[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 129 (Friday, August 4, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11353-S11372]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
now proceed to the consideration of S. 1026, the Department of Defense 
bill, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1996 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are ready to proceed now on this 
bill, and I believe the distinguished Senator from Nebraska desires at 
this time to take up the amendment.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2111

            (Purpose: To propose a substitute to title XXXI)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I send to the desk the Thurmond-Domenici 
amendment and ask it be reported immediately.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for 
     himself, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Lott, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Bond, 
     Mr. Thompson, Mr. Frist, and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2111.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. EXON. I thank my friend and colleague, the distinguished chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee.


                Amendment No. 2112 to Amendment No. 2111

 (Purpose: To strike section 3135 of S. 1026 authorizing a program for 
                       hydronuclear experiments)

  Mr. EXON. As per our previous agreement, I send an amendment in the 
second degree to the desk at this time and ask that it be read in its 
entirety, and I also ask that the cosponsors of the amendment be 
identified as part of the reading.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon], for himself, Mr. 
     Hatfield, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Levin, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Glenn, 
     Mr. Harkin, Mr. Simon, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. 
     Wellstone, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2112 to amendment No. 2111.
       On page 33 of the underlying amendment, strike out section 
     3135, lines 11 through 19.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
South Carolina will have 70 minutes under control in this debate and 
the Senator from Nebraska will have 90 minutes. The Senator may 
proceed.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. EXON. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous-consent 
request, I thought we said we could speak about the bill first, and 
then it would go to Senator Exon for the debate.
  Did I misunderstand? If I misunderstood, it is all right. 

[[Page S 11354]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the order, immediately after the reading 
of the amendment, the Senator from Nebraska was to be recognized to 
offer a second-degree amendment to the Thurmond amendment; there would 
be 70 minutes debate under the control of the Senator from South 
Carolina and 90 minutes under the control of the Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I did not need the time. Just so I know when we would 
be speaking.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, it is my understanding, and I ask the 
Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from South Carolina if they agree 
with this, that during this period that has just been identified, we 
would be able to speak on the underlying amendment or on the Exon 
amendment or on both, and the statement I intend to give would be a 
statement on both, starting, of course, with a description of the 
Thurmond amendment and my reason for sponsoring it, and also discussing 
my reason for supporting the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, if I might respond and clear up any 
misunderstanding, the time agreement that was entered into and was 
specifically agreed to last night was 90 minutes under the control of 
the Senator from Nebraska, and 70 minutes under the control of the 
Senator from South Carolina. That time agreement is for debate on both 
the amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina and the second 
degree, and the time can be allotted. Any Senator can debate either the 
underlying amendment or the amendment in the second degree.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, if I may ask the Senator from Nebraska, it 
is my understanding, though, it would be used off of either the time--
let me state this. I worked, the Senator from Nebraska knows, on the 
time agreement. The 70 minutes was to be used in opposition to the 
amendment of the Senator from Nebraska. We have arranged time to speak 
against the amendment of the Senator, and that was certainly my 
understanding.
  Mr. EXON. The time to speak against the second-degree amendment would 
be under the control of the Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. REID. That is right. While the Senator is debating, I will talk 
to the chairman of the committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I am certainly pleased to join my good 
friend from Oregon, Senator Hatfield, and others, including the 
distinguished junior Senator from the State of New Mexico, and many 
other cosponsors, to correct one of the most objectionable provisions 
in the defense authorization bill that is now before the Senate. The 
Exon-Hatfield, et al., amendment is a very simple and a very 
straightforward one. It would delete--eliminate--section 3135 of the 
bill in its entirety, and remove the $50 million authorization for 
hydronuclear testing. Our amendment makes no adjustment to the funding 
for either the stockpiled storage program or the overall energy 
department budget. Our amendment is funding neutral. It simply removes 
the authorization in the bill for the use of $50 million to resume 
nuclear weapons testing.
  With that brief opening statement--and I will be expanding on this 
further--I now yield 10 minutes to my colleague, the junior Senator 
from New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. If I may ask the Senator from Nebraska, I hoped to have 
about 15 minutes before the end of the debate. May I take all that time 
at this point?
  Mr. EXON. Yes, I will yield 15 minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. I thought I had to make my opening statement.
  Mr. EXON. If the Senator from South Carolina wishes to make an 
opening statement preceding the 15-minute remarks by the Senator from 
New Mexico, I am certain that will be agreeable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as may be 
necessary.
  The proposed amendment is the result of the diligent efforts of 
interested parties that have endeavored to resolve concerns raised by 
the original provisions of title XXXI. I would like to thank the 
distinguished Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. Without the efforts of 
Senator Domenici and his staff the agreement underlying this amendment 
could not have been reached. It has been a privilege to work with him 
and his staff, I say to Senator Domenici.
  I would also like to thank the other Senators that have cosponsored 
this amendment, and contributed to the substance of the amendment. I 
want to specifically recognize the superb efforts of Senator Lott, the 
Chairman of the Strategic Forces subcommittee in arriving at this 
agreement. Finally, I wish to thank Senator Kempthorne whose excellent 
work raised key issues in hearings on the Department of Energy.
  Through this amendment we have achieved what we and our cosponsors 
believe is a prudent balance between the need to focus the Department 
of Energy on the near-term manufacturing capabilities required for the 
nuclear weapons stockpile and the need to invest in long-term science-
based stockpile stewardship. With this compromise we also restore the 
necessary resources to meet the Department of Energy's request for 
nonproliferation, verification, and arms control research and 
development.
  This bill sends the message that the Senate will support the 
necessary investment in this crucial element of strategic nuclear 
deterrence. Working together, we will continue to do what is necessary 
to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. 
Maintaining the Nation's smaller nuclear stockpile in a safe and 
reliable condition to meet the requirements of the Department of 
Defense is the first priority mission of the national security programs 
of the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy and the 
administration must not lose sight of this fact as they work to fund a 
variety of other important programs, such as the Environmental 
Restoration and Waste Management Program, which this amendment also 
supports.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Will Senator Thurmond yield me 5 minutes to speak on 
the amendment?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield the able Senator from New Mexico 
5 minutes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, first, let me thank Senator Thurmond for the kind 
remarks. Obviously, for those who know of my interest in the defense 
laboratories that are operated by the Department of Energy, in 
particular the three major nuclear deterrent laboratories of Los 
Alamos, Sandia-Albuquerque, and Lawrence Livermore, this is a very good 
amendment from the standpoint of recognizing their capability and their 
prowess in terms of maintaining the nuclear deterrent in a safe and 
reliable fashion.
  We are engaged, now, in a great transition between where we were 
going and what we were defending against, in terms of the development 
of nuclear weapons. Essentially, this bill says let us go a little bit 
slow before we jump to conclusions as to how we are going to replace 
and replenish the nuclear stockpile over time. Because, it says, we are 
moving now in the direction of a stewardship program that is built 
around the nuclear laboratories and in conjunction with the complex 
that does much of the fabricating and manufacturing. But it says we are 
not going to move rapidly into a ``let us build up and let us make sure 
we have all the manufacturing capabilities,'' but, rather, let us rely 
upon the institutions within the Defense Department and the DOE to tell 
us precisely how we ought to handle the stockpile we are going to have 
to maintain.
  I am very pleased that we struck a good balance here in that the 
Department of Energy and the Department of Defense wanted us to move 
toward a science-based stewardship program built around the three 
national laboratories, and we are in the process of developing that.
  While we are doing that, we do not want to let the other complexes 
that 

[[Page S 11355]]
were part of keeping us strong--we do not want to have them disappear. 
So there is money in here to keep them going, have them in a good state 
of repair, and make necessary investments.
  In the meantime, the institutions within the DOD and Department of 
Energy will be advising the Congress on precisely how we ought to, over 
a long period of time, maintain the requisite number of nuclear 
warheads and weapons.
  We do not have that kind of recommendation yet, and the bill, if not 
amended, would have drawn some conclusions in that regard that the 
Senator from New Mexico thought were premature. So that is why this 
amendment was offered. That is why we all worked very hard to put it 
together.
  It clearly says the powerful laboratories, including three or four 
that are helping with it, including the one in the State of Idaho, 
Argonne, and others--that all of these are part of maintaining our 
nuclear stockpile in one way or another and are also part of making 
sure we do the cleanup work and we maintain the capability for storage 
of the fuel that we need that is coming out of the defense side.
  So, Mr. President, this amendment increases the stockpile stewardship 
by $239 million. It maintains the nuclear posture review as the means 
of determining the size of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile. 
It lifts the prohibition on lab-directed research and development, and 
allows the Secretary to choose between a reactor and accelerator to 
produce tritium but it locates that in South Carolina, and provides 
additional stockpile management funding to upgrade the DOE production 
complex to meet manufacturing requirements.
  So I believe when you look at that it is a rather comprehensive 
amendment, and it is a substitute for a very major part of the bill.
  I want to thank Senators on our side who worked together, and it was 
my privilege--not being on the committee--to work with them in putting 
this amendment into the form that I believe the Senate ought to adopt 
without a dissenting vote.
  I want to acknowledge Senator Bingaman's actions with reference to 
this. Obviously in the committee he expressed some doubts about this. 
He will express those himself today. And clearly working together with 
Democrats and Republicans, and Senators like Senator Bingaman and 
Senator Nunn, and others, I think this amendment is going to come out 
to be a very forward step in maintaining our nuclear weapon deterrent 
and maintaining the stockpile in an appropriate manner for the next 20, 
30 or even 40 years. I thank Senator Thurmond for yielding.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I certainly want to associate myself with 
the remarks previously made in this regard by the Senator from South 
Carolina and the Senator from New Mexico with regard to the measure 
before us, the underlying amendment that was offered the first thing 
this morning by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
  I wholeheartedly support this amendment that was worked out after a 
lot of hard work and a lot of thought. I think it is a very, very sound 
amendment. It has the wholehearted support of this Senator.
  It is a good time though for me to emphasize--with all the work that 
has been done by all of the parties that have been partially named thus 
far this morning that I support--that I think the amendment now before 
us, the underlying amendment introduced by the Senator from South 
Carolina, is a great improvement over what came out of the committee, 
and I believe it is nearly unanimously supported. I thank all of those 
who played a key role in working this out.
  It is a good time for me to emphasize though that the second-degree 
Exon amendment goes after one part of this bill which I will be talking 
about in greater detail as will many others Senators. That is the part 
of the bill which allows hydronuclear testing which we think is an 
important step in the wrong direction, and, if the Exon second-degree 
amendment is approved today, I think there will be unanimous support 
for the bill as introduced by the Senator from South Carolina--if the 
Exon-Hatfield, et al., amendment is accepted.
  With that statement, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  I yield 15 minutes--with my thanks for all the work he has done on 
this in company with Senator Domenici and others--to the Senator from 
New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the statement by the 
Senator from Nebraska, and also the statement by my colleague from New 
Mexico.
  Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of the Thurmond amendment and of 
the Exon second-degree amendment to it. I would first like to explain 
to my colleagues why the Thurmond amendment is an enormous improvement 
over the DOE provisions currently in the bill. There are three 
exceptions and they are being dealt with in the second-degree 
amendments being proposed by Senators Exon, Reid, and McCain. I will 
support all of those amendments as well.
  When we debated this bill in committee, I raised numerous objections 
to the DOE provisions. I expressed the view that these provisions took 
a series of extreme positions for which there was no support in the 
hearing record of the committee. My objections were summarized in the 
dissenting views I filed in the committee's report. I am pleased to 
report to my colleagues that the Thurmond substitute amendment has now 
corrected most of the numerous problems I identified and several that 
were subsequently identified by the executive branch.
  Let me highlight the most significant changes:
  I had criticized the tritium production and plutonium disposition 
provisions because they would have prejudged ongoing programmatic 
environmental impact statements by favoring a multipurpose reactor 
approach--the least likely approach to come out of these studies. The 
Thurmond amendment is now neutral on the technical choice. It 
appropriately funds work on tritium targets, work that DOE under 
Secretary Curtis told us in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing 
on May 16 would be required under all options.
  Unfortunately, while backing off from making a technical choice on 
tritium production, the Thurmond amendment now contains a provision 
mandating that any new tritium production facility be sited at Savannah 
River. It is that provision which Senator Reid is seeking to strike 
because it obviously disadvantages the Nevada test site in the ongoing 
environmental impact statement process.
  The tritium language also makes $10 million available to a university 
consortium for plutonium research. Senator McCain will seek to ensure 
that any money spent for university research in this area is 
competitively awarded. This is a long-standing policy of the Armed 
Services Committee at least since Senator Tower was chairman.
  The second area that was problematic in the original bill was a 
series of provisions--sections 3134, 3163, and 3166--and a $344 million 
funding add-on aimed at sizing a nuclear weapons manufacturing complex 
at cold war levels when far more cost-effective alternatives are being 
developed in the stockpile stewardship and management programmatic 
environmental impact statement process. Those provisions are entirely 
reworked in the Thurmond amendment and the funding for stockpile 
management has been reduced $215 million. There is now no mandate to 
rebuild production capacity to cold war levels. What is left in the 
bill is consistent with the ongoing programmatic environmental impact 
statement process on stockpile stewardship and management.
  The third problem in the original bill had to do with laboratory 
management and funding. Senator Domenici referred to this. The original 
bill contained a provision, section 3139, barring the laboratories from 
using defense program funds for laboratory-directed basic research, the 
lifeblood of the laboratories, and for science education. The bill also 
cut requested funding for dual-use technology partnerships with 
industry by $249 million. The Thurmond amendment deletes the 
prohibition on use of defense funds for lab-directed basic research and 
science education, restores $239 million for the stockpile stewardship 
technology partnership 

[[Page S 11356]]
and education programs and includes a provision that all of these 
programs must support national security requirements.
  The fourth problem in the original bill involved a severe cut in 
requested funding for nonproliferation and arms control verification 
program--a total of $78 million. This would have very seriously damaged 
the national laboratories' programs in critical areas and slowed the 
effort to bring Russian nuclear weapons facilities under better 
security and safeguards. The Thurmond amendment restores all of that 
funding.
  The fifth problem in the original bill involved provisions, sections 
3137 and 3138, which would have put the Department of Energy's defense 
facilities outside the purview of the National Environmental Policy Act 
and raised a constitutional separation of powers issue according to the 
Secretary of Energy, who opposed them. The Thurmond amendment deletes 
those provisions.
  Finally, the original bill included a provision, section 3167, that, 
according to the statement of administration policy on this bill, would 
have prohibited international inspections of DOE facilities under the 
terms of the treaty between the United States and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. The Thurmond amendment deletes this provision, 
which I know Senator Pell was very concerned about.
  This rewrite of the DOE provisions marks a significant improvement in 
this bill as a whole. It brings this bill into alignment with the 
energy and water appropriations bill passed on Tuesday evening and with 
the administration's request with only modest changes. I commend my 
senior colleagues from New Mexico, Senator Domenici, for his central 
role in helping to bring about this result. He did yeoman work on 
convincing the members of the Armed Services Committee on his side to 
accept these changes. I also commend him for producing in his role as 
chairman of the subcommittee the excellent defense section of the 
energy and water appropriations bill passed on Tuesday.
  Mr. President, there are still, however three problems with the 
Thurmond amendment. I have already mentioned the Reid and McCain 
amendments. Let me now turn to the amendment being offered by Senator 
Exon.
  Senator Exon is seeking to strike a provision in the Thurmond 
amendment, which was also in the underlying bill. The provision sets 
aside $50 million to prepare for hydronuclear testing. The 
administration did not request funds to carry out hydronuclear tests in 
fiscal year 1996. These are tests with a low yield, usually measured in 
pounds of TNT, which provide information about the ignition of the 
primary of a nuclear weapon. These are expensive tests to conduct, 
approximately the same as for a nuclear weapons test--on the order of 
$10 to $20 million per test.
  The administration's policy in the ongoing Comprehensive Test Ban 
negotiations is to limit such tests to a yield of four pounds of TNT. 
The administration is not opposed in principle to such testing, but the 
technical experts have not found tests which are worth doing. A 1994 
summer study by a JASON task force, chaired by Sid Drell of Stanford 
University, has recommended against hydronuclear testing. The JASON's 
are a group of the Nation's foremost scientists who under the aegis of 
the Mitre Corp. advise DOD and DOE on technical matters. They wrote:

       The very limited added value of hydronuclear tests that 
     provide for a brief glimpse into the very early stages of 
     critically have to be weighed against costs, and against the 
     impact of continuing an underground testing program at the 
     Nevada Test Site on U.S. nonproliferation goals. On balance 
     we oppose hydronuclear testing.

  Mr. President, this is frankly a highly complex matter. The bottom 
line for me is that the nuclear weapon stewards in the Department are 
not crying out for hydronuclear tests within their limited budgets. The 
best minds in the scientific community on balance do not support them. 
If a specific problem arises that would require a 
hydronuclear test to resolve, I believe that the 
administration would request the funds and the test would be conducted 
within the 4 pound limit the President has set. But the bill before us 
and the Thurmond amendment insist on spending $50 million to prepare 
for hydronuclear tests with no specific purpose in mind.
  I attended the May 16 Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearings on the 
weapons program and I can recall no witness from the laboratories or 
DOE or the Pentagon demanding such test preparations.
  Mr. President, we can not afford to spend money unwisely when we are 
fighting to bring our deficit under control. I urge my colleagues to 
support Senator Exon's amendment.
  To summarize, Mr. President, I am cosponsoring the Thurmond amendment 
because it is an enormous improvement in six different areas over the 
existing bill language. I also support all three efforts to further 
improve the language in the Thurmond amendment.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Yes, I am glad to yield to my colleague from New 
Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I just wanted to correct one item the 
Senator would not have known about because it was changed last night. 
Senator McCain's request for competitiveness with reference to that $10 
million university project, is in the amendment as offered.
  I am not speaking for Senator McCain, but I am not sure there will be 
an amendment on that effort because he already prevailed and it is in 
the amendment that was sent to the desk.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate that updated information. I 
think that is one additional improvement in the Thurmond amendment and 
I, as I say, commend my colleague and others who have worked hard to 
put this amendment together. I hope we can pass it with an overwhelming 
vote.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HATFIELD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to speak on the Exon 
amendment, the Exon-Hatfield amendment, and I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Mr. EXON. I yield 10 minutes or whatever time he needs to the Senator 
from Oregon.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I wonder if the Senator from Nevada will yield for a 
question.
  Mr. REID. I will be happy to, as long as it is on Senator Exon's 
time.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I would like to ask if this would be a convenient time 
for me to speak.
  Mr. REID. Very convenient.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I am trying to get ahead of the game at 10 o'clock.
  Mr. REID. I know the Senator has a full committee markup.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator and I thank Senator Exon.
  Mr. President, it is a pleasure to join with Senator Exon this 
morning. The Senator from Nebraska is perhaps one of the Senate's most 
knowledgeable persons on the issues involving the nuclear weapons 
stockpile. He has certainly demonstrated leadership in protecting the 
integrity of the stockpile, as well as the efforts to end nuclear 
proliferation. So I do not believe this is an either/or situation. I 
think it is a very wise approach that the Senator from Nebraska has 
created for us to consider.
  I think every Senator should be aware that the bill as reported by 
the Armed Services Committee contains an extremely provocative, 
unnecessary, and expensive provision which would allow for the 
preparation of hydronuclear experiments which would yield expulsions up 
to 20 tons.
  Mr. President, we got out of that nuclear explosive testing business 
3 years ago by the actions of this body. Three years ago, the Congress 
adopted a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, and this 
moratorium was put in place as an acknowledgment after hundreds--
hundreds--of underground tests of our nuclear stockpile. It was in our 
national interest not to test.
  The Armed Services Committee in its report justifies this provision 
and the authorization for $50 million to prepare for these tests with a 
statement that it is concerned about the readiness of the Nevada test 
site. This is the wrong reason to test. In fact, this is not a reason 

[[Page S 11357]]
at all. It is no reason. I will be interested to learn the source of 
concerns about the test site's readiness capabilities--who dreamed this 
up, and why the preparation for a hydronuclear test is the preferred 
option for maintaining that readiness. I think we deserve to have that 
kind of information and the source of it.
  As most Senators know, the Exon-Hatfield-Mitchell law, which 
initiated our testing moratorium 3 years ago, acknowledged the 
possibility that a resumption of testing could be necessary to ensure 
the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Following an initial 9-
month moratorium on testing, the Exon-Hatfield-Mitchell law allows for 
a 3-year program of limited testing and no more than five tests per 
year. So there is a flexibility factor already in the law. To date, the 
President of the United States has not certified that any weapon in the 
arsenal has a safety or reliability problem that would require 
explosive testing.
  So certainly the President, who has a role to play in this, and 
especially through the Department of Defense, has no request for this. 
This is pure and simple a resurrection of the cold war mentality that 
has dominated this Congress for too long, especially under the military 
industrial complex that exists all over this country that former 
President Eisenhower warned this country against.
  Yet the Armed Services Committee is recommending that the full Senate 
approve $50 million to prepare for the commencement of a series of 
tests at the Nevada test site. Why? There is no justification for these 
funds. There is no request for these funds--not from the Department of 
Defense, not from the President of the United States, not from the 
National Security Council, not from any body of authority that 
represents the major responsibility for protecting this country.
  The provision included in the bill must be removed. It is dangerous 
and provocative and threatens the goal clearly stated by a Congress 
when it adopted the Exon-Hatfield-Mitchell law. That goal is the 
successful negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
  Let me say that again. The goal is a comprehensive test ban treaty, 
not the renewal of testing to challenge the rest of the nations of the 
world.
  Mr. President, current CTB negotiations led by the United States 
contain a discussion about thermal nuclear tests, but the official 
position of the United States is that the comprehensive test ban should 
prohibit all nuclear tests exceeding 4 pounds. Four pounds, Mr. 
President, not 40,000 pounds as the Armed Services Committee is 
proposing.
  I believe that the provision in this bill and its accompanying report 
are fatally flawed. Let me read to my colleagues a passage from page 
367 of the Armed Services report:

       The Committee recognizes that the administration is 
     currently negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in an 
     effort to preclude or make more difficult the spread of 
     nuclear weapons. However, the committee notes that sub-
     kiloton hydronuclear experiments are not particularly 
     suitable for bomb development or giving foreign military 
     planners confidence in a nuclear weapons design.

  I am stunned by this passage. It is factually incorrect. Independent 
nuclear weapons experts have made it clear that hydronuclear tests are 
useful to proliferant states attempting to develop nuclear weapons 
capabilities. That is the very reason the United States comprehensive 
test ban negotiation position bars such tests over a few pounds of 
yield. This bill ignores these facts and argues that the United States 
should prepare for tests anyway.
  It is clear to me and should be to all of my colleagues that the 
provision included in the bill is at the very best a very unfortunate 
mistake. The President has not requested these tests. The independent 
group of nuclear weapons experts known as the JASON group concurs that 
testing because no safety or reliability problem exists.
  If this mistake is left unrepaired, it will result in grave 
consequences. American public opinion is solidly behind the effort to 
achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty and expect our leadership in 
the negotiations. If this bill is adopted with the current provision 
intact, we will irreparably harm our ability to negotiate a 
comprehensive test ban. I fully expect the American public and people 
around the world to react with the same astonishment and anger that it 
vented when France announced its decision to resume testing.
  The Exon-Hatfield proposed amendment must be adopted if we are to 
avoid a return to the Dark Ages of a nuclear arms race. Three years ago 
we were able to end the cycle of vague justifications for underground 
nuclear testing and replace them with concrete requirements which must 
be met before testing resumes. The provision included in this bill 
breaks current law and will likely lead to irreparable harm to the 
comprehensive test ban negotiations.
  Mr. President, as the chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, I would make one final note. The Senate has already 
completed action on the energy and water appropriations bill, which 
contains funding for weapons activities. That bill does not include 
funds for hydronuclear testing. Voting for this amendment would be 
consistent--that is, voting for our proposed amendment, Senator Exon's 
and mine--with current law as well as appropriations for the coming 
fiscal year. And I can assure the Armed Services Committee I will do 
all within my power as the chairman of the Appropriations Committee to 
block any funding for this kind of foolishness if it should prevail in 
this final bill.
  Now, Mr. President, I would add one final note. For the last few days 
I have been asked to interview on my experience in Hiroshima a month 
after the bomb had been dropped, following World War II. It has only 
been the last few years that I would even like to talk about that kind 
of experience. But how--how absolutely immoral, how insensitive to 
begin to act for this kind of provision on the 50th anniversary of that 
horrible devastation that was wreaked upon Hiroshima and the people of 
Japan. What a monster we let loose in that situation.
  It saved my life. I can attest to that because we were stationed for 
the invasion of Japan at the time. And having been in that occupation 
of September 2, 1945, and seen the following MacArthur order to put a 
white sheet before each of the gun emplacements at the very area we 
were to invade it was like sailing through inland seas of 
checkerboards. It would have been a murderous crossfire upon which 
probably who knows, a million people would have lost their lives. But 
nevertheless--nevertheless--not trying to judge in hindsight the wisdom 
of that bomb, the fact is, how insensitive on the 50th anniversary of 
that bomb to propose something of returning to the Dark Age mentality 
of testing again for increasing the capacity to kill and to destroy 
life as this would lead us to.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. I yield myself such time as I may need from our allotted 
time.
  I just want to compliment my very dear friend and colleague from 
Oregon for the excellent remarks that he has just made. It puts in 
perspective so dramatically and so honestly and in such a 
straightforward manner the heart and soul of the Exon-Hatfield 
amendment, which is to follow on the Exon-Hatfield amendment of 3 years 
ago that we were joined in by the then-majority leader, George 
Mitchell. I think maybe we were somewhat surprised when we won that 
vote. But I think it was a giant leap forward in facing up to the 
realities of the situation that confront us.
  So I thank my friend and colleague, a man of great wisdom and 
experience, for outlining in a very articulate fashion his views as to 
why the Exon-Hatfield amendment should be adopted, and also backing 
that up with his vast experience. When he was talking about those dark 
days of World War II when important decisions were being made, I was at 
Clark Field in the Philippines, which had just been taken during that 
particular period of time. And I know also--not to the extent that I 
believe my friend from Oregon did--but we knew full well what was being 
planned. We knew the sacrifices that were going to have to be made. And 
when the Senator from Oregon said his life was probably saved by that 
action, I think that is very much on point.
  Having said that, I would like to come to the defense for a moment of 
former Senator Harry Truman, then President Harry Truman, who had the 

[[Page S 11358]]
courage to make that devastating decision that I believe very likely 
left its mark on the great President Harry Truman.
  I am convinced he did the right thing, but it was a horrible thing. 
The Senator from Oregon has brought that very dramatically to the 
attention of the Senate.
  Therefore, while I have been known as a hawk, and continue to be a 
hawk, I happen to feel that humanity has to recognize that if we keep 
maintaining as a major part of our national security the threat of 
another Hiroshima, then we are in dire circumstances, as far as 
humanity is concerned.
  I ask my friend, though, about one part of his remarks, if I 
understood them correctly--I suspect there was somewhat an unintended 
understatement, if I heard my friend correctly--I believe he said that 
if the Exon-Hatfield amendment is not adopted, it will irreparably harm 
the chances for a nuclear test ban treaty. I believe those were the 
well-chosen words the Senator from Oregon used.
  I happen to think that is a very minimal statement. I simply say if 
the Exon-Hatfield amendment does not prevail, it will not harm our 
effort for a comprehensive test ban treaty, it will destroy it.
  I wonder if the Senator from Oregon feels that I am justified in 
making that statement a little more stronger than he did in his well-
chosen remarks?
  Mr. HATFIELD. I would not want to debate that issue with the Senator, 
because I know that he made that with care, understanding, with great 
feeling. I do feel, based upon the kind of outpouring of criticism that 
was leveled by all parts of the world against France for its announced 
intention to resume testing, that it would be escalated by about a 
hundredfold against the United States because of our superb leadership 
role we play in making those policies that affect the whole world, far 
more than France. But nevertheless, even with France, it is a setback. 
I think it would be even a greater setback and perhaps lead to total 
impossibility of success if you resume testing.
  (Mr. SHELBY assumed the chair.)
  Mr. EXON. I could not agree more and thank my friend for his remarks.
  Mr. President, the Exon-Hatfield amendment then, if I can repeat that 
again, is a very simple and straightforward one. It will delete section 
3135 of the bill in its entirety and remove the $50 million 
authorization for hydronuclear testing that the Senator from Oregon has 
addressed in a very eloquent fashion.
  Our amendment makes no adjustment to the funding for either the 
stockpile stewardship program or the overall Energy Department budget. 
Our amendment is funding neutral. It simply removes the authorization 
in the bill to use $50 million to resume nuclear weapons testing, and 
the reasons for removing that and not doing it have been adequately 
addressed already by my colleague from Oregon and the junior Senator 
from New Mexico.
  Three years ago, as was alluded to by Senator Hatfield, a strong 
bipartisan coalition in both Houses of Congress twice approved a plan 
to phase out nuclear weapons testing and give the moribund 
comprehensive test ban negotiations a shot in the arm. Successful 
negotiation of a global comprehensive test ban treaty would 
significantly advance the cause of nuclear weapons proliferation by 
denying those nations tempted to develop nuclear capability the means 
to prove out their weapons. Getting that done, in the view of this 
Senator, is absolutely essential.
  The Senator from Oregon, Mr. President, raised some rather 
interesting questions in his riveting remarks to the Senate this 
morning. He said, why is this included in the defense authorization 
bill? It was not requested by the administration. How did it creep back 
in? I suggest the answer to the question is that, despite all of our 
efforts to the contrary, there are people embedded in the Pentagon 
today that want to resume nuclear testing on a full-scale basis. This 
is a step in that direction, a very important and a very ill-timed one, 
in the opinion of this Senator.
  Those people deep inside the Pentagon, and associated with it, have 
tried to influence the President of the United States to lift his 
objections, which he has stated over and over and over again to not 
begin nuclear testing by the United States of America, who is far ahead 
of any real, imagined or invented future enemies that might be a 
nuclear threat. If we begin testing today, it will be viewed by the 
rest of the world as they are currently reviewing and showing their 
distress of the French and their distress of the Chinese for the 
testing in this area that they are about as of now.
  We must not join. The attack that will be launched against China and 
France and the United States of America, the leader in this field, is a 
terrible step in the wrong direction.
  Mr. President, I feel so strongly about this issue. I talked a great 
deal yesterday, along with others, about the ballistic missile defense 
system. And on a close vote, the Senate validated the actions of our 
Armed Services Committee in that regard. I think that was a terrible 
mistake, but it has been done. But if we do not adopt the Exon-Hatfield 
amendment and go ahead with this program that is an open invitation, 
much more than a camel's nose under the tent, to start the nuclear race 
all over again, we will have essentially no one but ourselves to blame.
  A comprehensive test ban would also freeze in place the inherent 
advantage of the United States, as it has at the present time, because 
we possess the most tested and proven nuclear stockpile ever. After 
1,148 nuclear weapons tests over 50 years, the United States possesses 
the safest and most reliable nuclear weapons in the world. No one can 
argue with that.
  The resulting law that we talked about earlier, called the Hatfield-
Exon-Mitchell law, enacted an initial 9 months testing moratorium 
period, followed by 3 years of limited weapons testing, if necessary. 
And the Senator from Oregon referenced that in his remarks this 
morning.
  During this 3-year period, no more than 5 safety and reliability 
tests could be conducted each year, for a total of 15 tests. Approval 
for the tests are to be sought from Congress through an annual testing 
report outlining the justification for such testing.
  To date, no authority to conduct any weapons tests have been sought 
by the administration, and along with Russia, which, of course, are 
watching us in this area, we have not tested. Now comes France, and we 
all observe as to what they have done recently with regard to tests.
  Likewise, I will mention once again the concern I have with the 
Chinese action. But during the time following enactment of the 
Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law, those nations, led by the United States, 
have been working hard to reach agreement in Geneva on a comprehensive 
test ban treaty.
  If we want to flush that down the drain, then defeat the Exon-
Hatfield, et al., amendment.
  I must confess, Mr. President, that I have had some rather angry 
words with certain administration officials on this particular matter. 
While the President has been steadfast, there are some close to him who 
are wishy-washy on this issue. I hope the President will listen to 
those of us who have done a great deal of study and have a great deal 
of concern about this. And I think the President will, notwithstanding 
the fact that some of those closest to him are wishy-washy on the 
issue, and I have told that to them to their face.
  After 2 years of negotiations, we are hopeful that we are entering 
maybe some kind of an end-game with regard to a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. The nuclear and nonnuclear nations of the world are on track to 
reach an agreement, possibly, by 1996--a goal expressly endorsed by not 
only the United States, but China, Russia, and France. No one should 
ignore the fact that the permanent extension of the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty was obtained this spring with the assurance 
provided by the nuclear powers that a comprehensive test ban treaty 
would soon follow. The world is in agreement: It is time to close the 
nuclear Pandora's box, and a comprehensive test ban treaty is a 
significant step toward that end. Let us not kill the possibility.
  I recount the history of this issue so as to provide a context for 
better understanding the real reason why the Armed Services Committee 
provided $50 million for hydronuclear testing. Let no Senator 
misunderstand the true 

[[Page S 11359]]
intent behind this provision of the bill. Its purpose is to bust out of 
the nuclear testing moratorium we have been observing for the past 3 
years as a result of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell bill that has been 
referenced on several occasions this morning. It wants the United 
States to renege on our commitment made during the NPT conference. It 
hopes to scuttle the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations now 
underway.
  The cumulative effect of these consequences will be to undermine our 
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. As a 
result, our national security will be weakened, not enhanced, by the 
resumption of nuclear weapons testing and a new nuclear race will be in 
full swing. Our standing as a world leader will be irreparably harmed 
on the issue of nonproliferation. For proof of these things to come, 
simply look at the world condemnation over the recent French decision 
to resume testing. The world is astonished, but the French, in their 
way, go ahead as they always do. Let us not follow their course.
  Some may ask, what is a hydronuclear test exactly? The simple 
definition is that it is a very low yield detonation--usually measured 
at a few pounds of explosive yield--to assess primary performance and 
safety of warheads. While a high-explosive explosion generates 
sufficient energy to melt the core of the weapon, the nuclear energy 
release is insufficient to cause the bomb to reach full criticality and 
with the possibility that it would explode with full power. It is true 
that the U.S. negotiation position in Geneva would allow for such 
experiments not to exceed 4 pounds of yield under a comprehensive test 
ban treaty. However, a treaty agreement has not been reached, and it is 
the present administration policy not to conduct such tests outside the 
treaty. I hope the President and the administration maintain that 
position.
  Moreover, the authorization bill seems to use the term ``hydronuclear 
experiments'' rather loosely. As section 3165 of the bill notes, the 
tests to be performed may be measured not in terms of pounds of TNT 
yield, but rather in tons. That was stated in somewhat different form 
by the Senator from Oregon in his remarks to the Senate this morning. 
The type of nuclear tests the committee majority has in mind are not--I 
emphasize ``not,'' Mr. President--traditional hydronuclear tests. They 
are looking at detonation with yields up to 40,000 pounds-- that is a 
whole lot more than 4 pounds--or 20 tons of explosive power.
  The $50 million authorization provided in the bill for these nuclear 
weapons tests is a particularly mischievous add-on to the President's 
budget request. The mandate is in violation of existing law, which 
states that all proposed nuclear tests be included in the annual 
administration report on our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and the 
need, if any, to conduct tests. Specifically, the bill violates the 
provision of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law that states, ``Only the 
numbers and types of tests specified in the report * * * may be 
tested.''
  In short, the bill totally negates the process already in existence 
for proposing and approving, with congressional concurrence, new 
nuclear weapons tests.
  More central to the point is whether these new tests are really 
needed. No safety or reliability problem is known to exist with any of 
our Nation's nuclear weapons to justify a resumption of weapons 
testing. On this most important point, there is no disagreement. 
Administration officials, from the laboratories to the Secretaries of 
Defense and Energy, all the way up to the President, are unanimous in 
this opinion. Even the JASON group--also referenced by the Senator from 
Oregon in his remarks this morning--an assembly of outside nuclear 
weapons experts, concurs with the finding that no safety or reliability 
problem exists, and that the restart of nuclear testing is not 
necessary.
  Mr. President, there is no explanation in the committee bill as to 
which warheads are to be tested, or which weapons, why they are to be 
tested--though, in a very vague fashion, almost a carte blanche 
authority--and they do not even say how many tests are allowed. There 
is no limit.
  Absent a known safety or reliability problem, the primary purpose for 
the resumption of testing is unknown. If it is to maintain worker 
expertise at the Nevada test site, it should be made clear that the 
committee has received no testimony to suggest that the testing 
expertise is eroding, or if it was, the proposed authorization to use 
$50 million to resume testing would stem this.
  There is not any question but that this Senator has stood at the 
forefront--because we live in an uncertain world, and we have no way of 
knowing what the next move in the world, especially in nuclear testing 
is going to be--I have been at the forefront in maintaining a facility, 
with the people at the Nevada test site to be there, to do the testing, 
if an emergency arises.
  I suggest that the true reason for the committee action is the basic 
belief that the United States should test for the sake of testing. It 
is a good thing to do, some seem to feel, even if it means undermining 
our Nation's efforts to close Pandora's box and halt the spread of 
nuclear weapons around the globe.
  American leadership in the world community is strongest when we lead 
by example. We should continue to do that--lead by example. There is 
never more the case than in the area of nuclear weapons testing. We 
must continue to lead, and we must be responsible.
  Contrary to the committee direction, there is no reason, Mr. 
President, to restart nuclear weapons testing. American public opinion 
has been solid against such a proposition for quite some time. Our 
country is poised to join the world community in taking a historic step 
toward limiting the number of nuclear states in the future.
  Seriously endangering these efforts, as the committee testing 
provision would do, we will be working against the very national 
security interests that we profess to support in other areas of the 
bill, such as ballistic missile defense funding and, of course, the 
Nunn-Lugar program.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the Exon-Hatfield, et 
al., amendment and turn back this misguided attempt to fire up the cold 
war rhetoric of the past.
  After 1,100 nuclear detonations, our stockpile is safe. It is 
reliable. It is time to concern ourselves with whether other nations 
are going to start and deploy their own nuclear arsenals.
  The resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing will doom--will doom--
the comprehensive test ban negotiations, and in the process, give the 
green light to the world leaders, hoping to find superpower status in 
the form of even a nuclear bomb or two.
  Our amendment is a choice between priorities. A vote for the Exon-
Hatfield, et al., amendment is a vote against the spread of nuclear 
weapons. A vote against our amendment is a vote for more testing and an 
abdication of responsible U.S. leadership.
  We would be no different from the French, in their decision to test--
an object of worldwide ridicule and derision.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to carefully think and then cast 
their vote, which I think and hope will be overwhelming, for the cause 
of halting the spread of nuclear weapons, and support the Exon-
Hatfield, et al., amendment.
  Mr. President, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska has 31 minutes 
remaining, and the Senator from South Carolina has 61 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from 
Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I extend my appreciation to the chairman of 
the committee, the manager of this bill, and extend my congratulations 
to him, also, for the amendment that he has offered.
  This amendment removes the triple play reactor for tritium 
production, appropriately shifts more funds to stockpile stewardship, 
restores stewardship funding for industrial partnerships that are 
critical to the new technology development for stockpile stewardship, 
and restores verification funding critical to fighting nuclear 
proliferation
   I am also very pleased to see that the amendment endorses test 
readiness and hydronuclear tests.
  There is only one problem I have with the amendment, and under the 

[[Page S 11360]]
  unanimous-consent request I will offer an amendment at a subsequent 
time about that.
  Mr. President, I say to my colleagues in the Senate that I have the 
deepest respect for the senior Senator from Nebraska and the senior 
Senator from Oregon. I say to my friend from Nebraska that he could not 
be more wrong. He keeps talking about nuclear testing. This has nothing 
to do with nuclear testing. That is the whole point of the experiments 
we are talking about. They are not nuclear tests.
  Mr. President, there has been reference by the Senator from Nebraska 
and the Senator from Oregon about the JASON report. We will talk about 
the JASON report.
  In July of this year, July 25, a couple of weeks ago, the new JASON 
report, the one that we should be talking about, says:
       Underground testing of nuclear weapons at any yield level 
     below that required to initiate boosting is of limited value 
     to the United States. However, experiments involving high 
     explosive and fissionable materials that do not reach 
     criticality are useful in our understanding of the behavior 
     of weapon materials under relevant physical conditions. They 
     should be included among treaty consistent activities . . .
  The report cited by the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from New 
Mexico--they should have read the more recent version, because it 
supports what the Senator from South Carolina is doing with this 
amendment.
  With all due respect, they should not be throwing around the JASON 
report, because quoting from the JASON report arrives at the opposite 
conclusion.
  Now, we will also talk about this as it relates to Nevada. Mr. 
President, this is not some kind of a pork issue for Nevada. The bill 
provides funds for a program of hydronuclear experiments at the nuclear 
weapons design laboratories at the Nevada test site.
  I assure Members that it was written to assure that the majority of 
funds would go to the weapons laboratories which are not in Nevada. 
They are in New Mexico and one in California. The funds will go to the 
labs, regardless of how the vote on this amendment turns out.
  Very little, if any, of the funds will go to the Nevada test site. My 
concern is not dollars to Nevada, but, rather, making it clear that 
these experiments are important and should be allowed to commence.
  I also caution the stewardship supporters that support the Exon 
amendment could be interpreted as a prohibition of experiments the labs 
are currently contemplating at the labs and at the test site. I think 
people should be very careful about the intent of this amendment, and 
what the final result would be if the amendment is adopted.
  There is no accepted definition of hydronuclear experiments. Mischief 
can and will be done if this amendment is passed. If the amendment is 
defeated, the decision on hydronuclear experiments will revert to the 
President, where it belongs.
  I am forever amazed, Mr. President, that we are elected to the 
legislative branch of Government. But it seems we have 535 Secretaries 
of State.
 We have people who seem to think that they know better than the 
executive branch.

  The Exon amendment is to limit stewardship, it is to limit readiness, 
and, of course, hydronuclear experiments. For 3 years we have let our 
nuclear weapons competence deteriorate. It is now time to end that 
deterioration. Not to return to the cold war--no one wants to do that--
but to maintain and protect our nuclear deterrence and our nuclear 
expertise.
  The Senator who offered the amendment has stated on a number of 
occasions that there have been a lot of tests conducted. Sure there 
have been a lot of tests conducted. Carl Lewis has been running and 
broad jumping and doing all the other things he does for 12 or 15 
years. If he stops, he loses that touch. You must continue to work on 
something you are good at--recognizing that we led the world in safety 
and reliability of nuclear weapons. Of course we did. Why? Because we 
continually worked at it and we should not just give up on that.
  Stockpile stewardship is critical to maintaining a safe, secure, 
reliable nuclear stockpile. Stockpile stewardship is also underfunded, 
but that is not the debate here today. As long as we own nuclear 
weapons--there is no doubt we will own them for the foreseeable 
future--we have an obligation to ourselves and to the world to keep 
them safe, secure and reliable.
  My friend who has offered this amendment has attempted to make this a 
nuclear testing issue. The problem in the world today is not because of 
nuclear testing. We are not going to do nuclear testing. Even if this 
amendment is defeated, we are not going to do nuclear testing. The 
problem in the world today is nuclear weapons, and these experiments 
will do nothing to harm the negotiations that are taking place for the 
comprehensive test ban, which I support. I repeat, as long as we own 
nuclear weapons--and there is no doubt we will own them for the 
foreseeable future--we have an obligation to ourselves and the rest of 
the world to keep them safe.
  The Senator from Oregon stated we have had hundreds of tests. Of 
course we have had hundreds of tests. But those tests, the majority of 
them, were for new weapons development. You cannot have this huge 
nuclear arsenal we are going to have for the foreseeable future and 
just let it sit. So long as we choose to own nuclear weapons, without 
the benefit of full-scale nuclear testing--and we are not talking about 
doing full-scale nuclear testing--we must support a fully funded 
stockpile stewardship program. This bill recognizes we must support the 
ability to resume testing, which is referred to as ``readiness.''
  I appreciate the complimentary statement of the author of this 
amendment regarding readiness. But, until we have proven that the 
alternative, the stockpile stewardship and management program, will 
work, we must retain the ability to test in an emergency.
  Furthermore, this bill, the underlying bill, recognizes that 
readiness can only be achieved cost effectively as a byproduct of 
ongoing experimental programs. The experimental program at the test 
site has been put on hold for a long time. We have acknowledged that. 
There was a legitimate break in the test and experimental program, as 
the laboratories reassessed what needed to be done. I have heard the 
senior Senator from New Mexico talk for hours about the ability of the 
labs to do what is important, scientifically, for this country. I 
accept that and I agree with that. We have had these labs, the best in 
the world, the best the world has ever known--we have had these labs 
reassess what needs to be done in a world without nuclear testing. 
Because, no matter what the Senator from Oregon says, no matter what 
the Senator from Nebraska says, we are not talking about nuclear 
testing. Our laboratories have said: We have reassessed this in light 
of the fact we do not believe there is going to be further nuclear 
testing. They say to give us confidence in our nuclear weapons, a 
transition must be made.
  That is what we are talking about and that is why I support the 
amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina.
  There was some added delay that came in deference to politics --not 
good science; politics--to the extension of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. That treaty has been extended. I supported 
that. We are now engaged in comprehensive test ban negotiations, but 
the experiments the labs have proposed for 1996, and the President 
would approve, are clearly well within the scope of any potential 
comprehensive test ban. They are also well outside the scope of the 
Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell testing limitation.
  If there is any problem in the bill because of report language or 
some vague, abstract thought process that people may have, I have 
acknowledged to the Senator from Nebraska we will put specific 
language--I should say more specific language--in the bill saying the 
tests are limited to no more than 4 pounds. I made that offer. But 
people do not want to accept that. They want to fight on nuclear 
testing, and there is no nuclear testing. We cannot fight about 
something that does not exist.
  I repeat, we will offer to say there can be no experiment--not a 
test--no experiment over 4 pounds; not tons, not kilotons, not 
megatons--4 pounds. How big is 4 pounds?
  My dad was a miner. I used to go down, as a boy, with him in the 
mines. He would drill the holes and he would load the holes, tamp that 
powder in--sticks of dynamite. He would put in 4 

[[Page S 11361]]
pounds, and 4 pounds is not very much, Mr. President. We acknowledge 
that. We agree to that. Because that is what the amendment of the 
Senator from South Carolina talks about, is those experiments of 4 
pounds or less.
  But no one has agreed to accept that. Why? Because they want to 
debate here on nuclear testing. This is not what the debate is about. 
This is not nuclear testing.
  So, I urge my colleagues to vote against this Exon amendment. What 
does this amendment mean for U.S. policy? The United States is trying 
to negotiate a comprehensive test ban by the end of this year. Our goal 
is to end nuclear testing. Our goal is also to preserve the right to do 
treaty-compliant experiments, and that is what we are talking about 
here today. Hydronuclear experiments would be included in this.
  We passed a resolution earlier this session of Congress to continue 
to hold firm in seeking these goals. I supported that. That was the 
right way to go. Recently, 24 Senators wrote the President to request 
that he not change his strategy. That strategy includes the experiments 
we are talking about in this amendment--not big tests; but experiments 
of less than 4 pounds. Are we now telling the President to change his 
strategy, to no longer seek to assure the right to do these important 
experiments? I hope the answer is no, and that the record will show 
that the answer is no, because otherwise this amendment is much more 
dangerous than it appears on the surface.
  What is a hydronuclear experiment?
  Could I ask the Chair how much time of the 20 minutes does the 
Senator from Nevada have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada currently has 
approximately 8 minutes remaining.
  Mr. REID. What is a hydronuclear experiment? I am quoting:

       Nuclear materials, either plutonium or uranium are 
     configured with high explosives in a geometry very similar to 
     a nuclear explosion. The amount of material and/or the 
     geometry are chosen so that no--

  I underline or underscore ``no.''

     nuclear chain reaction will occur when the explosion is 
     detonated. Nuclear reactions occur and radiation is emitted 
     in tiny quantities. By historic convention, in the United 
     States the yield of an experiment is less than 4 pounds of 
     TNT equivalent.

  This is a millionth of a kiloton. This is 4 pounds.
  The vast majority of informed experts that have studied the issue of 
the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons, including the JASON 
group--including the JASON group--who have studied the issue of the 
safety and reliability of nuclear weapons, recognize the importance of 
doing the experiments we are talking about today.
  The only substantial debate is over the value or the size or the 
yield of these various experiments. That debate is going on in the 
Government now. But remember, we have agreed to clearly indicate, in 
this amendment, that it would be no more than 4 pounds.
  So that is what the bill seeks to support. That is why we need 
hydronuclear experiments. And that is why we should support this bill 
and defeat the Exon amendment.
  This is not, I repeat, a fight over nuclear testing. We should not 
let this become a fight over nuclear testing. Nothing in this bill will 
lead us to break any treaty, to break any existing law, or to end our 
testing moratorium.
  To compare 4-pound experiments to what the French or Chinese are 
doing is stretching one's imagination beyond my ability to comprehend. 
The French are setting off kilotons in the middle of the ocean. In the 
Chinese deserts, they are setting off kilotons, thousands of tons of 
TNT.
  So to try to compare that to these tiny little experiments in which 
you could carry the dynamite around in your pockets, 4 pounds, is 
absolutely absurd.
  We know that the President will only approve treaty compliance 
experiments. We know the President's position on a comprehensive test 
ban. He has made it very clear. This bill will not change the 
President's position on that. The issue is whether you can conduct 
these experiments. The only experiments being proposed by the labs or 
the Department of Energy are treaty compliance, and well within the 
scope of any plausible test ban treaty.
  The experimental preparations called for in this bill are long 
overdue. We are talking about experimental preparations that will be 
done in laboratories.
  Senator Exon and others are concerned about this bill leading to an 
undermining of U.S. efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban. There 
is no basis for that concern. First of all, the President must approve 
all nuclear tests or hydronuclear experiments. And we all know that he 
will not approve any experiment that is not consistent with our 
negotiating position.
  Second, the hydronuclear experiments that would be considered by the 
nuclear weapons laboratories and the Department of Energy will not have 
yield that would be considered a nuclear tests under U.S. law or under 
international conventions. What this bill will do is get our Nation 
moving on fully developing our stockpile stewardship program.
  Is there anything wrong with wanting to make sure that these weapons 
that we have are safe and reliable? No one is talking about building 
new weapons or new weapons systems. Should we not have a stockpile, no 
matter how large or how small, that is safe and reliable? I hope the 
answer cries out as yes.
  An essential element of a program like this is a program of 
experiments that uses both nuclear materials and high explosives, a 
program of hydrodynamic experiments and hydronuclear experiments. This 
bill says that we have delayed these experiments long enough, and it is 
time to move with an experimental program and do it soon.
  This program is critical to stockpile stewardship. This program is 
critical to readiness. And let me add that readiness to testing is 
critical until we have fully established that we can maintain the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile without nuclear 
testing. This is not an attempt to start testing. This is an attempt to 
find an alternative to testing and at the same time preserve our 
capability to resume testing if our national security demands it.
  We must be concerned about the dangers of an accidental explosion. We 
must be concerned that we have a safe and reliable stockpile.
  I again refer to the professional group that was talked about by the 
Senator from Nebraska and the Senator from Oregon, giving great 
credence to the JASON report. I again read from their own sources. 
Their own sources say, however, that experiments involving high 
explosives and fissionable material that do not reach criticality are 
useful in improving our understanding of the behavior of weapons 
materials under relevant physical conditions. They should be included 
among the treaty's consistent activities.
  I suggest that if you are going to use something as a source, you 
should use the latest source. And the latest source is July 25, 1995, 
where the JASON group supports what the committee has agreed to in this 
bill. Based upon the JASON report of good common sense, logic, and the 
safety and reliability of our weapons, this amendment should be 
defeated.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I was hoping we could move back and forth on 
time. There are 31 minutes left on our side.
  I would like to have a better balance on time. But if there is no 
speaker ready to go over here, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from 
Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
  Mr. President, this discussion is taking place on the anniversary of 
the end of World War II and the use of atomic weapons, as we all are 
aware from the news reports of the last few days. It was the first time 
we really had weapons of mass destruction used like this, and we saw 
what nuclear weapons could do. My view in that area, as an aside, is 
that we really saved lives, both Japanese and American, by what 
happened out there. But out of World War II we came into the cold war, 
where bomb and missile development became very major programs and 
became survival for this country.
  At the same time, though, that we were proceeding along those lines, 
we kept our concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
material, and hoped all along that someday we 

[[Page S 11362]]
could get control of our nuclear stockpiles as well as those of our 
major adversary for all of those years, the Soviet Union. Then, in the 
meantime, we hoped that others could be persuaded not to go the nuclear 
route. We had hopes that someday we might get control of some of these 
matters. Until that day, we wanted to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons. We did not want to see nuclear information, nuclear weapons, 
be spread to smaller and smaller nations where maybe their use would be 
common in border wars and things that the rest of the world would not 
deem that important. And we would see new levels of terror around the 
world that would make Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like tiny 
firecrackers compared to the potential of what might happen.
  So what did we do? Well, in the hope that we might be able to make 
some advances in this area, we formed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and 
we have just gone through the 25th anniversary. The purpose of NPT was 
to tell nations foursquare with the nuclear weapons route, if you will, 
that we will cooperate with you on peaceful uses of nuclear material 
for medicines or whatever purposes. Meanwhile, we will try to get 
control of this nuclear stockpile on both sides, Soviet and American, 
try to get it under control.
  We passed legislation here in 1978 just a couple of years or 3 years 
after I came into the Senate called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. 
The Pressler amendment came much later. Other laws have been put on the 
books through the years, all with the objective of keeping control of 
nuclear weapons around the world.
  We finally at last, in our day and time, are seeing a reduction in 
these stockpiles of weapons. We still hope that we can get to a 
comprehensive test ban sometime, one that is verifiable and justifies 
the faith that these other nations have placed in the United States. So 
here we are, in 1995, having really moved down the road a long, long 
way. We have made a lot of progress.
  So, Mr. President, I rise to speak as a cosponsor of the amendment 
offered by my colleague from Nebraska, Mr. Exon, to strike what I view 
as an ill-advised provision in the bill pertaining to low-yield testing 
of nuclear weapons.
  On May 12, 178 parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty agreed 
to make that treaty permanent. That was a big fight. They agreed to 
make that treaty permanent, not a 5-year review as we have been going 
through, but to make it permanent. And America's success in achieving 
this outcome was substantially encouraged by promises made by the 
nuclear weapons states to conclude, to do everything we could to 
conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996.
  Shortly after the celebration died down, after that NPT extension, 
China set off a nuclear device, and said more would follow. France then 
declared it, too, would fire off a few before halting next year. China 
continues to support the right to conduct so-called PNE's, peaceful 
nuclear explosions. These steps by China and France do not help at all 
to advance the cause of nuclear nonproliferation of either variety--
horizontal nonproliferation which seeks to prevent the geographical 
spread of the bomb in more countries, or vertical proliferation which 
seeks to prevent the increased growth and sophistication of weapons 
already in the stockpiles of the nuclear weapons states.
  Yet, instead of expressing its opposition to the actions of France 
and China and proceeding along the lines that we have developed through 
all of these years, the hoped-for area where we really could get 
nuclear stockpiles under control, the Armed Services Committee voted on 
June 29 to require the President to make ``preparations to commence 
low-yield hydronuclear experiments,'' a policy that would substitute 
low-test for no test.
  It was stated here that these have nothing to do with nuclear 
explosions, but they do. The title of them is hydronuclear--small 
amounts, very small amounts, but they are nuclear experiments. They are 
low-test nuclear experiments. That is the definition of them. That is 
the reason they are called hydronuclear experiments.
  These experiments are basically an attempt to say that we will look 
at the hydro characteristics of a low-yield explosion-- in other words, 
the wave patterns, the way the motion occurs internally, combine that 
with computer techniques that can tell us something about safety. That 
is true. But it could also be used by a nation that could develop 
sophisticated computer techniques to give them a lot of clues how to go 
ahead and do their own weapons development.
  So the question comes down to, do we want a comprehensive test ban or 
does this undermine a comprehensive test ban?
  In the dreams of its supporters, this action could well pave the way 
for nuclear test explosions with yields ranging from 4 pounds to 
several hundred tons of TNT equivalent--even within something called a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And recall, 100 tons is 200,000 pounds 
equivalent of TNT--100 tons, 200,000 pounds of TNT.
  By comparison, the blasts at Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center 
were equivalent to the explosive yield of between 1,000 and 2,000 
pounds of TNT. The FBI has not released its official estimate figure 
yet, but it is in the ballpark because on August 3, 1995, the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms informed my staff that their own 
explosives experts estimate the yield of the Oklahoma City bomb at 
about 2,100 pounds of TNT equivalent.
  More explosive than these detonations, however, will be the punch 
that will come from angry members of the global nonproliferation regime 
if the United States and the other nuclear weapons States start to play 
games over their commitment not to engage in any further nuclear tests, 
which was a key item during deliberations over whether we were going to 
extend the NPT. Many of these countries have already sent a blizzard of 
demarches, aide-memoirs, nonpapers, and other such diplomatic missives 
to remind the United States and the other nuclear weapons States about 
that basic arms control and nonproliferation goal, perhaps best 
summarized in the preamble of the NPT itself of seeking to achieve the 
discontinuance of all test explosives of nuclear weapons for all time.
  Any resumption by the United States of such tests, or even active 
preparations to resume such testing, would jeopardize this hard-won 
consensus on the permanent extension of the NPT.
  Essentially, if we heed the nuclear testing policy dictated in this 
bill, we will only invite the following type of collective declaration 
by the nonnuclear weapons States: Halt all testing or we leave the 
treaty. I think some nations might well do that. If we are having 
trouble today affording a limited missile defense and curbing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons within the NPT and ABM Treaties, just 
imagine how worse these conditions would be if these treaties 
collapsed. I do not think we can afford to take such a risk.
  The testing policy dictated in this bill is all the more mystifying 
given that even veteran bomb designers do not believe that low-yield 
nuclear test explosions are vital to ensure either the safety or 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile.
  Former Livermore Director Herbert York does not believe such tests 
are necessary. We have conflicting testimony here about the JASONs. And 
the JASONs, I might add, are an advisory group to the Department of 
Defense. They are academics and defense experts, think-tank experts. 
They are one of the most top-level scientific groups that advises the 
Department of Defense, so their expertise in this area is without 
question.
  Now, the JASONs in the past have said they see some advantages to 
this type of testing but the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages 
in the dangers to nonproliferation, to the NPT, and so on--outweigh 
this--and that has been their view in the past. Another view was 
expressed on the floor this morning. We are asking for some 
clarification of that. And I hope we can get that before our debate 
here is concluded this morning.
  In November 1994, just last fall, the JASONs specifically cited the 
effect of renewed underground nuclear testing upon U.S. 
nonproliferation goals as grounds for their conclusion that they oppose 
it. After considering NPT and considering the advantages, and some of 
which there were, they say, ``On balance, we oppose hydronuclear 
testing.''
  That was last November. Even our nuclear weapon labs have come around 


[[Page S 11363]]
to the view that such testing is not necessary to maintain the nuclear 
arsenal.
  Dr. Frank Von Hippel, until recently the Assistant Director for 
National Security in the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, goes so far as to say that a resumption of nuclear testing--and 
this would be just low-level nuclear testing, hydronuclear testing

     . . . would be seen as a fraud by virtually all of the 170 
     nonnuclear states that agreed this spring to an indefinite 
     extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty after receiving a 
     commitment that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be 
     signed next year . . . Based on U.S. experience, the 
     objective value of ``reliability'' tests is negligible in 
     comparison with the costs of reneging on the deal with the 
     nonweapons States, which promises that we will all work 
     together against the spread and to reduce the numbers of 
     these terrible devices.

  That was published in the Los Angeles Times on July 26 of this year.
  We have all sorts of definitions of ``comprehensive,'' I guess. I 
think comprehensive is pretty clear myself, but comprehensive to me 
means these lower-level tests also. So we need obviously a bit more 
predictability when we attempt to forge a national policy or craft a 
permanent international treaty. But we cannot go on unilaterally 
contriving new definitions of our international treaty commitments, a 
lesson that unfortunately has yet to be learned by supporters of 
provisions in the current bill addressing the ABM Treaty.
  Mr. President, a basic nuclear fission explosion is caused when a 
chemical explosion forces a sudden release of energy from the nucleus 
of atoms, typically plutonium or highly enriched uranium. In testing a 
nuclear explosive device, there is no nuclear explosion if the total 
energy released from a detonation is equal to the yield from the 
detonation of just the chemical explosives in that test device. If, 
however, you get some energy release greater than the energy that is 
released from the chemical explosive, then you have a nuclear 
explosion. A device that produces such explosions is what we call a 
nuclear explosive device.
  Under current nuclear proliferation sanctions legislation, our 
country imposes tough sanctions if nuclear nonweapons states detonate a 
device that produces a nuclear yield of only 1 pound, 1 pound of TNT 
equivalent.
  The source for that is section 834 of the Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act of 1994, Public Law 103-236. This was a standard used by 
the United States during a nuclear test moratorium between 1958 and 
1961. It was used at that time to define what was called a hydronuclear 
experiment.
  Section 3135 of the current bill makes available $50 million for, 
``Preparation for the commencement of a program of hydronuclear 
experiments.'' Later on, in section 3165 of the bill, the bill makes it 
clear that this bill intends to include detonations with nuclear yields 
on the order of 20 tons of TNT to fall within the category of 
``hydronuclear tests''--that is in the bill--although the series of 
tests during the old moratorium had nuclear yield of far less than a 
pound of TNT.
  The bill is therefore not only an extreme diversion from historic 
U.S. practice but in establishing a 4-pound testing level, it adopts a 
standard that is four times higher than the standard we now apply to 
other countries in implementing our nuclear proliferation laws.
 I think it opens up a Pandora's box for arms control professionals and 
intelligence professionals who are responsible for verifying compliance 
with a comprehensive test ban. Verifying such a ban is difficult 
enough, but I think it is far easier to verify that there have been no 
nuclear explosions whatsoever, than it is to determine whether a given 
nuclear explosion at an unknown location had a yield of 1, 3, 4, 5 
pounds, or whatever.

  Moreover, our current 1-pound definition for sanctions, which is 
still the law, has nothing to do with restraints on nuclear testing. As 
I clearly stated on the floor in my remarks a couple years ago, on May 
27, 1993, this definition:

       . . . is not intended to foreclose any other definition 
     that may be adopted in the course of the negotiation of any 
     future international agreement limiting the testing of 
     nuclear explosive devices, including a Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty.

  I would today go further and say, no test ban treaty that deserves 
the word ``comprehensive'' in its title can allow nuclear explosions of 
any size, period. That is what comprehensive means, no nuclear 
explosions.
  Explosive tests at even 1 pound and below can give a proliferant 
country some potential benefits, no doubt about that, especially in the 
areas of weapons safety, though there is no indication that any 
proliferant country has chosen that route to acquire the bomb. When you 
go to 4 pounds, then 40 pounds, then 400 pounds, and beyond, then you 
obviously run into more and more proliferation risks. We drew the line 
at 1 pound for sanctions purposes many years ago, not to legitimize 
tests below that level but simply to guarantee that no proliferant 
country could escape from the force of U.S. sanctions by undertaking 
exactly the type of so-called hydronuclear experiments described in the 
current bill.
  In short, America should not be encouraging the world community to 
engage in low-yield nuclear testing. A comprehensive test ban must 
eliminate all nuclear explosions. As I said on this floor last March 
16, it is essential that we proceed with several measures to strengthen 
controls against the global spread of nuclear weapons, including:

       Negotiation at the earliest possible date of a verifiable--
     underline verifiable--permanent comprehensive ban on the 
     testing of nuclear explosive devices, with emphasis on those 
     words ``verifiable,'' ``permanent,'' ``comprehensive'' and 
     ``ban.''

  Mr. President, we in the past have seen Taiwan have a program for 
nuclear weapons. We were able to bring them around to turn that program 
off. South Korea had a similar program at one time. We turned that off. 
Iran is in the process, we believe, now of heading for nuclear weapons. 
We are trying to turn that off. Pakistan has already gone that route 
against our very serious objections. India went that route in 1974.
  Are we now to come into this debate today and say that we are going 
to perform little bitty nuclear explosions, but you people cannot do 
the same things? It just does not make sense if what we are trying to 
go to is a comprehensive test ban.
  The debate today is ironic given that we just do not need to perform 
hydronuclear experiments to maintain the reliability of our nuclear 
arsenal. In fact, our Government is now investing billions in special 
facilities that will enable our country to ensure the safety and 
reliability of the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. And 
that includes hydronuclear testing. This is what is known as to the 
stockpile stewardship program.
  Are there advantages to hy- dronuclear testing? Of course there are. 
I agree with that. But the dangers to the NPT and the worldwide spread 
of nuclear weapons as other countries see us testing and decide to do 
the same thing is far greater. The danger is far greater than any 
advantage we get out of the hydronuclear test.
  If the hundreds upon hundreds of nuclear tests that we have 
undertaken over the last half century have still not given us a 
reliable arsenal, then this dubious record surely offers sufficient 
cause for us to question whether testing is truly as efficient a method 
for establishing a method of safety and liability as its proponents 
claim it is. The truth is, of course, that we already have a safe and 
reliable arsenal. And a good way to keep it that way without testing is 
to leave the designs alone.
  Supporters of the nuclear testing section of the bill appear to want 
it both ways, twice. They want both to resume nuclear testing and fund 
big-ticket nonnuclear test facilities. They also want both to expand 
current nuclear and missile defense capabilities and to propagate the 
view that our potential adversaries will do nothing in response that 
will adversely affect our national security. I am opposed to such 
reasoning, and I am sure I am not alone in challenging these totally 
incompatible goals.
  I applaud the leadership of my friend from Nebraska. Over the years 
he has fought for restraints on nuclear testing. I am proud to be 
included as a cosponsor of his amendment today. I hope our colleagues 
have been following the debate here on the floor today. And I hope we 
have an overwhelming vote in support of the Senator from Nebraska.
  I reserve the remainder of my time. 

[[Page S 11364]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the able Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the chairman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. President, I rise in very strong opposition to the Exon amendment 
and in support of the committee's position.
  Let us begin with a redefinition here of what we are talking about. 
What is a hydronuclear test? All that the committee has done is to 
provide $50 million to enable us to have the capability to conduct such 
tests, should the administration decide to go forward with that 
decision.
  A hydronuclear experiment is one in which the conventional high 
explosive yield is greater than the nuclear yield.
  So we are, by definition, talking about something that does not have 
a high nuclear yield. As a matter of fact, the kind of tests that have 
been contemplated in the past are tests with approximately 4 pounds--4 
pounds--of material, between 1 and 4 pounds. All these experiments 
provide is an experimental calculation of the safety of the stockpile. 
That is what we are talking about here.
  Now, what about the CTB, the comprehensive test ban? Would conducting 
such tests run afoul of the test ban? Well, we can quote no better 
authority than one of our colleagues here in the U.S. Senate who was 
here during the debate on the Hatfield amendment. And I refer to the 
Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy, who suggested that such 
low-yield tests would be perfectly acceptable within the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. On September 18, 1992, Senator Kennedy said:

       The first of these concerns--accidental detonation--can be 
     resolved with safety tests with an explosive power equivalent 
     to a few pounds or less of TNT. Such test need not be limited 
     under a comprehensive test ban.

  That is on page S13965 of the Congressional Record.
  Now, the reason, of course, why, such tests should be allowed under 
the CTB is because they are not verifiable. As the Senator from Ohio 
pointed out, the CTB only works at levels where you can verify that the 
nations that are adhering to the treaty are, in fact, adhering to the 
treaty. These low yields are not verifiable. They are so small you 
cannot detect them. That is why they could not be included under a CTB. 
That is why this has nothing to do with the CTB. So let us get that off 
the table right now.
  The next point is: Why test? Lawrence Livermore Laboratory estimates 
that:

       One-third of all of the weapon designs placed in the U.S. 
     stockpile between 1958 and 1987 required and received post-
     deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems.

  In other words, after we had put the warheads on top of the missiles, 
or put them in the bombs in the planes, one-third of all of those 
weapons required and received postdeployment tests to resolve problems 
that they had developed.
  ``In three-quarters of these cases the problems were identified as a 
result of nuclear testing.'' In each case the weapon was thought to be 
reliable and adequately tested when it entered the stockpile.
  In other words, Mr. President, we test in order to find out whether 
they are still going to work, whether they will be reliable, and 
whether they will remain safe. These are the most complex weapons in 
our entire inventory, and yet they receive the least testing once they 
have been deployed. We shoot the guns. We fly the airplanes. We sail 
the ships. This is called readiness.
  But some of our friends on the other side do not want to know whether 
the most complex weapons in our inventory are reliable, whether they 
will work, and whether they are safe. And how can they possibly 
constitute an effective deterrent if those against whom they might be 
used understand that they have not been tested maybe for 30 years? We 
are talking about weapons, warheads that will be in our inventory for 
30 years or more, never having been tested. Lawrence Livermore notes 
that in three-fourths of the cases where testing was done, problems 
were identified as a result of that testing.
  These weapons were thought to be reliable. Let me be very specific.
  Of the 16 Lawrence Livermore developed warhead designs that entered 
the stockpile between 1958 and 1987, several were found to have 
problems. For six of these, the WXX, the W84, the W79, the W68, the 
W47, and the W45, the resolution of these problems involved nuclear 
tests.
  Further, of the 25 Los Alamos weapon designs that were deployed 
between 1958 and 1987, one-third have required postdeployment nuclear 
testing. That is what we are talking about here.
  Let us go to the element of safety, because, obviously, we want our 
weapons to be safe, and technology has improved, has enhanced our 
capability of making these weapons safe.
  The 1990 Drell panel, which was constituted to consider this issue, 
concluded that ``there is still room for substantive improvement in 
nuclear weapons safety.''
  One manner to improve the safety of the warheads is to replace 
warheads--the ones that have high explosives--to ones with insensitive 
high explosives, the so-called IHE. High explosives can be detonated in 
abnormal thermal pressure or shock environments.
  That can be a danger in a crash situation or a fire situation.
  As the Drell panel noted, ``In certain violent accidents, such as 
airplane fires or crashes, HE has a high probability of detonating, in 
contrast to IHE.'' The Drell panel concluded that:

     . . . replacing warheads with HE with new systems with IHE is 
     a very effective way--perhaps the most important step--for 
     improving safety of the weapons stockpile from scattering 
     plutonium.

  IHE was first introduced in 1979 in the stockpile. As of early 1990, 
only 25 percent of the stockpile was equipped with IHE. Incorporating 
IHE in the stockpile could require design changes and, thus, the 
requirement to retest the weapon to ensure its ability to accomplish 
its military requirement.
  So, Mr. President, both for reliability reasons and for safety 
reasons, some limited testing is necessary.
  There has been a lot of quotation here of the so-called--I should not 
say ``so-called''--of the experts on the subject, because experts will 
differ in their opinions and the JASONs are all experts and so are the 
directors of the laboratories.
  I quoted the statistics from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and 
the Los Alamos Laboratory. One of my colleagues said the lab directors 
are against this. The lab directors are for it. Ask Sig Hecker, who is 
the director today of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Some of the quotations 
were for previous directors. This is the current director of Los 
Alamos, and he says we ought to have testing.
  You can find whatever you want to in the JASON report, but what my 
colleague from Nevada is quoting from is the most recent report. It is 
the draft July 1995 report. That is the most recent report.
  Of course, they point out the fact that there are some advantages and 
some disadvantages, but one of their conclusions is that experiments 
involving--actually let me read the first sentence, because it will 
support the position of the Senator from Nebraska. I do not want to 
quote selectively, I am going to quote the whole thing:

       Underground testing of nuclear weapons at any yield level 
     below that required to initiate boosting is of limited value 
     to the United States.

  They are talking about these very low yield kind of tests.
  But they go on:

       However, experiments involving high explosives and 
     fissionable material that do not reach critical--

  The ones we are talking about--

     are useful in improving our understanding of the behavior of 
     weapons materials under relevant physical conditions. They 
     should be included among treaty consistent activities.

  That is the most recent JASON report. Obviously, they discussed all 
of the pros and cons, and there are pros and cons of this kind of 
testing.
  Let me just conclude with two points, Mr. President. The Senator from 
Nebraska, in his opening remarks, talked about the wishy-washy advisers 
of the President. I think who he had in mind--he can correct me if I am 
wrong--is the Secretary of Defense William Perry, perhaps among others. 
If the Senator would like to correct me right now.
  Mr. EXON. The Senator is wrong, but he has a right to be wrong.
  
[[Page S 11365]]

  Mr. KYL. Will the Senator tell me who he meant when he referred to 
the wishy-washy advisers to the President?
  Mr. EXON. There are a whole group of wishy-washy advisers to the 
President. I talked about people inside the Pentagon. The Secretary of 
Defense supports my position. I hope you are not saying the Secretary 
of Defense supports your----
  Mr. KYL. Yes, I am going to say that.
  Mr. EXON. You are wrong. You have a right to be wrong.
  Mr. KYL. Because the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Department 
in May of this year had suggested to the administration the 
desirability of these kinds of tests. When the issue went to the 
National Security Council and the highest counsels, including the 
President, the Defense Department recommendations were shelved, they 
were overruled.
  As a result, we are not going to go forward with these tests, 
although the most recent Defense Department document in July of this 
year, which I can quote to you, does refer to the continuing open issue 
as to whether we should go forward.
  But in any event, I find it interesting that this is the same 
Secretary of Defense who was so relied upon yesterday in the debate on 
missile defense and find it ironic that some people on the floor were 
suggesting that the reason we did not need missile defenses is because 
we could rely upon our triad, our nuclear triad. You cannot have it 
both ways. If you are not going to test reliability and safety of the 
triad, then you should be supporting missile defense. If you are not 
going to support missile defense, then you ought to be supporting the 
effectiveness of our nuclear triad.
  Mr. President, I want to conclude at this point. The whole phrase, 
the whole concept of stockpile stewardship implies a responsibility. 
That is what stewardship means. And these are the most complex weapons 
in our inventory. As I said, we test guns and planes and ships 
regularly. It is called readiness. I cannot believe that we are arguing 
here about a 1-to-4 pound test that does not reach criticality, where, 
by definition, the conventional yield is greater than the nuclear 
yield, and it seems to me, therefore----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. KYL. The Senate ought to support the committee position and 
reject the position of the Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 more minutes to the able Senator.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the chairman for yielding. I will take 30 seconds of 
that time.
  Let me say this. We all wish the nuclear genie had not been let out 
of the bottle, but it was. I noted with interest, Senator Hatfield, 
Senator Exon, and others commented about their experience in World War 
II and glad that President Truman made the decision he did, which 
probably brought that horrible war to a conclusion much faster than it 
would have been, and thank God the weapon he chose to use worked.
  All we are saying is, in the future, 30 years from now we better know 
that the weapons we rely on in our stockpile will work. To do that, we 
need to be prepared to conduct the very limited tests, and that is 
going to require the limited money included in the bill for this 
purpose. That is why we need to reject the Exon amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 12 minutes to the able Senator from Nevada.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair, and I thank the distinguished chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment offered 
by my good friend, the senior Senator from Nebraska. During the course 
of the debate this morning, references have been made to the 50th 
anniversary of the end of World War II and the use of nuclear weapons 
at Hiroshima and later Nagasaki. Let me say, I think those references 
have absolutely nothing to do with what we are talking about today.
  We are not debating whether we should resume underground testing, as 
it has been historically known at the Nevada test site. That is not the 
issue before us today. We are not debating about the prospect of 
developing new nuclear weapons. The issue, I think, that was framed so 
artfully by the distinguished junior Senator from Arizona, the question 
today is the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal.
  No scenario that I am familiar with contemplates a future in terms of 
our armed service deterrent that does not include our nuclear arsenal. 
So safety and reliability is essential and critical.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have joined my 
colleagues on a number of occasions questioning the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Defense officials regarding our plans to 
maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile in 
the absence of nuclear testing.
  In hearing after hearing, the answer came back that we simply do not 
know. Mr. President, no one in this body can state with categorical 
certainty that our nuclear weapons arsenal has suddenly become safe and 
reliable for the foreseeable future, and that there is no need to 
continue to ascertain the safety and reliability of that nuclear 
stockpile.
  Nuclear weapons, by their very nature, are extraordinarily complex 
systems. We simply do not understand the effects of aging on many 
components that make up each nuclear device. Those who designed the 
nuclear weapons planned for our enduring stockpile did not contemplate 
the maintenance of these systems past their designed life. Our national 
labs, which are ultimately responsible for certifying the safety and 
effectiveness of our nuclear weapons systems, have initiated a science-
based stockpile stewardship program, which aims to give us the 
information we need to know about the nuclear stockpile without nuclear 
testing.
  Many of my colleagues are familiar with these new strategies, 
including the National Ignition Facility, the ATLAS, the DAHRT, and 
many others. Once these facilities are up and running, the labs 
anticipate the ability to obtain much of the data previously gathered 
through nuclear testing without performing nuclear tests. But science-
based stockpile stewardship has never been considered as a complete 
substitute for all types of nuclear tests or experiments for a number 
of reasons.
  Even when the science-based stockpile stewardship program is fully 
implemented, there will still be gaps in the type of knowledge our labs 
need to gather. It is a common misperception that the new simulator 
technology, anticipated to become available soon, will, in effect, 
simply simulate nuclear tests and allow us to gather all of the same 
data that a nuclear test may provide. Mr. President, nothing could be 
further from the truth. Each of the components of the science-based 
stockpile management program will provide some of the data, which are 
issues of concern, such as certifying the safety and effectiveness of 
our weapons system. None will provide all the data, and even the 
combination of all of the new technologies currently being considered 
will not eliminate the need for certain types of actual testing with 
nuclear materials.
  Given the high level of uncertainty that remains regarding science-
based stockpile stewardship, the Senate Armed Services Committee has 
taken a very reasonable and responsible approach in the legislation 
currently before the Senate. The committee directs preparations to 
conduct nuclear testing should this type of testing become necessary. 
The bill does not direct hydronuclear testing, and hydronu- clear tests 
would still have to be approved by the President of the United States 
under current law.
  It is, in my judgment, reckless for our Nation to hold thousands of 
the most powerful and dangerous weapons known to mankind and not have 
the knowledge or understanding of how to maintain them.
  Another concern regarding this amendment is its affect on the Nevada 
test site and the unique capabilities this complex brings to the U.S. 
national security effort. The DOE stated its intention to allow the 
readiness of the Nevada test site to slip from 6 months up to 3 years. 
The Nevada testing facility is a unique resource, and 

[[Page S 11366]]
the Nation's investment in it must be protected. Personnel at the 
Nevada test site are a small community of highly specialized workers 
with expertise found nowhere else in the world. This capability is 
irreplaceable and must not be risked. The combination of an aging 
stockpile and the decaying nuclear weapons expertise at the Nevada test 
site and at the labs pose a direct threat to the safety and reliability 
of our stockpile.
  It is important to note that hydronuclear testing would not lead the 
United States on a path to violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
as has been suggested by some of our colleagues.
  While negotiation positions are generally regarded as classified, it 
has been reported in the media that the United States favors a limit 
under the CTB of hydronuclear tests with less than 4 pounds of nuclear 
yield. Other nations apparently want a much higher yield.
  It has been reported in the press that Great Britain wants up to 100 
pounds, Russia wants tests up to 10 tons, and France wants tests 
allowed up to 100 to 200 tons.
  At this point, there is simply no way to predict how the final CTB 
may be negotiated. Even with the hydro- nuclear testing program, the 
United States can remain in full compliance with all current 
international agreements and the likely future provisions of any CTB.
  In fact, the Armed Services Committee report language specifies 
``treaty complaint'' hydronuclear tests.
  We must remember that even if START II is ratified, the United States 
will continue to maintain a stockpile of thousands of nuclear weapons.
  The reliability of these weapons forms the basis of their existence 
as a strategic deterrence. As our stockpile of nuclear weapons is 
reduced, the reliability of each nuclear weapon becomes even more 
critical to an effective deterrence.
  It is possible that only through hydronuclear testing at the Nevada 
test site can we have adequate assurance that our nuclear weapons will 
function as expected if a time should ever be needed to use them in a 
crisis.
  Almost one-half of the nuclear weapons systems developed since 1970 
have needed nuclear testing to correct or evaluate defects. Clearly, 
this amendment could seriously hamper our confidence in our nuclear 
weapons stockpile.
  Mr. President, I am afraid this amendment may, in some part, be 
motivated by a misunderstanding of what the committee hoped to 
accomplish by adding funding to the stockpile stewardship account for 
hydronuclear testing.
  While the terminology may be confusing, the committee does not 
envision a resumption of the type of nuclear tests that we have become 
familiar with over the years. These are not full-scale tests of nuclear 
weapons, nor are they intended to test for new weapon designs.
  Very small hydronuclear tests may, for example, test whether dropping 
a weapon would result in a nuclear detonation--a test that, I suggest, 
should hardly raise nonproliferation concerns.
  Such tests are not designed to improve our ability to use nuclear 
weapons against any future enemy. They are designed to protect those in 
the Armed Forces or the general public who may be put at risk by an 
unsafe or deteriorated weapon.
  Other experiments, slightly larger, but still nowhere near the level 
of a full-scale test, and still completely consistent with our treaty 
obligations, could test the so-called ``boost'' provided by the tritium 
components of a weapon.
  Some have argued that such tests are largely irrelevant; the claim is 
made that it makes little difference if the yield of the nuclear weapon 
deteriorates only slightly over the period of time. The answer to that, 
Mr. President, is that we simply have no assurance, however, that an 
old weapon will experience only a slight reduction in yield.
  While everyone hopes and assumes that we will never use a nuclear 
weapon again, it is simply unconscionable not to provide our military 
planners the confidence they need in the anticipated yields of our 
nuclear weapon systems.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment offered by 
the senior Senator from Nebraska.
  I yield the floor and the remainder of my time to the able chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield Senator Kempthorne 10 minutes.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee. With regard to this debate, there is a reality, and 
the reality is that we have a nuclear arsenal. It exists. Now, perhaps 
through START Treaties we are going to see a reduction of the nuclear 
warheads. I think we all want to see that continue. But the reality is, 
we have a nuclear arsenal. And the reality is, Mr. President, it is the 
oldest stockpile in our history. Yet, we want to make sure that we 
maintain the safety and the reliability of that stockpile.
  Talk about scenarios of disaster, what happens if you have an 
unreliable situation occur with a nuclear stockpile? Right now, we have 
a high level of confidence. As we continue each year, the confidence 
level goes down.
  It is analogous to having an automobile that is working well today; 
does that mean we should then shut down all garages and diagnostic 
centers? No, because the automobile is a machine, and it will need to 
have monitoring and repair, just as this machine that we have of the 
nuclear arsenal will need.
  These hydronuclear tests with a yield of about 4 pounds--and I agree 
with the Senator from Nevada, I support, if there is need for 
clarification, that it is not more than 4 pounds-- these 4-pound tests 
should more accurately be called experiments. These are safety 
experiments. These experiments give detailed data about how a weapon is 
aging. This data is then used to draw decisions about the safety and 
reliability of the weapon.
  These experiments are compatible with the ongoing negotiations for a 
comprehensive test ban. Indeed, during a recent discussion with the DOD 
Under Secretary Curtis, he pointed out that hydronuclear experiments 
will be compatible with a comprehensive test ban.
  Moreover, during the previous moratorium, an underground test from 
1958 to 1961, the United States conducted hydronuclear tests at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory. In testimony this year, Dick Reis, the 
Department of Energy official in charge of defense programs, 
acknowledged that there is no guarantee that the proposed Science-Based 
Stockpile Stewardship Program will work.
  What does that mean--the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program? 
This is a program that has to come up with computer modeling, physics 
machines, to understand the aging of weapons. It will take about 10 
years to put this science-based stockpile reliability program in place. 
And then perhaps another 10 years to determine its accuracy. Ten years 
before we will have it in place, and another 10 years to determine its 
accuracy. That is a total of 20 years, Mr. President.
  The design life of our nuclear stockpile is 20 years, roughly. 
Unfortunately, that clock is not just starting.
  As I said, we have the oldest stockpile in our history. So in 4 
years, 5 years, when we hit the year 2000, many of the elements to that 
arsenal will have reached their design life capacity.
  That does not mean they will no longer be of value to us, but again 
the confidence level goes down.
  Dick Reis informed the Armed Services Committee on May 16, ``The 
history of the stockpile has shown that the continuous surveillance, 
repair and replacement of components and subsystems is commonplace.''
  We are spending billions of dollars on Trident submarines, on D-5 
missiles, upgrades to the Minuteman missile, but without a safe and 
reliable nuclear stockpile, all of this investment could be for naught.
  The bill now on the floor authorizes almost $200 million to maintain 
the Nevada test site in a state of readiness. The current 
administration policy says we must be able to conduct an underground 
test at the test site within 3 years of a decision to test. The 
investment to maintain the test site requested by the President allows 
us to leverage that investment and conduct these experiments at minimum 
cost. 

[[Page S 11367]]

  On May 16, the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, Dr. Hecker, 
testified before the Armed Services Committee. As part of his written 
testimony, Dr. Hecker provided the committee with a document entitled 
``Nuclear Weapons Stewardship: Los Alamos National Laboratory.''
  Page 18 of this document states:

       Hydronuclear experiments include some fissile material but 
     no nuclear explosion. Only small amounts of energy are 
     released. They are used to assess primary performance and 
     safety. These experiments are important for two reasons: They 
     can be used, (1) to directly address the nuclear detonation 
     safety of the stockpile weapon; and, (2) to provide important 
     benchmark performance measures. Our plan is to gather 
     baseline, hydrodynamic and hydronuclear data on all 
     stockpiled weapons systems.

  In other words, hydronuclear tests are an important component of the 
new Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program.
  Mr. President, will we continue to oppose hydronuclear experiments 
after a comprehensive test ban treaty is signed? In other words, are we 
going to exclude these experiments from all future stockpile 
stewardship activities?
  I do not believe that is the position of the Clinton administration. 
I do not believe it is the position of the Armed Services Committee. 
Given the uncertainties in the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship 
Program and the time lag before this program provides meaningful data, 
the Armed Services Committee took what it believes to be the prudent 
step of providing funds to prepare for hydronuclear experiments that 
are compatible with the comprehensive test ban treaty, to stem the 
inevitable decline in the confidence of our nuclear stockpile.
  There has been a great deal of reference as to what is the amount 
that we are going to be testing--400 pounds, 4,000 pounds, 40,000 
pounds. Again, it is 4 pounds. I will reference in the bill itself, 
page 383, section 3165, Report on Hydronuclear Testing:

       The committee directs that the Secretary of Energy is to 
     move forward with the ``preparation of a comprehensive 
     report'' by the directors of the two nuclear weapons design 
     laboratories on the relative costs and benefits of 
     alternative limits on the permitted levels of hydronuclear 
     testing to include 4 pounds, 400 pounds, 4,000 pounds, 40,000 
     pounds of yield.

  But it is a report. It is a report on the cost and benefit analysis.
  Then it goes on to say:

       The committee requests the preparation of a single report 
     with additional and/or dissenting views by each director as 
     they deem appropriate. The report should be delivered to the 
     congressional defense committees, the Secretaries of Defense 
     and Energy and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic 
     Command for their comments.

  That is what is in here. Again, Mr. President, in summary, we have 
nuclear stockpile. It is the oldest in our history. We better ensure 
the safety and the stability of that stockpile. The way they are 
proposing they will do that is to now come up with a computer model 
program that is 10 years away from now.
  We are simply saying that one component that will help us is the 
hydronuclear experiments of not more than 4 pounds. If that is not a 
very realistic and responsible approach, I do not know what is.
  I yield the balance of my time back to the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 7 minutes to the able Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from 
South Carolina.
  Mr. President, I rise to speak about the importance of maintaining a 
safe and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent, and in opposition to the 
amendment offered by my friend, the senior Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. President, the issue is not testing of new weapons. It is 
assuring a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent. If the United States is to 
maintain a nuclear weapons capability, we must be able to assure the 
safety and reliability of our existing stockpile.
  Unless we have the capability to continue experiments and testing, we 
cannot ensure either.
 We must continue to make needed investments in nuclear weapons 
stockpile maintenance.

  Nothing in the bill that is pending before us will violate any treaty 
or obligation, nor will it violate self-imposed moratorium on nuclear 
testing. Hydronuclear testing will not violate any existing U.S. treaty 
commitments, nor would it violate the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty that we are trying to negotiate. But such testing does provides 
the essential margin of safety we need--short of the resumption of 
full-scale nuclear testing. I would add that the President has reserved 
the right to resume testing, if deemed to be vital to our national 
security interests and maintenance of our nuclear deterrent.
  The amendment that has been proposed will nullify our ability to 
assure to stockpile safety and reliability. We will not get to the goal 
of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty if we unilaterally preclude 
ourselves from conducting essential stockpile maintenance and 
relaiblity activities, including hydronuclear testing.
  One critical component of U.S. nuclear stockpile management is the 
Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant, a Department of Energy [DOE] facility 
located in Amarillo, TX. The Pantex plant, along with Savannah River, 
Y-12 and the Kansas City plant, is one of the few remaining production 
sites with existing infrastructure and capabilities that, if upgraded 
in place, can cost-effectively and meet the needs of nuclear weapons 
stockpile management and missile material disposition requirements 
identified in the Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review.
  However, Mr. President, I remain very concerned that the Department 
of Energy's published 5-year budget plan calls for cuts in weapons 
activities of up to 40 percent in fiscal year 1997 and beyond. The DOE 
portion of the Defense authorization bill should be used for its 
intended purpose--to meet the nuclear deterrent capability our national 
security needs require.
  Our nuclear weapons complex is undergoing a crucial reconfiguration. 
I am concerned that decisions could be made which would both compromise 
the integrity of our nuclear deterrent and needlessly waste billions of 
dollars of taxpayer money. The current and future existence and full 
utilization of our production sites, working with the national labs, is 
critical to maintaining an effective and efficient nuclear deterrent.
  Pantex, as the sole site in the United States for assembly, 
disassembly, and maintenance of nuclear warheads, as well as the 
primary site for interim storage of plutonium components removed from 
these weapons, is key to a cost-effective, competent nuclear deterrent 
in a scaled-back complex. Some proposals in DOE would suggest that 
Pantex and the other production sites be phased out, with the Nevada 
test site becoming the sole production site for the complex.
  This course, however, would not only deprive our country of the 
ability to remanufacture and deal with significant weapons production 
if the need ever arose, but would also result in the needless 
recreation of a multibillion-dollar infrastructure at Nevada which 
already exists at the existing production sites. By retaining and 
upgrading Pantex as the primary stockpile stewardship and management 
facility, we would also realize other cost savings, in the form of 
avoided transport cost and duplicative environmental, security, and 
safety expenditures.
  We must ensure an orderly and safe transition to civilian stewardship 
of nuclear materials decommissioned from military use. I believe that 
one of the most critical national security issues facing our country 
today is the safe, environmentally sound, and secure storage and 
disposition of these materials. An example of this transition would be 
purification and fabrication of weapons components. Such capacity could 
complement a reactor for the dedicated source of tritium production, by 
fabricating mixed oxide fuel from plutonium components for disposition 
in such a reactor.
  One key element to implementation of this transition for the entire 
complex is the National Resource Center for Plutonium, which is 
operated by a consortium of Texas universities. The center was funded 
at $9 million in fiscal year 1995, and the administration and the 
House-passed version of the Defense authorization bill recommended 
authority for $10 million in fiscal year 1996, with recommendations for 
continuing support in fiscal year 1997. This center enjoys a symbiotic 
relationship with the national labs, in its work with 

[[Page S 11368]]
fissile material disposition supplements.
  I would like to personally thank Chairman Thurmond and Senators Lott 
and Kempthorne for the outstanding work done by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in bringing needed attention to nuclear stockpile 
management and the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent capabilities, 
which addresses, head-on, the concerns raised in the Defense 
Department's Nuclear Posture Review.
  Mr. President, the position outlined in the Senate Armed Services 
Committee Defense authorization bill provides the Department of Energy 
with clear guidance to maintain and enhance our nuclear deterrent 
capabilities. At the same time, the bill provides direction to DOE to 
make the necessary decisions to clean up nuclear waste sites; to 
address the issue of plutonium and highly enriched uranium disposition; 
to consider new reactor options for disposition of fissile materials 
and the disposition of fissile materials--plutonium--through 
fabrication of mox fuel and the burning up of mox fuel in a reactor; 
and finally to make a rational choice, in the very near term, for a 
dedicated source of tritium production.
  Mr. President, nuclear weapons stockpile management is a critical 
element in putting us on the right course to meet our critical national 
security requirements and this legislation sets us on the right course 
and gives needed direction and support to the Department of Energy. I 
am proud to be part of and supportive of the efforts of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee to address in a meaningful and realistic 
manner our Nation's critical national security and defense needs.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I will yield myself 3 minutes.
  First, I would like to introduce letters from the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of Energy, since their names have been 
mentioned, in full support of the Hatfield-Exon amendment.
  I would simply also advise the Senate that, following the references 
made by some Senators with regard to the new JASON report, the 
Secretary of Energy initiated a call to me. She was very upset about 
the slant that was being placed on this. She has furnished me a full 
copy of the JASON report of August 3. I submit that at this time to be 
made part of the Record.
  I ask unanimous consent the letters and the report be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, July 31, 1995.
     Hon. James Exon,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Exon: Thank you for sending me a copy of your 
     June 20 letter to President Clinton providing your views on 
     the nuclear testing moratorium and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     (CTB) Treaty. I want to assure you that U.S. policy on the 
     nuclear testing moratorium has not changed, and there are no 
     plans to change it. Based on the assumption that a treaty 
     will be signed before September 30, 1996, and subject to the 
     same understandings that govern our current moratorium, the 
     President extended the moratorium until the CTB enters into 
     force. As you may know, the President has stated that he 
     considers the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear 
     stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United 
     States. We are currently reviewing how best to ensure that 
     this mandate can be carried out, both now and in the future. 
     Your letter provides an important perspective for our 
     deliberations.
           Sincerely,
     William J. Perry.
                                                                    ____

                                      The Secretary of Energy,

                                   Washington, DC, August 3, 1995.
     Hon. James Exon,
     Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
         Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Exon: As the Senate considers provisions 
     relating to hydronuclear experiments in S. 1026, the 
     ``National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,'' 
     as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, I wanted 
     to reiterate that the President's Fiscal Year 1996 budget 
     request included no funds to conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments. The Administration stands behind its budget 
     request.
           Sincerely,
     Hazel R. O'Leary.
                                                                    ____


                            Nuclear Testing

(Prepared by JASON, the MITRE Corp; Sidney Drell, Chair, John Cornwall, 
  Freeman Dyson, Douglas Eardley, Richard Garwin, David Hammer, John 
Kammerdiener, Robert LeLevier, Robert Peurifoy, John Richter, Marshall 
 Rosenbluth, Seymour Sack, Jeremiah Sullivan, and Fredrik Zachariason; 
                             Aug. 3, 1995)


                     1 (u) summary and conclusions

       (U) We have examined the experimental and analytic bases 
     for understanding the performance of each of the weapon types 
     that are currently planned to remain in the U.S. enduring 
     nuclear stockpile. We have also examined whether continued 
     underground tests at various nuclear yield thresholds would 
     add significantly to our confidence in this stockpile in the 
     years ahead.
       (U) Our starting point for this examination was a detailed 
     review of past experience in developing and testing modern 
     nuclear weapons, their certification and recertification 
     processes, their performance margins,\1\ and evidence of 
     aging or other trends over time for each weapon type in the 
     enduring stockpile.
     \1\ Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                              conclusion 1

       (U) The United States can, today, have high confidence in 
     the safety, reliability, and performance margins of the 
     nuclear weapons that are designated to remain in the enduring 
     stockpile. This confidence is based on understanding gained 
     from 50 years of experience and analysis of more than 1000 
     nuclear tests, including the results of
      approximately 150 nuclear tests of modern weapon types in 
     the past 20 years.
       (U) Looking to future prospects of achieving a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a stated goal of the 
     United States Government, we have studied a range of 
     activities that could be of importance to extending our 
     present confidence in the stockpile into the future. We 
     include among these activities underground experiments 
     producing sub-kiloton levels of nuclear yield that might be 
     permitted among the treaty-consistent activities under a 
     CTBT.
       (U) Three key assumptions underlie our study:
       1. (U) The U.S. intends to maintain a credible nuclear 
     deterrent.
       2. (U) The U.S. remains committed to the support of world-
     wide nonproliferation efforts.
       3. (U) The U.S. will not encounter new military or 
     political circumstances in the future that cause it to 
     abandon the current policy--first announced by President Bush 
     in 1992--of not developing any new nuclear weapon designs.


                             conclusion 2:

       (U) In order to maintain high confidence in the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of the individual types of 
     weapons in the enduring stockpile for several decades under a 
     CTBT, whether or not sub-kiloton tests are permitted, the 
     United States must provide continuing and steady support for 
     a focused, multifaceted program to increase understanding of 
     the enduring stockpile; to detect, anticipate and evaluate 
     potential aging problems; and to plan for refurbishment and 
     remanufacture, as required. In addition the U.S. must 
     maintain a significant industrial infrastructure in the 
     nuclear program to do the required replenishing, 
     refurbishing, or remanufacturing of age-affected components, 
     and to evaluate the resulting product; for example, the high 
     explosive, the boost gas system, the tritium loading, etc. 
     Important activities in a stockpile stewardship program that 
     will sustain a strong scientific and technical base, 
     including an experienced cadre of capable scientists and 
     engineers, are described in the body of this study.
       (U) The proposed program will generate a large body of 
     technically valuable new data and challenging opportunities 
     capable of attracting and retaining experienced nuclear 
     weapons scientists and engineers in the program. This is the 
     intent of DOE's currently planned stockpile stewardship 
     program.\2\ For the success of this program, the management 
     of the three weapons laboratories (LANL, LLNL, SNL) must 
     motivate, support, and reward effort in an area that has lost 
     some of its glamor and excitement in the absence of new 
     nuclear design and test opportunities.
       (U) Nevertheless, over the longer term, we may face 
     concerns about whether accumulated changes in age-affected 
     weapons components, whose replacements might have to be 
     manufactured by changed processes, could lead to inadequate 
     performance margins and reduced confidence in the stockpile.
       (U) Enhancements of performance margins will add 
     substantially to long-term stockpile confidence with or 
     without underground tests. To cite one example, we can adjust 
     the boost gas fill or shorten the time interval between 
     fills. (This is discussed more fully in the classified text.)


                             conclusion 3:

       (U) The individual weapon types in the enduring stockpile 
     have a range of performance margins, all of which we judge to 
     be adequate at this time. In each case we have identified 
     opportunities for further enhancing their performance margins 
     by means that are straightforward and can be incorporated 
     with deliberate speed during scheduled maintenance or 
     remanufacturing activities. However greatest care in the form 
     of self-discipline will be required to avoid system 
     modifications, even if aimed at ``improvements'', which may 
     compromise reliability. 

[[Page S 11369]]

       (U) This brings us to the issue of the usefulness, 
     importance, or necessity of reduced-yield (less than 1 
     kiloton) underground tests for maintaining confidence in the 
     weapon types in the U.S. stockpile over a long period of 
     time.
       (U) For the U.S. stockpile, testing under a 500 ton yield 
     limit would allow studies of boost gas ignition and initial 
     burn, which is a critical step in achieving full primary 
     design yield. The primary argument that we heard in support 
     of the importance of such testing by the U.S. is the 
     following: the evidence in several cases and theoretical 
     analyses indicate that results of a sub-kiloton ( 
     500 tons) test of a given primary that achieves boost gas 
     ignition and initial burn can be extrapolated to give some 
     confidence in the yield of an identical primary with full 
     boosting. Therefore, if a modified or remanufactured primary 
     is introduced into the stockpile in the future to correct 
     some aging problem, such tests on the modified system would 
     add to confidence that the performance of the new primary is 
     still adequate.
       (U) It follows from this argument that the utility to the 
     U.S. of testing at yields of up to approximately 500 tons 
     depends on such tests being performed on a continuing basis 
     and yielding reproducible results. If they are permitted only 
     for a few years, such tests could add to the theoretical 
     understanding of the boosting process and the reliability of 
     the computer-codes that attempt to describe it, but would not 
     contribute directly to the reliability of the weapon in the 
     enduring stockpile in view of the possible manufacturing 
     changes made at a later date. To gain evidence as to whether 
     long-term changes in age-affected weapons components have any 
     impact on boost-performance the tests would have to be made 
     with the remanufactured weapons themselves.
                             Conclusion 4:

       (U) In order to contribute to long term confidence in the 
     U.S. stockpile, testing of nuclear weapons under a 500 ton 
     yield limit would have to be done on a continuing basis, 
     which is tantamount to remaking a CTBT into a threshold test 
     ban treaty. While such ongoing testing can add to long term 
     stockpile confidence, it does not have the same priority as 
     the essential stockpile stewardship program endorsed in 
     Conclusion 2, nor does it merit the same priority as the 
     measures to enhance performance margins in Conclusion 3. In 
     the last analysis the technical contribution of such a 
     testing program must be weighed against its costs and its 
     political impact on the non-proliferation goals of the United 
     States.


                             Conclusion 5:

       (U) Underground testing of nuclear weapons at any yield 
     level below that required to initiate boosting is of limited 
     value to the United States. However experiments involving 
     high explosives and fissionable material that do not reach 
     criticality are useful in improving our understanding of the 
     behavior of weapons materials under relevant physical 
     conditions. They should be included among treaty consistent 
     activities that are discussed more fully in the text.
       (U) This conclusion is based on the following two 
     observations.
       (U) [(a)] So-called hydronuclear tests, defined a limited 
     to a nuclear yield of less than 4 lbs TNT equivalent, can be 
     preformed only after making changes that drastically alter 
     the primary implosion. A persuasive case has not been made 
     for the utility of hydronuclear tests for detecting small 
     changes in the performance margins for current U.S. weapons. 
     At best, such tests could confirm the safety of a device 
     against producing detectable nuclear yield if its high 
     explosive is detonated accidentally at one point. We find 
     that the U.S. arsenal has neither a present nor anticipated 
     need for such re-confirmation. The existing large nuclear 
     test data base can serve to validate two- and three-
     dimensional computational techniques for evaluating any new 
     one-point safety scenarios, and it should be fully exploited 
     for this purpose.
       (U) [(b)] Testing with nominal yields up to a 100-ton limit 
     permits examination of aspects of the pre-boost fission 
     process. However, this is at best a partial and possibly 
     misleading performance indicator.
       (U) An agreement to limit testing to very low yields raises 
     the issue of monitoring compliance. We have not made a 
     detailed study of this issue, but not the following: 
     Cooperative, on-site monitoring would be necessary, and 
     relevant measurements, including for example neutron yields, 
     could be made without compromising classified information on 
     bomb designs.
       (U) We have reviewed the device problems which occurred in 
     the past and which either relied on, or required, nuclear 
     yield tests to resolve.


                             Conclusion 6:

       (U) For the weapon types planned to remain in the enduring 
     stockpile we find that the device problems which occurred in 
     the past, and which either relied on, or required, nuclear 
     yield tests to resolve, were primarily the result of 
     incomplete or inadequate design activities. In part, these 
     were due to the more limited knowledge and computational 
     capabilities of a decade, or more, ago. We are persuaded that 
     those problems have been corrected and that the weapon types 
     in the enduring stockpile are safe and reliable in the 
     context of explicit military requirements.
       (U) Should the U.S., in future, encounter problems in an 
     existing stockpile design (which we do not anticipate at 
     present) that are so serious as to lead to unacceptable loss 
     of confidence in the safety, effectiveness, or reliability of 
     a weapons type, it is possible that testing of the primary at 
     full yield, and ignition of the secondary, would be required 
     to certify a specified fix. Useful tests to address such 
     problems generate nuclear yields in excess of approximately 
     10 kT. DOE's currently planned enhanced surveillance and 
     maintenance program is intended to alert us to any such need 
     that may arise. A ``supreme national interest'' withdrawal 
     clause that is standard in any treaty to which this nation is 
     a signatory would permit the U.S. to respond appropriately 
     should such a need arise.


                             Conclusion 7:

       (U) The above findings, as summarized in Conclusions 1 
     through 6, are consistent with U.S. agreement to enter into a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of unending duration, 
     that includes a standard ``supreme national interest'' 
     clause. Recognizing that the challenge of maintaining an 
     effective nuclear stockpile for an indefinite period without 
     benefit of underground tests is an important and also a new 
     one, the U.S. should affirm its readiness to invoke the 
     supreme national interest clause should the need arise as a 
     result of unanticipated technical problems in the enduring 
     stockpile.
                               footnotes

     \1\ Defined as the difference between the minimum expected 
     and the minimum needed yields of the primary.
     \2\ See the 1994 JASON Report JSR-94-345 on ``Science Based 
     Stockpile Stewardship''.

  Mr. EXON. I just want to summarize what the situation is with regard 
to this report. Senator Reid, Senator Kyl, and probably others have 
confused the just-completed JASON report. But they did not reveal the 
full story. They are simply wrong, and they are comparing oranges with 
lemons. The entire quotation in the JASON report just put out, on 
hydronuclear testing, is as follows:

       A persuasive case has not been made for the utility of 
     hydronuclear tests for detecting small changes in the 
     performance margin for current U.S. weapons.

  So the newest JASON report does not endorse nuclear tests. Also, the 
particular quotation used by the Senator lacks accuracy. When they 
quote the JASON report as saying, ``However, experiments involving high 
explosives and fissionable material that do not reach criticality are 
useful in improving our understanding of * * * weapons materials,'' the 
Senator fails to mention the most important point, that the experiments 
that do not reach criticality are not hydronuclear tests. They are not 
hydronuclear tests.
  I simply point out that the portion of the report that the Senator 
quotes deals with experiments that are not hydronuclear in any way. 
Again, the JASON report is very clear. I quote from it.

       A persuasive case has not been made for the utility of 
     hydronuclear tests . . .

  I hope this begins to set the record straight. I yield 5 minutes to 
my colleague from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank the Senator from 
Nebraska for yielding but also, most important, for the legislative 
initiatives which he and Senator Hatfield and others have taken over 
the years to try to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons through a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. And they are related. And that is 
the whole issue.
  We recently were able to obtain the continuation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. We fought really hard for that and we got 
other nations to go along with it. We did so based on our commitment to 
a comprehensive test ban treaty. We are in no position to tell other 
nations that they cannot have nuclear weapons, even though we do, if we 
are going to ignore our commitments to them to obtain a comprehensive 
test ban--emphasis on the word ``comprehensive''--when that commitment 
to them and that representation to them was part and parcel of our 
getting a nonproliferation treaty. That is the issue. It is the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  That is why the statement that was made by the DOD and DOE scientific 
advisory group--called JASON--relative to hydronuclear tests, is so 
important. I am going to read that again because this, to me, is really 
the heart of the issue. We are talking about hydronuclear tests. This 
is what they said just last November:

       The very limited added value of hydronuclear tests have to 
     be weighed against costs and against the impact of continuing 
     an underground testing program at the Nevada test site on 
     U.S. nonproliferation goals.


[[Page S 11370]]

  That is what they say. This is the JASON group which has been 
referred to so many times this morning. These are the scientists that 
advise the DOE and DOD, and this is the weighing process, the limited 
added value, of which there is some. Everyone concedes that tests have 
value. The question is, Do the benefits outweigh the costs? We have 
done a lot of that in regulatory reform lately talking about cost-
benefit analysis.
  So what our DOD and DOE scientists did last November was weigh the 
benefits, the limited added value of hydronuclear tests against the 
costs. That is, in their words, the impact of continuing that program, 
an underground testing program at the Nevada test site on U.S. 
nonproliferation goals.
  What is their conclusion? Now I am quoting JASON:

       On balance, we oppose hydronuclear testing.

  Why? These are their words:

       Since hydronuclear tests would be potentially more valuable 
     to proliferants, it would be in our national interest to 
     forego them.

  That, for me, is the bottom line. We have spent a lot of time here 
trying to figure out how we can defend against nuclear weapons, either 
in the theater system, short-range missiles delivering them, or in 
long-range missiles delivering them.
  This body I think is darned near unanimous on how we are going to try 
to defend against theater missiles. We are very much divided as to the 
best way to defend against the long-range missiles. But proliferation 
is the greatest threat in the future to this country--proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.
  Our best scientists say hydronuclear tests are potentially more 
valuable to proliferants--the bad guys--than they are to us and, 
therefore, it would be in our national interest to forego them.
  What the current JASON report says in this is the one that was quoted 
by our good friend from Nevada. He quoted the section that relates to 
tests which have no nuclear yield, tests which do not reach 
criticality. That is not the issue before us. Those are hydrodynamic 
tests. Those are not hydronuclear tests. Those have zero nuclear yield. 
There is no criticality. And he read a section of the report that was 
just released last night which said, ``Experiments involving high 
explosives and fissionable material that do not reach criticality are 
useful in improving our understanding in behavior of weapons.''
  That is true. But there is no downside on that. That is not a nuclear 
test. That is not a nuclear experiment. That does not reach 
criticality. There is no nuclear yield.
  The next page of this same most recent report is the one that Senator 
Exon has just quoted from reasserting the conclusion of the JASON group 
against hydronuclear testing.
  I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  Mr. EXON. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Massachusetts, and 
following that, 1 minute to the Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the Exon amendment to delete 
the section on nuclear testing. For the second time in 2 days we are 
addressing provisions of the committee bill that go against the tide of 
history, and would send us back to the days of the cold war and the 
nuclear arms policies of that period.
  In April, the United States reached a new milestone with the 
permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This 
treaty, first signed in 1968, is a solemn agreement by 178 nations to 
halt the spread of nuclear weapons.
  Achieving this goal was not a foregone conclusion when the treaty 
extension conference commenced. The five nuclear weapons states agreed 
to work in good faith for a comprehensive test ban in 1996. It was 
understood by all the nations at the conference that a test ban will be 
the single most important step we can take to ensure that the non-
proliferation treaty will be observed and maintained.
  The bill and the Thurmond amendment calling for the administration to 
prepare for nuclear tests runs directly contrary to the principle we 
accepted at the non-proliferation conference. Some argue that test in 
question--called a hydronuclear test--is not a real nuclear test. That 
is not true in terms of physics, and it is not true in terms of public 
policy.
  In physics, a hydronuclear test is a very low yield explosion, but it 
is a nuclear explosion nonetheless. Moreover, it is a type of explosion 
that the United States does not need to maintain the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear arsenal. This view has been stated and 
reaffirmed by Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, and by many technical 
experts, including the JASON panel. We can use alternative methods, 
such as advanced simulations and other non- nuclear technical means, to 
ensure the safety and reliability of our stockpile.
  In terms of public policy, a hydronuclear test is clearly regarded as 
a nuclear explosion by many of the signatories to the NPT. They have 
made it clear that they will not accept a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
that allows for hydronuclear tests.
  That is the reality. Some may wish it was otherwise. In the past, I 
have suggested that such tests, if small enough, might be acceptable 
under a comprehensive test ban. But clearly other nations disagree, and 
the goal of a comprehensive test ban is too important to lose.
  The Exon amendment will enable us to take the next important step in 
the post-cold war era-- the achievement of a comprehensive test ban 
that will serve as the cornerstone in that all important battle to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I urge the adoption of 
the amendment.
  This is a sound, sensible amendment. I hope that it will be agreed 
to.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I support the amendment being offered by the 
Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon], and am pleased to be a cosponsor. 
This amendment would remove from the Armed Services Committee bill the 
requirement that $50 million be spent in preparation for hydronuclear 
testing.
  In one respect, I believe the committee bill would set our Nation on 
an unfortunate course. It in effect would place the United States in a 
position of moving toward a new nuclear testing program. This would 
deflect us from the current strong administration effort to achieve a 
comprehensive test ban and it would send an unmistakable signal to 
other nations of the world that the United States is not serious and 
purposeful in its quest of a test ban.
  Those who joined with us in the decision this spring to extend the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty could come to no other conclusion than that 
the United States had acted in bad faith in order to secure approval of 
extension of the treaty. This would be an unfortunate effect of any 
such decision to go forward with a testing program that simply is not 
needed to safeguard our national security.
  Mr. President, I believe that this amendment will leave the way open 
to the successful completion of test ban negotiations in Geneva. That 
negotiation is in process now with the goal of achieving a 
comprehensive test ban next year.
  I would hope that such a ban can be in place by October 1, 1996, as 
envisaged in legislation over the last several years. Until that time, 
I would hope that the United States would continue to adhere to the 
present moratorium on nuclear testing. I believe that the President 
should be commended strongly for his steadfastness in this regard.
  Some years ago President John F. Kennedy reached a breakthrough 
agreement with the Soviet leadership that brought the first agreed 
limit on nuclear testing. That agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
of 1963, forbade nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 
under water. It allowed testing only underground and required that 
testing be done in such a way that the world be spared from radioactive 
poisoning from the debris of nuclear tests.
  Moving beyond that Limited Test Ban Treaty has been difficult and 
tortuous. President Nixon accomplished the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 
1974 and his successor, President Ford, negotiated the Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions Treaty. It took more than 10 years to get these treaties 
ratified and in place.

[[Page S 11371]]

  Currently, the five nuclear powers are following different courses. 
We and the British, who must use our testing site, are adhering to a 
moratorium. The Russians are also adhering to a moratorium. The Chinese 
are following a nuclear testing program in anticipation that a test ban 
may be achieved. The French have just unleased a political firestorm in 
the Far East by announcing a series of tests in the South Pacific.
  Earlier this year the President of the United States made the very 
wise decision to abandon U.S. efforts to negotiate a treaty with a 
provision allowing an easy exit from the treaty at the 10-year mark. 
This provision could accommodated those who would like a comprehensive 
test ban to be effective and in force for only 10 years. Nonetheless it 
worried those nations who fear
 that the nuclear superpowers do not, in fact, intend to end nuclear 
testing for all time. The President understood these concerns and 
decided to negotiate a treaty without an easy exit. As is the case with 
most treaties, nations will be able to get out of the treaty if they 
find their supreme national interests are jeopardized.

  Unfortunately, there have been protracted discussions on whether to 
allow exceptions under the treaty and what kind of exceptions they 
should be. Some of the parties would like to see a reduced threshold 
for nuclear testing rather than elimination of testing. Some would like 
to see so-called peaceful nuclear explosions revived. Still others 
would like to see safety and reliability testing be permitted. In our 
own country, these discussions have led from the suggestion that 
detonations with explosive power of several pounds be permitted. This 
has led still further to advocacy by some in the defense community of 
flexibility in the treaty that would allow hydronuclear explosions of 
several tons, or even hundreds of tons of explosive power.
  Mr. President, we would delude ourselves if we believe that the 
nations of the world, having agreed to the permanent extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty this spring at our behest, would now agree to 
allow continued nuclear testing under any guise. We are committed to 
these nations to bring nuclear testing to a halt. We should not be 
dissuaded from pursuing that course.
  The authorization bill as written would require hydronuclear testing 
and essentially deflect us from our goal of a complete end to nuclear 
testing. The Exon amendment would get rid of this provision and allow 
the President to pursue the present course. I hope the Senate would 
have the wisdom to agree to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I have 2 minutes left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes, fifty-one seconds.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to support the prudent and 
reasonable attempt to plan for the resumption of treaty compliant 
hydronuclear testing, as contained in the Thurmond-Domenici amendments.
  Every weapons system, indeed every machine in our technological 
society, requires testing. Hydronuclear testing is the only tool left 
to assess our confidence in the safety and reliability of the shrinking 
U.S. nuclear stockpile.
  DOE testimony to the House states that the potential alternative to 
testing, science-based stewardship, is not guaranteed to work. If it 
does work, it will take 15 to 20 years to perfect. Given this risk, it 
is imprudent to give the sole remaining tool which can perform a 
reality check on the primary of a nuclear weapon in a dynamic 
environment.
  No other nation should feel threatened that we feel the need to keep 
our weapons safe and reliable. I urge the defeat of the Exon-Hatfield 
amendment and demonstrate a strong support for our Nation's nuclear 
deterrence.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I will use 1 minute out of my leader time.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the first of 
the consecutive votes, there be 4 minutes of debate equally divided 
between Senator Thurmond and the sponsor of each amendment before each 
of the remaining votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. DOLE. I ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be 
the only first-degree amendments in order to S. 1206, and that they be 
limited to relevant second-degree amendments.
  I will submit the list, since there are 185 amendments; 105 
Democratic amendments and 80 on the Republican side.
  This has been approved by both sides. At least it gets us to a limit.
  I do not know how we can finish this bill. Senator Thurmond is 
prepared to stay all night tonight. He has a plane at 5:30 in the 
morning.
  So we can go at least until 5:30.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. I ask unanimous consent that the list be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                     possible amendments--majority

       Abraham: Burdensharing, manufacturing technology.
       Brown: Fitzsimmons, Pakistan, Pakistan, Pueblo, Pueblo, 
     Taiwan.
       Campbell: Fitzsimmons Army Hospital.
       Cohen: Information technology relevant.
       D'Amato: Land conveyance, transfer of real property, waste 
     water treatments.
       Dole: JPATS.
       Domenici: Energy, USMER ranchers, DNA microwave, Army 
     ground radar, Army EAC, Flirs for customs, AF laser, spouse 
     abuse.
       Faircloth: Subtitle D.
       Gramm: Relevant.
       Grassley: DOD executive aircraft, reduce funding level, 
     defense modernization account, sale of aircraft.
       Helms: Battle of Midway, Fort Bragg, relevant.
       Inhofe: PFNA, CATT Program.
       Kempthorne: Relevant.
       Kyl: Nunn-Lugar funding, Coop threat reduction.
       Lott: ABM review sec. 237, relevant, relevant, relevant, 
     hydra 70.
       McCain: Land conveyance, Wyoming, Olympics, land 
     conveyance, Montana, BRAC improvement, U.N. peacekeeping.
       McCain/Campbell/Brown: ____________.
       Murkowski: North Korea, military housing.
       Nickles-Inhofe: Ft. Sill Milcon.
       Pressler: Jr ROTC, Indian reservations, relevant.
       Shelby: Battlefield Integration Center, BMD Technology 
     Center, DSETS.
       Smith: DAGGR, Brac leases, relevant.
       Specter: Bosnia war crimes.
       Stevens: Rules for acquisition/subcont, cargo preference.
       Thurmond: Air Force Reserve, relevant, awards, report 
     requirements, relevant (personnel), Defense Cooperative 
     relation, relevant, relevant, relevant, relevant, relevant, 
     relevant.
       Warner: Relevant fissile materials, relevant, relevant, 
     relevant, relevant.
       Warner/Kempthorne: Nuclear spent fuel.


                     possible amendments--minority

       Akaka: SoS French nuclear test.
       Bingaman: Funds ongoing ops., Funds TRP, Pentagon 
     renovation, relevant, relevant, relevant.
       Boxer: Military convicts, Land conveyance, Executive 
     compensation, relevant.
       Breaux: Cargo preference.
       Bradley: Budget cap, F22, Comanche.
       Bumpers: Relevant, relevant, relevant, Ft. Chafee.
       Byrd: Relevant, relevant, relevant.
       Conrad: Relevant.
       Daschle: Health care, relevant, relevant.
       Dorgan: Land conveyance, relevant.
       Exon: Nuclear testing report, Navy nuc. fuel storage, ASAT 
     funding.
       Feinstein: Jordan draw down, repeal sec. 382, land 
     conveyance, military const. auth. ext., defense conversion, 
     relevant, base reuse.
       Ford: ROTC.
       Glenn: Service academy requirements, humanitarian 
     assistance, defense modernization, IRIS, relevant, relevant.
       Harkin: Burdensharing, civil air patrol, relevant, 
     relevant, relevant.
       Heflin: Start 1, advance technologies, test equipment.
       Johnston: Relevant.
       Kennedy: Relevant, relevant.
       Kohl: Authorization levels, Env. advisory board.
       Lautenberg: Relevant, relevant.
       Leahy: Land mine moratorium, land mine clearance.
       Levin: Relevant, relevant, relevant, relevant, relevant, 
     relevant, relevant.
       Mikulski: Relevant, relevant Holskid BRAC Disposal.
       Nunn: J ROTC, civil military cooperative, civil military 
     cooperative, civil military cooperative, relevant, relevant, 
     relevant, Missile Defense, relevant, relevant.
       Pell: Relevant, relevant.
       Pryor: Leasing provision on closed bases, SoS director 
     oper. test. & eval., testing of TMD, report arms export 
     control, relevant, relevant.
       Reid: Relevant, relevant.
       Robb: Relevant, relevant, pilots rescue radio, reserve 
     authorization, commercial ship research, privatization of 
     military air.

[[Page S 11372]]

       Sarbanes: Anechoic Chamber, Pax River Ready Reserve Fleet.
       Simon: IMET provision, peacekeeping funding, contingency 
     force peace operations, land exchange.
       Wellstone: Relevant.
       

                          ____________________