month 
ago, and I am reading from it again. The language is very clear. In 
plain English, that clearly supports tests or experiments that 
opponents were trying to prohibit. More importantly, it should be 
understood that the JASON study report is a political report, not a 
technical report. It was created for political reasons, and its 
conclusions were generally preordained. Using the report as a so-called 
consensus of nuclear weapons experts is a misrepresentation. There may 
have been an expert or two on the committee, but that does not mean it 
represents the expert opinion on the issue.
  On the technical level, there is still much for the Senate and the 
public to evaluate. The technical issues are complex and do not lend 
themselves easily to public debate. I will, though, Mr. President, do 
the best I can to make the key issues clear to the Senate and to the 
American public. Bits and pieces of the issue have been addressed in 
various studies, and the whole picture has not been laid before the 
Congress.
  In particular, the loss of confidence that will come from the end of 
testing has not been adequately reviewed. No one who even superficially 
understands the issue will claim that we can maintain the current level 
of confidence in our nuclear weapons system without testing. The 
question is how much confidence do we need.
  When that issue is fully understood by the Congress and the American 
people, we can then properly assess the value of testing and the need 
for testing. My view is clear. We must have the utmost confidence in 
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, and anything we can 
do to achieve that confidence should be done. Second-class confidence 
is irresponsible and unacceptable in a first-class nation.
  In the best case, this means we should continue with nuclear testing. 
In the case we debated last month, it meant getting on with whatever 
experiments the President was prepared to allow. We must continue to 
explore this issue. The debate on testing, stewardship, treaty 
compliant experiments is not over and should not be over until all the 
facts are out.
  I look forward to the JASON report being finalized and published. 
That should help us all understand the basis for the conclusions of the 
study group and perhaps clear up some of the controversy on this issue.
  I also, Mr. President, look forward to the weapons laboratory report 
called for in section 3164 of the Senate version of the National 
Defense Authorization Act, the matter that is now before this body. I 
look forward to it being completed and presented to the Congress. This 
report promises to be a credible technical report, written by real 
nuclear weapons experts.
  In the meantime, I urge the President to get on with the stockpile 
stewardship plan that he has developed, including the treaty compliant 
experiments endorsed by the JASON's and called for in the current test 
ban negotiating positions. The $50 million added by the Senate should 
allow these experiments to begin without further delay. It is time for 
action with respect to implementing all elements of our Nation's 
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
  Mr. President, I appreciate very much the managers of this bill 
allowing me to speak out of order, but certainly this is of relevance 
to the matter before this body.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
allowed to speak for up to 5 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.

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