[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 129 (Friday, August 4, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11448-S11450]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S TESTIMONY ON IRAQ

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs held two hearings 
on Iraq. The hearings, chaired by the distinguished subcommittee 
chairman, Senator Brown, focused on the importance of maintaining U.N. 
sanctions on Iraq and on the Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds.
  I thought both hearings made a significant contribution to the 
Senate's understanding of a critical foreign policy issue, and I 
commend Senator Brown for bringing the matter to the forefront of the 
subcommittee's agenda.
  At the start of the first hearing, U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations Madeleine Albright made a compelling, irrefutable case for 
keeping U.N. sanctions in place against Iraq. Equally as important, her 
testimony underscored the superb job the United Nations is doing to 
dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, deter further 
Iraqi aggression, and to protect Iraq's minorities.
  At a time when the Congress is considering numerous proposals to 
condition or reduce U.S. support of the United Nations, Ambassador 
Albright's testimony serves to remind us of the tremendous 
contributions the United Nations makes to advance vital U.S. foreign 
policy interests. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of 
Ambassador Albright's remarks be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
             Statement by Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright

       Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 
     subcommittee.
       I welcome this timely opportunity to discuss with you 
     United States policy towards Iraq, with particular attention 
     to the aspects of that policy that are carried out through 
     the United Nations.
       As members of the subcommittee know, the United States has 
     been determined, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, to 
     prevent Iraq from once again developing weapons of mass 
     destruction or threatening its neighbors with aggression. In 
     this effort, the tool of economic and weapons sanctions, 
     imposed by the U.N. Security Council, has been of singular 
     value.
       Over the past year, we have worked hard to gain and 
     maintain support for our view that sanctions should remain in 
     place until Iraq is in overall compliance with all relevant 
     Council resolutions. This effort has been successful. In 
     March, May, and again in July the sanctions were extended 
     without controversy or change.
       Iraqi officials have said publicly in recent days that, if 
     the sanctions are not lifted in September, when they next 
     come up for review, Iraq will cease to cooperate with the 
     United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM, which is the 
     body established to monitor Iraqi compliance. Such statements 
     are harmful both to the interests of the Iraqi people and to 
     the world at large.
       The re-integration of Iraq into the world community is a 
     goal we all share, but there is only one path to that 
     objective--and that path requires full cooperation with 
     UNSCOM and full compliance with the requirements of the 
     Council. The regime in Baghdad must understand that it is not 
     involved in a negotiation; it is under an obligation brought 
     on by its own transgressions.
       The United States is insisting, as is a majority of 
     Security Council members, that before there is serious 
     discussion of lifting sanctions, Iraq must comply not only 
     with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, 
     but with other obligations established under council 
     resolutions. These include the return of stolen property, 
     accounting for those missing in action, and ending support 
     for terrorism and repression against the Iraqi people.
       In his speech on July 17, Saddam Hussein characterized the 
     UN sanctions as ``cruel, harsh and repressive'' and said they 
     were causing ``great suffering'' among the Iraqi people. 
     Unfortunately, the sincerity of this statement of concern is 
     belied by Saddam's refusal to accept the terms of Security 
     Council Resolution 986, which would permit Iraq to sell up to 
     $1 billion of oil every three months in order to purchase 
     humanitarian supplies. It is belied, as well, by the 
     ``putting people last'' spending priorities of the Iraqi 
     government, by Saddam's campaign of terror against minorities 
     in the north and south, and by the barbaric treatment given 
     Iraqis suspected of disloyalty to the regime.
       For four years, Iraqi officials have sought alternatives to 
     full compliance with Council resolutions. They have delayed 
     and obfuscated. They have demanded concessions in return for 
     small steps. They have threatened and bullied UNSCOM. They 
     have lied. Last fall, they even attempted to intimidate the 
     Council through threatening military maneuvers directed 
     towards Kuwait.
       These tactics have not worked; and in the interests of 
     stability and justice, they must not be allowed to work.
       Last month's decision by the Iraqi government to release 
     two American citizens who had been detained since March was 
     welcome, but irrelevant to the sanctions issue. The two 
     Americans should not have been jailed in the first place. We 
     congratulate Representative Bill Richardson for his 
     successful effort to gain their release, but his was strictly 
     a humanitarian endeavor. There was no message of any kind 
     from the Administration and no authorization to negotiate. 
     The Richardson trip did not represent the opening of a new 
     channel of communication between Iraq's government and our 
     own, and it has not and will not influence our policy with 
     respect to sanctions.
       Let me describe now, more specifically, what that policy is 
     and why we feel so strongly about it.
       We are insisting that Iraq meet fully all obligations 
     established by the Security Council because we remain highly 
     distrustful of the Iraqi regime, and because that regime 
     remains a potential threat to a region of great strategic 
     importance to us and to the world. It was five years ago this 
     week that Iraq invaded Kuwait. Hundreds of thousands of 
     American soldiers put their lives at risk to halt and reverse 
     that act of blatant aggression. We should not allow Saddam 
     Hussein to regain in the Security Council what he forfeited 
     through his own ambition and miscalculation on the 
     battlefield.
       It should be obvious that a premature return to business as 
     usual with this regime would entail grave and unacceptable 
     risks. If past is prologue, we could expect the Iraqi 
     Government to resume the development and production of 
     weapons of mass destruction as rapidly as possible; we could 
     expect it to test repeatedly the limits of what could be 
     gained through the intimidation of its neighbors; we 

[[Page S 11449]]
     could expect a halt to progress in resolving humanitarian and financial 
     issues arising out of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; and we could 
     expect continued brutal repression of the Iraqi people.
       Accordingly, we are determined to maintain sanctions until 
     we are convinced by Iraq's behavior that it no longer 
     constitutes a threat to peace and stability in the Persian 
     Gulf. Iraq can demonstrate that by proving--through its 
     compliance with the Resolutions--that it is no longer an 
     outlaw state. Only when its peaceful intentions are proven 
     will there be grounds for modifying the sanctions regime.
       Experience tells us that Saddam Hussein's Iraq will respond 
     constructively only to a policy of firmness and steady 
     resolve. Last fall, when Iraqi troops once again threatened 
     Kuwait, President Clinton responded immediately, forecefully 
     and effectively. As a result, Baghdad not only pulled back 
     its troops; but it agreed, at long last, to recognize 
     formally its legal border with Kuwait.
       The central question, of course, is whether Iraq is, in 
     fact, complying with the terms of the relevant Security 
     Council resolutions. The answer, unfortunately, is that Iraqi 
     compliance has been grudging, slow, sporadic and 
     insufficient.
       During the next few minutes, with the help of the National 
     Intelligence Council, I would like to review with you the 
     facts and the evidence that supports them. Mr. Andrew Liepman 
     of the CIA is here to assist in answering any questions you 
     may have.


         weapons of mass destruction (wmd)--biological warfare

       First, with respect to weapons of mass destruction.
       On July 3, the Security Council was notified by UNSCOM 
     Chairman Ekeus that Iraq had finally admitted that it had, 
     indeed, possessed an offensive biological warfare program. 
     The Iraqis said that the program was conceived in 1985 and 
     that the production of biological warfare agents began at the 
     Al Hakam facility in 1989 and continued until 1990. They 
     claimed that the biological warfare agents produced were 
     destroyed in October 1990 in view of the imminence of 
     hostilities.
       The Iraqis have now undertaken to draft a complete report 
     on their biological warfare program. We understand that an 
     initial draft has been prepared, and that it is--as we 
     speak--being reviewed in Baghdad by UNSCOM. If past efforts 
     by Iraq are any precedent, we can expect the process of 
     explanation and verification to consume a considerable amount 
     of time. In the area of chemical weapons, for example, Iraqi 
     obfuscation, deception and sloppiness caused a delay measured 
     not in days or months, but years. The sad fact is that no 
     initial Iraqi weapons declaration has been truthful.
       There are, moreover, ample grounds for continued 
     skepticism.
       Iraq claims--we believe falsely--that the biological 
     warfare agents produced were never weaponized. We believe 
     that the Iraqis began their biological warfare program much 
     earlier than they have admitted, and that more biological 
     agents were manufactured and many more facilities and people 
     involved than Iraq has revealed.
       Iraq has not acknowledged to the UN anywhere near the 
     number of people normally associated with a research effort 
     of this size. Iraq will have to cooperate with UNSCOM in 
     showing the location of its biological warfare facilities and 
     the equipment used in production. UNSCOM will also need a 
     full explanation of the disposition of the more than 17 tons 
     of biological growth media that remain unaccounted for and of 
     the ways and means by which the produced biological agents 
     were allegedly destroyed.
       We should not forget that, until five weeks ago, Iraq 
     denied outright the existence of an offensive biological 
     warfare program. The story changed only after irrefutable 
     evidence was made available to UNSCOM and members of the 
     Security Council that such a program had existed. In other 
     words, Iraq only admitted what we already knew. We cannot 
     count on Iraqi officials to volunteer accurate information 
     and, in this context, the importance of obtaining complete, 
     accurate and verifiable data is critical.
       Consider that the Iraqis have admitted to producing more 
     than 500,000 liters of anthrax and botulinum toxin at the Al 
     Hakam facility. Anthrax, in doses of a millionth of a gram, 
     is fatal within five to seven days, nearly 100 percent of the 
     time. Botulinum is 100,000 times more toxic than the chemical 
     warfare agent sarin that was used by terrorists in the 
     Japanese subway tragedy earlier this year. Although weather 
     conditions and limitations on delivery capability would limit 
     potency, it is at least theoretically true that the amount of 
     biological warfare agents Iraq admitted producing is more 
     than enough to kill every man, woman and child on earth.
                   other weapons of mass destruction

       Discrepancies between the Intelligence Community's 
     assessments of the scale of Iraqi WMD efforts and Iraqi 
     declarations to the UN lead us to believe that Iraq is still 
     hiding equipment and materials belonging to its other WMD 
     programs. For example, the U.S. Intelligence Community 
     estimates that as many as several dozen Scud missiles remain 
     unaccounted for.
       We are concerned, moreover, that if the oil embargo is 
     lifted unconditionally, Baghdad could well order the 
     departure of UN inspectors. Under those circumstances, Iraq 
     could then rebuild its weapons of mass destruction programs, 
     a process that would take: less than a year for Iraq's 
     biological weapons programs; two to three years for its 
     chemical warfare (CW) program; and five to seven years, with 
     foreign help, for a first nuclear device.
       Lest there be doubt about its intentions, Iraq continues to 
     devote money and manpower to rebuilding its infrastructure 
     for its weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons 
     programs. The Al Kindi missile research and development 
     facility, for example, supported many Iraqi weapons programs 
     before the war. The facility was damaged heavily during 
     Operation Desert Storm but has been largely rebuilt and even 
     expanded since then. The facility has been under UN 
     supervision, but if UN inspectors were forced to leave, it 
     could easily be converted to support prohibited weapons 
     programs.
       The Habbaniyah II facility produced CW agent precursor 
     chemicals before Desert Storm. The Iraqis have rebuilt the 
     main production building and the chlorine plant and have 
     added a phenol production line as well as a ferric chloride 
     line. These production lines contain dual-use equipment that, 
     in the absence of UNSCOM, could easily be converted to CW 
     agent or precursor chemical production.


             return of captured kuwaiti military equipment

       The Security Council has required that Iraq return to 
     Kuwait the military equipment it stole during the invasion. 
     Iraq's claim to have complied with this requirement is 
     laughable.
       Baghdad says that it retains only a few pieces of damaged 
     Kuwaiti combat equipment; the truth is that Iraq has 
     integrated a variety of this equipment into its own military.
       For example, Iraq claims that it has only four of the BMP-2 
     infantry fighting vehicles that it stole from Kuwait; we 
     estimate it has more than 200.
       Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq only had single-carry 
     heavy-lift transporters in its inventory. They stole about 
     100 Kuwaiti transporters capable of carrying two APCs each. 
     The Iraqis even used them to move pieces of equipment--
     including the stolen Kuwaiti BMP-2's--that were used to 
     threaten the emirate last October.
       Much of what Iraq actually has returned is not Kuwaiti at 
     all, but rather derelict Iranian equipment, captured during 
     the Iran-Iraq war, complete with documents written in Farsi 
     and painted-over pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini.


                               terrorism

       Iraq has also continued to use terror as an instrument of 
     state policy.
       We believe Iraqi security services were behind a highly 
     suspicious auto accident last summer that resulted in the 
     death of the son of the late spiritual leader of Iraqi Shia.
       In April 1994, Iraqi intelligence officers murdered Talib 
     al-Suhayl, an Iraqi oppositionist in Beirut. The officers 
     were arrested and still being held by Lebanese authorities.
       Iraq also remains in contact with terrorist groups such as 
     the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation 
     Front.


                     repression of the iraqi people

       Security Council Resolution 688 requires that the 
     Government of Iraq cease its brutal repression of the Iraqi 
     people. Here, as elsewhere, the record of Iraqi compliance is 
     dismal.
       The Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human 
     Rights, Max van der Stoel, reports that repression continues, 
     including political killings, mass executions and state-
     sponsored terrorism.
       In the north, Saddam's economic blockade of the three 
     Kurdish provinces is now in its third year, and Baghdad's 
     shut-off of electrical power to Dahuk province is in its 
     second year.
       In the south, at least 700 hamlets have been destroyed by 
     government forces since 1991. More have been destroyed this 
     year. Government attacks against Shia communities have been 
     accompanied over the past two years by the draining of the 
     southern marshes. This has produced catastrophic results for 
     local animal species and for the marsh Arabs whose unique and 
     ancient culture now verges on extinction.
       The Special Rapporteur has asserted that the Government of 
     Iraq has engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
     and may have committed violations of the 1948 Genocide 
     Convention. The Special Rapporteur continues to 
     call on the Government of Iraq to permit the stationing of 
     monitors inside the country to improve the flow of 
     information and to provide independent reporting of alleged 
     human rights abuses. We continue to support Mr. van der 
     Stoel's work and his call for monitors.


           coping with sanctions--palaces first; people last

       In April, the Security Council approved Resolution 986, to 
     simplify procedures for Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil 
     to purchase humanitarian goods for its people. Iraq has 
     rejected this resolution, demonstrating again that Saddam 
     Hussein desires not to ease his people's suffering, but to 
     use that suffering to gain sympathy for getting sanctions 
     lifted.
       Neither war nor sanctions nor diplomatic isolation have 
     altered Saddam's priorities; he continues to devote 
     considerable resources to rebuilding the Iraqi military and 
     his own palaces.
       Iraq has built 50 new palaces or luxury residences since 
     the end of Desert Storm at 

[[Page S 11450]]
     a cost of over $1.5 billion. There are now 78 such palaces or 
     residences in Iraq for use by Saddam, his family, or close 
     supporters.
       For example, the Mosul palace complex includes two areas; 
     one with five palaces and two offices or apartment buildings; 
     the other with three completed palaces and a fourth under 
     construction on a newly excavated, man-made lake. The 
     estimated postwar cost of expanding this complex is between 
     $170-$230 million.
       One of the largest and most elaborate palaces in Iraq is in 
     the Lake Tharthar complex; its estimated size of about 
     300,000 square feet is about five times the size of the White 
     House and one and one-half the size of Versailles. Other 
     buildings on the compound, including residence and service 
     and security facilities, add at least another 150,000 square 
     feet to the complex. The estimated cost of this complex is 
     $180-$240 million.
       An additional $230-$310 million has been spent since the 
     end of the war adding new wings with elaborate archways to 
     the Baghdad Republican Palace, a building which serves as the 
     official palace and symbol of the regime.
       In addition to diverting scarce resources away from needed 
     purchases of humanitarian goods, Saddam and his family 
     capitalize on their official positions in Iraq for personal 
     profit, often at the expense of their own citizens.
       For example, members of Saddam's family, particularly his 
     son Uday, control extensive business interests in Iraq. Some 
     family members exploit the economic distortions caused by UN 
     sanctions by importing goods into Iraq for resale at 
     exorbitant prices. Saddam's relatives also are involved in 
     illicit oil exports from Iraq and use the proceeds, in part, 
     to line their own pockets. Finally, relief supplies donated 
     by the international community also have ended up for sale in 
     stores reserved for the elite friends of the regime.


                              a look ahead

       In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stress several 
     points.
       First, UN sanctions against Iraq have accomplished much. 
     Iraq's capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction has 
     been dismantled; weapons have been destroyed; the border with 
     Kuwait has been recognized; there are clear constraints on 
     what Iraq can do to intimidate its neighbors. The 
     effectiveness of sanctions is directly attributable to their 
     multilateral nature. Here, the value of the United Nations, 
     and the importance of international cooperation in defense of 
     common interests, is clear.
       Second, the continued effectiveness of sanctions cannot be 
     taken for granted. We have indicated that we would use the 
     veto, if necessary, to prevent sanctions from being lifted 
     prematurely. But to be most effective, sanctions must be 
     enforced, and that is much harder to do unilaterally. This is 
     a major reason we have argued so strongly, in the context of 
     Bosnia and elsewhere, that the integrity of UN sanctions must 
     be respected.
       Third, the value to our interests of sharing appropriate, 
     but sensitive, information with United Nations bodies has 
     been demonstrated clearly in this case. And those who lapse 
     into derisive generalities about the quality and capabilities 
     of UN organizations should recognize that UNSCOM has 
     performed its complex tasks extremely well despite difficult 
     and at times dangerous conditions.
       America's position on Iraq sanctions has been consistent, 
     principled and grounded in a realistic and hard-won 
     understanding of the nature of the Iraqi regime.
       Our policy will not change until and unless Iraq does 
     everything the UN Security Council says it must. As President 
     Clinton stated in his most recent report to Congress on this 
     subject:
       Iraq is still a threat to regional peace and security . . . 
     I continued to be determined to see Iraq comply fully with 
     all its obligations under the UNSC resolutions. I will oppose 
     any relaxation of sanctions until Iraq demonstrates its 
     overall compliance with the relevant resolutions. Iraq should 
     adopt democratic processes, respect human rights, treat its 
     people equitably and adhere to basic norms of international 
     behavior.
       I should add that the Administration appreciates the strong 
     and bipartisan support it has had from Congress with respect 
     to our policy towards Iraq. this has been, and will remain an 
     essential ingredient to that policy's success.
       Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here today. 
     I look forward to any questions you might have.
     

                          ____________________