[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 135 (Friday, August 11, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S12326]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


 REPORT OF THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE 
             ACT OF 1995--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 76

To the Senate of the United States:
  I am returning herewith without my approval S. 21, the ``Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.'' I share the Congress' 
frustration with the situation in Bosnia and am also appalled by the 
human suffering that is occurring there. I am keenly aware that Members 
of Congress are deeply torn about what should be done to try to bring 
this terrible conflict to an end. My Administration will continue to do 
its utmost with our allies to guide developments toward a comprehensive 
political settlement acceptable to all the parties. S. 21, however, 
would hinder rather than support those efforts. It would, quite simply, 
undermine the chances for peace in Bosnia, lead to a wider war, and 
undercut the authority of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to 
impose effective measures to deal with threats to the peace. It would 
also attempt to regulate by statute matters for which the President is 
responsible under the Constitution.
  S. 21 is designed to lead to the unilateral lifting by the United 
States of the international arms embargo imposed on the Government of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the United States has supported the 
lifting of the embargo by action of the U.N. Security Council, I 
nonetheless am firmly convinced that a unilateral lifting of the 
embargo would be a serious mistake. It would undermine renewed efforts 
to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an 
escalation of the conflict there, including the almost certain 
Americanization of the conflict.
  The allies of the United States in the U.N. Protection Force for 
Bosnia (UNPROFOR) have made it clear that a unilateral lifting of the 
arms embargo by the United States would result in their rapid 
withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. The United States, 
as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under these 
circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, thereby putting thousands 
of U.S. troops at risk. At the least, such unilateral action by the 
United States would drive our allies out of Bosnia and involve the 
United States more deeply, while making the conflict much more 
dangerous.
  The consequences of UNPROFOR's departure because of a unilateral 
lifting of the arms embargo must be faced squarely. First, the United 
States would immediately be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw 
UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, the fighting in 
Bosnia would intensify. It is unlikely the Bosnia Serbs would stand by 
waiting while the Bosnian government received new arms and training. 
Third, under assault, the Bosnian government would look to the United 
States to provide arms and air support, and, if that failed, more 
active military support. Unilateral lift of the embargo would lead to 
unilateral American responsibility. Fourth, intensified fighting would 
risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for 
regional peace. UNPROFOR's withdrawal would set back fresh prospects 
for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future. 
Finally, unilateral U.S. action under these circumstances would create 
serious divisions between the United States and its key allies, with 
potential long-lasting damage to these important relationships and to 
NATO.
  S. 21 would undermine the progress we have made with our allies and 
the United Nations in recent weeks to strengthen the protection of the 
safe areas in Bosnia and improve the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. NATO has agreed to the substantial and decisive use of air 
power to protect Gorazde, Sarajevo, and the other safe areas. The U.N. 
Secretary General has delegated his authority to the military 
commanders on the ground to approve the use of air power. The British 
and French, with our support, are deploying a Rapid Reaction Force to 
help open land routes to Sarajevo for convoys carrying vital supplies,
 strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission. These 
measures will help provide a prompt and effective response to Serb 
attacks on the safe areas. This new protection would disappear if 
UNPROFOR withdraws in response to the unilateral lifting of the 
embargo.

  Events over the past several weeks have also created some new 
opportunities to seek a negotiated peace. We are actively engaged in 
discussions with our allies and others on these prospects. Unilaterally 
lifting the arms embargo now would jeopardize these ongoing efforts.
  Unilaterally disregarding the U.N. Security Council's decision to 
impose an arms embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia also would have 
a detrimental effect on the ability of the Security Council to act 
effectively in crisis situations, such as the trade and weapons 
embargoes against Iraq or Serbia. If we decide for ourselves to violate 
the arms embargo, other states would cite our action as a pretext to 
ignore other Security Council decisions when it suits their interests.
  S. 21 also would direct that the executive branch take specific 
actions in the Security Council and, if unsuccessful there, in the 
General Assembly. There is no justification for bringing the issue 
before the General Assembly, which has no authority to reconsider and 
reverse decisions of the Security Council, and it could be highly 
damaging to vital U.S. interests to imply otherwise. If the General 
Assembly could exercise such binding authority without the protection 
of the veto right held in the Security Council, any number of issues 
could be resolved against the interests of the United States and our 
allies.
  Finally, the requirements of S. 21 would impermissibly intrude on the 
core constitutional responsibilities of the President for the conduct 
of foreign affairs, and would compromise the ability of the President 
to protect vital U.S. national security interests abroad. It purports, 
unconstitutionally, to instruct the President on the content and timing 
of U.S. diplomatic positions before international bodies, in derogation 
of the President's exclusive constitutional authority to control such 
foreign policy matters. It also attempts to require the President to 
approve the export of arms to a foreign country where a conflict is in 
progress, even though this may well draw the United States more deeply 
into that conflict. These encroachments on the President's 
constitutional power over, and responsibility for, the conduct of 
foreign affairs, are unacceptable.
  Accordingly, I am disapproving S. 21 and returning it to the Senate.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, August 11, 1995.
  

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