[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 135 (Friday, August 11, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12330-S12339]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf 
of Senators Nunn, Warner, myself, and Senator Cohen, and ask unanimous 
consent that it be printed in the Record.
  (The text of amendment No. 2425 is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, at the request of the Majority and Minority 
Leaders, Senators Cohen, Levin, Warner, and I have been meeting 
intensively for the past several days to address issues raised by the 
proposed Missile Defense Act of 1995, as set forth in S. 1026, the 
pending national defense authorization bill. The goal of our effort was 
to develop an amendment establishing a missile defense policy that 
could be supported by a broad bipartisan group of Senators. Today, we 
have filed a bipartisan substitute amendment reflecting our best 
efforts to meet that objective.
  I want to begin by expressing my thanks to my three colleagues for 
the diligence, tolerance, and goodwill each of them showed throughout 
the long and, at times, difficult negotiations that have led to the 
agreement embodied in the substitute amendment. I believe the amendment 
is a significant improvement to the version in the bill, and I support 
its adoption.
  The bill as reported set forth a proposed policy for future national 
missile defenses. It also proposed a demarcation between theater and 
anti-ballistic missile defenses. In my judgment, however, and that of 
many other Senators, the proposal addressed these vital issues in a 
manner that unnecessarily presented major difficulties in terms of arms 
control and constitutional considerations.
  Mr. President, I support the development of national missile defense. 
I have supported a missile defense system against limited, accidental, 
or unauthorized attacks since the early 1980's when I called for a 
development of ALPs--an accidental launch protection system. I will 
support the deployment of a system to defend against limited, 
accidental, or unauthorized missile attacks, assuming that the system 
meets the deployment decision criteria set forth in this amendment--it 
must be affordable and operationally effective; an appropriate response 
to the threat, and we must weigh carefully any ABM Treaty 
considerations that could affect a deployment decision.
  The revised version of the Missile Defense Act of 1995, as set forth 
in the bipartisan substitute amendment, addresses these issues in a 
manner that serves three important functions:
  First, it clarifies the intent of the United States with respect to 
decisions about future missile defenses;
  Second, it defuses a potential constitutional contest between the 
Executive and Legislative branches; and
  Third, it makes clear to the international community our policy 
toward the ABM Treaty.
  Let me try to highlight these accomplishments by comparing what was 
in the bill as reported and what the bipartisan substitute amendment 
would provide, if adopted. Section 233 of the bill as reported would 
set forth a policy to ``deploy'' a multi-site national missile defense 
system. The same section of the bill as reported also stated that the 
system, ``will be augmented. . .to provide a layered defense against 
larger and more sophisticated [missile] attacks.'' This phrasing 
confused the stated objective--to have an effective defense against 
accidental, unauthorized, or limited attacks--with the concept of a 
thicker missile defense system to defend against larger attacks. It is 
important to keep the system focused on the appropriate objective--
defending against limited, accidental, or unauthorized attacks.
  The substitute version of section 233 in the bipartisan amendment 
makes the following changes:
  The policy is no longer stated as a binding commitment to deploy a 
national missile defense system. That is a decision that will be made 
in the future. Instead, the national missile defense policy in section 
233(2) of the bipartisan substitute amendment is to ``develop for 
deployment''.
  The substitute adds several important qualifiers, such as:
  The system must be ``affordable and operationally effective''. This 
requirement appears in section 233(2) and is reemphasized throughout 
the amendment.
  The system is limited to addressing only ``accidental, unauthorized, 
or limited attacks''. That qualification, which is set forth in section 
233(2), is repeated throughout the amendment.
  There is no commitment to deploy an augmented system. It depends on 
the threat.
  Under section 233(2) of the substitute, any development of an 
``augmented'' system will also be confined to augmenting a defense 
capability to address ``limited, unauthorized, or accidental'' missile 
attacks.
  One of the most important qualifications under the substitute is the 
requirement in section 233(3) for ``congressional review, prior to a 
decision to deploy the system developed for deployment . . . of: (a) 
the affordability and operational effectiveness of such a system; (b) 
the threat to be countered by such a system, and (c) ABM Treaty 
considerations with respect to such a system.'' These vital issues will 
all be considered before we take any step in the future to authorize 
and appropriate funds for the deployment of a national missile defense 
system.
  Section 235(e)(2) of the bipartisan substitute amendment specially 
requires the Secretary of Defense to provide an assessment as to 
whether deployment is affordable and operationally effective''; and
  Perhaps the most important qualification, both in terms of arms 
control and the separation of powers is section 233(8), which requires 
the Secretary of Defense to carry out the policies, programs, and 
requirements of the entire Missile Defense Act ``through processes 
specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates 
the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.''
  The revised version also contains language taken from the Cohen 
amendment which was approved by a 69-26 vote last week, and which is 
largely incorporated into the substitute amendment in sections 233(2) 
and 237. Collectively, the Cohen provisions encourage the President to 
undertake negotiations with the Russian Federation to provide 
modifications or amendments to allow us to deploy a multisite national 
missile defense in compliance with the Treaty, and, if the negotiations 
are not successful, they call for consultations with the Congress to 
review our options, including our legal right to withdraw.
  Section 235(a) of the bill as reported required achievement of an 
initial operational capability (IOC) for a multisite national missile 
defense system in 2003. The substitute provision in the bipartisan 
amendment calls for development on a timetable that would make it, 
``capable of attaining'' such an IOC, if there is a decision to deploy 
such a system.
  Finally, Mr. President, let me address the theater missile 
demarcation provisions briefly. Section 238 of the bill as reported 
would have established 

[[Page S 12331]]
in permanent law a specific demarcation between theater and strategic 
missile defenses, and would have prohibited the President from 
negotiations or other actions concerning the clarification or 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty and the line between theater and 
strategic missile defenses. The bipartisan substitute amendment strikes 
all of section 238, and provides a limited funding restriction in 
section 238(c), with the following provisions:
  The funding restriction that applies only for fiscal year 1996;
  This substitute restriction applies only to the implementation of an 
agreement with the successor states to the Soviet Union, should one be 
reached, concerning:
  A demarcation between theater and strategic defenses for the purposes 
of the ABM Treaty; and
  Additional restrictions on theater missile defense systems going 
beyond those in the demarcation.
  In addition, to being limited to one year, the substitute funding 
limitation in section 238(c) has three exceptions. The limitation does 
not apply:
  ``To the extent provided'' in a subsequent Act;
  To ``implement that portion of any such agreement that implements'' 
the specific terms of the demarcation set forth in the amendment; and
  To ``implement an agreement that is entered into pursuant to the 
Treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution.''
  Mr. President, there are many other changes for the better in the 
bipartisan substitute amendment. I ask unanimous consent that a line-
in-line-out version of the amendment, comparing the amendment to the 
bill as reported, be printed in the Record. I believe the bipartisan 
substitute amendment provides a useful statement of Congressional 
policy and intent, presented in a framework that makes clear that we 
seek a negotiated set of changes with the Russian Federation to allow 
for more effective defenses against limited missile attacks than either 
side is permitted today. I believe the bipartisan substitute amendment 
is not, and should not be seen by Russia as a threat by the United 
States either to abandon the ABM Treaty or to reinterpret the Treaty 
unilaterally to our advantage. Both we and Russia face a threat of 
ballistic missile attacks; the threats may differ somewhat, but the 
need for defenses should be clear to both sides. What we have to do is 
to arrange for both sides to be able to deploy more effective defenses 
than exist today, against accidental, unauthorized and limited strikes, 
while maintaining overall strategic stability.
  There being no objection, the bipartisan amendment was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

    Bipartisan Amendment Concerning the Missile Defense Act of 1995

       Text from S. 1026, the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1996, Subtitle C of Title II (the Missile 
     Defense Act of 1995) with additions in italic and deletions 
     bracketed.
       On page 49, strike out line 15 and all that follows through 
     line 9 on page 69 and insert the following in lieu thereof:

                      Subtitle C--Missile Defense

     SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Missile Defense Act of 
     1995''.

     SEC. 232. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The threat that is posed to the national security of 
     the United States by the proliferation of ballistic and 
     cruise missiles is significant and growing, both 
     quantitatively and qualitatively.
       (2) The deployment of effective Theater Missile Defense 
     systems can [will] deny potential adversaries the option of 
     escalating a conflict by threatening or attacking United 
     States forces, coalition partners of the United States, or 
     allies of the United States with ballistic missiles armed 
     with weapons of mass destruction to offset the operational 
     and technical advantages of the United States and its 
     coalition partners and allies.
       (3) The intelligence community of the United States has 
     estimated [confirmed] that (A) the missile proliferation 
     trend is toward longer range and more sophisticated ballistic 
     missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental 
     ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within 
     5 years, and (C) although a new indigenously developed 
     ballistic missile threat to the continental United States is 
     not forecast within the next 10 years there is a danger that 
     [there are ways for] determined countries will [to] acquire 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles in the near future and 
     with little warning by means other than indigenous 
     development.
       (4) The deployment by the United States and its allies of 
     effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges, 
     as well as against cruise missiles, can [will] reduce the 
     incentives for countries to acquire such missiles or to 
     augment existing missile capabilities.
       (5) The Cold War distinction between strategic ballistic 
     missiles and nonstrategic ballistic missiles and, therefore, 
     the ABM Treaty's distinction between strategic defense and 
     nonstrategic defense, has changed because of technological 
     advancements and should be reviewed. [is technologically and 
     geostrategically outdated.]
       (6) The concept of mutual assured destruction, which was 
     one of the major philosophical rationales [rationale] for the 
     ABM Treaty [and continued reliance on an offense only form of 
     deterrence, is adversarial and bipolar in nature and is not], 
     is now questionable as a [suitable] basis for stability in a 
     multipolar world [and one] in which the United States and the 
     states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize 
     relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
       (7) [By undermining the credibility of, and incentives to 
     pursue, destabilizing first strike strategies, theater] 
     Theater and national missile defenses can contribute to the 
     maintenance of [strategic] stability as missile threats 
     proliferate and as the United States and the former Soviet 
     Union significantly reduce the number of strategic nuclear 
     forces in their respective inventories.
       (8) Although technology control regimes and other forms of 
     international arms control can contribute to 
     nonproliferation, such measures alone are inadequate for 
     dealing with missile proliferation, and should not be viewed 
     as alternatives to missile defenses and other active and 
     passive defenses.
       (9) Due to limitations in the ABM Treaty which preclude 
     deployment of more than 100 ground-based ABM interceptors at 
     a single site, the United States is currently prohibited from 
     deploying a national missile defense system capable of 
     defending the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii 
     against even the most limited ballistic missile attacks.

     SEC. 233. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) deploy as soon as possible [highly] affordable and 
     operationally effective theater missile defenses capable of 
     countering existing and emerging theater ballistic missiles;
       (2)(A) develop for deployment [deploy] a multiple-site 
     national missile defense system that: [(A)] (i) is [highly] 
     affordable and operationally effective against limited, 
     accidental, and unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the 
     territory of the United States;[,] and [(B)] (ii) can [will] 
     be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a 
     layered defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
     [larger and more sophisticated] ballistic missile threats;
       (B) initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as 
     necessary to provide for the national missile defense systems 
     specified in section 235; and
       (C) consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of 
     withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the 
     provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, subject to 
     consultations between the President and the Senate;
       (3) ensure congressional review, prior to a decision to 
     deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph 
     (2), of: (A) the affordability and operational effectiveness 
     of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such a 
     system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to 
     such a system.
       (4) [(3)] improve existing cruise missile defenses and 
     deploy as soon as practical defenses that are [highly] 
     affordable and operationally effective against advanced 
     cruise missiles;
       (5) [(4)] pursue a focused research and development program 
     to provide follow-on ballistic missile defense options;
       (6) [(5)] employ streamlined acquisition procedures to 
     lower the cost and accelerate the pace of developing and 
     deploying theater missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, 
     and national missile defenses; [and]
       (7) [(6)] seek a cooperative transition to a regime that 
     does not feature mutual assured destruction and an offense-
     only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability; 
     and [.]
       (8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of 
     subtitle C of title II of this Act through processes 
     specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which 
     anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to 
     the Treaty.

     SEC. 234. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) Establishment of Core Program.--To implement the policy 
     established in section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     establish a top priority core theater missile defense program 
     consisting of the following systems:
       (1) The Patriot PAC-3 system, with [which shall have] a 
     first unit equipped (FUE) in fiscal year 1998.
       (2) The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system, with [which shall 
     have] a user operational evaluation system (UOES) capability 
     in fiscal year 1997 and an initial operational capability 
     (IOC) in fiscal year 1999.
       (3) The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, 
     with [which shall have] a user operational evaluation system 
     (UOES) capability in fiscal year 1997 and an initial 
     operational capability (IOC) no later than fiscal year 2002.
       (4) The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system, with [which 
     shall have] a user operational evaluation system (UOES) 
     capability 

[[Page S 12332]]
     in fiscal year 1999 and an initial operational capability (IOC) in 
     fiscal year 2001.
       (b) Interoperability and Support of Core Systems.--To 
     maximize effectiveness and flexibility, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall ensure that core theater missile defense 
     systems are interoperable and fully capable of exploiting 
     external sensor and battle management support from systems 
     such as the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), 
     the Army's Battlefield Integration Center (BIC), air and 
     space-based sensors including, in particular, the Space and 
     Missile Tracking System (SMTS).
       (c) Termination of Programs.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall terminate the [following programs:
       [(1) The Corps Surface to Air Missile system (Corps SAM).
       [(2) The] Boost Phase Interceptor (BPI) program.
       (d) Follow-on Systems.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall 
     develop an affordable development plan for follow-on theater 
     missile defense systems which leverages existing systems, 
     technologies, and programs, and focuses investments to 
     satisfy military requirements not met by the core program.
       (2) Before adding new theater missile defense systems to 
     the core program from among the follow-on activities, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report describing--
       (A) the requirements for the program and the specific 
     threats to be countered;
       (B) how the new program will relate to, support, and 
     leverage off existing core programs;
       (C) the planned acquisition strategy; and
       (D) a preliminary estimate of total program cost and 
     budgetary impact.
       (e) Report.--(1) Not later than the date on which the 
     President submits the budget for fiscal year 1997 under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code [than 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act], the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a report detailing the Secretary's plans for 
     implementing the guidance specified in this section.
       (2) For each deployment date for each system described in 
     subsection (a), the report required by paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection shall include the funding required for research, 
     development, testing, evaluation, and deployment for each 
     fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 through the end 
     of the fiscal year in which deployment is projected under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 235. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) In General.--To implement the policy established in 
     section 233, the Secretary of Defense shall develop an 
     affordable and operationally effective national missile 
     defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or 
     unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable 
     of attaining [which will attain] initial operational 
     capability (IOC) by the end of 2003. Such system [The 
     national missile defense system to be developed for 
     deployment] shall include the following:
       (1) Ground-based interceptors capable of being deployed at 
     multiple sites, the locations and numbers of which are to be 
     determined so as to optimize the defensive coverage of the 
     continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against 
     limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile 
     attacks.
       (2) Fixed ground-based radars and space-based sensors, 
     including the Space and Missile Tracking system, the mix, 
     siting and numbers of which are to be determined so as to 
     optimize sensor support and minimize total system cost.
       (3) Battle management, command, control, and communications 
     (BM/C3).
       (b) Interim Operational Capability.--To provide a hedge 
     against the emergence of near-term ballistic missile threats 
     against the United States and to support the development and 
     deployment of the objective system specified in subsection 
     (a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop an interim 
     national missile defense [capability] plan that would give 
     the United States the ability to field a limited operational 
     capability by the end of 1999 if required by the threat. [, 
     consistent with the technical requirements and schedule of 
     such objective system to be operational by the end of 1999.] 
     In developing this plan [capability] the Secretary shall make 
     use of--
       (1) developmental, or user operational evaluation system 
     (UOES) interceptors, radars, and battle management, command, 
     control, and communications (BM/C3), to the extent that such 
     use directly supports, and does not significantly increase 
     the cost of, the objective system specified in subsection 
     (a);
       (2) one or more of the sites that will be used as 
     deployment locations for the objective system specified in 
     subsection (a);
       (3) upgraded early warning radars; and
       (4) space-based sensors.
       (c) Use of Streamlined Acquisition Procedures.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall prescribe and use streamlined 
     acquisition procedures to--
       (1) reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of 
     developing the national missile defense system specified in 
     subsection (a); and
       (2) ensure that any [the] interim national missile defense 
     capabilities developed pursuant to subsection (b) are 
     operationally effective and on a path to fulfill the 
     technical requirements and schedule of the objective system.
       (d) Additional Cost Saving Measures.--In addition to the 
     procedures prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the 
     Secretary of Defense shall employ cost saving measures that 
     do not decrease the operational effectiveness of the systems 
     specified in subsections (a) and (b), and which do not pose 
     unacceptable technical risk. The cost saving measures should 
     include the following:
       (1) The use of existing facilities and infrastructure.
       (2) The use, where appropriate, of existing or upgraded 
     systems and technologies, except that Minuteman boosters may 
     not be used as part of a National Missile Defense 
     architecture.
       (3) Development of systems and components that do not rely 
     on a large and permanent infrastructure and are easily 
     transported, emplaced, and moved.
       (e) Report on Plan for Deployment.--Not later than the date 
     on which the President submits the budget for fiscal year 
     1997 under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code [60 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act], the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report containing the following matters:
       (1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this section.
       (2) For each deployment date in subsections (a) and (b), 
     the report shall include the funding required for research, 
     development, testing, evaluation, and deployment for each 
     fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 1997 through the end 
     of the fiscal year in which deployment is projected under 
     subsection (a) or (b). The report shall also describe the 
     specific threat to be countered and provide the Secretary's 
     assessment as to whether deployment is affordable and 
     operationally effective.
       (3) [(2)] An analysis of options for supplementing or 
     modifying the national missile defense architecture specified 
     in subsection (a) before attaining initial operational 
     capability, or evolving such architecture in a building block 
     manner after attaining initial operational capability, to 
     improve the cost-effectiveness or the operational 
     effectiveness of such system by adding one or a combination 
     of the following:
       (A) Additional ground-based interceptors at existing or new 
     sites.
       (B) Sea-based missile defense systems.
       (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
       (D) Space-based directed energy systems.

     SEC. 236. CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall undertake 
     an initiative to coordinate and strengthen the cruise missile 
     defense programs, projects, and activities of the military 
     departments, the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the 
     Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to ensure that the 
     United States develops and deploys [highly effective] 
     affordable and operationally effective defenses against 
     existing and future cruise missile threats.
       (b) Actions of the Secretary of Defense.--In carrying out 
     subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that--
       (1) to the extent practicable, the ballistic missile 
     defense and cruise missile defense efforts of the Department 
     of Defense are coordinated and mutually reinforcing;
       (2) existing air defense systems are adequately upgraded to 
     provide an affordable and operationally effective defense 
     [defend] against existing and near-term cruise missile 
     threats; and
       (3) the Department of Defense undertakes a high priority 
     and well coordinated technology development program to 
     support the future deployment of systems that are [highly] 
     affordable and operationally effective against advanced 
     cruise missiles, including cruise missiles with low 
     observable features.
       (c) Implementation Plan.--Not later than the date on which 
     the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1997 under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code [60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act], the Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
     a detailed plan, in unclassified and classified forms, as 
     necessary, for carrying out this section. The plan shall 
     include an assessment of--
       (1) the systems that currently have cruise missile defense 
     capabilities, and existing programs to improve these 
     capabilities;
       (2) the technologies that could be deployed in the near- to 
     mid-term to provide significant advances over existing cruise 
     missile defense capabilities, and the investments that would 
     be required to ready the technologies for deployment;
       (3) the cost and operational tradeoffs, if any, between 
     upgrading existing air and missile defense systems and 
     accelerating follow-on systems with significantly improved 
     capabilities against advanced cruise missiles; and
       (4) the organizational and management changes that would 
     strengthen and further coordinate the cruise missile defense 
     efforts of the Department of Defense, including the 
     disadvantages, if any, of implementing such changes.

     SEC. 237. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

       (a) Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible 
     changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on 
     the provisions of this treaty''.
       (2) Articles XIII and XIV of the ABM Treaty establish means 
     for the Parties to amend the Treaty, and the Parties have 
     employed these means to amend the Treaty.
       (3) Article XV of the ABM Treaty establishes the means for 
     a party to withdraw from the Treaty, upon 6 months notice, 
     ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
     subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
     interests.''
       (4) The policies, programs, and requirements of subtitle C 
     of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes 
     specified within, or 

[[Page S 12333]]
     consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and 
     provides the means for amendment to the Treaty.
       (b) [(a)] Sense of Congress.--In light of the findings and 
     policies provided in this subtitle, it is the sense of 
     Congress that--
       (1) Given the fundamental responsibility of the Government 
     of the United States to protect the security of the United 
     States, the increasingly serious threat posed to the United 
     States by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
     and ballistic missile technology, and the effect this threat 
     could have on the options of the United States to act in a 
     time of crisis--
       (A) it is in the vital national security interest of the 
     United States to defend itself from the threat of a limited, 
     accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack, 
     whatever its source; and
       (B) the deployment of a national missile defense system, in 
     accord with section 233, to protect the territory of the 
     United States against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
     missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and 
     deterrence; and
       (2)(A) the Senate should [(A)] undertake a comprehensive 
     review of the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty 
     with the intent of providing additional policy guidance on 
     the future of the ABM Treaty during the second session of the 
     104th Congress; and
       (B) upon completion of the review, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, in consultation with the Committee on Armed 
     Services and other appropriate committees, should report its 
     findings to the Senate.
       [(B) consider establishing a select committee to carry out 
     the review and to recommend such additional policy guidance 
     on future application of the ABM Treaty as the select 
     committee considers appropriate; and
       [(2) the President should cease all efforts to modify, 
     clarify, or otherwise alter United States obligations under 
     the ABM Treaty pending the outcome of the review.
       [(b) ABM Treaty Negotiating Record.--(1) To support the 
     comprehensive review specified in subsection (a), the 
     Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other appropriate 
     officials of the executive branch, shall provide the Senate 
     with a complete, declassified version of the ABM Treaty 
     negotiating record, including--
       [(A) within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, an index of the documents comprising the negotiating 
     record; and
       [(B) within 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the documents comprising the negotiating record in 
     unclassified form.
       [(2) If the Secretary considers it necessary to do so, the 
     Secretary may submit the documents referred to in paragraph 
     (1)(B) in classified form when due under that paragraph. If 
     the Secretary does so, however, the Secretary shall submit 
     the documents in unclassified form within 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       [(c) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense, after consultation 
     with any select committee established in accordance with 
     subsection (a)(1)(B) or, if no select committee, the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, may waive the 
     declassification requirement under subsection (b) on a 
     document by document basis.]
     SEC. 238. PROHIBITION ON FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT AN INTERNATIONAL 
                   AGREEMENT CONCERNING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 
                   SYSTEMS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 provides that the ABM Treaty does not 
     apply to or limit research, development, testing, or 
     deployment of missile defense systems, system upgrades, or 
     system components that are designed to counter modern theater 
     ballistic missiles, regardless of the capabilities of such 
     missiles, unless those systems, system upgrades, or system 
     components are tested against or have demonstrated 
     capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.
       (2) Section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995 provides that the United States shall 
     not be bound by any international agreement that would 
     substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is 
     entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the 
     President under the Constitution.
       (3) the demarcation standard described in subsection (b)(1) 
     is based upon current technology.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) unless a missile defense system, system upgrade, or 
     system component, including one that exploits data from 
     space-based or other external sensors, is flight tested 
     against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of 
     3,500 kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second, 
     such missile defense system, system upgrade, or system 
     component has not been tested in an ABM mode nor deemed to 
     have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic 
     missiles, and
       (2) any international agreement that would limit the 
     research, development, testing, or deployment of missile 
     defense systems, system upgrades, or system components that 
     are designed to counter modern theater ballistic missiles in 
     a manner that would be more restrictive than the criteria in 
     paragraph (1) should be entered into only pursuant to the 
     treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution.
       (c) Prohibition on Funding.--Funds appropriated or 
     otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for 
     fiscal year 1996 may not be obligated or expended to 
     implement an agreement with any of the independent states of 
     the former Soviet Union entered into after January 1, 1995 
     that would establish a demarcation between theater missile 
     defense systems and anti-ballistic missile systems for 
     purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the 
     performance, operation, or deployment of United States 
     theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent 
     provided in an act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to 
     implement that portion of any such agreement that implements 
     the criteria in subsection (b)(1); or (3) to implement such 
     an agreement that is entered into pursuant to the treaty 
     making power of the President under the Constitution.
     [SEC. 238. STANDARD FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM 
                   TREATY.

       [(a) Policy Concerning Systems Subject to ABM Treaty.--
     Unless and until a missile defense or air defense system, 
     system upgrade, or system component, including one that 
     exploits data from space based or other external sensors 
     (such as the Space and Missile Tracking System, which can be 
     deployed as an ABM adjunct, or the Navy's Cooperative 
     Engagement Capability), is flight tested in an ABM qualifying 
     flight test (as defined in subsection (c)), such system, 
     system upgrade, or system component--
       [(1) has not, for purposes of the ABM Treaty, been tested 
     in an ABM mode nor been given capabilities to counter 
     strategic ballistic missiles; and
       [(2) therefore is not subject to any application, 
     limitation, or obligation under the ABM Treaty.
       [(b) Prohibitions.--(1) Appropriated funds may not be 
     obligated or expended by any official of the Federal 
     Government for the purpose of--
       [(A) prescribing, enforcing, or implementing any Executive 
     order, regulation, or policy that would apply the ABM Treaty 
     (or any limitation or obligation under such Treaty) to 
     research, development, testing, or deployment of a missile 
     defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or system 
     component, including one that exploits data from space based 
     or other external sensors; or
       [(B) taking any other action to provide for the ABM Treaty 
     (or any limitation or obligation under such treaty) to be 
     applied to research, development, testing, or deployment of a 
     missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or 
     system component, including one that exploits data from space 
     based or other external sensors.
       [(2) This subsection shall cease to apply with respect to a 
     missile defense or air defense system, system upgrade, or 
     system component, including one that exploits data from space 
     based or other external sensors, when that system, system 
     upgrade, or system component has been flight tested in an ABM 
     qualifying flight test.
       [(c) ABM Qualifying Flight Test Defined.--For purposes of 
     this section, an ABM qualifying flight test is a flight test 
     against a ballistic missile which, in that flight test, 
     exceeds (1) a range of 3,500 kilometers, or (2) a velocity of 
     5 kilometers per second.
       [(d) Actions of the Secretary of Defense.--Not later than 
     60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and each 
     year thereafter in the annual report of the Ballistic Missile 
     Defense Organization, the Secretary of Defense shall certify 
     to Congress that no United States missile defense or air 
     defense system, system upgrade, or system component is being 
     limited, modified, or otherwise constrained pursuant to the 
     ABM Treaty in a manner that is inconsistent with this 
     section.
       [(e) Congressional Review of Range and Velocity 
     Parameters.--Congress finds that the range and velocity 
     parameters set forth in subsection (c) are based on a 
     distinction between strategic and nonstrategic ballistic 
     missiles that is technically and geostrategically outdated, 
     and, therefore, should be subject to review and change as 
     part of the Senate's comprehensive review under section 237.]

     SEC. 239. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM ELEMENTS.

       (a) Elements Specified.--In the budget justification 
     materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department 
     of Defense budget for any fiscal year after fiscal year 1996 
     (as submitted in the budget of the President under section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code), the amount 
     requested for activities of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Organization shall be set forth in accordance with the 
     following program elements:
       (1) The Patriot system.
       (2) The Navy Lower Tier (Area) system.
       (3) The Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
       (4) The Navy Upper Tier (Theater Wide) system.
       (5) Other Theater Missile Defense Activities.
       (6) National Missile Defense.
       (7) Follow-On and Support Technologies.
       (b) Treatment of Non-Core TMD in Other Theater Missile 
     Defense Activities Element.--Funding for theater missile 
     defense programs, projects, and activities, other than core 
     theater missile defense programs, shall be covered in the 
     ``Other Theater Missile Defense Activities'' program element.
       (c) Treatment of Core Theater Missile Defense Programs.--
     Funding for core theater missile defense programs specified 
     in section 234, shall be covered in individual, dedicated 
     program elements and shall be available only for activities 
     covered by those program elements.
       (d) BM/C3I Programs.--Funding for programs, projects, and 
     activities involving battle management, command, control, 
     communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I) shall be covered in 
     the ``Other Theater Missile Defense Activities'' program 
     element or the 

[[Page S 12334]]
     ``National Missile Defense'' program element, as determined on the 
     basis of the primary objectives involved.
       (e) Management and Support.--Each program element shall 
     include requests for the amounts necessary for the management 
     and support of the programs, projects, and activities 
     contained in that program element.

     SEC. 240. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

       For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``ABM Treaty'' 
     means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 
     Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, 
     and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow 
     on July 3, 1974.

     SEC. 241. REPEAL OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROVISIONS.

       The following provisions of law are repealed:
       (1) The Missile Defense Act of 1991 (part C of title II of 
     Public Law 102-190; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
       (2) Section 237 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
       (3) Section 242 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160).
       (4) Section 222 of the Department of Defense Authorization 
     Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 613; 10 U.S.C. 2431 
     note).
       (5) Section 225 of the Department of Defense Authorization 
     Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 614).
       (6) Section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180; 101 Stat. 
     1057; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
       (7) Section 8123 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-463; 102 Stat. 2270-
     40).
       (8) Section 8133 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 1992 (Public Law 102-172; 105 Stat. 
     1211).
       (9) Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1595; 10 
     U.S.C. 2431 note).
       (10) Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2701; 10 
     U.S.C. 221 note).

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. This amendment, of course, is the first one recited in 
the agreement just reached less than an hour ago by the U.S. Senate 
regarding the procedures by which the Senate will address the 
authorization bill for 1996. This particular amendment entitled 
``bipartisan amendment,'' is the result of negotiation by myself; the 
distinguished Senator from Maine, Mr. Cohen; the ranking member of the 
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Nunn; and the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan, Mr. Levin.
  We should note that we have served together some 17 years on this 
committee. And the four of us from time to time have often been tasked 
to work through difficult issues, particularly issues relating to 
international matters. It happened many times under the chairmanship of 
Senators Stennis and Tower and Senator Goldwater and, indeed, going as 
far back as Senator Jackson.
  Mr. Cohen and Mr. Nunn initiated many of the discussions which led up 
to this particular negotiation. And during the course of their 
discussions there was a decision of the majority leader, together with 
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond, and indeed 
the Democratic leader, Senator Daschle, that the four of us should try 
to resolve what appeared to be at that time a very difficult gap. And 
indeed, at that time, it was questionable whether that gap could be 
bridged. That has now been done.
  By way of background, I simply want to say, Mr. President, this is an 
issue which has concerned this Senator for many, many years. I was in 
the Department of Defense at the time the ABM agreement was negotiated, 
and by virtue of my office as Secretary of the Navy at that time and my 
responsibility as the principal negotiator of the Incidents at Sea 
Agreement, I was in Moscow in May 1972 with President Nixon, Dr. 
Kissinger, and others at the time the ABM agreement was signed between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.
  I simply note that footnote of history to underline my personal 
knowledge that the ABM Treaty was never, never, never envisioned by the 
drafters or the signatories to apply to theater missile systems. It has 
long been my goal, together with many others here in the Senate, to 
make certain that the ABM Treaty is not reinterpreted or amended or in 
any other way revised so as to put a limitation on the ability of the 
scientific expertise of this country to devise systems to deter and 
then, if deterrence fails, defend against theater missile ballistic 
systems.
  What better evidence for the necessity of these defensive systems 
than what we saw in the gulf war where we, the United States, took the 
single largest number of casualties at any time during that conflict, 
from a single theater ballistic missile, a Scud missile sent by Saddam 
Hussein and his armed forces onto a barracks housing many U.S. military 
personnel.
  This amendment goes a long way, perhaps not as far as this Senator 
and other Senators might have desired, but nonetheless it goes a long 
way toward making it clear that the Administration, as it addresses 
changes, modifications or clarifications to the ABM Treaty, will do so 
in a manner consistent with our Constitution, namely, to come to the 
Senate of the United States under the advice-and-consent clause, to 
make certain that such amendments as may be adopted in the future--
particularly ones clarifying the demarcation between what is a theater 
missile defense system and what is an antiballistic missile system; 
together with others relating to range, velocity, the number of 
deployment sites and the like relating to theater defense systems --are 
all submitted to the Senate so that the Senate is a full partner to any 
decisions by this Nation with respect to future systems for theater 
missile defense. That was the main thrust here.
  In other areas of this amendment we address the clear intention of 
the United States to deploy both a national system as well as a theater 
system. That is consistent with the overwhelming desire of the American 
people that we move forward in this area. Many people in America, the 
vast majority according to polls, think we already have in place 
systems that will protect this great country of ours from an accidental 
attack, an unintentional attack, or a limited attack. But, 
unfortunately, that is not the case. And, likewise, with the theater 
missile defense systems, we should have in place more modernized, more 
effective systems than the current Patriot.
  I believe that the bipartisan amendment on missile defense is a 
significant step forward. As with all such negotiated amendments, 
neither side ended up with everything it wanted. But the result of this 
effort by Senators is a Missile Defense Act of 1995, a substitute to 
the original one in the bill, which sets a clear path to the 
deployment--and I stress the word deployment--of effective missile 
defenses, both theater and national, to protect the territory, citizens 
and forward-deployed forces of the United States.
  This revised Missile Defense Act of 1995 establishes a policy of 
developing for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense 
system capable of defending the United States; and prohibits any final 
effort by the Administration to impose limitations, without the consent 
of the Senate, on the development and deployment of U.S. theater 
missile defense systems by virtue of new interpretations of the ABM 
Treaty of 1972. This Treaty was never intended to apply to theater 
systems of deterrence and defense.
  The principal focus of my remarks today is on the changes made to 
Section 238 of the Missile Defense Act of 1995--the so-called Warner 
amendment which was incorporated by the Armed Services Committee into 
the bill. As it originally appeared, Section 238 used the Senate's 
power of the purse to impose a broad and absolute prohibition on the 
administration's ability to take any action which would impose ABM 
Treaty restrictions on the development and deployment of theater 
missile defense systems. These systems are urgently needed to protect 
the lives of the men and women of the Armed Forces, United States and 
allied, who are forward deployed into hostile situations.
  The bipartisan amendment achieves our goal--namely, to prohibit the 
administration from implementing any agreement with Russia which would 
impose limitations, including performance, operational or deployment 
limitations, on theater missile defense systems, unless the Senate 
exercises, pursuant to a Presidential submission of such agreement, its 
constitutional right of advise and consent. 

[[Page S 12335]]

  Mr. President, as I said last week during the Senate's original 
debate on the Missile Defense Act of 1995, I have long believed that we 
must accelerate the development and deployment of operationally 
effective theater missile defense systems for our troops--defenses that 
are not improperly constrained by the ABM Treaty. Likewise we must, in 
the interest of the American people, make a clear statement of our 
national determination to proceed to a national defense system to 
protect against the threats enunciated in this bipartisan amendment.
  The threat that theater missiles pose to our forces is clear--30 
nations have such systems, and more are acquiring the same capability. 
The gulf war should have caused all Americans to unite behind this 
missile defense effort. What can be more terrifying than the thought of 
U.S. citizens--both at home and deployed overseas--defenseless against 
the type of weapons of terror used by Saddam Hussein? And yet, here we 
are 5 years after that conflict, and our troops are still not 
adequately protected from ballistic missile attacks, and there are 
those who still resist efforts to move forward in this area.
  Mr. President, it became evident to me, earlier this year, that our 
crucial effort to develop and deploy the most capable theater missile 
defense systems was in danger of being unacceptably hampered by the 
administration's desire to achieve a demarcation agreement with the 
Russians. They were actively negotiating toward that goal. Several of 
the negotiating positions either proposed or accepted by the 
administration would have severely limited the technological 
development of U.S. theater missile defense systems, and would have 
resulted in an international agreement imposing major new limitations 
on the United States. Consequently, I have taken actions in 1994 and 
now in 1995 to prohibit such actions by the administration.
  Mr. President, previously I have tried other avenues to have the 
Senate's voice heard on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation. My preferred 
option--and the one which I tried last year--was simply to require the 
President to present to the Senate for advice and consent any 
demarcation agreement which would substantively modify the ABM Treaty. 
The Congress adopted my views and made them part of the fiscal year 
1995 Defense Authorization Act.
  However, despite that legal requirement, the administration has made 
it abundantly clear that it does not intend to submit any such 
demarcation agreement, pursuant to the Constitution, to the Senate for 
advice and consent. Although the administration was negotiating an 
agreement that would, in effect, make the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty, 
administration officials believed that there was no need for the Senate 
to exercise its constitutional right to provide advice and consent to 
that agreement.
  It was clear that a new approach was needed. Therefore, I focused on 
the Congress' power of the purse to ensure that the views of the Senate 
were considered in the demarcation negotiations.
  The bipartisan missile defense amendment preserves this approach. 
Section 238 prohibits the expenditure of funds for fiscal year 1996 to 
implement an agreement that would establish a demarcation between 
theater missile defense systems and ABM systems or that would restrict 
the performance, operation or deployment of U.S. theater missile 
defense systems, unless that agreement is entered into pursuant to the 
treaty making powers of the President, or to the extent provided in an 
Act subsequently enacted by the Congress. In other words, for the 
coming fiscal year the prohibition stands unless the Senate takes an 
affirmative act to change or remove that prohibition.
  In addition, this provision establishes as a sense-of-the-Congress 
the generally accepted demarcation standard between TMD and ABM 
systems. Section 238(b)(1) states that ``unless a missile defense 
system, system upgrade, or system component, including one that 
exploits data from space-based or other external sensors, is flight 
tested against a ballistic missile target that exceeds a range of 3,500 
kilometers or a velocity of 5 kilometers per second, such missile 
defense system, system upgrade, or system component has not been tested 
in an ABM mode nor deemed to have been given capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles.'' This was the standard used by the 
Clinton administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations 
in November 1993. The administration would be well-advised to return to 
that standard.
  Mr. President, I would have preferred a prohibition that would have 
remained in effect for more than one fiscal year. I would have 
preferred a demarcation standard adopted in a binding form, rather than 
as a sense-of-the-Congress. But I believe that the essence of my 
original amendment was preserved in this compromise package.
  This legislation represents a significant step forward in the effort 
to provide the men and women of the Armed Forces with the most 
effective theater missile defense systems that our great nation is 
capable of producing. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Finally Mr. President, I wish to acknowledge my special appreciation 
and respect for Senator Cohen's very valuable contribution to the 
negotiations leading up to the bipartisan amendment. We have worked 
together for 17 years on the Armed Services Committee, and I value his 
advise and counsel.
  I also I wish to commend a number of Members of the Senate, of the 
Armed Services Committee. Senator Smith was very active, and Senator 
Kyl, who is not a member of the committee, was very active in all of 
these negotiations. And I think we have reached a result which is in 
the best interest of the Senate.
  And finally, this agreement would not have been possible without the 
outstanding work of a number of dedicated staff members. In particular, 
Eric Thoemmes of the majority staff of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee was instrumental to the successful conclusion of these 
negotiations. In my 17 years on the Armed Services Committee, I have 
not seen a finer job done by a Professional Staff Member. I thank him 
for all he has done for the Nation's defense. In addition, I would like 
to acknowledge the outstanding contributions of Bill Hoehn, Andy Effron 
and Rick DeBobes of the minority staff of the Armed Services Committee, 
Richard Fieldhouse of Senator Levin's staff, and Judy Ansley and Les 
Brownlee of my staff. A lot of hard work by both Senators and staff 
resulted in a package of which we can all be proud.
  I thank again my distinguished colleague from Michigan for his 
valuable contribution to this effort.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I know my good friend from Virginia must leave, but on his 
way out, I do want him to hear my own feelings about his contribution 
to this institution and to this Nation, and more specifically to this 
agreement.
  A number of us worked day after day after day, and Senator Warner is 
really extraordinary in his commitment to resolving difficult issues in 
fair ways. I just want to tell him, again, what a pleasure it is to 
work with the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, when we debated the national missile 
defense and the antiballistic missile language in the defense 
authorization bill, a number of us felt that the bill was severely 
flawed in a number of ways.
  First, we argued that the provisions in the bill would seriously 
damage our relationship with Russia by stating that we will deploy a 
national missile defense system. Such a statement of commitment to 
deploy would violate our treaty with the Russians, which says that 
neither party will deploy a multiple site system.
  Our good friend from Virginia is, of course, right. The Antiballistic 
Missile Treaty did not cover theater missiles or short-range missiles. 
The missiles which are covered by this treaty are the longer-range 
missiles. But we have a treaty, and that treaty has been an important 
part of a stable relationship 

[[Page S 12336]]
when we had a cold war, and the preservation of our word now is 
particularly important when we are attempting to have a normal 
relationship with Russia.
  The language in the underlying bill which said that it was our 
decision to deploy a system which would violate a treaty with Russia 
was the most troublesome of the language in this bill.
  Those of us who opposed that language and sought to strike it urged 
on the Senate that this was a reckless course of action which could 
jeopardize the nuclear weapons reductions now taking place in the START 
I Treaty, and would also jeopardize the ratification of the START II 
Treaty. Those treaties are going to eliminate thousands of Russian 
nuclear warheads. Those treaties are going to reduce the number of 
Russia's warheads to 3,000, instead of the 8,000 warheads that they 
otherwise would have. That is a huge benefit for the security of the 
United States.
  A decision to undermine the agreement and threaten the reductions 
which it has made possible is very serious business, indeed. That is 
what the Secretary of Defense told us, that is what the Secretary of 
State told us, that is what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Shalikashvili, told us.
  They expressed grave doubts about the bill's language which would 
threaten our relationship with Russia. Those of us who strongly opposed 
the bill's provisions, relative to the ABM Treaty and national missile 
defense, also pointed out that the language unilaterally declared in 
law what the dividing line is between a long-range missile, which is 
covered by the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and a short-range missile, 
or theater missile, which is not covered by the treaty.
  Senator Warner is exactly right, theater missiles are not covered by 
the ABM Treaty; only the long-range or strategic missiles are covered 
by that treaty. But what is the precise dividing line between the two? 
There is great bipartisan support in this body for having defenses 
against theater missiles. That is allowed by the treaty, and it is a 
real threat. But what is the dividing line between the two? That is the 
subject of negotiations, because it is part of a treaty that was 
negotiated.
  But under the bill language, there was a unilateral declaration as to 
what the dividing line was, and there was a prohibition on the 
President negotiating any other dividing line. It is threatening enough 
to a negotiating partner to unilaterally declare something which is the 
subject of discussions and negotiations. It is particularly unsettling 
when the party that is representing us, the President, is not even 
allowed to negotiate anything other than what we declare unilaterally 
to be the dividing line. And the language in the bill, for which this 
language would substitute, actually prohibits the President or the 
President's representatives from sitting down and talking about what 
the dividing line should be. There was a funding prohibition which does 
not allow any funds to be spent even to negotiate, to talk, to discuss 
anything other than the dividing line, which we unilaterally declared 
in the Senate.
  That is extremely unsettling to the negotiator on the other side of 
the table, and it makes it impossible to even discuss the subject 
because the language in this bill prevents anyone on our side to even 
talk to the other side about it.
  Our amendment removes some of these very troublesome provisions. As 
the body well knows, we spent a long time debating this issue. My 
amendment, which would have struck some of the language which I have 
just described, lost by 2 votes. Subsequent to that, Senator Cohen, the 
Senator from Maine who has been a major contributor of just knowledge 
and background in this area, offered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
which was adopted by the Senate but which also raised some issues then 
about the underlying language. And then the President, or at least his 
advisors, indicated that the President would veto this bill based on a 
number of problems that they saw. But a major problem that they pointed 
out as a cause for the recommendation to veto the bill was the language 
relative to national missile defense.
  So, at that point, what the majority leader, the Democratic leader, 
the chairman of the committee and the ranking member of the committee 
did was appoint Senators Warner and Cohen on the Republican side, and 
Senator Nunn and myself on the Democratic side to see if we could 
negotiate a substitute version.
  We have done that. We are going to be presenting it to the Senate for 
its consideration immediately following the recess, and I believe that 
our substitute cures a number of the defects in the underlying 
language.
  First, the substitute amendment is explicit that there is no decision 
in this bill to deploy the national system. For instance, section 
233(3) says that it is the policy of the United States ``to ensure 
congressional review prior to a decision to deploy the system developed 
for deployment under paragraph (2).''
  I repeat this language because it is, to me, some of the most 
critical language in our substitute: That it is the policy of the 
United States ``to ensure congressional review prior to a decision to 
deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph (2) of''--
this is congressional review of--``the affordability and operational 
effectiveness of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such 
a system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to such a 
system.''
  So the substitute is explicit on issues of affordability, military 
effectiveness, the impact on the ABM Treaty, and an assessment of the 
threat that must be made before any deployment decision is made.
  Our substitute amendment allows the President to negotiate the 
demarcation between long-range and short-range missiles. Funds are 
restricted in this substitute for 1 year to implement an agreement 
which sets a different demarcation line, which our sense-of-the-Senate 
language feels is the right demarcation line. But the President is 
permitted to negotiate and, as provided for by our language, is told 
that if there is a different line provided for by those negotiations, 
then the President must come back to us for the funding to implement a 
different demarcation line.
  Now, our substitute does some other important things. It recognizes 
the ABM Treaty in a number of places and in a number of ways. While the 
bill that we seek to amend with this substitute provided for the 
deployment of a multisite system--no ifs, ands, or buts, the ABM Treaty 
be damned--our substitute amendment provides that the development of a 
system for deployment can take place. The development of a system takes 
place, but with plenty of ifs, ands, and buts--before any decision to 
deploy is made.
  I previously made reference to the fact that our substitute 
recognizes the ABM Treaty in a number of places and in a number of 
ways. Let me just briefly mention one of them. In section 233, 
subsection 8, our substitute states that it is the policy of the United 
States to carry out the policy's programs and requirements of subtitle 
C of title II of the act--and these next words are important for my 
point--``through processes specified within or consistent with the ABM 
Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment 
to the treaty.''
  Finally, Mr. President, let me say this. Even current law provides 
for the development for a deployment of a multisite system. But the 
current law attached conditions before any such deployment occurs. That 
is current law. Our substitute also provides that it is the policy to 
develop for the deployment of such a system. But it also attaches 
conditions to any deployment.
  So the substitute amendment, Mr. President, does not commit the 
United States to deploying an ABM system, multisite or otherwise. It 
calls for development of such a system, which is already what we are 
doing, and explicitly requires Congress to review the program ``prior 
to a decision'' to deploy such a system. It also says that the system 
shall be ``capable of being deployed'' at multiple sites but not that 
it must be deployed at multiple sites.
  This substitute amendment limits the scope very clearly of any 
national missile defense system, so that it is intended for use only to 
defend against limited, accidental and unauthorized missile attacks. 
That is very different from the what the star wars system was intended 
to be. 

[[Page S 12337]]

  This substitute amendment is the product of bipartisan negotiation. 
It is a significant improvement, in many respects--and I have only 
enumerated some--over the original version. It was discussed and 
debated by the four of us at great length over a period of a week. I 
particularly thank Senators Nunn, Cohen, Warner, and all of our staffs 
who spent not only day after day, but night after night negotiating 
this bipartisan substitute. I hope it finds favor with the entire 
Senate when we present it as an amendment to the defense authorization 
bill upon our return.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two documents that I 
prepared, the first called ``Missile Defense Act Provisions: Old Versus 
New,'' and the second, entitled ``Missile Defense Act of 1995: 
Substitute Amendment,'' be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               Missile Defense Act Provisions: Old v. New

       Here are two critical questions concerning the Missile 
     Defense Act, and a comparison between the original bill and 
     the new substitute amendment.
       (1) Does the Act commit the U.S. to deploy a national 
     missile defense (NMD) system?
       Answer: The original bill (S. 1026) does commit the U.S. to 
     deploy a multiple site national missile defense system by the 
     end of 2003, and an interim system by 1999.
       The substitute amendment does not commit the U.S. to deploy 
     a national missile defense system. It explicitly requires a 
     congressional review of the program ``prior to a decision to 
     deploy'' an NMD system. (It makes it the policy of the U.S. 
     to ``develop'' an NMD system for deployment.)
       Before Congress makes any decision to deploy a national 
     missile defense system, it must first review four issues: the 
     affordability and operational effectiveness of the system, 
     the threat to be countered by the system, and ABM Treaty 
     considerations.
       (2) Does the Act require the U.S. to violate the ABM 
     Treaty?
       Answer: The original bill does require the U.S. to violate 
     the ABM Treaty by requiring the U.S. to deploy a multi-site 
     NMD system by 2003, perhaps as early as 1999. And it declares 
     it the policy of the U.S. to deploy a multiple-site NMD 
     system.
       The substitute amendment does not require the U.S. to 
     violate the ABM Treaty. It states that U.S. policy is to 
     carry out the provisions of the Missile Defense Act according 
     to or consistent with the ABM Treaty.
                                                                    ____

           Missile Defense Act of 1995: Substitute Amendment

       Side-by-side comparison of the Missile Defense Act in S. 
     1026 and the substitute amendment of August 10, 1995.


                            Sec. 233. Policy

       The bill asserted that the policy of the U.S. was:
       --to ``deploy a multiple site'' national missile defense 
     system that ``will be'' augmented to provide a larger defense 
     in the future.
       The substitute amendment has as the policy:
       --to develop for deployment a national missile defense 
     system that can be augmented.
       --to negotiate with Russia to provide for such a system, 
     based on the ABM Treaty.
       --to consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of 
     withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.
       --the purpose of the system is to defend only against 
     limited, accidental and unauthorized missile attacks a new 
     provision in the substitute amendment states the policy that:
       --Congress shall review the affordability, the operational 
     effectiveness and the threat to be countered by the national 
     missile defense system, and ABM Treaty considerations, prior 
     to deciding whether to deploy the system.
       The last new policy provision:
       --to carry out the policies, programs and requirements of 
     the Missile Defense Act through processes specified in or 
     consistent with the ABM Treaty.


                 Sec. 234. Theater Missile Architecture

       The Bill requires the Pentagon to meet certain dates for 
     the specified programs.
       The substitute amendment:
       --relaxes the requirement to meet those dates,
       --requires a report for each program/date explaining the 
     cost and technical risk of meeting those dates,
       --and requires a report on the specific threats to be 
     countered by each TMD system.


            Sec. 235. National Missile Defense Architecture

       The Bill requires the Pentagon to develop a national 
     missile defense system which will be operational first in 
     2003. It requires the system to include ground-based 
     interceptors ``deployed at multiple sites''.
       The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a 
     national missile defense system that is capable of being 
     first operational by the end of 2003. It states that the 
     system shall include ground-based interceptors capable of 
     being deployed at multiple sites.
       Interim capability:
       The bill required the Pentagon to develop an interim 
     capability to be operational by 1999.
       The substitute amendment requires the Pentagon to develop a 
     plan instead of a capability, and that it would give the U.S. 
     the ability to have such an interim capability in place by 
     1999 if required by the threat.
       The substitute amendment also requires a report that would 
     include information on the cost of the program, the specific 
     threat to be countered, and the Defense Secretary's 
     assessment of whether deployment is affordable and 
     operationally effective.


               Sec. 237. Policy Regarding the ABM Treaty

       The Bill has sense of Congress language that:
       --the Senate should conduct a review of the ABM Treaty,
       --the Senate should consider establishing a Select 
     Committee to conduct the review, and
       --the President should cease all efforts to ``modify, 
     clarify, or otherwise alter'' our obligations under the ABM 
     Treaty.
       The Bill requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a 
     declassified record of the ABM Treaty negotiations. The 
     substitute amendment adds findings related to the ABM Treaty, 
     including that the policies, programs and requirements of the 
     Missile Defense Act can be accomplished in accordance or 
     consistent with the ABM Treaty.
       The substitute amendment:
       --strikes the proposal to establish a Select Committee
       --strikes the proposal that the President cease all efforts 
     to modify or clarify our obligations under the ABM Treaty
       --strikes the entire provision calling for a declassified 
     treaty negotiating record
       --states that the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
     committees should conduct the review of the Treaty.


Sec. 238. Prohibition on Funds to Implement a TMD Demarcation Agreement

       The Bill:
       --states the policy that ``unless and until'' a missile 
     defense system is tested against a target missile with a 
     range greater than 3,500 km or a velocity greater than 5 km 
     per second, it has not been tested ``in an ABM mode'' nor 
     ``been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic 
     missiles'' (both of which are prohibited by the ABM Treaty), 
     and therefore is not subject to ABM Treaty application or 
     restrictions.
       --prohibits any appropriated funds from being obligated or 
     expended by any official of the federal government to apply 
     the ABM Treaty to TMD systems, or for ``taking any other 
     action'' to have the ABM Treaty apply to TMD systems. (This 
     would prevent any discussion or negotiation by federal 
     officials with the Russians to consider any other demarcation 
     than the one specified in the bill.)
       The substitute amendment strikes Sec. 238 and replaces it 
     with:
       --two findings that restate items from previous Acts
       --sense of the Congress language defining the TMD 
     demarcation (3,500 km/ 5kps), and stating that unless a TMD 
     system is tested above the demarcation threshold, the system 
     has not been tested in an ABM mode, nor deemed to have been 
     given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles''.
       --sense of Congress language saying that any agreement with 
     Russia that would be more restrictive than the demarcation 
     provided should require ratification.
       --Binding prohibition on funding: FY 96 DOD funds cannot be 
     used to implement a demarcation agreement unless: provided in 
     a subsequent act (majority vote), or if the agreement goes 
     through the ratification process.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, in June, when the Armed Services Committee 
marked up the Defense authorization bill, the committee voted to put 
the United States on the path to deployment of a highly effective 
system to defend the American people against limited missile attacks.
  Because we want to and must defend all Americans, not just those in a 
particular region of the country, we called for a multiple-site 
defense. And, because we can expect the threat to evolve to become ever 
more sophisticated, we called for a defensive system that would also 
evolve and a research and development program to provide options for 
the future. Since the national missile defense program approved by the 
committee goes beyond that being pursued by the administration, we 
added $300 million above the $371 million requested.
  We also called for deployment of highly effective systems to defend 
our forward deployed forces and key allies and, to ensure this result, 
reorganized the administration's theater missile defense effort. A 
related matter involved negotiations being conducted with Moscow to 
define the line distinguishing TMD from ABM systems. Over the last year 
and a half, the Clinton administration has drifted toward accepting 
Russian proposals to limit TMD systems in unacceptable ways--in effect, 
to subject TMD systems to the ABM Treaty, which was never intended to 
cover theater defenses. The committee addressed this troubling 
situation 

[[Page S 12338]]
with two steps. First, we voted to write into law the Clinton 
administration's initial negotiating position on what constitutes an 
ABM system. And second, we adopted bill language to prevent the 
administration from implementing any agreement that would have the 
effect of applying ABM Treaty restrictions to TMD systems.
  Last week, when the defense authorization act came to the floor, the 
committee's judgment was challenged. One amendment was offered to 
delete the additional $300 million provided for national missile 
defense. And another amendment was offered to eliminate the policy to 
deploy a multiple-site national defense system, eliminate the statutory 
demarcation between TMD and ABM systems, and eliminate the ban on 
applying the ABM Treaty to TMD systems.
  As was the case during the committee's mark-up, these efforts failed 
in relatively close votes.
  Mr. President, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since 1979 
and have spent most of that time in the majority. It has not been our 
practice for the majority to use its position to impose its views on 
the minority. Instead, we have usually sought to develop as broad a 
consensus as possible on important issues of national security.
  In this spirit, Members of the majority also offered amendments on 
the floor to move beyond close, partisan votes toward a broader 
consensus.
  Senator Kyl offered an amendment expressing the sense of the Senate 
that all Americans should be protected from accidental, intentional, or 
limited ballistic missile attack. His amendment setting forth this 
basic principle, which was the basis for the Armed Services Committee's 
action, was approved overwhelming, 94-5.
  And to address the concerns of some Senators that the committee was 
advocating abrogation of the ABM Treaty, I offered an amendment 
affirming that the multiple-site defense we endorsed can be deployed in 
accordance with mechanisms provided for in the ABM Treaty--such as 
negotiating an amendment--and urging the President to negotiate with 
Moscow to obtain the necessary treaty amendment. My amendment was also 
approved by a very large margin, 69 to 26.
  I highlight that vote margin because the bipartisan amendment we have 
negotiated would change even the language of the Cohen amendment, which 
was adopted overwhelmingly by the full Senate. I think this a clear 
indication of how far the majority has been willing to go in 
accommodating the minority in order to build a broader consensus.


                        The Bipartisan Amendment

  The result of the negotiations that have occurred is the bipartisan 
amendment, which is being cosponsored by the four senators designated 
by the two leaders to resolve this issue. In order to reach agreement 
on this amendment, both sides made concessions, although it should be 
noted that many of the agreed upon changes are less concessions than 
clarifications of the Armed Services Committee's intent.
  Senators interested in this matter can read the bipartisan amendment 
and compare it to current text of the bill. Our negotiations involved 
debate over almost every single word in subtitle C. For reasons of 
time, I will merely try to summarize the most important issues.


                         Missile Defense Policy

  In section 233, which addresses missile defense policy, we have made 
a number of changes to clarify the intent of the committee's language.
  The bipartisan text states that ``it is the policy of the United 
States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile 
defense system.'' The difference with the original text is that it 
substitutes the words ``develop for deployment'' for the word 
``deploy.'' While I do not believe there was anything inappropriate 
with the committee's language, this change is consistent with the fact 
that what we are funding in this bill is research and development on 
national missile defense, not procurement. There will be a number of 
authorization and appropriations bills to be acted upon before we begin 
to fund the actual deployment of the system. I would note that the 
words ``develop for deployment'' were in the committee-approved bill, 
in the NMD architecture section, and so this clarification is 
consistent with the committee's intent.
  Moreover, I would emphasize that the policy section clearly states--
as did the committee bill--that the system we are pursuing is a 
multiple-site system. As the findings make clear, a multiple-site 
system is essential if we are to defend all of the U.S. and not just 
part of the country. This is also made clear in the NMD architecture 
section, which states that the system must be optimized to defend all 
50 States against limited, accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile 
attacks.
  This is further bolstered by the new language inserted by the 
compromise at various places that the system must be ``affordable and 
operationally effective.'' An NMD system confined to a single ground-
based site would not be operationally effective, as noted in the ninth 
finding.
  The bipartisan text also states in the policy section that the NMD 
system will be one that ``can be augmented over time as the threat 
changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or 
unauthorized ballistic missile threats.'' This passage was of great 
importance to many Members on this side who are concerned about the 
ability of the system to remain effective in the face of an evolving 
threat.
  The committee-approved language stated that the NMD system ``will be 
augmented over time to provide a layered defense.'' There were strong 
feelings on our side about the words ``will be augmented.'' In the end, 
we agreed to change this to ``can be augmented.'' Again, while the 
committee's language had much to commend it, funding for deployment of 
other defensive layers will not be appropriated for several years.
  The other changes to this passage, such as the inclusion of the words 
``limited, accidental, or unauthorized'' clarify the ballistic missile 
threat for which a layered defense would be required, reflect the 
intent of the committee's bill.
  At the suggestion of the other side, a new paragraph was added to the 
policy calling for congressional review, prior to a decision to deploy 
the NMD system. This is fully consistent with the committee's intent 
and the realities of the congressional budget process. Funds to begin 
deployment of the NMD system are not in the bill before the Senate. 
Thus, when such funds are requested, that request will pass through the 
regular process of committee hearings and mark-ups, floor 
consideration, and conference action.
  Another change to the policy section was the inclusion of several 
portions of the amendment that I offered and that was approved by the 
Senate last week. This states that it is U.S. policy to ``carry out the 
policies, programs and requirements of (the Missile Defense Act of 
1995) through processes specified within, or consistent with the ABM 
Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment 
to the Treaty.''
  It also states that it is U.S. policy to initiate negotiations with 
the Russian Federation as necessary to provide for the NMD systems 
specified in the NMD architecture section. At the urging of Congress in 
the Missile Defense Act of 1991, President Bush initiated such 
negotiations with Moscow. It is my understanding that tentative 
agreement was reached to provide for the deployment of ground-based 
multiple-site NMD systems. But the Clinton administration discontinued 
those negotiations. Under this legislation, it would be U.S. policy to 
once again engage Moscow in negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty or 
otherwise allow for multiple-site NMD systems.
  The policy section then states that ``it is the policy of the U.S. to 
. . . consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of withdrawing 
from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of 
the Treaty, subject to consultations between the President and the 
Senate.''
  I would note that both amendment to the Treaty, as provided for in 
Articles XIII and XIV, and withdrawal from the Treaty, as provided for 
in Article XV, are ``processes specified within the ABM Treaty.''
  Contrary to the concerns of some, the Armed Services Committee never 
advocated abrogation of the Treaty and the bill reported out by the 
committee neither required nor supported abrogation. The debate that 
took place during 

[[Page S 12339]]
the committee mark-up made it clear that there was absolutely no intent 
to abrogate.
  These provisions regarding the ABM Treaty and negotiations with 
Moscow taken from the Cohen amendment and incorporated into the 
bipartisan amendment reaffirm what was always the intent of the 
committee.
  Mr. President, I want to emphasize that these provisions and the 
other language in the section 233 clearly state that these policies are 
``the policy of the United States.'' Not the policy of the Senate or 
the policy of the Congress. I say this because I have heard that an 
administration official has said that, once this bill becomes law, the 
administration will declare that these statements of U.S. policy are 
not its policy but merely the sense of the Congress.
  The bill makes a clear distinction between statements of U.S. policy 
and expressions of the sense of Congress. We have spent a great deal of 
effort negotiating exactly what statements will fall into the policy 
section and which will be in the form of sense of the Congress. In 
fact, these negotiations began with Senator Nunn urging that the Cohen 
amendment be strengthened from being the sense of the Congress to a 
statement of U.S. policy.
  Mr. President, I would merely note the obvious fact that once the 
bill becomes U.S. law, then the bill's statements of policy are U.S. 
policy.


                            NMD Architecture

  The bipartisan amendment also provides changes and clarifications 
regarding the architecture of the national missile defense system.
  The committee's bill stated that the NMD system ``will attain initial 
operational capability by the end of 2003.'' The bipartisan amendment 
states that the NMD system will be ``capable of attaining initial 
operational capability by the end of 2003.'' This is a useful 
clarification because while Congress can mandate many things, we cannot 
dictate with certainty that engineers will accomplish specific tasks 
within a specific period of time.
  In subsection (b) of section 235, our side did make a significant 
concession. The committee's bill directed the Secretary of Defense ``to 
develop an interim NMD capability * * * to be operational by the end of 
1999.'' In order to achieve agreement with the other side, we have 
modified this to require the Secretary ``to develop an interim NMD plan 
that would give the U.S. the ability to field a limited operational 
capability by the end of 1999 if required by the threat.'' In both 
versions, the interim capability would have to not interfere with 
deployment of the full up NMD system by 2003.
  Mr. President, I would also note that the bipartisan amendment 
retains the portion of section 235 that calls for a report by the 
Secretary of Defense analyzing ``options for supplementing or modifying 
the NMD system * * * by adding one or a combination of * * * sea-based 
missile defense systems, space-based kinetic energy interceptors, or 
space-based directed energy systems.'' As I discussed earlier, such 
options for layered defenses are of considerable interest to many 
Members.
  To summarize, Mr. President, the bipartisan amendment both clarifies 
and changes the committee bill's provisions on national missile 
defense. It keeps us on the path toward a ground-based, multiple-site 
NMD system with options for layered defenses as the threat changes. But 
it recognizes that requests for NMD procurement funds will not be made 
for several years.


                            TMD Demarcation

  The other issue that required much discussion was what is commonly 
referred to as the theater missile defense demarcation question. 
Senator Warner will discuss this at greater length, but I would like to 
summarize the resolution that was achieved in section 238, which was 
completely rewritten with the assistance of many Senators.
  The section has findings noting that the ABM Treaty ``does not apply 
to or limit'' theater missile defense systems. The findings also note 
that ``the U.S. shall not be bound by any international agreement that 
would substantially modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is 
entered into pursuant to the treaty making powers of the President 
under the Constitution.'' What this means is that any agreement that 
would have the effect of applying limits on TMD systems under the ABM 
Treaty must be approved as a treaty by the Senate.
  Section 238 then states the sense of Congress that a defensive system 
has been tested in an ABM mode, and therefore is subject to the ABM 
Treaty, only if it has been tested against a ballistic missile target 
that has a range in excess of 3,500 kilometers or a velocity in excess 
of 5 kilometers per second. This threshold is the one defined by the 
administration and proposed in its talks with Moscow on this subject.
  Finally, section 238 has a binding provision that prohibits 
implementation during fiscal year 1996 of an agreement with the 
countries of the former Soviet Union that would restrict theater 
missile defenses. This prohibition would not apply to the portion of an 
agreement that implements the 3500 kilometer or 5 kilometer per second 
criteria nor to an agreement that is approved as a treaty by the 
Senate.
  But it would apply to all portions of an agreement that sought to 
impose any restrictions other than the 3500 kilometer or 5 kilometer 
per second criteria. Various other potential restrictions have been 
discussed, such as limits on the number of TMD systems or system 
components, geographical restrictions on where TMD systems can be 
deployed, restrictions on the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles, and 
restrictions on the volume of TMD interceptors missiles. Under section 
238 of the bipartisan amendment, during fiscal year 1996, the 
administration is barred from implementing any of these potential 
restrictions or any other restrictions on the performance, operation, 
or deployment of TMD systems, system components, or system upgrades.
  At the same time, Mr. President, there are no constraints on the 
ability of the President to engage in negotiations on the demarcation 
issue, which I know was an issue of concern to some. What section 238 
controls is the implementation of any restrictions on TMD systems.
  Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the efforts of the many Senators 
who contributed to the drafting of this amendment. Every member of the 
Armed Services Committee played a role, as did the two leaders, and key 
Senators off the committee. Senator Kyl played a very constructive 
role, offering language that formed the basis for the resolution on 
section 238 and providing useful suggestions on the NMD portions of the 
bill. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is to be especially 
commended for providing strong guidance to the negotiators and the 
committee, as a whole, and facilitating the talks along the way.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, as I understand, we are in morning 
business, and I am permitted to speak for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that I might 
proceed for 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the Chair.

                          ____________________