[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 128 (Thursday, August 3, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11227-S11321]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 1026, which the clerk will 
report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1996 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] is recognized to offer an amendment on which 
there shall be 90 minutes for debate equally divided.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Senator from North 
Dakota? The Senator from Nebraska has been attempting to make an 
opening statement with regard to the measure before us. I am wondering, 
after the Senator from North Dakota has made the presentation under the 
unanimous-consent agreement, if both sides would agree to the Senator 
from Nebraska having 10 minutes for an opening statement on the overall 
measure without being charged to the time under the control by the 
majority or the minority.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if I might respond to the Senator from 
Nebraska, I have no objection. But my understanding is that the 9 to 
10:30 time period for this amendment would result in a vote at 10:30, 
and there are some leadership obligations that require that vote to 
occur at 10:30, and by unanimous consent we have limited debate to an 
hour and a half, 45 minutes to each side, on the amendment.
  It might be the case that the Senator should give an opening 
presentation immediately after the vote at 10:30.
  Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator. That does not happen to agree with the 
schedule of the Senator from Nebraska. But I will try again.
  Thank you very much, Mr. President.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I might say that I have no objection. But 
my understanding is that the 10:30 vote must occur at 10:30 because of 
some leadership obligations by previous agreement.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Robert 
Russell, a fellow on detail from the Department of Energy, be allowed 
floor privileges during the debate of S. 1026.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2087

  (Purpose: To reduce the amount authorized to be appropriated under 
                 Title II for national missile defense)

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself, 
     Mr. Bradley, Mr. Leahy, 

[[Page S 11228]]
     Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2087.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 32, strike out line 14 and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following` ``$9,233,148,000, of which--
       ``(A) not more than $357,900,000 is authorized to implement 
     the national missile defense policy established in section 
     233(2);''.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we have by unanimous consent a time 
agreement on this amendment, I understand 45 minutes to each side. I 
yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. President, let me begin to describe this amendment. It is 
painfully simple. There was $300 million added to the defense 
authorization bill by the Armed Services Committee for something that 
this country does not need and that the Secretary of Defense says he 
does not want. The proposal that I lay before the Senate is to take the 
$300 million back out.
  This, it seems to me, is a very symbolic issue. The $300 million is 
to build a national missile defense system with instructions it be done 
on a priority or accelerated basis so that the deployment begins in 
1999. Some said yesterday, well, this has nothing to do with star wars. 
And, of course, that is not true at all. This is, in fact, national 
missile defense, which includes a star wars component. It is the 
building of missiles in order to create some sort of astrodome over our 
country to block incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles.
  It is the revival of a proposal offered in the early 1980's by then 
President Ronald Reagan. Of course, times were different then. The 
Soviet Union existed. We had a cold war that was in full force. We had 
an active adversary and a real threat. Times have changed. Now we have 
the dismantling and destruction of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
in Russia. And, paradoxically, we are helping pay the bill to destroy 
those missiles.
  It is an irony that does not escape me this morning that the same 
people who proposed $300 million in additional spending this year as 
part of what will eventually be a $48 billion new project are also 
saying they want to cut back on our contribution to help the Soviets 
dismantle and destroy their intercontinental ballistic missiles. If 
ever there is a disconnection, it seems to me it is in that logic.
  To call this $300 million--or what eventually will be a $40 billion 
program--``pork'' is I think unfair to pigs. Hogs carry around a little 
meat. This in my judgment is pure, unadulterated lard.
  I want to describe this proposal in the context of what the Secretary 
of Defense has said. I am reading from a letter from the Secretary to 
Senator Nunn:

       This bill will direct the development for deployment by 
     2003 [incidentally, the early deployment by 1999] of a 
     multiple site system for national missile defense that, if 
     deployed, would be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. The 
     bill would severely strain U.S.-Russian relations and would 
     threaten continued Russian implementation of the START I 
     Treaty and further Russian consideration of the START II 
     Treaty. These two treaties will eliminate strategic launchers 
     carrying two-thirds of the nuclear warheads that confronted 
     the Nation during the cold war.

  That is a statement of current administration policy.

       S. 1026 would authorize appropriations for defense programs 
     that exceed by approximately $7 billion the administration's 
     FY 1996 request.

  A $7 billion increase, this from folks who say they are opposed to 
the Federal deficit.
  Here is what the committee says:

       The committee recognizes that deploying a multiple site NMD 
     system by 2003 will require significant investments in the 
     outyears.

  And, incidentally, the Congressional Budget Office says anywhere from 
$30 to $40 billion. But the committee avoids the issue. The committee:

       . . . directs the Secretary of Defense to budget 
     accordingly.

  This is very interesting. The Armed Services Committee says we are 
going to build this. Here is $300 million you do not want to build 
something we do not need, and it is going to cost $48 billion, and we 
say to you, Mr. Secretary of Defense, ``budget accordingly.''
  It does not say where he should get the money. It does not say they 
are going to raise taxes to pay for it. It says to the Secretary of 
Defense, budget accordingly.
  Well, we all understand what that means. That means that the warriors 
who fight so hard rhetorically to reduce the Federal budget deficit are 
now wallflowers who decide they want to use the taxpayers' credit card 
to go out and purchase a $48 billion national ballistic missile program 
that this country does not need and cannot afford.
  It seems to me we ought to ask two questions about these kinds of 
proposals when they come to us. One is, do we need it? And the second 
is, can we afford it?
  On the first question, do we need it, do we need the $300 million 
added to this budget, the Secretary of Defense says no.
  Can we afford it? Even if we do not need it, can we afford it? Does 
anybody in this room, living in a country that is up to its neck in 
debt, with annual yearly deficits that are still alarming and a Federal 
debt approaching $5 trillion, believe we can afford something we do not 
need?
  I am going to talk some about the system itself, but first I wish to 
talk about the irony of being here in the Chamber at a time when we are 
told repeatedly, week after week after week, that we do not have enough 
money. We are told we do not have enough money to fully fund the 
programs to be able to send kids to college. So we are going to budget 
in a way that is going to make it harder for families to send their 
kids to college because we have to tighten our belt. We are told that 
we cannot afford to provide an entitlement that a poor child should 
have a hot lunch at school in the middle of the day because we must 
tighten our belt. We are told health care is too expensive and so we 
must cut $270 billion from Medicare and a substantial amount from 
Medicaid because we must tighten our belt.
  So for the American family, the message is tighten your belt on 
things like education, health care, nutrition. But when it comes to 
security, we are told it is not time to tighten our belt; let us get 
the wish lists out and let us get the American taxpayers' checkbook 
out--or the credit card more likely--and let us decide to build a 
project that the Secretary of Defense says he does not want money for 
at this point.
  Let me talk about the project itself.
  This bill provides research and development funds in order to 
accelerate the deployment of a national missile defense system. The 
administration requested $371 million for its ongoing research and 
development program. The Armed Services Committee says that is not good 
enough for us. The committee wants $300 million more added to the 
request because it wants to deploy the system in four years. The 
committee is telling the Defense Department to build it. They are 
saying that it does not matter to us what you think; it does not matter 
to us whether you think we need it. We insist you build it.
  I come from a State where the only antiballistic missile system in 
the free world was built. It was built in the late 1960's and early 
1970's. Less than 30 days after it was declared operational, it was 
mothballed. In other words, in the same month that it was declared 
fully operational it was also mothballed.
  It is anticipated, because of our Nation's geography, that one of the 
sites in a multiple site national missile defense system would be in 
North Dakota. There would likely be one North Dakota site. And I 
suppose some would say, well, that means jobs in your State; you ought 
to support this.
  I do not think it makes sense to support a defense initiative of this 
type especially at this time in our country's history if you measure it 
with the yardstick of a jobs program. Yes, this might include some jobs 
in North Dakota, but it also will include the commitment and the 
prospect of taking $40 billion from the American taxpayers to build a 
project we do not need, with money we do not have, at a time when we 
are telling a lot of Americans that we cannot make investments in human 
potential for the future of this country.
  There is an ancient Chinese saying:

       If you are planning for a year, plant rice; if you are 
     planning for 10 years, plant trees; if you are planning for 
     100 years, plant men.


[[Page S 11229]]

  I take ``plant men'' to mean ``educate your children.''
  In this Chamber, we appropriately say that we have big financial 
problems. We are choking on debt and must do something about it. We 
have a lot of folks who talk a lot about it, gnash their teeth, who 
wring their hands, and act like warriors on deficit reduction--until it 
comes time for a bill like this. And then they say to us, boy, we have 
threats; we have threats from North Korea; we have threats from Libya; 
we have threats from Iraq.
  What do those threats suggest we should do? What we should do is, 
under the aegis of reform--which is the wrong ``re'' word; the real 
``re'' word is not ``reform''; it is ``retread''--is resurrect and dust 
off a proposal coming from the early 1980's, a cold war relic to build 
a national missile defense system to put an umbrella over America to 
protect against incoming missiles from some renegade country. Far more 
important, in my judgment, is the threat from a suitcase bomb 
somewhere; you start worrying about a nuclear device hauled in the 
trunk of a car and parked at a dock in New York City; you start 
worrying about a canister 3 inches high of deadly biological weapons. 
That is far more likely a threat to this country than a terrorist 
getting ahold of an intercontinental ballistic missile and attempting 
to blackmail America.
  Mr. President, I am most anxious to hear those who defend this kind 
of spending on projects that are, in my judgment, worthless. So let me 
at this point yield the floor and listen and then respond to some of 
what I hear. I hope maybe the Senate, voting on this today, will decide 
that it ought not spend $300 million we do not have on something the 
Secretary of Defense says we do not need. That would seem to me to send 
a powerful signal to the American people who in this body is serious 
about the issue of the Federal deficit.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve my time.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the 
Dorgan amendment. The Armed Services Committee has taken a hard look at 
the ballistic missile defense programs and concluded that an increase 
of $300 million is warranted--indeed, badly needed. If the United 
States is to ever be defended against even the most limited ballistic 
missile threats, we must begin now.
  The administration's program for national missile defense is simply 
inadequate. And in my view, the ballistic missile threat facing the 
United States is significant and growing. This threat clearly justifies 
an accelerated effort to develop and deploy highly effective theater 
and national missile defenses. In the bill now before the Senate we 
have done just this. The Missile Defense Act is a responsible and 
measured piece of legislation that responds to a growing threat to 
American national security.
  There have been many arguments raised in opposition to the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995. These are either false or seriously exaggerated. 
Let me address three of the main objections that have been mentioned 
repeatedly.
  First, the Missile Defense Act of 1995 does not signal a return to 
star wars. It advocates modest and affordable programs that are 
technically low risk.
  Second, it does not violate or advocate violation of the ABM Treaty. 
The means to implement the policies and goals outlined in the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995 are contained in the ABM Treaty itself.
  Finally, the policies and goals contained in the Missile Defense Act 
of 1995 will not undermine START II or other arms control agreements. 
Russia has repeatedly agreed in the past that deployment of a limited 
national missile defense system is not inconsistent with deterrence and 
stability. The United States must not allow critical national security 
programs to be held hostage to other issues when there is no 
substantive or logical linkage between them.
  Mr. President, I therefore would conclude by urging my colleagues to 
oppose the amendment by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota. 
This amendment would undermine a critical defense requirement and 
further perpetuate the vulnerability of the American people.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I, too, rise in opposition to the amendment. 
I would like to begin with a quote from Secretary Perry in this general 
area now, that we have entered the post-cold war time. Secretary Perry 
is quoted as saying:

       The bad news is that in this era deterrence may not provide 
     even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We may be 
     facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles 
     and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future. And they 
     may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be 
     madder than MAD.

  MAD, mutually assured destruction.
  Mr. President, I think it is unfortunate that there are those who 
seem to think that the American people should not be defended against 
the one military threat which holds them at risk in their homes on a 
daily basis. Simply stated, this amendment seeks to perpetuate what 
many believe is truly an American vulnerability.
  Yesterday there were only five Senators who opposed a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution that the American people should be defended against 
accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack. Today the 
Senator from North Dakota is attempting to cut $300 million from 
national missile defense to ensure that American cities will in effect 
remain undefended without this additional funding.
  Senators yesterday voted in favor of defending the American people in 
this new era that we are in. So today all Senators will have an 
opportunity to demonstrate whether or not they are serious about a 
national defense. If you believe, as the Senator from North Dakota so 
honestly does, and has stated, that the United States should not be 
defended against this particular potential for ballistic missile 
attack, then support the amendment. But if you believe that the time 
has come to get on with national missile defense, you should oppose 
this amendment.
  We have heard quite a bit about how there is no threat and how 
investment in national missile defense is a waste of money. Let us 
remember that more Americans died in the Persian Gulf war as a result 
of one missile than any other single cause. I do not imagine that the 
families of these victims would view missile defense investments as a 
waste.
  The argument that there is no threat to justify the deployment of a 
national missile defense system I think is strategically shortsighted 
and technically incorrect. Even if we get started today, by the time we 
develop and deploy an NMD system we will almost certainly face new 
ballistic missile threats to the United States. Unfortunately, it will 
take almost 10 years to develop and deploy even a limited system.
  Much has been made of the intelligence community's estimate that no 
new threat to the United States will develop for 10 years. But the 
intelligence community has confirmed that there are numerous ways for 
hostile countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in 
much less than 10 years by other than indigenous development. I would 
point out the same intelligence has also prepared a chart that has been 
displayed on the Senate floor showing the North Korean missile 
programs, including the Taepo Dong II ICBM, which DIA says could be 
operational in 5 years.
  We see the size and the capability of destructive ability of these 
various missiles. You have got the Scud-B, the Scud-C, the No Dong, the 
Taepo Dong I and II. And these have not been tested. But it is very 
capable for them to do that, the North Koreans to do that. And it is 
estimated that they could go to this biggest one, which would be well 
over the 1,000 kilometers, in 5 years or maybe less. And in developing 
this system North Korea has demonstrated to the world that an ICBM 
capability can emerge rapidly and relatively with little notice.
  Nobody knows with certainty what the range of this potential new 
missile would be. But we do know that it is approximately the size of 
the Minuteman ICBM.
  Even if we knew with certainty that no new threat would materialize 
for 10 years there would still be a strong case for developing and 
deploying a national 

[[Page S 11230]]
defense system. Developing an NMD system would serve to deter countries 
that would seek to acquire otherwise ICBM capability. A vulnerable 
United States merely invites proliferation, blackmail, and even 
aggression.
  It has also been argued that the administration's NMD program costs 
less than the one proposed in the defense authorization bill. Well, I 
guess that is right. It usually does cost more to actually do something 
about a problem than nothing, which is precisely what the 
administration's program will do, I fear--nothing at all. They request 
money. And they have requested almost $400 million this year. And yet 
it is not enough to actually get the job done. The administration's 
program has no deployment goal in sight. In effect, you know, it wastes 
almost $400 million per year on a program designed never to achieve a 
specific end. In my view, if we are not going to actually deploy 
something we ought to take the rest of the NMD money and spend it on 
something that will defend America.
  The Senator from North Dakota has stated that the system we want to 
build will cost $40 billion. But by the administration's own charts, it 
states that it would cost less than $25 billion, including a full 
space-based sensor constellation. How does this compare to the cost of 
the F-22, the B-2 or other major new systems? I think it is a pretty 
good investment relative to virtually anything else that DOD is 
developing. What good does it do to be able to project power overseas 
with modern and sophisticated weapons if we cannot secure our families 
at home? Remember what we are talking about here.
  It is not an insignificant amount, an additional $300 million 
approximately, but you are talking about the cost of three or four 
airplanes. You are talking about offensive weaponry, three or four 
airplanes. We can move toward the ability to develop and deploy this 
system.
  One other chart I would like to refer to with regard to the national 
missile defense program. The Bottom-Up Review just, I guess, 2 years 
ago, projected the expenditures at this level for the national missile 
defense. The administration fiscal year 1995 request was as you see up 
to about, I believe it indicated about $500 million. And then in the 
fiscal year 1996 it dropped down, and what this bill actually does is 
basically a very small increase over what the administration's fiscal 
year 1995 request was. So, talking about just enough increase to move 
toward actual development and the ability to deploy within 10 years.
  So this is a good-sense approach. It is one based on what the 
administration had projected in its Bottom-Up Review and what it asked 
for in 1995.
  For those who argue that the Senate Armed Services Committee is 
throwing money at ballistic missile defense, I point out that the 
amount of this bill for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is 
$136 million lower than the Clinton administration's own Bottom-Up 
Review recommended for fiscal year 1996. It is also less than the 
administration's own budget forecast in last year's plan.
  All four of the defense committees in Congress have increased funding 
for the national missile defense. In fact, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee have 
recommended a smaller increase than the House committees have. The 
House has recommended an increase of $450 million.
  In response to those who say the administration did not request this 
increase, I point out the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has 
made it clear on many occasions and with the administration's, I think, 
tacit approval, that if more money was made available for ballistic 
missile programs that they would want to spend $400 million on the 
national missile defense program.
  The bottom line is simple. If you think that the American people 
should not be defended against ballistic missiles, then go ahead and 
support this amendment. If you think that the time has come to do 
something about an ever-increasing threat in this post-cold-war era, 
then vote against this amendment.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to put themselves on the side of 
defending the American people at a very reasonable cost.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the time.
  I was listening intently to the Senator from Mississippi. I was glad 
he brought that up because the Senator from North Dakota has said over 
and over and over again that this is a $40 billion program for the 
future. I think it has to be clarified, and yet after we clarify it, I 
suggest the Senator from North Dakota will continue to use $40 billion. 
This is just not true.
  The Senator from Mississippi talked about, according to the figures 
of the administration, it was $24.2 billion. But I suggest that 
includes the SMTS program, Brilliant Eyes, which is funded separately, 
which can be taken off. It is closer to $18 billion.
  We do have an investment today in the program of $38 billion. Some 
people estimate it is more than that. Let us be conservative and say 
$38 billion in what we call the SDI program, which some people like to 
continue to use star wars to try to make the public of this country 
believe that this is some fantasy, that it is not real. It is not 
something we are handling today.
  The SDI program, we feel, helped end the cold war by 5 years. What 
kind of a value can we put on that? In fact, the Russian Ambassador to 
the United States, Vladimir Lukin, stated that if it had not been for 
SDI, the cold war would have gone on for 5 additional years.
  The SDI program and its research led to systems, not fantasies, but 
systems in place today, such as the Aegis system, cruisers and 
destroyers, kinetic energy programs, the hit-to-kill technologies which 
are used in the THAAD, the PAC-3, the Navy upper-tier defense systems. 
These are not star wars; these are technologies. They are on line 
today.
  All we are trying to do is say that in 5 years from now, where many 
in the intelligence community say we are going to be threatened by 
perhaps North Korea or other technology that will reach the United 
States--and this is something that most of the intelligence community 
agrees with--we want to do something today that will be within the 
confines of the ABM Treaty. We talked about that before. This is as 
much as we can do to reach the point so that 5 years from today, we are 
going to be able to defend the United States against missile attacks.
  The Senator from North Dakota refers over and over again to the 
suitcase bombs, to the ships and vans that deliver weapons. And on that 
case, I agree with the Senator from North Dakota, I think he is right. 
But we are already taking care of that. We are already working on that 
program.
  The Senator from North Dakota talks about intelligence estimates. I 
asked yesterday on this floor, what if we are wrong, what if those 
intelligence estimates he is saying where the threat is not there for 
10 more years, what if we are right and it is 5 more years? What if he 
is wrong? Look back to 1940 and Pearl Harbor. At that time our 
estimates were wrong; North Korea in 1950, or more recently, Iraq in 
1990. Our intelligence was wrong at that time.
  The Senator relies on the cold war mutually assured destruction 
program embodied in the triad of missile submarines, land-based 
missiles and bombers, but we had all these things 5 years ago, and that 
did not deter Saddam Hussein from using Scud missiles.
  When the Senator points out that the administration says that $300 
million to defend Americans from attack is not in our interest, he 
ignores the fact that just 3 months ago, the director of the Pentagon's 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, with the administration's 
blessing, said that they could spend $500 million more. That is $200 
million more than the additional amount we are trying to put on that we 
did put on in the Senate Armed Services Committee and our counterparts 
in the other body to reach a system that would defend America.
  The Senator from North Dakota is also citing the administration 
supposedly defended our interests last year by spending $2 billion. We 
are doing a lot of talking now about $300 

[[Page S 11231]]
million. What about the $2 billion that we spent for humanitarian 
missions that, by their own admission, in the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, by the Secretary of Defense were really not to our vital 
national security interests.
  I am talking about Somalia and Haiti and Bosnia and Rwanda. We are 
spending all this money. We are sending our troops all the way around 
the world to defend violations of human rights. Certainly, I am not 
insensitive to the ethnic cleansing that is going on and all these 
human rights violations. But we are spending huge amounts for that. I 
disagree with the foreign policy of the administration, and I do not 
think we should be doing it. But if we are doing it, that is $2 
billion, and we are talking $300 million right now to keep this on line 
to be able to defend this country 5 years from now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from South Carolina yield 2 
additional minutes?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I grant him 2 more minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. Finally, Mr. President, I must express my amazement with 
the priorities of the Senator from North Dakota. He wants to cut $300 
million from the missile defense. He says we have higher domestic 
priorities. We heard about the nutrition programs, we heard about all 
these social programs that seem to, in his mind, have a higher 
priority.
  I suggest to you that this $300 million is a relatively small amount 
of money. The one bomb in Oklahoma City that wiped out the Murrah 
Federal Building cost the taxpayers $500 million--one bomb.
  I suggest if the Senator from North Dakota could have stood with me 
in Oklahoma City on April 19, April 20, April 21, when they are sending 
troops and volunteers into this building to pull out people who might 
be alive in there, the hope was there that more would be alive, then 
the fourth day came and the smell of death had enveloped the city, if 
you could have been there, and what was going through my mind was, this 
is just one building in one city, one missile could come in there and 
wipe out every building in the city of Oklahoma City, in the city of 
Sioux Falls, SD, in Bismarck, ND, in New York City, could wipe out the 
entire thing.
  Multiply that one thing, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 
by 100, by 1,000. That is the threat that is out there. That is the 
threat that can reach, according to many in the intelligence community, 
this country within 5 years. We have to be ready for that. This should 
be the highest priority. We are elected to defend America. That is 
exactly what this is about today.
  So, Mr. President, in the strongest of terms, I say this is the 
minimum that we can do to keep on force, to have a national missile 
defense system in place in 5 years when the threat is very real.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee.
  The Ballistic Missile Defense Initiative, reported by the Armed 
Services Committee, puts our Nation on the right track to address the 
growing missile threat to our country.
  In the defense appropriations bill, which was reported last week, we 
fully supported every element of that plan, and I congratulate Senators 
Thurmond, Lott, and others who worked with them on this plan.
  Every intelligence assessment available to the Congress indicates 
that the threat posed to U.S. military forces is growing from ballistic 
missiles, as is the threat to the United States itself.
  There can be no greater imperative, as we allocate funding for 
research and development for future systems, than to develop and deploy 
an effective national missile defense system.
  This matter has special significance to every citizen of my State of 
Alaska. Already, North Korea is developing missiles that could attack 
the military installations in Alaska.
  Alaska-based F-15's, F-16's, and OA-10 aircraft will be the first to 
respond to any attack on South Korea. On that basis, we are a target 
for North Korea.
  The distinguished Senator from North Dakota may be confident that his 
State will not face that threat in coming years, and I share that 
confidence. Our country was lucky in the gulf war. The ingenuity and 
technical creativeness ensured that we had some minimal capacity to 
respond to the Iraqi Scud missile threat.
  We cannot, and must not, rely on luck to be ready to face the risk of 
missile launches against my State and against the United States in 
total. We must make the investment now to have ready a system to 
deploy, if that is the decision of the President and Congress.
  The additional funds proposed for authorization and appropriation for 
national missile defense is a reasonable and affordable start for this 
program.
  I am here to urge all Members to support this initiative. I do so as 
a Senator from a State that is seriously threatened today, and I 
believe the funding authorized by this bill, already included in the 
defense appropriations bill, is the proper way to start.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield such time as I may consume to 
myself.
  Mr. President, statements have been made that my position is I do not 
want to defend America's cities against a very real threat--total 
nonsense; absolute nonsense.
  My position is that we should not be spending money we do not have on 
something the Secretary of Defense says we do not need. Let me read 
from a letter from Secretary of Defense William Perry to Senator Nunn:

       The bill's provision would add nothing to DOD's ability to 
     pursue our missile defense programs and would needlessly 
     cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks. 
     The bill would require the United States to make a decision 
     now on developing a specific national missile defense for 
     deployment by 2003, with interim operational capability in 
     1999, despite the fact that a balanced strategic missile 
     threat has not emerged. Our national missile defense program 
     is designed to give us the capability for a deployment 
     decision in 3 years, when we will be in a much better 
     position to assess the threat and deploy the most 
     technologically advanced system available, if they think it 
     is needed.

  This is not a case of somebody deciding we do not want to protect 
America's cities. It is a case of saying we do not want to spend $300 
million that the Secretary of Defense says we do not need to spend.
  Let me respond to a couple of other things that have been said. This 
is not about just $300 million. It is about $48 billion, according to 
the Congresional Budget Office. I ask all the Senators who spoke here, 
where are you going to get that money? You suggest that the Secretary 
of Defense budget for it. I ask you, are you going to charge it? And 
are you going to tax people for it? Where are you going to get the 
money? Do you want to advance a notion now that you want to build a $50 
billion new system, which by the way does, indeed, include star wars, 
as page 59 of the bill says? I ask you, where are you going to get the 
money for it?
  Let me say to you, as well, that when you talk about the threat from 
an intercontinental ballistic missile, as you have all talked about, 
you understand and I understand--I have some material that I will not 
read from on the floor, but it is material from Nobel laureates, from 
veterans of the Manhattan project and from physicists who are experts 
in this field, all of whom agree--and I think you would agree--that a 
threat from a renegade country is far more likely as a result of a 
cruise missile, which cannot be defended against by this system, than 
it is from an intercontinental ballistic missile. A cruise missile is 
easier to build and cheaper to build and more likely for them to get.
  I ask you this question, if you are worried about protecting 
America's cities: If you finished spending $48 billion to defend 
against ballistic missiles, then tell me how that system defends 
America's cities against the far more likely threat of cruise missiles. 
The fact is that by building a national ballistic missile defense you 
have done nothing to defend against a cruise missile attack on American 
cities.
  That is the point. The point here is that this is a weapons program 
with a constituency. Like all weapons programs, it does not matter what 
the climate is--it can be rain, snow, wind, or 

[[Page S 11232]]
sleet; you can have a Soviet Union or not, and it could be 1983 or 
1995--this weapons program has legs. It has jobs and it has 
constituencies. This is out of step, makes no sense, and yet we see on 
the floor of the Senate folks who come here and say, well, let us, this 
year, stick $300 million more in this program than was asked for and 
than is needed. Why? Because we want to defend America's cities. 
Against what? Against a threat which the Secretary of Defense says does 
not exist, and Nobel laureates and veterans of the Manhattan project 
say does not exist.
  If you are so all-fired worried about threats, let us focus on the 
threats that the Nation will really face.
  One additional thing. I think the Senator from Oklahoma makes the 
point that I have been trying to make this morning when he talks about 
the tragic bombing of Oklahoma City. It is not an intercontinental 
ballistic missile with all of its sophisticated targeting that is the 
likely way to attack against America. It is far more likely to be a 
rental truck, a suitcase, a glass vial, a single-engine airplane. I 
think the Senator from Oklahoma made the point I was trying to make.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. I will not yield on my time.
  Mr. INHOFE. I would like to respond to the Senator.
  Mr. DORGAN. If the Senator would give time, I am happy to answer 
questions. But we have 45 minutes equally divided.
  I will at this time reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Minnesota, Senator Wellstone.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, let me just say that 5 
minutes is not a lot of time to make the case. But I am in strong 
support of the Dorgan amendment for a number of reasons. First of all, 
I will talk policy, and then I will talk budget. There is no 
significant long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States 
now or in the immediate future. The head of the DIA stated:

       We see no interest in or capability of any new country 
     reaching the continental United States with a long-range 
     missile for at least the next decade.

  Mr. President, the national missile defense provides no defense 
against the most likely future attacks on the United States, which will 
not be delivered by missiles. We have seen that clearly in a tragic way 
at the World Trade Center, the Federal building in Oklahoma City, and 
the subway in Tokyo.
  Mr. President, there are many arguments I could make about this 
impossible dream. But let me just put it in a slightly broader context. 
We have out here a bill that requests $7 billion more than the Pentagon 
says it needs. We have out here with star wars a request for $300 
million more than the Pentagon says it wants to spend or needs to 
spend.
  Mr. President, I think this amendment is about more than star wars. 
It is about priorities. And if you look at requests for Head Start, it 
is $3.9 billion, but the total cost of the next aircraft carrier, the 
CVN-78, is $4.6 billion.
  If you look at requests for police officers, housing, childhood 
immunization, alongside star wars, the B-2, Pentagon budget, $7 billion 
more in this bill than requested by the Pentagon itself, of the kind of 
stories that are now coming out, Mr. President, about a variety of 
different pork projects, all across the country, we have to ask 
ourselves the question, what are we doing here?
  I was on the floor of the Senate not too long ago, saying why are we 
eliminating low-income energy assistance? I was talking about the poor 
in the cold-weather State of Minnesota. We also could talk about 
cooling assistance. This was during the time where we read that 450 
people died, many elderly and poor.
  On the one hand, we cut low-income energy assistance, we cut 
education programs, we cut job programs, we cut all sorts of nutrition 
programs, we are not investing in our children, and we have here a bill 
that asks for $7 billion more than the Pentagon says it needs for our 
national defense.
  Now we have--for this impossible dream, many independent people 
arguing it never will work anyway--a request for an additional $300 
million.
  Mr. President, the real national security for our country is not for 
star wars in space. It is to feed children and educate children and 
provide safety and security for people in communities, and job 
opportunities for people on Earth.
  This is outrageous. At the very time we have some of our deficit 
hawks saying, ``Cut this nutrition program, cut low-income energy 
assistance, cut legal services, cut job training, cut summer youth 
programs, cut education programs, cut health care programs,'' we have 
here a budget that asks for $7 billion more than the Pentagon wants, 
and $300 million more for star wars--this impossible dream, this 
fantasy--than is requested by our own defense people.
  This is really a test, I say to my colleague from North Dakota, this 
is a test case vote, as to whether or not we are serious about reducing 
the deficit and investing in people in our country, investing in people 
who live in the communities in our country. That is what this is about.
  Senators, you cannot dance at two weddings at the same time. Maybe 
you are trying to dance at three weddings at the same time. You cannot 
keep saying you are for deficit reduction, you cannot keep saying you 
are for children and education, you cannot keep saying that you are for 
job opportunities, you cannot keep saying you are for veterans, you 
cannot keep saying we will not cut Medicare, and at the same time 
allocating more and more money for your pork military projects, and 
adding to a military budget that the Pentagon itself says it does not 
need. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee for yielding time to discuss this amendment.
  Going back to basics, the amendment is to cut $300 million from the 
committee's request for funding for the Defense Department. The 
committee has a $300 million increase from what the administration had 
requested for this particular part of the budget. The House had 
increased it $400 million. The Senate increase is less than the House 
increase by $100 million. The Dorgan amendment is to cut $300 million 
from the committee's request.
  The primary arguments against the committee's mark are categorized 
into two areas: First, the threat is not that great or that soon; 
second, the money could be spent on other things.
  First, talking about the threat, there is a suggestion here that the 
threat is not imminent. The threat we are talking about is a threat to 
relatively soon be able to attack the continental United States, 
because this is the national missile defense part of the program we are 
talking about.
  Now, we all understand that eventually we will have to have a defense 
against missiles that would either be accidentally or intentionally 
launched against U.S. territory. The question is, how soon do we need 
to begin preparing for that?
  The Senator from North Dakota says we do not need to worry about it 
yet because it will be maybe 10 years before the threat emerges. There 
are two primary responses to it. First, it is wrong; and, second, we 
are not taking into account the fact that it takes a long time to 
develop the programs to respond to the offensive threat.
  We have been working at this program for a long time. It has been 5 
years yesterday, since the taking over of Kuwait by Iraq. Yet we are 
not very far down the road in terms of improving our ability to defend 
even against a missile like the Scud B that the Iraqis had. We are 
talking here about much longer range missiles than the Scud B. We are 
talking about missiles that could reach U.S. territory.
  Now, at first we are talking about the State of Alaska or the 
Territory of Guam. I know it is of interest to the Senator from North 
Dakota.
  In fact, we all would be very, very concerned about a threat to any 
U.S. citizen, whether it be in Guam or whether it be in Alaska. It does 
not have to be to the heartland of America.
  What is the fact with regard to this threat? The person who last 
headed the CIA just prior to the new Director, John Deutch, the then 
Acting Director 

[[Page S 11233]]
of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral William Studeman, made this 
point just a few months ago. He said,

       Our understanding of North Korea's earlier Scud development 
     leads us to believe that it is unlikely Pyongyang could 
     deploy Taepo-Dong I or Taepo-Dong II missiles before 3 to 5 
     years. However, if Pyongyang has foreshortened its 
     development program, we could see these missiles earlier.

  What the acting CIA Director was saying is that they probably will 
not have this missile that could reach the United States for 3 to 5 
years.
  Well, we cannot develop this system within 3 to 5 years. The bill 
calls for some kind of a deployment, hopefully, by 1999. That is within 
the timeframe that the CIA Director acknowledges the Taepo-Dong II 
missile could be developed.
  Now, what about the current CIA director? John Deutch said last year, 
``If the North Koreans field that Taepo-Dong II missile, Guam, Alaska, 
and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk.''
  The point here is that North Korea, a belligerent state over whom we 
have virtually no negotiating control, no diplomatic control, is 
developing a weapon which the CIA says could potentially reach United 
States territory in 3 to 5 years.
  If the 3 years is correct, we cannot possibly have anything deployed 
in time to meet that threat. Even if it is just used to blackmail us, 
it is a tremendous threat. For those who say that there is no threat 
here, the facts do not bear them out. The intelligence estimates do not 
bear them out.
  The other side of this argument is, well, there are other threats. 
There could be a suitcase bomb. There is a cruise missile threat, and 
of course the answer is yes, that is true. We are doing everything we 
can to meet those threats as well.
  It is a fallacy of logic to suggest that because there is some other 
threat that, therefore, this is not a threat. That is the logic of the 
Senator from North Dakota. Well, somebody might bring a suitcase bomb 
over.
  Well, we are working that problem very hard. The last three CIA 
Directors have said that their primary concern is the proliferation of 
these weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that can deliver 
them.
  As a matter of fact, there has not been a suitcase nuclear bomb 
explode, but there have been missiles launched against U.S. forces. As 
a matter of fact, as I said yesterday, fully 20 percent of our 
casualties in the Persian Gulf were as a result of a Scud missile. We 
did not have an adequate protection against the Scud missile.
  We at least had the Patriot over there. We have nothing to protect 
the people in the United States. I think the CIA Directors are a pretty 
good source for the proposition that there is a potential threat out 
there, and we will be lucky to be able to deploy a system in time to 
meet that threat, if their statistics are correct.
  Now, just one quick final point on the threat. The Senator from North 
Dakota suggests that the triad is actually adequate here, but the same 
Secretary of Defense that he is so fond of relying on has made it clear 
that mutual assured destruction, the threat that we retaliate with 
nuclear weapons against Iraq or some other country, is just not 
credible.
  As Secretary Perry said on March 8 of this year,

       The bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not 
     provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We 
     may be facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic 
     missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future, 
     and they may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they 
     may be madder than MAD.

  And the M-A-D that he is referring to is the mutual assured 
destruction doctrine, which the Secretary is saying is madness today. 
That doctrine no longer works. We need a defense, not just the threat 
of massive retaliation to prevent countries from launching missiles 
against the United States.
  Finally, let us talk about the amount here. First of all, as the 
Senator from Mississippi pointed out earlier, the amount that is in the 
Senate bill this year is less than the Clinton administration requested 
last year in their 5-year budget. So in the 5-year plan the 
administration sent up here last year, they were asking for more money 
for this program than the committee has asked for this year. It is a 
matter of timing, of when you spend the money. As I think I have 
pointed out, even with this amount of money we will be lucky to be able 
to field something that is effective by the time the threat is upon us.
  Second, there is a suggestion here that the Secretary does not want 
this because he has not asked for it. Obviously, we are all aware of 
the politics within the Pentagon and the administration and not asking 
for it is not the same as not wanting it. You will note in the letter 
from the Secretary, nowhere does he say: Do not send us this $300 
million, I do not want it and I will not spend it if you send it to me. 
As a matter of fact, his spokesman on this issue, Gen. Malcolm O'Neill, 
before the House committee just a few weeks ago, was asked if he could 
spend this money, and here is what he said:

       I have reviewed the BMD program, the impact of last year's 
     budget reductions and the schedule of several key programs in 
     order to recommend where additional resources could be best 
     applied.

  Remember, the House is talking about $400 million in additional 
resources. And he says:

       These funds could be effectively used in several key BMD 
     programs to accelerate development efforts, preserve early 
     development options for a national missile defense system, 
     and to protect current theater missile defense system 
     acquisition schedules.

  In other words, the expert in this area, the head of the program, 
Gen. Mal O'Neill, made it clear to the House of Representatives if he 
had this extra money he could effectively use it. I understand the 
administration position is against this. We all understand that. But it 
is not common sense when you recognize the speed with which this threat 
could be upon us and the ability we have to develop a system that could 
defend us.
  When I say it is not common sense, I do not mean to denigrate the 
Secretary of Defense. He is a fine public servant and is very concerned 
about the future of our country. But reasonable people can differ about 
the speed with which we ought to get on with this effort and the 
priority of spending this money. I submit the weight of evidence from 
the Central Intelligence Agency and from the other people who have 
spoken on the issue is, we better get about this task right away.
  The final point with regard to the money is that while we could be 
spending this money on summer youth programs or Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance--of course we could. But what is more important, defending 
American lives or summer youth programs? We have to set priorities 
around here. I submit, if a missile were launched against the State of 
Hawaii or the State of Alaska, every one of us on this floor would be 
denouncing the act and would be asking why that was allowed to happen? 
Who sat by while this threat emerged? Who allowed this threat to evolve 
to the point we could not defend our own citizens from a missile 
attack? Those would be the questions asked on this floor.
  Today that question can be answered because those people who seek to 
cut these funds out of the committee bill will be the people 
responsible for us not having a system at the time that the CIA 
believes we are going to need to have it. That is the question before 
the body. Do we go along with the leadership? Do we go along with the 
committee, which is the body of expertise on this? Do we go along with 
the Central Intelligence estimates, and do we go along to fund this 
program to at least get us on a path to develop and deploy a system in 
the time we need it? Or do we take the risk and roll the dice, spend 
the money on summer youth programs or Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
or the like?
  I submit the decision today is that we should go along with the 
committee's request here, support the committee and vote down the 
Dorgan amendment which would cut the $300 million.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me yield a minute to myself before I 
yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas.
  I might say if ever there is an Olympic event called side stepping, I 
have seen this morning several candidates for gold medals.
  Let us not be confused about what the Secretary of Defense has said. 
Here is a letter he sent last week. It says this:


[[Page S 11234]]

       The bill's provisions would add nothing to DOD's ability to 
     pursue our missile defense programs and would needlessly 
     cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks.

  That is not a letter from a Secretary who is undecided about whether 
this is good policy or not. The Senator from Arizona says he just has 
not asked us. The Senator says that of course, the Secretary would like 
to get it this additional money.
  Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. This letter says he does not want it. He thinks it adds 
excess costs and additional security risks to this country. So let us 
not be confused about the message from the Secretary of Defense. He is 
clear on this issue.
  Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas. I will be 
happy to yield momentarily for a question.
  Mr. KYL. Briefly, can the Senator point anywhere in that letter where 
he is referring to this $300 million? He is referring generally to this 
bill, not to this $300 million.
  Mr. DORGAN. In fact, he specifically refers to this $300 million in 
this program, I say to the Senator from Arizona, in the following part 
of this paragraph. I read it once before and I am not going to read it 
again for you.
  The point is, he is talking about developing specific national 
missile defense for interim operational capability in 1999 and for full 
deployment in 2003. That is exactly and specifically the program we are 
now debating. If the Senator is asking, was the Secretary talking about 
this issue, the answer is clearly, unequivocally, yes, that is exactly 
what the Secretary was talking about in this letter.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from New Hampshire is 
recognized.
  Mr. SMITH. I thank the Senator from South Carolina for yielding, and 
thank him for his leadership in support of the defense of the United 
States of America.
  I am very pleased that this amendment has been offered. I oppose it, 
vehemently and strongly oppose it, but I am glad it has been offered 
because it gives the American people a chance once and for all to see 
just exactly what this debate is all about and who stands for what.
  The Dorgan amendment would leave the American people completely 
vulnerable to ballistic missile threats, completely vulnerable. It says 
to our constituents, it is OK to protect Israel, protect France, 
protect Germany, protect Italy, protect our allies, but not our folks 
at home. Do not protect them.
  The armed services bill, on the other hand, establishes a program to 
defend all Americans, regardless of where they live, against a limited 
ballistic missile attack. For the life of me, I do not understand how 
anyone could use the argument it is OK to protect somebody in one area 
of the country and not in another area of the country. How can one do 
that and keep a straight face?
  The Clinton program and the Dorgan amendment leaves the United States 
hostage, completely, to the likes of Kim Jong Il and the Pyongyang 
Communists. The intelligence community has suggested that North Korea 
may well deploy an ICBM capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii within 5 
years, and some talk maybe even as far as San Francisco in a very short 
period of time, but the Senator from North Dakota thinks it is wrong 
for us to defend these American citizens?
  If the Senator disagrees with this assessment, let us look at the 
statement of the recently confirmed Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, John Deutch. Dr. Deutch stated,

       If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong II missile, Guam, 
     Alaska, and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk.

  This is a serious, serious problem. The issue really boils down to 
this. Twenty nations have acquired or are acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction and the capability to deliver them, Iran, Syria, North 
Korea, Libya, China, to name a few. That ought to put the fear of God 
in us--just that, just thinking about those nations. And at least 24, 
some of the same ones I just mentioned, have chemical weapons. And 
approximately 10 more are believed to have biological weapons. And at 
least 10 countries are reportedly interested in development of nuclear 
weapons.
  The international export control regime is failing to prevent the 
spread of these technologies. They are being spread all over the world, 
this missile technology, biological, chemical, nuclear, and the 
capability to deliver them.
  The Armed Services Committee, under the strong leadership of Senator 
Strom Thurmond, recognizes that fact. This is a far-reaching, 
farsighted, looking-ahead attempt to protect the United States of 
America and its citizens in the outyears. You have to be thinking about 
that today, not 50 years from now, because 50 years from now it will be 
too late. You think about it today, and that is what the Senator from 
South Carolina has done. Under his leadership we have provided, in the 
Armed Services Committee, the opportunity to protect our citizens.
  The Dorgan amendment would say that the continental United States, 
Alaska, and Hawaii, are absolutely vulnerable to these threats. The 
reckless leaders of North Korea, Syria, Libya, and others basically 
have free access to our citizens. The choice is simple, really; really 
simple. If you believe the American people should be protected against 
limited accidental or intentional missile attacks--take your choice--
you should support the Armed Services Committee bill.
  That is why we are on the committee. That is why we delve into these 
matters in great detail. That is our specialty. That is what we are 
there for, to understand these things and to present options to the 
full Senate. But if you believe the American people should not be 
defended and should be completely vulnerable, then you vote for the 
Dorgan amendment.
  It is ironic--and tragically ironic, frankly--that those who oppose 
defending the American people hide behind the fig leaf of the cold war. 
The cold war is over. And the technology and the philosophy that we use 
to defend against it is also over. We do not have mutual assured 
destruction anymore. We do not have a bipolar world anymore. These 
people are not rational. Does anybody think Saddam Hussein is rational? 
Would Saddam Hussein have used a nuclear missile in the Persian Gulf 
war if he had the opportunity? You bet he would. He just does not have 
it.
  We do not have the capability to protect against this. It is very 
interesting that focus groups have been held where we call a few people 
into the room and interview them. We asked them, ``What would you do if 
somebody fired a missile at the United States?'' In this group, 
American citizens were put together in a room and they were asked, 
``What would you do if someone fired a missile at the United States of 
America?'' And every single one of those people said, ``We would shoot 
it down.'' Guess what? We do not have the capability to shoot it down, 
Mr. President. This amendment will make sure we do not have the 
capability to shoot it down until it is too late.
  So I urge my colleagues to defeat this very irresponsible amendment.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Arkansas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, first of all, I want everyone to 
understand that the President's request already has $371 million in the 
bill for a national ballistic missile defense system. The committee 
added $300 million. So now we have $671 million, almost doubling what 
the Pentagon requested. The Senator from North Dakota very sensibly and 
wisely is trying to strike out the extra money. I hear people on that 
side of the aisle saying, ``We are not trying to abrogate the ABM 
Treaty. This does not abrogate the ABM Treaty.'' Really?
  Here is what the ABM Treaty says:

       Each party shall be limited at any one time to a single 
     area out of the two provided in Article III of the treaty for 
     deployment of antiballistic missile systems or their 
     components. . . .

  English is the mother tongue. If you speak English, you understand 
the word ``single.'' It means one. Our one site is now in North Dakota. 


[[Page S 11235]]

  Here is what this bill says. Here is what the language of the bill 
clearly says if you speak the mother tongue.

       It is the policy of the United States--to deploy a 
     multiple-site national ballistic missile defense system . . . 
     .
  I want to emphasize that--``a multiple-site'' NBMD system.
  And section 235 of the bill says:

       The Secretary of Defense shall develop a national missile 
     defense system, which will attain initial operational 
     capability by the end of 2003 . . .
       It shall include . . . ground-based interceptors deployed 
     at multiple sites . . .

  Remember, the ABM Treaty bans multiple-site systems. If that in 
itself is not compelling, there is more. This bill says we will decide 
what is a national missile defense system, and what is a theater 
missile defense system. We could not care less what the Russians think. 
Do you think people in Russia, the former Soviet Union, who crafted 
this treaty with us and that we ratified with, should have any say 
about what we are going to do in abrogating the treaty?
  I read a very interesting article the other day in the Washington 
Post, an op-ed by someone named Sarah Roosevelt, who I do not know. She 
said, ``Do not tweak the bear.'' Russia is an economic basket case. 
They are a military basket case. They were a military basket case and 
an economic basket case when Hitler decided he could take them with one 
hand behind him. They did not have any choice but to allow millions of 
their people to be slaughtered until they could arm and beat Hitler.
  If I had asked this body 10 years ago standing beside my desk, 
``Senators, what would you give to see the Soviet Union disappear, and 
to see East Germany, Hungary, Poland, all of those nations free, how 
much would you be willing to cut the defense budget in exchange for 
that?''--10 years ago--I daresay a consensus in the body, the smallest 
number would have been 30 percent, and a lot of people would have said 
50 percent.
  So what are we doing with this bill, which is the most irresponsible 
defense bill I have seen in my 21 years in the U.S. Senate? We say we 
are going to give to the Pentagon $7 billion which it doesn't even 
want. What kind of insanity is sweeping over this body?
  We spend already, without the additional $7 billion, twice as much as 
our eight most likely enemies including China, Russia, North Korea, 
Iraq, and Iran--twice as much; and, with NATO, twice as much as the 
rest of the world combined. And in this bill we are putting an 
additional $7 billion into defense.
  If this bill goes to the President's desk in its present form and he 
does not veto it--I am going to say publicly he is a very good friend 
of mine, and I want him to be reelected--if he does not veto this bill, 
I am going to be terribly disappointed.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Louisiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, there is an old song that says: ``You 
keep coming back like a song.''
  Mr. President, in spite of the end of the cold war, in spite of the 
fact that the Russians are dismantling their nuclear weapons and we are 
buying the plutonium and the enriched uranium, in spite of the fact 
that there is no longer a threat from intercontinental ballistic 
missiles to the United States, no longer targeted at this country, this 
same issue, this military-industrial complex that the Defense 
Department does not want, keeps ``coming back like a song.''
  Mr. President, I have had amendments on this I guess four or five 
times over the past few years; more than I think $25 billion ago. And 
we have won it sometimes on the floor only to see it reversed by one 
vote or by two votes. But, Mr. President, this really at this time in 
our history is madness.
  The biggest threat to this country right now is not from Russian 
ICBM's and certainly not from Saddam Hussein, who is no conceivable 
threat to the continental United States. Rather, the real threat to the 
United States is from this kind of spending, which would start a new 
cold war, which would hurt the economy of the United States and weaken 
this country.
  If you are really worried about nuclear weapons, I can tell you where 
the threat would come. It is from a terrorist nuclear weapon which 
could be easily brought into the United States in a suitcase.
  Look, if they can smuggle bales of marijuana into this country 
easily, they can easily smuggle into this country a suitcase bomb which 
can be put into something the size of a briefcase. And so why are we 
spending billions of dollars, even going into space-based lasers? Do 
you know what it takes to drive a space-based laser? A nuclear bomb. 
That is what it takes; otherwise, they do not have enough power.
  That is what we are spending all this money for? What is the threat, 
Mr. President? It is absolute madness. It is what President Eisenhower 
warned against--the military industrial complex--which gets this 
enthusiasm, gets it going; we have jobs out there in the economy. That 
is what this thing is about. It is not about defending the United 
States.
  We really ought to go further than the Dorgan amendment. We ought to 
do away with any thought of deploying any ballistic missile defense in 
the continental United States. Do some research but do away with this 
deployment. It makes no sense today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I wish to speak for a few minutes about 
our ballistic missile defense program and the ABM Treaty with an eye 
toward dismantling several myths about our missile defense program and 
the scope of the ABM treaty. Unfortunately, many of the opponents of a 
deployable national missile defense system, including the President, 
confuse the central issues at hand in this debate through the 
perpetuation of two central myths about national missile defense.
  They maintain consistently that one, deploying a national missile 
defense system is a return to star wars and two, that such a deployment 
is an abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Neither of these claims has any 
grounding in fact.
  First, the opponents of a deployable NMD system would have the Senate 
believe that in supporting NMD deployment we are committing ourselves 
to a long-term research program that would cost this Nation tens of 
billions of dollars.
  In addition, they would have the Senate think that this system is a 
space-based system modeled along the lines of the star wars program of 
the 1980's. The deployed NMD system called for in this bill is neither 
a distant technological dream, a space-based system, nor an overly 
expensive investment for the American taxpayer. This legislation calls 
for a deployable, multiple site, ground-based interceptor system by the 
year 2003. Let me repeat--a ground-based interceptor system.
  The current GBI configuration of a national missile defense system 
builds off our current advances in theater missile defense--advances 
that proceed from the concept of ground-based antiballistic missiles. 
Such a system builds upon existing ground-based interception 
technology--technology that is currently deployed or is being validated 
through successful flight tests.
  The only current limitation on rapid EKV development and deployment 
is the funding strangulation placed on our NMD program by the current 
administration. The centerpiece of this system, the Exoatmospheric kill 
vehicle or EKV, has been in development for 5 years and has 
demonstrated outstanding technological progress and achievements. The 
EKV is a real piece of hardware designed to perform a mission that is 
well within our current intercept capabilities. As opposed to tens of 
billions dollars in outlays to develop and deploy a ground-based NMD 
system, a deployable system will require a scant percentage of the 
funding provided for space-based research in 1980's. In fact, this 
year's authorization and appropriations bill call for an increase of 
only $300 million for national missile defense--an amount that is 
roughly a third of the cost of one destroyer.
 The opponents of national missile defense also claim that the national 
missile defense provisions in 

[[Page S 11236]]
this authorization bill would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty. While the ultimate goal of multiple site deployment of an NMD 
system will require modifications to the ABM Treaty, nothing in the 
range of the coming year's research and development efforts will in 
fact, violate the constraints of the treaty. Therefore, the committee 
has, wisely, asked only for a Senate study on the application and 
relevance of the ABM Treaty to the current missile defense needs of 
this country. The ABM Treaty is over two decades old. It is based upon 
a doctrine of deterrence commonly known as mutually assured 
destruction. While this doctrine was absolutely applicable to the 
realities of the cold war, it has little place in a nonbipolar world of 
rogue regimes and proliferating ballistic missile technology. 
Unfortunately, the current administration continues to adhere not only 
to a belief that the parameters of the treaty remain valid in today's 
world, but seem determined to apply unilateral interpretations to the 
treaty that limit not only our national missile defense program, but 
also our theater missile defense systems--limitations beyond those 
expressly contained in the treaty. Therefore, the committee has 
recommended a provision that would codify TMD speed and range standards 
for treaty compliance--standards derived from the administration's own 
November 1993 proposal. Make no mistake, Mr. President, the global 
political situation and the nature of the ballistic missile threat has 
changed dramatically from the time of the ABM Treaty's ratification. 
North Korea is nearing long-range ballistic missile capability. Just 2 
months ago, the Chinese fired a truck-launched ICBM, demonstrating just 
how easy it will be for rogue states to develop and launch ICBM's on 
the cheap. Mr. President, the threat to the United States from long-
range ballistic missiles from rogue regimes will exist by 2003, if such 
capabilities do not already exist.
  It is absurd and irresponsible to continue to deny our citizens 
protections from a real threat, especially if that protection can be 
provided for limited cost and is based upon technology which is near 
fruition. I strongly urge my colleagues to see through the myths 
regarding national missile defense and resist any attempts to weaken 
the commitment of this act to deploying an NMD system.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Ohio, Senator Glenn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the amendment 
offered by my colleague from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, to strike the 
$300 million that was added to the bill by the majority of the Armed 
Services Committee for national missile defense [NMD].
  The President had requested $371 million for NMD--and the committee 
is proposing virtually to double that amount.
  I do not believe that sensitive national security and diplomatic 
issues should be allowed to sink into the unruly pit of partisan 
politics. There have been appropriate lines drawn over the many years 
of this Republic by the various political parties, and I think most of 
us would have to agree that politics should stop at the water's edge 
when it comes the most sensitive issues of our national defense and 
security.
  The language on national missile defense in the bill and the 
committee report, however, vaults over this line in a manner that 
infringes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive in 
foreign policy, drains our Treasury, makes our country less secure, and 
ultimately increases international strategic instability.
  After having to listen to the litany of complaints by the current 
majority party about tax-and-spend members of my own party, I find it 
ironic to see the majority party has now embraced this same tax-and-
spend doctrine as the Rosetta Stone of that party's entire approach to 
strategic defense.
  This is all the more ironic given that the Secretary of Defense, Mr. 
Perry--whose words can surely be taken as nonpartisan on this issue--
has stated quite clearly that, ``* * * a valid strategic missile threat 
has not emerged.'' [Letter of Sen. Nunn, July 28, 1995] These words 
echo the sentiments of our intelligence community. Gen. James Clapper, 
the DIA Director, testified before the Armed Services Committee on 
January 17, 1995, that ``* * * we see no interest in or capability, of 
any new country reaching the continental United States with a long 
range missile for at least the next decade.''
  The ABM Treaty authorizes its parties to have a limited national 
missile defense capability, but the terms of the treaty are quite clear 
about what is permissible and what is not permissible. The committee 
majority seems determined to plus-up those programs that will 
inevitably drive us out of that treaty--a result that they earnestly 
believe will serve the national security.
  Yet will it truly serve our security to spend a fortune to erect 
high-tech Maginot line defenses of dubious reliability against 
nonexistent threats, while we continue to underfund efforts to address 
clear and present dangers? I am speaking particularly of the challenges 
we should be facing to prevent proliferation from occurring, as opposed 
to just trying to cope with it after it is a fact of life as the 
majority evidently prefers to do. Proponents of the current bill seem 
more eager to prevent Qadhafi from launching a blizzard of nuclear-
tipped ICBM's at Chicago than in keeping Qadhafi from obtaining the 
nuclear materials he will need to manufacture such warheads in the 
first place. Let me say, it would be a much more efficient use of our 
resources to focus our efforts on the latter type of problem. By the 
way, if Qadhafi finally gets enough of that material, he will not need 
to--and probably will prefer not to--attach the United States using 
ballistic missiles. There are plenty of other ways to get the job done.
  Will it serve our security to place in jeopardy the progress that has 
been made in recent years in the START process to cut the size of the 
United States and Russian nuclear arsenals? If we march forward blindly 
into the future and eventually abrogate the ABM Treaty, does anybody 
seriously believe that such an action will have no effect on Russia's 
readiness to proceed with such cuts in its nuclear stockpile?
  Will it serve our security to drain some $48 billion out of our 
Treasury to build a national missile defense system? That is what the 
Congressional Budget Office has estimated it will cost to build a 
complex that covered Grand Forks, ND, and five other States. To this we 
must add billions more for theater missile defense--which these days is 
getting to look more and more like strategic missile defense. And the 
costs just keep adding up. We must not forget the long-term costs of 
operating and maintaining such facilities. The legacy we will leave to 
future generations from this investment will not be a more secure 
country, but a less secure world, and a towering pile of budgetary 
IOU's.
  Will it serve our security, in deploying an extensive national 
strategic missile defense network, to drive China, Britain, and France 
out of international negotiations aimed at further nuclear reductions?
  Will it serve our security to jeopardize the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which was just extended indefinitely on the basis 
of solemn commitments by the nuclear-weapon states both to conclude an 
early comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests and new progress on 
nuclear arms control and disarmament?
  These are just some of my reasons for supporting the Dorgan amendment 
today. We are standing on a slippery slope leading to the demise of the 
ABM Treaty. The Dorgan amendment merely seeks to remove one large 
banana peel from that slope. I urge all my colleagues in joining me in 
endorsing his responsible proposal.
  In summary, Mr. President, the President requested $371 million for 
national missile defense. That was to do the basic research. And 
somehow we come along now and want to say we are going to double that 
amount; we are going to put another $300 million in here. And for what? 
I do not understand the rationale of this whole thing except it seems 
to me we have reversed parties here almost. Tax and spend, tax and 
spend, tax and spend, that is what we have heard leveled at the 
Democratic Party all these years. Now, here we are with something that 
is not even needed and we are going to tax and spend, and now it is the 
Republican tax 

[[Page S 11237]]
and spend. I think that is a valid charge back at the Republicans on 
this.
  Tax and spend for what? The Secretary of Defense says that a balanced 
strategic missile threat has not emerged. General Clapper, DIA 
director, testified before the Armed Services Committee, and I quote 
him:

       We see no interest in or capability of any new country 
     reaching the continental United States with a long-range 
     missile for at least the next decade.

  At the same time we are going to endanger the ABM Treaty, which 
authorizes its parties to have a limited national missile defense 
capability--limited. But the terms are quite clear about what is 
permissible and what is not permissible.
  I do not know why the majority is determined to plus up these 
programs with something that will take a chance of eventually driving 
us out of that treaty. I think it is ridiculous. Will it really serve 
our security to place in jeopardy the progress that has been made in 
recent years in the START process to cut the size of the United States 
and Russian nuclear arsenals? If we march forward blindly into the 
future and eventually abrogate the ABM Treaty, does anybody seriously 
believe such an action will have no effect on Russia's readiness to 
proceed with such cuts in its nuclear stockpile?
  I just do not see how it is going to serve our security to drain $48 
billion--$48 billion--out of our Treasury to build a national missile 
defense system that is not needed. And that is not my figure. That is 
what the Congressional Budget Office estimated it will cost to build a 
complex that covers Grand Forks, ND, and five other States. That is $48 
billion, and it does not even cover the whole country. That does not 
even cover the theater missile defense, which I support.
  I think it moves in the wrong direction. I do not see that it serves 
our security in deploying an expensive national missile defense network 
to drive China, Britain, and France out of the international 
negotiations aimed at further nuclear reductions.
  I am not sure either exactly what kind of system this is. Is this to 
be an SDI system? The President provided research, and yet we do not 
know what this system is. At best, it is going to be a $48 billion 
operation just to cover five States. It literally makes no sense 
whatsoever to take a chance of driving us out of the ABM Treaty when we 
have no international intercontinental missile defense necessity for 
this country at this time.
  Let us do the research the President wanted. Let us continue on down 
the road with that research, which I favor, voted for it, support 
fully, and if we see a threat developing, we will have time to go to 
what this provides prematurely.
  I know my time has expired. I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, three quick rebuttals. First, to my 
distinguished colleague from Ohio where he quotes General Clapper. 
There are two fallacies in that argument I say. One, it is predicated 
on a startup within a country to build it all the way up. But there are 
open bids on the free market in this world today from many countries, 
primarily Iran, Iraq, and others, that would buy a Chinese system which 
could hit the United States within that lesser period than 10 years. 
Also, it will take us 10 years to build the very system we are debating 
here at this point in time. So there is a convergence, Mr. President, 
in time and need for this system.
  Shifting to another argument from the distinguished Senator from 
Louisiana, who said it is madness. Well, let me tell you, Mr. 
President, a little story of madness. The distinguished Senator from 
Georgia; myself; the distinguished Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye]; 
and the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] were in Tel 
Aviv on February 18, 1991. I remember it very well. It happened, 
coincidentally, to have been my birthday. We were there in the Defense 
Ministry when a Scud alert was sounded and in a very calm way we 
participated with the others in putting on our gas masks. The Scud fell 
some 2 or 3 miles away. We were not in danger.
  May I say to my colleagues, when we went out the next morning to 
visit the community that was struck and to talk to the people, that was 
madness. That was madness, to see in their faces the attack by Saddam 
Hussein for no military reason whatsoever, strictly to use that type of 
weapon as a terrorist weapon, a single strike. Coincidentally, it was 
the last to fall on Tel Aviv.
  And I say, Mr. President, that same problem could happen, a single 
one as a terrorist weapon to fall on this country, and we have an 
obligation to the people of this country to invest this comparatively 
small, modest sum to ensure against that.
  Mr. NUNN. Would the Senator yield for a brief observation?
  I remember that evening very well. And I do not want to say this with 
much humor. There is not much humorous about anything regarding a Scud 
missile attack. The Senator said we were not in danger. If the Senator 
would amend that by saying we were not in danger because the target was 
where we were, the Ministry of Defense, and the Scud missiles are 
notoriously inaccurate. So we were probably in a safe place. But the 
target was the Ministry of Defense, we found out.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I acknowledge that. I recall, if we want 
to close off on a note of humor, the distinguished Senator from Georgia 
said to me, ``Saddam Hussein just sent you a birthday present.''
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. How much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven minutes, thirty seconds. The Senator 
from South Carolina has 2 minutes.
  Mr. DORGAN. I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. I want to respond very briefly to my distinguished friend 
from Virginia. He is talking about theater missile defense. I am all 
for theater missile defense.
  What we are talking about here is starting down a track that if we go 
this route and violate the ABM Treaty, we have got the Russians at that 
point of probably putting the coordinates back into their missiles or 
ICBM's. We have plenty of time, according to the people that do the 
estimates on these things, for Qadhafi and people like that before they 
develop true intercontinental capability. I am all for the theater 
missile defense that would have taken care of the situation that he is 
talking about that he was in. But I think when we go down this track of 
taking a chance of knocking out the ABM Treaty, which this does, if we 
go ahead with this whole process, then I think we just--the greatest 
likelihood is we are going to encourage the former Soviets, the 
Russians, to go back on the track of missile activation again. I see 
that as a real threat. That is an active threat. And I think this is 
folly to go down that course.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
Senator from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I will make this real quick.
  After my remarks, the Senator from North Dakota made a couple of 
comments. Let me respond to him. First of all, he said we do not have 
any cruise missile defense in this bill. That is a greater threat. Let 
me suggest to you if you read page 119, we have $140 million in here 
for cruise missile defense. And I hope that no one believes that we 
think that the missile threat is the only threat to America. There are 
many other threats that are being addressed.
  Now, the other thing is that the two Senators from Wisconsin and 
North Dakota know very well that the defense budget is not causing the 
deficit. We always hear about from the big spenders over there, ``Well, 
we've got to do something about defense.'' The last 11 years our 
defense budget has declined. And for that period of time for every $1 
of defense cuts, we have had $2 

[[Page S 11238]]
of increase in domestic spending. To be specific, in using 1995 
dollars, in fiscal year 1985 the defense budget was $402 billion. Today 
we are considering one that is $265 billion.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. the Senator's time has expired.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the way I see this, I do not intend to vote 
for this amendment. I believe the money that is added here, the $300 
million, which puts this budget back on national missile defense, about 
where it was when President Bush left office, I think the money is 
consistent with a limited thin defense but an effective defense against 
limited attack against accidental launch or against third countries 
that may develop a limited capability against the United States. What 
is inconsistent with that is the language in this bill which will be 
the subject for the next amendment which puts us in a position of 
anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty, will be read like that in 
Russia, with no reason to be in breach because we do not have any 
programs in the next fiscal year that would in any way contravene that 
treaty. So we are going to be paying a huge price for nothing because 
of the language in this bill. So I will not favor the money striking 
because the money is needed.
  I will favor though the amendments that will try to correct this 
language. If this language goes forward as it is, we are going to pay a 
big price, probably not only in the failure of ratification of START II 
but also in the Russians not complying or continuing to comply with 
START I. So we are buying ourselves perhaps 6,000 or 8,000 warheads 
pointed at America by the language in this bill. And I hope people 
recognize that when we get to the next amendment. But I do not believe 
the answer is to strike the money which everybody agrees at some point 
we are going to need some kind of limited defense. The administration 
agrees with that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is expired.
  Mr. NUNN. Could I get another minute?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina does not have 
any time.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Dorgan's amendment to 
eliminate the Armed Services Committee add-on of $300 million for the 
national missile defense system. If I am not already listed, I ask 
unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor.
  The committee funded increase of $300 million is an initial 
downpayment on what the committee majority advertises as a multisite, 
multilayered missile defense system designed to protect against a large 
and sophisticated missile attack. The missile defense language in the 
authorization bill makes clear that the system desired is one that will 
violate the ABM Treaty and intercept a Soviet-type missile attack. The 
$300 million plus-up in the bill is the first installment of a bill 
that could grow to a staggering $48 billion cost according to a March 
1995, CBO report. This $48 billion is in addition to the $35 billion we 
have already spent on missile defense. Let no one misunderstand the 
significance of this vote. This is the first of many expensive 
installments to resurrect the Star Wars concept.
  This vote is on a question of priorities. At a time when we are 
significantly slashing domestic spending and making tough, painful 
budgetary choices, it would be irresponsible to add $300 million into a 
system concept designed to defend against a threat that does not exist 
today and will not exist by the operational deployment date of 1999.
  I believe we should send a powerful signal to the American public by 
approving the Dorgan amendment and putting the Senate on record that 
the domestic welfare of our citizens will not be sacrificed on the gold 
plated alter of star wars. This vote is on a question of priorities. We 
can ill-afford to shrug our shoulders and say ``what is $300 million'' 
at a time when we are asking all Americans to tighten their belts. As I 
said earlier, a vote for this $300 million installment is only part of 
a lengthy payment plan that will eventually drain our treasury by 
another $40 to $50 billion. To buy into such a payment plan would be 
the height of fiscal folly. I urge my colleagues to support the Dorgan 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to this 
amendment which would severely reduce the funding needed to develop 
missile defenses. In light of our experiences in the Persian Gulf war, 
and the advanced weapon development programs of hostile countries such 
as Korea, this amendment should be soundly rejected by the Senate.
  The dangers of leaving our own country unprotected cannot be ignored. 
Perhaps some Senators have forgotten that we had a demonstration of the 
dangers of a ballistic missile attack just a few years ago. The picture 
of an unprotected Israel being hit by Scud missiles chilled the hearts 
of all Americans, but that incident would pale in comparison to the 
consequences of a nuclear missile strike. It was reported in the news a 
year ago that the North Koreans vowed to launch missiles at Tokyo 
should armed conflict occur with South Korea. While their capability to 
launch such an attack is questionable, the threat cannot be ignored.
  It is my understanding that in reaction to this, Japan has approached 
the Department of Defense to discuss the purchase of our THAAD missile 
system. Unfortunately, THAAD will not be ready for deployment until the 
turn of the century. I am sure that if Japan could have anticipated the 
threat they now face, they would have invested in some type of missile 
defense system much sooner. As it is, Japan will be vulnerable to North 
Korean blackmail for years to come. They can only hope that North Korea 
never carries out its threat.
  Mr. President, we cannot allow the United States to be put in such a 
vulnerable position. I firmly believe, however, that the present crisis 
with North Korea clearly demonstrates that need to continue the 
development of a national missile defense system. The cost of being 
unprepared to defend ourselves is too great to be ignored.
  I encourage my colleagues to join me in defeating this unwise 
amendment.
  Mr. DORGAN. I yield the remaining time to myself.
  Mr. President, this has been a most unusual debate. I see a couple in 
this chamber who are parents who have no doubt read their children the 
Berenstain Bears books. One of the Berenstain Bear books talks about 
the ``give me's.'' Talks about ``give me, give me, give me, give me 
this, give me that, give me this.'' You know, it is interesting to me 
as I read to my children and describe the Berenstain Bears books about 
``give me,'' it reminds me a bit of the folks who come to this floor 
with every conceivable project, every conceivable program in national 
defense that is proposed by someone and says--they say, ``We have got 
to build this. We have got to fund it. In fact, we cannot wait. We have 
got to do it right now.''
  I asked the question an hour and a half ago, where are you going to 
get the money? Where is the money? The Congressional Budget Office says 
this will cost $48 billion. I ask, where is the money? Are you going to 
charge it? Are you going to tax people for it? Where are you going to 
get the money? I have not heard one response in an hour and a half. And 
I know why, because they do not have the foggiest notion where they are 
going to get the money. They just have an appetite to spend it and 
build this program.
  Let me end where I began. This is $300 million the Secretary of 
Defense says he does not want, and we do not need, that folks who say 
they are opposed to the Federal deficit are now insisting we spend. To 
describe this as pork is to give hogs a bad name. At least hogs carry 
around a little meat. This is in my judgment pure lard to pay for a 
program this country does not need and cannot afford.
  Now let me respond to a couple of the things that have been said. 
During this 

[[Page S 11239]]
debate it has been said that this national defense program does not 
violate the ABM Treaty. Supposedly, this does not violate the ABM 
Treaty. How can anyone possibly say that? Of course it violates the ABM 
Treaty. To understand that is only to be able to read. This bill calls 
for many sites. The ABM Treaty only allows one. This bill calls for 
more than 100 interceptors. The ABM Treaty limits this Nation to less 
than 100 interceptors. This bill on page 59 calls for weapons in space. 
The ABM Treaty forbids weapons in space. Of course this bill violates 
the ABM Treaty. Let us not debate this issue with that kind of 
representation.
  This leaves us vulnerable, one speaker said. That what folks want to 
do is defend France and Israel and leave us vulnerable. There is $371 
million in this bill for ballistic missile defense. I am not touching 
that.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Has the time expired on both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has no time left.
  The Senator from North Dakota has 2 minutes, 45 seconds. The Senator 
from South Carolina has no time left.
  The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we are told by some speakers that our 
intention is to leave American cities vulnerable while at the same time 
we defend Israel and France and Egypt and others.
  Total nonsense. There is $371 million in this bill for a ballistic 
missile defense system. All we want to do is take out the extra $300 
million that was added that the Secretary of Defense says he does not 
want and that we do not need. That is all we are trying to do.
  I do not need to hear from folks about the threat to this country. 
North Dakota has been ground zero for 40 years. If we seceded from the 
Union, we would be the third most powerful country in the world--300 
intercontinental ballistic missiles with Mark-12 warheads, a B-52 base, 
we had a B-1 base. We understand about ground zero. They built an ABM 
system in North Dakota, in fact, the only site in the free world. Spent 
billions. Within 30 days after it was declared operational, it was 
mothballed. Tell that to the taxpayers.
  We understand about missiles and bombers and national defense, and we 
understand about ground zero. But we also understand about Government 
waste. We understand it when people say we cannot afford to send kids 
to school; we are going to make it harder for parents to send their 
kids to college; we cannot afford money for the elderly for health 
care; we simply cannot afford money for nutrition programs; we have to 
tighten our belts.
  And then the same folks say that it is our priority to add money to a 
system that the administration does not need. The Senator from 
Louisiana said this is madness. He is absolutely correct. This makes no 
sense at all. We ought to decide as a Senate what our priorities are. 
The Senator from Ohio, a decorated combat veteran in service to this 
country, stood up and said it the way that it is. Let us build things 
that are necessary for the defense of this country.
  I am for a strong defense, but I am not for wasting the taxpayers 
money on boondoggles that we do not need and boondoggles that will not 
work. Let us decide for a change that we mean what we say when we talk 
about reducing the Federal budget deficit. Let us decide we cannot at 
this point embark on a new venture, to spend $48 billion on a ballistic 
missile program, a national defense missile system--yes, Star Wars, 
because part of it will be based in space--at a time when we are up to 
our neck in $5 trillion of debt, and when this year we will run a $170 
billion deficit.
  If we have some courage and common sense in this body, we will, in 
this case, say, ``You can't add $300 million for something this country 
doesn't need and for something the Secretary of Defense doesn't want. 
To do so makes no sense.''
  That is the ultimate threat to this country: That debt, this deficit, 
this kind of mindless spending. That is the threat to America, and let 
us decide to stand up and finally stop it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. All time has 
now expired.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask 
for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
lay on the table amendment No. 2087. The yeas and nays have been 
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell], 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 48, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 354 Leg.]

                                YEAS--51

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--48

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Campbell
       
  So the motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2087) was agreed 
to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. SMITH. I move to table the motion.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in a moment I will send an amendment to the 
desk which would strike language from the bill which violates the ABM 
Treaty, which establishes unilateral interpretation of the ABM Treaty, 
and which also would tie the President's hands in even discussing the 
ABM Treaty with the Russians.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, however, that I now be 
allowed to yield the floor to Senator Exon for 10 minutes, and then to 
Senator Baucus for 5 minutes, without losing my right to the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, may 
I ask the Senator from Michigan, as part of that, will he agree to a 
time agreement on his amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. We are trying to see how much time will be required by 
various speakers. We are trying to put that together right now. We are 
working on that.
  Mr. McCAIN. Also, reserving the right to object, following your 
amendment, there will be no more amendments on this issue?
  Mr. LEVIN. I cannot say that; I do not know that.
  Mr. McCAIN. Again, reserving the right to object, I remind the 
Senator from Michigan, we have now been on this single issue for all 
intents and purposes for 2 days.
  At this point, we will have thoroughly ventilated the ballistic 
missile defense issue, and at some point we should acquire a list of 
proposed amendments and be prepared to move forward. I hope it is 
possible we could start reaching some time agreements.
  The issue is a very important issue. I understand. It is critical. At 
some point, I think we should move on to other issues. There are other 
Members who plan on proposing amendments. I hope we can move forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to make an objection. Reserving the 


[[Page S 11240]]
right to object, can I inquire of the Senator whether or not, given the 
somewhat unusual procedure of asking two Senators be allowed to speak--
you now holding the floor--would the Senator include in his request 
that those desiring to speak will not offer amendments?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to do that. It is not my understanding 
they want to offer amendments.
  I will modify my amendment. But I also will modify my UC in another 
way.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, is it in order for a quorum to be called at 
this point?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am sorry, I did not hear you.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is it in order for a quorum call?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No, it is not. The Senator from Michigan has 
the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. I object to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the most dangerous portion of this bill, in 
my view, is its head-on assault on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 
This is not a subtle issue. This is not an issue of interpretation. 
That is a frontal, head-on assault which says that it is now going to 
be the policy of the United States----
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, could we have order in the Senate? The 
Senator is making a very important speech. He is entitled to be heard.
  I make the point of order the Senate is not in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senate is not in 
order. Will we remove the conversations, please, from the floor? Will 
we remove the conversation over here on my left from the floor, please? 
The Senator may proceed.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the language we are going to analyze, that 
is in this bill, directly confronts the ABM Treaty and says it is the 
policy of the United States--and these are the words of the bill--no 
longer to abide by the ABM Treaty.
  It does it in a number of ways throughout this bill, but the way in 
which it does it first is by simply stating, in section 233, that ``It 
is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site national 
missile defense system.'' It goes on beyond that in section 233, but 
that is a very clear statement of what the intention and what the 
effect is, of this bill.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from Michigan yield for one second?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to withdraw my objection to the unanimous-
consent request of the Senator from Nebraska to speak for 10 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Arizona. While we were going back 
to the unanimous consent, I would like to modify my UC in another way. 
This relates to the question of how many amendments will there be on 
this subject.
  It was my intention originally to offer three different amendments 
striking the bill in three different places. I believe there has been 
some discussion between the ranking member and the chairman on this 
subject. I am not positive. But my amendment strikes language in three 
separate places and, rather than having three amendments striking three 
different places, since the issue is generally the same, I would modify 
my unanimous-consent request to make it in order that the amendment 
that I send to the desk strike three different provisions.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator work on a time agreement for that 
amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. We are working.
  Mr. THURMOND. As I understand it, the Senator has one amendment; is 
that correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. I have one amendment touching the bill in three different 
places rather than having three amendments. This is the only amendment 
on ABM that this Senator has. But there are other Senators who may have 
other amendments.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Michigan.
  If he wants to proceed with his unanimous-consent request, I will not 
object.
  Mr. LEVIN. As modified?
  Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Is it necessary, 
when a unanimous-consent request is made, is it necessary for a Senator 
to reserve the right to object to get the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. When a unanimous-consent request is made, the 
Senator making the request retains the floor. Others may ask for a 
right to reserve the right to object at the sufferance of the Senator 
having the floor.
  Mr. BUMPERS. But is it necessary for a Senator to be recognized? When 
a request is made for a unanimous-consent agreement, is it necessary 
for the Senator to say ``I reserve the right to object'' in order to 
state whatever he wishes to state or she wishes to state?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the appropriate process to proceed.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, my question is, is it necessary?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is appropriate.
  Mr. BUMPERS. But it is not necessary, is it?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair says it is an appropriate process.
  Is there objection now to the UC?
  If there is confusion here, will the Senator restate his unanimous-
consent request, please?
  Mr. LEVIN. I am not sure the confusion relates to my unanimous-
consent request. I will be happy to restate my unanimous-consent 
request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If you would.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is, I now be allowed to yield the floor for 10 
minutes to the Senator from Nebraska. Following his 10-minute remarks, 
without offering an amendment, that the Senator from Montana be 
recognized for 5 minutes, and that he is not intending to offer an 
amendment. And that, then, I retain my right to the floor.
  It is now part of the modified UC that it be in order in the 
amendment, which I will send to the desk, that it touch the bill in 
three places.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Nebraska is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from 
Michigan, Senator Lott, and others for their cooperation. I would 
simply say, we have just gone through an exercise in futility, although 
finally successful. Had the Senator allowed me to proceed, I would have 
been almost through with my statement at this time. But at least I 
appreciate the consideration that has been offered by both sides.
  There has been some criticism about the possibility of redundancy 
with regard to this authorization bill, particularly with regard to 
ballistic missile defenses. I simply say, this is the time to pause, 
this is the time to reflect, this is the time, if you will, to take 
some time. Because what we are about, in this authorization bill, is 
going to have long-range, possibly serious implications, in the view of 
this Senator, who has worked on these matters for a long, long time.
  Later in the day, I believe, probably my colleague from Arkansas, 
Senator Bumpers, will be addressing some of the issues that I will be 
addressing now, and he will probably be referencing a statement that 
came out of Moscow today with regard to what the Russians are doing and 
not doing and thinking as we proceed in this area.
  Certainly, the policies regarding the national security interests of 
the United States should not be dictated by Moscow. But certainly, 
since we are talking about the possible violation if not the outright 
violation of treaties that we are a party to and a part of, we are 
talking about serious business here. And whatever redundancy is 
necessary to get that message across should be the order of the day.
  Mr. President, I rise to offer my thoughts on the fiscal year 1996 
National Defense Authorization Act. Rarely in my 17 years in the U.S. 
Senate have I come to the floor to take issue with a Defense 
authorization bill reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
As a member of the committee, I have usually been satisfied that the 
reported bill was the product of a bipartisan effort to further advance 
our national security objectives. 

[[Page S 11241]]
To my dismay, the content and philosophy embodied in this year's bill 
is a significant departure from those of previous years. Crafted with 
little bipartisan consultation, the bill reported out of the committee 
represents a regrettable and potentially harmful U-turn in our national 
security policy that will, unless corrected, return the United States 
to the confrontational cold war policies of the 1980's that predated 
the fall of the Soviet Empire.
  While much in the committee bill is laudable and will greatly enhance 
the readiness and capabilities of our Armed Services, I am fearful that 
these constructive elements of the authorization bill will be offset by 
misguided efforts to defend against threats that do not exist and 
hostile attempts to scuttle international agreements intended to 
enhance our security through peaceful means. As originally drafted--I 
emphasize ``originally drafted''--in the Armed Services Committee, this 
bill attempted to: abolish the Department of Energy; gut the 
cooperative threat reduction program responsible for the removal of 
thousands of Russian nuclear warheads from their missiles; prevent the 
administration from carrying out a number of important nuclear non-
proliferation agreements relative to North Korea and the former Soviet 
Union, and purchase unwanted B-2 bombers at a potential cost totaling 
tens of billions of dollars.
  While the majority of the Armed Services Committee was successful in 
overturning these and other astonishing hardline recommendations, many 
provisions remain in the reported bill that will return us to the cold 
war mentality of yesteryear. Among the most objectionable of these 
reversals are bill provisions that: advocate violation of the 
antiballistic missile treaty; as has been briefly addressed and will be 
addressed more so by the Senator from Michigan on an amendment that I 
am a cosponsor of.
  Add over $500 million in star wars missile defense funding; endanger 
ratification of the Start II Treaty, and resurrect at least two 
battleships.
  Let me repeat that because this is an old battle that this Senator 
has carried on against unneeded, unwanted, and useless battleships.
  It resurrects at least two battleships at a cost of nearly a $0.5 
million a year with untold future modernization and operations costs; 
and, mandates the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
  These are just a few of the things that I think are terribly wrong 
with this bill.
  The defense authorization bill is rife with legislative initiatives 
and reshuffled spending priorities intent on rekindling an arms bazaar 
that will have both domestic and international repercussions. The bill 
includes $7 billion--let more repeat that this bill includes $7 
billion--in additional spending above the administration's request, a 
large majority of which has been siphoned off for the purchase of 
ships, planes, trucks, and other weapons not requested by the Pentagon. 
The so-called readiness debate we used to hear so much about is dead 
after only a year. The real winners in the committee reported bill are 
the defense contractors who stand to receive billions of dollars in 
unexpected weapons buys.
  While our domestic spending accounts are being squeezed tighter and 
tighter--and while the polls are showing very clearly that with all the 
hoopla the standing in the public with the newly created Congress is 
going down and down. The people are catching on.
  So I emphasize again, Mr. President, while our domestic accounts are 
being squeezed tighter and tighter, this bill contains a Christmas list 
or unexpected gifts for home State contractors that carry staggering 
price tags: $770 million more for missile defense contracts; a $650 
million downpayment for two more DDG-51 destroyers; $1.3 billion for 
the unrequested LHD-7 assault ship; 12 more F-18's than asked for and 
the list goes on. Add in to this mix a committee initiative 
establishing a loan guarantee program for defense contractors to export 
their weapons overseas and you can understand why defense contractors 
throughout the country are popping champagne corks: Christmas has 
indeed come early.
  But the bill to the taxpayer is not complete at the committee passed 
authorization of $264.7 billion. There is a built-in cost overrun. In 
the rush to fund these and other unrequested multibillion dollar 
weapons, the committee majority did not fund the anticipated expenses 
for ongoing Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Bosnia. This 
outstanding bill, the cost of which will in the mean time come out of 
Pentagon operation accounts, will come due next year and I warn my 
colleagues to not be surprised when this $1.2 billion expense is funded 
in part by more domestic spending cuts. Ironically, this built-in cost 
overrun is nearly identical to the cost of the LHD-7 add-on. I would 
hope that the Senate will reconsider this issue during floor debate and 
decide to place the operations funding of our troops in the field 
overseas above the cost of building an unneeded naval vessel.
  While the funding priorities in this bill are questionable to say the 
least, there should be no doubt as to the design and effect of the bill 
on arms control and international relations. The defense authorization 
bill before the Senate takes aim at scuttling the ABM Treaty by 
requiring that the United
 States break out of the treaty and deploy a multiple site national 
missile defense system by 2003. Caught in the cross hairs of the 
committee's aim is the START II Treaty as well. Although this arms 
control agreement is a good deal for the United States as well as 
global security, the defense authorization bill does its best to see 
that it is killed in the cradle. That is precisely what will happen if 
the bill provision to break out of the ABM Treaty is approved. 
Ratification of START II will be blocked by the Russian Duma and the 
new alliance between our two countries will, in turn, be irreparably 
damaged, thrown into a resumption of the cold war, and still higher 
defense budgets. The bill is filled with jabs at Moscow designed to 
create distrust toward the United States and harm our new alliance. As 
if breaking out of the ABM Treaty and derailing START II Treaty 
ratification is not enough, the bill adds $30 million for a new 
antisatellite weapons program, it attacks and limits the Nunn-Lugar 
program that has been responsible for the safe and accountable 
disarming of over 2,500 former Soviet nuclear warheads, it cuts Energy 
Department nonproliferation, arms control, and verification funding, it 
recommends reconstituting our nuclear weapons manufacturing complex at 
untold billions of dollars while at the same time advocating the 
resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing. This last committee 
initiative is contrary to U.S. policy and is designed to scuttle 
ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations and any prospect of 
reaching a treaty agreement. I will have a great deal more to say about 
the issue of nuclear testing later on during the consideration of this 
bill.

  In summary, I am concerned with the tone and substance of the bill. 
The level of micromanagement placed on the Pentagon and the Department 
of Energy is unprecedented and harmful to our Nation's standing in the 
international community. Many of the committee initiatives are driven 
by a desire to defend against a superpower threat to U.S. security that 
simply does not exist. At a time when our one-time enemies are now 
allies and the world community is committed more than ever before to 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the committee bill is at odds 
with reality and in strong need of amendment before it can properly 
serve our Nation's security interests.
  At a time when American leadership in the world community is strongly 
needed, we cannot be viewed as a nation living in the past, jousting 
with imaginary dragons in order to lay claim to the mantle of being 
``strong on defense.'' We are a strong country, the preeminent military 
power in the world by far. But we must also be forward looking and 
recognize that it is in our national interest as well as in the 
interest of other nations to encourage arms control and alliances based 
on collective security. It is unfortunate that some feel more 
comfortable in an adversarial environment than in one based on 
cooperation and a lowering of superpower antagonism.
  Like a beehive, the world in 1995 has the capacity to be both 
dangerous and peaceful. If handled properly, the hive can be benign and 
capable of producing sweet honey. If agitated, however, it can become 
hostile and threatening. The defense authorization bill in its present 
form is a sharp stick ready to be jabbed into the hive. The design and 

[[Page S 11242]]
intent of the bill is to agitate the world community to the ultimate 
detriment of ourselves. This is not the time in history to rekindle the 
rhetoric of the cold war. I urge my colleagues to support amendments 
that will correct these and other self-defeating elements of this 
flawed legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana has 5 minutes.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Thank you, Mr. President.


                  Vietnam Moving Wall Opening Ceremony

  Mr. President, this morning, the Vietnam Moving Wall--the portable 
replica of the Vietnam War Memorial--came to Bozeman, MT. I would like 
to offer my thanks and congratulations to retired Col. Ron Glock and 
Jim Caird for their hard work in making it all happen, and say a few 
words in honor of this solemn occasion.
  Walls generally divide people. But this wall unites us. It unites us, 
as Montanans and Americans, in reverence and gratitude to the Americans 
who gave their lives in Vietnam.
  The Vietnam War Memorial allows people to touch the names of their 
friends and their relatives, and remember those individuals who touched 
our lives so deeply. And the Moving Wall, as it travels our country, 
allows each of us to honor their lives and their gifts, and remember 
the lessons of history.
  The young people who were born after the war--many of them now 
entering adulthood--have a chance to experience and understand the 
magnitude of a war where we lost over 50,000 Americans.
  The families and comrades in arms see their brothers, fathers, and 
friends given the honor which is their due.
  And we all learn again the lesson of the cost of war.
  So today we come together to honor and remember all those we lost in 
Vietnam, and in particular those who went off to war from Bozeman and 
Montana State and whose names we can read on the Wall today:
  David Jay Allison, Jack Herbert Anderson, Alan Frederick Ashall, 
Richard DeWyatt Clark, Air Force Capt. Charles Glendon Dudley, whose 
mother is present at the opening ceremony this morning, Glenn Charles 
Fish, James Francis Fuhrman, Raymond LeRoy Gallagher, Edward Joseph 
Hagl, Hal Kent Henderson, James D. Hunt, Lyle Albert Johnson, Ronald 
George Jordet, Patrick Joseph Magee, Ronald John Moe, Stephen Stanford 
Oviatt, Duane Kenneth Peterson, Jimmy Dee Pickle, Dean Andrew Pogreba, 
Alexander Pomeroy, Roger Paul Richardson, Anton John Schonbrich, Donald 
William Seidel, Larry Max Smith, Jerry Wayne Snyder, Arthur Lee 
Stockberger, Johnnie Bowen West- ervelt, Robert Vincent Willett, Jr., 
and Alvy Eugene Wood.
  May the Lord bless them and grant them eternal peace.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Michigan retains the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, this bill is a head-on assault on the ABM Treaty. 
There is nothing subtle about it. Unlike our existing policy which 
permits us to consider whether or not we wish to withdraw from the 
treaty at the appropriate time, if and when there is a threat and after 
we have done the research and development to see how much it would cost 
to put up a national defense and after we have gathered together the 
information that we need and the impacts that we need in order to make 
that decision on a reasonable basis, this bill decides now that it is 
the policy of the United States to pull out of the ABM Treaty. It makes 
no bones about it. The language of section 233 says:

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
     site national missile defense system.

  That is a clear breach of the ABM Treaty. Article III of the ABM 
Treaty says:

       Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems at more 
     than one site.

  The ABM Treaty has permitted us to do a number of things. First, it 
is permitting arms reduction in offensive weapons. Without the ABM 
Treaty, the Russians are not going to be reducing their offensive 
weapons, as they have agreed to in START I and we hope they will ratify 
in START II. That process is going to be ended because if they are 
going to be facing missile defenses, they are going to be increasing 
the number of offensive weapons rather than decreasing the number of 
offensive weapons.
  They have told us that. So the ABM Treaty has allowed us to do the 
most important single thing we are probably doing right now in the 
nuclear strategic world, which is to reduce the number of offensive 
nuclear weapons.
  The ABM Treaty has also allowed us to avoid a defensive arms race, 
where a defense is installed and there is a countermeasure to the 
defense, and then there is a counter-countermeasure to the defense, and 
then there is a counter-counter-counter, and on and on ad infinitum.
  But first and foremost, what is going on right now is the dramatic 
reduction of offensive arms, and we have been told by the Russians--and 
I am going to read from General Shalikashvili's letter in just a moment 
about how seriously he takes this issue--they are going to stop the 
reduction of offensive arms and forget the ratification of START II.
  That is what the stakes are in this discussion. This is not some 
theoretical discussion about defenses. This is a premature decision to 
destroy a treaty which is allowing us now as we speak to reduce the 
number of offensive weapons that threaten us, that face us, that are 
aimed at us now.
  The bill also States in section 235 that to implement the policy that 
I just read in section 233:

       The Secretary of Defense shall develop an . . . 
     operationally effective national missile defense system which 
     will attain initial operating capability by the end of the 
     year 2003.
       It shall be developed in a way which includes ground-based 
     interceptors deployed at multiple sites.

  There we go again with the multiple-site breach of the ABM Treaty. 
Section 235 also provides for an interim operational capability. It is 
all laid out very specifically as to the deployment schedule for the 
ABM system.
  Now, this is a head-on collision. This again is not like our current 
law provides, that we are going to continue to do research and 
development on nationwide defenses, on strategic missile defenses. This 
bill decides now that it is the policy to deploy such a system before 
we have done the research and development and before we have concluded 
our negotiations with the Russians in an effort to make such a 
nationwide defense system permissible under an amended treaty.
  This is not a question of interpretation. This is the head-on clash, 
this is the trashing of the ABM Treaty. This is the establishing of a 
policy now to pull out of the ABM Treaty. I cannot think of anything 
much more shortsighted than this. It is a provocative move to commit 
ourselves now to deploy an illegal national defense system, the ABM 
Treaty be damned. This is going to wreck the START treaty which was a 
landmark arms reduction treaty which was achieved by President Bush, 
and it is going to spark a buildup of offensive weapons instead of the 
reduction of offensive weapons which we have been trying to achieve.
  Now, General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, wrote me the following on June 28:

       While we believe that START II is in both countries' 
     interests regardless of other events, we must assume such 
     unilateral U.S. legislation could harm prospects for START II 
     ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader 
     security relationship with Russia as well.

  The Secretary of Defense has weighed in in strong opposition to these 
missile defense provisions saying, in a letter to Senator Nunn dated 
July 28:

       These provisions would put us on a pathway to abrogate the 
     ABM Treaty. The bill's provisions would add nothing to the 
     DOD's ability to pursue our missile defense programs and 
     would needlessly cause us to incur excess costs and serious 
     security risks.

  Secretary Perry's letter continues as follows:
       . . . certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be 
     very damaging to U.S. security interests. By mandating 
     actions that would lead us to violate or disregard U.S. 
     Treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment date of 
     a multiple-site NMD system [national missile defense 
     system]--the bill would jeopardize Russian implementation of 
     the Start I and Start II Treaties, which involve the 
     elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons.


[[Page S 11243]]

  And Secretary Perry's letter went on to say the following:

       The bill's unwarranted imposition, through funding 
     restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation 
     interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions, 
     and would raise significant international legal issues as 
     well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the 
     President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.

  And he concluded as follows in his recent letter to Senator Nunn:

       Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly 
     modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national 
     security interests of the United States.

  That is pretty strong language. Here is the Secretary of Defense, 
telling us this language, unless it is eliminated or significantly 
modified, will ``* * * threaten to undermine fundamental national 
security interests of the United States.''
  Not only would this committee decision to deploy missile defenses 
destroy a treaty which has been a cornerstone of global nuclear arms 
control for over 20 years, it would increase the threat to the United 
States by leaving more nuclear weapons pointed at us and it would, in 
addition, poison our relationship with Russia, a relationship which is 
improving and beginning to stabilize. Now, why do we want to risk that? 
Why do we want to hand the hard-liners in the Russian Duma an excuse to 
block the ratification of the Start II Treaty and resume an offensive 
arms race, instead of continuing and accelerating the dismantlement of 
nuclear strategic weapons? There is no new threat of massive nuclear 
missile attack on the continental United States requiring a decision 
now to pull out of the ABM Treaty.
  The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Clapper, 
said:

       We see no interest in or capability of any new country 
     reaching the continental United States with a long range 
     missile for at least the next decade.

  For several years, we have had a bipartisan consensus in Congress for 
continuing research on national missile defense that is consistent with 
the ABM Treaty. We have had a consensus that we should preserve the 
option to decide later to deploy a national missile defense system if 
the threat increases or if it proves financially feasible, or both. At 
the same time, we have had a national or bipartisan consensus that we 
should seek ABM Treaty understandings or changes that are mutually 
agreeable between the United States and Russia, and we should be doing 
these things simultaneously. We should be doing research and 
development of national missile defenses. We should be seeking 
understandings and modifications of the ABM Treaty while these research 
activities are continuing, and we should keep the option open when the 
time comes to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
  This bill before us breaks that bipartisan consensus, and instead 
decides now that it is the policy of the United States to trash the ABM 
Treaty and to withdraw from it. This bill commits us to meet a 
deployment program that is simply reckless because it is so 
intentionally provocative to the Russians without any military benefit 
to us because our present program is unconstrained by the ABM Treaty. 
What we are doing now in missile defense research is unconstrained by 
the treaty.
  We do not need to make this decision now to trash a treaty which is 
allowing us to reduce the number of offensive weapons that threaten us. 
That is what is so reckless about this language. It prematurely commits 
us to a course of action which we need not take now and maybe never 
need to take. We do not know that.
  We have had a bipartisan consensus to keep an option open. This wipes 
out that bipartisan consensus. Now, there is another provision in this 
bill which is threatening to our security in the eyes of Secretary 
Perry, and that is the one that sets a demarcation line between short-
range and long-range missiles. Defenses against the former are 
permitted. Defenses against the long-range missiles are not.
  What is the demarcation line? What is the range? We have been trying 
to negotiate that with the Russians as to what is the precise line 
between a short-range missile and a long-range missile. We put a 
proposal down on the table which we hope is going to be adopted. This 
bill incorporates our proposal as U.S. law.
  We, in this bill, unilaterally adopt the proposal that the 
administration is making at a negotiating session and saying they 
cannot deviate from their proposal. Now, that is a rather unusual way 
to negotiate: You are sitting down with the other side, trying to reach 
an agreement, and your Congress back there unilaterally puts into 
domestic law what your first proposal is. Now, what would we think if 
the Duma did the same thing? We say we would like a range of 3,500 
kilometers and the Duma says, unilaterally, the ABM Treaty means a 
range of 3,000 kilometers. Now, what would our reaction be? We are 
sitting at a negotiating table with the Russians, trying to figure out 
a demarcation line, and the Russians unilaterally make their own 
interpretation and make it their law, and tell their President he 
cannot deviate from that law. He cannot even sit down with the 
Americans to talk about it. He cannot even listen.
  Under this bill, the President's people are not even allowed to 
listen to a Russian proposal because that would involve the expenditure 
of funds; that is, travel funds. So you can kiss goodbye those 
negotiations. And, by the way, the language in this bill says it is the 
sense of the Senate that the President cease all negotiations for a 
year. That is just sense-of-the-Senate language. But there is the power 
of the purse that is used here to prevent the President or the 
President's people from implementing any Presidential policy relative 
to the ABM Treaty. Negotiations to set a demarcation line are over.
  Now, this is a country that has thousands of nuclear weapons that we 
have been in a cold war with, that we are trying to improve our 
relationship with, and we have had some real successes. And now we put 
one stick, two sticks, three sticks right in their eyes. For what? A 
new threat? Has our research carried us to the point where we now can 
even make a decision as to whether we can effectively and cost-
efficiently deploy such a system? We are not at that point now.
  The ABM Treaty does not constrain our research and development. That 
is why Secretary Perry said that the bill's unwarranted imposition 
through funding restrictions of a unilateral demarcation interpretation 
would jeopardize these reductions and would raise significant 
international legal issues, as well as fundamental constitutional 
issues regarding the President's authority over the conduct of foreign 
affairs.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters from General 
Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                              Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                    Washington, DC, June 28, 1995.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin. Thank you for your letter and the 
     opportunity to express my views concerning the impact of 
     Senator Warner's proposed language for the FY 1996 Defense 
     Authorization Bill on current theater missile defense (TMD) 
     programs.
       Because the Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty 
     with other arms control issues--particularly ratification of 
     START II now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would 
     deal in isolation with unilateral US legislation detailing 
     technical parameters for ABM Treaty interpretation. While we 
     believe that START II is in both countries' interests 
     regardless of other events, we must assume such unilateral US 
     legislation could harm prospect for START II ratification by 
     the Duma and probably impact our broader security 
     relationship with Russia as well.
       We are continuing to work on TMD systems. The ongoing 
     testing of THAAD through the demonstration/validation program 
     has been certified ABM Treaty complaint as has the Navy Upper 
     Tier program. Thus, progress on these programs is not 
     restricted by the lack of a demarcation agreement. We have no 
     plans and do not desire to test THAAD or other TMD systems in 
     an ABM mode.
       Even though testing and development of TMD systems is 
     underway now, we believe it is useful to continue discussions 
     with the Russians to seek resolution of the ABM/TMD issue in 
     a way which preserves our security equities. Were such 
     dialogue to be prohibited, we might eventually find ourselves 
     forced to choose between giving up elements of our TMD 
     development programs or proceeding unilaterally in a manner 
     which could undermine the ABM Treaty and our broader security 
     relationship with Russia. Either alternative would impose 
     security 

[[Page S 11244]]
     costs and risks which we are seeking to avoid.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                                                    ____

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn:  I write to register my strong 
     opposition to the missile defense provisions of the SASC's 
     Defense Authorization bill, which would institute 
     Congressional micromanagement of the Administration's missile 
     defense program and put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM 
     Treaty. The Administration is committed to respond to 
     ballistic missile threats to our forces, allies, and 
     territory. We will not permit the capability of the defenses 
     we field to meet those threats to be compromised.
       The bill's provisions would add nothing to DoD's ability to 
     pursue our missile defense programs, and would needlessly 
     cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks. 
     The bill would require the U.S. to make a decision now on 
     developing a specific national missile defense for deployment 
     by 2003, with interim operational capability in 1999, despite 
     the fact that a valid strategic missile threat has not 
     emerged. Our NMD program is designed to give us the 
     capability for a deployment decision in three years, when we 
     will be in a much better position to assess the threat and 
     deploy the most technologically advanced systems available. 
     The bill would also terminate valuable elements of our TMD 
     program, the Boost Phase Intercept and MEADS/Corps SAM 
     systems. MEADS is not only a valuable defense system but is 
     an important test of future trans-Atlantic defense 
     cooperation.
       In addition, certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty 
     would be very damaging to U.S. security interests. By 
     mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard 
     U.S. Treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment 
     date of a multiple-site NMD system--the bill would jeopardize 
     Russian implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, 
     which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic 
     nuclear weapons. The bill's unwarranted imposition, through 
     funding restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation 
     interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions, 
     and would raise significant international legal issues as 
     well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the 
     President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs. 
     These serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed 
     Senate review of the ABM Treaty before considering such 
     drastic and far-reaching measures.
       Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly 
     modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national 
     security interests of the United States. I will continue to 
     do everything possible to work with the Senate to see that 
     these priorities are not compromised.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William J. Perry.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the bill does not stop there.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I wonder if the Senator will yield for a question, or 
does he prefer to finish.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield for a question.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I have been listening with great interest 
to the Senator's comments, and I find them enormously persuasive.
  Does the Senator agree with me that these negotiations on SALT I and 
SALT II have been worked out in a very comprehensive way by Republican 
Presidents, Democratic Congresses, Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Secretaries 
of Defense? They were all negotiated not just as a way of trying to 
ease some pressure on the Soviet Union, but were negotiated because 
they were considered to be in the United States national security 
interest. It was Republicans and Democrats alike, after debate and 
discussion in the course of the hearings with the Foreign Relations 
Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and over a very difficult 
and complex period of time, as to the nature of the relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that these were put 
into place because the leaders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
leaders of our military establishment, the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Secretaries of State, Presidents of the United States--Republican in 
these instances in terms of the SALT agreements--believed that they 
were in our national security interest.
  As I understand from the Senator's excellent presentation, just by 
reviewing the particular words and phrases that are included in the 
defense authorization bill, the provisions that are included in the 
legislation, that this is effectively saying that a majority, in this 
case probably in terms of the vote, are expressing a counterview; that 
somehow they have better knowledge of the security interests and the 
nature of the nuclear threat to the American people than that long-term 
negotiating process that took place by those who were very sensitive to 
the security interests, the role of the United States and the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
  Can the Senator comment briefly on the historic context? I found very 
persuasive the particular details.
  Second, does the Senator from Michigan, if he assumes that all of 
this was done in our security interest, believe that this is an 
extraordinary action on the floor of the U.S. Senate, when we are 
having our challenge in our relationship between China and the United 
States--we recently have heard about two military officers who were 
actually arrested in China; we have the tragic circumstances around Mr. 
Wu who has been apprehended, and the human rights violations--a range 
of different challenges that we are having with one of the other great 
world powers, China?
  Our Secretary of State is involved in trying to work out at least 
some kind of modus operandi with the Chinese. As a student of history 
and as one of the leaders in the U.S. Senate on the whole issue of arms 
control policy, does the Senator from Michigan feel that we should be 
unilaterally abrogating the solemn treaty of the United States with the 
Soviet Union on nuclear weapons that will certainly, in a very 
significant way, put in serious threat our relations with the Soviet 
Union? Does this make any sense?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is right. The Secretary of State has written a 
letter to Senator Nunn dated August 2, which I also want to print in 
the Record, which addresses the questions which the Senator from 
Massachusetts has raised.
  These arms reduction treaties, starting with the ABM Treaty, which is 
limiting arms, and then going to START I and START II--START II is 
before us now, supported by the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee--these have been negotiated by Democratic and Republican 
administrations alike. These are not partisan treaties.
  President Nixon is the one who negotiated the ABM Treaty. This is a 
Republican President who strongly believed that the ABM Treaty was in 
our security interest, and I believe every single President since has 
supported keeping the ABM Treaty, modifying it at times. We have had 
protocols to it, we have had interpretations to it, but it has allowed 
us to reduce offensive arms. So it has had broad bipartisan support in 
administration after administration.
  The Secretary of State points that out when he says in his letter to 
Senator Nunn that ``successive administrations have supported the 
continued viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and 
enhance our national security.'' And the Secretary of State points out 
that these unilateral interpretations ``would immediately call into 
question the commitment to the treaty and have a negative impact on 
United States-Russian relations and on Russian implementation of the 
START I Treaty and Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.''
  The START II Treaty is going to come to the floor of the Senate one 
of these days, I understand with the support of the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, negotiated by a Republican President. It 
allows us to significantly reduce, dramatically reduce, the number of 
offensive nuclear weapons which we face.
  We are told by General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that for us 
to trash the ABM Treaty will threaten the ratification of the START II 
Treaty. It makes absolutely no sense in terms of the bipartisan 
consensus which has been put together for these treaties over the years 
and in terms of reducing the number of offensive weapons. So I agree 
with the Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator's conclusion be that should the 
violation of the ABM Treaty--and I think the Senator has made that case 
both with regard to the multiple-site issue and also for the unilateral 
declaration on the theater and strategic systems, which are in the 
process of being negotiated, and the unilateral action or statement or 
sense-of-the-Senate resolution, that as far as our chairman of our 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to 

[[Page S 11245]]
the President of the United States as well as the Secretary of State--
those who have responsibility in the nature of both defense policy in 
this area and diplomacy--that the counteraction will be an action by 
the Soviet Union which will result in more nuclear missiles being 
pointed toward the United States, there will be more nuclear missiles 
pointed to the cities in my State, there will be more nuclear missiles 
pointed to cities in the Senator's State, and that there will be less 
security in terms of the citizens of our Nation from the dangers of 
nuclear war?
  Finally, let me just ask the Senator, how does the whole Nunn-Lugar 
effort fit into this whole process? We have been involved in the very 
recent times with a bipartisan effort to try and help and assist the 
dismantling of Soviet weapons systems. For the obvious reason, as the 
Senator and others have pointed out, we believe that kind of reduction 
is in our security interest.
  There have been difficulties in terms of the expenditure of funds and 
other factors which I know that the Armed Services Committee and DOD 
are interested in. The Congress has been reviewing that effort in terms 
of trying to see further action in the dismantling of nuclear weapons.
  Does he think that this kind of unilateral action will enhance that 
whole kind of effort for further dismantlement, or does the Senator 
believe that whole effort will be undermined in a significant way as 
well?
  Mr. LEVIN. I think the Nunn-Lugar effort is totally undermined, 
because instead of being willing to dismantle weapons, which Nunn-Lugar 
helps them achieve, our best experts in the State Department, the 
Defense Department say they are going to go the other way, they are 
going to stop the dismantlement and stop the ratification of START II, 
because now they are going to be told by the U.S. Senate that it is the 
American policy to put up defenses to their weapons, and that means in 
order for whatever they have left after START II to be effective, they 
are going to have to have more, not less, in order to overcome whatever 
defense.
  This is a very threatening thing, we have to understand, to us. This 
is a threat to our security, what is going on in this bill language, 
because instead of seeing offensive weapons aimed at our States 
continuing to be reduced, the numbers of those weapons are suddenly 
going to go up instead of down. At a minimum, we are going to see the 
termination of these dramatic reductions which we have been able to 
achieve under START I and START II.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I know the Senator has further comments to make, but I 
want to ask him, as I understand the situation we are facing in the 
Soviet Union--we are facing local elections that are going to be taking 
place in the next year.
 It is also a commitment in terms of the Presidential election which is 
to take place next year--there is movement in terms of the Soviet Union 
and, as I understand it, in terms of the political process and activity 
of increasing involvement and intensity and increasing United States 
investments.

  Obviously, there are the creaking problems of a new nation finding 
itself in terms of trying to develop democratic institutions in that 
nation. Does the Senator, as someone who is a student both of the 
Soviet Union and the recent history of this time, does he think that 
this will help to stabilize the nature of the political discussion in 
the Soviet Union? As he has pointed out, the reduction of these nuclear 
arms was done because we believed they were in the security interests 
of the United States. As the Senator pointed out, if we take this 
action, that will be threatened.
  Does he believe, as well, that if the Soviet Union did this action to 
the United States, there could be a counteracting reaction here in the 
Senate and among the American people? Does he anticipate that this may 
very well have some factor and force in terms of the domestic politics 
and defense politics of the Soviet Union?
  Mr. LEVIN. This unilateral action in setting the dividing line 
between short-range and long-range missiles, which has been subject of 
the negotiations, suddenly is yanked out from those negotiations, the 
U.S. Senate usurps this and puts into American law what it believes the 
demarcation line is and prohibits the President from negotiating any 
other demarcation line. At the same time, we establish the policy of 
the United States to deploy a system which clearly violates the ABM 
Treaty.
  Doing those things will play into the hands of the most rabid, anti-
Western political forces in Russia. We are going to pay a terrible 
price, not just in having more weapons face our States, we are also 
going to pay a terrible price in terms of lending unwitting support to 
the very anti-Western forces in Russia which are creating so much 
difficulty already, not just for Russia, but for the rest of the world.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Finally, the Senator spent a great deal of time in 
recent years, along with others, in terms of the meaning of the ABM 
Treaty. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. All of us were 
enormously impressed during the 1980's and 1990's when the ABM Treaty 
issue and related issues were being reviewed as to the meaning. I think 
all of us who followed this whole issue in terms of arms control and 
the ABM Treaty are very mindful of the expertise which the Senator from 
Michigan has.
  I hope at some time during the debate that at least included in this 
record, there will be some references to that review and that study, so 
that those that may be newer Members of this body can have some 
appreciation for the extensiveness and the depth of the hearings that 
were held on the meaning and significance of the ABM Treaty, which was 
challenged and reviewed and reviewed. So that the presentation will be 
given the weight that it should have. I think some reference or 
incorporation of some past discussion of that history is important for 
the understanding of the Senators.
  I thank the Senator. I hope that our colleagues listen carefully to 
the excellent presentation. I find it absolutely persuasive. We have 
not gotten into if the Soviet Union takes corresponding action, what 
will be the corresponding action here in the United States. I think 
anybody who has followed the arms issue with the Soviet Union can 
predict that very easily and with certainty, not only with the cost but 
the instability that will be brought about.
  So I thank the Senator. I think it has been a very important 
presentation. I think, in many respects, this may very well be either 
the first or second most important vote that we will have this year. I 
hope our colleagues give it attention.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. He reminds us that 
we had a debate here, and there was an effort made by Senator Nunn and 
myself, and many others, to avoid a unilateral reinterpretation of the 
ABM Treaty during the 1980's. This Senate has had a long history in not 
undermining treaties or not undermining chief executives who are aimed 
at negotiating treaties. We have an advise-and-consent function that is 
very different from putting into American law unilateral 
interpretations and prohibiting Presidents from even negotiating 
relative to treaties.
  Senator Nunn's leadership during the 1980's on the whole ABM issue--
and the Senator from Massachusetts was correct, he was deeply involved 
in it, as well--was part of a long-time bipartisan effort, generally, 
on the part of the Senate to avoid this kind of unilateral 
interpretation of treaties being put into American law and undermining 
the executive branch in their negotiating function, as well.
  Now, Mr. President, the language in this bill, by saying that 
``appropriated funds may not be obligated or expended by any official 
for the purpose of implementing any executive policy that would apply 
the ABM Treaty to the research, development, or deployment of a missile 
defense,'' means the President and the President's representatives 
cannot even listen at a negotiation. They cannot even use travel money. 
``Appropriated funds are prohibited here from being obligated or 
expended by any official for the purpose of implementing an executive 
policy that would apply the ABM Treaty to the deployment of a missile 
defense.''
  That is section 238(b). In another subsection: ``Or from taking any 
other action to provide for the ABM Treaty to be applied to the 
deployment of the missile defense.''
  That is what the ABM Treaty is all about. 

[[Page S 11246]]

  So this language does three things. First, it unilaterally says what 
the demarcation is between short-range and long-range, and makes that 
the law of the United States. It prohibits the President of the United 
States from negotiating anything other than that. He cannot even listen 
to anything other than that.
  It does one other thing. This is some of the most, I think, extreme 
language I have read in any bill, almost on any subject that has come 
to the floor because, under this language, if there were a test that 
violated this definition of a long-range system, nobody could act to 
stop it, because it says here that ``appropriated funds may not be 
expended by any official to implement any policy that applies the U.N. 
treaty to the deployment of a missile defense.''
  What happens if you have a test here of an ABM system against a 
missile with a range of 4,000 kilometers, clearly in violation of the 
demarcation line, by this new demarcation line. Under this language, 
until the test is completed, the prohibition on the use of any funds to 
stop that test stands.
  This language says that ``unless and until there is an ABM qualifying 
flight test of a system, this prohibition stands.''
  This language goes so far as to say that even if there is going to be 
a flight test of an ABM system against a missile, with a range that 
clearly violates this unilateral declaration, that nobody can stop that 
illegal action on our part, which is admittedly illegal under this 
unilateral definition because the flight test has not occurred. Unless 
and until the flight test is completed, this restriction stands.
  The ABM Treaty cannot be used to stop a test, even if it is illegal, 
by the definition in this bill.
  Now, if we want to talk about language which is so excessive, this 
fits the test. That is what it says, what I guess is the frosting on 
the cake. What the bill provides is that we will have a commission to 
look at this whole thing. On page 61 of this bill, section 237, it says 
that the Senate should undertake

     . . . a comprehensive review of the continuing value and 
     validity of the ABM Treaty, with the intent of providing 
     additional policy guidance on the future of the ABM Treaty 
     during the second session of the 104th Congress.

  Now, in addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the ABM 
Treaty, we were are also told in subsection B we should consider 
establishing a select committee to carry out the review, and to 
recommend such additional policy guidance on future application of the 
ABM Treaty, as the select committee considers appropriate.
  Now, that is a little bit like having the hanging first, and then the 
trial. This bill says it is our policy to trash the ABM Treaty; this is 
the dividing line unilaterally; the President cannot negotiate anything 
else. But it is our policy now under this bill to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty. That is what this bill says.
  Then the same bill that says that says: But we are going to have a 
study; we are going to have a comprehensive review of the continuing 
validity of the ABM Treaty.
  We ought to have the study before we trash the treaty. Looking at the 
committee report on page 119, it says:

       The committee believes that Congress should undertake a 
     comprehensive review of the continuing value and validity of 
     the ABM Treaty, with the intent of making a well-informed and 
     carefully considered recommendation on how to proceed by the 
     end of the 104th Congress.

  That is supposed to be the purpose of this comprehensive review.
  On page 120, the majority says it is prudent--prudent--to dedicate a 
year to studying all ABM Treaty-related issues and alternatives, and 
recommends the review of the continuing value and validity--a careful 
1-year review, the report says--of the continuing value and validity of 
the ABM Treaty. Why not do the ``careful'' study before we decide to 
trash the treaty?
  If it is prudent to have a 1-year study of the ABM Treaty's value, is 
it not prudent to have the review prior to saying it is the policy of 
the U.S. Government to trash the ABM Treaty? Does not prudence dictate 
that you withhold your conclusion until after the study?
  If the purpose of our ``comprehensive careful 1-year review'' is to 
make a study of the value of the ABM Treaty, for heaven's sake, we 
should withhold the conclusions until after the study. That is not what 
this bill does. This bill says it is the policy of the United States to 
deploy a multiple-site system. That is an illegal system under the ABM 
Treaty. That is why Secretary Perry says that these serious 
consequences argue for conducting the proposed Senate review of the ABM 
Treaty before considering such a drastic and far-reaching measure. He 
underlines the word ``before.''
  It seems to me it is just absolute common sense that we do not reach 
conclusions and implement those conclusions the way this bill does, 
with initial operating capability, with a date set, 2003. There is an 
IOC of 2003 for a national missile test, an interim capability mandated 
by the bill for this system.
  We are mandating violations of a treaty when at the same time in 
another part of the bill we say we are studying the continued validity 
of that treaty. That makes no sense at all.
  Mr. President, I will be sending an amendment to the desk which 
addresses these three issues that I have just outlined. It will strike 
the words that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a 
multiple-site system, since that is directly violative of the ABM 
Treaty; we will also strike the language which sets forth in permanent 
law what the demarcation line is between long-range and short-range 
missiles, since that is the subject of negotiations; and we will also 
strike the language which prevents the President from even discussing 
any matters relative to the ABM Treaty with the Russians.
                           Amendment No. 2088

    (Purposes: (1) To strike section 233(2); (2) To strike section 
237(a)(2), which states that the President should cease all efforts to 
   clarify ABM Treaty obligations; (3) To strike Section 238, which 
establishes a unilateral interpretation of the ABM Treaty and prohibits 
                       treaty-compliance efforts)

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, at this point, I send the amendment to the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kyl). The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr. 
     Exon, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. 
     Feingold, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Biden, Mr. Moynihan, 
     Mr. Harkin, Mr. Jeffords, and Mr. Pell, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2088.

  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 52, strike out lines 20 through 25.
       On page 62, strike out lines 8 through 11.
       Beginning on page 63, strike out line 11 and all that 
     follows through page 65, line 24.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the distinguished manager of the bill on 
the majority side, Senator Thurmond, is anxious to get a time 
agreement.
  I wonder if I might inquire of the distinguished ranking member as to 
the progress we are making on that. Many Senators are working on their 
schedules. Many Senators are anxious to engage in the debate on this 
particular amendment, I think at the convenience of the Senate. And 
this means to keep this momentum that we have this morning going 
forward, I wonder if I might inquire as to this.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I think we ought to 
inquire of the Senator from Michigan as to his intentions.
  We talked about a time agreement. The Senator from Michigan informed 
me he would prefer to come to the floor and determine how many people 
wanted to speak on this amendment.
  I welcome a time agreement. I hope we can reach one. Perhaps the 
Senator from Michigan could give an indication of his feeling at this 
point.
  Mr. LEVIN. I do not have the final figure yet, but it is 
approximately--and there are a couple more Senators we must consult 
with--2\1/2\ hours on this side that will be needed so far. We think 
that is fairly close to the total, but we are not quite there yet.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is a period of time considerably 
longer than I had hoped. That would mean if this side were to require 
an equal amount, we would be 5 hours.
  Credit, perhaps, is being given on the 2\1/2\ hours for this time, so 
we are beginning as of this moment.
  Mr. LEVIN. That would be 2\1/2\ additional hours, but that is not 
quite yet the total. There are two other Senators 

[[Page S 11247]]

we have yet to hear from that we believe want to speak, and we have not 
heard how much time.
  Mr. NUNN. If I may say to my friend from Virginia, the Senator from 
Michigan made such a powerful speech on this subject, with the 
intervention of the Senator from Massachusetts, and I plan to make a 
speech on it, and I know the Senator from Nebraska plans to speak, 
perhaps by the time our colleagues hear these speeches, they will not 
feel the need to speak as long on this subject. That remains to be 
seen.
  I hope we can cut that time down. I will work with the Senator from 
Michigan. This is an important amendment. This is the heart of the bill 
in terms of the opposition to the bill. This is the heart of it.
  While I would like to accelerate this process and will work hard to 
do that, I do think that once this matter is settled one way or the 
other on this amendment, and perhaps on another amendment that may 
follow if this one fails, I think once we do that, we will begin to 
make a lot more progress on the bill.
  So, I say to my friend from Virginia and my friend from South 
Carolina, I know they want to move this bill, I will continue to work 
with them to see if we cannot reach some time agreement.
  Mr. President, I would like to be recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might say, I thank my distinguished 
colleague. It is very reassuring to hear him say we can try to reduce 
the amount of time. Because the majority leader is very anxious to have 
this bill completed, as you know, on the timetable this week. I hope we 
can reduce the amount of time.
  I see the Senator from Michigan indicating----
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if Senator Exon has a question?
  Mr. EXON. No, I was going to follow up on some of the remarks that 
had been made by the other Senators on this matter. The Senator from 
Georgia probably wishes to do the same.
  Mr. NUNN. Has the Senator from Nebraska had a chance to make a 
statement this morning?
  Mr. EXON. Yes, I got that statement made.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am going to make some remarks on the Levin 
amendment and I am going to try to cut my remarks down. I think this is 
a very important amendment. I support the amendment. I would like to 
lay out what I consider to be the defects in the bill as it now exists 
and why I think this amendment is important and why I will support the 
amendment.
  If this amendment fails I anticipate another amendment in this area.
  Mr. President, the defects in the majority's Missile Defense Act of 
1995 are simple and straightforward. First, the Missile Defense Act 
constitutes what, in law, I would call--reflecting back years ago on my 
law school courses--I would call this an anticipatory breach of the ABM 
Treaty. Only in this case, it is not a contract, as in law school. The 
bill before us proposes to breach an international treaty, the treaty 
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, now succeeded by Russia, on the limitation of the 
antiballistic missile systems known as the ABM Treaty. Thus the Missile 
Defense Act if we pass it, if it became law, puts this body on record 
as directing the United States to knowingly violate an existing 
international treaty without first seeking amendments to the treaty and 
without reference to the provisions in the treaty which permit either 
party to withdraw upon 6 months' notice.
  The ABM Treaty was entered into, not as a sacred document to be 
adhered to forever, but rather as a document that reflected the 
security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States at 
that time. I am not wedded to every word in the ABM Treaty, as I will 
review in a moment. I do believe amendments are in order. But why not 
negotiate the amendments? Why act as if there is no treaty? That is 
what this bill does.
  If we cannot negotiate the amendments, if the Russians will not budge 
after a good-faith effort, why not then consider whether to withdraw 
from the treaty under the provisions of the treaty? That is the way you 
get out of a treaty if you do not feel it is in your national security 
interests.
  The second problem with the Missile Defense Act is that this breach 
is wholly unnecessary to the conducting of the near-term missile 
defense program run by the ballistic missile defense organization. In 
other words, we are basically serving notice that the treaty is going 
to be breached and it is not getting us anything in the next fiscal 
year--nothing. There is no program in this bill that would violate the 
ABM Treaty in the next fiscal year.
  Enactment of the Missile Defense Act authorizes no activity by the 
ballistic missile defense office during fiscal year 1996 that would 
otherwise be proscribed by the ABM Treaty.
  So, what we have is we are asked to take a gratuitous poke at the eye 
of the Russians, while helping to persuade them that the United States 
Congress is bent on resurrecting what some have called star wars.
  In my view the Russians do not have the resources to compete in this 
arena in the near term. So they will certainly be frustrated, in the 
sense that they see us moving to breach the ABM Treaty when they do not 
have the resources to compete. They just simply do not have the 
finances to compete.
  But, what they do have is thousands of missiles. Not a few hundred, 
but thousands of missiles that they are supposed to dismantle under 
START I, and they already are doing that under START I, and thousands 
more missiles they are supposed to dismantle under START II, which has 
been negotiated, and signed by President Bush but is now pending 
ratification both in the Duma and here in the Senate.
  What they can do very easily is they can simply continue to target 
those thousands of missiles at the United States. That is likely to be 
their response to what they see as a breach of the ABM Treaty.
  Do we really, on the floor of the U.S. Senate, after going through 
the Reagan administration, the Bush administration, basically 
negotiating carefully arms control agreements and trying to carry them 
out, getting thousands of nuclear warheads dismantled, do we want to 
turn around and do something in this bill that is going to say to the 
Russians, in effect: We are going to break out of the ABM Treaty. Now 
whatever you do is up to you?
  I know what they are going to do. I believe I know what they are 
going to do. They do not have billions of dollars to conduct defenses 
now. They may in the future. In the future I think it is in their 
interests also to have some defenses. I think both countries ought to 
have some limited defenses against accidental launch, against any kind 
of unauthorized launch or against a Third World country that emerges as 
a threat. I think we ought to have those kind of defenses. I think the 
Russians ought to, too.
  But if we strike out unilaterally they are going to do what we would 
do if we were in their circumstances. What is that? We would not 
dismantle our strategic offensive forces. We would find a way to 
proliferate the offensive forces because those offensive forces are 
going to have defenses that they have to contend with. And, what the 
Russians would fear, as we would fear, is that the combination of going 
to a lower START level, dismantling warheads, going down to START II, 
doing that, limiting the number of warheads; then having the United 
States embarked on a breach of the ABM Treaty, saying we are clearly 
going to deploy defenses without regard to negotiation, without regard 
to amendments, without regard to the provisions of the treaty--the 
combination of those two things says to them: Limited warheads, 
defenses by the United States, possible preemptive attack. We would 
never do that. We know that. But they do not know that just like we do 
not know that about them. That is the basis of our deterrence policy. 
We do not know that and we are not going to bank on it.
  But the combination limiting the number of warheads, defenses in this 
country that basically breach the ABM Treaty, plus a preemptive attack, 
means that they would lose the ability to retaliate.
  That is paranoia. But the whole equation of deterrence for years has 

[[Page S 11248]]
  been based on both sides being somewhat paranoid. And not irrationally 
so, based on the former confrontation all over the globe.
  This breach of the ABM Treaty is wholly unnecessary. This poke in the 
eye to Russia leads to a third problem. That problem is one with 
serious, perhaps even tragic consequences. While enactment of the 
Missile Defense Act permits nothing within our own missile defense 
programs that we cannot already do in the next fiscal year, it may very 
well persuade the Russians that we have abandoned our obligations under 
the ABM Treaty.
  Perhaps the majority does not really want to do that. If so, we have 
room to work out wording that would change that impression in this 
bill. The Russians have repeatedly told us, those in the executive 
branch as well as those of us in the Senate who have met with them on 
many occasions, they have told us of the importance they attach to 
continued compliance with the ABM Treaty by both parties. And they have 
suggested if they conclude we are abandoning the ABM Treaty 
unilaterally, this would call into question Russia's continued 
compliance with their international agreements.
  Thus we may be jeopardizing START I and START II, thousands of 
warheads that would continue to be pointed at the United States, it 
will take us 10 or 12 years at best to build the defenses, yet we have 
a chance of dismantling thousands of warheads that are aimed at us.
  Which is more cost effective? Embarking on a unilateral course 
without regard to the people we entered into the treaty with? Or 
negotiating with them, and determining what we would do if negotiations 
fail?
  Why do we want to get thousands more warheads pointed at the United 
States? I do not. I do not think anybody in this body does. I do not 
think the American people do. That is the result of where we are 
heading, unless this bill is changed.
  Mr. President, it is not only the two START agreements, it is also 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. That is the treaty where the 
Russians dismantled and continue to dismantle literally thousands--they 
are moving at least thousands and thousands of tanks and other 
threatening equipment, artillery tubes under the CFE Treaty in Europe.
  They already are frustrated by that treaty. They already are making 
signs that this treaty causes them big problems. It is going to be a 
problem whether we pass this amendment or not. But, if we pass this 
amendment, it is going to be a bigger problem very quickly.
  The two START treaties, if fully entered into force, will reduce by 
three-fourths the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads in their 
arsenal--a far greater reduction of nuclear warheads potentially 
threatening the United States than any defensive system could possibly 
offer or that we have any capability of developing and paying for in 
the next 10 years. Three-fourths of the warheads are coming off under 
START I and START II.
  Do we really want to jeopardize that? The Russians have complained 
frequently about the enormous cost to them of compliance with these two 
START treaties and the CFE. But so far they are complying. We may reach 
a point where they do not. But they are so far complying. How much more 
will it cost us in our own defense budget if the START treaties go by 
the boards? Also, many Members are aware the Russians have been
 seeking relief from the limitations imposed under the CFE Treaty on 
the level of conventional forces and equipment they are permitted to 
station on their volatile southern flank. If the full Senate adopts the 
Missile Defense Act, this will give them a plausible excuse to ignore 
the CFE limits on stationing forces and equipment. To repeat, Mr. 
President, all of these serious consequences and costs may be brought 
upon us by adoption of the Senate Armed Services Committee majority's 
Missile Defense Act, which itself allows us to do no more than we 
already planned to do in the short run, unless the bill is changed.

  The fourth problem with the Missile Defense Act is that it tries 
legislatively to have it both ways: the Senate Armed Services Committee 
majority wants the ABM Treaty to go away, and legislates as though it 
had already gone away; yet they do not take the straightforward 
approach of using legal remedy. Mr. President, if the Senate believes 
adherence to the ABM Treaty is no longer in our national interest, then 
we should have availed ourselves of a straightforward and honorable 
resolution. Under article XV, paragraph 2, of the ABM Treaty, the 
United States can withdraw from the ABM Treaty, after giving 6 months 
notice to Russia. Is the Senate ready to take that step? Or will we 
adopt the language of the Missile Defense Act to squeeze past, a direct 
confrontation with the ABM Treaty, by pretending that it is not there.
  It seems to me that is the course we are on, pretending it is not 
there.
  This unwillingness to confront the ABM Treaty head-on, Mr. President, 
leads to the fifth problem with the Missile Defense Act. By ignoring 
the ABM Treaty, rather than proposing U.S. withdrawal from it, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee majority are forced to try to negate 
its effect by the following legislative device: They restrict the use 
of appropriated funds to enforce our obligations under the ABM Treaty. 
In attempting to negate the treaty in this way, Mr. President, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee majority sets up a direct 
constitutional conflict between the executive and the legislative 
branches regarding responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and 
the enforcement of this Nation's international obligations.
  Mr. President, consider what is at stake here. Should the Missile 
Defense Act approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee majority be 
enacted in the next couple of years, we stand to gain nothing, but we 
stand to lose a great deal: we could lose the agreed drawdowns of 
nuclear arsenals under START I and II; we could lose the CFE Treaty's 
constraints on Russian conventional force deployments near troubled 
areas.
  Now, some in the Senate Armed Service Committee majority will argue 
that the Missile Defense Act does not really breach the ABM Treaty, 
because only some subsequent testing or deployment action would 
technically place us in violation of the treaty.
  They will argue this by saying that only some subsequent testing or 
deployment would technically place us in violation of the treaty.
  Mr. President, this is too clever by one-half. If the Russian 
Republic were to announce tomorrow that it no longer intended to meet 
the timetable for reduction of nuclear systems under the START I 
Treaty, that it was not going to renegotiate them, that it simply was 
going to move forward as if START I did not exist, and that there was 
nothing we could do about it, would the Senate Armed Services Committee 
come to the Senate floor to calmly inform us that this is not a breach 
of their obligations under the treaty? Would they argue that the START 
I Treaty can only be breached once the deadline for implementing 
reductions is past? Or would they say instead, as I think would be the 
case, breach is inevitable, and based on what the Russians have told 
us, we should now move to prepare for this breach and take the 
necessary security precautions?
  I think that the majority--and I would be in that majority--would say 
let us assume that they are going to do what they say they are going to 
do; they are going to breach the treaty, and we had better start 
recognizing that.
  To recap, Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee's 
Missile Defense Act provision has major problems: First, it abandons 
United States adherence to the ABM Treaty; second, abandoning adherence 
now is unnecessary--we can conduct an effective missile defense program 
in the near-term while continuing adherence; third, abandoning 
adherence now is likely to impose huge costs on us, if Russia declines 
to carry out some of its legal obligations in response to our breach; 
fourth, the Senate Armed Services Committee bill abandons adherence by 
stealth, rather directing the administration to use the legal 
withdrawal procedures contained in the treaty; and fifth, by failing to 
use the legal option, the Senate is forced to try to compel the 
executive branch to abandon adherence by usurping certain powers of the 


[[Page S 11249]]
executive branch over the conduct of foreign policy, a move that raises 
serious constitutional issues, and
 could lead to this act never becoming law even if it passed as is.

  Mr. President, I do not want any Senator to misconstrue my message 
regarding the ABM Treaty, and I am sure there will be people on this 
side who will not listen to the latter part of this message. I am not a 
diehard supporter of the ABM Treaty as some sacred document that cannot 
be changed. I think that would be a mistake in view of this treaty. 
Circumstances change. The circumstances surrounding the treaty's 
establishment have changed significantly since it was entered into in 
the early 1970's. Therefore, either the treaty itself must be changed 
to reflect the new realities, or the Congress and the President must at 
some point make the decision that the treaty's usefulness has ended and 
exercise our legal right to withdraw from the treaty.
  The ABM Treaty condition contains provisions for renegotiation; 
indeed, that is precisely what the Clinton administration has been 
trying to do at Geneva, and they really need the backing of Congress to 
do that. Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion that the treaty cannot 
be amended by mutual agreement to allow us to deploy the missile 
defenses we consider necessary to meet our national security 
requirements. But Russia must understand that these negotiations must 
make progress and that the time period available for negotiations is 
not infinite. It is finite.
  I think that message needs to go forth to the Russians clearly. It 
would be useful if it went forth in a united way from both the 
administration and from the Congress. But we will not have any united 
message because we are going to be too busy deciding whether there is 
an anticipatory breach by ignoring any negotiations and by ignoring the 
treaty itself.
  Mr. President, I intend to vote in favor of the amendment by the 
Senator from Michigan; I hope it is successful. If it fails to pass, I 
believe the Senate then will face a major dilemma. I believe that, 
unless the problems I have outlined above are dealt with, this bill 
faces a bleak future. The administration is already on record that the 
House version of the Missile Defense Act is unacceptable, as is the 
provision in this bill as passed by the committee.
  Thus, the prospects for an outcome in conference that will become law 
are indeed bleak unless we make some fundamental changes.
  The Senator from Michigan seeks to correct the flaws by striking 
whole sections. If this approach is shown to be unacceptable to a 
majority of Senators present and voting, then the only remaining 
possibility will be to try to modify the language. And I will certainly 
have an amendment to do that after we decide what happens on this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have worked for many years with my 
distinguished colleague from Georgia, and more often than not we have 
had a joinder of views and positions. But on this we are strong 
opponents.
  I was the author of a number of provisions in this bill which are the 
subject of the strike of my good friend, the Senator from Michigan.
  I vigorously oppose the Senator's amendment.
  Mr. President, it is my understanding the administration is 
orchestrating a full court press to defeat the Missile Defense Act of 
1995 and in particular section 238 of that act which was known as the 
Warner amendment during our markup.
  I was the author of the previous Missile Defense Act, and the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995 builds on the act that was put in in I believe 
1991.
  Therefore, it seems to me that it is a logical sequence of 
legislative steps by the Congress to build on the foundation that we 
laid in 1991.
  I have tried for many years together with a number of my colleagues 
through many, many legislative initiatives to ensure that the men and 
women of the Armed Forces are not once again sent into harm's way 
unless they are provided with the most effective defenses that not only 
we can buy with the dollars but that we can devise with the brains. I 
wish to emphasize that--devise with the brains.
  My basic premise is that successive administrations have used the ABM 
Treaty as a means to limit the use of the intellectual capacity of the 
United States to develop the most efficient, the most cost-effective 
and the most technically sound and reliable systems for the defense 
against short-range ballistic missiles.
  We failed in many respects during the gulf war. The crude Scud 
missile was utilized by the Iraqi military forces not only against the 
coalition of allied military forces but against the innocent people, 
the defenseless people of Tel Aviv.
  Israel was not a combatant in the gulf war, yet Saddam Hussein rained 
down upon those innocent people the Scud missile, not for military 
purposes but solely for terrorist purposes.
  Here we are some several years later still wrestling with the 
fundamental question: Are we going to unleash the full magnitude of the 
brains of this Nation, working with other nations, and in particular 
Israel, to devise the finest and most technically capable system to 
defend against the short-range missile?
  That is what this is all about--that is that section of the strike 
that goes to the Missile Defense Act of 1995.
  Over 30 nations now have short-range ballistic missiles--30 nations. 
Talk about the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is between the United States 
of America and the former Soviet Union. And at that time in 1972 there 
was not even on a drawing board, so far as anybody can recall, an idea 
about a short-range system. Today, there are 30 nations with some 
measure of capability, and yet we are sitting here dealing with this 
archaic act, treaty, whatever you wish to call it, saying that it 
should stand there as a guardian against the ability of this country to 
devise our best systems.
  Seventy-seven nations have cruise missiles, the flat trajectory. Many 
of the systems that we are looking at now to deter the ballistic 
missile also have a technical capability of being adapted to defend 
against the cruise missile.
  As the gulf war demonstrated, the threat such missiles pose to the 
men and women of the Armed Forces is real, immediate, and growing. At 
this very moment and while we are debating this issue, all across the 
world are men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces on watch as a means to 
deter against attack, many of them within the range of the short-range 
ballistic systems posed as a threat by these 30 nations.
  How many recall the incident in the gulf war which resulted in the 
largest number of American casualties? It was a single Scud missile 
that landed on a barracks killing and wounding the greatest number of 
Americans during that war.
  Are we to say to the American people, particularly the mothers and 
fathers, the uncles and aunts, the loved ones of those on duty in 
places throughout the world today that this could happen once again 
because the United States will not unleash its full brain power to 
devise the best system to defend against that type of weapon?
  If you look at the balance between the launch pad of a short-range 
system, that is fairly elementary. You can cobble that together. We 
know that from the crude Scud missile system. You can put it together. 
But the defense, the interceptor, the electronics needed to bring that 
missile into the bore sight of some weapon, that is many times more 
costly than the launch system. But we are going to stand here, if I 
listened correctly to the proponents of this amendment and once again 
go back to a treaty of 1972 and allow it to stand, stand there and 
block the full resources, mental and dollarwise of this great Nation to 
prevent another incident like we experienced in the gulf.
  In the judgment of this Senator, we must accelerate the development 
and deployment of highly effective land- and sea-based theater missile 
systems to protect our troops, defenses that are not artificially or 
wrongfully limited, constrained by this ABM Treaty.
  Therefore, Mr. President, it was in April of this year that I 
introduced an amendment along with dozens of cosponsors to clearly 
establish a policy for the United States of America which states that 
the ABM Treaty does not apply to short-range theater ballistic systems. 


[[Page S 11250]]

  In effect, this legislation is intended to prevent the Clinton 
administration from making the ABM Treaty in effect a TMD treaty. That 
is what is underway and has been underway for some several years, to 
take this 1972 treaty and somehow wrap it around the short-range 
system. Despite administration claims that this provision is 
unconstitutional, I carefully chose the congressional power of the 
purse as the vehicle to get congressional views on the issue of ABM-TMD 
demarcation, to take those into consideration.
  Contrary to the assertion of its critics, this provision does not 
prohibit negotiations with the Russians. I listened to this this 
morning. I cannot believe it. That is a weak reed to walk out on, I say 
to the proponents of the Levin amendment, a very weak reed to walk out 
on.
  Instead, the provision would in effect prohibit the implementation of 
any resulting agreement which would have the effect of making the ABM 
Treaty a TMD treaty. That was the purpose of my legislation. I have 
tried in the past, and many others have tried, but to no avail to 
ensure that the Senate of the United States would be involved in 
decisions the administration might make in the demarcation 
negotiations.
  Last year, I sponsored legislation requiring that any international 
agreement entered into by the President that would substantially modify 
the ABM Treaty be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent 
pursuant to our constitutional authority on treaties.
  Despite that legal requirement, it became clear to me during the 
administration briefings on the demarcation issue--and I will say to 
their credit, particularly to a former Senate Armed Services staff 
assistant, Robert Bell, there has been considerable consultation on 
this demarcation series of negotiations, but we have not been able to 
present what I regard as a convincing argument.
  I repeat, despite that legal requirement of last year, it became 
clear to many of us here in the Senate during these briefings on the 
demarcation that the administration had no intention of submitting any 
demarcation to the U.S. Senate, no intention, despite the fact that the 
administration's negotiating position would result in an international 
agreement that would impose major new limitations on the United States.
  Therefore, many of us saw the need to act, and act we did. And as a 
consequence, we have before us today a bill that will give this country 
needed protections. Regrettably, one of our colleagues, joined by 
others, is wishing to strike that provision.
  Mr. President, the ABM Treaty was never intended to limit or restrict 
theater missile defense systems. That is clear. The administration, in 
a sense, concedes the point. In addition, I had the opportunity to 
discuss this issue with two individuals who were intimately involved in 
the ABM Treaty negotiations at that period of time, 1972. I was 
privileged to be the Secretary of the U.S. Navy and was in Moscow 
primarily for the purpose of the Incidents of the Sea Agreement with 
the delegation that signed the ABM Treaty. These were persons that I 
had worked with for some several years prior thereto in the Department 
of Defense. The ABM Treaty was not a matter primarily in any respect 
under the jurisdiction of the military departments. But nevertheless, 
the military departments, including, of course, the Navy Department, 
had access to the negotiations, the papers, and were asked from time to 
time for views on this issue.
  So I do have a contemporary recollection firsthand of this period of 
time in history. And I went back and talked with my former colleague, 
Dr. John Foster, who at that time was the head of the research and 
development section in the Department of Defense, an eminent scholar, 
mathematician, physicist. And he reassured me that the issue of short-
range systems was not a product in any respect of the treaty. I 
likewise talked to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was 
the National Security Adviser during that period of time. And he also 
reaffirmed just a short time ago that theater missiles were never 
contemplated during the ABM Treaty negotiations.
  Specifically, according to Dr. Kissinger, the focus of the 
negotiation was on defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles 
because they were the only systems that were then in existence. 
Unfortunately, the administration appears intent on concluding an 
agreement with the Russians that would severely limit the technological 
development and deployment of United States theater missile defense 
systems, an agreement that would transform the ABM Treaty, in my 
judgment, into a TMD treaty.
  These are examples of what the administration has been doing, is 
table proposals; that is, put on the table for discussion with the 
Russians, proposals that would accept performance limitations on the 
TMD systems. The ABM Treaty does not even impose performance 
limitations on the strategic systems.
  Second, the administration initially accepted a Russian proposal to 
prohibit deployment of the Navy upper-tier system, a system that was 
subsequently deemed to be treaty compliant by the administration. 
Initially they put that on the table as a proposal.
  The negotiations clearly then and indeed now are headed in the wrong 
direction. In my view, it is time for the Congress to act to pave the 
way for the development of the most capable, most cost-effective 
theater missile defense system to protect the lives of the men and 
women of our Armed Forces. My legislation does just that. It would 
prohibit the obligation or expenditure of any funds by any official of 
the Federal Government for the purposes of prescribing, enforcing or 
implementing any Executive order, regulation or policy that would apply 
the ABM Treaty or any limitation or obligation under such treaty to 
research, development, testing or deployment of a theater missile 
defense system, upgrade or component. The standard which I have used in 
this legislation to define the demarcation line between antiballistic 
missile defenses are limited by the ABM Treaty.
  Let me repeat that. The standard which was used in this legislation 
and adopted by the Senate Armed Services Committee to define the 
demarcation line between antiballistic missile defenses which are 
limited by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses which are not so 
limited by the treaty, is the one, the very one used by the 
administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations in 
November 1993. That is, a missile defense system which is covered by 
the ABM Treaty is defined as a missile defense system that has been 
field tested against a ballistic missile with, one, a range of more 
than 3,500 kilometers, or, two, a maximum velocity of more than 5 
kilometers per second.
  Put simply, if a missile defense system does not have a demonstrated 
field-tested capability to counter intercontinental ballistic systems, 
it should not be limited in any way by the ABM Treaty. Without this 
legislation, Mr. President--I acknowledge that the current occupant of 
the chair was a most valuable participant in drawing up this 
legislation--without this legislation, Mr. President, the Senate will 
have no role to play in an international agreement which will impose 
major new obligations and restrictions on the military capabilities of 
the United States. This is an issue which is vital to our national 
security and which can be ignored no longer.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. Two sentences, and then I will be happy to yield. We 
will no doubt debate this issue at length, as we are doing right now. 
And I welcome the debate, and I urge all to support those who seek to 
defeat the amendment by our distinguished colleague from Michigan.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. I cannot speak for the Senator from Michigan. Of course, he 
is on the floor to speak for himself.
  What I hear the Senator from Virginia say is his main purpose is to 
protect the theater missile defense systems and to have a demarcation 
point of definition between those systems and the strategic systems 
that would be affected by the ABM Treaty. Assuming that is the 
Senator's main objective, it seems to me we can reach some agreement on 
this because that is not the language that gives me the problem. I do 
not think it is the language 

[[Page S 11251]]
that gives the Senator from Michigan the problem. It is all language 
that basically states we are going to deploy national missile defenses 
with multiple sites without any negotiation and without any regard to 
the ABM Treaty, which has nothing to do with theater missiles. That is 
all strategic and it is all clearly involved with the ABM Treaty.
  But if the Senator's main goal is to protect the theater missile 
defense system and have a demarcation more than a definition, as long 
as there is some flexibility for the administration so that there is 
not an absolute ruling out of any administration efforts--because 
somebody has got to negotiate this demarcation point no matter what we 
say--if that is the Senator's goal, I agree with him on the demarcation 
point. I think that is a very sensible point. If that is the Senator's 
goal, then there is no reason we cannot find a way, whatever happens on 
the Levin amendment, to deal with this language,
 because that is not the language we are trying to take out of this 
bill.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in reply, that is encouraging to hear the 
views from my distinguished colleague. The Levin amendment, 
nevertheless, strikes the Missile Defense Act of 1995, which in turn 
incorporated in the committee markup the Warner provision, which I have 
just addressed.
  Do I understand that there is some thought about amending the Levin 
amendment to----
  Mr. LEVIN. No.
  Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator from Michigan stated----
  Mr. LEVIN. I want to go through the language of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and apologize for jumping in without 
being recognized.
  My amendment strikes the language in the bill which commits us to 
deploy a system which clearly violates the ABM Treaty. It leaves the 
language about deploying as soon as possible highly effective theater 
missile defenses. That is in the bill. It is left in the bill. I was 
surprised to hear the Senator from Virginia say the issue here is 
whether we want to deploy theater missile defenses. Boy, that is not 
the language we are after. We left that language in there.
  Section 233 says:

       It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) deploy as soon as possible highly effective theater 
     missile defenses capable of countering existing and emerging 
     theater ballistic missiles;

  We did not touch that. It is the next paragraph we touched. The next 
paragraph says it is the policy of the United States:

       (2) deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system. 
     . .

  Which I am absolutely confident my friend from Virginia will agree 
that a multiple-site national missile defense system is inconsistent 
with the ABM Treaty, just as I concede that the ABM Treaty does not 
prohibit theater missile defenses. It does not and we should proceed to 
deploy those, and we are.
  By the way, General Shalikashvili says the ABM Treaty does not 
constrain our development of theater missile defenses. He said in his 
letter to me ``the progress on these programs''--referring to theater 
missile defenses--``is not restricted by a lack of a demarcation 
agreement.''
  Just as I would be the first to concede, indeed proclaim, that the 
ABM Treaty does not restrict theater missile defenses, I hope my friend 
from Virginia will agree that his language in section 233(2) that it is 
a policy to deploy a multiple-site national defense system that would 
violate the treaty unless the treaty were amended. We are seeking to 
try to amend this treaty. Yes, theater missile defenses are not 
constrained by the ABM Treaty, nor should they be, nor are they. But it 
is the language in subparagraph (2) that makes it the policy to deploy 
a multiple-site national defense system which clearly violates the ABM 
Treaty, which is the first target of the amendment.
  So we leave in the theater defense language in subparagraph (1). We 
do not touch that.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator address section 238?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
  Mr. WARNER. That is the provision of the Senator from Virginia, and 
that is subject to the strike.
  Mr. LEVIN. It is the bill that I am addressing in three different 
places. In section 238----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is the subject of the amendment of 
the Senator from Virginia and the subject I just covered in my floor 
remarks. Looking at the Senator's amendment at the desk, in section 3, 
it says ``to strike section 238 which establishes a unilateral 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty and prohibits treaty compliance 
efforts.''
  Mr. LEVIN. Section 238 does establish the dividing line between long-
range and short-range missiles. It does it unilaterally, it does it in 
law. The reason that that is inappropriate is these are the subject of 
negotiations now, should be the subject of negotiations. If the Duma 
established a range of 4,000 kilometers for a short-range missile, I 
think the Senator from Virginia would be on his feet saying, ``What, 
the Russian legislative body is unilaterally determining what is a 
short-range system and they said 4,000 kilometers? What is going on? We 
thought this was the subject of negotiations, this is bad faith. You 
have a Russian legislative body unilaterally saying 4,000 kilometers?''
  Yes, we should not be establishing in law--in law--the demarcation 
line between the two when two things are true: One is the subject of 
ongoing negotiations and two, and this is critically important, is that 
General Shalikashvili told us that the absence of a demarcation line, 
having been agreed to, is not a constraint on the research and 
development of the theater missiles that we all support. In other 
words, it is not constraining us. So for us to prematurely, 
unilaterally have the Congress say this is the demarcation line between 
long-range and short-range does great mischief in terms of reaching an 
agreement with the Russians on a bilateral basis and militarily does 
not achieve anything for us because the absence of a demarcation line 
is not constraining the research and development of theater missiles.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question 
and observation?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think it is important, and I state this 
only for my own view and the Senator from Michigan can respond. There 
is a difference in making a finding and saying that this is where the 
Congress thinks the demarcation line ought to be and passing a line 
saying this is the way it is. Passing a law knocks out the executive 
branch of Government, if they sign the law and if it is constitutional, 
in any kind of negotiation. So you do not even have the ability under 
this bill, the way I read it now, for the President to say to the 
Russians or his Ambassador to say to the Russians, this is what the 
Senate passed. I believe the bill is so sweeping in its denial of 
executive authority to have any negotiations on this point that I do 
not think they would be able to inform the Russian Duma or the Russian 
leadership, Yeltsin and others, as to what the Senate did.
  If the Senator wants to say this is where we think the line ought to 
be, and this is what we believe the administration ought to negotiate 
with the Russians, and this is what we think the Russians ought to 
accept, or these are the sensible findings we make, that would be a 
totally different matter. It is when you put it in law so it knocks out 
not only the Russians from having any say whatsoever in it, no 
negotiations, no say, no response, it knocks out even the President and 
the executive branch.
  First of all, I do not think this will become law, but if it does, 
you will have almost an absurd situation. In fact, there is some 
language in here that is so broad that it might be interpreted if this 
became law to preclude the U.S. Senate from even debating it again. It 
says no Federal official. We are Federal officials, last time I got my 
paycheck. We are included in that, too. We cannot even talk about it 
once it is passed.
  I think the Senator's language goes much further than the Senator's 
intent. That is what I think we need to work on, and if we can make 
findings on demarcation and urge the President forward and urge him to 
take this position, then I believe we can reach some 

[[Page S 11252]]
consensus. It is the law part of it that bothers me.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may reply----
  Mr. NUNN. I believe I was to ask a question. That is a question mark 
at the end.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Chair observes the Senator 
from Michigan has the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia to 
answer the question without losing my right to the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. The three of us who are now engaged in debate and, 
indeed, the occupant of the chair and others have been in the briefings 
on the negotiations of this demarcation issue.
  As I said in my remarks, it was the fear that the administration 
would not come back to the U.S. Senate for ``advise and consent'' that 
has required this Senator and others to take this action. We cannot sit 
here knowingly, allowing the administration to go forth with a 
demarcation which would, in our collective judgment, not be in the best 
interest of this country, and the only way we would have a means to 
express that would be through the advice-and-consent procedure.
 And the administration, very forthrightly, said they would not bring 
it back. And that is the reason we acted.

  Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield to me for 1 minute?
  Mr. LEVIN. Yes.
  Mr. KYL. I want to add to the comments of the Senator from Virginia 
that at least some of us on this side have sent no fewer than five 
letters to the President on this subject asking to be consulted and 
advised, suggesting that the administration, frankly, was going too far 
in these discussions with the Russians and asked him not to do so.
  As the Senator from Virginia just noted, one of the reasons for 
finally putting the language in the bill is that our entreaties have 
gone unheeded, the administration has gone forward. This is apparently 
the only way we can get their attention. We had 50 Senators, all 
Republicans, urging the administration not to go forward, and they did 
so anyway. That is the reason for finally acting in a legislative way.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. As the Senator from Georgia said, it is very different to 
give a recommendation to the President, which is one thing. To put into 
law what we believe the demarcation line is unilaterally, saying that 
the President cannot deviate from it, and he cannot negotiate even an 
improvement from our perspective. By the way, this language even goes 
beyond that. This language literally, when you read it, would prevent 
an official of the United States from stopping a test which violates 
this demarcation line by its own terms. In other words, let us assume 
that we were testing an ABM system against a missile that had a range 
of 4,000 kilometers. This language says that until it is flight tested, 
this prohibition is in place. That is what the language says. The 
Senator from Virginia and I have worked a long time on lots of bills 
together. But this language violates common sense because you could not 
even stop a test from occurring, which, by the terms of this bill, 
violates the ABM Treaty. That is how extreme this language is.
  I yield the floor at this point.
  Mr. WARNER. I will be very brief. The Senator from Michigan put in a 
letter of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili. I 
wish to put in the Record at this point in our colloquy my reply to 
General Shalikashvili and in the spirit of total fairness, again his 
reply back to my letter. Clearly, we disagree.
  I would like to read one paragraph to the Senator. I said to the 
general:

       Unfortunately, that is exactly what is happening. Our 
     ongoing TMD efforts--in particular THAAD and Navy Upper 
     Tier--have been artificially limited by ABM Treaty 
     considerations. For example, neither system has been allowed 
     to incorporate space-based sensors because of concerns that 
     the use of such sensors would not be ABM Treaty-compliant. 
     This despite the fact that all of the military experts with 
     whom I have consulted have assured me that we could develop 
     and deploy more cost-effective and technically capable TMD 
     systems if such systems incorporated space-based elements.

  Mr. President, that is it, clear and simple. It is right there.
  I ask unanimous consent to have those letters printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, July 18, 1995.
     Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA,
     Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your June 28 
     letter to Senator Levin concerning the impact of the ``Warner 
     Amendment,'' which prohibits the application of the ABM 
     Treaty to U.S. theater missile defense systems.
       I introduced this amendment in April with only one goal in 
     mind--to rapidly provide the brave men and women of the Armed 
     Forces with the most technically advanced, cost-effective 
     theater missile defense systems which the United States is 
     capable of producing. As you well know, over 30 nations 
     currently possess short-range ballistic missiles. The Gulf 
     War demonstrated that such missiles pose a threat to our 
     troops which is real, immediate and growing.
       In my view, work on defenses against these missiles should 
     not in any way be constrained by restrictive and erroneous 
     interpretations of the ABM Treaty--a Treaty which was never 
     intended to limit or restrict theater missile defenses.
       I was there, General, in Moscow in May 1972 when this 
     Treaty was signed. Further, as Secretary of the Navy, I knew 
     and had access to the people conducting the negotiations and 
     preparing the working papers for those negotiations. I have 
     since--recently--spoken with some of thee people to confirm 
     that short-range systems were not the subject of their work. 
     The ABM Treaty was intended only to apply to strategic, long-
     range systems. It should not now be stretched to cover the 
     short-range, or theater, systems.
       Unfortunately, that is exactly what is happening. Our on-
     going TMD efforts--in particular THAAD and Navy Upper Tier--
     have
      been artificially limited by ABM Treaty considerations. For 
     example, neither system has been allowed to incorporate 
     space-based sensors because of concerns that the use of 
     such sensors would not be Treaty-compliant. This despite 
     the fact that all of the military experts with whom I have 
     consulted have assured me that we could develop and deploy 
     more cost-effective and technically capable TMD systems if 
     such systems incorporated space-based elements. And I 
     might add that this is not a new problem. This course was 
     followed by previous administrations as well as the 
     current one.
       My amendment establishes a clear demarcation line between 
     anti-ballistic missile defenses which are limited by the ABM 
     Treaty, and theater missile defenses which are not. The 
     demarcation standard which I selected for my amendment is the 
     one used by the Clinton Administration at the beginning of 
     the demarcation talks in November 1993, and one that was 
     accepted by the Russians at that time. It is a standard 
     which, to my knowledge, has not been disputed by either party 
     to the negotiations.
       Contrary to the assertion in your letter, my amendment does 
     not prohibit the Administration from conducting demarcation 
     negotiations with the Russians. Instead, the amendment would, 
     in effect, prohibit the implementation of any agreement which 
     might result from those negotiations which would have the 
     effect of making the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty. To remain on 
     solid Constitutional grounds, I carefully chose the Congress' 
     power of the purse as the vehicle to ensure that 
     Congressional views on this issue are taken into 
     consideration.
       I, and many of my colleagues, have grave reservations about 
     the direction the Administration has been pursuing in the 
     demarcation talks with Russia. It appears that the 
     Administration is intent on concluding an agreement with the 
     Russians that would severely limit the technological 
     development and deployment of a U.S. theater missile defense 
     system. For example, reportedly over the objections of senior 
     military
      officers, the Administration earlier this year tabled a 
     proposal which would impose performance limitations on our 
     theater missile defense systems, and accepted a Russian 
     proposal to prohibit the deployment of the Navy Upper Tier 
     system--a system that was subsequently deemed to be 
     Treaty-compliant by the DoD. The negotiations are clearly 
     headed in the wrong direction. A change of course is in 
     order.
       Your letter mentioned the potential impact my amendment 
     might have on Russian ratification of START II. I might point 
     out that START II Treaty ratification by the Russian Duma is 
     in doubt for reasons having nothing to do with the ABM Treaty 
     or U.S. theater missile defense efforts. Put simply, many 
     Russians do not want to give up their multiple warhead ICBMs, 
     as called for under START II. We must not hold our TMD 
     efforts hostage to Russian threats concerning START II 
     ratification, or any other issue.
       While I share your desire to maintain a good security 
     relationship with the Russians, I am not willing to sacrifice 
     vital and legitimate U.S. defense efforts in the interest of 
     that security relationship.
       I think you would agree with me that our goal should be to 
     provide our troops with the best defenses that our technical 
     experts are capable of producing. I believe that my amendment 
     advances that goal.
       Thank you for your attention.
           Sincerely,
     John Warner.
                                                                    ____


[[Page S 11253]]

                                                     The Chairman,


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                   Washington, DC, August 2, 1995.
     Hon. John Warner,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Warner: Thank you for your letter and strong 
     support of efforts to protect US troops from the theater 
     missile threat. The explanation and clarification of the 
     intent and effect of your amendment are sincerely 
     appreciated.
       Since the beginning of the demarcation discussions, the 
     first priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been 
     protecting US troops. I share the view that the ABM Treaty 
     was never intended to limit theater missile defenses, and 
     agreed to an initial demarcation approach to the Russians 
     based on the standard specified in your amendment. As you 
     note, the Russians appeared to accept the limiting parameters 
     of 3500 km and 5 km/sec for testing against theater ballistic 
     missiles, but pushed for interceptor performance limits as 
     well.
       In June 1994, in an effort to each early, acceptable 
     demarcation agreement, some limits on interceptor velocity 
     were proposed by the United States. As negotiations 
     progressed, a subsequent proposal for an interim agreement 
     which would have deferred some unresolved issues--such as 
     deployment of Navy Upper Tier--was also proposed. The 
     Russians rejected both US approaches.
       The May 1995 Joint Summit Statement was an effort to move 
     the negotiations away from technical parameters back to a set 
     of principles which would preserve both the ABM Treaty and 
     our ability to test and deploy needed theater missile 
     defenses. The latest US negotiating position was based on 
     that joint statement and was intended as just the sort of 
     ``change of course'' you suggest.
       The Chiefs and I have been fully involved in developing US 
     positions and have never lost sight of our first 
     responsibility to protect US forces. We are unanimous in our 
     commitment to develop and field highly capable theater 
     missile defense systems. While cueing from space-based 
     sensors has yet to be incorporated into those systems, this 
     is currently in our plans.
       With regard to broader security issues, the linkage between 
     the ABM Treaty and START II has been stressed repeatedly by 
     the Russians with US military representatives in many fora, 
     including discussions with members of the Duma. While there 
     are, of course, other factors at play in the Duma 
     considerations, one must assume that unilateral US 
     legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification 
     and probably impact our broader security relationship as 
     well.
       In closing, the priority goal has been to provide the US 
     Armed Forces with best defenses technical experts are capable 
     of producing. But we also seek to reconcile requirements for 
     protection from theater ballistic missiles with further 
     strengthening of the framework of strategic stability, 
     including strategic arms reduction and the ABM Treaty. We are 
     working to achieve both these goals.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
                            Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment to 
strike the missile defense provisions in the bill, because, if passed 
as is, I think this language will greatly complicate the work of our 
military and of our diplomats in the years ahead. I have been 
interested to hear that one of the reasons we have this in the bill, 
apparently, is because we have sent a number of letters, or some 
Members have sent a number of letters to the President, and did not get 
a response. They either got no response or one they did not like, so 
they decided to put it in legislation.
  I can only say that I think taking that kind of action, when the 
leadership, in negotiating treaties and in seeing they are adhered to, 
is a function of the executive branch, does not ring very strongly with 
me, because I can remember--I could probably go back to the files and 
bring out a dozen or more letters I wrote during the Reagan 
administration, during those 8 years and during the 4 years of the Bush 
administration, and I may have gotten responses to some of those but 
certainly not to all of them. That did not mean to me that I took over 
what the constitutional powers of the President are and put into law 
things that would have tried to put my view into law, as opposed to 
what treaty requirements were or what treaties had been negotiated.
  I say further that I think we are, obviously, talking a lot here 
about the demarcation between theater missile defense and national 
missile defense. That is a legitimate thing to try and work out. But to 
take over and unilaterally on the part of the Congress define language 
that would change the ABM Treaty or have that potential, I think, is 
wrong. I think we have to tread very carefully when we do that.
  I think this could possibly harm our efforts to proceed with nuclear 
arms reduction, not just with Russia, when we try and negotiate these 
things with China, Britain, and France. It will raise new threats to 
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially its cornerstone, 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT. It could establish an 
extremely undesirable new method for unilaterally reinterpreting 
treaties, thus setting up a precedent that will obviously be used 
against us in the years ahead.
  I think it could establish programs that would cost us a fortune. It 
could divert money from military needs that are, in my opinion, much 
more vital to the country and ultimately leave America substantially no 
safer as a result. It tramples on the President's constitutional 
responsibilities as Commander in Chief and as the individual in charge 
of American foreign policy. In short, I think this would be a very bad 
mistake for this country.
  I would like to begin with a few comments about the general level of 
partisanship that we have seen from the proponents of these provisions 
on the ABM Treaty. I hasten to add that I think missile defense should 
not be a partisan affair. All Americans understand that (a), the 
national interest may require the deployment of U.S. forces in unstable 
areas around the world. This bill contains some very undesirable 
features, I feel, that, if enacted, could greatly complicate the work 
of our military and our diplomats in the years ahead.
  Let me talk about ballistic missile defense. So (a), the national 
interest may require deployment of U.S. forces in unstable regions 
around the world; and (b), these forces may be the targets of missile 
attacks, including missiles delivering weapons of mass destruction; and 
(c), such forces must be protected. That is something I am sure we can 
all agree on.
  Now, though the committee has approved many of the administration's 
requested theater missile defense projects, the majority's refusal to 
yield on several controversial proposals dealing with key missile 
defense issues gives these proposals the quality of partisan ultimata 
rather than a sound foundation for policy. In other words, it is either 
or else.
  Similarly, the bill's heavy emphasis on investing in expensive 
hardware for missile defense detracts from an equally, if not more 
important, goal: Pursuing means to reduce the numbers and performance 
characteristics of offensive missiles that may be fired against us in 
theater conflicts. This goal typically requires significant 
improvements in export controls, intelligence capabilities, analytic 
capabilities for the conduct of arms control and nonproliferation 
verification activities,
 better coordination between our military and our diplomats and other 
such means.

  The committee, however, is placing inordinate reliance upon technical 
fixes to counter missile attacks, rather than strengthening efforts to 
slow our halt of the proliferation of such missiles in the first place. 
This position is unfortunate, since the latter will ultimately prove to 
be a better investment of scarce taxpayers' dollars.
  With respect to the missile defense provisions the bill does support, 
many of these would considerably erode the stable consensus that exists 
to support ballistic missile defense efforts, would jeopardize both 
antiballistic missile, ABM and START II treaties, usurp the President's 
constitutional powers with respect to the conduct of foreign relations 
and the performance of the role of Commander in Chief, or otherwise 
erode, rather than enhance, U.S. national security.
  These conclusions, to me, follow from an examination of the following 
provisions of the bill: First, the bill mandates, as a statutory policy 
objective, an action that would violate the ABM Treaty. It establishes 
a policy of deploying a multiple-site national missile defense network 
by the year 2003. That is in violation.
  Second, the majority places into U.S. law a formal definition of an 
ABM-permissible ballistic missile defense system. We can justifiably 
assume, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John 
Shalikashvili, has warned, any such statutory definition could 
jeopardize prospects for early ratification of the START II Treaty in 
the 

[[Page S 11254]]
Russian Parliament and negatively impact our broader security 
relationship with Russia.
  It seems only prudent that before the Congress ventures off with a 
unilateral interpretation of a major bilateral arms control accord, we 
should consider very carefully several implications of such an action.
  They would include: Is this the type of precedent we wish to 
establish as a basis for treaty interpretation? Do we want to set an 
example that can lead the Duma to legislate its own preferred 
definitions of vital terms of Russia's arms control and disarmament 
treaties?
  In other words, what if the Russian Duma, what if we had word coming 
through or had pictures on TV this evening on the news that the Russian 
Duma is unilaterally deciding to put a new interpretation into the ABM 
Treaty. What would we do? I know what we would do. We would think the 
whole thing is null and void if they went ahead and legislated 
preferred definitions of vital terms of Russia's arms control and 
disarmament treaties.
  If Russia deployed enough ballistic missile defense sites containing 
missiles just falling below the dictated threshold, could they 
collectively acquire an ability to counter United States strategic 
nuclear forces? What will be the reactions of China and other powers if 
the United States moves away from its ballistic missile defense 
restraints?
  I point out that these agreements are hammered out word by word by 
word over agonizingly long negotiations. The ABM Treaty was no 
exception to that. To change some of that wording, or to change an 
interpretation of it unilaterally, means that our word in any other 
treaty that we might have with any other place around the world--
whether China, Russia, wherever--is not going to be looked at as being 
worth very much.
  While the committee majority has raised the specter of structural 
nuclear disarmament--a term that is supposed to describe our alleged 
inability to expand our nuclear arsenal in the event of future 
threats--it ironically ignores completely the effects on our deterrent 
force of releasing Russia from the treaty obligations that prevent it 
from acquiring a national missile defense capability.
  The Russians are not going to just stand by and see us reinterpret 
that treaty without feeling free to go their own way. They will no 
longer be bound by that agreement that was hammered out over a long 
period of time.
  So, if the opponents in the ongoing missile defense debate have their 
way, and that ``fearsome beast,'' the ABM Treaty, is finally slain, the 
credibility of America's strategic missile forces would almost 
immediately be called into question as Russia begins to deploy its own 
large-scale national missile defense force.
  What would prevent them from doing it? Certainly not the treaty that 
we would have violated at the time. It seems to me, if the majority is 
truly interested in avoiding this structural nuclear disarmament, as it 
is called, it should do all it can to ensure that U.S. nuclear 
deterrent retains its credibility. This is exactly what the ABM Treaty 
helps to achieve, by barring Russia from creating its own national 
strategic missile defense system.
  The treaty accomplishes this, moreover, without the need for a 
diplomatically and financially costly expansion of our offensive 
nuclear capabilities. So-called deficit hawks in Congress today should, 
therefore, love the ABM Treaty, not revile it. It works to preserve our 
deterrent and saves plenty of money at the same time. One of the 
estimates by CBO has indicated that even a partial national missile 
defense system would cost about $48 billion, at a time when we really 
do not need it, as testimony and as the letters from the Secretary of 
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated.
  I am afraid our colleagues in the majority, however, have turned a 
collective blind eye to these considerations. They appear to believe 
that unilateral United States actions to ensure against our own 
national missile vulnerability will instantly translate into a safer 
America and not lead Russia to reduce its vulnerability to our own 
strategic missile attacks.
  In its enthusiasm not to miss an opportunity to bash the ABM Treaty, 
the majority is urging a course of action that can weaken our nuclear 
deterrent capability, can stimulate an offensive nuclear arms race, and 
eventually funnel tens or hundreds of billions of dollars into 
elaborate strategic national missile defense schemes, none of which, of 
course, will ever free American citizens from risk of nuclear attack.
  The bill seems to enshrine into law what is known as the fallacy of 
the last move, which holds that any increment in our own security will 
take place without any detrimental side effects. I lose a lot more 
sleep over the side effects than I do over the slogan of ``structural 
nuclear disarmament.''
  The Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings, coupled with the 
Tokyo gas attacks should serve as a sobering reminder that weapons of 
mass destruction can be delivered by a variety of means other than 
missiles. It does not mean we are not concerned about missiles. We are. 
Furthermore, our intelligence officials have repeatedly testified the 
United States will not face a new missile threat until sometime in the 
next century.
  The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. James 
Clapper, testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence last 
January: ``We see no interest in or capability of any new country 
reaching the continental United States with a long-range missile for at 
least the next decade.''
  We should not permit a fixation with delivery systems to distract our 
attention from the important goal of halting the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
  Third, the majority voted down on a straight party vote a proposal by 
Senator Levin to ensure that America's theater missile defense systems 
will not be given strategic antiballistic missile capabilities, a 
proposal that was essentially a restatement of existing law, existing 
law under the ABM Treaty.
  Fourth, the majority insisted on almost doubling the size of the 
administration's request for national missile defense projects, despite 
the majority's complete inability to identify any new foreign threat 
against which such a defense would be directed.
  I do not believe that a highly conjectural North Korean missile 
threat to the Aleutian Islands sometime in the 21st century is 
sufficient grounds for America to abandon the ABM Treaty. I doubt North 
Korea will even manage to survive as a country by that time. It may 
not, anyway.
  Furthermore, there is a fundamental contradiction in the majority's 
willingness to write a blank check on behalf of national missile 
defense and yet apply the sternest possible accounting standards for 
the more modest sums that we authorized elsewhere in this bill to such 
programs as humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief.
  I would add, the systems we are talking about have yet to be 
invented. We made some progress in setting up systems, or doing some 
research in years past, but to mandate at this point we will have any 
of these systems by the year 2003, which is what is in the systems we 
are proposing here, is wishful thinking. Some of the claims under star 
wars were made back some years ago. I talked to the people at the 
Pentagon who were working in these areas, who had some confidence in 
those systems, or said they did. I thought some of the claims were so 
preposterous I went out to some of the laboratories where work was 
going on on the so-called star wars system. The scientists who were 
working on the systems out there almost laughed about some of the 
claims being made on star wars at that time. It was not just a matter 
of having the money to deploy, to cut the hardware and deploy it. We 
had not yet invented the systems. Yet we are talking about now we can 
set up a national missile defense system, just a partial one, for $48 
billion, with equipment that has yet to be invented and certainly 
should not be deployed on a timetable between now and the year 2003. 
Within 8 years, we are supposed to now have this and it has to be 
deployed. And that is ridiculous.
  Star wars before was talking about deformable laser mirrors, 12 feet 
across, that could take lasers of a power not yet invented, and focus 
it on a spot out there several hundred miles in space the size of a 
golf ball. At least 

[[Page S 11255]]
the first step would be to focus it on a mirror in space that could be 
deformed, then focus it in turn on a spot the size of a golf ball 
several hundred miles away on a missile coming up at a changing rate of 
speed, and keep it focused on that area. We do not have the computer 
capacity nor the technology yet developed to enable us to do some of 
those things that were claimed years ago.
  Now we are saying we have some different systems. But those systems 
are anything but proven and are anything but systems that should be set 
up on a time schedule that would have to be in place by law by the year 
2003.
  What do we think the Soviets would be doing all this same time? I 
know what the Duma would probably do, our counterpart over there in 
Russia. The Duma probably is going to say, OK, if all bets are off on 
the ABM Treaty, then the very first thing we are going to do is put all 
the coordinates back in on American targets we just took out of our 
missiles in agreement with the Americans, back just a few months ago. 
To me, that would be very silly if we did anything that might lead them 
into that kind of activity.
  Yet, if the Russians were doing the same thing we are debating here 
today, I can guarantee the first thing I would be doing on the floor 
would be demanding we put their coordinates back in our missiles if 
they were advocating abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying a missile 
defense system that neither side thought we needed to deploy.
  Much has been written about the dangers of new isolationism as a 
foreign policy doctrine. Its companion in defense policy I guess would 
be called a fortress America. Nothing is more reflective of this 
doctrine than the current bill's fundamentally misguided policy 
approaches on nuclear testing and the ABM Treaty.
  So I am still hopeful a new bipartisanship will emerge in the years 
ahead, however, behind policies that reflect a greater awareness of the 
costs of a modern national defense, a greater sensitivity to 
international reactions to U.S. defense actions, greater appreciation 
of the unexploited potential that lies in creative international 
solutions to security problems, and a greater emphasis on preventing 
proliferation rather than trying to manage it. If we abrogate the ABM 
Treaty or put language in here, in this legislation, or permit language 
to stay in that allows the Duma, in its own right, to start 
reinterpreting the ABM Treaty, then I do not see any option but what we 
are into an arms race again. Just as we spent probably most of the past 
decade taking some of those dangers down, reducing our arms, taking the 
targeting out of our missiles and the Soviets took it out--the Russians 
took it out of their missiles, I think we are in danger of reversing 
this whole direction, this trend that has been set in place over the 
past 10 years, and to cope with a threat that is not out there, by the 
best testimony we have from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and spend a lot of money in the whole 
process, $48 billion for a very limited defense system that will not be 
a full national missile defense. It would be, basically, a missile 
defense that covers five States.
  So I support the change proposed by the Senator from Michigan. I hope 
our colleagues will look at this very, very carefully. If we are to put 
into law something that encourages the ABM Treaty to be questioned and 
the Soviets to have less confidence in the American willingness to 
abide by that treaty, I think we will have made a drastic mistake in 
the Senate of the United States.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                           Order Of Procedure

  Mr. DOLE. I will just take a minute. I want to see if we cannot get 
agreement on time here. We have been on this amendment since 11 
o'clock. I have been listening to people ask for time agreements. We 
are not even close to a time agreement.
  This bill is dying on the floor. This may be a very important 
amendment, but we intend to complete action on this bill by tomorrow 
night or I do not see when it comes up again. Because Friday--Saturday 
we will do appropriations bills, maybe one or two appropriations bills. 
Maybe late Saturday afternoon we can start on welfare reform, and then 
late in the week take up the defense appropriations bill.
  If we want to pass the DOD bill we have to have cooperation. If we do 
not want to pass it, I assume we can take 6 or 7 hours on this 
amendment. It has been 2\1/2\ hours.
  Is there any indication, any willingness to enter into a time 
agreement at this point? The Senator from Michigan----
  Mr. LEVIN. If that is addressed to me, we are very willing to enter 
into a time agreement. Two Senators who wanted to speak have already 
spoken. There is one now who says he is willing to give up his time. I 
am adding it up and I will come up with a figure in about 2 minutes, 
now.
  Mr. DOLE. I will just wait until the Senator adds it up. If we do not 
get it now, it may be another hour.


                                Title 31

  Mr. KYL. Will the majority leader yield so I may make an announcement 
on behalf of Senator Thurmond? This is a very important announcement 
for all Members of the Senate. Senator Thurmond and Senator Domenici 
propose to offer a substitute amendment to title 31 of Senate bill 
1026. This amendment contains numerous changes. In order to allow all 
Senators an opportunity to review it, copies of the amendment will be 
available in the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  I thank the majority leader for yielding.
  Mr. NUNN. I believe, if I may just add to the statement of my 
colleague from Arizona, that is the energy section of the bill that has 
been worked on for 2 or 3 days.
  Mr. KYL. That is correct.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, when the Senator from Michigan adds the time 
there, we may want some time on the other side of the amendment. 
Hopefully not as much. I do not think it would take as much.
  Mr. LEVIN. We need 1 hour and 50 minutes on this side.
  Mr. DOLE. Say 2 hours on that side, and 1 hour on this side? So we 
could vote, then, by maybe 4:30, depending on how much time we use? I 
do not think we need 2 hours on this side. I just want to get the time 
agreement.
  If there is no objection, let me propose this consent agreement.
  I ask unanimous consent that there be 3 hours on the Levin amendment 
prior to a motion to table, to be divided 2 hours for Senator Levin or 
his designee, 1 hour for Senator Thurmond or his designee, no second-
degree amendments or amendments to the language proposed to be stricken 
be in order prior to a failed motion to table, and any second-degree 
amendment or amendment to the language proposed to be stricken be 
relevant to the first-degree amendment, and that following the 
conclusion or yielding back of time, Senator Thurmond or his designee 
be recognized to table the Levin amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I do not 
intend to object, did the unanimous consent preclude second-degree 
amendments?
  Mr. DOLE. No, not until after a motion to table, if it is not tabled.
  Mr. LEVIN. It would be open to second-degree amendments which are 
relevant.
  Mr. DOLE. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. EXON. Reserving the right to object, I would hope we are about to 
be in a place where we could agree to this. I heard the leader say that 
there would be no second-degree amendments. Now I understand. I was not 
clear.
  If I understand correctly, the amendment offered under the unanimous 
consent agreement by the majority leader, if we agree to this time 
agreement, as he has just spelled out, there would be no allowable 
second-degree amendment to the Levin amendment until after a tabling 
motion.
  Mr. DOLE. That is correct.
  Mr. EXON. After a tabling motion, then a second-degree amendment 
would be in order.
  Mr. DOLE. That is what we have done here the last several times.
  Mr. EXON. I have no objection.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object for one more moment, in the 

[[Page S 11256]]
  event that it is not tabled, then in the event more second-degree 
amendments are offered, there is not in this unanimous consent any time 
limit on those second-degree amendments.
  Mr. DOLE. That is true. This only refers to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, under this time agreement I would like to 
yield myself 20 minutes, and I ask to be notified when that 20 minutes 
has expired.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, since the Senator from Ohio just spoke in 
favor of the amendment, I thought I would take some of our time to 
speak in opposition to the amendment.
  It seems to me that the arguments in favor of the amendment boil down 
to three: First of all, variations of the theme of the ABM Treaty is 
relatively sacrosanct; second, we have to do everything possible to 
avoid riling the Russians, doing something they may not like; and, 
third, that we should not limit the power of the President.
  Let me discuss each of those arguments in turn. First of all, 
regarding the 1972 ABM Treaty, I think it is important to recognize 
that the ABM Treaty has, since its inception in 1972, been under the 
process of negotiation. There have been discussions going on between 
our two countries almost throughout that period of time. So the fact 
that we may be talking about making changes in it is nothing new, and 
it has never been interpreted as a breach or an anticipatory breach of 
treaty for the United States to be stating that we want to change a 
particular part of the agreement. As a matter of fact, the original ABM 
Treaty called for two national ballistic missile sites, not one. That 
was amended to one site. And one of the things that is being called for 
in the underlying legislation here is multiple sites.
  I think almost all of us would agree that it does not make sense for 
us to deploy an ABM system in this country if we cannot have multiple 
sites. It just will not be effective. So that is our stated policy in 
the legislation. That is nothing new. It is nothing that the Russians 
should get excited about. As a matter of fact, I am not even sure what 
their position would be. I would not be surprised at all if they would 
agree that multiple sites are appropriate. So I do not think that is a 
big problem with the policy stated in the bill for multiple sites.
  The second point under this first argument is that demarcation, as 
called for in legislation here, does not violate the ABM Treaty. As a 
matter of fact, the administration has already been demarking what is 
appropriate testing for a theater ballistic missile system, and has 
already been discussing that with the Russians.
  Bob Bell, former staff member of the committee, a prominent 
specialist at the National Security Council, told the National Defense 
University that, ``We have already reached an agreement with the 
Russians that you can shoot at a target that goes 5 kilometers per 
second and not have it captured as an ABM.'' The problem here is, of 
course, that the negotiations that the administration has been engaging 
in went further than that, and accepted, at least temporarily, Russian 
demands that the proposed demarcation also include a speed limit on the 
United States' interceptor of 3 kilometers per second, which would in 
effect dumb down our system to the point where it would not be as 
robust as we would want it to be.
  The point here is that you cannot argue demarcation per se is a 
violation of the ABM Treaty. The administration has done it. That has 
been policy. The question before us is whether or not we will in 
legislation demark that limit at which we can test our theater 
ballistic missile system since it has never been a part of the ABM 
Treaty. I think that is an important point for us to make. Again, the 
ABM Treaty only limits strategic systems. It does not limit theater 
systems.
  All the demarcation in the Warner language does is to define the 
level of testing that can be engaged in for theater systems. There 
should not be anything wrong with that. The administration has already 
engaged in demarcation. As a matter of fact, in a speech before the 
National Defense University, again referring to Bob Bell, he ably 
explained that this question of identifying the demarcation between ABM 
and TMD has been an issue for as long as the treaty has been around, 
and, as a matter of fact, it has changed. One of the things he said is, 
what is a TMD and what is not a TMD goes back to the ratification 
hearings and the negotiations themselves.
  During the Senate hearings on the ABM Treaty in 1972, then-Director 
of Defense Research and Engineering, Johnny Foster, was asked by 
Senator Proxmire, ``Where is the line? Where is the distinction between 
the two?'' He said, ``If you shoot a missile interceptor at a target 
that goes faster than 2 kilometers per second, that is an ABM.''
  Of course we all know that demarcation is unacceptable today. That is 
the point. Technology changes. It has been 23 years since the ABM 
Treaty was adopted.
  What we are trying to do in this legislation is to keep up with the 
times. As a matter of fact, our own Defense Department has made the 
point that the treaty has not kept up with the times, and the gentleman 
who is now the CIA Director, John Deutch, has made the point that the 
treaty, the ABM Treaty, constrains us in ways that technology should 
not anymore. And, as a result, it seems to the committee--and it seems 
to me--that it is important for the United States to draw this 
demarcation so that we can test the systems that we could ultimately 
deploy against theater threats.
  Why is it important to have the language in the bill? Because the 
administration in effect proposes to dumb down our TMD. And that is the 
problem. In both the Patriot system and the THAAD system earlier, we 
dumbed them down. The reason the Patriot could not be any more 
successful in the gulf war was because of decisions made right after 
the ABM Treaty that in effect preclude the use of certain sensors to 
enable it to be more robust.
  We have done the same thing with the THAAD system in taking out 
certain software and making certain hardware changes that precluded it 
from being as robust as it otherwise would be in meeting these threats. 
We cannot do this anymore. And we should not dumb down our TMD system.
  Our demarcation language in the bill merely proscribes tests against 
strategic missiles, as I said, and that enables us then to continue to 
test the theater system in a way that would make it effective against 
future threats.
  Let me quote, as a matter of fact, from General Shalikashvili. He has 
been quoted before. Let me first of all quote a January 3 memo to 
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch. Here is what he said General 
Shalikashvili said:

        The United States should make no further concessions and 
     even start thinking about rolling back the U.S. negotiating 
     position.

  The reason that General Shalikashvili, I believe, made that statement 
is because he understood that the position that Bob Bell had negotiated 
with the Russians that I referred to earlier was as far as this country 
should go; that if we went any further, we would arbitrarily be putting 
limits on our theater systems in ways that we should not do. That would 
make them less capable of meeting future threats. That is why he said 
at that time that we should make no further concessions and even start 
thinking about rolling back the U.S. negotiating position.
  That is the real position of General Shalikashvili. That is the 
position which is embodied in this legislation, to make no further 
concessions with regard to this demarcation.
  Finally, with respect to this argument that the ABM Treaty is sort of 
sacrosanct, I want to make this point. There is no anticipatory breach 
in the bill at all because, of course, there are two specific 
conditions. No. 1, there can be amendments to the ABM Treaty. That is 
all we are suggesting should eventually occur here. But it is suggested 
that maybe the Russians will not agree with the policies stated in the 
bill, and they will not agree to those negotiations or to our position.
  The United States can always withdraw from the ABM Treaty after 
having given 6 months' notice if that is 

[[Page S 11257]]
deemed to be in the interest of the United States. So should we deem it 
to be in the interest of the United States to act in ways that the 
Russians would deem inimical to continuation with the ABM Treaty, they 
can either negotiate or the United States can step out of the treaty. 
The bill itself does not violate the treaty.
  I want to make that point crystal clear.
  There is some notion that has been seeping into this debate that 
somehow there is still a cold war going on here.
  The cold war is over. The Soviet Union, with whom we negotiated the 
ABM Treaty, is no longer even in existence. The threats that the 
theater ballistic missiles are designed to thwart are not necessarily 
threats emanating from the Soviet Union or now Russia but, rather, are 
threats coming from countries like North Korea and Iraq and Iran, and 
countries of that sort.
  Therefore, we cannot be proscribed from acting against those threats 
because of an ABM Treaty with the Russians. We need to proceed to 
develop theater missiles that can protect the United States, protect 
our forces deployed abroad, and protect our allies against these 
theater threats, whether they come from Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or 
whatever. So the ABM Treaty really ought not to stop us from doing it.
  The second point is that it would cause the Russians to react 
negatively. It would not be a reason for the United States to forego 
actions which are clearly in our national interest. The argument that 
is being made here is the same argument that was used against the 
Reagan initiatives that in fact today are credited with ending the cold 
war. Maybe the Russians will react badly to this. Well, as it turned 
out, by taking bold action, we were able to win peace through strength. 
The cold war is over because of the initiatives we took and because we 
did not listen to those who said the Russians might react badly to this 
if we do it. So I do not necessarily think that is a good argument.
  I again refer to the now CIA Director, John Deutch, on the ABM 
Treaty. In some respects, the technology has exceeded the limits of the 
ABM Treaty, and we have to go forward with the technology to protect 
ourselves not just from Russian threats but from threats around the 
rest of the world. And the problem of waiting for the Russians to agree 
is that this is no longer a bipolar world and we have these other 
threats to be concerned about.
  It is also, I think, an important point to make that the Russian Duma 
is not likely to ratify the START II Treaty in any event, and this is 
clear from a variety of things that come out of Russia. So to suggest 
that the action we take here is going to prevent Russia from ratifying 
the START II Treaty is not relevant.
  Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Relations Committee, Vladimir Lukin 
said:

       We need big money to carry out these reductions [in START 
     II], and we don't have it. We do not want to ratify this 
     treaty and then not be able to comply with its terms. We will 
     have to wait until we see how to pay for our promises.

  That is the reason--or at least that is one of the reasons--nothing 
to do with what we are talking about today.
  Others suggest that ratification should be tied to other 
international issues.
  The Speaker of the Federation Council, their upper chamber, Vladimir 
Shumeyko, said:

       We closely link [START II] ratification with the overall 
     situation existing between Russia and NATO. . . We consider 
     the perseverance of NATO as a stumbling block to our 
     cooperation in the era of disarmament and advancement on the 
     road to peace.

  And still others see START II as inimical to Russian interests. 
Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, said:

       If this treaty [START II] is fully implemented, the United 
     States will almost double its superiority, while the damage 
     to Russia's national security will be unrecoverable.

  There are many more quotations that I could cite.
  The point is there are a lot of reasons why a lot of Russians do not 
want to ratify the START II Treaty. It is not because of what we are 
doing in this legislation here today.
  Finally, let me just refer to this notion of anticipatory breach. If 
we are going to use that legal doctrine here, we also ought to refer to 
the equitable doctrine of clean hands.
  I will not take the time here to recite the numerous instances of 
Soviet and Russian violations of treaties that we have negotiated, but 
they are numerous. And in some respects we have chosen to ignore those 
violations because we believe that it is important to continue the 
dialog and to keep the process moving. But the fact is it would be 
anomalous for the Russians to consider that a policy we state today 
that in no way involves a violation of the treaty is some kind of a big 
deal when they are in violation of a variety of treaties, and should my 
colleagues desire we can put that information in the Record.
  The final argument that is given as a reason to support the amendment 
of the Senator from Michigan is that the language of the bill ties the 
President's hands. What we do here is two things. We call for a study 
to determine what the administration should negotiate relative to the 
ABM Treaty. We are not saying what the administration has to negotiate. 
We are saying let us have a study and pick those areas where we want to 
make a change. One of them I think is going to be clear. We should not 
go forward in this country to deploy a national defense missile system 
at one site. That would not make sense. So one of the items clearly is 
going to be let us ask the Russians to negotiate this multiple site. 
That is the only way we should deploy a national system. And I do not 
see what the problem with that is.
  In the meantime, we are saying let us not use defense funds to 
continue, the administration should not use the 050 account to continue 
to make concessions to the Russians on matters that ought to be either 
the subject of further negotiation or at least the administration ought 
to come to the Senate to discuss them with us.
  That is the final point I wish to make here. We have been trying for 
months to get the administration to work with us. That is what advice 
and consent is all about. And it is true that there are prerogatives of 
the administration that are important to be protected, and I do not 
want to step on those. But it is also true that the Senate has 
prerogatives. We have the right of advice and consent, and thus far the 
administration has generally ignored the position that at least those 
of us on this side have taken. What we are asking in this legislation 
is that you not go any further--in fact, we are demanding that the 
administration go no further in the direction of making further 
concessions to the Russians in ways that would limit our ability to 
develop our theater systems which can be used not just against Russians 
but against other potential threats; that they do not do that; that 
they not use defense funds for that purpose. That is why we are saying 
it is important for us to be talking to the administration.
  If the administration wants to get together with us and talk about 
what they can do, if they want to submit the changes to the Senate, 
then well and good. So far that has not been the administration's 
position.
  So with regard to the argument that we are stepping on the 
administration's prerogative, I would just note that the administration 
has been ignoring the Senate and its advice and consent prerogatives, 
and it is time for us to be giving a little advice and asking for the 
ability to consent to what the administration is doing.
  Mr. President, the bottom line here is that the Armed Services 
Committee came up with a very good bill, and I wish to commend the 
chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, who is here; Senator Lott 
is a member of the committee; Senator Warner made an excellent 
statement here this morning in opposition to the amendment of the 
Senator from Michigan, and I believe that it would be in the best 
interests of the United States for this body to agree with the Armed 
Services Committee to vote down the amendment of the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield 20 minutes to the Senator from 
Nebraska. 

[[Page S 11258]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have been listening and waiting very 
patiently for my turn to make some remarks on this matter. I had 
hesitation about the unanimous-consent agreement because this is one of 
the most important matters, if not the most important matter in my view 
that I have been a part of in my 17 years in the Senate.
  Notwithstanding the desire to move on briskly, I simply say that I 
hope, regardless of political affiliation, we will all take a very 
close look at what we may be about to do unless the Levin, et al, 
amendment, of which I am proud to be an original cosponsor, is passed.
  I have been listening to the Senator from Arizona and his rather 
interesting remarks, and during those remarks the Senator from Arizona 
mentioned the names of several very prominent administration officials, 
including Bob Bell at the White House, National Security Council. He 
mentioned the present CIA Director, the former second man at the 
Department of Defense. He mentioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Shalikashvili.
  I simply want to say that I am not indicating the Senator from 
Arizona has misrepresented any of the statements that those individuals 
have made, but I have checked, while the Senator from Arizona was 
addressing the Senate, with Bob Bell at the White House. Bob Bell tells 
me that, notwithstanding the name dropping, all of the individuals 
mentioned by the Senator from Arizona to substantiate his position of 
being against the Levin amendment is not shared by anyone in the 
administration including each and every one of the officials mentioned 
in support of his argument by the Senator from Arizona.
  This is a tremendously important matter. My judgment is that this 
should not come down to a party-line vote.
  I am afraid it is going to be a party-line vote. Maybe if we can just 
reach a few Republicans. I would guess at this time that we would not 
lose more than one or two Democratic votes, two at the most, on this 
side of the aisle, maybe none, which means that we Democrats are 
talking to five, six or seven of our Republican friends asking that 
they look very closely at this before they vote against the Levin 
amendment.
  I thought it was rather ironic a couple hours ago while I was on the 
floor at that particular time there were four Senators on the floor. 
There was Senator Nunn, for whom I have great respect and with whom I 
have worked closely for 17 years; there was the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, my dear friend, and no one has more respect in this 
body, in the view of this Senator, than my friend Strom Thurmond from 
South Carolina; there was John Warner, who came to the Senate the same 
time as this Senator. And the four of us happened to be here on the 
floor.
  There have been many very important statements made and, I thought, 
well thought out by Members on both sides of this issue. It is an issue 
that may not be clear-cut in some people's minds. For 17 years, I 
believe, on national defense matters I have stood hand in hand with the 
Senator from South Carolina, the Senator from Virginia and others. I do 
not know that we have been very far apart, if far at all, on many 
issues. I can include Senator Lott, a Member of the Senate that I work 
very closely with; Senator Levin; and others.
  I simply say that we are at a point where I do not feel it is fair to 
indicate people are in bad faith on that side of the aisle on the 
matter. I just hope they will listen to the pleas that we are making on 
this side. Maybe a good way to put it is, I think they know not what 
they do. They are not badly intentioned. I think they know not what 
they do.
  To put this in perspective, I would like to ask a question of the 
Senator from Michigan on this matter that may put this in some kind of 
perspective as far as this Senator sees it. Notwithstanding the 
protestations to the contrary, if the Levin amendment is not adopted, I 
feel that we have gone a long way down the road to disrupt some of the 
advances that have taken place over the last few years with regard to 
downplaying the role of dependence on nuclear devices. It is this 
Senator's feeling--and I am wondering to what degree this is shared by 
my friend and colleague from the State of Michigan. Senator Levin and I 
came here at the same time. We have sat side by side on the Armed 
Services Committee. We have generally agreed. And I would generally 
include him in that group of bipartisan Senators, Democrats and 
Republicans, that have worked hand in hand on critical defense matters.
  Without losing my right to the floor, I want to ask Senator Levin 
this question: If your amendment striking basically the references to 
the ABM Treaty fails, it is the opinion of this Senator that such 
action, if your amendment fails, will probably end any chance of 
finally completing in a successful fashion the implementation of the 
START I treaty. In all likelihood, further, it will scuttle any chances 
of cooperation to obtain ratification of the START II treaty and then 
further eliminations of the number of nuclear warheads that were 
planned to follow on beyond that. I think it drives a stake through the 
heart of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I think it certainly would do 
great harm to any chances that we have with regard to the 
nonproliferation treaties that we are interested in. And last and 
certainly not least, I would think this action very likely would go a 
long way to maintain a conventional forces understanding in Europe 
meaningful from the standpoint of seeking some form of stability in the 
world. All of these things, I think, have a very grave threat of 
extinction if we proceed in the fashion that the ABM Treaty language 
that the Senator from Michigan is trying to strike as it came out of 
the committee remains.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is right. In my view and, even more important 
by far, in General Shalikashvili's view when he says in his letter to 
Senator Warner, the following:

       With regard to broader security issues, the linkage between 
     the ABM Treaty and the START II has been stressed repeatedly 
     by the Russians and U.S. military representatives in many 
     forums, including discussions with many Members of the Duma. 
     While there are, of course, other factors that play in the 
     Duma consideration, one must assume that unilateral U.S. 
     legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification 
     and probably impact our broader security relationship as 
     well.

  And it is that broader security relationship that I think my good 
friend from Nebraska is referring to. And I do agree with his 
assessment of the impact. But again, our top military officer agrees, 
our Secretary of Defense agrees, our Secretary of State agrees with 
that assessment.
  Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from Michigan. Let me summarize, if I 
can, some of the overall problems that I see with this measure that I 
partially addressed in remarks this morning.
  The way this came out of the committee it attacks the limits of the 
Nunn-Lugar proposal that has been responsible for the safe and 
accountable disarming of over 2,500 former Soviet Union warheads. It 
cuts the Energy Department nonproliferation arms control and 
verification funding. It recommends reconstituting our nuclear weapons 
manufacturing complex at untold billions of dollars, while at the same 
time advocating the resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing. This 
last committee initiative is contrary to U.S. policy, and it is 
designed to scuttle ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations and any 
prospect of reaching a treaty agreement.
  I will have some more to say about this later on as we go into other 
particular issues under consideration in this bill. Let me simply say, 
though, I am concerned with the tone and the substance of the bill and 
the level of micromanagement placed on the Pentagon and the Department 
of Energy is unprecedented and harmful to our Nation's standing in the 
international community. Many of the committee initiatives are driven 
by a desire to defend against a superpower threat to U.S. security that 
simply does not exist. At the same time, when one-time enemies are now 
allies and the world community is committed more than ever before to 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the committee bill is at odds 
with the reality and the strong 

[[Page S 11259]]
need of amendment before it can properly serve our Nation's security 
interests. At a time when American leadership in the world community is 
strongly needed, we cannot be viewed as a nation living in the past, 
jousting with our imaginary dragons in order to lay claim to the mantle 
of being strong on defense. We are a strong country, the preeminent 
military power of the world by far. But we must also be forward looking 
and recognize that it is in our national interest as well as the 
interest of other nations to encourage arms control and alliances based 
on collective security. It is unfortunate that some feel more 
comfortable in an adversarial environment than in one based on 
cooperation and lowering of superpower antagonism.
  Like a beehive, the world in 1995 has the capacity to be both 
dangerous and peaceful. And handled properly, the hive can be benign 
and capable of producing sweet honey. If agitated, however, it can 
become hostile and threatening. The defense authorization bill in its 
present form is a sharp stick ready to be jabbed into the hive. The 
design and intent of the bill is to agitate the world community to the 
ultimate detriment of ourselves. This is not the time in history to 
rekindle the rhetoric of the cold war. I urge my colleagues to support 
the amendment that will correct these and other self-defeating elements 
of this flawed legislation.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, a defense bill must meet threats, real 
threats, not shadows or ghosts of threats disappeared.
  Our military leaders and our intelligence services have properly 
identified the threats our Nation faces.
  They have come before us and told us what threats we face.
  We have ignored much of their counsel and drafted a bill addressed to 
the realities of yesterday and a dark view of a possible future tens of 
years away.
  This provision if enacted will take a step toward abrogating the 
antiballistic missile treaty, scuttling the START II Treaty, and 
launching us back into the arms race of the cold war.
  This bill includes many weapons systems designed to match a missile 
threat from the Soviet Union that does not exist. Due to the diligent 
efforts of former President Bush, President Clinton, our diplomats and 
Senators like Mr. Nunn and Mr. Lugar, we have been able to 
substantially curtail that threat, to destroy hundreds of the missiles 
that used to be aimed at our nations, and to divert the targeting of 
the others that still remain.
  Since 1991, the Nunn-Lugar program has helped the states of the 
former Soviet Union to destroy their weapons of mass destruction and 
reduce the threat posed by proliferation of these weapons. This program 
remains an example of concise policy designed to meet an identified 
threat and has significantly improved our national security.
  We cannot stress to the appropriate degree how important arms control 
efforts have been to our national security. Today, as a result of 
bipartisan efforts from different administrations, Russia is planning 
to eliminate 6,000 nuclear warheads that formerly were directed toward 
our Nation. That is far more than any national missile defense could 
hope to destroy.
  It would be a shame if the other provisions of this bill caused this 
progress to be in vain.
  Therefore, I reject the provisions in this bill that if enacted will 
most likely resurrect an arms race between the United States and 
Russia.
  By unilaterally deciding what the ABM standard is in regard to 
missile interceptors, the Senate would disrupt the negotiating process 
currently underway. Not only is this an unwarranted intrusion into the 
normal working of foreign policy, this provision dangerously increases 
the risk that the ABM and other weapons treaties will be abrogated 
completely by the Russians.
  Later this year the Russian Duma was to vote on the ratification of 
START II. After they see the provisions in this bill regarding the ABM 
treaty, and realize how we plan to have a missile defense system that 
could theoretically counter an attack on the United States, the 
incentive to destroy the thousands of weapons called for in START II 
will be greatly diminished.
  Regardless of what we tell them, the Russians will logically be 
thinking, why destroy our missiles when we may need them to get through 
a U.S. missile defense system?
  Though its proponents claim this measure will protect us from a 
change in Russian policy, this measure will only further destabilize 
our relations and cause the hardliners in Russia to question our 
commitment to START II.
  We would be throwing away a chance to destroy literally thousands of 
nuclear weapons on the faint hope that we can build an impenetrable 
missile defense system.
  To justify the national missile defense system now when the Soviet 
threat is gone, the supporters of this bill are countering the views of 
our professional military and intelligence personnel and telling the 
American people a threat exists elsewhere when in fact it does not.
  The supporters of this bill say that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or 
Libya now have or will have shortly the ability to launch a missile 
that can reach our shores. That is simply not the case.
  The report to this bill specifically notes the possible threat from 
the North Korean Taepo Dong II missile, which the report claims may 
have the range to hit Alaska. Since this weapon is in development, we 
do not in fact know that this missile will be capable of that range. 
But with North Korea in such dire straits economically and the growing 
possibility of its opening, with reunification with the south 
increasingly likely, should we spend billions on a missile defense 
system that probably won't work to counter a threat that may never 
exist?
  Our professional military and intelligence personnel, the people who 
have the training, the knowledge, and the access to the most sensitive 
of information to judge these threats, say there is no threat from any 
indigenously developed missile for the next 10 years. Yet the 
supporters of these provisions do not believe those who know the most 
about this subject.
  This presumed threat does not justify spending the tax money of 
American citizens on unproven and untested antiballistic missile 
defense.
  This bill adds $300 million this year toward a national missile 
defense system. In 1993, the GAO reported that the cost of such a 
system would total $35 billion and a CBO estimate from earlier this 
year pegged the cost at $48 billion. As we know from past estimates, 
these estimates would probably be low.
  The bill calls for the deployment of this system even though it is 
unproven and untested.
  Under the most likely of scenarios, the nuclear umbrella this would 
create would be a leaky one that fails to completely protect our Nation 
if the nonexistent threat were to become real. With nuclear, chemical 
or biological weapons, anything less than 100 percent certainty will 
not suffice.
  One clear lesson from history is that in military affairs, those who 
concentrate their efforts on defense are bound to fail. In the 1930's 
and 1940's France felt secure behind the Maginot Line. Their defensive 
posture was outwitted and decimated by a German Army dedicated to the 
offensive. When it comes to threats to the United States today, the 
means chosen to deliver a weapon of mass destruction would very likely 
be something other than a missile. It may be a cliche that the best 
defense is a good offense, but it is also true. We should look to 
counter any incipient threat from rogue nations through a robust 
offensive capability.
  If someone is intent on attacking the United States, they need not be 
rocket scientists to figure out our Nation's vulnerabilities. Why spend 
millions of dollars on missiles whose launch we can instantly trace and 
respond to with enough devastating force to destroy an entire 
civilization? No, our potential adversaries would most likely seek the 
path of least resistance. The delivery system posing the greatest 
threat is the rental truck, not a ballistic missile. We face that real 
threat through offensive actions against rogue nations and terrorist 
groups.
  We can support and focus our offensive capability through intense 
intelligence activities, so our policymakers and military commanders 
know most about what countries or groups are developing weapons of mass 
destruction, delivery systems, and the characteristics and locations of 
these systems. Next, the full diplomatic and economic 

[[Page S 11260]]
powers of our Nation can be used to counter the threat that may 
develop. Then, if the developers cannot be dissuaded in peacetime, the 
weapons themselves can be destroyed either preemptively or in war.
  I have heard other Senators state that the United States is 
vulnerable to an accidental ballistic missile attack. The truth is, the 
situation today is the same as it has been for 30 years. We have 
managed to survive this long because governments have stressed proper 
security and operating procedures for these terrible weapons. Nations 
understand the gravity of a mistake when nuclear weapons are involved. 
That is why the launching of one of these missiles involves so many 
intricate, redundant steps with multiple built-in safeguards.
  Yes, Murphy's law is true. Accidents can happen. But to have an 
accidental ballistic missile launch, several accidents must occur. 
Several redundant safeguard systems would have to fail all in the 
proper sequence at the precise moment, not just multiple failures of 
equipment but also multiple failures of human judgment, communication, 
and authority.
  I am no statistician, but I bet the likelihood of all that occurring 
simultaneously is far more remote than other Senators have led the 
public to believe. It would be far more likely that an interceptor 
missile in the national missile defense aimed at a moving target would 
miss its mark. The threat of an accidental ballistic missile launch 
toward our shores does not meet even the lowest threshold to qualify as 
a legitimate threat.
  Again, I say to my colleagues, we need to have a rational assessment 
of the threats our Nation faces. And the threat we face from a Russia 
with several thousand more nuclear weapons is far greater than the 
threat from a Russia that abides by the START II agreement.
  Mr. EXON. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Kerrey be listed as a 
cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. EXON. I ask the Chair how much time is remaining of the time 
assigned to the Senator from Nebraska?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six and a half minutes.
  Mr. EXON. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at this 
time, I be allowed to yield in this order: 8 minutes to Senator Simon; 
15 minutes to Senator Kerry; 8 minutes to Senator Bingaman, and that 
they be recognized in that order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. SIMON. Madam President, it was just a few days ago when Senator 
Byrd, in the middle of a series of votes, was acknowledged for his 
14,000th vote in a row. He got up and, among other things, he said 
there is a growing and excessive partisanship in this body.
  I was on the subway this morning with Senator Lugar, and some young 
eager student asked me what was different from when I came here. I 
said, ``The body, the Congress as a whole, is more partisan than it 
used to be.''
  I mention that because if we end up with a straight party vote on 
something as vital to the future of our Nation as this is, we have not 
done our two parties a favor. I think the Levin amendment is extremely 
important to the security of our country.
  If we just decide we are going to abrogate the ABM Treaty on our own, 
we are going to interpret it the way we want to, and that is what this 
amendment calls for, we are going to raise fears all over the world. We 
are going to be playing into the hands of the Russian hardliners. No 
one should misunderstand that for a moment. If we pass this bill 
without the Levin amendment, the Russian hardliners are going to say, 
``We're going to have to stop this elimination of nuclear warheads. 
We're going to have to move in the other direction.''
  Unilaterally to say this is what the ABM Treaty is going to be--and 
among other things in this bill it says, no U.S. official, presumably 
the Department of Defense, can discuss with any other country what the 
ABM Treaty means. That is a restriction on freedom of speech, among 
other things, that is unwise.
  What we have is the present course where we are gradually reducing 
the nuclear threat, the arms threat in the world where we have moved 
from the great threat being nuclear annihilation, to the great threat 
being instability around the world, and we are going to move to a world 
where the threat is both instability and a nuclear threat.
  Our present course reduces the nuclear danger. I happen to think we 
are spending way too much on arms. We are spending more than the next 
eight countries combined. If you take a look at the 1973 defense 
appropriations and add the inflation factor to it, we are spending more 
today than we were in 1973. That is when the Berlin wall was up, that 
is when we were in Vietnam, that is when we had almost twice as many 
troops in Europe.
  I think some sensible reduction in arms expenditure is desirable and, 
frankly, I think even the high number requested by the administration 
would not be there but for the sensitivity of the President, because he 
was not part of the military, he does not want to look like he is 
antimilitary. But this $7 billion increase is just unwarranted.
  On top of that, to say we are going to just unilaterally decide what 
the ABM Treaty means, on top of that to escalate the nuclear threat, I 
think, just does not make any sense at all, and it is going to waste 
billions and billions and billions of dollars in addition to increasing 
the threat to our country.
  If this bill passes in substantially the present condition, then I 
think the President of the United States has no option but to veto it, 
and I will strongly urge the President to veto it.
  We have to move away from an arms race. This bill, without the Levin 
amendment, increases the probability of an arms race.
  Madam President, I yield whatever time I may have left to Senator 
Levin.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized 
for 15 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Thank you, Madam President.
  Madam President, I want to congratulate the Senator from Michigan and 
also thank the Senator from Illinois for his comments with respect to 
this amendment. It seems that some of our colleagues in this body, in 
the wake of losing the former Soviet empire and the monolith of 
communism as targets of their opposition, now have lost their compass. 
They seem unsure of where to direct their energies and our taxpayers' 
money, and so are struggling to find another opponent at which to throw 
this Nation's treasure--regardless of the costs or risks entailed.
  The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and we are well into 
implementation of the START I Treaty limiting nuclear weapons and on 
our way to a START II Treaty to dismantle strategic delivery systems 
and further limit nuclear weapons.
  So we are on a course where the compass clearly points toward 
reduction in the number of nuclear weapons present in our world, toward 
the reduction of risk to our citizens and our society itself from an 
aggressor's attack, toward the control and reduction of weapons, and, 
indeed, toward the creation of stability in our world's political 
equation.
  As all of us who grew up in the 1950's and 1960's understand, nuclear 
deterrence is built on the concept of mutually assured destruction. 
``They'' can destroy ``us,'' ``we'' can destroy ``them,'' so neither 
chooses to destroy the other because nobody knows what would be left.
  In effect, that has maintained a state of rough peace--even if an 
uneasy peace--since the end of World War II. Certainly there have been 
surrogate wars and smaller skirmishes and client-state struggles around 
the globe, but the great nuclear powers have never seen fit to attack 
each other because of the belief that the damage that would be returned 
would be unacceptably great.
  Now, in 1995, we are no longer faced with Soviet expansionism, a 
Soviet desire to exploit every conceivable Western weakness, and, in 
every way short of initiating an all-out conflict, a Soviet desire to 
achieve and maintain the 

[[Page S 11261]]
advantage in every competitive situation. We no longer stare across the 
North Pole at thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads targeted on 
America's cities, its industrial and military facilities, and its 
governmental and social lifelines. Yet in the bill that is before the 
Senate today, we have a provision that unilaterally abandons--and, I 
would argue, effectively nullifies--one of the critical ingredients 
that has brought us to the point where the compass is pointing in the 
right direction.
  The Antiballistic Missile--or ABM--Treaty is a keystone to this arms 
control progress--which already has made huge contributions to the 
security and safety of our Nation and its people, and offers the 
promise of even greater safety and security in the foreseeable future.
  The bill brought before the Senate by the Republican-controlled Armed 
Services Committee establishes as our national policy that we will have 
a national missile defense system at ``multiple locations,'' which 
violates the ABM Treaty. It says that we will develop defense systems 
against theater ballistic missiles without regard to the ABM Treaty 
restrictions. It prohibits our President from even negotiating on this 
subject. It prohibits any interference with TMD missile testing that is 
self-apparently illegal under the ABM Treaty which our Nation signed 
and this very body ratified.
  The bill before us unilaterally obliterates the ABM Treaty, Madam 
President.
  Anyone who understands the history and psyche of the Russian people 
knows that they adamantly insist on realistic means of defending their 
nation. Fundamental to their willingness to enter into arms control 
agreements, and to continue to abide by them, is a requirement that 
their strategic weapons systems be effective in order to serve as a 
real deterrent to aggression against their nation, and an effective 
means of retaliation if that deterrence fails.
  If the United States moves ahead unilaterally to build a system that 
can defend successfully against their strategic forces, we undo a 
delicate balance, and in the process almost surely destroy the 
willingness of the Russian nation to continue to honor arms control 
agreements that further damage their side of the balance-of-power 
equation.
  Madam President, nuclear deterrence is already tricky enough. But it 
really has always rested on each nation's perceptions of the others' 
forces and of the threat that is poised against it. We hold the upper 
hand with respect to that today, relative to every country on the face 
of this planet.
  Today, to break out of the ABM Treaty, or signal our intention to do 
so, is to invite a return to the days of suspicion and 
countersuspicion, and far more dangerously, to invite a diminishment of 
the stability of our current world order. It is not perfect, of course, 
but I think few would argue with the assertion that it is better than 
it was for the 40 years between 1949 and 1989.
  We do not attack each other, because we know to do so would be to beg 
the ultimate destruction. But if we develop a capacity to knock down 
anything that could be sent at us, we have changed the threat 
perception--the perception of whether a balance exists--changed it in 
our own mind, and changed it for those who are our adversaries.
  Changing the threat perception or the perception of whether a balance 
exists initiates the very hopscotching process that is the simple 
history of the entire cold war. We detonated the first atom bombs; the 
Soviets followed. We detonated the hydrogen bomb; they followed. We put 
long-range bombers in the air with nuclear weapons; they followed. We 
developed intercontinental ballistic missiles; they followed. We 
developed long-range submarines with ballistic missile capability; they 
followed. We developed multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle 
or MIRVed nuclear warheads; they followed. Every single major episode 
of the cold war consisted of a first effort by the United States to 
develop technology that would give us an advantage. In every case, the 
Soviets responded by countering that advantage. After the Berlin wall 
fell, finally it became evident that this was an insane and vicious 
circle, consuming precious resources in our Nation and bankrupting the 
Soviet Union--in more than one respect.
  But now, at long last, that threat has receded. The Soviet Union is 
no more. And the threat of ballistic missile attack of the United 
States is virtually nil--and will be virtually nil for many years.
  Only Russia and China today can reach the United States with a 
nuclear warhead carried on an ICBM. All our intelligence agencies agree 
that there is no significant threat of such a missile attack today from 
either of those nations. Russia, while one must respect the military 
power still at its disposal, including intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, is not in any wise prepared to engage our Nation in an armed 
conflict. China has some strategic ballistic missile capability, but 
not anywhere close to enough to initiate a war with the United States. 
We are the only remaining superpower.
  And our intelligence community further agrees that no other nation 
will be able to develop the ability to hit the United States with 
ballistic-missile-conveyed weapons of mass destruction for a minimum of 
10 years.
  Let me share with my colleagues an excerpt from the prepared 
statement of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at 
a public hearing on January 10 of this year on the threats faced by our 
Nation. General Clapper said, in part:

       We see no interest in or capability of any new country 
     reaching the continental United States with a long-range 
     missile for at least the next decade.

  Then-Acting Director of Central Intelligence Adm. William Studeman, 
in response to questions asked at that same hearing, replied that

       No new countries have emerged with the motivation to 
     develop a missile to target CONUS and the four that we 
     previously identified--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya--
     are at least a decade away.

  The administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of 
State are all opposed to the missile defense and ABM provisions of this 
bill. Let me share the Secretary of State's letter with the Senate. In 
a letter to the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he 
says:

       I am writing to you to express my deep concern over certain 
     provisions in S. 1026. Specifically, it contains missile 
     defense and ABM Treaty-related provisions that raise serious 
     constitutional foreign policy and national security concerns. 
     Unless these provisions are removed or modified, I will 
     oppose this bill.
       If enacted into law, the provisions related to missile 
     defenses and the ABM Treaty would put the U.S. on a path to 
     violate the ABM Treaty by developing for deployment a non-
     compliant, multi-site, National Missile Defense by the year 
     2003. Such a program is unnecessary and would place the START 
     I and START II treaties at risk.
  I know that the Secretary of Defense also has opposed these 
provisions.
  Successive administrations, this one included, have supported the 
continued viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and 
enhance our national security.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have the entire letter 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                   Washington, DC. August 2, 1995.
       Dear Senator Pell: I am writing to you to express my deep 
     concern over certain provisions in S. 1026, the Senate's 
     National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996. Specifically, 
     S. 1026 contains missile defense and ABM Treaty related 
     provisions that raise serious constitutional, foreign policy 
     and national security concerns. Unless these provisions are 
     removed or modified I will oppose this bill.
       If enacted into law, the provisions related to missile 
     defenses and the ABM Treaty would put the U.S. on a path to 
     violate the ABM Treaty by developing for deployment a non-
     compliant, multi-site National Missile Defense (NMD) by the 
     year 2003. Such a program is unnecessary and would place the 
     START I and START II Treaties at risk.
       Successive Administrations have supported the continued 
     viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and 
     enhance our national security. Not only has it been critical 
     to preventing an arms race, but it has also made possible the 
     extraordinary progress that both Republican and Democratic 
     Administrations have made in reducing strategic offensive 
     arms. Our allies, including Britain and France, also view the 
     ABM Treaty as crucial to strategic stability and the 
     viability of their own independent nuclear deterrents. 

[[Page S 11262]]

       Another provision seeks unilaterally to impose a solution 
     to the on-going negotiations with the Russians on the ABM/TMD 
     demarcation. By prohibiting the obligation and expenditure of 
     funds to implement Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty according 
     to any interpretation except the interpretation specified in 
     the bill, the bill would infringe upon the President's 
     exclusive responsibility for the execution of the law and 
     would impair the conduct of foreign relations consistent with 
     U.S. treaty obligations.
       Further, such actions would immediately call into question 
     the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty, and have a negative 
     impact on U.S.-Russian relations, Russian implementation of 
     the START I Treaty, and Russian ratification of the START II 
     Treaty. This would leave thousands of warheads in place that 
     otherwise would be removed from deployment under the two 
     Treaties, including all MIRVed ICBMs such as the Russian 
     heavy SS-18.
       There is no need now to take actions that would lead us to 
     violate the Treaty and threaten the stabilizing reductions we 
     would otherwise achieve--and place strategic stability at 
     risk. We have established a treaty-compliant approach to 
     theater missile defense that will enable us to meet threats 
     we may face in the foreseeable future--and one that preserves 
     all the benefits of the ABM, START and START II Treaties.
       I hope that you will join with me to ensure that future 
     generations enjoy the benefit of these treaties and remove 
     these provisions that place these benefits at risk.
           Sincerely,
                                               Warren Christopher.

  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, we do not need to abrogate the ABM Treaty 
in order to defend against a threat that does not exist, and will not 
exist for at least 10 years. Indeed, there are many things that we can 
do while remaining in full compliance with the ABM Treaty to prepare a 
defense, should the decision be that such preparations are warranted 
and their cost is justified. And we always retain the option, under the 
terms of the treaty, to withdraw from the treaty under its terms, or to 
negotiate modifications to the treaty if the Russians will agree to our 
objectives.
  I might add, respectfully, that there are other ways to respond to a 
perceived threat that do not require building $40 billion systems that 
we do not even know will work when they are completed. We could use 
permissive action links; we could be negotiating harder with the 
Russians, and others, to take steps to prevent any kind of accidental 
launch; we could pursue the activities supported by Nunn-Lugar program 
funding, including strengthening Russian government controls over their 
nuclear weapons, safely and surely dismantling surplus nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems, and preventing technicians from transferring 
dangerous technologies to rogue states; we can provide for integral 
systems that literally destroy a missile before it is launched if 
someone tries to fire it without authorization.
  Indeed, under the terms of the ABM Treaty, we already are allowed to 
develop an antiballistic missile defense system in one location, and we 
started to do some years ago in Grand Forks and then we decided it was 
too expensive and we gave it up.
  But that is not the course this bill takes, Madam President. The 
missile defense and ABM provisions of this bill are an exercise in 
sheer lunacy. This is an attempt to create from thin air a reason to 
continue the numbingly expensive defense systems that the demise of the 
cold war has made superfluous--while simultaneously threatening the 
tremendous progress we have made in reducing the threat to our people 
from nuclear weapons.
  The effect of this bill is to jettison the current, real, 
demonstrable protections of the START I and START II Treaties in 
exchange for spending a minimum of $40 billion to develop a system to 
attempt to defend our Nation against ballistic missiles--an entirely 
theoretical system that may or may not function as designed.
  There are some Senators who have argued that we must be prepared, 
even if the risk is small and distant, for the possible threat of a 
potential aggressor nation developing and choosing to use against the 
United States a ballistic missile carrying a weapon of mass 
destruction. Others have said that the biggest risk is that some rogue 
nations may purchase such systems from either Russia or China. Mr. 
President, the fact is that if such nations wish us ill, and choose to 
act on those wishes, there are far less expensive, far faster, far 
easier, and far less technically complicated and failure-prone ways to 
wreak ill on the United States--ways against which a national missile 
defense system would be powerless to defend.
  Should a rogue nation, for whatever reason, choose to pursue 
development and fielding of a ballistic missile system capable of 
reaching our Nation, that capacity is so far down the road, so prone to 
detection, and so capable of being preemptively neutralized if 
necessary, that the world should not shudder at the notion that we are 
somehow defenseless.
  The main threats to our Nation today are from terrorists rolling 
bombs, nuclear or conventional, into our cities in cars or trucks, or 
carrying them in suitcases. Or cruise missiles launched from offshore. 
These are threats that the $40 billion-plus national missile defense 
system either cannot defend against at all, or against which the system 
could defend only incompletely.
  The biggest threat of all, Madam President, is one right before our 
faces. It is the very same threat with which we have lived for the 
duration of the cold war, and which we finally reduced dramatically and 
are reducing further by the arms control treaties which are constructed 
on the bedrock foundation of the ABM Treaty. Trashing the ABM Treaty 
will rekindle the strategic/nuclear arms race with Russia, because even 
in its current condition of economic distress, Russia will do whatever 
is necessary to ensure it has an effective deterrent and retaliatory 
capability. Russia, at a minimum, will retarget its ICBM's and SLBM's 
on American cities, industries, and military installations. It will 
stop retiring and disassembling nuclear warheads and delivery systems. 
The progress toward a safer world that was so painstakingly and 
painfully achieved over two decades by Presidents of both parties would 
be demolished. Surely, in a world that lacks the Soviet empire, in a 
world where we do not have the same kind of threat we have lived with 
for the last 50 years, we do not have to turn around and create a new 
arms race.
  Let us review the effects of this provision of the bill: In one 
sweeping movement, we are effectively demolishing--unilaterally--a 
treaty to which our Nation is a party and which this Chamber ratified. 
This action simply ignores procedures to withdraw legally from a treaty 
we determine no longer is in our best interests.
  We are countenancing in law the known, deliberate violation of U.S. 
law.
  We are pushing Russia to cease abiding by the terms of START I and 
halt progress to implementation of START II.
  We are tying the hands of our President in terms of negotiating arms 
control agreements.
  And we are launching this Nation on the course of spending a minimum 
of $40 billion for an untried, untested missile defense system that 
will not protect against the greatest threats of attack on this Nation.
  The people of this Nation have long ago concluded that we in the 
Congress often make decisions and laws that make no sense to them. The 
provisions of this bill that pertain to missile defense and, in 
particular, to the ABM Treaty, result from fanning the flame of an 
irrational fear built on a fiction--a fiction with which none of our 
senior intelligence community officials agrees, and that has no basis 
in our foreign policy history, in our arms control history, or in 
current threat analysis. If the Senate approves these provisions, it 
will take one of the most outrageously nonsensical steps it has taken 
in my 11 years of service here.
  I strongly support the amendment of the Senator from Michigan in 
deleting the offensive language from this bill. I believe Senate 
adoption of his amendment is absolutely essential. Without approval of 
this amendment, I will vote against this bill and urge all Senators to 
do the same. I will join with other Senators to urge the President to 
veto it--a step he already has indicated he expects to take if these 
provisions are not acceptably modified.
  I believe this bill is destined for the trash heap if the amendment 
is not approved. I hope it will be approved by an overwhelming vote.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I opposed this bill when it was being 
considered in the Armed Services Committee. The main reason I did so 
were the 

[[Page S 11263]]
provisions in the bill entitled the Missile Defense Act of 1995.
  I believe these provisions will do this Nation's security more harm 
than good, by ensuring that START II will not be ratified by the 
Russian Duma.
  Madam President, I am not going to repeat the analysis which Senator 
Levin, Senator Nunn, Senator Exon, Senator Kerry, and various others 
have already made about the specific provisions that the Levin 
amendment would strike. They are clearly the most provocative of the 
provisions on missile defense that the bill contains and the ones that 
are most certain to incite the Russians to react.
  I would like, however, to ask my colleagues how we, here in this 
Senate, would react if the Russian Duma passed a defense bill that 
contained the following provisions: First, how would we react if the 
Russians adopted a provision that committed Russia to deploy a 
multisite antiballistic missile defense by the year 2003, with an 
interim capability by the year 1999, which constituted an anticipatory 
breach of the ABM Treaty and that added hundreds of millions of dollars 
in ruble equivalence in order to pursue that goal.
  How would we react here in this Senate if the Russians adopted a 
provision that revived a space-based missile defense program, in the 
hope that it would allow Russia to dominate space in the long run, 
while providing a second layer of missile defense for that country?
  How would we react here in this Senate if the Russians adopted a 
provision that unilaterally resolved the theater missile defense 
demarcation line at a point that would clearly make the American 
theater missile defense systems beyond Patriot violations of the ABM 
Treaty in Russia's view?
  How would we react here in this Senate if the Russian Duma adopted a 
provision that limited President Yeltsin's ability to retire strategic 
weapons systems before START II is ratified by the U.S. Senate?
  Finally, how would we react in this body if the Russians adopted a 
provision that proposed to resume hydronuclear testing with yields up 
to hundreds of tons of TNT, which is a level that is not usually 
associated with the term hydronuclear.
  Madam President, if that bill were to pass the Russian Duma, the din 
on this floor would be deafening. Member after Member would stand up 
and declare that the right wing had won the internal political 
controversy in Russia, that the cold war was back on, and that in light 
of this deeply provocative attack by the Russian Duma, ratification of 
the START II Treaty was out of the question.
  I am certain that at least 34 Senators here would dispatch a letter 
to the President declaring their opposition to START II, and demanding 
a defense supplemental bill be submitted to the Congress so we could 
react to what has happened.
  Now, of course, if we do this sort of thing, in this defense bill 
that we are now considering on the floor, I presume the expectation is 
that the Russians would not be similarly provoked.
  Madam President, I do not buy that assumption. The one thing that the 
Russian industrial base could effectively compete with us on is 
fabricating nuclear weapons and missiles. Some of that base is in the 
Ukraine and would have to be revived in Russia.
  I, for one, do not want to take the chance that the extreme 
provisions in this bill will reignite the arms race. I, for one, do not 
want to subscribe it a double standard in our dealings with the 
Russians, now that the cold war is over.
  The extreme and provocative actions by our so-called 
``conservatives'' in this bill, in my view, will undoubtedly play into 
the hands of those who consider themselves conservative from a Russian 
perspective--those, in many cases, in Russia at least, who are bent on 
unraveling START II and other arms control efforts.
  The only thing that is attempting to be conserved by this 
transnational alliance would be the cold war.
  Madam President, I urge my colleagues, as many others have this 
afternoon, to support Senator Levin's effort to strike the most extreme 
provisions of this bill. If they are not struck, I trust that the 
President would veto the bill. I hope that is not necessary. I hope 
that we can act appropriately on this amendment and this bill can be 
improved to an extent that the President could sign it. Thank you. I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, in sitting here in the past few moments 
listening to the debate, I am somewhat surprised at the level of 
rhetoric that is currently being used.
  We heard Senator after Senator get up and say this declaration in the 
DOD authorization bill is one to violate the ABM Treaty, or to signal 
our intent to do so. They say this is a unilateral abrogation of the 
treaty against a fictional threat.
  I point out to my colleagues that nothing in this bill calls for the 
abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Nothing in this bill calls for us to 
violate the treaty.
  Fictional threat? I wonder how our supporters on the other side feel 
about the fictional threat that was launched against the state of 
Israel? What if the state of Israel had no defensive systems? What if 
they had no Patriots to defend against the Scud missile?
  I wonder how many would take the floor and say it is tough luck that 
they are out of business. All we had to have is a few Scud missiles 
carrying chemical warheads land in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem and wipe out 
their populations. They had no defensive mechanism available against 
it.
  We are talking about something quite different in terms of ICBM 
threats. I recall the debate on the threat from Iraq, during the debate 
on the Persian Gulf war. I remember those citing estimates by our CIA 
and our DIA and other intelligence agencies at that time. They said, we 
cannot give you an estimate. It could be 1 year, it could be 10 years, 
and we are guessing it is closer to 10 years than 1 year.
  Following the war with Saddam Hussein, I think we came to an entirely 
different conclusion. We discovered that Saddam had achieved much 
greater progress toward that goal than we had been aware of.
  Members on the other side say this should not be a partisan issue. 
Why is it that every time the Republican majority suggests a policy, it 
is partisan, but when everybody on that side lines up and vote against 
it, it is not partisan.
  This is not a partisan issue. It ought to be bipartisan. We ought to 
say, as a body, that we are concerned about the proliferation of 
technology--missile technology--in the world. We are concerned when we 
see major powers selling technology to potential enemies. We are 
concerned when we see China, for example, selling technology to other 
countries that may pose a threat to us in the future. We ought to be 
concerned about the proliferation of technology that one day--and we 
cannot predict when that one day will be--will pose a threat to our 
population.
  Now, admittedly, if we were to engage in a war with the former Soviet 
Union, that would not involve a limited attack or an accidental launch 
against us. That would be a massive exchange, against which there is no 
defense.
  I am one who, at different times over a number of years, has stood on 
this floor opposing the notion of having a so-called dome over the 
United States to protect us from an all-out attack. I never believed it 
was possible to do so and led the effort to defeat spending money in 
pursuit of that kind of system.
  But I have also stood on the floor with the Senator from Georgia, 
Senator Nunn, when he expressed concern about limited attacks, about 
accidental launches, about what we would do if suddenly received a 
message stating: ``Sorry, some accidental launch has taken place. There 
is an ICBM headed for New York City or Washington, DC, or Los 
Angeles,'' and all we can do is wait for it to hit?
  We are talking about constructing a system that will protect against 
a limited attack or accidental launch and nothing more, and it is all 
to be done in accordance with the ABM Treaty.
  The ABM Treaty as originally written called for multiple site 
defenses, two sites for each side. We renegotiated that treaty--at that 
time with the Soviets--to one site. Now we are saying, in view of the 
proliferation of technology, we ought to renegotiate it to 

[[Page S 11264]]
allow each of us, the Russians and the United States, to have some 
minimal capability to protect our respective countries against an 
accidental launch or a limited attack. We can do that within the ABM 
Treaty.
  The ABM Treaty explicitly anticipates ``changes in the strategic 
situation'' and provides a means to negotiate amendments to deal with 
such changes. It also allows for us to pull out of the ABM Treaty upon 
6 months' notice.
  Following what I hope will be the defeat of the Levin amendment, I 
intend to offer an amendment--perhaps joined by the Senator from 
Georgia, perhaps not--to make it clear that we intend to act in 
accordance with the ABM Treaty. We intend also to call upon the 
President to seek to negotiate with the Russians to allow each side to 
develop and deploy a limited system to protect our respective countries 
against this proliferation threat. And if the President should fail to 
do so, it will be my recommendation that the President come back and 
report to the Congress and then seek our advice as to whether or not we 
should continue with the ABM Treaty or at that time should indicate our 
desire to withdraw.
  That is all within the ABM Treaty. And contrary to what is being 
represented here on the floor this afternoon, we are not seeking a 
unilateral abrogation. I do not want to see that. I hope, later on 
during the course of this afternoon, I can make that very clear with 
explicit language that will resolve any doubts about that. We want to 
continue to act in accord with the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty allows us 
to negotiate to seek amendments. We want to see if we cannot negotiate 
with the Russians to allow for a deployment on a land-based system with 
multiple sites--and the Russians would have the same right to do so--to 
protect us against miscalculation or accident.
  Madam President, there is an assumption in all of this debate that 
somehow the threat will only come from the former Soviet Union. I do 
not make that assumption. We are concerned about what is taking place 
on a global basis. We are concerned about potential threats from other 
sources. We cannot predict who they are, where they may be, or how far 
along the line of technology development they have proceeded. But we 
cannot face our constituents in good conscience and say: ``Sorry we 
failed to take any measures to protect you. Our only defense is to 
launch an all-out attack on whomever launched that missile.'' That is 
our only option today. Is that a rational, sound option, to say if you 
launch one or two missiles against the United States, we end up 
launching ours against yours?
  What we need to do is to have a limited protective system. That is 
what the Armed Services Committee seeks to do in this authorization. I 
intend, following the debate and conclusion of the Levin amendment, to 
offer an amendment to make that very clear.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I will just yield myself 1 minute and 
then I will yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the language of this bill which we strike 
says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site 
national missile defense system. A multiple site national defense 
system is not allowed by the ABM Treaty. Period.
  It also says we should negotiate. That is great. But it is very 
precise, and we tried to get these words out in committee and we 
failed. I am very glad to hear from the Senator from Maine he does not 
support abrogating the treaty and he will offer language making it 
clear we want to stay inside the ABM Treaty. That is what my amendment 
does. That is precisely what my amendment does, is to strike the 
language which says that it is the policy of the United States to 
deploy a multiple site system--which violates the ABM Treaty.
  There is one other provision in here. The Senator from Maine talks 
about, ``We should negotiate,'' and I surely agree with him on that, 
too. It is stated right here in language which the amendment will 
strike, if it succeeds, that it is the sense of the Senate the 
President should cease all efforts to modify or clarify obligations 
under the ABM Treaty.
  So while the Senator from Maine, in a way that I fully support, says 
he thinks we should negotiate changes in the ABM Treaty, the bill has 
language, which the Levin amendment will strike, which says that for 1 
year pending this study the President should not seek to modify, to 
clarify obligations under the ABM Treaty.
  So I think the amendment which the Senator from Maine says he will 
oppose actually gets exactly at the language which I believe he 
basically will oppose as well, at least from the statement he gave this 
afternoon on the floor, that is to make it clear we are not now going 
to declare we are going to violate the ABM Treaty. The purpose of the 
Levin amendment is to strike the language in the bill that says we are 
going to violate the ABM Treaty. It is clear, as you can read it. ``It 
is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site system.'' 
That is what is not permitted by the ABM Treaty. That is the language, 
specifically targeted, rifleshot language that we seek to remove from 
this bill.
  Now I will yield to the Senator from Massachusetts 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized 
for 15 minutes.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Madam President, I listened to the interventions of my friend and 
colleague from Maine and the response from the Senator from Michigan, 
Senator Levin, about whether the provisions in question effectively 
abrogate the ABM Treaty. I would like to refer to the committee report 
which I believe gives us an answer. The report reads, ``The committee 
acknowledges that many of the policies and recommendations contained in 
the Missile Defense Act of 1995, if implemented, would require relief 
in one form or another from the ABM Treaty.''
  It cannot be much clearer than that. This language, agreed upon by 
the majority of the members of the committee, acknowledges that many of 
the policies and recommendations contained in the Missile Defense Act 
of 1995, if implemented, would require relief from the ABM Treaty.
  It is the purpose of the amendment of the Senator from Michigan to 
remove those particular provisions that would require such relief. 
Those who oppose his amendment want to maintain the provisions in the 
Missile Defense Act of 1995 which effectively will emasculate the ABM 
Treaty.
  There is no question--certainly there was no question on the minds of 
any of the members of the Armed Services Committee--as to what was 
intended, and the Senator from Michigan has outlined in careful detail 
those parts of the ABM Treaty that are inconsistent with the provisions 
included in this bill. So we should be under no illusion about what was 
intended by the majority of the members of the Armed Services Committee 
and what the remedy will be if the amendment of the Senator from 
Michigan is accepted.
  Madam President, during the course of the debate on the issue, some 
on the other side have argued that we need to build and deploy a 
national missile defense to protect our citizens against the accidental 
and unauthorized launch of Russian nuclear missiles. The Defense 
Department has looked at this matter. It is not a new issue. It is not 
a new argument. It is a matter that was considered and has been 
considered in its various forms over recent years in the fashioning and 
shaping of the START I, START II and the ABM treaties. During that 
consideration, the Defense Department determined that the best way to 
defend our Nation against accidental launches is to do two things: 
first, reduce the number of nuclear missiles in the Russian arsenal, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of an accidental launch. Republicans 
understood that. President Nixon understood it when he advanced the ABM 
Treaty. President Bush understood it when he advanced the START I and 
START II treaties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various 
Secretaries of Defense and State understood it as well.
  There must be some new revelation that has come over the members of 
our committee to undermine that very 

[[Page S 11265]]
basic and fundamental concept embraced by Republicans and Democrats, 
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, and members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. They agreed that the most important thing that can be done for 
the security of the United States was to achieve nuclear arms 
reductions. These agreements were initiated and supported because 
Presidents over a long period of time believed that they were in the 
interest of the security of the American people, and of the nations of 
the globe.
  The Missile Defense Act would undermine these achievements, the 
successful arms reductions negotiated in START I and START II. We have 
been warned of that. The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of State have outlined the statements, comments, and 
conditions of Russian leaders that indicate they would not go forward 
to ratify START II if the ABM Treaty is abrogated.
  Before taking the second step to protect our Nation against the 
unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear missiles one must 
understand that the Soviet Union is not our adversary and that it is 
not our ally. We can expect one form of conduct from our adversary and 
another from our ally. But the Soviet Union is neither.
  So the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have recognized a 
second step, which they have put into practice, that will be further 
undermined if the Levin amendment is not agreed to, and that is to work 
cooperatively with the Russians to assure firm command and control over 
our respective forces. For example, in 1994 we reached the nuclear 
detargeting agreement with the Russians. We agreed that our nuclear 
missiles deployed in silos or on submarines would not be targeted 
against each other--an important step.
  The Russian missiles are not targeted against us today. I do not want 
to see them retarget their missiles on our territory because they have 
additional concern about the United States breaking out of the ABM 
Treaty. Our friends on the other side cannot guarantee that. We cannot, 
as supporters of the Levin amendment, guarantee it. But we can say with 
some degree of predictability that the arguments for changing that 
policy of retargeting and increasing instability are further advanced 
by the defeat of the Levin amendment.
  We agreed in 1994 that we would change the targeting of our missiles 
both on land and on the seas, and, in that way, if there were an 
accidental launch of a Russian nuclear missile, it would not land on 
United States cities but harmlessly in the ocean. We achieved this 
important agreement through cooperative discussions, not by mandates 
such as those included in this particular proposal that would mandate 
the President's negotiating position on the demarcation between theater 
missile defenses and strategic defenses. We get it through cooperative 
methods, not by sending bulletins to the Russians. We did it through 
cooperation, and it has worked and is working, and we are safer and 
more secure today because of that.
  How are we going to make similar progress if there is no cooperative 
relationship with the Russians? How are we going to do that? We have 
not heard an explanation of how cooperation will continue if this bill 
is not amended. Once again, the key to United States-Russian nuclear 
safety is maintaining the productive relationship we have struck since 
the end of the cold war: to continue with the START reductions and 
cooperative threat reduction efforts. And the best way to protect 
Americans from unauthorized and accidental launches of Russian missiles 
as maintained by the Defense Department is through cooperative 
measures, not through active defenses.
  There are two efforts--continued reductions in strategic nuclear 
weapons and the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs--that 
we must ensure will continue. There is no question that there would be 
serious damage to these efforts if we allow this bill to put 
cooperative ventures at risk.
  Finally, Mr. President, in the committee report on this bill, there 
is the discussion in the section on the Missile Defense Act that states 
that in the near term, national missile defense deployments serve to 
stabilize mutual deterrence by reducing prospective incentives to 
strike first in a crisis.
  That has been an issue that has been debated by Republicans and 
Democrats for as long as I can remember, for as long as we have been 
talking about strategic nuclear weapons. That was the argument when we 
were looking at star wars, and it has been resurrected even with the 
changed world conditions.
  I have great difficulty understanding the logic behind this point. If 
we were to deploy a national missile defense, we would be degrading the 
effectiveness of the Russian offensive missiles. And as anybody who 
follows strategic nuclear policy understands, any time you degrade the 
effectiveness of a nation's missiles, you shorten the fuse on those 
missiles in a time of crisis, you increase the incentives for the other 
side to strike first.
  Mutual deterrence remains as the ultimate guarantor of our safety 
from nuclear attack. There are ways to make deterrence more stable and 
more secure. That is through negotiation of arms reductions and 
negotiations on command and control agreements that improve the safety 
of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
  I believe that is the way to go, and all of those efforts will be 
advanced by the acceptance of the Levin amendment.
  Madam President, I strongly support the amendment to save the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty from unilateral abrogation, which would be the 
result if this bill is enacted in its present form. Since the United 
States and the Soviet Union signed this landmark treaty in 1972, it has 
been the cornerstone of United States nuclear arms control policy. By 
insuring that nuclear arsenals remain effective deterrents, the ABM 
Treaty has brought stability to the nuclear relationship for the past 
quarter century.
  Unilaterally discarding the ABM Treaty would severely undermine the 
cooperative United States-Russian strategic relationship. Just as the 
United States is beginning to reap the greatest rewards from the 
strategic nuclear policy constructed on the foundation of the ABM 
Treaty, many Members of Congress want to throw it all away.
  The START I and START II accords, signed by President Bush, would 
verifiably eliminate three-quarters of all the nuclear weapons ever 
pointed at the United States. Through the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat 
reduction Program, the Russians are actually accepting United States 
help to dismantle their nuclear weapons, a situation that none of us 
would have dared imagine only a decade ago.
  The bill's provision is a clear and present danger to the ABM Treaty. 
It would turn United States-Russian cooperation into mistrust. We would 
be discarding tangible present advances in arms control for the 
illusion of future security through a national missile defense system 
that will cost billions of dollars above and beyond the huge defense 
burden we already carry in this era of deep budget cuts.
  The only way that opponents of the ABM Treaty could develop a 
rationale in support of the offending provisions in this bill is by 
misrepresenting the nature of nuclear threats to the United States in 
the post-cold war era, the value of the ABM Treaty today, and the need 
for building and deploying strategic defense in the near future.
  Five transparent myths underlie the case for building national 
missile defenses and abrogating the ABM Treaty. Once the myths are 
exposed, the case for abrogating the ABM Treaty crumbles.
  Myth No. 1 is that the ABM Treaty is a cold war relic whose value 
disappeared with the demise of the former Soviet Union, so that we can 
abrogate the ABM Treaty at no cost to United States security.
  The cold war may have ended, but nuclear deterrence still remains as 
the centerpiece of U.S. nuclear security.
  The end of the cold war and the relaxation of military tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet successor states have not made 
the ABM Treaty obsolete. The nature of nuclear weapons and their 
massive destructive power has not changed. No matter how much the 
opponents of the ABM Treaty wish it were otherwise, effective mutual 
deterrence is what keeps Americans safe from nuclear war.
  Today, 6 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and nearly 4 years 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the 
United States and 

[[Page S 11266]]
Russia is in transition. Russia is no longer our adversary, but it is 
not our ally either. Although we see no apparent tensions that could 
lead to nuclear conflict, prudence dictates that we structure our 
remaining nuclear arsenals to achieve the most stable nuclear 
deterrence possible.
  The end to the hostile relationship allows us to cooperate much more 
extensively than in the past to solidify and stabilize nuclear 
deterrence at much lower levels of nuclear weapons. Over the past 6 
years, we have managed to use this change in the relationship in a way 
that leaves deterrence more stable, and the American people safer than 
at any time since the beginning of the cold war.
  Consider the progress we have made in recent years. In 1991, 
President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty. Two 
years later, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the START II 
Treaty, which will reduce the number of Russian nuclear warheads 
pointed in our direction from 10,000 to 3,500.
  In addition, through cooperative initiatives, the so-called Nunn-
Lugar programs, we are working with the Russians to assist them in 
dismantling their nuclear warheads, thereby substantially reducing the 
Russian arsenal's threat to the United States and substantially 
reducing the likelihood that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands 
of renegade regimes or terrorists.
  The ABM Treaty is the indispensable foundation for these steps. 
Abrogating the treaty would jeopardize all of these important advances, 
and endanger the future of United States-Russian nuclear relations.
  Some argue that the ABM Treaty is obsolete because deterrence is no 
longer needed. They pretend that we can rely on missile defenses to 
protect the American people from nuclear war. This is the same 
preposterous argument we heard during the 1980's, when star wars was 
oversold as a miracle protection from the nuclear threat.
  SDI never came close to meeting the standards of operational 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness that the Reagan administration 
said would be necessary to make the transition from deterrence to 
defense. No technical advances since the abandonment of that ill-
conceived and wasteful adventure make the reality today any different. 
Defense cannot replace deterrence, and we would be foolish to try it. 
The ABM Treaty is not obsolete. It is still the foundation for stable 
deterrence, and it deserves to be maintained.
  The second myth is that the Russians will not mind if we abrogate the 
ABM Treaty. It is said that we can deploy a national missile defense 
and still maintain a cooperative strategic relationship with Moscow.
  This groundless assertion is refuted by the Secretary of Defense, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and most important of all, by 
the Russians themselves.
  Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
in a June 28 letter to Senator Levin stated that undermining the ABM 
Treaty will make START II ratification by the Russian parliament highly 
unlikely. In the letter, he addresses this issue clearly. He writes:

       While we believe that START II is in both countries' 
     interests regardless of other events, we must assume such 
     unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for START II 
     ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader 
     security relationship with Russia as well.

  General Shalikashvili is the top military officer in the Nation. He 
has had extensive contacts with senior Russian military officers. In 
his view, enactment of legislation that harms the ABM Treaty will 
damage our cooperative security relationship with the Russians at the 
very moment when we are trying to move forward in arms control.
  Secretary of Defense Perry, in a letter to Senator Nunn, the ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee, feels the same way. He writes 
that the provisions in this bill ``would jeopardize Russian 
implementation of the START I and START II treaties, which involve the 
elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons.'' Secretary 
Perry understands full well the damage this bill would inflict on U.S. 
security, which is why the administration strongly opposes these 
provisions.
  The Russians themselves feel the same way. At the May summit in 
Moscow, President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed a joint 
statement that commits both nations to upholding the ABM Treaty, and to 
developing and deploying theater missile defense systems in compliance 
with the Treaty. It is reckless to think that the Russians will watch 
us violate this commitment without a response that will set back the 
cause of our mutual security.
  At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on June 29, Russian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Kozyrev reaffirmed the commitment of the 
Yeltsin government to ratify the START II Treaty, ``subject to strict 
compliance with the ABM Treaty.''
  It could not be any clearer. If we abrogate the ABM Treaty, we will 
not have START II, much less START III. We will not have cooperative 
threat reduction. And we may well not have a comprehensive test ban and 
other arms control agreements we need in the years ahead.
  The third myth underlying the proposed abrogation of the ABM Treaty 
is that we face the threat of ballistic missile attack from renegade 
nations that will achieve this capability in the near future.
  This myth squarely contradicts the conclusions of the U.S. 
intelligence community and the Pentagon leadership.
  Lt. Gen. James Clapper, Jr., the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, testified before the Armed Services Committee in January that 
``we see no interest in or capability of any new country reaching the 
continental United States with a long range missile for at least the 
next decade.'' Secretary Perry endorsed this judgment in testimony 
before the Armed Services Committee this year.
  Concern about future ballistic missile threats to U.S. territory is 
the basis for the Clinton administration's research and development 
program on national missile defenses. This reasonable level of spending 
on anti-missile defenses will put the United States in a position to 
rapidly deploy such a defense if unforeseen threats arise in the near 
future. It makes sense to spend a modest amount on R&D. It makes no 
sense to throw billions of dollars into deploying what may be an 
unnecessary system sooner.
  Myth No. 4 is that a multi-site national missile defense can be 
deployed over the next decade for a modest cost. This assertion is a 
fantasy. This year's bill plans to spend $671 million on national 
missile defense, an increase of $300 million over the administration's 
request. But this increment is only the tip of a very large iceberg.
  According to the Congressional Budget Office, deploying a single-site 
national missile defense would cost $29 billion to complete and $16.5 
billion of the total would be spent over the next 5 years. This 
estimate does not include the cost of building additional sites, which 
the pending bill calls for, and it does not include the cost of 
operating and maintaining the system once it is operational.
  Other costs will be higher too. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty will 
doom START II, and saddle us with a nuclear stalemate with the Russians 
at cold war levels. We will have to maintain our strategic nuclear 
arsenal at its current size, not the greatly reduced level under START 
II. If we proceed with this bill, we will be spending tens of billions 
of tax dollars in a way that increases the nuclear threat to the United 
States. The American taxpayer was taken for a long and expensive and 
unnecessary ride by star wars in the 1980s. It makes no sense to repeat 
that experience in the post-cold war era.
  Myth No. 5 is that we need to discard the ABM Treaty in order to 
build and deploy effective theater missile defenses to protect U.S. 
forces in the field. The fact is, the United States can do both. We can 
comply with the ABM Treaty, and we can create effective theater missile 
defense systems.
  The ABM Treaty strictly limits development and deployment of 
strategic missile defenses. But it expressly allows the signers to 
deploy theater missile defenses. The United States is already 
developing advanced theater missile defenses that may have significant 
capability to defeat strategic offensive missiles.
  As a result, the Clinton administration has entered into negotiations 
with 

[[Page S 11267]]
Russia to determine which systems will be permitted under the ABM 
Treaty. By so doing, the President is using one of the key features of 
the treaty--its flexibility to update and revise the Treaty as 
developments demand.
  This bill, however, prevents the effective negotiation of any 
boundary between theater and strategic defenses. It would deny the 
President the power to negotiate this clarification of the treaty in a 
way that will best serve our national security.
  By attempting to achieve by legislative mandate what the President 
should negotiate, the bill will undercut the basic constitutional 
allocation of treaty-making powers between the President and Congress. 
It is wrong to legislate an ideological negotiating position while 
rational negotiations are underway. This step sets an extremely 
dangerous precedent for the future, and could result in the collapse of 
the ABM Treaty.
  It is time to cut through the myths and misrepresentations. Our 
national security is at stake. It makes no sense to sacrifice real and 
verifiable reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal, in exchange for a 
multibillion dollar national missile defense that will leave us less 
secure. A decade ago, we should have left star wars in Hollywood where 
it belonged--and that is where this senseless sequel belongs too.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Madam President, I yield whatever time remains back to the Senator 
from Michigan.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized 
for 10 minutes.
  Mr. SMITH. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. President, the other side in this debate, Senator Levin and 
others, assert that somehow this bill is going to violate the ABM 
Treaty or require us to violate the ABM Treaty. Those are the terms 
that we have heard used--violate or require us to violate the treaty.
  My friend, Senator Levin, is a very accomplished attorney, and I 
respect his intellect very much, but this is just patently false. There 
is no requirement to violate any treaty in this legislation we have 
written. Nothing in this bill violates the treaty, nothing. If it did, 
if the language in here were to violate the treaty, why does the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, in comment after 
comment talk about an anticipatory breach down the road?
  If there is an anticipatory breach down the road, the way I read that 
is there is not any breach yet. There is not any violation of anything. 
We are anticipating it. Well, you can anticipate anything you want, but 
the facts speak for themselves. This does not violate the ABM Treaty, 
period. Nothing in this bill violates the ABM Treaty. It is simply 
patently false to say that it does.
  Now, in 2003--that is the deployment date for ground-based multiple 
sites--in 2003, yes, we could do that, but it is not 2003. This is 
still 1995 as I looked at the calendar, and I do not quite understand 
the logic here of how it is that we are violating something that we 
have not violated yet. We are anticipating a violation, but we are not 
violating anything. So I am having trouble understanding the semantics, 
and I think that is probably the intent of the opposition here, to make 
sure that others have trouble understanding the semantics so that we 
can confuse and obfuscate and hide the real truth, which is that we are 
not violating any treaty at all in this language.
  Now, article XIII, which the Senator from Michigan and others are 
aware of, is very clear on this, about what our rights are under this 
treaty. There is nothing hidden about it. I have a copy of the treaty 
right here in my hand, and it says:

       To promote the objectives and implementation of the 
     provisions of this treaty, the parties shall establish 
     promptly a standing consultative commission within the 
     framework of which they will--

  Among other things,

     consider possible changes in the strategic situation which 
     have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty.

  Surely, my colleagues will admit there have been strategic changes 
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Second:

       Consider as appropriate possible proposals for further 
     increasing the viability of this Treaty including proposals 
     for amendments.

  We have a right to amend the treaty. And finally it says under 
article XV, Mr. President, that:

       Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty 
     have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides 
     that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of 
     this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests and it 
     shall give notice of its decision to the other party 6 months 
     prior to the withdrawal from the Treaty.

  So we are not violating any treaty with this language. If someone is 
saying we are anticipating the violation of the treaty, fine; we can 
anticipate anything we want to. But it is simply wrong to say that we 
are violating this treaty or that we do not have the right to change 
this treaty or to withdraw from this treaty or whatever the parties 
wish to do. It is right there. It is written. It is clear. It is 
indisputable. It is fact.
  I am kind of surprised to hear that we are going to automatically 
violate this treaty if we decide that we, in the United States of 
America, want to defend America against attack.
  Well, you know what? We do not violate the treaty, but if we had to 
defend America I would violate the treaty--that happens to be this 
Senator's personal opinion--because I do not think I am worshiping at 
the altar of a treaty. I did not know that a treaty was forever and 
that we could not change the provisions.
  We have the right to change this treaty. It was written to change, 
just like the Constitution was written with a possibility to amend it. 
This treaty was written to change it, to even withdraw from it if it is 
in the national security interests of a nation to do so.
  Those are the facts. I suggest to my colleagues that the end of the 
cold war is just the kind of change the treaty is referring to. That is 
the kind of strategic change that this treaty is referring to, the end 
of the cold war, the end of a bipolar world. We are now in a multipolar 
world with threats that we do not really know how to calculate, with 
weapons that are different and in the hands of some who may be more 
inclined to use them than even the old Soviet Union. Our colleagues who 
support the Levin amendment, if we are to put this in perspective, are 
the same people who day after day, day after day, year after year, 
argue the cold war is over and therefore we should adapt our defense 
program to the changed environment.
  That is a good argument. The cold war is over. We must adapt. We are 
adapting. We have downsized our military. We are changing some of the 
priorities in our weapons systems. That is fine. But why are they 
fighting so hard, Mr. President, to preserve the most obvious relic of 
the cold war, the ABM Treaty? The ABM Treaty, the AntiBallistic Missile 
Treaty, the relic of the cold war, deals with a bipolar world, deals 
with a concept of mutual assured destruction, that if one side fires at 
the other, the other will fire back; therefore, the first side will not 
fire. That is the whole logic here, but is not a bipolar world.
  Does anybody believe that Saddam Hussein would be reasonable and 
rational, or perhaps Qadhafi in Libya? Are we dealing with rational 
people in some of these fundamentalist and other nations around the 
world today? I think not, and the American people know that.
  Frankly, those who wrote this treaty knew that, that we were not 
always going to have the same situation in the world. The treaty is 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no Soviet 
Union anymore. Even if we agree that Russia is the successor to the 
Soviet Union--which frankly is an open question--there are many other 
nations now, legitimate nations of the world that were part of that old 
Soviet Union. It is not just Russia. Russia is not the automatic 
successor to the Soviet Union.
  It is clear that this treaty does not include the nations that 
threaten us the most. The nations that threaten us most: Libya, North 
Korea, Syria, Iran, Iraq, China, they did not sign the ABM Treaty. They 
do not have anything to do with the ABM Treaty. So why are 

[[Page S 11268]]
we locked to an ABM Treaty? Why are we locked to an ABM Treaty that 
does not even deal with the countries that are threatening us?
  The answer is very simple. We should not be. And the treaty founders, 
those who authored that treaty, knew it. We are not standing on the 
brink with Russia. In fact, Yeltsin says Russia is no longer targeting 
us with missiles. This is no longer bipolar. It is multipolar.
  The Levin amendment would leave us perpetually locked into an 
outdated posture of confrontation with the former Soviet Union, the 
past, the cold war. Let us step into the 21st century. Let us look at 
the threat today, not yesterday. We have an obligation here in this 
Senate to look ahead, to protect the future, and this language does it. 
This language does it. It encourages a cooperative transition away, 
away from mutual assured destruction toward mutual assured security--
not destruction.
  The Levin amendment would leave America completely vulnerable to 
ballistic missile attack. It would strike this language, gut the 
essence of the bill, restrict our ability to make theater defenses as 
technologically capable as possible.
  The SASC bill says all Americans deserve to be protected and ensures 
that our national security and theater defense programs are targeted 
toward the specific threats which confront us today, not yesterday.
  The Levin amendment would perpetuate the policy again of mutual 
assured destruction, even though the cold war is over. Do not take my 
word for it. Henry Kissinger, who helped develop the doctrine, agrees 
that mutual assured destruction is no longer relevant; not even 
appropriate, yet Senator Levin would continue a policy that I believe 
is absurd, that leaves our Nation defenseless while being locked into a 
policy, a relic that belongs in the dustbin of history.
 It is time to move on, Mr. President. It is time to move into the 21st 
century.

  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-seven seconds.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, and 
I thank the Senator from South Carolina for yielding.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield the Senator from Arkansas 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. President, I heard the Senator from Maine a moment ago say that 
there is not anything in this bill that abrogates the ABM Treaty 
between Russia and the United States.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I cannot hear very well. Is the Senator 
using his microphone?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator using his microphone?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I thought I was. I see it lying on the floor.
  Most people say, ``I heard your speech awhile ago, and when I stuck 
my head out the window I could really hear it.''
  Is this better? I apologize.
  As I was about to say, the Senator from Maine awhile ago said there 
was not anything in this bill that would abrogate the ABM Treaty. I do 
not know how more forcefully you can abrogate the treaty than to pass 
this bill. Now, obviously, it is not going to be abrogated until the 
Soviet Union gets a stomach full of this kind of stuff and withdraws 
from the treaty, which they have a right to do on 6 months' notice. 
But, first of all, I want you to look at the language of the treaty. As 
I said this morning, English is the mother tongue. That is what we 
speak. That is what we write. And here is what the mother tongue says 
in article I of the 1976 Protocol of the ABM Treaty. ``Each party shall 
be limited at any one time''--limited at any one time--``to a single 
area out of the two provided in article III of the treaty for 
deployment. . .''
  You see the word ``single''? That means one. ``Single'' and ``one'' 
are the same.
  Here is what the bill says. Section 233, ``It is the policy of the 
United States to . . . deploy a multiple-site''--``multiple,'' 
colleagues, is more than one. ``. . .United States to . . . deploy a 
multiple-site national ballistic missile defense system.''
  Section 235, two sections down, ``The Secretary of Defense shall 
develop . . . national missile defense system, which will attain 
initial operational capability by the end of 2003.'' It shall include 
``Ground-based interceptors deployed at multiple sites''--not two; 
maybe a half a dozen. And the treaty is very specific that we shall be 
limited to one.
  And people have the temerity to get up on this floor and, I assume, 
try to deceive the American people into believing this is a perfectly 
harmless, innocent little bill. Oh, I wish I missed the cold war like 
some of my colleagues do. There are colleagues in this place that 
cannot sleep at night since the cold war ended and will do anything to 
resurrect it. There are defense contractors who cannot stand the demise 
of the Soviet Union. I do not know why it bothers them. We certainly 
have not cut defense spending any.
  When the Senator from Maine mentioned the people of Israel, he was 
talking about a theater missile defense system which virtually every 
person in this body has strongly supported. We are not talking about 
theater missiles. We are talking about headed toward an antiballistic 
missile system in direct contravention of our word as a nation with our 
name on a treaty that either means something or it does not.
  Oh, the arrogance in this bill drives me crazy. First, we will say 
where the demarcation line is between whether something is a theater 
missile or an antiballistic missile system. We will decide. And if the 
Russians do not like it, as we used to say when I was a kid, they can 
take it or lump it. We will deploy on multiple sites. And if the 
Russians think that violates the treaty, which it clearly does, they 
can take it or lump it.
  This bill says ``the Senate.'' Now, you think about the President of 
the United States, who negotiates treaties and who is talking to the 
Russians right now about trying to resolve some of these ABM questions. 
What does this bill say? The Senate--not the President--the Senate will 
appoint a group of Senators to review ``continuing value and validity 
of the ABM Treaty.'' We will decide whether it has any value, whether 
it has any continuing validity. That would be insulting enough. What 
else do they say? This committee will recommend policy guidance, and 
the President--Mr. President, you will ``cease all efforts to modify, 
clarify or otherwise alter this treaty,'' et cetera, et cetera. The 
arrogance of a bill that says to the President, ``Stop it. Quit trying 
to work something out. We will decide whether this treaty has value or 
not.''
  The arguments on the other side about how this bill does not abrogate 
the treaty, all it does is set out a whole host of things which lead 
unalterably toward a flagrant violation of the treaty and abrogation of 
the treaty. No self-respecting nation--and Russia is one--will sit idly 
by while we construe the treaty any way we want to. And they are 
expected to sit idly by and say, ``Yes, yes, yes.''
  I have never heard as much third-grade sophistry in my life as I 
heard when the Senator from Michigan offered his amendment. On June 21, 
President Yeltsin submitted the START II Treaty, not negotiated by Bill 
Clinton, negotiated by George Bush--a good treaty. It should be 
ratified by both sides immediately. George Bush should say he wants it 
put on his epitaph that he negotiated START II. So when President 
Yeltsin appointed his Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozynev, and his Defense 
Minister, Pavel Grachev, then the President of the Russian party, to 
negotiate with the Duma and ratify START II, a spokesman for the Duma 
said:

       The ratification process would undoubtedly be influenced by 
     progress in the attainment of a Russian-American agreement on 
     the delineation of the strategic and tactical antimissile 
     defense system. The observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty depends 
     on this.
       The role of this treaty remains unchanged in creating 
     conditions for cutting down strategic offensive weapons.

  Can you blame Russia? Be fair-minded for about 10 seconds. That is 
unusual around here. But try it. Be fair-minded for about 10 seconds. 
If the roles were 

[[Page S 11269]]
reversed, if the Russians were passing laws to abrogate the ABM Treaty, 
would we ratify START II? We would take it to the men's room, is what 
we would do with it.
  Well, Mr. President, both nations have saved billions of dollars by 
not building antiballistic missile systems. We have a lot of Senators, 
I say, who just can hardly handle the end of the cold war. How many 
times have I stood at this desk trying to keep this Nation from 
spending $2 billion resurrecting a bunch of old rusty buckets called 
battleships. Two billion dollars. Where are they? In mothballs right 
where everybody knew they were going. Two billion dollars already gone.
  I stood here pleading with this body, ``Don't buy all these D-5 
missiles, you can't possibly use that many.'' And the Star Wars battle 
which I thought was over.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I ask for 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. BUMPERS. All I heard was, ``The chiefs want it, the Secretary 
wants it,'' and now the chiefs do not want this. They did not even want 
the $7 billion that was added in committee, and they certainly do not 
want all this language in the bill. Chairman Shalikashvili does not 
want it. Nobody wants it except the Armed Services Committee.
  Our bombers are not on alert. Our cities are not targeted. For the 
first time in 40 years the American people can get a decent night's 
sleep. So what are we going to do? We are going to say, ``Wake up, 
remember the good old days when you couldn't sleep at night for fear of 
a nuclear war? They are going to bring it back to you in spades.''
  There are a lot of things wrong with this bill. I said this morning, 
and I say again, in my 21 years in the Senate, this is, by far, the 
worst defense bill that has ever been presented on this floor.
  Oh, the arrogance of power. Every great nation that has indulged in 
the arrogance of power, as this bill does, has lived to regret it. The 
Senator from New Hampshire said we have not violated the ABM Treaty 
``yet,'' ``we're just going to interpret it any way we want to and we 
are going to build a system and we will decide where the demarcation 
line is.'' Do you think the Russians are going to take something that 
they feel is prejudicial to their security? The last guy to 
underestimate Russia was Adolf Hitler. They are on their hunkers, but I 
will tell you, they will starve their people before they will be 
humiliated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I ask for 1 additional minute.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I have watched on Discovery Channel for the past 2 
months and on PBS all these battles of World War II, a lot of them the 
Russians against the Germans. Twenty-two million Russians died. They 
starved to death by the thousands at Leningrad and in Stalingrad.
  I am not suggesting we be afraid of Russia. I am suggesting that the 
world will be eminently better off if the two superpowers of this world 
can agree. The American people really do not understand the details of 
this. Do you know what the American people do? They elect you and me to 
do responsible things. They elect us expecting that we will know 
something about it and that we will protect the American people.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield to Senator Chafee 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned over this bill's 
provision affecting the ABM Treaty, and I would like to discuss my 
support for the Levin amendment. Let me give a little bit of history.
  The ABM Treaty was agreed to 20 years ago. What does it do? We hear a 
lot about the ABM Treaty, but what does it do? What is the key part of 
it? The thrust of it was to prevent the United States or the Soviet 
Union from gaining the ability to unilaterally --that is one side 
alone--to launch a ballistic missile attack against the other without 
the possibility of retribution. In other words, the whole purpose of 
the treaty was to prevent either side from employing a defensive system 
to shoot down incoming missiles, because that would, in effect, 
encourage one side to launch an attack knowing that they would be 
protected from any retaliation.
  Since that time, the geopolitical situation in the world has changed. 
The Soviet Union no longer exists and the Warsaw Pact has collapsed. 
There has also been rapid technological advances that could not have 
been predicted at the time that the ABM Treaty was signed.
  Given these dramatic changes, I certainly understand the interest to 
take a look at this ABM Treaty. It has been 20 years. It is appropriate 
to have modifications and to look at it again. But, the point I want to 
make is, the changes to this treaty, or any other treaty, for that 
matter, must be negotiated by the President of the United States, in 
consultation with his military and diplomatic advisers and, obviously, 
with confirmation by the Senate.
  Such changes should not be dictated by the legislature, either the 
House or the Senate.
  Let us look at what S. 1026 does in regard to the ABM Treaty. This is 
what it says:

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
     site national missile defense system.

  The ABM Treaty says each nation can only have one ABM site, one site 
in each nation. This says ``No, no, we are changing that policy.''

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
     site national missile defense system.

  That policy is clearly in violation of the ABM Treaty. We are going 
to hear arguments back and forth, does that mandate that there be 
multiple sites? It can be argued both ways, and it obviously is an 
arguable point. But there is no question but we are declaring that it 
is the policy of the United States to have multiple sites.
  Whether that is a mandate or not, I do not know, but certainly I do 
not want any part of it. We have gotten along with the ABM Treaty for 
20 years. If we want changes, let us negotiate them. Let us not have 
them emerge from this Senate dictating in a way or declaring it is a 
policy to have these multiple sites.
  What else does the bill we are debating today do? It prohibits ``any 
missile defense or air defense system or system upgrade or system 
component that has not been flight tested in a unilateral,'' and here 
we go ahead and define what is an ABM qualifying flight test.
  Next, it goes on--here is an important point, Mr. President--it 
states the sense of Congress that:

       . . . the President should cease all efforts to modify, 
     clarify, or otherwise alter U.S. obligations under the ABM 
     Treaty pending the outcome of a Senate review.

  Look, who is in charge around here? Is it the Senate of the United 
States, or is it the President under his constitutional powers? We say, 
no, he cannot do anything until we have a Senate review of the treaty. 
How long is that going to last? It could last 3 years; it could last 10 
years. During all of that time, the President's hands would be tied. I 
really do not think that is what we want.
  The provisions of this bill constitute an unwarranted usurpation of 
Presidential authority to conduct foreign policy on the most sensitive 
of national security matters.
  Mr. President, Congress simply should not be in the business of 
dictating to the President how to interpret, how to implement, or how 
to renegotiate a binding treaty of the United States. As a Republican 
Senator, I would never impose those kinds of conditions on a Republican 
President, and as a Republican Senator, I do not suggest that they 
should be imposed on a Democratic President.
  Secretary of Defense William Perry has warned that these provisions 
would jeopardize Russian implementation of the Reagan and the Bush--who 
are they? Republican Presidents--Reagan-Bush negotiated START I and 
START II Treaties. These treaties involve the destruction of thousands 
of nuclear warheads.
  Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili has similarly cautioned 
that the bill's ABM provisions should 

[[Page S 11270]]
probably impact our broadened security relationship with Russia. I do 
not argue with the premise that the United States ought to pursue 
missile defense technologies in order to deter potential aggressors who 
have made substantial progress in this field. Yes, we ought to do some 
work in that area.
  I also do not oppose appropriate modifications of the 20-year-old ABM 
Treaty that are negotiated by the President. But this bill simply goes 
too far. Congress must not legislate such specific modifications to the 
treaty.
  So, Mr. President, I am in support of the Levin amendment and urge my 
colleagues to support it.
  So I want to thank the Chair and thank the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the amendment by the Senator from 
Michigan attempts to hold on to the cold war status quo that we have 
come to know as mutual assured destruction. But is the cold war not 
over?
  Mr. President, the United States should not be reluctant to reassess 
the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty. The Defense 
authorization bill does not advocate abrogation of the ABM Treaty, but 
it does firmly acknowledge that the strategic and political 
circumstances that led to the ABM Treaty have changed.
  The Levin amendment is a backward rather than a forward looking 
amendment. We should be looking forward and attempting to foster a new 
form of strategic stability that is not based on mutual assured 
destruction. Think about it--5 years after the end of the cold war, 
with all the political changes that have occurred, the United States 
and Russia have not fundamentally altered the strategic posture that so 
characterized the cold war.
  All Senators should agree that the ABM Treaty is technically and 
geopolitically outdated. While the treaty requires the United States 
and Russia to remain vulnerable to each other's threats, it has the 
effect of requiring the United States to remain vulnerable to threats 
posed by other countries. Countries like North Korea are developing 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, while missile and nuclear 
technologies are practically available on the open market. Let me quote 
former Deputy Secretary of Defense and current Director of Central 
Intelligence John Deutch:

       The 1972 ABM Teaty does not conform with either the changed 
     geopolitical circumstances or the new technological 
     opportunities of today. We should not be reluctant to 
     negotiate treaty modifications that acknowledge the new 
     realities, provided we retain the essential stabilizing 
     purpose of the treaty.

  It has also become clear that vulnerability to missile attack neither 
stabilizes nor enhances deterrence. The Persian Gulf war demonstrated 
this clearly. Israel, a country with an extremely credible retaliatory 
threat, came under repeated attack during the war. For a variety of 
complicated reasons Israel simply did not retaliate. Perhaps most 
ironic, the reason that Saddam Hussein launched missiles at Israel was 
precisely to provoke retaliation. Secretary of Defense Perry recognized 
this point in a recent speech: ``The bad news is that in this era, 
deterrence may not provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold 
war. We may be facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic 
missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future, and they 
may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than 
MAD.'' And yet, the amendment of the Senator from Michigan seems to 
deny that things have changed.
  On the subject of change, let me quote Secretary Perry again: ``We 
now have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not on 
MAD, not on mutual assured destruction, but rather on another acronym, 
MAS, or mutual assured safety.'' This is precisely what the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995 calls for. Its language almost mirrors Secretary 
Perry's statement.
  We must not allow a 20-year-old treaty to prevent the United States 
from responding to legitimate and growing security threats. Stated 
simply, the ABM Treaty as it now stands prevents the United States from 
deploying a national missile defense system that could protect all 
Americans against even a limited ballistic missile attack. The 
authorization bill says that it is time to begin changing this. There 
is a real and growing threat. It will take us 8 years to develop the 
system called for in the bill. By that time the United States could 
face a variety of new and unpredictable threats, including a North 
Korean ICBM.
  I would also point out that the ABM Treaty was meant to be a living 
document. Article XIII recognizes the possibility that changed 
circumstances would require the treaty to be modified. Articles XIV and 
XV provide the procedures for making such changes. The argument that 
this bill violates the treaty is simply false. All the means for 
achieving the policies and goals in the Missile Defense Act of 1995 are 
contained in the ABM Treaty itself.
  We should also remember that the ABM Treaty was originally a 
multiple-site treaty. For those who so resist any change to the treaty, 
I would remind them that the Senate voted to amend the treaty in 1974. 
It did not upset the Russians then and it should not upset them today 
if we restore the treaty's multiple-site aspect.
  In fact, the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to 
amend the treaty in ways that are fully compatible with the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995. Deployment of a multiple-site national missile 
defense system should not be viewed by the Russians as threatening or 
in any way undermining their confidence in deterrence.
  There is no substantive reason why a U.S. policy to develop such a 
system should undermine START II, as has been argued by the Senator 
from Michigan. START II has plenty of problems, but the ABM Treaty 
should not be one of them. Allowing the Russians to use the ABM Treaty 
as a distraction from the real problems would be a major mistake. Among 
other things, it would lead Russia to believe that it has a veto over a 
wide range of United States national security policies. Remember that 
they have linked START II ratification to things like U.S. NATO policy. 
Is the Senator from Michigan suggesting that we hold our NATO policy 
hostage to START II as well?
  Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that we should not try to 
reaffirm the cold war on the floor of the Senate 5 years after its 
demise. We should welcome the opportunity to establish a more normal 
relationship with Russia that is not a mutual hostage relationship. We 
should pursue what Secretary Perry termed mutual assured safety and 
reject the Levin amendment with its embrace of mutual assured 
destruction.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Rhode Island 10 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I strongly support the Senator from Michigan 
and my other colleagues in their effort to amend the missile defense 
sections of the defense authorization bill.
  The amendment would strike from the bill language that mandates 
action that would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The 
ABM Treaty, approved overwhelmingly by the Senate following extensive 
and thorough hearings by the Committee on Foreign Relations, has served 
in the intervening years as the centerpiece of modern arms control. The 
treaty has served to guarantee that neither side could threaten to 
neutralize the offensive forces of the other, with the result that we 
had years of strategic stability followed currently by major reductions 
in the strategic offensive arms of both sides. Various attacks have 
been made upon it over the years, largely by people who would prefer an 
unbridled strategic offensive arms race, but the treaty's benefits have 
been so clear that these assaults have been repelled.
  The present favorable strategic arms environment has been achieved 
under the umbrella of the ABM Treaty. It probably would have been 
impossible to reach the present situation in which we are moving away 
from heavy dependence on strategic defensive arms were it not for the 
ABM Treaty.
  The amendment also corrects an additional problem with the bill in 
that it 

[[Page S 11271]]
unilaterally interprets the ABM Treaty's meaning for theater missile 
defenses. The bill would arbitrarily impose a demarcation line between 
theater and strategic missile defenses that would tie the President's 
hands as he is trying to negotiate this very matter with the Russians. 
It is those negotiations that should determine the outcome, not some 
arbitrary judgment in an authorization bill.
  Secretary of Defense Perry noted to Senator Nunn his strong 
opposition to these provisions. He said, ``Unless these provisions are 
eliminated or significantly modified they threaten to undermine 
fundamental national security interests of the United States.''
  Secretary of State Christopher wrote me yesterday to point out that 
the provisions under discussion here ``raise serious constitutional 
foreign policy and national security concerns.''
  The Secretary continued:

       Further, such actions would immediately call into question 
     the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty, and have a negative 
     impact on U.S.-Russian relations, Russian implementation of 
     the START I Treaty, and Russian ratification of the START II 
     Treaty. This would leave thousands of warheads in place that 
     otherwise would be removed from deployment under the two 
     Treaties, including all MIRVed ICBMs such as the Russian 
     heavy SS-18.
       There is no need now to take actions that would lead us to 
     violate the Treaty and threaten the stabilizing reductions we 
     would otherwise achieve--and place strategic stability at 
     risk. We have established a treaty-compliant approach to 
     theater missile defense that will enable us to meet threats 
     we may face in the foreseeable future--and one that preserves 
     all the benefits of the ABM, START and START II Treaties.

  Mr. President, the Missile Defense Act portion of the bill, sections 
233-235 simply does not warrant approval by the U.S. Senate. The policy 
it sets forth is neither realistic nor wise. It gives a sense of 
urgency that is not justified by any known facts.
  There is no obvious danger from theater-range missiles that must be 
countered. As we all know, the Patriot missile system proved to be both 
highly effective and appropriate to the threat we faced in Desert 
Storm. An effort is now under way to upgrade the Patriot system over 
time to meet the threat in future years.
  It is quite easy to overstate the missile threat this country might 
conceivably face, but it is important to understand that the missile 
technology control regime [MTCR] has done much to reduce the potential 
threat we will face from ballistic missiles. At present there are very 
few nations who have even the potential to mount new missile threats 
against us that could not be handled by planned systems. The provision 
states the policy that the United States should deploy a missile system 
that is highly effective against ballistic missile attacks on the 
United States, to be augmented over time to provide a defense against 
larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. This proposal 
seems to me highly unrealistic.
  Few Members of this body can seriously believe that any deployed 
missile system could be highly effective against any limited missile 
attack, much less a larger attack. While it is true that, under certain 
circumstances, ballistic missile defenses could shoot down incoming 
ballistic missile warheads, I would not wish to place a wager that no 
warheads would get through to bring on havoc and destruction nor would 
I want to risk my family or any other American lives on the supposition 
that any reasonable level of spending for a multiple site national 
missile defense system would do much of anything other than squander 
major parts of the national treasure.
  The bill specifies that we should seek a cooperative transition to a 
regime that does not feature mutual assured destruction and the 
offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability. 
This provision of the bill gives the impression that we do not 
understand what mutual assured destruction meant for our security 
during the cold war. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty essentially 
guarantees that neither side can develop the sort of ballistic missile 
defenses that would prevent the other side from effectively attacking 
in a nuclear confrontation. The fact of assured destruction of a mutual 
nature kept both sides at bay.
  Since the cold war has ended, the United States and Russia have 
embarked upon cooperative ventures that are moving us away from the 
confrontations of the past. We are working with them to dismantle their 
weapons, to ensure the safe storage of nuclear weapons material, and to 
implement such agreements as START I and, prospectively, START II. If, 
as envisioned in this bill, the United States were to violate or 
abrogate the ABM Treaty, the people on both sides rather than the 
treaty structure itself would be victimized. Moreover, such action 
could sabotage the current movement toward greater cooperation and 
throw us back to an era of confrontation as it jeopardized prospects 
for continued reductions in the START process and beyond.
  Under the provisions of this bill, the Secretary of Defense is 
directed to develop an affordable and operationally effective national 
defense system with an initial operational capability by the end of 
2003. If all goes well, that time is just about when the major 
reduction of the American and former Soviet nuclear arsenals by two-
thirds is to have been completed.
  I doubt that any Member can contemplate a situation in which the 
United States would go at top speed toward deployment of a national 
missile defense system and the Russian response would be passive 
acceptance. They might well match our system. They might well deploy a 
larger, more capable system. They might well bring to an end the 
reductions that are so clearly in our own national interests. They 
might well engage in other activities of a bellicose nature that we 
would find hard to bear. And that would require reactions on our part. 
It could well incite an action/reaction phase in our national defense 
activities that would be ruinously expensive and that would, in the 
end, increase the dangers to us rather than permitting the present 
continuous reduction in the strategic nuclear threat.
  To me it is important that we stop to think what it is we are doing 
if we follow this path. In response to an uncertain threat, a threat 
that has not yet materialized, and a threat that might well be handled 
through diplomatic efforts, we would be preparing to obligate tens of 
billions of dollars. We would do this in the mistaken belief that we 
would somehow be better protected. Whereas the truth of the matter is 
that, even if we were able to afford and to deploy an effective 
national defense structure, our potential adversaries would still have 
the option of sending nuclear weapons our way by air, by land, or by 
sea. At some point in the future if some despot were to contemplate 
attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon under the misbegotten 
notion that he would teach us a lesson, it is hard to imagine that he 
would be deterred if informed that we had a new national missile 
defense.
  Mr. President, this has been a rather difficult year in which many of 
us have tried to come to grips with the fact that our national deficits 
are alarming and must be curbed. We are required by the Constitution, 
to ``establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'' If we lose sight of the 
several objectives that must be met, we risk the very well-being of our 
country. I remember well that a distinguished predecessor, Senator 
Stuart Symington of Missouri, was fond of pointing out to the committee 
that the key to a sound defense is a strong economy.
  A key to a sound government is a demonstrated ability to keep various 
activities in proper focus and proper order, so that the whole Nation, 
not just the defense industry, would benefit.
  It will not profit us if we sink further in educational quality, if 
we deny more of our young people the opportunity of a good education at 
the elementary and secondary levels and reduce the quality of our 
institutions of higher education, if we increase the misery of those 
who have no homes and who are hungry all in the interest of saving 
money, only to turn around and waste it on unnecessary defenses. It 
does not seem a wise idea to this Senator.
  It is easy to say that one is for strong defenses. All of us are 
pledged to support strong defenses and we will do so. But the United 
States will stand first among nations because it continues to be strong 
in all of its endeavors, keeps 

[[Page S 11272]]
proper balances, and meets other standards of a great, modern nation.
  Mr. President, the strategic arms competition between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union has dwindled away. The ABM Treaty is 
serving as a very stabilizing force in this promising environment. 
Further reductions should be achievable.
  It would be extremely foolish to place all of this in jeopardy. It 
makes no sense to give the Russians cause to back away from their START 
commitments or to engage in a dangerous strategic defensive arms race. 
It makes no sense--when so many human needs are so obvious throughout 
our Nation--to jeopardize what has been achieved in controlling and 
reducing strategic arms and to spend billions for dubious purposes when 
there are so many other desperate calls upon our resources.
  Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for 
his initiative. I am happy to be a cosponsor of his amendment. I hope 
that the Senate will once again prove its wisdom with regard to the ABM 
issue and vote overwhelmingly in favor of this amendment.
  In conclusion, I am reminded of the question as to how we will be 
remembered in history, as succeeding generations look back at us, just 
as we often have looked back on ancient history from the floor of the 
Senate. I hope that we can be like Athens and not like Sparta--meaning 
put more emphasis on the civilian side of our economy, the economic 
side and the education side, and less on the military side. I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield such time as may be required by the 
distinguished and able Republican leader.
  Mr. DOLE. I thank the Chair.
  I would like to commend the members of the Armed Services Committee 
who, under the able leadership of the distinguished chairman, Senator 
Thurmond, and the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], have 
done a first rate job on the defense authorization bill. In particular, 
I would like to congratulate the Armed Service Committee for the 
forward-looking Missile Defense Act contained in this bill.
  The Missile Defense Act is unique because it does not just authorize 
appropriations for individual programs, it also provides a strategic 
logic--principles, premises, and policies--thereby integrating these 
programs into a coherent and comprehensive approach.
  In my view, the approach adopted in this bill is very compelling on 
four important points.
  First, this legislation firmly establishes the critical imperative of 
defending the United States of America from ballistic missiles. 
Morally, rationally, and constitutionally this must be our top 
priority.
  Why is this important now? Very simply because the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is 
dramatically increasing. I would like to commend the distinguished 
junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] for highlighting this threat, as 
well as the need to defend America against it, in his amendment.
  The Missile Defense Act notes that weapons can be acquired by our 
potential adversaries far more quickly than they can produce them 
indigenously.
  Mr. President, we cannot wait around for years until this threat is 
literally on our doorstep. We must prepare now.
  And so, I am very pleased with the national missile defense 
architecture established in the Missile Defense Act. This architecture 
includes ground-based interceptors, fixed ground-based radars and 
space-based sensors. The bill establishes a deployment goal of 2003 and 
provides an additional $300 million to support that goal. In my view, 
that is a good start, but frankly for something as important as 
defending our citizens, I would like to see an increase to ensure that 
we will be able to meet the 2003 date.
  Second, the Armed Services Committee's bill deals with the thorny ABM 
Treaty questions through an intelligent two-step approach:
  Step 1: It addresses what missile defenses are covered by the ABM 
Treaty, namely by establishing the following standard: Those actually 
tested against a ballistic missile with a range of over 3,500 
kilometers and a reentry velocity of over 5 kilometers per second. This 
is the standard proposed by both Presidents Bush and Clinton. The point 
is that we should not drag theater systems into a treaty which was 
never intended to cover them.
  Step 2: Contrary to wild administration accusations, the bill
   reviews where we go next with regard to the ABM Treaty. I think we 
need to set straight what this bill does and does not do.

  It does not set us on a collision course with the ABM Treaty by 
mandating abrogation.
  Indeed, it does not mandate any particular outcome.
  It does recognize that an effective multiple site defense of the 
United States is inconsistent with the treaty as things stand today. 
The key here is that an effective defense requires multiple sites.
  It does call for a year of careful consideration of these matters 
before we decide how to proceed on the ABM Treaty. The bottom line is 
that the bill recognizes what we all should be aware of--that mutual 
assured destruction, the doctrine underlying the ABM Treaty is not a 
suitable basis for stability in a multipolar world, nor for an 
improving relationship with Russia. Our goal should be, as outlined in 
this legislation, to seek a cooperative--and I stress cooperative--
transition to a more suitable regime to this post-cold-war era.
  The third aspect of this bill that is noteworthy is
   that it establishes a cruise missile defense initiative. In view of 
the fact that potential adversaries now have access, in varying 
degrees, to the technologies necessary to build effective cruise 
missiles, this measure is on the mark and reflects considerable 
foresight. It is my understanding that in addressing cruise missiles, 
the committee has in no way detracted from the emphasis placed on 
ballistic missiles which are a current and rapidly growing threat.

  Finally, I would like to commend the establishment of a theater 
missile defense core program. The rationale behind theater missile 
defense is to deny a potential adversary the option of escalating by 
attacking or just threatening to attack U.S. Forces, coalition 
partners, or vital interests. The key elements of this core program are 
three systems already being pursued by the Clinton administration--
namely Patriot-3, Navy lower tier, and THAAD--as well as one critical 
addition: Navy upper tier. The committee has wisely added $170 million 
to Navy upper tier.
  Mr. President, just imagine trying to put together the Desert Storm 
Coalition if Saddam Hussein could have credibly threatened London, 
Rome, Istanbul, or Cairo with ballistic missiles. We cannot allow our 
political and military flexibility to be hindered. Therefore, our 
objective must be to prevent placing our forces, or those of our 
allies, needlessly in harm's way--with systems such as THAAD and Navy 
lower tier.
  Furthermore, the United States must have the ability to project a 
regional ballistic missile defense capability where and when we need 
it. Navy upper tier give us that capability.
  Mr. President, I would also like to note that the bill does save some 
money by terminating the boost phase intercept program and adding a 
lesser amount to explore fulfilling the same mission with an unmanned 
air vehicle [UAV], in conjunction with Israel. Given Israel's expertise 
in UAV's and its keen interest in a boost phase interceptor, this makes 
sense to me.
  In addition I would like
   to emphasize that the programs and approach contained in the Missile 
Defense Act should be viewed as an integral part of our counter-
proliferation strategy. If our adversaries know that their hard-gained 
missiles will be of no use against America and its allies, they may 
well be dissuaded from acquiring them in the first place.

  Before I conclude, I would like to address the issue of how much all 
of this costs. It costs $3.4 billion. This is a substantial price tag, 
but does not represent even 2 percent of the total Department of 
Defense budget. More importantly, however, in considering the costs 
associated with missile defense, we need to keep in mind how the threat 
to our Nation's security and to our interests has changed.
  For two centuries, oceans protected us. Now technology gives even 
relatively weak adversaries the hope of attacking or blackmailing the 
United States. This bill takes concrete steps 

[[Page S 11273]]

     to protect us and sends the clear message that we will defend 
     our homeland with our superior technology. Moreover, America 
     has, and will continue to have, vital interests around the 
     globe which must be protected, as well.
  Therefore, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject the measure 
offered by the Senator from Michigan--or any other amendment which 
would weaken or threaten the Missile Defense Act.
  Just let me indicate, having visited briefly with the chairman, that 
it is his hope, and it will happen, we will be here late tonight, and 
hopefully during this next vote we can line up serious amendments. Last 
night sort of fizzled out. Nothing very serious happened after 8:30. So 
tonight we would hope to have amendments up until a late hour and then 
conclude action on this measure tomorrow.
  This is a very big amendment. It has taken a long time. It is now 
5\1/2\ hours into this one amendment and I think that should be, with 
30 minutes to go, that should be enough time on this amendment. But 
this is a very substantial amendment. It is one of the more important 
amendments. It certainly deserves a lot of consideration.
  But, again, I would just say to my colleagues in the nicest way I 
can, that a lot of people want to have an August recess and they would 
like to have it start in August. We are trying to work that out, and 
much will depend on the cooperation of our colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  First I ask unanimous consent Senator Nunn be added as a cosponsor of 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it has been said that this language in the 
bill is not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. I just want to simply 
read the language. It speaks for itself. The ABM Treaty says that the 
parties undertake to deploy an ABM at no more than one site. The bill 
says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site 
defense system.
  It also has been said, quoting here Mr. Deutch, that we should be 
willing to modify the ABM Treaty. And we surely should. Those 
negotiations are taking place right now. I believe we should try to 
modify the ABM Treaty. I would like to see a negotiated capability to 
deploy defenses--a negotiated capability to deploy defenses. The 
current Missile Defense Act provides that as something we should seek 
to obtain through negotiations.
  But what does the bill say about negotiations and modifying the 
treaty? The bill says it is the sense of the Senate that the President 
should cease all efforts to modify the United States' obligations under 
the ABM Treaty. So, on the one hand, people are saying we should be 
willing to modify--indeed we should. We should be willing to negotiate 
to change it--indeed we should. And, on the other hand, there is a 
sense of the Senate that the President should cease until the Senate is 
done with its study, which will happen sometime next year. And then 
there is a prohibition on the spending of funds. Which, the way I think 
I read it, and any reasonable interpretation, is that the President may 
not change the demarcation line that is set forth in this bill through 
negotiations.
  But the reading of this bill leaves, I think, only one conclusion, 
and that is that the treaty says multiple sites are not allowed. The 
bill says we will deploy--it is our policy to deploy multiple sites. I 
cannot think of a clearer conflict, and it should not be fudged or 
papered over, because I think it was the obvious intent of the sponsors 
of that language.
  I yield the floor. I also ask unanimous consent that Senators Daschle 
and Kerry be added as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 5 minutes to the able Senator from Alabama [Mr. 
Heflin].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of providing a 
system to protect the citizens of the United States from ballistic 
missile attack.
  There are two parts to the Levin amendment. The first provision 
strikes the goal of the Missile Defense Act of 1995--a multiple site 
deployment designed to protect the United States. The second provision 
strikes the demarcation provision for theater defenses.
  My concern is with the first provision of this amendment. I support 
deployment. I fully believe the goal of the Missile Defense Act must be 
to deploy defenses to protect the United States as soon as possible. As 
I stated many times before, I strongly believe we should act within the 
ABM Treaty and deploy a single site defense immediately. I also believe 
it is important that the administration begin serious treaty 
negotiations to allow the deployment of additional ABM sites. This 
means that the long-range goal of our negotiations with the Russians 
must be a multiple site, ground-based deployment.
  A statement of a national policy to deploy a multiple site defense 
system to protect the United States is far from violating the ABM 
Treaty. Many of my colleagues have called this language different 
things, such as a statement to plan to breach or an anticipatory breach 
of the ABM Treaty.
 By anticipatory breach I assume they mean that something like 
``conspiracy to agree to commit a breach of the ABM Treaty.'' A breach 
does not ripen until it actually occurs.

  The treaty clearly defines what constitutes a breach. Deploying 
multiple missile defense sites today would be a breach. Stating a goal 
of deploying multiple sites would only be a breach if there is no legal 
way to perform such a deployment within the confines of the treaty. 
Fortunately, there are two legal ways. The first is a new protocol to 
the treaty. This may be possible to negotiate. You do not know until 
you try. Remember, the original treaty allowed two sites. It was a 
subsequent agreement that limited us to just one site. A second option 
is to actually withdraw from the treaty. It is our legal right to 
withdraw with 60-days notice. In summary, Mr. President, while there 
are legal methods to deploy multiple sites within the framework of the 
ABM Treaty, there can be no anticipatory breach.
  I further support replacing the stated goal in the committee version 
of the bill with a new goal calling for the deployment of a treaty 
compliance system coupled with immediate negotiation for additional 
sites. This was a goal of the bipartisan Missile Defense Act of 1991. 
Unfortunately, in striking out the goal of a multiple site deployment, 
Senator Levin's amendment also strikes out the only statement that the 
goal of the United States is to protect our people from a nuclear 
missile attack. To me, this is unacceptable.
  As for demarcation provisions, I share many of Senator Levin's 
concerns. I believe we should leave the President the flexibility to 
negotiate modifications to the treaty as required with the guarantee of 
a Senate ratification to safeguard against unacceptable provisions.
  I regret that the two distinct separate provisions are in the same 
amendment.
  Mr. President, unless there can be some compromise--and I hope that 
there can be some compromise--on the goal of the Missile Defense Act I 
will have to vote against the Levin amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, if anyone else has an amendment, we 
would like for them to come forth now. We are ready to go forward with 
this bill.
  I would like for both sides to notify their Members on the hotline 
that we are ready to vote on this bill.
  In the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the quorum call 
not be counted against the remaining time we have left in view of the 
fact we only have about 4 or 5 minutes at the most left. 

[[Page S 11274]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Nebraska has 
about 5\1/2\ minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of the amendment to 
eliminate numerous objectionable provisions on missile defense 
contained in the pending authorization bill. There was no more 
contentious issue in the Armed Services Committee markup of this bill 
than the issue of missile defense. The committee was divided 11 to 10 
on numerous unsuccessful votes to amend the missile defense language. 
There is a good reason for the controversy surrounding this section of 
the bill. No single issue is more deserving of amendment than this one.
  The committee bill is nothing short of a power grab on the part of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee. The slim majority that approved 
the missile defense provisions in the bill is not satisfied with simply 
making foreign policy; it wants to override the foreign policy position 
of the President of the United States, our Commander-in-Chief and the 
person in which the Constitution vests the power to make foreign 
policy.
  The committee bill in its present form moves to end our Nation's 23-
year participation in the ABM Treaty and move aggressively to deploying 
multiple missile defense sites throughout the United States. More 
specifically, it defines our national missile defense policy in terms 
that not only abrogate our Nation's treaty obligations but also sets in 
motion a disastrous course of events that will profoundly threaten our 
national security. That is right, Mr. President, contrary to how it is 
being advertised by the proponents, the national missile defense system 
called for in this bill will harm, not enhance, our national security.
  By voting our intention to break out of the ABM Treaty, we will be 
feeding the paranoid rhetoric of the militaristic, conservative wing of 
the Russian Duma looking to place Russia back in an adversarial 
relationship with the United States. Members of this body must not 
ignore the sobering consequences of breaking out of the ABM Treaty and 
strengthening the hand of Russian extremists. Not only will withdrawing 
from the ABM Treaty endanger our new alliance with Russia, it will 
likely sink future ratification of the START II Treaty and further 
implementation of the START I Treaty. The language in this bill is a 
dagger pointed at the heart of a whole array of arms control 
agreements, least of which is the ABM Treaty. It will imperil a whole 
generation of arms control agreements which will in turn have far-
reaching consequences both domestically and internationally. It will 
hasten the return to a time of bigger Defense budgets, an arms race in 
space, larger nuclear arsenals and a general erosion of global 
security.
  To best describe what type of national missile defense system is 
envisioned by this bill, I will read directly from section 233 of the 
bill. It states:

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
     site national missile defense system that (a) is highly 
     effective against limited ballistic missile attacks on the 
     territory of the United States, and (b) will be augmented 
     over time to provide a layered defense against larger and 
     more sophisticated ballistic missile threats.

This is no different from the flawed star wars concept pushed by
 President Reagan during the height of the cold war. In their rush to 
revive this concept of a shield against a Soviet missile attack, the 
committee majority is willing to trample the ABM Treaty along with 
START I and START II, and the START agreements that were contemplated 
to follow.

  As a Nation, we have spent $35 billion in taxpayers' money on 
ballistic missile defense since 1983. The costs of implementing the 
type of system envisioned in the bill could easily reach or exceed that 
amount. No one knows for sure. A CBO report in March of this year, 
prepared at my request, estimates that a single site--not a multiple 
site, but a single site--system could cost $29 billion to complete. 
Additional sites necessary to provide the protective umbrella called 
for in the bill would cost an additional $19 billion, for a grand total 
of $48 billion. Is this the fiscal commitment we are ready to endorse? 
I think not. By voting for the missile defense provisions in the bill, 
that is exactly the road the Senate will be supporting--$48 billion for 
a Star Wars system all over again.
  By the way, it may not work as advertised. After already spending $35 
billion, there is no high degree of confidence that we can 
operationally deploy the technology capable of intercepting a large and 
sophisticated strike against the United States by the year 2003. I call 
it ridiculous. The technology is far from proven and like the Maginot 
Line following World War I may be the wrong defense against the 
emerging threat, easily circumvented by a terrorist nuclear attack 
employing a delivery means other than a ballistic missile.
  While the superpower threat has disappeared and the cold war is over, 
there seems to be a wave of nostalgia sweeping over some in the Senate 
to gain a renewed sense of mission and purpose by reconstituting the 
threat facing the United States. The testimony provided to the Armed 
Services Committee by both military and intelligence witnesses are in 
agreement that an enemy ballistic missile threat against the United 
States does not exist and will not emerge, if at all, well past the 
2003 deployment mandate in the bill. I am struck by the irony that in 
trying to defend against a nonexistent threat we would by our rash 
actions be unwittingly fostering the very threat we profess to 
originally be addressing. In other words, our actions would be a self-
fulfilling prophesy.
  Mr. President, Senator Levin and others have already spoken to the 
numerous flaws contained in this bill language. I simply ask each 
Senator to read the language in the bill closely before voting on the 
amendment. The words speak for themselves. The only proper action is to 
support the Levin amendment and strike the objectionable sections of 
this bill that have been outlined by many of us who have studied this 
issue.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back any remaining time 
assigned to me by Senator Levin.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from 
Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Michigan.
  I wish to thank the Senator from Nebraska, who, I might add, as a 
member of this committee, has fought against what seems to be the most 
perverse development in our military budget and planning in the last 4 
years. The idea that now of all times in our history we need to 
overturn what was a centerpiece of two successive Republican Presidents 
seems to me to be a little bit bizarre. But, Mr. President, to state 
the obvious, I rise in support of the amendment of the senior Senator 
from Michigan, Senator Levin.
  Mr. President, the so-called National Missile Defense Act of 1995 is 
a hodgepodge of contradictory provisions that, if implemented, would 
jeopardize our national security beyond anything that I have witnessed 
since I have been in the U.S. Senate. The bill before us represents a 
frontal assault on the ABM Treaty. I heard yesterday some sort of, how 
can I phrase it, interesting questions posed by some of our Republican 
friends--asking Senators, ``Are you for missile defense? Are you for 
mutual assured destruction?'' I would point out that the reason why we 
are where we are and we are dismantling missiles and we are diminishing 
the prospect of nuclear confrontation by super or former superpowers is 
because the policy of mutual assured destruction has worked pretty darn 
well. But I will get back to that in a minute.
  This bill represents a flat, frontal assault on the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. First, it would force us to violate the ABM Treaty by 
mandating dangerous unilateral infractions of that treaty. Then, it 
would jettison the 

[[Page S 11275]]
entire treaty by requiring the development of a national missile 
defense system by the year 2003. In a final strange and, I think, 
unexplainable twist, it goes on to call for a select committee to 
review a treaty that is effectively being declared null and void by the 
very same bill.
  Now, either the folks who wrote this into the bill do not understand 
what our nuclear strategy has been thus far--and I know they do--or 
this is incredibly poor draftsmanship or there is a perverse game being 
played here.
  The first two parts of what is before us--not the amendment, but 
absent the amendment--by definition, destroy the ABM Treaty. Then the 
third part is to set up a select committee to review the treaty that we 
are legislatively destroying.
  Now, I assume that may be because there is not enough work or enough 
committee assignments for Senators. They want to have other committees 
because maybe they get additional staff. I do not know. But, I mean, 
why in the devil do you need the third part if you are doing away with 
the first two parts? But at any rate, taken together, these provisions 
would simply eviscerate the ABM Treaty, which has provided the basis 
for our strategic arms reductions over the past 20 years.
  The most likely immediate consequence of gutting the ABM Treaty would 
be that the Russian Duma, their Congress, would refuse to approve the 
START II Treaty, which is, quite frankly, a jewel in the crown of 
President Bush's, and prior to that President Reagan's, foreign policy 
initiatives. With START II unratified, the hopes for further strategic 
arms reduction would be dashed--which, I might add, I think is the real 
purpose of this initiative by the majority. They did not like START II 
to begin with. They did not like START I. They do not like the idea of 
our having to talk about further reductions in the amount of nuclear 
warheads that exist in the world.
  But make no mistake about it that if we pass this, why if you were 
sitting in the Russian Duma, why if you were a Russian or anyone else 
for that matter, would you conclude that it is a good idea to follow 
through with the destruction of your existing nuclear arsenal? Why 
would you do that? I think I understand. I think that is the underlying 
purpose of the legislation before us.
  This singular achievement of the Bush administration, the START II 
Treaty, is the basis upon which we moved to even further reductions--
and, along with it, the significant enhancement of the security of 
Americans that we all hoped would be the byproduct of winning the cold 
war. Now, I do not know what you all are going to tell your kids. I do 
not know what you are going to tell your family and friends after you 
tell them how we won the cold war, but there is a greater need for 
nuclear weapons.
  Now they say, well, this is not about nuclear weapons; this is about 
the ability to prevent our being attacked by nuclear weapons. I will 
not go into all the science which Senator Nunn and others have talked 
about here, but the one thing for certain about how you deal with an 
ABM system is you overwhelm it. You build more offensive systems. It is 
a lot easier and a lot cheaper to build offensive systems than it is to 
build defensive systems. As an old bumper sticker from my generation 
used to say, ``One nuclear bomb that gets through could ruin your 
day.'' One hydrogen bomb dropping on Manhattan can ruin your day. So 
all you have to do, without even having the technology, is overwhelm 
the system. And it is cheaper to do that.
  Now, I know what my friends are thinking. They say, ``Boy, we have 
got the Russians in a great spot. They are broke. Let's take advantage 
here. They are not going to be able to do this.''
  Well, at a minimum, folks, I do not know why they are going to go 
ahead and destroy what they have, if, in fact, we are going to adopt 
this policy. The most likely immediate consequence of cutting the ABM 
Treaty, as I said, will be the elimination of the START regime.
  Mr. President, what troubles me most about the provisions on the ABM 
Treaty is their reckless unilateralism. Article VI-A of the ABM Treaty 
contains two provisions that have been in place for years. First, it 
bans both parties from giving ABM systems the capacity to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles; and, second, it bans testing of such 
systems in an ABM mode.
  The bill before us would effectively collapse these two provisions 
into one by asserting than an ABM system is actually not an ABM system, 
unless it has been field tested as a system. In other words, it must 
have a demonstrated capacity--a demonstrated capacity--of being an ABM 
system.
  Now, there is a reason why when we did the ABM Treaty we insisted 
that you violate the treaty first, if you demonstrate a capacity to set 
up a system, or second, if such a system could be deployed in such a 
capacity even if it has not been tested.
  Now, it might be useful at this juncture to cite the case of 
Krasnoyarsk radar, which we debated for months and months on the floor 
of the Senate not too many years ago. Some of the same people here were 
on the floor then pointing out how the Russians were violating the ABM 
Treaty and we could not do business with them and could not trust them. 
Now some of the same people are here saying we should do what we told 
the Russians they could not do.
  A gentleman who is gone, a very bright fellow whom we all respected, 
from Wyoming, Senator Wallop, was on the floor day in and day out 
warning us about the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviet Union built this 
giant radar in Siberia in the 1980's. Although the radar was never 
turned on, that is, its capacities were never demonstrated as would be 
required now, we argued that it had the inherent capability of an ABM 
system and constituted a violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets 
asserted that since the system had never been tested, it was permitted 
under the ABM Treaty.
  Eventually, through the good offices of my conservative friends and 
some of us who joined them, the Russians tore down the radar. If, in 
fact, the Armed Services Committee provisions that are contained in the 
bill prevail, absent being amended by the Senator from Michigan, they 
would be able to keep the radar.
  It would not be a violation of the ABM Treaty. I wonder how many of 
my friends over there would be saying, ``You know, no problem, we 
understand. We think there should only be one test.''
  I wonder what my friend Senator Thurmond would be saying then. I 
wonder what my friends over on the right would be saying. They would be 
apoplectic, because although it had not been turned on and 
demonstrated, it clearly had the inherent capability and, therefore, 
was in violation of the ABM Treaty.
  I would like to point out to my colleagues that there is no legal 
basis for a unilateral amendment to the ABM Treaty. It seems like I 
have been fighting this, along with Senator Nunn, Senator Levin, and 
others, for the last decade. The Reagan administration tried a frontal 
attack on this in the early eighties saying, ``We are going to 
reinterpret the ABM Treaty.'' If you do not like what it says, 
reinterpret it. Well, we won that fight, and little did I think we 
would be back here having this fight.
  It would be better to come out here and just declare the treaty null 
and void and have a Senate vote saying it contravenes our national 
interest to be part of the ABM Treaty any longer. At least we would be 
honest with the people here. At least we would be telling the truth. 
But this is a charade.
  I point out to my colleagues, again, that there is no legal basis for 
the unilateral amendment of the ABM Treaty, or any other treaty, for 
that matter. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties serves as a 
source of customary international law and provides guidance in this 
matter. According to its provision, a treaty is to be interpreted in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms.
  The two prongs of section 6(A) of the ABM Treaty are clear: One is 
aimed at constraining demonstrated capabilities, and the other is aimed 
at constraining inherent capabilities. In other words, this provision 
was intended to prevent testing against strategic missiles and 
development of systems that have the ability to counter such missiles.
  To say that only the testing, or demonstrated capacity, standard is 
relevant would represent a clear departure from the obligation set 
forth in the treaty. 

[[Page S 11276]]

  A second area in which the provisions of this bill would mandate 
unilateral action with regard to the ABM Treaty is defining the 
demarcation line between strategic and theater missiles. The bill 
before us would arbitrarily set that mark at a peak reentry velocity of 
5 kilometers per second and an effective range of 3,500 kilometers. The 
so-called 5/3,500 threshold may, in fact, be a legitimate demarcation 
line.
  Guess what? The treaty says you negotiate those things. You negotiate 
them. That is what the existing treaty demands.
  Mr. President, these amendments to the ABM Treaty affirm that we will 
define unilaterally the line between a strategic missile system and a 
theater missile; and we will declare unilaterally our ballistic missile 
defenses are in compliance with the ABM Treaty. Forget the fact that 
the very issues are now being negotiated with the Russians. We are 
going to do what we want.
  As my young 14-year-old daughter's friends often say, ``Why don't we 
get real here?'' Let us just declare the treaty null and void and stop 
this. At least that would have the integrity of allowing others to 
trust making a treaty with us again. At least it is straightforward, 
and almost every treaty including the ABM Treaty says if this is not in 
our national interest, the President can declare it so and we are out.
  So let us not wreck the ABM Treaty. Do not wreck this President's or 
future Presidents' ability to negotiate treaties of consequence with 
people when we can come along and just redefine them midstream, when we 
either think the other party is extremely vulnerable or we want to do 
something that the treaty does not suggest.
  I want to ask the rhetorical question: If we did not need an 
antiballistic missile system when the Soviet Union had over 12,000 
nuclear warheads all aimed at the United States or things of vital 
interest to us, why in the devil do we need it so badly now?
  As Senator Nunn explained, such a system is not the thing that is 
going to prevent a Qadhafi or some Third World screwball from 
detonating a nuclear weapon in the United States. They will bring it in 
by ship, smuggle it in, reassemble it in the basement of the World 
Trade Tower, and blow us up. They are not going to wait until they have 
an intercontinental ballistic capability to do it.
  This is nuts, with all due respect. If there is any lingering doubt 
about whether the provisions I have referenced are meant to scuttle the 
ABM Treaty, I hope we disabuse ourselves of that.
  The ABM Treaty is based on a very simple, yet powerful premise that 
has been tested and proven to be valid--and that is that the 
development of defenses against strategic ballistic missiles is 
inherently destabilizing. Were the Russians to develop a shield against 
strategic ballistic missiles, what would be our reaction? We would do 
the same thing they are likely to do if this provision becomes law--
that is, maintain the means to overwhelm those defenses.
  Or would we say, ``You know, it's good for everybody, that they are 
now impervious to attack as long as we keep our missiles at the same 
number. We do not have that capability, but we are going to trust them; 
we have no problem.'' We know we would rush to do that.
  Or would we sit here and say, ``My Lord, the only thing we know for 
sure we can do, and do it more cheaply, is build more intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and theater ballistic missiles, for that matter, so 
that no matter how many of these brilliant pebbles or whatever else is 
in the sky, we can just send enough in so that a few will get 
through.''
  But we are going to expect the Russians to say, ``Don't worry, we 
know those good old Americans would never, ever do anything like this 
to us; therefore, we don't have to worry. We'll continue to dismantle 
our missiles, and we won't attempt to do the same thing and all will be 
well.''
  One of the first assignments I was sent on abroad was in 1978 on the 
so-called SALT Treaty. I was asked to take a group of new Members of 
the Senate to meet with Mr. Brezhnev, then the leader of the Soviet 
Union. We sat down and negotiated what were referred to as conditions, 
Senate understandings that we had attached to the SALT Treaty.
  In the middle of the conversation, as I was pointing out how we would 
never do anything bad, Brezhnev looked at me and said through an 
interpreter: Let me make sure I understand this.
  He said, ``I would like to remind you that as bad as you think we 
are, we never dropped a nuclear bomb on anybody. As bad as you think we 
are, you are not as good as you think you are. You expect us to say we 
know you would never attack us with nuclear weapons when, in fact''--I 
am not judging whether it was right or wrong--``you have already 
demonstrated when your national interests are at stake, you will use 
atomic weapons.'' That is kind of a compelling point.
  If we are going to take such a brazen step as trashing a treaty that 
has helped to lessen the prospect of nuclear Armageddon for over two 
decades, you would think that there is a good reason behind it. Well, 
there is none that I can discern.
  Instead, we are asked to accept the dubious justifications contained 
in a couple of paragraphs of this year's Defense authorization bill.
  One justification is that mutual assured destruction and its 
corollary--deterrence--is no longer relevant after the cold war. That 
is right, folks, traditional deterrence is dead because the bill before 
us has declared it passe.
  Mr. President, you cannot delegislate deterrence. That concept is 
grounded in the fundamental interaction among States.
  In a continued elaboration of flawed logic, the bill goes on to 
assert that with traditional deterrence dead, both the United States 
and Russia will be encouraged to reduce their offensive strategic 
arsenals.
  This bizarre line of reasoning reveals a failure to grasp the 
fundamental counter-intuitive interaction between offense and defense 
that gave rise to the ABM Treaty in the first place.
  As long as we have a potentially adversarial relationship with 
Russia--in other words, as long as we are not dealing with a Canada, or 
a France, or a Britain--our sense of security will depend on the 
confidence we have in our retaliatory capability.
  Anything that undermines confidence in retaliatory capability--which 
is what strategic missile defenses do--will increase the reluctance of 
one side or the other to reduce offensive strategic forces.
  One implicit aspect of the bill's analysis is correct--the Russians 
do not have the economic means to develop an ABM system on a par with 
what we are capable of developing with the expenditure of a large 
portion of our treasure. But they do have a stockpile of surplus 
warheads which they could deploy to respond to our national missile 
defense system.
  With our planned deployment of a national missile defense system, the 
Russians, now feeling less certain of their retaliatory capability, 
will opt for the next best alternative--they will ignore their 
remaining commitments under Start I and they will refuse to ratify 
Start II.
  It will not end there--they are likely to begin expanding their 
strategic forces to overcome missile defenses. We will respond by 
expanding our forces and by developing even more robust missile 
defenses, and so on. In short, we will restart the spiral of escalating 
nuclear deployments that marked the worst days of East-West 
confrontation.
  What a cruel irony that would be--after the cold war, when we could 
have achieved significant reductions in strategic arms--we will instead 
have created the kind of bankrupting, paranoia-driven arms race that 
the ABM Treaty sought to prevent, and, indeed, did prevent during the 
cold war.
  Another justification for scuttling the treaty could be called the 
Barbarians are at the gates argument. According to this line of 
reasoning, there are numerous rogue States on the verge of acquiring 
advanced tactical and strategic ballistic missiles. And we urgently 
need to develop the means to counter this imminent threat to our 
national security.
  This is a crucial matter, and one which deserves more careful 
analysis than has been employed to date. I know about the estimates 
that say that some countries are only a decade away from having long 
range ballistic missile delivery capability. But I question the 
validity of those analyses. 

[[Page S 11277]]

  Many other reputable studies by experts in the field indicate that 
the nations causing the greatest worry to the Defense Department will 
not acquire long range delivery systems for the next 20 to 30 years, if 
ever. Even Defense Department data reveal that 97 percent of the Third 
World missile threat comes from theater ballistic missiles with a range 
of 1,000 kilometers or less.
  The delivery system of choice of rogue states targeting the United 
States with weapons of mass destruction will not be ballistic missiles. 
There are plenty of ways to circumvent defenses without even using 
missiles. These are the threats on which we should focus our ever-
scarcer resources, not on the alarmist scenarios that are being touted 
by the proponents of national missile defense.
  If a national missile defense can be rendered ineffective by an 
overwhelming Russian attack, and if such a system is many times more 
capable than what is required to contend with the Third World theater 
ballistic missile threat, then we are left to ask a basic question--
what are we spending tens of billions of dollars to defend ourselves 
from?
  I think that the only logical conclusion is one that is not 
explicitly stated, but begins to emerge if you read carefully between 
the lines. The real reason for going on a crash program to develop a 
national missile defense system is that there are some who don't care 
that the ABM Treaty will be jettisoned because, in their view, arms 
reduction per se is not in our national security interest.
  If our deployment of a national missile defense causes the Russians 
to abandon START II, that fits right in with their strategy. Such a 
move by the Russians will provide the excuse they need to argue for 
maintaining and perhaps even expanding a large United States strategic 
arsenal.
  I realize that there are others who might vote for a national missile 
defense system because, upon first glance, it seems to be a way to 
render strategic ballistic missiles obsolete. I know that not everyone 
who supports a missile defense wants an arms buildup. Some may honestly 
believe that a national missile defense is a path to future arms 
reduction.
  But I would hope that those who do want arms reduction will realize 
the essential paradox of defense and offense where strategic ballistic 
missiles are concerned. The more you try to defend, the more the other 
side will buildup. This has been borne out by experience. In this 
manner, a well-meaning attempt to reduce the effectiveness of strategic 
weapons by building a robust defense could have the perverse impact of 
leading to a new and costly arms race.
  In closing, I would just like to remind my colleagues who remain 
skeptical about the usefulness of the ABM Treaty, that the START 
treaties--in which both sides have agreed to cut their strategic 
arsenals by a total of two-thirds--were concluded without the United 
States having deployed a single strategic defensive system.
  The ABM Treaty has served the purpose of arms reduction remarkably 
well. We should seek to build upon its successes, not scuttle it for an 
ill-defined and perilous course.
  Finally, let me say that if Senators are going to stand on the floor 
and say they are going to vote against the Levin amendment but they 
support START I and START II, then I respectfully suggest that they go 
read this legislation. I do not know how you can say that.
  If a Senator is going to say, ``I support the ABM Treaty but I am 
against the Levin amendment,'' I suggest he or she go read the 
legislation before us. If a Senator comes to the floor and says, ``By 
the way, I not only do not like the doctrine of mutual assured 
destruction, I do not support START I, START II, or the ABM Treaty,'' 
then I say vote against this amendment, because then you will be 
intellectually honest. It is a legitimate position to take. But let us 
not kid the American people and the world and say we support reducing 
the number of nuclear weapons, we support START I, we support START II, 
we are even for a START III, which we are contemplating, and we are for 
the ABM Treaty but, by the way, we are going to vote for this 
legislation. You cannot do both and be intellectually honest about it.
  So, as they say, pick a team, pick a side, pick a position, but do 
not pretend you are on both sides because you cannot be against Levin 
and for the ABM Treaty. You cannot be against Levin and for the START 
II agreement. You cannot be against Levin and for further reduction in 
the nuclear arsenals of the major powers in the world.
  I thank my colleague from Michigan, and I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Levin-
Exon-Bingaman-Glenn amendment, to the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1996, to strike provisions of the bill which would 
directly lead to our violation of the ABM treaty. This treaty is vital 
to American national security.
  The Missile Defense Act would lead to violations of the ABM Treaty in 
two crucial ways.
  First, it would establish a deployment plan for a national missile 
defense. If a national ballistic missile defense were deployed, it 
would blatantly violate the treaty.
  Second, before any national missile defense system can be deployed, 
it must be tested. Fully testing this type of system would violate the 
ABM Treaty.
  The ABM Treaty is the diplomatic foundation of our intercontinental 
ballistic missile reduction strategy. It was possible to negotiate and 
ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START, which is currently 
being implemented, and negotiate START II, which awaits ratification by 
this Senate and the Russian Duma because of the strategic groundwork 
laid in the ABM Treaty. Abandoning or violating the ABM Treaty would 
threaten the strategic ballistic missile reductions under these two 
treaties which, when implemented, would verifiably eliminate the 
intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying two-thirds of Russia's 
nuclear warheads.
  Further, abandoning our treaty obligations jeopardizes our future 
relationship with Russia. The Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations 
have worked hard to not only strengthen the strategic relationship 
between our nations, but economic, cultural, and diplomatic 
relationships as well. We have achieved measurable strategic reductions 
because of the foundation of trust the ABM Treaty provides. To 
jeopardize this trust, especially while START II waits precariously for 
ratification, is simply unwise. If the ABM Treaty is abandoned, the 
casualty may very well be the future of nuclear arms reductions with 
Russia.
  While it is true that the ABM Treaty was ratified at the height of 
the cold war and that its outlook is bipolar in nature, the fact 
remains that the greatest ballistic missile threat to the United States 
is still located in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union. 
The ABM Treaty gives a sense of security to the Russian government 
which allows them to move forward toward reducing their stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons under both START and START II.
  Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Shalikashvili, has felt it necessary to declare that United States 
abandonment of the ABM Treaty could harm both the prospects for START 
II ratification by the Duma and our broader security relationship with 
Russia. In addition, abandonment of the treaty could threaten the 
continued dismantlement of nuclear weapons under START. Again, if we 
abandon our commitments under the ABM Treaty, we stand to lose the 
verified elimination of thousands of nuclear missiles currently aimed 
at the U.S. Our national security priority should be to greatly reduce 
this ICBM threat.
  My support of the ABM Treaty does not negate my willingness to see a 
national ballistic missile defense system studied. We should continue 
our research and development programs for a national ballistic missile 
defense system and should always look toward our future defense needs.
  Turning to the issue of theater missile defense, I also believe 
deeply that we must develop and deploy this type of system which does 
not violate the ABM Treaty. Development and deployment of this type of 
system is technologically feasible and is permissible under the ABM 
Treaty. Most of the 

[[Page S 11278]]
theater ballistic missile defense systems currently in development and 
being tested are ABM Treaty compliant. In fact, the joint summit 
statement from the May Clinton/Yeltsin Summit delineates a set of 
principles that provides that both sides can deploy effective theater 
ballistic missile defense systems within the framework of the ABM 
Treaty.
  Because theater ballistic missile defense is entirely possible under 
the ABM Treaty, is it not the better path to both maintain the ABM 
Treaty thus protecting the elimination of thousands of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles under START and START II and to develop and deploy a 
theater ballistic missile defense system that could both protect future 
theater ballistic missile threats to American shores and current 
theater ballistic missile threats to American and Allied troops 
overseas?
  Let us continue our research and development programs for a national 
ballistic missile defense, let us continue to develop and work to 
deploy a theater ballistic missile defense, but let us oppose 
abandoning the ABM Treaty and thus lose our opportunity to eliminate 
thousands of Russia's intercontinental ballistic missiles.
  It is in our national security interest to continue to support the 
ABM Treaty until the great threat of Russian ICBMs aimed at the United 
States is substantially reduced under START and START II. Until this 
important process is completed, let us work to deploy a theater missile 
defense system and continue our research towards the development of 
national ballistic missile defense system.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, today, I received a letter from the 
Honorable Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State. I will take a few 
seconds to read a short paragraph:

       I commend the Committee's decision to set a course for 
     deployment of a National Missile Defense system to protect 
     all Americans. Development of such a system is long overdue. 
     I believe that such a deployment will actually enhance 
     deterrence. . . The ABM Treaty is unable to help the United 
     States deal with one of the most significant post-Cold War 
     security threats: the proliferation of long-range ballistic 
     missiles. In fact, the ABM Treaty now stands in the way of 
     our ability to respond in an effective manner.

  I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
record, as follows:

                                                   August 3, 1995.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Thurmond: I am writing to congratulate you on 
     your recent markup of the Defense Authorization Bill, 
     especially the provisions in the bill dealing with ballistic 
     missile defense and the ABM Treaty. With the bill soon to be 
     debated on the Senate floor, I wanted to present my views on 
     a number of related issues.
       The time has clearly come for the United States to consider 
     either amending the ABM Treaty or finding some other basis 
     for regulating U.S.-Russian strategic relations. The ABM 
     Treaty was born of a different era, characterized by a 
     different set of strategic and political circumstances. As I 
     said in my testimony before your committee earlier this year, 
     when things have changed so much, we must not fear changes in 
     our Cold War treaty arrangements if such changes are in our 
     best interest.
       I commend the Committee's decision to set a course for 
     deployment of a National Missile Defense system to protect 
     all Americans. Development of such a system is long overdue. 
     I believe that such a deployment will actually enhance 
     deterrence and provide the basis for deeper offensive 
     reductions. Our experience with the ABM Treaty has shown that 
     a lack of defense neither promotes offensive reductions nor 
     otherwise enhances stability. More important, the ABM Treaty 
     is unable to help the United States deal with one of the most 
     significant post-Cold War security threats: the proliferation 
     of long-range ballistic missiles. In fact the ABM Treaty now 
     stands in the way of our ability to respond in an effective 
     manner.
       I am also pleased to see that the Committee has passed the 
     legislation introduced by Senator Warner, which establishes a 
     clear demarcation between permitted Theater Missile Defense 
     systems, and strategic defenses limited by the ABM Treaty. It 
     is essential that the ABM Treaty not be extended to cover 
     systems that were never intended to be limited, such as 
     Theater Missile Defense systems. Such systems are too 
     important to be held hostage to arbitrary and unnecessary 
     negotiations. I find it hard to believe that the Clinton 
     Administration objects to having its own demarcation standard 
     codified into law. Such a move seems entirely appropriate and 
     consistent with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
       I believe that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 is an 
     important step in the right direction. It is a measured and 
     well-focused response to a dramatic threat to United States 
     national interests.
           Sincerely,
                                               Henry A. Kissinger.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, is the leader ready to proceed?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Yes.
  Mr. LOTT. I will withhold. I understand the Senator from Texas may 
have some remarks, if the Senator would like to wait, or would he like 
to proceed?
  Mr. DASCHLE. I am prepared to speak, but if the Senator has been on 
the floor, I am happy to defer to her.
  Mr. THURMOND. How much time does the Senator from Texas want?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Two or three minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I think there is a fundamental issue 
here, and that is, as the world changes, is the U.S. Senate and the 
U.S. Congress going to continue to meet the challenges of the new world 
that we face today?
  The world has changed since the ABM Treaty. No longer are we a 
bipolar world. We now know--and it has been published often in 
newspapers--that there are numerous countries that have nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. Do they have the ability to attack 
the United States with these weapons? We believe that some might.
  So the question is: Are we going to unilaterally disarm our ability 
to defend our shores from a potential attack? That is the issue. We 
cannot, in any way, limit our capability to meet the challenges of the 
post cold war, multipolar world that we are living in today.
  So I hope that we will not do anything that will lessen our ability 
to defend our shores. We must have a theater ballistic missile defense. 
We must continue to go forward to make sure we have the technology to 
defend ourselves against any incoming missiles, or to defend our armed 
services in any theater in which they may be fighting. That is the core 
issue today.
  So I hope that our colleagues understand the significance of this 
argument. This is not, in any way, partisan; it ought not be in any way 
a matter for discussion, really; it is a matter of priorities and what 
our leadership role is. I hope that we will put aside partisan views on 
this issue and look at our responsibility to defend our shores and our 
future generations.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the 
Democratic leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Michigan for the time.
  Mr. President, I want to also thank him for offering this amendment, 
and I commend Senators Exon, Bingaman and Glenn for cosponsoring it. I 
believe that the vote on this amendment may be one of the most critical 
votes that we cast this year. There are many provisions in this bill 
that I, along with many of the people on this side of the aisle--and I 
suspect beyond the beltway--strongly oppose. However, perhaps the most 
objectionable provisions in this bill--and potentially the most 
damaging to the long-term security interests of the United States--are 
those calling for the United States to deploy multiple-site national 
missile defenses by the year 2003.
  As Senator Levin and others have already pointed out, committing this 
country to deploying a multisite national missile defense system at 
this time would have very damaging consequences for our national 
security. The Levin amendment would retain the strategic policies that 
have kept this country safe now for a half century.
  I strongly support the Levin amendment for several reasons.
  First, I am concerned that any effort by the United States to deploy 
theater missile defenses could jeopardize several important treaties 
negotiated under both the Clinton and Bush administrations. For 
instance, the provisions could hold up implementation of 

[[Page S 11279]]
the START Treaty; imperil Russian ratification of the START II Treaty, 
which requires Russia and the United States, as everyone here knows, to 
reduce their long-range nuclear weapons from 8,500 to 3,500; and 
possibly impact the conventional forces in Europe Treaty, which calls 
for the reduction of heavy weapons, such as tanks and combat aircraft 
throughout NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.
  Second, I am concerned that deployment of national missile defenses 
in the United States could undermine U.S. nonproliferation efforts. For 
instance, China could withhold support for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty if the United States violates or renegotiates the ABM Treaty.
  Needless to say, Chinese resistance to the CTB could induce other 
regional powers to follow suit, thus eroding support for the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. Moreover, deployment of theater missile 
defenses would make other nuclear countries, like China, Britain, and 
France, less willing to enter into future nuclear reduction treaties.
  Third, as has been pointed out several times during this debate, 
nothing in the treaty precludes the Department of Defense and the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Office from conducting the program as 
currently planned for at least the next year or two. Let me repeat 
that. The ABM Treaty will not constrain our ballistic missile defense 
efforts for at least the next year or two.
  Therefore, we have ample time to weigh the threats this Nation faces 
and debate the appropriate response. We need not march off 
precipitously on a path that leads us to unilateral abrogation of one 
treaty, and the probable breaking of several others.
  Mr. President, let me make it clear, I am not saying that we should 
never consider making changes to the ABM Treaty or any other treaty. 
Circumstances change and security requirements must be modified 
accordingly.
  Even the Constitution, the greatest document drafted by this country, 
has been modified 26 times. What I am saying is that this is neither 
the time nor the manner to modify the treaty.
  For all these reasons, I strongly support the Levin amendment and 
urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I yield such time as I have remaining to the author of the amendment, 
the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire about the remaining time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and eighteen seconds for the 
Senator from South Carolina, and 6 minutes for the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LOTT. Due to the fact that we only have 1 minute and 18 seconds, 
we will reserve our time to see if the Senator from Michigan would like 
to use the balance of his 6 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I understand the Chair is saying there is 6 minutes 
remaining. I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. President, the language in the bill which this amendment would 
correct does three things.
  First, the language sets forth a head-on clash with the ABM Treaty. 
Words have clear meaning by the way they have consequences, too, which 
we will get to in a moment.
  Section 233 says it is the policy of the United States to deploy 
multiple site national defense missiles. The ABM Treaty prohibits such 
defenses. You cannot get much clearer than that without a formal 
abrogation document. What this bill says is the policy to do it is not 
allowed by the ABM Treaty.
  In addition, section 235 of the bill says that to implement the 
policy established in that earlier section, the Secretary of Defense 
shall develop an affordable and operationally effective national 
missile defense system, which will attain initial operational 
capability by a specified year.
  ``Shall'' and ``will;'' these are very clear and very strong words.
  Second, the bill says that the line between short-range and long-
range missile defenses is a specific line. We are doing it by U.S. law.
  Now, it is the same demarcation which is being negotiated between 
Russia and us. What we are doing is usurping the negotiations and 
transferring them from wherever they are being negotiated to the floor 
of the U.S. Senate. If the Duma did that, we would not stand for it for 
one moment--any of us--I hope. So there is a unilateral interpretation 
of the ABM Treaty in this bill which would be stricken by this 
amendment.
  Third, the bill says it is a sense of the Senate that the President 
shall not negotiate--these are the words--sense of the Senate the 
President should cease all efforts to clarify U.S. obligations under 
the ABM Treaty.
  We have heard a lot about the need to modify. By the way, I think 
most would agree that the ABM Treaty should be modified. At least many 
of us, including myself.
  Here it is said in section 237, that it is the sense of the Senate 
that the President should cease all efforts to modify, clarify, U.S. 
obligation. Both words are used--modify and clarify.
  On the floor, we hear a lot about we ought to try to modify this 
treaty, and we should. Section 237 says the President shall cease all 
efforts to modify or clarify our obligations under the treaty. That 
section would also be stricken.
  Mr. President, this language in this bill which the amendment would 
strike will dash the hopes of our generation for a new relationship 
with Russia, following the end of the cold war. That is what Secretary 
Perry tells us. That is what General Shalikashvili tell us.
  This is why Secretary Perry has written us the following:

       Certain provisions [in this bill] related to the ABM Treaty 
     would be very damaging to U.S. security interests. By 
     mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard 
     U.S. treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment 
     date of a multiple-site NMD system--the bill would jeopardize 
     Russian implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, 
     which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic 
     nuclear weapons.

  We cannot get much more serious than this. It has never been more 
important to read words in a bill than it is now because what our 
Secretary of Defense is telling us; that the elimination of offensive 
weapons aimed at us is jeopardized if we unilaterally move to trash the 
ABM Treaty or interpret the ABM Treaty the way this bill does.
  That is why this debate is worth 5 hours--indeed, maybe 5 days. That 
is the seriousness of the language that is in this bill.
  Then the Secretary of Defense goes on to say that, ``The bill's 
unwarranted imposition through funding restrictions, of a unilateral . 
. . demarcation interpretation would similarly jeopardize these 
reductions . . .''
  Now, we have a treaty. Treaties should mean things. They should have 
significance. When the Russians violated it, we tried to hold them 
accountable. So, I believe, the Duma will point to our action in saying 
that this gives them an excuse to, instead of reducing nuclear weapons, 
to stop those reductions, to keep the numbers where they are, and, 
indeed, increase them, in order to now deal with these new defenses 
which this bill commits us to build.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LOTT. We do have at least one more speaker. Could I ask unanimous 
consent we have 10 additional minutes, 5 on each side?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, does that then supersede whatever time we 
have left?
  Mr. LOTT. It would begin now, when all existing time expires, which 
is within about 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President. We have talked about this now 
for 3\1/2\ hours, and we have got a little bit longer to go.
  I think it has been said every argument has been made on both sides 
by this time. When the Senator from Texas stood up and talked about 
this being a different world, I have to emphasize that this is a 
different world than it was back in 1972.
  In 1972, we had two superpowers. We had the USSR and the United 
States, and we had a treaty that took place back then that was 
controversial at that time, the ABM Treaty between two parties. One of 
those parties does not even exist anymore. The world is totally 
different. The threat is not there from the Soviet Union because the 
Soviet Union is not there anymore.
  If we stop and look at the comparison that we have today, we are 
living under 

[[Page S 11280]]
a treaty that says that we can defend ourselves overseas, we can defend 
ourselves in a theater missile environment, but we cannot defend our 
own country.
  Now, I think we have to look at it and say, is the environment we are 
in today a more dangerous environment than it was in 1972? I think 
there is some argument, very persuasive argument, that there is. We 
have heard quoted several times on this floor a statement by Jim 
Woolsey, who is the Security Adviser to President Clinton, said that we 
know of between 20 and 25 nations that have developed or are developing 
weapons of mass destruction--either nuclear, chemical, or biological--
and they are working on the missile method to deliver those weapons of 
mass destruction.
  I think that a case can be made that the environment we are in today 
is far more serious, far more dangerous, to our Nation's security than 
it was when we could identify who the enemy was.
 At that time, of course, the enemy was the U.S.S.R.

  I will share with you a conversation I had with Dr. Henry Kissinger. 
We all know he was the architect, back in 1972, of this controversial 
antiballistic missile treaty. He said at that time he felt it was the 
right thing to do.
  At that time the mutual destruction mentality that we had seemed to 
make sense. ``We only have two countries in the world who are capable 
of developing and delivering any form of destruction of that nature, so 
let us just both make ourselves so we are vulnerable to the other 
one.'' Maybe it made sense then. I am not sure that it did.
  But the other day, in a private conversation with me--and he said it 
is fine to quote him--he said: For us to be living under that treaty 
today is insane. And he said, and this is a direct quote, ``It's nuts 
to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.''
  I do not know whether that is in the letter that the distinguished 
Senator from South Carolina submitted for the Record. I suggest words 
to that effect are there, but it is a lengthy, two-page letter. In that 
letter he describes it.
  This is the person who was the architect of the ABM Treaty. So all I 
am saying, Mr. President, is today it is a different world. Today it is 
a world not with two superpowers but with a superpower, the United 
States--if we want to call ourselves that--and many other semi-
superpowers or quasi-superpowers, any of which, if they have the 
technology, can deliver weapons of mass destruction to the United 
States.
  I agree with Henry Kissinger; it is nuts to make a virtue out of our 
vulnerability, which is exactly what we have been doing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to Senator Dorgan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by 
the Senator from Michigan. I think this is awfully important. I know it 
has taken an awful lot of time on the Senate floor today, but I think 
it is worth the amount of time it has taken. This is an enormously 
important amendment. This amendment strikes the language in the bill 
that is brought to the floor by the Armed Services Committee that will 
abrogate the ABM Treaty. In my judgment, it is reckless to do what is 
done in this bill in a manner that will abrogate that treaty.
  We had a long debate this morning on the subject of funding, $300 
million added to the bill for a national missile defense system. That 
amendment that I brought to the floor to strip the $300 million out 
lost by a vote of 51 to 48. I hope we will revisit that issue in an 
appropriate way and we will achieve a different result. That was 
important.
  But this is even more important. I hope the Senate, on this 
amendment, will understand the dimensions of this amendment offered by 
the Senator from Michigan. The ABM Treaty is the foundation of the arms 
agreements which we have reached with the Soviet Union and Russia and 
others. I think it is critically important that we agree to this 
amendment this afternoon and strike the language in the bill brought to 
the floor, that I think jeopardizes, literally jeopardizes, our 
security by weakening the arms control agreements that are now in 
place.
  I congratulate the Senator from Michigan for a long, hard fight. I 
hope when the votes are counted we will find, in this circumstance, he 
prevails--he prevails for the good of this country and for the future 
of our children.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, could I inquire on the remainder of time on 
both sides of the aisle?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 minute and 33 seconds left on the 
majority side and 3 minutes and 50 seconds left on Senator Levin's 
side.
  Mr. LOTT. I reserve the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the cold war is over. But there are some 
remnants that remain, including about 8,000 nuclear warheads on Russian 
soil. Those warheads are being dismantled. They are being dismantled as 
part of the START I agreement and START II agreement. The dismantling 
of those warheads is critical to our security.
  The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs says that the continuing 
dismantlement of Russian warheads that threaten us is jeopardized if we 
undermine the ABM Treaty. Because instead of dismantling warheads, the 
Russians will now be faced with the threat of defenses, which means 
they would be tending to increase the warheads in order to overcome 
those defenses.
  So there are a number of treaties which are at issue. There is the 
ABM Treaty, but there is also a START I Treaty and a START II Treaty.
  When General Shalikashvili tells us, as he has in writing, that we 
must assume that unilateral United States legislation could harm 
prospects for START II ratification by the Duma, and probably impact 
our broader security relationship with Russia as well, we should 
listen.
  And when the Secretary of Defense says that the study which is 
referred to in this bill should be completed before we decide to deploy 
sites in violation of the ABM Treaty instead of vice versa--we should 
not be now committing to deploy multisites when they violate a treaty 
which we are then going to study--so what the Secretary of Defense last 
said is these serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed 
Senate review of the ABM Treaty before--underlined--before considering 
such drastic and far-reaching measures.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is up. Who yields time?
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, has all time expired?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is approximately 1 minute, 31 seconds on 
your side, approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on the side of the 
Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I have the authority of the majority leader 
to use leader time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I understand correctly what the Senator 
from Michigan said a minute ago--did I hear him say the ``threat of 
defense''? The ``threat of defense,'' did the Senator say that?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. Our having defenses to the Soviets 
means that instead of getting rid of their offensive weapons, they will 
need more. That is not what I am saying, though. That is what General 
Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry are saying, far more important than 
what this Senator was saying.
  Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator, but I just want the American people to 
think about that terminology. The threat of defense. Maybe that should 
be the description of what the Levin amendment is all about. Defense--
who does it scare in America? Our defense scares the Russians? The MAD 
era is over, thank God. Let us admit it. Let us let it go. Times have 
changed. The threat of defense, to me, is not a scary idea.
  We are not saying, do it now. We are saying, let us move forward with 
development, let us have some plans, let us begin some specificity, let 
us have enough money to really do the job. Let us not have enough money 
to waste. Let us have enough money to do the job. Let us have enough 
money to deploy. 

[[Page S 11281]]

  Yes, we should be reasonable. We should think it through. But does 
any Senator here, or any American, think that the Senator from Maine is 
going to support language that is going to be dangerous and 
irresponsible? That is ridiculous. The Senator from Virginia, Senator 
Warner, who has worked on this for years and years and years and was 
one of the coauthors, with the Senator from Georgia, of the missile 
defense language of 1991, these are not irresponsible people.
  Can we continue to work together to try to move into this new era to 
move beyond ABM? Yes. Let us do it rationally and reasonably. But let 
us do it. What is this absolute infatuation, this clinging to ABM? It 
is time to move on.
  We have a letter from Dr. Kissinger that has been referred to. But I 
know a lot of Senators on both sides of the aisle have a lot of respect 
for Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger's letter is very telling. I am going 
to read every word of it because it really sums up where we are today. 
It is addressed to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Thurmond. It is dated August 3. He also testified 
before the Armed Services Committee very clearly and very succinctly 
about what we should do and how we should move into the present and 
forget the past. This language is about the future, how do we get there 
and plan to get there. By clinging to ABM, are we trying to, as a 
matter of fact, stop a movement toward defense and start the movement 
toward the next generation? I fear that is what is involved.
  Here is what Henry Kissinger had to say:
                                                   August 3, 1995.
       Dear Senator Thurmond: I am writing to congratulate you on 
     your recent markup of the Defense Authorization Bill, 
     especially the provisions in the bill dealing with ballistic 
     missile defense and the ABM Treaty. With the bill soon to be 
     debated on the Senate floor, I wanted to present my views on 
     a number of related issues.
       The time has clearly come for the United States to consider 
     either amending the ABM Treaty or finding some other basis 
     for regulating U.S.-Russian strategic relations. The ABM 
     Treaty was born of a different era, characterized by a 
     different set of strategic and political circumstances. As I 
     said in my testimony before your committee earlier this year, 
     when things have changed so much, we must not fear changes in 
     our Cold War treaty arrangements if such changes are in our 
     best interest.
       I commend the Committee's decision to set a course for 
     deployment of a National Missile Defense system to protect 
     all Americans. Development of such a system is long overdue. 
     I believe that such a deployment will actually enhance 
     deterrence and provide the basis for deeper offensive 
     reductions. Our experience with the ABM Treaty has shown that 
     a lack of defense neither promotes offensive reductions nor 
     otherwise enhances stability. More important, the ABM Treaty 
     is unable to help the United States deal with one of the most 
     significant post-Cold War security threats: the proliferation 
     of long-range ballistic missiles. In fact the ABM Treaty now 
     stands in the way of our ability to respond in an effective 
     manner.
       I am also pleased to see that the Committee has passed the 
     legislation introduced by Senator Warner, which establishes a 
     clear demarcation between permitted Theater Missile Defense 
     systems, and strategic defenses limited by the ABM Treaty. It 
     is essential that the ABM Treaty not be extended to cover 
     systems that were never intended to be limited, such as 
     Theater Missile Defense systems. Such systems are too 
     important to be held hostage to arbitrary and unnecessary 
     negotiations. I find it hard to believe that the Clinton 
     Administration objects to having its own demarcation standard 
     codified into law. Such a move seems entirely appropriate and 
     consistent with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
       I believe that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 is an 
     important step in the right direction. It is a measured and 
     well-focused response to a dramatic threat to United States 
     national interests.
           Sincerely,
                                               Henry A. Kissinger.

  eThis is a name, this is a voice, although sometime not 
understandable, one that we all recognize, that has influenced so much 
of what has happened in this area over the past 30 years, I guess. Yet, 
he takes such a strong stand. Why are we so afraid of this?
  So I think that we should defeat the Levin amendment. I know there 
are negotiations between the Senator from Maine, Senator Cohen, and 
Senator Nunn, and perhaps some others for some improvements. I am 
always willing to look at that. I think we can do that. But first we 
must defeat the Levin amendment. We must move into the era of reality.
  The argument has been made that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 will 
undermine START II ratification, and perhaps even damage broader United 
States-Russian relations. This argument is fundamentally rooted in a 
cold war view of the world. It assumes an adversarial, bipolar 
relationship between the United States and Russia. Essentially, it 
projects the United States-Soviet rivalry into the present day by 
suggesting that missile defenses, even limited defenses, are 
destablizing.
  I do not believe that. Times have changed. Yes, there is some 
opposition to this, and there are those in the Soviet Union that will 
argue that the START II Treaty may be in trouble. But if it is, there 
is plenty of evidence that it is for other reasons: money. We have 
quotes from the Russians saying they just do not have the money to 
implement it or for them to be able to tie START II and ABM. We cannot 
allow that.
  They have even tried to link other things to ratification of START II 
such as expansion of NATO, which they oppose. It is clear that Russia 
is willing to play the START II card on a number of issues. We must 
reject this linkage lest we encourage Russia to believe that they 
possess a veto over U.S. foreign and national security policy.
  Of course, we should cooperate with Russia and not disregard their 
legitimate security concerns. But this is what START II ratification is 
all about. This agreement is manifestly in both countries interest and 
should not be held hostage to other issues.
  Before we conclude that a U.S. national missile defense program will 
undermine START II, we should examine what impact such a system would 
actually have. In reality, the NMD system envisioned by the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995 would in no way undermine Russian confidence in the 
effectiveness of their strategic deterrent. Even a multiple-site 
deployment will not significantly alter Russia's ability to threaten 
the United States.
  Given this, I believe there is no basic rationality to these 
connections. Even President Yeltsin himself recommended a global 
defense system shortly after he assumed office. During the Bush 
administration, there was tentative agreement between the 
United States and Russia on amending the ABM Treaty to allow 
for up to five sites and unlimited deployments of sensors, including 
space-based sensors. Since then, many Russian officials have 
reconfirmed that a limited NMD deployment would not in any way 
undermine their deterrent posture.
  We must also recall that the ABM Treaty has already been amended 
once, and that the original treaty did allow for the deployment of more 
than one site. In fact, I think multiple sites was in the original 
treaty. During the negotiations that led up to the signing of that 
treaty in 1972, the Russians were even willing to agree to as many as 5 
sites with 100 ABM interceptors each.
  So there is a long history here of an understanding really of what 
ABM means and the recognition that we need or may need and should move 
toward multiple sites.
  But let me begin to conclude with these two points. Why is this 
legislation needed? The proliferation of ballistic missiles of all 
ranges, along with weapons of mass destruction, poses an ever-
increasing threat to the United States and its interests. I think there 
is a lot of evidence that shows that, even from administration 
officials. We must get started now if the United States is to counter 
these threats in time. Ten years? Is that a rush? There is an orderly 
plan here.
  The administration has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to 
extend the ABM Treaty to theater missile defense systems which have not 
and have never been covered, as I understand it, by treaty.
  What the legislation does not do is it does not signal a return to 
star wars. It advocates a modest and affordable program that is 
technically low risk. It does not violate, as I understand it, or 
advocate violation of the ABM Treaty. The means to implement the 
policies and the goals outlined in the Missile Defense Act of 1995 are 
contained in the ABM Treaty itself.
  So I urge that we take this step. Is it a step? Yes. Is it different 
from last year or 2 years or 3 years ago? Absolutely. Times are 
different. In order to 

[[Page S 11282]]
make that step, though, we must first defeat the Levin amendment.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, do I have any time left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and twenty seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, just last May our President and the Russian 
President issued a joint statement following a summit. One of those 
statements was that the United States and Russia are each committed to 
the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.
  That is how important the ABM Treaty is to the Russians.
  Should they be afraid of our defenses? Should they be threatened by 
our defenses? Gosh, we do not think so because we are good guys.
  The truth of the matter is they are. What is the proof of that? 
General Shalikashvili's statement and Secretary Perry's statement, 
which says flatout that if we act in this way to undermine the ABM 
Treaty, we jeopardize the reduction in START I and START II. So we are 
not afraid of defenses. We should be afraid of 8,000 Russian warheads 
which probably now will not be dismantled if we jeopardize a treaty 
which has provided some strategic stability. That is the threat to us, 
the 8,000 warheads which are currently being dismantled, reduced under 
START I and II, which now will probably not be dismantled according to 
two pretty important folks, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili. 
That is current evidence of what the stakes are here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from South Carolina controls 1 minute 26 seconds.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, has the distinguished Senator from Michigan 
yielded all time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, he has.
  Mr. LOTT. I believe we are ready to proceed.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are willing to yield back any time 
remaining if they are and we will proceed to a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask 
for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table the Levin amendment No. 2088. The yeas and nays are ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 49, as follows:
                      [Rollcall Vote No. 355 Leg.]

                                YEAS--51

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--49

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone
  So the motion to table the amendment (No. 2088) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
motion was agreed to.
  Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.


                           Amendment No. 2089

 (Purpose: To express the sense of Congress on missile defense of the 
                             United States)

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen], for himself and Mr. 
     Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 2089.

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following:
       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
     ballistic missiles of all ranges is a global problem that is 
     becoming increasingly threatening to the United States, its 
     troops and citizens abroad, and its allies.
       (2) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible 
     changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on 
     the provisions of this Treaty''.
       (3) Articles XIII and XIV of the ABM Treaty establish means 
     for the Parties to amend the Treaty, and the Parties have 
     employed these means to amend the Treaty.
       (4) Article XV of the ABM Treaty establishes means for a 
     Party to withdraw from the Treaty, upon 6 months notice, ``if 
     it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject 
     matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
     interests.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--Given the fundamental 
     responsibility of the Government of the United States to 
     protect the security of the United States, the increasingly 
     serious threat posed to the United States, the increasingly 
     serious threat posed to the United States by the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
     missile technology,and the effect this threat could have in 
     constraining the options of the United States to act in time 
     of crisis, it is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) it is in the supreme interest of the United States to 
     defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
     attack, whatever its source;
       (2) the deployment of a multiple site ground-based national 
     missile defense system to protect against limited ballistic 
     missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and 
     deterrence;
       (3) the policies, programs, and requirements of subtitle C 
     of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes 
     specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which 
     anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to 
     the Treaty;
       (4) the President is urged to initiate negotiations with 
     the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty as necessary 
     to provide for the national missile defense systems specified 
     in section 335 to protect the United States from limited 
     ballistic missile attack; and
       (5) if these negotiations fail, the President is urged to 
     consult with the Senate about the option of withdrawing the 
     United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the 
     provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, may we have order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor. The 
Senate will come to order.
  Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I am going to yield to the minority leader 
in just a moment. I just want to indicate that during the course of the 
debate on the Levin amendment, I indicated that I would be sending an 
amendment to the desk for consideration that would, I think, clarify 
the intent of the Armed Services Committee, as far as the ABM Treaty is 
concerned.
  My understanding is that the minority leader wishes to proceed at 
this point and introduce another measure dealing with welfare. I am 
prepared to yield to him if that is his desire, or we can continue to 
debate the amendment that I have now offered. But I am prepared to 
yield the floor for as much time as the minority leader needs, and then 
I will come back to my amendment following his statement.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Maine for his courtesy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I seek the floor using my leader time to make a 
statement unrelated to the bill. If I can do that and then return to 
the bill just as soon as we complete the statements, I prefer to do 
that. I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Maine.

[[Page S 11283]]

  Mr. COHEN. Senator Nunn is a principal cosponsor of the amendment I 
just sent to the desk.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will we be able to get a time agreement on 
this amendment? Is it going to be accepted? We just spent 7 hours on 
the last amendment. If this bill is not finished by tomorrow night, I 
think it is gone. I hope we can get a time agreement, if it is 
necessary to have it.
  Mr. COHEN. If the leader will yield, I think we can have a fairly 
short time agreement. I think Senator Nunn and I are working through 
really modifying this amendment to make sure we have broad bipartisan 
support for it. It should not take very long. If the leader wants to 
propose a time agreement----
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the leader withhold offering a time agreement until 
we can see the amendment?
  Mr. NUNN. I will say to the majority leader, if he will yield, I 
would like to have a time agreement on this amendment no longer than an 
hour equally divided. I believe we would be better to put that 
unanimous-consent request after the minority leader makes his 
statement.
  Mr. BUMPERS. If the majority leader will yield, I wonder if it is 
possible to sequence the amendments so the Members will have some idea 
as to the sequence. I am not pleading for mercy, but I have to go to a 
funeral in my State this weekend, with absolutely no reservation. I 
have to leave here tomorrow night. I have a couple of amendments, and I 
would like to offer them before I leave. I think it would be 
expeditious for the Senate if we can get some lined up and some 
sequence and time agreements, maybe 30 minutes or an hour. I think we 
got the tough ones out of the way. The rest should not take that much 
time.
  Mr. DOLE. I think that is an excellent idea. Senator Daschle and I 
may be starting to put it together, to rotate back and forth on the 
sequence of amendments. I think the Senator from Arizona wants to do 
the same thing. Maybe we can do the Senator's this evening if he has to 
be gone tomorrow.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I yield to the manager of the bill.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to say that we have spent a 
long time now just on a few amendments. I hope we can get reasonable 
time agreements and finish up this bill. I am saying that we can finish 
this bill in a reasonable time tomorrow, if we stay here tonight and 
work a reasonable time and do not take too much time on any one 
amendment. Most of the people know how they are going to vote; it is 
just a matter of voting. I hope we are all together.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, given that, I will use my leader time, 
and Senator Dole and I will have an opportunity to go off the floor and 
talk.
  I will yield to the Senator from Maryland, and following that, the 
distinguished Senator from Louisiana, for remarks regarding the Work 
First welfare reform plan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
  (The remarks of Ms. Mikulski and Mr. Breaux pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 1117 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the 
Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment 2089 offered 
by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. 
Nunn].
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe that language is still being 
worked out by Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn, and I believe that 
language will be resolved very quickly and with a commensurate time 
agreement.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment No. 2089, 
offered by the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside in order to allow Senator McCain to proceed with 
his amendment, and that there be a time limitation of 2 hours equally 
divided.
  Mr. McCAIN. They are not ready for the time agreement.
  Mr. COHEN. I ask unanimous consent that we set aside the pending 
amendment to allow Senator McCain to proceed with offering his 
amendment dealing with Seawolf. And, during the course of that time for 
debate, if we, Senator Nunn and I, come to the floor with our 
amendment, we then go off the McCain amendment and return to the Cohen-
Nunn amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if I may repeat, my understanding of the 
parliamentary situation is that we temporarily set aside the Cohen 
amendment while negotiations continue on that amendment in order to 
take up the Seawolf amendment. It is also my understanding that a time 
agreement on the Seawolf is being negotiated. On the McCain amendment, 
there are negotiations going on, and I ask that the clerk keep time so 
that it will apply once the unanimous-consent agreement is reached for 
the purposes of moving forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct with respect to the 
parliamentary situation. The clerk will keep time on the McCain 
amendment.


                           Amendment No. 2090

    (Purpose: To delete funding for procurement of a third Seawolf 
 submarine, and to prohibit expenditures of fiscal year 1996 funds and 
       prior fiscal year funds for procurement of such submarine)
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk, and I ask 
for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), for himself and Mr. 
     Roth, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Grams, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2090.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 30, after the matter following line 24, insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 125. SSN-23 SEAWOLF CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINE.

       (a) Deletion of Funding.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the total amount of the funds 
     authorized under section 102(a)(3) for the Navy for fiscal 
     year 1996 for shipbuilding and conversion is reduced by 
     $1,507,477,000.
       (b) Prohibition.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of this Act, funds available for the Department of Defense 
     for fiscal year 1996 and, except as provided in paragraph 
     (2)(B), funds available for the Department of Defense for any 
     preceding fiscal year may not be obligated or expended for 
     procurement of a third SSN-21 Seawolf class attack submarine 
     or for advance procurement for such submarine.
       (2)(A) Funds available for the Department of Defense for 
     fiscal year 1996 may not be used for paying costs incurred 
     for termination of any contract for procurement of a third 
     SSN-21 Seawolf class attack submarine, including any contract 
     for advance procurement of such submarine.
       (B) Only the funds available for the Department of Defense 
     for fiscal years before fiscal year 1996 for procurement of 
     an SSN-23 Seawolf attack submarine may, to the extent 
     provided in appropriations Act, be used for paying costs 
     described in subparagraph (A).

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, for the information of my colleagues who I 
know are interested in this amendment, especially my friends from 
Connecticut, the pending unanimous-concept agreement is 1 hour equally 
divided on each side, which would mean that, unless the Cohen amendment 
intervenes, there would be a vote approximately 2 hours from now since 
I anticipate that there would be a time agreement agreed to very 
shortly, which I would like to propound as soon as it is agreed to.
  Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to terminate the 
Seawolf submarine program and delete $1.6 billion included in the 
fiscal year 1996 national defense authorization bill for attack 
submarine programs.
  Mr. President, before I get into details, I want to talk about why it 
is 

[[Page S 11284]]
that I oppose the Seawolf submarine. Mr. President, if this were the 
cold war, I would be standing here as a staunch advocate of the Seawolf 
submarine. It is a technological marvel. It is a state-of-the-art 
weapons system, and it is perhaps one of the finest weapons of war that 
has been produced by the enormously capable industrial base of this 
country.
  But, Mr. President, I oppose the Seawolf submarine simply on the 
grounds that we are experiencing a justified decline in the defense 
budget. We are having to make very, very difficult decisions. This year 
we are authorizing the appropriations of funds for a very small number 
of ships, submarines, airplanes and tanks. And we simply cannot afford 
a submarine that costs almost $5 billion per submarine for the first 
two, and around $4 billion per submarine for the third.
  Mr. President, you are going to hear the argument propounded on the 
floor that the Russians are ahead of the United States, that they are 
devoting every waking hour to developing a fast, quiet submarine, and 
that, unless we build the Seawolf submarine, the Russians will pass us 
and pose some grave threat to our national security.
  Mr. President, I am sure that the Russian Defense Minister, General 
Grachev, is having a meeting with his top military advisers, and he is 
saying to them: ``Guys, we have a little problem in Chechnya. We have 
taken a few thousand casualties. We have spent a few billion rubles. 
Although there is a tenuous cease-fire, it is by no means clear that we 
are going to be through in Chechnya for many years. We have a few 
battalions down there in Georgia to take care of that situation. We 
have Russian troops everywhere around what we now call the `near 
abroad' that used to be the Soviet Union practically, and certainly to 
the south and to the west. We have our military officers who have come 
back from Eastern Europe living in boxcars with their families because 
we cannot afford to build houses for them, some of them living in 
tents. Recent conscriptions show that less than half of those 
conscripted are even showing up, much less being actually inducted into 
the military. Our fleets at Sevastopol and Vladivostok are rusting at 
the pier. Recent Western visitors have attested to that. We cannot even 
afford the oil required to allow them to go out on exercises. But 
forget all of that, guys. Our primary concern is fast, quiet 
submarines.''
  Mr. President, give me a break. Fast, quiet submarines are not the 
priority of the Russian military today. And I might say that up in room 
407, the secret room to which only a privileged few are allowed, is the 
CIA document that I would urge my colleagues to read that I have not 
read--that I have not read--but I know the content of, that raises into 
serious question the assumptions that the Russian priority is fast, 
quiet submarines. In fact, you do not have to go to room 407 to figure 
that out. All you have to do is read the newspaper to discover that the 
Soviet Union has enormous challenges as far as where they spend their 
defense dollars which are, as we all know, dramatically declining.
  So for us to base our continued support on the Seawolf submarine on a 
perceived threat to our national security, frankly flies in the face of 
the facts at hand.
  Mr. President, the amendment is straightforward. It prohibits 
expenditure of any defense funds for a third Seawolf submarine. It 
eliminates the noncompetitive language in the Senate bill. Section 121 
directs the allocation of the first new submarine contract to the 
Electric Boat shipyard and the second contract to the Newport News 
shipyard. In short, the amendment seeks to terminate the Seawolf 
program without making a judgment on a follow-on attack submarine 
program.
  In total, the amendment would delete $1.6 billion from the 
committee's recommendation for shipbuilding. The fact is that, like the 
B-2 bomber and many other cold war weapons systems, the Seawolf 
submarine has little or no place in the military force of the future. 
It is a costly relic of the longstanding tensions between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the reasoning which 
led the committee to reject additional funding for the B-2 bomber 
program did not extend to the committee's action on attack submarine 
programs. The committee chose to authorize funding for a third Seawolf 
submarine and to delay cost-saving competition for the follow-on new 
attack submarine until sometime in the next century.
  Mr. President, it is noted--it should be noted with interest--that we 
entered into the deliberations of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
bent on competition as to where the next submarine would be built. That 
was between the two remaining and major shipbuilding corporations, and 
now we came out with no competition until sometime in the next century 
designating one submarine for one shipyard and designating one for 
another, and just to make sure there was proper support, of course, we 
threw in an amphibious ship.
  After all, the Seawolf program has already cost nearly $11 billion, 
or more than $5 billion per submarine. Since the contracts for the 
first two Seawolf submarines were originally signed, their procurement 
costs have increased by $1.4 billion. The third Seawolf submarine is 
estimated to cost more than $2.4 billion, slightly more than last 
year's estimate.
  Because of these increasing costs, the Congress included in last 
year's defense authorization legislation a cost cap procurement of the 
first two Seawolf submarines. As a result of the legislative cost cap, 
the Navy instituted a new program management team, which has been 
successful so far in containing the costs of these two submarines. 
Hopefully, no further taxpayer dollars will be required to finish them.
  However, the cost cap would not apply to a third submarine, if one is 
authorized, which could therefore cost much more than the $2.4 billion 
currently estimated by the Navy.
  As we know, in the past 10 years, defense budgets have declined. 
Since 1985, it has declined in real terms by 35 percent, and we will 
probably experience another 10-percent reduction by the turn of the 
century.
  These significant reductions have meant that the Pentagon has 
canceled or delayed nearly all of its force modernization programs for 
the future. And it has meant that marines deployed on the U.S.S. Inchon 
off the coast of Somalia returned home to spend time with their 
families and friends for 10 days before being sent off to the coast of 
Haiti.
  Even with the increased resources, the committee was unable to begin 
to redress all of the recognized deficiencies in current and future 
force structure. At the same time, the committee approved funding for 
the third Seawolf submarine, $1.5 billion, that I would rather see 
allocated to programs with a mission in the likely potential conflicts 
of the future.
  Those who continue to support the program argue that procuring a 
third submarine is necessary to counter an enduring submarine threat. I 
do not find that argument to be persuasive.
  As we all know, the Navy earlier this year published and widely 
distributed a very slick booklet advertising proliferation of 
conventional submarines in Third World countries and emphasizing the 
growing number and technological sophistication of Russia's attack 
submarine force. Their conclusion? Buy the Seawolf submarine to meet 
this growing threat.
  Mr. President, I already discussed earlier the problems that the 
Russians face and the disarray of their economy, the disarray of their 
society, the problems in Chechnya, et cetera.
  At a hearing this year before the Seapower Subcommittee, the General 
Accounting Office witness testified that the intelligence analysis upon 
which the Navy based its claim of a growing Russian submarine threat 
was incomplete and in some cases disputed within the intelligence 
community.
  At the same hearing, the Congressional Research Service witness 
testified that a third Seawolf submarine is not necessary to fulfill 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirement for 10 to 12 stealthy attack 
submarines by the year 2012.
  Thus, military requirements do not support authorization of an 
additional submarine. The Armed Services Committee report flatly states 
that the Navy's argument of an operational requirement for the SSN-23 
was not compelling as a reason to build another Seawolf submarine.
  Another argument on behalf of the Seawolf program is the requirement 
to 

[[Page S 11285]]
maintain a two-shipyard submarine industrial base.
  I am fully aware of the portion of the submarine industrial base that 
is in my State of Arizona, thanks to the efficiency of General Dynamics 
and Electric Boat. There are $62 million worth of contracts in the 
State of Arizona. I suspect that most Members of Congress have been 
advised in detail about the financial advantages to their constituents 
of continued nuclear submarine production at Electric Boat shipyard.
  Mr. President, if we continue to base our support for weapons systems 
on whether there are defense contracts in our State or congressional 
districts, we will be doing an enormous disservice to the American 
taxpayer. We no longer have that luxury, if we ever did.
  I believe the committee's authorization of $1.5 billion to complete 
the third Seawolf submarine amounts to a capitulation to the 
administration's submarine industrial base arguments. It is clear from 
the committee's explanation of its recommendations to authorize the 
third Seawolf submarine that cost considerations took second place to 
industrial base arguments. No other reasoning could explain the 
committee's action.
  The Navy's stated policy is to maintain the two nuclear-capable 
shipyards currently in operation in the United States, Newport News in 
Virginia and Electric Boat in Connecticut. Under this policy, Newport 
News would build only carriers, although it is capable of building 
submarines, and Electric Boat would build only submarines. It is not 
capable of building carriers.
  However, separate analyses by the Navy and by Newport News 
Shipbuilding Co. demonstrate that maintaining one nuclear-capable 
shipyard is cheaper than maintaining two yards. I am not sure how deep 
an analysis that might have required. For the period of fiscal year 
1996 to 2012, the Navy estimates savings of $1.9 billion while Newport 
News estimates a savings of $5.8 billion if we had one shipyard instead 
of two.
  Yet, the committee chose to endorse at least through the end of this 
century that part of the administration's industrial base policy which 
requires maintaining two nuclear-capable shipyards.
  The committee explicitly directed that the first new attack submarine 
be built at Electric Boat, but in a departure from the administration's 
policy then directed that the second would be built at Newport News. 
What a surprise.
  The committee appeared to support the concept of competition for the 
submarine's procurement but then chose to delay implementing cost-
saving competition between the two shipyards until sometime in the next 
century--I might add, having the beneficial effect of pleasing everyone 
involved.
  Under the committee's recommendation, however, future competition for 
the third and later submarines will not necessarily result in a winner-
take-all contract award which could mean that both shipyards would stay 
in business indefinitely.
  Essentially, the committee kicked the can down the road, granting one 
submarine contract to each shipyard without addressing future 
competition. The result is that the taxpayers will see no savings from 
competition until sometime in the next century, if at all.
  Because of this arbitrary delay in imposing competition for submarine 
procurement, the committee found it necessary to accept the Navy's 
contention that building the third Seawolf submarine at Electric Boat 
was required to maintain Electric Boat shipyard as a viable competitor 
in the future. Thus, the committee authorized $1.5 billion for the SSN-
23, an overly expensive submarine for which the threat will not 
materialize in the foreseeable future.
  A more than adequate alternative to procuring a third Seawolf 
submarine and beginning the new attack submarine program in fiscal year 
1998 as planned is extending the service life of the existing attack 
submarine force.
  Currently, as of May 1, 1995, the U.S. attack submarine force 
consists of 83 SSN's. The Bottom-Up Review stated a long-term 
requirement for a force of only 45 to 55 attack submarines. In order to 
reduce the current force to the required levels, the Navy plans to 
retire rather than refuel a substantial portion of the SSN-688 class 
submarines. The Navy plan would mean scrapping submarines with an 
average of 18 years of service life remaining.
  I might add, Mr. President, that those ships were built with an 
average service life of 30 years.
  The cost of buying replacement submarines far exceeds the cost of 
refueling existing submarines as well as the estimated savings from 
decommissioning existing submarines.
  For example, $1.5 to $2 billion is the estimated cost of a new attack 
submarine while the estimated savings from early decommissioning is 
only $600 to $700 million. Clearly, if the newest of the Navy's SSN-688 
class submarines were retained in inventory throughout the remaining 
service life, the Bottom-Up Review requirement for 45 to 55 attack 
submarines could be met well into the next century at a cost much less 
than the cost of buying the SSN-23 and buying new attack submarines on 
an noncompetitive basis.
  Terminating the Seawolf program and deferring a decision on a follow-
on attack submarine program would provide needed time to reassess the 
need for and the design of a follow-on program. Such a decision, 
however, requires that we clearly face the stark reality of declining 
defense budgets and the future budgets which require tough decisions 
about sustaining duplicative infrastructure at a cost of billions of 
dollars.
  The fact is that there are currently two nuclear-capable shipyards in 
the United States, Electric Boat and Newport News. How much of our 
scarce defense dollars are we willing to spend to maintain two 
shipyards capable of producing nuclear-powered submarines at $4 to $5 
billion a copy? The price is very steep.
  Mr. President, I yield at this time to the distinguished chairman, 
who I think is ready to propound a unanimous-consent request.
  Mr. THURMOND. I wish to thank the able Senator from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now 
be a total of 2 hours of debate prior to a motion to table on an 
amendment to be offered by Senators McCain, Roth, Feingold, and Grams 
regarding the Seawolf submarine, with the time equally divided between 
Senators McCain and Cohen; I further ask that no second-degree 
amendments be in order prior to a vote on a motion to table, and that 
upon expiration or yielding back of time the Senate proceed to a vote 
on or in relation to the McCain amendment.
  Mr. COHEN. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. President, could we also indicate that the time that has been 
consumed to this point also be included in that 2-hour period?
  Mr. THURMOND. That is correct, Mr. President, the statement made by 
the able Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous consent that upon disposition of the 
first McCain amendment, Senator McCain be recognized to offer an 
amendment regarding Seawolf cost cap and immediately after the clerk 
reports that amendment Senator Dodd be recognized to offer a relevant 
second-degree amendment and that there be a total of 10 minutes of 
debate equally divided in the usual form on both amendments. I further 
ask unanimous consent that upon the expiration or yielding back of the 
time on the second amendment, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in 
relation to the Dodd amendment, followed immediately by a vote on or in 
relation to the McCain amendment, as amended, if amended.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Thank you.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-two minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President in their ongoing efforts to convince the 
Congress to spend another $1.5 billion on a militarily unnecessary 
program Seawolf proponents argue that so much 

[[Page S 11286]]
money has already been spent on the third Seawolf that it would be 
foolish to terminate the program now. They argue that terminating the 
third submarine would save only $315 to $615 million.
  Mr. President, never once in the 12 years that I have been in 
Congress have the proponents of a program that was up for cancellation 
not argue that it was more expensive to cancel a program that it was to 
keep it alive. I guess going back to that old Vietnam philosophy we had 
to destroy it in order to save it.
  Mr. President, even if the savings are only $615 million, that is 
still a lot of money to most Americans. However, I must point out that 
a careful look at the facts shows that these claims are, at best, 
misleading.
  CBO estimates that savings from terminating the Seawolf submarine 
could amount to between $1.1 and $1.3 billion. In a May 15, 1995 letter 
report, CBO concluded that: ``Canceling the third Seawolf would save 
about $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1996, minus $500 million in potential 
expenses over the next 5 years.''
  In an updated July 28 letter report, CBO refined their estimate of 
the potential expenses to be in the range of $300 to $500 million.
  CBO concluded that ``the net savings from canceling the SSN-23 could 
amount to between $1.1 and $1.3 billion * * * . ''
  Now, I am sure those that run the shipyards would strongly contest 
those figures. I would rather rely on the Congressional Budget Office, 
an organization that clearly has much less at stake than the respective 
shipyards.
  Obviously, in claiming that terminating the third Seawolf would 
result in little or no savings, the submarine's supporters use inflated 
figures. Let me explain some of the fallacies of their statements.
  A document being circulated on Capitol Hill asserts that termination 
costs allegedly using a Navy estimate are $500 million to $800 million. 
The facts do not support this assertion.
  In a June 8 response to my questions about the Seawolf program, the 
Navy stated: ``If work were to be stopped today on SSN 23 the total 
additional liability beyond the $438 million expended would be $215 to 
$290 million.'' That is $285 to $510 million less than the contractor 
claims. It is also a significant amount of termination liability for 
less than $900 million in existing contracts. And the Navy admits that 
the amount of termination liability is entirely negotiable.
  In addition, $484.6 million of prior year appropriations for the 
Seawolf submarine remained unexpended as of June 8, according to the 
Navy. Termination costs could be paid out of these unspent funds, 
saving even more money for the taxpayers.
  The Navy estimates the impact of terminating the Seawolf would have a 
cost impact on existing and future contracts at Electric Boat shipyard, 
totaling $700 million to $1 billion. These estimates include some very 
questionable assumptions.
  CBO notes a significant area of difference in their estimates and the 
Navy's, since the Navy included $130 million to $340 million for 
anticipated increased overhead on future contracts at Electric Boat. 
CBO did not include these costs in their estimate because their amounts 
and even whether they will be incurred at all depend on future 
decisions of the administration and the Congress.
  Nor did CBO include the Navy's claims to other potential costs in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars for unspecified future claims. In their 
own estimates, the Navy has been unable to attach any estimated dollar 
amount to these potential claims for such things as environmental 
cleanup, severance pay, and depreciation.
  The total estimated cost of the third Seawolf submarine is $2.4 
billion, including more than $900 million already appropriated. The 
question we need to ask is, what are the sunk costs in that submarine 
today?
  $438 million of prior year appropriations have already been spent and 
cannot be recovered.
  Using the Navy's own estimates, an additional $420 to $650 million 
would have to be spent to pay contract termination costs and increased 
overhead expenses on other existing contracts at Electric Boat.
  Adding these two amounts together results in approximately $850 
million to $1.1 billion in total funding required if the third Seawolf 
were terminated today. That's $1.3 to $1.6 billion less than the 
estimated cost of the submarine. Or, in other words, that's $1.3 to 
$1.6 billion in savings for the American taxpayer.
  In my view and in the view of our highest ranking military officers, 
the priorities for U.S. defense spending are near-term readiness, 
quality of life for our military personnel and their families, and 
future force modernization to meet the likely challenges of the future. 
In my discussions with these officers, they say emphatically that 
strategic lift, tactical air forces, amphibious forces, and advanced 
conventional munitions procurement are the types of programs most 
urgently required to adequately equip our forces. The Seawolf submarine 
is not mentioned.
  There is no question that the Seawolf submarine is a technological 
marvel. Everyone associated with its development, design, and 
construction should be rightfully proud of this stellar example of 
American skill and ingenuity. The Seawolf program must be reviewed in 
the context of funding high-priority military requirements with a 
seriously inadequate defense budget.
  The debate over the Seawolf program is not about the merits of a 
weapons system, rather, it is about priorities. All of us want to 
ensure that our military forces have the best equipment and are the 
best prepared to deal with the potential threats of the future. For all 
the reasons discussed above, particularly the declining defense budget, 
we simply cannot afford to buy another Seawolf submarine.
  I cannot support spending another $1.5 billion on a militarily 
unnecessary jobs program. I cannot support procurement of a 
noncompetitive follow-on submarine when our existing submarine force 
remains capable and can be maintained into the next century.
  Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support my amendment to strike 
funding for the third Seawolf submarine.
  Mr. President, I have several letters here. Citizens Against 
Government Waste says:

       The Seawolf program is a Cold War relic designed to meet a 
     threat that no longer exists. Russia can not afford to 
     maintain its submarine fleet and at our current naval level, 
     the U.S. is well defended on the seas against any potential 
     threat of the future. Adding a third Seawolf adds little to 
     defense--

  The only convincing argument: It is a great jobs program--

       while taking much-needed resources from other necessary 
     defense programs. . .. We applaud you for introducing this 
     amendment and encourage your colleagues to support this 
     amendment.

  Mr. President, the National Taxpayers Union says:

       If members of Congress are truly serious about balancing 
     the budget, they must refrain from setting costly precedents 
     by continuing to fund unnecessary and outdated programs. . .. 
     Today, our nation faces a far more destructive threat--a 
     national debt racing toward $5 trillion. Winning this war 
     requires a different kind of weapon--fiscal discipline.
       Congress should consider scrapping the Seawolf entirely.

  That is from the National Taxpayers Union.
  And from the Citizens for a Sound Economy:

       On behalf of Citizens for a Sound Economy and our 250,000 
     members nationwide. . .. At a time when all Federal spending 
     is undergoing increased congressional scrutiny, the 
     Department of Defense like other federal agencies, must find 
     ways to get spending under control. . ..
       Congress should not approve the Navy's request for $1.5 
     billion to start building a third Seawolf submarine. That's 
     $1.5 billion that could be put to better use by taxpayers 
     themselves.

  And, finally, Mr. President, from the Council for a Livable World.

       . . .. we believe it to be unconscionable to spend $1.5 
     billion for white elephants that would have no other mission 
     than to serve as floating museum pieces.

  I am not sure I agree with that last comment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that several documents related 
to this subject be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


[[Page S 11287]]

                                              Council for Citizens


                                     Against Government Waste,

                                    Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
     Hon. John McCain,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McCain: The Council for Citizens Against 
     Government Waste (CCAGW) supports your amendment to the 
     Department of Defense (DoD) Authorization canceling the third 
     Seawolf submarine (SSN-23), saving taxpayers nearly $1.5 
     billion over the next five years.
       The Seawolf program is a Cold War relic designed to meet a 
     threat that no longer exists. Russia can not afford to 
     maintain its submarine fleet and at our current naval level, 
     the U.S. is well defended on the seas against any potential 
     threat of the future. Adding a third Seawolf adds little to 
     defense, while taking much-needed resources from other 
     necessary defense programs.
       When the next phase in the submarine program, the New 
     Attack Submarine, begins construction in 1998, there will be 
     a shipyard fully prepared to begin construction, most likely 
     at a cheaper cost. Why add the unnecessary burden of building 
     an archaic third submarine as we are preparing to move into a 
     new phase of naval defense? Advocates of the third Seawold 
     muster only one convincing argument: It's a great jobs 
     program.
       This Congress' mission must be to reevaluate how all 
     taxpayer money is spent. When looking at the changes the Navy 
     is making in its submarine defenses, we cannot continue to 
     fund outdated programs like Seawolf, leaving other programs 
     more vulnerable to the budget ax! We applaud you for 
     introducing this amendment and encourage your colleagues to 
     support this amendment.
           Sincerely,
     Tom Schatz,
       President.
     Joe Winkelmann,
       Chief Lobbyist.
                                                                    ____



                                     National Taxpayers Union,

                                    Washington, DC, July 31, 1995.
     Attn: Defense LA
       Dear Senator: The 300,000-member National Taxpayers Union 
     is pleased to support Senator McCain's amendment to the FY 96 
     Defense Authorization bill which would eliminate $1.5 billion 
     to procure a third Seawolf submarine.
       Seawolf continues to be plagued by numerous problems: it is 
     behind schedule and has incurred cost overruns. Already, $1.4 
     billion more has been spent over the original estimate, 
     costing taxpayers a total of nearly $11 billion, or more than 
     $5 billion per submarine. The third Seawolf estimate to cost 
     more than $2.4 billion, slightly more than last year's 
     estimate. A third submarine, however, would be exempt from 
     the cost cap that applied to the first two, which could 
     drastically increase its price tag. If members of Congress 
     are truly serious about balancing the budget, they must 
     refrain from setting costly precedents by continuing to fund 
     unnecessary and outdated programs.
       In the very year when Congress has pledged to make progress 
     towards balancing the budget, some lawmakers would pull this 
     policy in the wrong direction. The Cold War has ended, and 
     with it the submarine threat that endangered the Seawolf 
     program. Today, our nation faces a far more destructive 
     threat--a national debt racing towards $5 trillion. Winning 
     this war requires a different kind of weapon--fiscal 
     discipline.
       Congress should considers scrapping Seawolf entirely. At 
     the very least, however, members should reject any additional 
     subsidies for this relic of a bygone era. They can reaffirm 
     their commitment by voting YES on the McCain Amendment.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Jill Lancelot,
     Director, Congressional Affairs.
                                                                    ____

                                 Citizens for a Sound Economy,

                                    Washington, DC, June 27, 1995.
     Senator John McCain,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McCain: On behalf of Citizens for a Sound 
     Economy and our 250,000 members nationwide, I would like to 
     extend support for your proposed deletion of $1.5 billion in 
     funding for the Navy's third Seawolf submarine. At a time 
     when all federal spending is undergoing increased 
     congressional scrutiny, the Department of Defense, like other 
     federal agencies, must find ways to get spending under 
     control.
       The United States' Seawolf submarine program was a Cold War 
     undertaking to make the best submarine force in the world 
     even better. However, given the fall of the Soviet Union, and 
     the weakened Russian economy, a third Seawolf submarine (and 
     its $4 billion plus price tag) no longer can be justified. 
     Recognizing the need to prioritize tight defense dollars, 
     President Bush tried unsuccessfully in 1992 to stop the 
     Seawolf program after the completion of one submarine. In 
     today's fiscal climate, the case against a third submarine is 
     even more compelling.
       Moreover, in terms of time and cost, the Seawolf program is 
     indicative of too many major defense programs--it has been 
     marked by schedule delays and cost overruns. In fact, by the 
     time Congress capped the spending level on the first Seawolf 
     submarines at $4.759 billion just last year, the program 
     already had cost $2 billion more than originally anticipated.
       Congress should not approve the Navy's request for $1.5 
     billion to start building a third Seawolf submarine. That's 
     $1.5 billion that could be put to better use by taxpayers 
     themselves.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Paul Beckner,
     President.
                                                                    ____

                                    Washington, DC, July 27, 1995.

               Support Amendment To Cancel Third Seawolf

       Dear Senator: We urge you to support the amendment by 
     Senator McCain to prohibit funding for the third Seawolf 
     submarine.
       The Congress is working hard to fulfill its commitment to 
     reduce government waste. The Seawolf submarine, conceived 
     over a decade ago to counter a specific Soviet threat, lacks 
     a mission and should be cut.
       The program has been plagued by repeated cost increases and 
     scheduled delays. Last year Congress voted to cap the cost of 
     the first two submarines at $4.759 billion. However, 
     finishing the third Seawolf will require at least an 
     additional $1.5 billion and will push the current estimate 
     for the total program cost to over $12.9 billion, or $4.3 
     billion each.
       It is widely acknowledged that the case for building the 
     third Seawolf is founded entirely on ``industrial base'' 
     arguments. However, many of the skills associated with 
     submarine production would be maintained in other industries 
     and submarine-unique skills would be maintained through 
     ongoing submarine maintenance and repair activities.
       It is our judgment that Congress should resist pressure to 
     continue this funding simply to preserve jobs. We understand 
     the concerns and fears of the people of Connecticut and Rhode 
     Island. We strongly support assisting the people and the 
     communities affected by the program termination in their 
     adjustment to a difficult situation. However, at the same 
     time, we believe it to be unconscionable to spend $1.5 
     billion for white elephants that would have no other mission 
     than to serve as floating museum pieces. There are too many 
     other desperate needs in this society--to say nothing of a 
     federal budget deficit of $250 billion--to build this cold 
     war relic.
       Funding a missionless Seawolf is a waste of national 
     resources. We urge you to support the McCain amendment to end 
     this program.
           Sincerely,
         Jim Matlack, American Friends Service Committee; Darryl 
           Fagin, Americans for Democratic Action; Timothy 
           McElwee, Church of the Brethren, Washington Office; 
           John Parachini, Committee for National Security; John 
           Isaacs, Council for a Livable World; Joe Volk, Friends 
           Committee on National Legislation; Maurice Paprin, Fund 
           for New Priorities in America; Kay van der Horst, 
           International Center for Technology Assessment; J. 
           Daryl Byler, Mennonite Central Committee, Washington 
           Office; Howard Hallman, Methodists United for Peace 
           with Justice; Christopher Paine, Natural Resources 
           Defense Council; Kathy Thornton, NETWORK: A National 
           Catholic Social Justice Lobby;
         Monica Green, Peace Action; Bob Musil, Physicians for 
           Social Responsibility; Caleb Rossiter, Project on 
           Demilitarization and Democracy; Robin Caiola, 20/20 
           Vision, National Project; Jennifer Weeks, Union of 
           Concerned Scientists; Robert Alpern, Unitarian 
           Universalist Association; George Crossman, United 
           Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society; Jerry 
           Genesio, Veterans for Peace; Edith Villastrigo, Women 
           Strike for Peace; Susan Shaer, Women's Action for New 
           Directions; Tim Barner, World Federalist Association.
                                                                    ____

                [From the New York Times, July 30, 1995]

                 Quietness Argument for Sub Won't Wash

       To the Editor: I have a lot of respect for Secretary of the 
     Navy John Dalton; I hate to see him fall prey to the sharks 
     who are trying to justify the spending of $1.5 billion for 
     the third Seawolf submarine (letter, July 24).
       Although I disagree with almost everything in his letter, I 
     would like to focus on his assertion that ``the quietest 
     submarines in the world today are operated by the Russians.''
       This allegation is like the ``missile gap'' or the ``bomber 
     gap'' or the ``readiness gap.'' When these were scrutinized, 
     it was found they did not exist. Their sole purpose was to 
     justify unwarranted defense spending. Does this ``quietness 
     gap'' exist?
       There are two aspects to quieting a submarine. The first 
     takes place when the submarine is built. To say that our 
     submarines are not built as well as Russian submarines 
     condemns the very shipyard we are trying to keep operating.
       The second aspect of quieting is in the operation of the 
     ship. Is Secretary Dalton telling us that the crews of our 
     submarines are not as well trained or as competent as the 
     Russians?
       I never met a submarine officer who did not think our 
     submarines were the best in the world--by far. I am sorry to 
     see this proud group stoop to chicanery to justify an 
     unnecessary weapon.
                                                 John J. Shanahan.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  
[[Page S 11288]]

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Rhode 
Island wish to have?
  Mr. PELL. Five minutes.
  Mr. COHEN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
amendment offered by my colleague from Arizona, Mr. McCain.
  The Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization Act authorized a third 
Seawolf submarine, commonly referred to as SSN-23. In 1992, Public Law 
102-298 appropriated $540.2 million for advance procurement of critical 
long-lead items for SSN-23. Subsequent to this action, roughly another 
$400 million has been appropriated and spent on SSN-23 thus far, for a 
total of $920 million.
  This amendment, which would deauthorize funding required for the 
completion of SSN-23, is opposed by the administration, is inconsistent 
with previous congressional action, and contradicts the findings of the 
Bottum-Up Review, the elaborate defense posture plan prepared by the 
Department of Defense as the blueprint for future weapon acquisition. 
In the Bottom-Up Review, the administration concluded that construction 
for the third Seawolf is the best, most cost-effective way to preserve 
the submarine industrial base. After much sober thought, numerous 
elaborate studies, and several thorough debates in this Chamber, the 
Department of Defense has concluded that completion of the third 
submarine would bridge the gap until we begin construction of the new 
attack submarine in fiscal year 1998.
  Sustained, low-rate production is the most effective way to preserve 
the technology, design, and unique skills necessary to maintain our 
submarine industrial base. If a production gap occurs, the Navy has 
determined, and many observers concur, that the highly specialized 
submarine vendor base, consisting of over 1,000 firms in more than 40 
States, will be jeopardized.
  Mr. President, in addition to preserving unique skills and 
technology, completing the SSN-23 makes economic sense. In a recent 
letter to Chairman Thurmond, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, state:

       Completing SSN-23 is right for the taxpayer and right for 
     our defense needs. The cost to complete SSN-23 is $1.5 
     billion. If SSN-23 were canceled, between $700 million to $1 
     billion in direct costs will still be incurred to existing 
     contracts and to the New Attack Submarine program without 
     acquiring a submarine. Thus, the net cost of building SSN-23 
     at this point in the program is approximately $500 million to 
     $800 million.

  Moreover, completing the SSN-23 also makes sense from a security 
viewpoint. In the same letter mentioned above, Secretary Perry and 
General Shalikashvili state that ``cancellation would deprive our Armed 
Forces of a needed military capability to counter the growing number of 
deployed improved Akula class submarines which are quieter than our 
improved 688 attack submarines.''
  Mr. President, SSN-23 is a necessary bridge for the entire submarine 
industry to be able to produce the more affordable and technologically 
advanced new attack submarine. The DOD's plan, as approved by the Armed 
Services Committee, is the only plan which will preserve this critical 
industrial base as well as permit long-term competition in the 
submarine industry. Furthermore, this plan will assist in our national 
strategy to maintain our margin of undersea superiority, a truly 
critical area.
  The Senate has, on several occasions, thoroughly debated and voted on 
this matter. And each year, the Senate decided to continue this program 
for the reasons I stated above.
  It would seem to me irrational and imprudent to cancel a program 
which would cost less to complete than to eliminate. It does not make 
sense from either a fiscal or national security viewpoint. The 
administration and the DOD strongly oppose this amendment, and I urge 
my colleagues to reject it.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter I mentioned 
above be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1995.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The submarine funding decisions now 
     before Congress are pivotal to maintaining our margin of 
     undersea superiority and capability to design and produce 
     nuclear submarines efficiently. The Department's plan 
     maintains both these national objectives by building a final 
     SEAWOLF in FY 1996 and a lead New Attack Submarine in FY 
     1998. This approach is the lowest cost plan to counter real 
     world threats while shifting to a more affordable and capable 
     submarine.
       Completing SSN-23 is right for the taxpayer and right for 
     our defense needs. The cost to complete SSN-23 is $1.5 
     billion. If SSN-23 is canceled, between $700 to $1,000 
     million in direct costs will still be incurred to existing 
     contracts and to the New Attack Submarine program without 
     acquiring a submarine. Thus, the net cost of building SSN-23 
     at this point in the program is approximately $500 to $800 
     million. Cancellation would deprive our Armed Forces of a 
     needed military capability to counter the growing number of 
     deployed improved Akula class submarines which are quieter 
     than our improved 688 attack submarines.
       The House National Security Committee in its bill supported 
     submarine modernization by endorsing the national commitment 
     to preserve two nuclear capable shipbuilders and by providing 
     full funding for the continued development and advance 
     procurement for a FY 1998 attack submarine. The Department 
     appreciates HNSC's support in this aspect.
       On the other hand, we take exception to the proposed HNSC 
     alternative industrial bridge plan. This plan spends nearly 
     $1 billion to avoid building SSN-23 and to build a technology 
     demonstrator submarine in place of a needed operational New 
     Attack Submarine. The House plan poses execution problems in 
     that it is under-funded and creates significant future 
     financial liability. Moreover, it causes SSN-21 and SSN-22 to 
     be one-of-a-kind submarines which would drive up 
     construction, operating, and support costs.
       We believe the Department's plan merits the full support of 
     Congress. It is the most straightforward and lowest cost 
     approach to sustaining attack submarine force level 
     requirements, while preserving two nuclear capable 
     shipbuilders to provide the option for competition.
       We ask your support for this very important program.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
                            Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                                 William J. Perry,
                                             Secretary of Defense.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COHEN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 
10 minutes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, first, I ask unanimous consent that 
Edward Foster, a legis fellow in my office, be given the privilege of 
the floor for the duration of the debate on S. 1026.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, it has been used on many occasions 
before, but in the famous words of Yogi Berra, ``It is deja vu all over 
again,'' with regard to the Seawolf. I rise in opposition to the 
amendment of my friend from Arizona which would terminate the SSN-23, 
the third and final Seawolf nuclear attack submarine.
  I am going to make three points in opposition to the amendment. The 
first is that in finishing the Seawolf submarine, we are not just 
involved in a make-work project. It will produce a submarine that will 
be of military value immediately and, in fact, will be the best nuclear 
attack submarine in the world and will help us close what I will call a 
submarine gap that has opened up between Russia and the United States 
in favor of Russia.
  Second, I will argue that the construction or the finishing of the 
third Seawolf is part of a carefully designed plan by the Pentagon to 
lead us to the construction of the new attack submarine, a smaller 
version of the Seawolf, smaller and less expensive.
  Mr. President, no one seems to disagree with the contention that we 
need to build more submarines for our national security in the future 
as the older attack submarines live out their lifespan. What we are 
seeing in opposition to this amendment is that the best way to get to 
the next stage, which we all seem to agree on, is to complete the 
Seawolf submarine, the SSN-23, and to preserve the military-industrial 
base that is necessary to get to the new attack submarine and to create 
competition in building that submarine. 

[[Page S 11289]]

  And finally, just as a matter of business common sense, we have spent 
almost a billion dollars on the third Seawolf already. It does not make 
sense not to complete it.
  Mr. President, let me go to the first argument. We are not debating 
production of a weapon which has no use or which no one wants. On the 
contrary. Everyone, and I stress everyone, involved in the national 
security of our Government has spoken out loudly and clearly that they 
want this submarine to be produced and that the Navy needs it for its 
military value, not just because it enables us to produce the next 
generation of attack submarines at a lower price into the next century.
  So let us not be confused as to what is fat and what is muscle in the 
defense budget that we are debating today. The President asked Congress 
to authorize this submarine, it is part of his budget and part of the 
plan which the Department of the Navy has laid out for shipbuilding 
into the next century.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, has 
told us why we need this submarine. He has said:

       Cancellation would deprive our Armed Forces of a needed 
     military capability to counter the growing number of deployed 
     improved Akula-class submarines--Russian subs--which are 
     quieter than our improved 688 attack submarine.

  And the quietness of a submarine is critical to its effectiveness.
  Mr. President, I will speak more about that in a moment.
  The Secretary of Defense, continuing our national security 
administration, has urged us to stay with the Navy plan and to 
authorize the SSN-23. Secretary Perry has said:

       We believe the Department's plan merits the full support of 
     Congress. It is the most straightforward and lowest-cost 
     approach to sustaining attack submarine force level 
     requirements.

  Secretary of the Navy Dalton and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Boorda have spent numerous hours testifying before congressional 
committees and meeting with individual Members of Congress to explain 
why they are convinced that the Seawolf is essential to our future 
security.
  Secretary Dalton has said:

       The builders of this submarine * * * are a national 
     treasure in knowledge and skills * * *. We are gambling with 
     a national treasure if we do not take steps to preserve it.

  And Admiral Boorda, the top warfighter in the Navy today, says:

       The Seawolf class submarine will ensure continued undersea 
     superiority, a position the United States cannot give up.

  Mr. President, I note also that as you listen to the best thinkers 
when they talk about the future of warfare and security citing 
particularly the technological revolution that is occurring in warfare, 
the submarine will play an increasingly central role because of its 
stealth, which is to say obviously that it is hard to detect at its 
best.
 It is under water, and because of the enormous range of capacities it 
has, not only to perform the traditional attack submarine function of 
hitting targets in the water or under the water, but being able to fire 
cruise missiles from standoff positions unseen at targets on the land, 
as was done in the gulf war, being able to perform intelligence 
missions, being able to drop special forces into difficult situations, 
being able to move in shallow water and, in fact, being able to perform 
intelligence functions with very sophisticated technical equipment from 
a standoff, safe position.

  Mr. President, there are many times on military authorizations when 
the Congress substitutes its judgment for that of the administration 
which is in power. I believe, however, that this is one time when we 
ought to listen carefully to the military experts and give them, as we 
always should, the benefit of the doubt.
  The Armed Services Committee of this Senate spent many hours in 
hearings earlier this year seeking the views of those experts, and we 
all listened with care. And it is with some satisfaction that I note 
the strong support which the completion of the third Seawolf, after 
hearing all that testimony, received from members of the committee. The 
SSN-23 is necessary and essential because it has military value and 
meets valid military requirements.
  Some have said that this submarine will serve no purpose, that there 
is no need or threat. I respectfully say that these allegations are 
wrong. We know that Russia, no matter what else has happened to its 
military apparatus, has continued to produce nuclear attack submarines 
after the end of the cold war. We know, as well, that these submarines 
are quieter than their predecessors--some because of better designs in 
their production and others because of backfitting of newer and 
quieting technologies. These submarines which Russia is putting to sea 
today are quieter than most of our existing fleet of attack submarines. 
For the first time in the history of undersea warfare, the United 
States does not have a qualitative edge over its potential adversaries 
in the stealth of the submarines which are taking our young sailors to 
sea to protect our national security. That is a fact, I would guess, 
that most persons are not aware of, but it is one that each of us must 
be unsettled by.
  Mr. President, I know it is counterintuitive because the general 
impression is that the Russian military is falling apart. But they have 
made a conscious decision, no matter what else is happening in their 
military, to invest in attack submarines. I think we should take a look 
at their reasoning and think about it as we plan our national security 
in the future.
  Listen to the words of the Russian Defense Minister, Gen. Pavel 
Grachev, who said a couple of years ago, June 8, 1993:

       A nuclear submarine fleet is the future of the armed 
     forces. The number of tanks and guns will be reduced, as well 
     as the infantry, but a modern navy is a totally different 
     thing.

  The underlying reality today is that the Russian political and 
military leadership has decided that they want to keep Russia a global 
military power. To do so, they have scaled down much of their military 
capacity and programming, but there are several key components critical 
to remaining a global military power, and at the top of that list--
particularly when it comes to strategic weapons but also the attack 
submarine function--is submarines.
  Much is made of the fact that the Russian surface ships are seen 
sitting in piers rusting, with no crews, undertrained crews, or 
rebellious and dissatisfied crews. But nobody has made those assertions 
about the Russian submarine forces because they are just not true. We 
know that Russia has in the water today about six submarines with 
fourth generation quieting technology. These improved Akula-class subs 
which are in the water today are quieter at tactical operating speeds 
that the best American submarines currently in our inventory cannot 
match.
  Further, we know that the Russian Navy has under construction and 
will launch in the next year or so the lead ship of a new class of 
submarines which will be even quieter than the Akula, better armed and 
with improved sensors. The lead ship has
 been named the Severodvinsk, the first true multimission submarine in 
the Russian inventory. These are all facts that are generally agreed 
upon by the entire U.S. intelligence community.

  There is also no disagreement within the intelligence community that 
the Russian Navy is returning to submarine operating patterns last seen 
in the mid-1990's. We are observing once again deployments of a 
submarine force capable of worldwide operations--and this includes 
renewed operations in the Western Atlantic.
  Thus, my view--and I believe the view of the senior military 
leadership in this country--is that there is a real threat which must 
be addressed and this Seawolf addresses it quite well. In short, there 
is a valid military requirement for SSN-23.
  The Joint Staff examined submarine force level requirements necessary 
to support the Bottom-Up Review and concluded that the U.S. Navy needs 
10 to 12 Seawolf-quiet submarines by the year 2012. Since the Russian 
Navy has 6 fourth-generation-quiet submarines in the water today which 
are quieter than our 688I submarines with more under construction, the 
United States military needs to establish a stable low rate of 
production of submarines with Seawolf-level quieting. The Navy view is 
that completion of the SSN-23 is the 

[[Page S 11290]]
most critical and timely contribution to achieving this essential 
warfighting capability.
  The bottom line then in my view, after having questioned every 
witness who came before the Army Services Committee on this subject 
this year, is NOT that SSN-23 would be militarily helpful as one 
analyst asserted, but that it is essential to meeting valid military 
requirements.
  Fourth, completing the third Seawolf is part of a plan which has been 
carefully developed by the Navy to ensure that this country can regain 
the tactical superiority it needs in undersea warfare and that we can 
maintain a national treasure, to use Admiral Boorda's description--the 
submarine industrial base in its broadest sense, in its entirety--which 
we will need in the future. And we should note, that future is not very 
far off as I have already demonstrated.
  Some critics try to argue that the Navy's plan--building SSN-23 and 
then a new attack submarine which will be more affordable and more 
focused on the threats of the 21st century--is not well thought-out or 
based on analysis. These charges are flat wrong. In the past 3 years, 
there have been some 14 different studies which have examined the 
submarine industrial base. The consensus of these studies has been that 
the most cost-effective approach to sustaining our ability to design 
and build nuclear submarines is through low-rate production of 
submarines. One does not learn or create the skills necessary to build 
these highly sophisticated ships and their many unique components in a 
short period of time. If this industrial base is shut down, as we will 
risk if SSN-23 is not authorized, the costs of regenerating these 
essential skills will be prhibitive--if in fact they can be 
regenerated.
  Let me turn then to a point which is often made when considering this 
subject and which does a disservice to this debate and to this body. 
Some people try to describe the third Seawolf as a jobs program--an 
attempt to keep people working in spite of the fact that there is no 
sense to the program
 anymore. Obviously, each of us in our own way wants to preserve jobs 
in our own State, and I, no less than any of our colleagues. But the 
fact is that even if this third Seawolf is built--as I believe it 
should and will be--the level of employment at Electric Boat in 
Connecticut and Rhode Island will go from a high of some 23,000 5 years 
ago to less than 14,000 by the end of this year and some 6,000 by the 
year 2000. That means some 17,000 workers at Electric Boat have or are 
going to lose their jobs as part of the effort to maintain our ability 
to build submarines into the next century.

  The managers at Electric Boat do not have any allusions that the cold 
war still exists. They have been actively reengineering and downsizing 
for a number of years to ensure that their company--a company with a 
long and proud history of submarine construction, a company made up of 
skilled and dedicated workers who don't get rich doing the work they 
do, but do take great pride in producing the world's finest submarines 
to protect our way of life--can continue to make submarines in the next 
century.
  Those who might claim that the Seawolf is just a jobs program for two 
northeastern States--or that the Navy plan is submarines for everyone--
are wrong and their observations are a disservice to the broader issues 
involved here, and an offense to the people whose jobs are going to be 
lost, even with the building of the third Seawolf.
  Mr. President, we have been here before on this issue. But, I believe 
the issues I have raised today are more relevant and more important 
than ever before. The cold war is over--no one who supports the Seawolf 
believes otherwise. But that does not mean that this incredible 
submarine--the first of which has already been christened and is in the 
water at Groton today--is not militarily necessary and vital to our 
national security.
  This has not been a perfect program. What weapons system ever is? For 
that matter, when was the last time an automobile was designed and 
produced without some problems? But the program is on a sound footing 
today. It will produce a submarine which has been requested by the 
President and the Department of Defense and will meet a valid military 
requirement. This issue has been studied at length by the Armed 
Services Committee under the leadership of Senator Thurmond and, in 
particular, in the Seapower Subcommittee under the probing and 
thoughtful leadership of its chairman, Senator Cohen.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Armed Services Committee position 
on this issue and to vote to authorize and complete construction of the 
third Seawolf. I will vote against the amendment by my colleague from 
Arizona and urge all Senators to do the same.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, shortly, I believe there will be an 
agreement on the Nunn-Cohen amendment which was set aside for the 
purpose of this amendment, and we will return to it.
  I would like to inform my colleagues that the distinguished chairman 
of the committee is ready to propound a unanimous-consent agreement of 
all remaining amendments. We have been on this bill since 9 o'clock 
yesterday morning. We intend to stay very late tonight, at least until 
we have a complete list of amendments with time agreements associated 
with them. Right now it is being hotlined to all the offices to get a 
list of the amendments.
  The chairman is going to propound a unanimous-consent agreement 
within a very short period of time. We have had sufficient time to 
determine what amendments we have to this bill, and the only way we are 
going to move forward and get done by tomorrow evening, which is the 
expressed desire of the majority leader, is to get the amendments in 
and then we will begin to propound a unanimous consent on that and the 
ensuing time agreements.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Rhode 
Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from Rhode Island is 
recognized for 8 minutes.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, despite the end of the cold war and 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, I think we can all 
agree that the United States still needs capable and effective military 
forces, and indeed that is why we are voting right now, very shortly, 
on a $264 billion appropriation, or authorization, for the U.S. 
military services. I do not think anybody in this body will argue that 
the United States will always be a maritime nation. Indeed, Mr. 
President, 95 percent of our export/import tonnage is carried by ship. 
That is an astonishing figure to me. Yes, 5 percent is carried over 
land to Canada and Mexico, or by air; but 95 percent is carried by 
ship.
  During the time I spent in the Navy Department, I learned that 
submarines are a relatively inexpensive way for a potential adversary 
to disrupt international commerce.
  Far too often, the press reports that the Navy does not really need 
the Seawolf. We are told that it is a ship solely designed to confront 
the Soviet Navy on the open ocean. This allegation is simply not true. 
I would like to refute it. The fact of the matter is that the third 
Seawolf has a valid military mission and will be instrumental in 
enabling the Navy to fulfill its national security obligations around 
the world.
  Now, yes, the Soviet Union is gone, and its military forces inherited 
by Russia are undergoing substantial downsizing. There is no question 
about that. It is also very clear that the Russian Navy--in particular, 
its submarine force--has not been scaled back in the manner other 
components of the Russian military service have been. For example, it 
is estimated that by the year 2000, which is only 5 years from now, 
Russia will have about 122 submarines in its fleet, more than half of 
which will be advanced third-generation vessels. Already today, Russia 
has several operational submarines that are quieter than the quietest 
United States submarine at sea. Russia's latest submarine will be 
operational by the year 2000--the one under design now--and is expected 
to rival the capabilities of our best attack submarines.
  To illustrate these advances, I would like to insert in the Record a 
February 12 article from Defense News documenting recent Russian 
undersea efforts.
  I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page S 11291]]


                [From the Defense News, Feb. 6-12, 1995]

  Russia Pours Resources Into Submarine Improvement--Better Weapons, 
                  Sensors Will Pose Challenge to West

                           (By Robert Holzer)

       Washington.--Despite enormous economic difficulties, the 
     Russian government continues to invest in submarines and is 
     expected to field a more advanced sub force by 2000, 
     according to U.S. Navy intelligence estimates.
       While the total number of submarines in the Russian Navy's 
     inventory will decline from today's level of 181 to 122 by 
     2000, the overall quality of that force will increase 
     markedly, with more than half the fleet composed of more 
     advanced third-generation submarines, according to the Navy's 
     analysis.
       ``They are getting more out of their programs now in terms 
     of research and development,'' Norman Polmar, a Washington-
     based submarine design consultant and an expert on the 
     Russian Navy, said Feb. 1. ``They are putting a lot of 
     resources into submarines.''
       Moreover, the Russians have started developing a new 
     submarine class, called the Severodvinsk, that will be 
     operational by 2000 and is expected to rival the capabilities 
     of the best U.S. Navy attack submarines.
       ``Designed to emphasize improvements in quieting, sensor 
     performance and weapons delivery, Severodvinsk is projected 
     to outperform today's most advanced Western submarines in 
     many respects,'' according to the January 1995 report 
     ``Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade,'' 
     prepared by Navy intelligence.
       The Russian Navy also is improving its mix of sea-based 
     weapons, according to the Navy's report, and has two 
     significant new weapon programs under development.
       One is described as an extremely fast rocket-powered 
     torpedo that has no equivalent in the U.S. or other Western 
     navies. The other is a new type of antiship cruise missile 
     that would be launched from the torpedo tubes of future 
     submarines and the Oscar II cruise missile-carrying 
     submarine.
       To achieve marked improvements in its submarine fleet, the 
     Russian military is making sacrifices in strategic bomber and 
     rocket forces, surface ships, and tank, artillery and 
     infantry capabilities, the report said.
       Third-generation submarines will climb to 51 percent of the 
     Russian submarine fleet by 2000, compared with only 28 
     percent today, according to the Navy's report.
       The percentage of less advanced, second-generation subs 
     remaining in the inventory will decline to 46 percent from 
     today's level of 68 percent, according to the report.
       The performance difference between second- and third-
     generation submarines is fairly dramatic, Navy sources said, 
     noting that third-generation Russian submarines incorporate 
     advances in quieting and improved propulsion systems, 
     enhancing the submarine's undersea stealth.
       Improved Russian submarine performance could greatly impact 
     U.S. and Western views of antisubmarine warfare and lead to a 
     reassessment of needed capabilities to counter this potential 
     threat, Navy sources and military experts said.
       ``With the improved Akula submarine, they have already 
     achieved acoustic parity with the [U.S. Navy's Los Angeles-
     class] SSN-688s, and that is frightening,'' retired Vice Adm. 
     Bernard Kauderer, president of the Annandale, VA-based Naval 
     Submarine League, said Feb. 1.
       Akula is an attack submarine that incorporates many of the 
     advances the Russians have made in reducing the radiated 
     noise of their submarines.
       ``We need to continue our research and development programs 
     and produce new submarines,'' Kauderer said.

  Mr. CHAFEE. Thankfully, today Russia is not a major adversary, and I 
am hopeful that this administration and future ones will indeed 
strengthen U.S.-Russian relations. We are all for that.
  However, in these uncertain times, unforeseen political instability 
or a rise in anti-West nationalism could result in Russia becoming a 
genuine undersea threat in the future. That is a big nation.
  Perhaps more importantly to the United States in the near term is 
Russia's sale of its very capable submarines to potential United States 
adversaries abroad, a move that poses a very serious challenge to our 
Navy.
  There are many nations that recognize the cost effectiveness of 
submarines, even relatively unsophisticated ones: diesel power, for 
example.
  Listen to this statistic, Mr. President. According to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, more than 600 submarines are operational in the 
navies of 44 countries. That is an astonishing statistic. Mr. 
President, 44 nations have submarines. I must say, I have difficulty 
adding up what the 44 are.
  Iran recently purchased two Kilo-class submarines from Russia. These 
vessels are operational today. Who would ever have thought Iran would 
have submarines? A third Kilo submarine is scheduled for delivery from 
Russia to Iran this year.
  In addition, China--that great inland land-based power--intends to 
buy as many as 22 diesel-powered submarines from Russia over the next 5 
years in its quest to enhance its military capability in the South 
China Sea.
  What about North Korea? Who ever thought of North Korea as a great 
military power? Who would have thought it is an undersea threat? Yet it 
possesses, if you can believe it, the world's fourth largest submarine 
force and could use these submarines in a variety of belligerent 
coastal missions.
  Yes, the cold war is over and we are grateful for that. However, I 
think we ought to recognize that the world is still a dangerous place. 
That is why we have this massive defense bill before us.
  Undersea threats remain a fact of life that we ask our military 
forces to address. I am convinced that completion of the Seawolf 
program with its third Seawolf will give the United States the ability 
to respond to these still potent undersea threats.
  Contrary to what we sometimes hear in the press, the Seawolf's 
capabilities are more than the ability to engage the former Soviet 
Union in open ocean conflict. The Seawolf would be used to strike both 
land and sea targets with its cruise missiles, making it a versatile 
platform against any potential adversary. It will allow the Navy to 
covertly and quickly exert special operation forces.
  The Seawolf will be given a wide variety of missions in our Navy of 
the future. As the director of submarine plans, Adm. Dennis Jones, said 
recently, ``We must fundamentally change the way we will fight in the 
future.'' Included among the undersea missions is a demonstration over 
the next year to assess how a submerged submarine can control an 
unmanned aerial vehicle. This new mission and others are described in a 
June 12 article from the Defense News that I ask be printed in the 
Record, Mr. President.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 [From the Defense News, June 12, 1995]

U.S. Subs Gear For Broader Mission--Force Explores UAVs, Communication 
                                 Links

                           (By Robert Holzer)

       Washington.--Shedding decades of self-imposed isolation 
     patrolling the open ocean, U.S. Navy submariners may soon 
     control unmanned vehicles and stealthily communicate with 
     each other in operations close to enemy shores.
       Long accustomed to operating independently and focused 
     almost exclusively on countering the Soviet submarine threat, 
     the U.S. submarine force seeks added capabilities in 
     communications, sensors and weapons to perform shallow-water 
     missions.
       ``One constant is that things are changing, not only for 
     us, but for our enemies,'' Rear Adm. Dennis Jones, director 
     of submarine plans, said in a June 6 briefing to the Naval 
     Submarine League's annual symposium in Alexandria, Va. ``We 
     must fundamentally change the way we will fight in the 
     future.''
       To accomplish this, the submarine force will conduct a 
     demonstration effort over the next year to assess how a 
     submerged submarine can control an unmanned aerial vehicle 
     (UAV), Jones said.
       Pentagon officials say the Navy will test the Predator UAV 
     in this role. Built by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems 
     Inc., San Diego, the Predator emerged over the last year as a 
     priority system in U.S. military plans.
       The Predator is a high-altitude endurance UAV that can 
     loiter aloft for more than 60 hours without refueling. It can 
     fly as high as 12,100 meters and carry a 180-kilogram 
     payload. The payload can include sensor packages that provide 
     instant imagery, even at night and in bad weather, to 
     tactical commanders.
       The Pentagon is dispatching several Predators now to 
     monitor the situation in Bosnia, military sources said.
       Because submarines usually are the first weapon systems 
     deployed off a potential enemy's coastline, often conducting 
     clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance days or weeks 
     before a crisis erupts, linking those operations with UAVs 
     makes good tactical sense, military experts said.
       ``There is a lot of flexibility with that concept,'' Norman 
     Polmar, a naval expert here, said June 7, noting that a 
     submarine could simply leave the UAV operating over an area 
     for an extended period and then come near the surface to tap 
     into the data the system collected during its reconnaissance.
       Submarines may even launch UAVs and retrieve them later at 
     sea, Polmar said.
       Although the submarine force has augmented its 
     communication capabilities over the last several years, 
     conveying information and data between submerged submarines 
     is a new area of emphasis, Rear 

[[Page S 11292]]
     Adm. Richard Buchanan, commander of Submarine Group 2 with the Atlantic 
     Fleet, said June 7.
       The service already has conducted several tests of 
     underwater communications, which even included the 
     transmission of imagery, Jones said.
       ``This is a revolution unto itself,'' Jones said. ``If 
     information doesn't go easily from submarines to joint task 
     force commanders, then we will be bypassed as seeming too 
     difficult.''
       To prevent this, the submarine force will field a number of 
     communication improvements over the next few years that will 
     yield tremendous increases in capability, Navy officials 
     said.
       These include the capability by 1998 to transmit video to 
     other subs or ships nearly instantaneously, and by 2000, 
     Super High Frequency satellite links that will vastly 
     increase the amount of data that submerged vessels can 
     transmit and receive.

  Mr. CHAFEE. I hope I have helped to dispel the myth that the 
submarine is a relic of the cold war and we no longer need submarines. 
To the contrary, the Seawolf is a very relevant military platform to 
face the threat of the post-Soviet world. For these reasons, I urge my 
colleagues to join me in opposing the McCain amendment.
  I thank the Chair and thank the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Maine. I will try and see if I 
cannot shave off some of those moments to move this along. I want to 
underscore and support the comments of the Senator from Arizona, trying 
to move this process along.
  I am tempted to repeat what I have repeated on other occasions in 
this body or elsewhere the words of the famous Congressman from 
Arizona. Having listened to an extensive debate and been the fourth or 
fifth speaker, he announced to the audience that everything had been 
said on the subject but not everyone had said it. So I will take a few 
moments to share some thoughts about the pending matter.
  Let me begin by commending my colleague from Connecticut, Senator 
Lieberman, who serves on the committee, the chairman of the 
subcommittee, Senator Cohen of Maine, and of course my colleagues from 
Rhode Island as well.
  My colleagues will be pleased to note that if we can successfully 
defeat this amendment, this may be the last debate on the Seawolf 
program, because this is the last Seawolf. That in itself may cause 
significant support to move in our direction, having heard for the last 
number of years on numerous occasions from colleagues across the 
country of their desire that this issue be resolved once and for all.
  So I urge my colleagues to oppose the McCain amendment and once and 
for all put the Seawolf issue to bed, having completed the third 
program.
  Mr. President, I will underscore many things that have been said by 
my colleagues from Connecticut and Rhode Island about the importance 
here--and it needs to be emphasized, it would be another matter indeed 
if we were talking about a world in which this technology had lost its 
appeal. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending upon your perspective, 
that is not the case.
  In fact, there are, as the junior Senator from Rhode Island pointed 
out, 44 nations that possess this technology. In fact, it seems to be 
growing in its appeal.
  Again, I emphasize what has been said about Russia. All of us are 
deeply pleased with what has occurred in the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the end of the cold war. Again, I think we all appreciate the 
lack of clarity as to which direction Russia is going in. We all hope 
that it is going to continue to move in the direction of a democratic 
State which does not pose a threat to its neighbors or to others.
  I do not think anyone would be prepared to stand on this floor today 
and say with absolute certainty that they were convinced that was going 
to be the ultimate result. If we cannot state that with absolute 
certainty, or the degree of certainty that seems to be the prudent 
course, to be mindful of the kind of technology that is being expanded 
and developed, and it is significant.
  In fact, we are told by those who watch these efforts far more 
closely than most of us, that today Russia is developing a technology 
in submarine arenas that will approximate the quietness that we have 
been able to achieve with our technology, and as my colleagues know, in 
submarine technology the quietness of a submarine is one of the most 
critical elements of all.
  So, the first point is, of course, that we still see a global threat, 
that there are nations that never before possessed this technology that 
are acquiring it.
  Second, Mr. President, the industrial base argument which was made in 
the past but I think needs to be made here as well, there are no less 
than 10 unique submarine technologies that will perish if this 
amendment is adopted. I am not talking about large corporations with 
thousands of workers. I am talking about facilities with literally the 
last of the craftsmen--men and women--with knowledge and skill to 
create and build unique components of our Nation's submarine fleet.
  Likewise, if this amendment should pass, the final legion of 
dedicated and professional workers who build the final product will 
disappear, and that is not an exaggeration.
  Let me tell my colleague something about those workers. Some of them 
have been building submarines literally for decades. Most are members 
of entire families that have passed that knowledge on between 
generations. These are craftsmen, I say to my colleagues. They are the 
final artists of a very unique industry that America must not abandon.
  Let me give an example of what I am talking about. It can take up to 
7 years to replace a fully qualified Navy nuclear welder capable of 
welding the 3-inch steel hulls of the Seawolf class submarine. Mr. 
President, 7 years to acquire that technology. That is the 
apprenticeship, yard time, evaluations, and, finally, qualification to 
perform the delicate welds in and around the nuclear reactor area of 
this submarine. Seven years to acquire that skill level.
  I suggest to my colleagues, and I think they would agree, we should 
not abandon that capability.
  As for cost, I agree with the Navy plan to go to a smaller, less 
expensive submarine program. But to get there, we have to finish what 
we have started. We have to complete this final boat of the Seawolf 
class.
  Remember, there were 23 of these boats we talked about. We are now 
down to three. I say to my colleagues that to complete the program 
here, to stop the program when it is 45 percent complete, I think, is 
penny wise and pound foolish.
  So, Mr. President, again I underscore the terrific work done by my 
colleague from Connecticut on the Armed Services Committee in making 
this case. I appreciate immensely the support of the chairman of the 
subcommittee, the Senator from Maine, and others who have stood with us 
on this program over the years. It is obviously important to us in 
Connecticut.
  But my colleague from Connecticut, my colleagues from Rhode Island, 
could not in good conscience stand here and ask our colleagues from 
across this country to support a program that did not contribute 
significantly to the long-term security needs of our Nation. No matter 
how important it is to us on a parochial level, that is not a 
justification to ever support one of these programs. As important as 
that is to us, the importance of this program is its contribution to 
the long-term national security needs of our Nation.
  For those reasons, and with all due respect and affection for the 
author of this amendment, I urge the rejection of the proposal.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Pennsylvania.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the subcommittee for yielding this time. I want to start out by 
congratulating the Senators from Connecticut for their fine work on 
this project, particularly Senator Lieberman, my colleague in the Armed 
Services Committee, for his outstanding work on this program.
  I come here as someone who in the past has been an opponent of the 
Seawolf. In fact, I introduced a bill back in 1991 which called for 
eliminating the 29 Seawolf submarines that were on the boards because I 
thought it was too costly, that it was a cold war 

[[Page S 11293]]
relic, that 29 of these submarines was far too many, the threat was not 
out there for that kind of expenditure of, really, tens of billions of 
dollars.
  Having watched what has happened since 1991, and since I introduced 
that resolution, I have seen the number of Seawolf submarines go from 
29 to 3, and I have seen the Russian Navy still be the focal point, as 
was said earlier. What I have seen in response, in the past 4 years 
since the fall of the Soviet Union, is the Russians keeping their eye 
on the ball of maintaining their capacity, their submarine capacity as 
really their focal point as to how they are going to be a world threat, 
militarily. That is where they have invested their money.
  So, while I would not stand up here and support another 27 Seawolf 
submarines, I will say that, given the threat that is out there, given 
the legitimacy of the dollars invested and the capability of the 
Russian fleet, nuclear submarine fleet and attack submarine fleet, that 
this is a wise investment for us.
  I repeat what the junior Senator from Connecticut said. We have a 
situation right now--and I agree with him, I do not think the American 
public realizes this--where the Russians are in fact ahead of us in a 
very important military capability and that is submarines. They are 
ahead of us. They have quieter ships than we do.
  That is stealth. You hear so much about stealth technology when it 
comes to the Air Force. That means you cannot see it on the radar and 
you can go in there and do things before anybody sees you. Stealth in a 
submarine is how quiet it is. If you cannot hear them you cannot find 
them. That is the situation we are in right now. We are sending our 
submariners out there, into the oceans of this world, in a sense 
blind--deaf to the threats that the former Soviet Union, the Russians 
are now putting forward. This is our response and it is an appropriate 
one. It is an appropriate place to invest those dollars.
  We do so recognizing if we pull the plug on the third Seawolf we will 
waste a whole lot of money. Already, as has been said many times, $900 
million is already appropriated for this submarine. We have over a 
third of the costs already in the submarine. To close it down would 
cost even more.
  There are disputes. The Senator from Arizona, whom I greatly 
respect--I admire his ability to go into this defense budget and try to 
find areas where he believes there is waste. I respect that. There are 
some substantial disagreements as to the CBO calculations for the cost 
savings of the Seawolf submarine, discontinuing the Seawolf submarine. 
The Navy, in a document that was transmitted to me, says that they 
underestimate a lot of the costs, that they do not recognize that by 
shutting off this third Seawolf we will likely end production of any 
kind of ships at Electric Boat, in Connecticut. They do not count for 
the shutdown of that facility or the costs that would be incurred in 
future shipbuilding as a result of having just one shipyard. I think it 
is a substantial one, not just for our industrial base--which I happen 
to believe is important--but for the competitiveness that is necessary 
to get high-quality, low-cost ships in this country.
  I want to mention just one final thing. I want to talk about the 
industrial base, not from a State that has a huge submarine industrial 
base, although we have some. I will say one of the other reasons I 
support this third Seawolf is because I do believe we do need an 
industrial base of skilled technicians and companies that can produce 
this kind of very high-quality, demanding, and very specific high-
quality work. If we do not continue this bridge, which the third 
Seawolf turns out to be, into the new attack submarine, we will not 
only have that new attack submarine cost more as a result, but I think 
we may not end up with as good a product.
  So I come here as a reformed Seawolf opponent who understands this is 
a project, an investment that is worthwhile to combat a serious threat 
to preserve an industrial base that is essential to the military 
capability, production capability of our country. I support it 
wholeheartedly and oppose the amendment of the Senator from Arizona.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. President, the GAO report was before the Armed Services Committee 
on May 16, 1995 as follows: On page 6:

       . . . there is disagreement about a number of issues 
     including Russia's defense spending priorities, Russia's 
     ability to maintain its operating tempo and readiness and 
     maintenance levels, and the future Russian force structure 
     levels and production programs.

  The GAO report goes on to say:

       The ONI report [Office of Navy Intelligence report] does 
     not address other factors that should be considered in 
     determining the overall superiority of United States and 
     Russian submarines, such as sensor processing, weapons, 
     platform design, tactics, doctrine and crew training.

  Public reports, news accounts and, more importantly, other DOD 
publications, including the Annual Director of Naval Intelligence 
Posture Statement, present other information on some of the factors 
that affect submarine superiority. For example, these reports note:

       . . . a decline in the operating tempo of Russian 
     submarines, order of battle, and construction programs.

  They also note:

       Morale and discipline have deteriorated, personnel 
     shortages are serious, and the frequency and scope of naval 
     operations, training, readiness and maintenance have 
     declined.

  Somebody said earlier, one of the Senators from Connecticut, I 
believe, we ought to use common sense here. Let us use common sense. 
Common sense shows us the condition of Russia today, the state of their 
military. This military could not even defeat the Chechnyans. To 
believe, somehow, they come from some kind of superior shipyard with 
superior workmanship and with superior quality of personnel flies in 
the face of common sense.
  Mr. President, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
  I will quote the New York Times, Sunday, July 30, 1995:

       To The Editor:
       I have a lot of respect for Secretary of the Navy John 
     Dalton. I hate to see him fall prey to the sharks who are 
     trying to justify the spending of $1.5 billion for the third 
     Seawolf submarine.
       * * * * *
       The allegation is like the ``missile gap'' or the ``bomber 
     gap'' or the ``readiness gap.'' . . . Does this ``quietness 
     gap'' exist?
       There are two aspects to quieting a submarine. The first 
     takes place when the submarine is built. To say our 
     submarines are not built as well as Russian submarines 
     condemns the very shipyard we are trying to keep operating.
       The second aspect of quieting is in the operation of the 
     ship. Is Secretary Dalton telling us that the crews of our 
     submarines are not as well trained or as competent as the 
     Russians?
       I never met a submarine officer who did not think our 
     submarines were the best in the world--by far. I am sorry to 
     see this proud group stoop to chicanery to justify an 
     unnecessary weapon.
       --John J. Shanahan, Vice Admiral, retired.

  Let us use some common sense when we evaluate whether we need to 
spend another couple of billion dollars on a weapons system for which 
there is no compelling requirement.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor and strong supporter 
of the amendment by Senator McCain to terminate the third Seawolf 
submarine.
  I want to thank the Senator from Arizona for his leadership on this 
issue and for his constant and tireless efforts to scour the defense 
budget--and, indeed, the entire Federal budget--for wasteful and 
unnecessary spending.
  Like the Senator from Arizona, I believe we must build a strong 
military that can respond to the rapidly changing threats America faces 
in the post-cold war world.
  The Seawolf submarine, which was developed to counter a specific 
Soviet threat during the cold war, is simply outdated and irrelevant in 
this new era.
  Mr. President, if we're going to buy military equipment that's behind 
the times, the least we could hope for is to get it at a cut-rate 
price. But this is not the case. The third Seawolf will cost $2.4 
billion bringing the grand total for this program to more than $7 
billion for just three submarines.
  I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to terminate the 
Seawolf and save the taxpayers a minimum of $1.3 billion. Moreover, 
these savings could increase in future years as we determine the most 
efficient way to construct the next generation of nuclear submarines.

[[Page S 11294]]

  As the Senator from Arizona has repeatedly pointed out, this funding 
is needed for higher priority defense programs that will truly enhance 
our military readiness.
  The McCain amendment has been strongly endorsed by a number of 
Government watchdog organizations, including the National Taxpayers 
Union, Citizens Against Government Waste, and Citizens for a Sound 
Economy.
  Mr. President, let's stand with these groups and show the American 
taxpayers that the Congress supports responsible spending that will 
yield a strong and strategically sound national defense.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-four minutes and thirty-two seconds.
  Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Senator from Arizona, who 
is a good friend and someone I have worked with since I came to the 
Senate and long before that time. He was advising me on military 
matters when he was with the Navy.
  Bismark once observed that there are two things that do not change in 
this life: One is history and the other is geography.
  Going back historically, we can look at the period of time during 
World War II. At that time we had over 5,000 ships in our inventory. We 
are now looking at downsizing to in the neighborhood of 340 or 348 
ships.
  So we have come from having such an armada of 5,000 ships capable of 
fighting during World War II down to about 340 to 350 ships. Obviously, 
they are much more capable today than they were in the past. But as the 
numbers have come down, we have insisted that the capability increase. 
And that is because the oceans have not diminished in size and 
geography has not changed. The oceans are still roughly the same size. 
Our commitments have not diminished in any significant degree. We still 
are an island nation.
  As my colleague from Rhode Island has said, we are likely to remain a 
naval power for the foreseeable future, hopefully for the indefinite 
future. Our commitment is to maintain the sealanes of communication. 
That is our lifeblood, and no nation should ever have the capability of 
being able to interrupt that, to cut off that flow, to cut off the 
blood supply, the oxygen supply. We depend upon having access to the 
open ocean and having that access unchallenged.
  So looking at history and looking at geography, we can say, well, we 
have downsized. The reality is the cold war is over. It does not mean 
there are no dangers left in this world. They are of a different 
magnitude and a different type. But they are dangers nonetheless.
  As most of my colleagues who have spoken in opposition to the Senator 
from Arizona, the one thing we keep reminding ourselves is that the 
Russians, notwithstanding the state of their economy, continue to 
produce submarines. Now, they may not be operating at the same tempo 
that our submarines are operating, the morale of their sailors may be 
at a much lower level than the morale of our sailors, but that, too, 
can change.
  What has not changed is the number. They are still producing roughly 
the same numbers of submarines that they were at the height of the cold 
war. Some of that is no doubt due to fact that it is just inertia and 
it is a jobs program for the Russians. They have to do something. They 
might as well do something that they have been working on. They have to 
build more ships.
  But the numbers ought to be of concern to all of us because at some 
point in time the tides might change. Our relationship with the 
Russians might change. It might get better. It might get worse. We do 
not know. We have no way of predicting the future. And we should never 
structure our forces or our industrial base predicated upon the 
unknown; that since we cannot foresee the future, we should simply 
conform our industrial base to what exists currently. That would be a 
prescription for future disaster.
  So we have to plan for the future taking into account the unknown, 
taking into account history, taking into account geography, and try to 
plan as best we can given the resources that are available.
  That, I believe, is what the Navy has done. The Navy has said we 
would like to have two nuclear-capable shipyards. We are not prepared 
at this point in time to say there should be only one yard in America 
producing nuclear-capable ships--one yard--namely, Newport News. That 
may be the situation sometime in the future. We may not be able to 
afford more than one yard.
  But the Navy is unwilling, given the unforeseeability of the future, 
given the sort of chaotic situation which exists in the world today, to 
take that chance at this point in time. They are saying, ``We are not 
willing to put all of our eggs in one basket. We do not know whether 
there will be a surreptitious attack upon that location. We do not know 
whether it will be a bolt out of the blue. We did not know whether it 
will be a natural catastrophe. We are unwilling to take the risk to put 
all of our shipbuilding into one yard.''
  We would like to see Electric Boat continue. And make no mistake 
about it, you cancel the third Seawolf and EB is out of business. They 
will shut down. Their 7,000 or 8,000 or 9,000 workers--whatever that 
figure is now--will be out of work. That may please the National 
Taxpayers Union and it may please the various groups that have come out 
in favor of this amendment saying it will save money. I do not think it 
will save money. It will put people on the welfare rolls. It will put 
them out of work. It will increase the deficit, no doubt, because we 
will simply have to pay for those welfare recipients and not have any 
income or revenues coming in from the taxpayers themselves.
  So I am not sure it would be an appropriate tradeoff. If we were only 
engaged in one public works program, if we were simply talking about 
public works or dead-end jobs, sweeping streets, cleaning up garbage, 
that would be one thing. But we are talking about here highly skilled 
individuals, people who work for years to develop the capability of 
designing and then constructing the most complicated ships in the 
world--nuclear submarines.
  It takes, as the Senator from Connecticut, Senator Dodd, indicated, 7 
years to build a ship.
  Ironically, I was just at a launching of the U.S.S. Maine in 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME. That ship, a Trident 
submarine, was launched. It was built by Electric Boat and commissioned 
at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The president of the EB yard was there 
and pointed out that in World War II Electric Boat was cranking out 
about two ships a month, or about one every other week. We are now down 
to producing one a year, or one and a half a year.
  So times have changed, and we have to change accordingly. But it does 
not mean that we should sever the ability of this country to maintain 
an industrial capacity of skilled working people who are contributing 
substantially to our national security.
  I can agree with much of what my colleague from Arizona has said. We 
come to a different conclusion on this. We are trying to keep Electric 
Boat in competition with Newport News for a little longer, at least 
because the Navy is unsure at this point whether or not we will ever 
have to build more than one ship a year, whether we will be able to 
support two yards. I think they are not prepared to say we can only 
afford one yard.
  I believe Admiral Boorda, or read the writings of Admiral Shanahan 
and others. But I would put that up against Admiral Boorda. I do not 
think Mike Boorda would come to the Congress or to the U.S. Senate and 
misrepresent the facts. I do not think that he would suggest that this 
is something that is really necessary when it is not, that it is simply 
a jobs program for the Navy or for EB. I think that he is persuaded 
that the Navy does in fact need this ship in order to get us to the 
follow-on.
  If you terminate the Seawolf right now, EB is not going to be in 
competition. That is very clear. We might as well say that Newport News 
will be the only yard that will then build the follow-on to the 
Seawolf, the Centurion, or whatever it is going to be called.
  That is a policy decision that we will be making here on the floor of 
the Senate, and some are prepared to make it. I do not for 1 minute 
question my friend from Arizona. He is someone who is expert in the 
field. He is someone who has dedicated himself to the 

[[Page S 11295]]
Navy. We just come out on a different end of the judgment on this one.
  But I do not for a moment want to put us in the position of making 
the policy judgment that we only need one yard in this country to 
produce aircraft carriers and submarines. That is what it ends up 
being. Newport News will be the only shipyard in the country producing 
all of our nuclear-capable ships into the future.
  I think that is a risk that the Navy is not willing to bear at this 
point in time. I think it is a risk that we as Senators should not be 
willing to bear at this time. And I think in view of the fact that we 
have spent the $900 million on the third Seawolf, in view of the fact 
we have come down from 23 to 3, in view of the fact that we would have 
termination liabilities, we at least ought to get a ship out of it 
which allows EB to be in a competitive position to compete head to head 
with Newport News on the follow-on ships.
  For those reasons, Mr. President, I hope that we defeat the amendment 
of my friend from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. President, I always respect and appreciate, and even enjoy, the 
comments of my old and dear friend from Maine. Usually he and I are on 
the same side on most issues. On this side, I pay careful attention to 
his words since they are always well thought out and extremely 
edifying.
  Again, we find, as he mentioned, ourselves on opposite sides of this 
issue.
  Mr. President, if we had a defense budget that we had all during the 
1980's, I would still have some questions about this weapons system, 
primarily because I still believe that our money could be spent much 
more wisely in other areas. But we really do not have the kinds of 
funds that I believe would allow us to afford this ship.
  I received a letter on July 28 from the Congressional Budget Office, 
so I can illuminate my friends as to what kind of money we are talking 
about.

       After briefly reviewing those savings, the accompanying 
     attachment focuses on the implications of consolidating 
     construction of all nuclear powered ships at a single 
     shipyard.
       CBO's analysis suggests that such a consolidation could 
     result in savings of between $2.4 billion and $3.7 billion 
     (in 1996 dollars) over the life of the new attack submarine 
     program, which is currently slated to acquire some 30 ships 
     between 1998 and 2020. That amount is less than one 
     contractor claims could be saved through consolidation, but 
     more than the Navy's own estimate. Consolidation could also 
     lead to a somewhat smaller shipbuilding work force: CBO 
     estimates that at most 3,300 shipyards jobs are at issue, and 
     the reduction resulting from consolidation might be 
     substantially less. Essential skills for producing nuclear-
     powered ships--many of which reside in the suppliers and 
     subcontractors to the shipyards--would be retained whether or 
     not production was consolidated.

  Signed by June O'Neill, who, as we all know, is the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office.
  Mr. President, I wish to make one additional comment. That is that I 
think we ought to look at history also, and the history of Russia is 
that they have primarily been a land empire. They have concentrated 
their focus on expansion of their empire to adjacent areas. It was not 
until well into the cold war that the Soviet Union began to build a 
fleet and when they built that fleet, it was primarily for strategic 
purposes and for the delivery of strategic weaponry. I do not believe 
that the Russians contemplate a strategic confrontation with the United 
States any time soon. Again, it is common sense, as has been said on 
this floor on many occasions.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 24 minutes 55 seconds.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, a $1\1/2\ billion vote deserves serious 
consideration by this body in this time of fiscal crisis. Throughout 
the defense budget debates in the 6 years since the cold war ended, I 
have been routinely amazed--and disappointed--that the Senate cannot 
bring itself to terminate one of the most expensive, outdated, poorly 
managed, cold war programs in the entire budget--namely, the Seawolf 
submarine program.
  Mr. President, there are several reasons to support the amendment 
that Senator McCain and I are offering. First, the Seawolf is a cold 
war weapon with no modern mission. It was originally conceived as the 
ultimate United States weapon against Soviet ballistic missile 
submarines. It would operate 1,000 feet beneath the seas, quieter than 
the seas themselves. Its special sensors and computer systems would 
detect Soviet nuclear submarines well before the Seawolf could be 
observed.
  If this Nation were still in the grip of the cold war, we would 
probably be justified in procuring further Seawolf submarines. But, the 
cold war is over, and the system has no mission in the post-cold war 
world. Consequently, it should be terminated immediately.
  Second, this program is poorly managed and the problems are such that 
I have little faith in the Navy's estimate of how much money the 
taxpayers will be required to spend. The General Accounting Office now 
says that average cost of the first two subs will be well over $5 
billion. Moreover, there are significant cost overruns in virtually 
every aspect of this program. According to the GAO, the design contract 
was overrun by 131 percent, the production contract on the first sub is 
overrun by about 80 percent, and the average unit cost is overrun by 
about 250 percent.
  Giving this hog more feed is not going to make it any leaner. The 
design for the first submarine is currently in its fifth revision and 
is more than half a million hours behind schedule, even though 
production began several years ago. With the proposed design changes in 
the SSN-23, additional delays and cost overruns are inevitable.
  A third reason to terminate the Seawolf program is to restore 
accountability for the Navy's poor acquisition management. There is no 
incentive for industry to perform efficiently as long as funding is 
guaranteed. The guise of the submarine industrial base should not 
remove the Navy's accountability for the Seawolf's 250 percent cost 
overrun. This program is a dud, and we ought to let it fizzle out.
  A fourth reason to kill the Seawolf program is that funding a third 
Seawolf submarine takes money away from more important needs. It is 
untenable to require service men and women to live off food stamps so 
that $100,000 a year defense contractors can remain employed in an 
endeavor that does not add to our national security. We have all heard 
stories of shortfalls in military readiness, due to lack of funds.
  A fifth reason not to fund a third Seawolf submarine is that there 
are more cost-effective means of protecting the industrial base. One 
alternative approach to maintaining the submarine industrial base is 
allowing it to work on commercial projects, which Electric Boat is 
currently pursuing and should do so more aggressively in the future. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the costs of other 
alternatives, such as overhauls and modernization efforts, are much 
less than building and maintaining a third Seawolf.
  We must also keep in mind that engineering expertise is being 
protected by work on the new attack submarine and design changes on the 
first two Seawolves. Furthermore, the submarine deactivation workload 
will ensure an industrial base well into the future. Finally, the Navy 
announced its intent to increase its reliance on commercial 
technologies in building the new attack submarine, and reduce its 
reliance on the submarine industrial base.
  Several years ago, when Senator McCain and I have moved to stop 
funding for the Seawolf, we garnered very few votes. Then, 2 days 
later, President Bush terminated the program in recognition that the 
cold war was over. Time and again, the program has been kept alive for 
political, rather than military, purposes. We can no longer afford to 
spend $1.5 billion for such reasons. I encourage my colleagues to vote 
to support our amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, due to the exigencies of the hour and the 
efficiency of my friend from Connecticut, and, as my other friend, 
Senator Lieberman, said, much of this debate has been covered in years 
past, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time if my 
colleagues are so prepared. Senator Cohen is prepared to yield it back.
  Mr. COHEN. I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? 

[[Page S 11296]]

  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I would move to table the----
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to my friend, if we do, we will bring up the 
amendment again and again until we get an up-or-down vote.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion be 
a tabling motion, as in keeping with the previous unanimous-consent 
agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can make a motion to table.
  Mr. COHEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have been asked to announce that the 
vote on this amendment--I ask unanimous consent that it be an up-or-
down vote----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN [continuing]. Will occur at 8:10. In the meantime, Mr. 
President, I would like to announce that on this side we have all of 
the amendments. We would appreciate it if those on the other side would 
complete their list of the amendments so that the distinguished 
chairman can move forward with the unanimous consent, at least so that 
we can finalize the list of amendments. We hope to be able to do that 
between now and 8:10, when the vote will take place. Also, Mr. 
President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur at 8:10.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask my friend from Maine if he is ready to move 
forward?
  Mr. COHEN. No.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that the quorum call be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that my 
leader time be extended by an additional 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Daschle pertaining to the introduction of S. 1117 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
                       Vote on Amendment No. 2090

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question occurs 
on the McCain amendment No. 2090.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 30, nays 70, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 356 Leg.]

                                YEAS--30

     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Bradley
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Coats
     Conrad
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lugar
     McCain
     Murray
     Pressler
     Roth
     Shelby
     Stevens
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--70

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Bennett
     Biden
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
  So the amendment (No. 2090) was rejected.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Several Senators addressed the chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I wonder if I could have the attention of 
all Members here so I can tell them where we are.
  It is my understanding we might be able to line up three votes here--
or three amendments, which will be debated tonight and voted on first 
thing in the morning if votes are necessary.
  I think the first will be an amendment by the Senator from Arizona, 
which will be second-degreed by the Senator from Connecticut. I am not 
sure that will require a vote. It may or may not require a vote.
  Then there is a DOE matter which will take, I understand, about 2 
hours of debate.
  Then Senator Bumpers, we want to accommodate him because he has a 
personal problem tomorrow. We would like to take at least one of his, 
debate one of his amendments tonight and the other the first thing in 
the morning.
  Will that be satisfactory?
  Mr. BUMPERS. That will be satisfactory.
  Mr. DOLE. So if that took that much time, it would be about 11:30.
  It would seem to me, those who are involved can stay here and debate 
those and then have those two votes first thing tomorrow morning, if 
that is all right with the Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. That will be all right if we can get through the 
debate--all but the voting. We have a lot of amendments tonight to act 
on.
  Mr. DOLE. I understand that.
  Mr. BUMPERS. If the majority leader will yield for a question, I have 
one amendment I would like to offer tonight. I am willing to settle for 
a 30-minute time agreement. I would like very much to go in front of 
the DOE amendment, which will take 2 hours, if that will be all right. 
It will be very helpful to me.
  Mr. COHEN. Which one is it?
  Mr. DOLE. Can you give us some indication of what the amendment was?
  Mr. BUMPERS. There is a provision in the bill that sets up a new 
method--directs the Department of Defense to set up a new method for 
financing arms sales. My amendment will strike that provision. It is a 
very simple amendment. Everybody will understand it.
  Mr. DOLE. If I can get consent, Senator Bumpers offers his amendment 
regarding export loan guarantees. There will be 30 minutes for debate 
divided in the usual form, with no second-degree amendments to be in 
order, and following the conclusion or yielding back of the time the 
Senate lay aside the amendment. That will follow the amendments by 
Senator McCain and----
  Mr. McCAIN. If the leader will yield, I think the majority leader's 
unanimous consent is excellent. But I would point out we still do not 
have the list of amendments from the other side. I hope we could, at 
least by the close of business, get a complete list of amendments which 
would then be propounded as a unanimous-consent agreement before we 
leave tonight. So at least it will narrow down the total number of 
amendments if we are to have any prospect whatsoever of finishing 
tomorrow night.
  Mr. NUNN. If the leader will yield, we are working on that list. We 
will have a copy of it in another hour or so.
  Mr. DOLE. Hopefully you are working it down.

[[Page S 11297]]

  Mr. NUNN. We are doing our best to work it down.
  Mr. DOLE. Because let me indicate again, on Saturday we start off 
with the Treasury-Post Office appropriations bill, and I am not certain 
when this bill will be back again. So, hopefully, if we can accommodate 
the manager, who has been working very hard--he lost 5 hours yesterday. 
We had 7 hours today on one amendment. They are trying to catch up 
here. So if we can keep our amendments to a minimum, I am certain it 
will help the managers, who have done a good job.
  We do want to accommodate the Senator from Arkansas. He has a funeral 
to attend tomorrow.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, let me correct that. I am sorry, I misled 
the leader. I am leaving here tomorrow night.
  Mr. DOLE. That is fine. We still want to accommodate the Senator from 
Arkansas.
  Is there any objection to the request on his amendment?
  Mr. CHAFEE. He goes first under the request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, is the Thurmond amendment 
going to come before the Bumpers amendment?
  Mr. DOLE. The amendment by Senator McCain will be next. That will be 
second-degreed by Senator Dodd. Following disposition of that, it will 
be Senator Bumpers' amendment, 30 minutes. Following that will be the 
DOE amendment which will take about 2 hours.
  Mr. McCAIN. And amendments to the DOE bill will be in order?
  Mr. DOLE. Amendments to the DOE bill will be in order but we would 
like to have the votes on those tomorrow morning.
  Mr. REID. Reserving right to object, I have no objection to the 
unanimous-consent request as far as it relates to the amendment of 
Senator McCain or the amendment of Senator Bumpers. But I do not 
consent to anything relating to the Thurmond amendment, the DOE.
  Mr. DOLE. Let us get this part and then I will make the next request. 
Is there objection to this?
  Mr. GORTON. Reserving the right to object, I say to the majority 
leader, on the DOE amendment I have some severe reservations.
  Mr. DOLE. I have not made that request yet. That is going to be next. 
All right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Now, if I can have the DOE.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I understand we are not going to be able to 
get an agreement. I will propose the consent agreement. So it may be we 
will have to have additional votes this evening. But I am going to ask 
consent, when Senator Thurmond offers an amendment regarding title 31 
of the bill, and immediately after reading of the amendment, Senator 
Exon be recognized to offer a second-degree amendment to the Thurmond 
amendment, and there be 45 minutes of debate under the control of 
Senator Thurmond and 90 minutes under the control of Senator Exon.
  Further, following the expiration or yielding of time, the Senator 
from Nevada, Senator Reid, be recognized to offer an amendment in the 
second degree regarding tritium, on which we will have 60 minutes, 40 
minutes to Senator Reid, 20 minutes to Senator Thurmond,
 and that the Senate proceed to vote on or in relation to the Exon 
amendment and on or in relation to the Reid amendment followed 
immediately by a vote on the Thurmond amendment, as amended, if 
amended.

  Mr. GORTON. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. DOLE. We cannot get an agreement.
  Does anybody else have any amendments that we can get agreements on?
  Why do we not go ahead? Let us go ahead and have the debate on this 
amendment and go ahead and have a vote on the first Bumpers amendment. 
Then we will try to determine what we can figure out in the next 30 
minutes.


                           Amendment No. 2091

 (Purpose: To limit the total amount that may be obligated or expended 
    for procurement of the SSN-21, SSN-22, and SSN-23 Seawolf class 
                              submarines)

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk and I ask 
for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2091.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 30, after the matter following line 24, insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 125. SEAWOLF SUBMARINE PROGRAM.

       (a) Limitation of Costs.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (b), the total amount obligated or expended for procurement 
     of the SSN-21, SSN-22, and SSN-23 Seawolf class submarines 
     may not exceed $7,187,800,000.
       (b) Automatic Increase of Limitation Amount.--The amount of 
     the limitation set forth in subsection (a) is increased after 
     fiscal year 1995 by the following amounts:
       (1) The amounts of outfitting costs and post-delivery costs 
     incurred for the submarines referred to in such subsection.
       (2) The amounts of increases in costs attributable to 
     economic inflation after fiscal year 1995.
       (3) The amounts of increases in costs attributable to 
     compliance with changes in Federal, State, or local laws 
     enacted after fiscal year 1995.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I make a point that the Senate is not in 
order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order?


                Amendment No. 2092 to Amendment No. 2091

 (Purpose: To propose an alternative limitation on the amount that may 
     be obligated for procurement of the Seawolf class submarines.)

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senator from 
Connecticut is recognized to offer a second-degree amendment.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk 
and ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2092 to amendment No. 2091.
       On page 1, line 7, strike out ``$7,187,800,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$7,223,659,000''.

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I make a point of order that the Senate is 
not in order. I know the Chair has a problem. But these are important 
amendments, and I hope the Chair will keep order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
  Mr. DODD. I yield to my colleague from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President I know what my amendment is about. I would 
be prepared to ask my friend from Connecticut what his is. But I would 
like to briefly explain mine.
  Last year the Congress adopted an amendment to the DOD bill which 
caps the procurement cost for the first two Seawolf submarines at $4.75 
billion, the total amount identified by the Department of Defense as 
necessary to complete construction of these two systems.
  The amendment was necessary to control escalating costs of the 
program. Therefore, I offer an amendment to expand the existing cost 
caps to include the third Seawolf submarine, the provision establishing 
a procurement cost cap of $7.2 billion on the three Seawolf submarines.
  The provision allows for the same automatic increases for inflation 
and labor law changes as the existing cap. It also exempts the future 
costs of outfitting in postdelivery for the submarines.
  These are costs which will undergo congressional review and require 
authorizations and appropriations in the future.
  For reasons which are not clear to me, the other body this year is 
recommending a repeal of the cost cap on 

[[Page S 11298]]
SSN-21 and SSN-22. I do not believe we can allow a return to the 
uncontrollable cost escalations we have seen on the first two 
submarines. I believe that imposing the same strict cost controls on 
the third Seawolf would be to the advantage of the American taxpayer.
  I yield to my colleague from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona.
  Let me make this very brief. I happen to agree with my colleague from 
Arizona on this amendment. We disagreed obviously on the previous 
amendment. But the Senator from Arizona is absolutely correct in what 
he is trying to do here.
  We have a second-degree amendment that absolutely modifies the 
amendment being offered by the Senator from Arizona--modifies it up by 
$30 million, which I think we can reach agreement on here.
  This is a mature program. I think a case can be made about cost 
containment provisions on defense procurement. In the early stages you 
ought to be somewhat careful about it when you are dealing with a 
mature program. That is what this is. This is a mature program. I think 
injecting some fiscal discipline into these programs can be helpful.
  I am confident that this amendment will offer no problems at all. We 
have talked to the contractors and to the Navy. We ought to be able to 
complete the program with caps that are suggested by these two 
amendments.
  So, Mr. President, I hope that there will be no need for a rollcall 
vote on this. We think it does the job.
  Again, I support what our colleague from Arizona is doing. It is the 
proper and appropriate approach that should be taken on matters such as 
this.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, very briefly, we disagree with our 
friend from Arizona whether or not to finish the third Seawolf. We do 
not disagree on the question of whether or not there should be a cost 
cap. There should be. I hope we will agree to the second-degree 
amendment. We disagree on the question of whether we should complete 
the third Seawolf. The Senate has spoken now on that question.
  On the question that the Senator from Arizona now raises as to 
whether there should be a cost cap, there is no disagreement. Senator 
Dodd and I and all the others who support the Seawolf feel probably 
even more strongly that there should be a cost cap.
  So I hope we can agree on a number and leave it at that.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, before we voice vote this, because it has 
been accepted on both sides, I would like to extend my congratulations 
to the two Senators from Connecticut and to the Senator from Maine on a 
significant victory in maintaining the Seawolf submarine. I obviously 
strongly disagree. But their arguments and the work they did indicated 
that a clear majority of the Senate chooses to maintain the procurement 
of this weapons system. And I congratulate them on their success.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back the remaining time?
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield back the time.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I would like to thank my friend from 
Arizona for his gracious statement and say to him that, given a choice, 
I would much rather have him on my side than against me, having real 
strength and conviction, and this is one of those cases where I end up 
after a fight respecting somebody more than I did before.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks 
of my colleague from Connecticut.
  My friend from Arizona and I have been with each other over these 
many years. And there is no better fighter, no more honest Member of 
our body, no person who brings more integrity to a debate, and I 
appreciate how fairly he raised this issue and gave us an opportunity 
to address it.
  Mr. President, I would also like to commend our respective staffs, my 
colleague from Connecticut for his staff, and mine, Bob Gillcash, who 
has done a tremendous job over the years on these issues, this one 
particularly and many others as well.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The question 
is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut in the 
second degree.
  The amendment (No. 2092) was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on amendment No. 2091, 
as amended.
  The amendment (No. 2091), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
                           Amendment No. 2094

(Purpose: To strike the bill's provision concerning Defense Export Loan 
                              Guarantees)

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers], for himself, Mr. 
     Feingold, Mr. Simon, and Mrs. Boxer, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2094.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike line 1 on page 353 through line 16 on page 357.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, we have a 30-minute agreement on this, 
but perhaps because it is a very straightforward, simple amendment, we 
may be able to do it in less time than that, and I hope we can.
  Right now, the United States totally dominates the foreign arms 
market. We sell 53 percent of all the arms in international trade. We 
also have four separate methods of financing these sales which help 
maintain our position of dominance.
  First of all, the Arms Export Control Act allows the President to 
commit the U.S. Government to a loan guarantee or a grant.
  Second the Export-Import Bank can finance any sale of technology as 
long as it is nonlethal. So we sell a lot of military hardware to 
countries that are financed by the Export-Import Bank.
  Third we have foreign military financing which is a part of the 
foreign aid bill. We pick out the countries and give them grants to buy 
our weapons. We say here is $1 billion for you and $1 billion for you. 
Come and buy whatever weapons you want until you use up that $1 
billion. We can also subsidize loans with this program.
  Fourth we have foreign military sales. Under this program the U.S. 
Government or a U.S. company sells arms to a foreign government.
  The bill we are debating says four methods of financing arms are not 
enough. We have to have another one. And it directs with virtually no 
guidance the Defense Department to set up a program exactly like OPIC. 
Senators know what OPIC is. You pay a little fee and you get your loan 
guarantee.
  That is all there is to this amendment. I say four is enough. Let me 
read you though just for entertainment purposes a list of the countries 
that arms sales merchants in this country will be selling arms to by 
simply paying a small fee to this new organization that the Defense 
Department is ordered under the bill to set up.
  You are not looking at another S&L scandal, but you are looking at 
something that has the potential for a mini-S&L. We just got through 
writing off $7.1 billion to Egypt and $300 million to Jordan.
  I do not want to refight those battles, but how do you feel about 
Burundi? Do you want to give loan guarantees to them? They already buy 
weapons from us.
  Here is a list of roughly 100 countries that the contractors, the 
arms merchants of this already country sell arms to.
  Now, the arms merchants are hot for this, and I do not blame them. 
How would you like to be able to sell $100 million worth of weapons to 
some Third World nation where 50 percent of the people are starving to 
death for a 

[[Page S 11299]]
little simple fee you pay on the front end?
  Incidentally, there is not even a prohibition in this against 
financing the fee. Let us assume you have a $10 million sale. Let us 
assume the fee is $500,000. Just add that on. Make it a $10.5 million 
loan. Finance the whole thing. There is no prohibition against it.
  But here is Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Senegal, Zambia, Zimbabwe--100 of them. And someday in the future they 
will pay a little fee, and we will sell arms to them on credit. And the 
American taxpayer will assume the risk.
  Now, Mr. President, I have a moral compunction about this. I make no 
bones about it. I have some moral reservation about how many arms we 
sell abroad. We keep forgetting that our weapons last longer than our 
friendships.
  Do you know where the contras down in Nicaragua got most of their 
arms? They were the arms we left in Vietnam. The Vietnamese inherited a 
cache of weapons that would choke a mule, and a lot of them went to the 
contras in Nicaragua. What happened to all the Stingers we sent to 
Afghanistan? Why, our good friends the Iranians have about 30 of them.
  As I said, we sell 53 percent of all the arms sold in the world, and 
the Pentagon estimates by the year 2004 we will be selling 59 percent. 
That is 59 percent of all the arms sales, and somebody will say, 
``Well, if we don't do it, somebody else will.'' I heard that argument 
the first year I was in the Senate, and I still hear it. I say let 
someone else then.
  This may influence some of you--The White House strongly supports 
this amendment. The administration does not want another method of 
financing weapons. And the Pentagon says this can only marginally 
affect the number of weapons that we are going to be selling abroad.
  Mr. President, in 1993-1995, that time period, we sold $53 billion 
worth of weapons. Let me ask you this: Who here believes that this 
Nation is safer and stronger because we are selling anywhere from $10- 
to $20 billion worth of weapons abroad each year?
  Now, Mr. President, let me say to my colleagues this is not the 
biggest item in this bill, but it is just another provision in which we 
ought not to get involved. I promise you we are going to be financing 
weapons to countries, and we are going to be forgiving the debts. We 
are going to be picking up all these bad loans. It is a very generous 
method. And there are a lot of Third World countries that will jump on 
this thing like a chicken after a June bug, and obviously the arms 
merchants will be tickled to death to sell the weapons.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the 
remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. President, the Bumpers amendment proposes to strike the language 
in the bill creating a self-financing defense export loan guarantee 
program at the Department of Defense. I underscore the fact that it is 
self-financing. All of the Members who support this measure also have a 
moral compass. The program provides financing to a very select list of 
countries for defense sales that meet all, all of the existing export 
controls and nonproliferation policies of the United States.
  It is also important to note that this authority is not limited 
strictly to arms. In many cases American companies lose bids to 
maintain or upgrade previously sold U.S. military equipment because 
they cannot offer financing. The program in the defense authorization 
bill will allow U.S. companies and American workers to compete on a 
level playing field with our international competitors.
  Today, almost every major arms exporter provides financing to support 
the export of their domestic products and services. Indeed, some 
purchasers now make financing a requirement before a company can bid on 
a proposed purchase. The program is financed by fees paid by the buyer 
or the seller.
  The list of eligible countries--and it was interesting Senator 
Bumpers went down a list of a number of countries, but the list of 
eligible countries is limited to our NATO allies, nonmajor allies, 
Central European countries moving toward democracy, and selected 
members of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group. Of the 185 
members of United Nations, we only allow 37 countries to be eligible 
for these loan guarantees.
  I would ask unanimous consent that the list of these 37 countries be 
printed in the record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                       List of Eligible Countries

       1. Albania.
       2. Australia.
       3. Belgium.
       4. Brunei.
       5. Bulgaria.
       6. Canada.
       7. Czech.
       8. Denmark.
       9. Egypt.
       10. France.
       11. Germany.
       12. Greece.
       13. Hong Kong.
       14. Hungary.
       15. Iceland.
       16. Indonesia.
       17. Israel.
       18. Italy.
       19. Japan.
       20. Luxembourg.
       21. Malaysia.
       22. Netherlands.
       23. New Zealand.
       24. Norway.
       25. Philippines.
       26. Poland.
       27. Portugal.
       28. Romania.
       29. Singapore.
       30. Slovakia.
       31. Slovenia.
       32. South Korea.
       33. Spain.
       34. Taiwan.
       35. Thailand.
       36. Turkey.
       37. U.K.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. When similar legislation was proposed 2 years ago, 
the Commerce Department and the Department of Defense expressed support 
for the export loan guarantee program. The American companies continue 
to lay off thousands of defense workers each month. This program will 
help us avoid paying unemployment to defense workers and help us 
preserve the U.S. defense industrial base.
  That is a winning combination. At a time when U.S. procurement of 
military equipment has reached all-time lows and we are all familiar 
with that in basics such as ships, planes, and trucks, it makes sense 
to sell these systems to our friends and our allies assuming those 
countries qualify for the equipment under our existing export controls.
  Now, the House-passed defense authorization bill includes similar 
language, and in a strong bipartisan vote the House voted 276-152 to 
keep the language in the bill. So, I urge my colleagues to reject the 
Bumpers amendment and allow us to have this sort of bridge for our 
defense contractors and American workers.
  With that, Mr. President, I would reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. THURMOND. How much time do you want?
  Mr. DODD. Three minutes, 4 minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Connecticut 3 
minutes.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered by 
the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers].
  Mr. President, I do not believe that section 1053--defense export 
loan guarantees--should be deleted or amended in any way.
  I believe the language in the bill strikes the right balance. It 
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish a program to issue 
export guarantees for financing of sales or long term leases of defense 
articles or services to certain countries.
  Under the provision contained in the bill, U.S. companies would be 
eligible to seek export financing guarantees to countries that are 
members of NATO, to countries designated as major non-NATO allies, to 
countries in Central 

[[Page S 11300]]
Europe, provided the Secretary of State has first designated such 
country as having a democratic government, and to certain non-communist 
member countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] 
organization.
  This financing won't be free. Companies will be required to pay 
appropriate fees and interest charges comparable to those that non-
defense exporters are charged by the U.S. Export/Import Bank.
  During a period of reduced funding for purchases of weapons systems 
and other defense equipment, I believe that defense exports can make a 
significant difference with respect to whether our domestic industrial 
base will be sustained at levels sufficient to protect our national 
security.
  I would remind my colleagues that we are not going to be the first 
country to offer such a program. We are way behind our allies and major 
trading partners on that score. Many of them make no distinction 
between defense and non-defense exports in their export assistance 
programs.
  The international defense market is incredibly competitive. Despite 
the fact that the U.S. defense industry produces some of the best 
equipment in the world, competitive financing can make or break the 
sale.
  Since 1989, I have been trying to convince my colleagues that we have 
got to equip our defense exporters so that they can compete on a level 
playing field.
  In 1989, I was successful in getting a much narrower defense export 
financing program operational for 1 year--fiscal year 1990. During the 
brief life of that program, a United States company--Sikorsky won a 
highly competitive contract to sell Black Hawk helicopters to Turkey.
  That sale totalled $1 billion and enabled some people in my State to 
remain employed who might otherwise have lost their jobs--that is not 
to say that significant numbers of Connecticut workers haven't been 
severely impacted by defense spending cut backs.
  The time has come to stop treating Americans employed in the defense 
industry like second class citizens. They deserve comparable support 
from their Government as they struggle to feed their families and pay 
their bills.
  The provision that the Arms Services Committee included in the 
pending bill has been carefully crafted so as not to impinge on U.S. 
Export/Import Bank financing. It will be a program operated in the 
Department of Defense.
  Nor should my colleagues be concerned that somehow we will be fueling 
the arms race with this program. No sale under this program will go 
forward until it has been fully vetted by all appropriate agencies to 
ensure that the sale is in the national interest.
  Mr. President, I believe that it is long past time for such a program 
to exist and I strongly oppose the amendment offered by Senator Bumpers 
to prevent that from happening.
  To sum up, for my colleagues, this is an area where the Senator from 
Idaho and I are in full agreement. In fact, before he arrived in the 
Senate this was an issue of great interest to me. As I mentioned 
earlier, in 1989, I was successful in having a very modest, 1 year, 
defense export financing provision included in the fiscal year 1990 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. In the 1 year that this 
provision was in effect it made a significant difference.
  I believe we have to be pragmatic about these matters. If every other 
country would back away from this kind of financing, then there would 
be no reason for us to be establishing such a program. But that isn't 
likely to happen anytime soon. I can personally tell my colleagues that 
other nations engage in very supportive financing schemes to assist 
their defense industries.
  As to the assertion that this provision will permit the sales of arms 
all around the world, I would say to my colleagues that is not 
accurate. I personally would not support a blanket authorization to 
finance the sale of defense equipment to every country around the 
globe.
  The provision in the bill does not propose that approach. As I said 
earlier, the provision limits access to such financing to a select 
number of countries, including NATO allies, major non-NATO allies, 
certain non-communist members of APEC, and several democratic countries 
in Central Europe, provided they remain on the democratic track.
  Moreover, I would say to my colleagues, at a time when we are 
reducing defense expenditures for obvious reasons, an intelligent, 
well-thought-out financing scheme makes sense. It allows us to market 
defense equipment to nations with strong democratic institutions, who 
are our allies. It is a way of maintaining an industrial base without 
having to go the taxpayers in this country to support it.
  The Senator from Idaho has been involved in this for some time. My 
colleague from Connecticut and I have met with numerous people over the 
years on this issue. I will tell you, in 1989, had this body not 
supported the particular effort we made, we would have lost a $1 
billion contract to the French or the Germans. I am telling you from 
personal experience, that a program such as the one proposed in this 
bill can make a difference.
  So with all due respect to my colleague from Arkansas, these are not 
Third World countries and not a wholesale financing scheme to any 
corporation that comes along. Nor is it meant to be in competition with 
the Export-Import Bank.
  If we fail to approve this program, we put in possible jeopardy the 
industrial base of our country. So for those reasons, I respectfully 
urge the rejection of the amendment offered by Senator Bumpers.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered 
by my distinguished colleague, Senator Bumpers, of Arkansas. It would 
remove a very important program from the bill we have discussed in our 
committee and on the floor for the last several years.
  According to studies conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment 
and others, the defense industry is laying off 20,000 workers every 
month and will continue to do so every month throughout the decade. One 
way to preserve these jobs is to help our industries export more 
defense products to our friends and allies. Export loan guarantees is 
the one way to put U.S. defense contractors on a level playing field 
with our foreign competitors.
  Other countries such as France and Great Britain provide such finance 
guarantees to their industries, and we should do likewise. The loan 
guarantee program establishing section 1053 is a no-cost program for 
U.S. taxpayers. The eligible countries are restricted to 37 of our 
allies and friends, and the controls on the sales of sensitive 
technologies are in no way relaxed.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this amendment.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina 
yield?
  Mr. THURMOND. How long?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. No more than 5 minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Can you go with less than that?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will try my best.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator is a tough negotiator. I thank the Senator 
from South Carolina.
  As my colleagues before me have said, I thank the Senator from Idaho 
for his leadership on this.
  I oppose the amendment offered by Senator Bumpers. The point is that 
this is an attempt to help the defense industry of our country and our 
defense workers whose jobs are endangered for a reason that we are 
happy about, the end of the cold war. But they are not happy about it. 
And we ought to try the keep that base alive by helping them sell 
abroad.
  The fact is that there is no source of export financing for arms 
exports available to American firms except at high commercial rates. 
The fact is that other countries are helping their firms dramatically 
with financing. I can give you one example. In Connecticut, where a 
Connecticut company actually moved over 70 good jobs from Connecticut 
to Canada in order to qualify for the export financing that the 
Canadian Government offers.
  Mr. President, this program is not only self-financing but it is 
limited. Let me come back to the references that my friend from 
Arkansas made to Burundi and Chad and Senegal and Zambia, et cetera, et 
cetera. High-risk countries are ruled out of participation in this 
program under this law. I refer my friend from Arkansas to section 

[[Page S 11301]]

2540 of the bill. You have to be a member of NATO. You have to be a 
country designated as a major non-NATO ally. I think we are thinking 
here of countries like Israel. You have to be a country in Central 
Europe that has changed its form of government, and you have to be a 
non-communist country that was a member nation of the Asian Pacific 
Economic Cooperation group, which includes countries like Korea, 
Singapore, et cetera. This is a good program: self-financing; protect 
jobs; protect the military industrial base.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. REID. I would ask if everyone would withhold while I ask for the 
unanimous-consent request.
  I ask unanimous consent that Larry Ferderber a congressional fellow 
assigned to my office be allowed floor privileges during the pendency 
of the action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, in just a moment I will yield to my good 
friend from Maryland, but I just want to make a couple of points.
  You know, the Senator from Connecticut just talked about jobs. I have 
to tell you this is one place where I consider that the worst of all 
arguments is to create jobs so we can sell weapons abroad.
  As I said, those weapons always have a tendency to get into terrorist 
hands. They get into all kinds of hands. They wind up half the time 
being used against us. And in addition to that, an awful lot of the 
arms sales in this country are quid pro quo. We will sell you so many 
weapons, but we will also create so many jobs in your country that 
would otherwise be in the United States. It is a trade-off.
  And when it comes to who is creditworthy, you have Mexico. We are 
bailing them out right now. They are eligible to buy weapons under 
this. Chile, they are eligible. All of the Pacific rim, 37 nations on 
here. I promise you even some of those nations in Central Europe are 
lousy credit risks. They are fine and we wish them well, but they are a 
lousy credit risk. We have no business setting up yet a fifth way to 
sell weapons in addition to the four we already have.
  Finally, let me just read this White House position for whatever this 
is worth to my colleagues.

       ``The bill would require the Secretary of Defense to 
     establish a program to issue loan guarantees and surety 
     against losses arising from the financing of defense exports 
     to certain countries. The administration opposes this program 
     because the administration has not found it necessary given 
     the availability of existing authority for transactions of 
     this type and the substantial American presence in 
     international markets for military equipment.''

  Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished friend from 
Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes.
  Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in very strong support of the 
Bumpers amendment. I hear all these assertions by the opponents of this 
amendment that it is necessary in order to make the United States 
competitive in the arms market. The fact of the matter is, the United 
States absolutely dominates the international arms market right now--
right now--and the U.S. percentage of the world's arms market has 
increased markedly over the last few years, ever since the implosion of 
the Soviet Union and other developments that have taken place.
  So I say to my colleagues, first of all, the assertion that you need 
this program in order to be able to sell the arms does not square with 
the facts. The reality is we dominate the international arms market.
  Second, I hear it asserted in some way as though there is no risk 
here. I think the term ``self-financing'' was used as though this thing 
is absolutely certain to pay its way. Clearly, that is not the case. 
Why are they seeking a Government guarantee? They are seeking a 
Government guarantee in order to insure against the risk which they 
otherwise would encounter in the private market. So, obviously, there 
is some risk connected with these arms sales; in some instances, 
potentially very heavy and substantial risks.
  As my colleague from Arkansas has pointed out, there are a series of 
programs right now to encourage these arms sales. Others say what these 
other countries do. None of these other countries have anything like a 
foreign military loan program and a foreign military gift program the 
way the United States does. So we are already making very substantial 
provision for arms sales. Of course, those programs are very tightly 
controlled and circumscribed to ensure that the national interests of 
the United States are provided for.
  The administration has not sought this. It is my understanding that 
the Pentagon--in fact, I will ask my colleague from Arkansas, is it, in 
fact, correct that the Department of Defense is resistant to this 
proposal?
  Mr. BUMPERS. Absolutely. The Defense Department says it is not 
needed, and the administration says it is not needed. As the Senator 
said, we have 53 percent of the arms market now, headed for 59. It is 
not as though we are not competitive.
  Mr. SARBANES. That is the worldwide market. If you isolate some of 
the areas, including some of the areas that are covered in this bill, 
the U.S. percentage rises substantially over that.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Exponentially.
  Mr. SARBANES. A lot of the places that it does not, a lot of the NATO 
producers make their own arms. You standardize their products and you 
direct that to meet their standardization purposely.
  Some of the countries provided for here are high-risk countries--a 
country in Central Europe that recently changed its form of national 
government. Financially, those are high-risk countries. Some of the 
Asian countries carry risks with them.
  I am not quite clear where this comes from. The administration does 
not want it. They are not proposing it. They are resistant to it. We 
dominate the arms market. I can understand the makers of arms want as 
many underwrites as they can possibly find. I think that is a given, 
and Members will recognize that. But whether it is wise to use money 
this way and to incur these kinds of risks by these guarantees, 
obviously there is a risk connected, and the provision recognizes that. 
To get up and assert somehow that this is a freebie, in every respect 
defies the basic rationale of the provision that is in the bill.
  So I urge my colleagues to support the Bumpers amendment. We ought 
not to start down this path. We have dealt with this issue before.
  Let me simply say this. The last time we had such a provision in the 
law, it was extended out to cover other countries as well. When it 
first comes before you, it gives you a short list. Then the next year 
that list gets added to. Then the year after that, it gets added to. 
And pretty soon they say, ``Well, we have to make this comprehensive 
now. We have covered so many countries that there is an insult 
connected with leaving a country out from this program.'' So then you 
make it comprehensive.
  That is exactly what will happen--I am prepared to predict that on 
the floor tonight--if this provision stays in the legislation. I hope 
my colleagues will support the Bumpers amendment.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] that would eliminate 
the defense export loan guarantee provision in this bill.
  I believe that the loan guarantee provision will help maintain and 
may help to create jobs as our Nation reduces defense spending here at 
home. By aiding the sale of ``made in the USA'' military items to our 
close allies, we can lessen the pain of defense downsizing for hundreds 
of thousands of defense and aerospace workers across the country.
  The entire Nation and, in particular, my home State of California, 
has been hard hit by defense downsizing, not to mention the recent base 
realignment and closure list. Hundreds of thousands of defense related 
jobs have been lost in California in the last 2 years, and this number 
is sadly expected to rise.
  Continued exports of defense goods is vital to maintaining 
California's industrial resources. We can help to ease the transition 
for defense and aerospace 

[[Page S 11302]]
workers by providing these loan guarantees, by establishing defense 
conversion programs, and through other initiatives. It is our duty to 
help in any way we can to provide good, high-quality jobs for the 
hundreds of thousands of dedicated workers who have contributed to U.S. 
national security.
  The defense export loan guarantee provision in this bill does not, in 
any way, eliminate the many existing safeguards that protect against 
risky proliferation. Loan guarantees would be limited to friendly 
countries specified in the bill--including our NATO allies, major non-
NATO allies, the democratic states of Eastern Europe, and the member 
nations of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APFC]. Further, 
congressional oversight of these foreign military sales would not be 
lessened. All foreign military sales would still have to be reviewed by 
Congress as required by the Arms Export Control Act.
  This defense export loan guarantee program offers an opportunity to 
assist our defense workers and improve our economy. I strongly believe 
that this provision is vital to our defense and aerospace industry and 
is essential to the preservation of hundreds of thousands of high-
quality, good paying jobs in California and throughout the Nation.
  I urge my colleagues to support this provision and oppose the Bumpers 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Idaho.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee for his courtesy.
  We continually hear references to a variety of countries. I just want 
to drive the point home. The list of the 37 countries that are eligible 
for these loan guarantees are allies and friends--allies and friends. 
You can keep reading all the countries all night long, but there are 
only 37 that are eligible, and also those 37 countries come under the 
entire export control and nonproliferation policy of the United States.
  This language simply grants the authority to the administration to 
allow the loan guarantees. It does not require the administration to do 
so. It is an authority to do so.
  So, Mr. President, again, I urge my colleagues to reject this 
amendment because the language is here that is going to finally 
accomplish what we have been setting out to do for a number of years.
  With that, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield the remaining 3 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  I must say that I do not understand the opposition to this program 
that the Senator from Idaho and I and the Senator from Colorado have 
sponsored. We have the model for this in the private sector. It is the 
Eximbank, and it works very well to put American companies on a level 
playing field and protect American jobs.
  Look, if somehow we were on the verge of achieving disarmament 
worldwide, I would say we should not be the only country out there 
selling weapons. The fact is, there is an active arms market worldwide. 
Why tie one hand behind our manufacturers when they go out to compete 
with other countries' manufacturers for contracts?
  The fact is that we have a lot on the line. We have some defense 
companies that could close up and make our country less secure in the 
future, undercut our industrial base. The fact is, we could lose 
thousands of jobs without this kind of support. So I do not apologize. 
I think this is just giving the Department of Defense an asset to 
protect defense companies and the people who work for them and put us 
on an even playing field with other manufacturers around the world.
  My friend from Idaho is absolutely right. Everything done here must 
be licensed under the Export Administration. There is no danger of 
proliferation in that sense. And I come back and say, Mexico was 
mentioned by the Senator from Arkansas, Chile was mentioned. They 
simply would not qualify. Of those 37 countries, the program mechanics 
are structured so that defaults are very, very unlikely.
  I think this bill is good for America's national security and good 
for those who work in America and will not at all increase the 
proliferation of weapons throughout the world.
  I thank the Chair. I hope my colleagues will vote against the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Since time has expired on both sides, I ask for the 
yeas and nays on this amendment.
  Mr. BUMPERS. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 1 minute.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I heard some ingenuous arguments, but the 
Senator from Connecticut saying we need to level the playing field when 
we already have 53 percent of the market headed for 60 percent is 
ingenuous. I do not know how much more you can level this field.
  But I would like to ask, on my time, the Senator from Idaho to tell 
me one country that we are going to finance under this provision that 
cannot buy weapons right now and to which you would want to provide 
loan guarantees.
 Name one.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. If the Senator will yield, Greece and Turkey are two 
countries.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Why can they not buy weapons now?
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. They need to finance it, and they are allies.
  Mr. BUMPERS. They cannot afford the weapons so we are going to sell 
them with loan guarantees under this new program?
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, both of those countries 
receive financing under the foreign military loan program, with all of 
the conditions and restraints of that program. Both of those countries 
receive financing under that currently.
  Mr. BUMPERS. And military financing. We have given both of those 
countries billions of dollars of weapons over the years under the 
foreign aid bill.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, to conclude, Greece and Turkey are 
allies, and I am proud to stand with the American workers that would 
provide necessary materials to our allies.
  Mr. BUMPERS. The whole reason this provision should be struck from 
the bill is because the only countries that need it are those whose 
credit is so bad that they cannot get weapons under the four existing 
programs for selling military equipment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  The question is on agreeing to the Bumpers amendment No. 2094.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote.
  The result was announced--yeas 41, nays 58, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 357 Leg.]

                                YEAS--41

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Domenici
     Exon
     Feingold
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Hollings
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pryor
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--58

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     
[[Page S 11303]]


                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Dorgan
       
  So the amendment (No. 2094) was rejected.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DOLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as we debate the fiscal year 1996 National 
Defense authorization bill, I want to join with my friend and 
colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from Idaho, in commending 
the Navy for its successful utilization of the Small Business 
Innovation Research Program in its development of the multipurpose 
processor. The multipurpose processor will be used to reduce risk and 
provide affordable technology for the new nuclear submarine, which will 
be developed within the next few years, as well as for the current U.S. 
submarine fleet.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I agree with my colleague, the 
distinguished senior Senator from Virginia. The American people demand 
that we continually look for the most cost effective solutions to our 
problems. That fact is particularly true with regard to Defense 
spending. The multipurpose processor is truly a cost effective and 
worthwhile program. It will provide our submarine fleet with a common 
open system processor which allows rapid insertion of advancing 
technologies while also protecting our previous investments in complex 
software. I therefore join with Senator Warner in commending the Navy 
for its initiative and leadership in this area.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Idaho, with whom I have the distinct pleasure of serving on both the 
Armed Services and the Small Business Committees. It is indeed 
noteworthy that the two of us are engaging in this colloquy because the 
multipurpose processor program combines the best interests of our 
Nation's defense with those of American small business. Many innovative 
products developed by small business have contributed significantly to 
the strength of our Armed Forces over the years and I trust, with 
continued congressional support for the Small Business Innovation 
Research Program, they will continue to do so well into the future.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I agree with my colleague on that 
point as well. The continued success of American small business is 
vitally important to the economic health of our Nation. The 
multipurpose processor program is an important example of how a small 
business, Digital System Resources, Inc., has made an important 
contribution to the Nation's defense. Appropriately, American small 
business should be given every opportunity to continue to make 
contributions to the national defense as well as to the other sectors 
of our economy.
                  medicare--eligible military retirees

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the Defense authorization bill now before 
the Senate contains the following provision:
  ``(1) * * * the Secretary of Defense should develop a program to 
ensure that covered beneficiaries who are eligible for Medicare * * * 
and who reside in a region in which the TRICARE program has been 
implemented have adequate access to health care services after the 
implementation of the TRICARE program in that region; and
  ``(2) to support strongly, as a means of ensuring such access, the 
reimbursement of the Department of Defense by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services for health care services provided such beneficiaries 
at the medical treatment facilities of the Department of Defense.''
  Our military retirees are entitled to the medical benefits which they 
have been promised. When the TRICARE system is fully implemented, 
Medicare-eligible military retirees can receive care in military 
hospitals only on a space available basis. Consequently, these retirees 
are being put at the back of the line and in some cases must change 
health care providers after years of care in military treatment 
facilities. I am very concerned about this.
  There must be an alternative to the current situation. Medicare funds 
should be transferred from the Department of Health and Human Services 
to the Department of Defense, so Medicare-eligible retirees will be 
able to use military health care facilities, with the costs covered by 
their Medicare benefits. I urge the approval of this legislation.
                civilian manpower and airlift operations

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to enter into a colloquy with the 
distinguished majority leader and the chairman of the committee.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, if my friend from Connecticut would yield. I 
am aware of the issue the Senator seeks to discuss and would be happy 
to enter into a colloquy on this matter.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague for his time. It is my understanding 
that the committee staff has reviewed the measure and has approved it. 
Specifically, this amendment seeks to restore funding to the Air Force 
Reserve operations and maintenance account for restoration of funds for 
civilian manpower and airlift operations support.
  The U.S. Air Force Reserve has historically provided service-wide 
critical airlift and logistics support to our national defense. A 
perfect example of this effort is the medical airlift capability for 
our forces. With over 70 percent of our national medical aircrew 
manpower coming from the active Air Force Reserves, reductions in 
operation and maintenance at this point seems unreasonable.
  Mr. DOLE. I have to agree with my colleague. I think Members would be 
interested to know that almost 45 percent of all heavy lift performed 
by the Air Force is provided by Air Force Reserves crewmembers. Another 
25 percent occupy tactical airlift cockpits. There is no question where 
our Nation turns in time or need for airlift support.
  Mr. DODD. I could not agree more. The Air Force Reserve is the very 
backbone of our national airlift and I ask my colleagues to join with 
me in this amendment to restore the necessary and requested funds to 
maintain this vital program.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for raising this 
important issue. I had previously directed the respective committee 
staff to review this matter and have included a funding adjustment in 
the manager's amendment. This adjustment would add $10 million to the 
Air Force Reserve account and reduce the Department of Defense wide 
activities by $10 million.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague and good friend from South Carolina.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I join my friend from Connecticut in 
thanking the distinguished Senator and chairman of the committee for 
his cooperation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, if I could have my colleagues' attention?
  If I can just suggest the absence after quorum for 1 minute, we are 
about to type out the consent agreement. If we can reach an agreement 
there will be no more votes this evening. If not, we will just have to 
work through it.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate to my colleagues that there 
will probably be additional votes tonight. There will be an amendment 
by Senator Cohen, 30 minutes equally divided--15 equally divided.
  Mr. FORD. On what?
  Mr. COHEN. This is on the ABM Treaty.
  Mr. NUNN. I did not hear the request.
  Mr. DOLE. Fifteen minutes equally divided on a Cohen amendment.
  Is there any objection to that?
  Mr. NUNN. I would suggest 30 minutes because most people on this side 
have not read the amendment.
  Mr. DOLE. Thirty minutes equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. No second-degree amendments. That would be followed by an 
amendment by the Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn. As I understand, 
there is not any time agreement on 

[[Page S 11304]]
that so we do not know when that vote will come. So that we will do 
those two tonight at least.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  This is the time agreement we wanted to obtain earlier. We could not 
do that. So I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow morning, after 
consultation with the managers--they can determine when to bring it 
up--Senator Thurmond be recognized to offer an amendment regarding 
title XXXI of the bill; that immediately after the reading of the 
amendment, Senator Exon be recognized to offer a second-degree 
amendment to the Thurmond amendment, and that there be 45 minutes of 
debate under the control of Senator Thurmond and 90 minutes of debate 
under the control of Senator Exon; further, that following the 
expiration or yielding of time, the Exon amendment be laid aside and 
Senator Reid be recognized to offer his amendment on tritium on which 
there be 60 minutes, to be divided 40 minutes under the control of 
Senator Reid and 20 minutes under the control of Senator Thurmond; and 
following that debate, the amendment be laid aside and Senator McCain 
be recognized to offer an amendment on competition, on which there be 
10 minutes for debate, to be equally divided in the usual form; to be 
followed by a vote on or in relation to the Exon amendment, to be 
followed by a vote on or in relation to the Reid amendment, to be 
followed by a vote on or in relation to the McCain amendment, to be 
followed by a vote on the Thurmond amendment, as amended, if amended.
  So we are talking about four amendments.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, everything is 
right except in the transcription, 45 should be 70 under the control of 
Senator Thurmond-- 90 and 70.
  Mr. DOLE. I said 90--
  Mr. BRYAN. Seventy, Mr. Leader, under the control of Senator 
Thurmond.
  Mr. DOLE. Did I short him? Good. I gave him 45 minutes.
  He wants 70.
  Mr. REID. We talked about that all night.
  Mr. DOLE. Make that 70 instead of 45.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Hopefully, when this happens tomorrow sometime, we will not 
take all this time, but we may. That would be 3 hours plus four votes. 
You are talking about a big, big time.
  I would also ask consent--to accommodate Senator Bumpers --that 
following the disposition of this agreement, whenever it occurs, the 
previous unanimous consent, Senator Bumpers offer his amendment on 
defense firewalls, 1 hour of debate to be equally divided in the usual 
form, no second-degree amendment be in order, and that following the 
conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate vote on or in relation 
to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Now, I might say to my colleagues, I know there are dozens 
of amendments out there. We are trying to accommodate those who have 
the shortest times. If we have 20 minutes equally divided or 30 
minutes, we will try to rotate back and forth. It seems to me, if we 
are going to finish the bill, if everybody gets 2 hours, 3 hours, 4 
hours, it is going to be 4 o'clock tomorrow afternoon before we take up 
2 or 3 amendments here, and we cannot be on this bill Saturday.
  I am not certain when we will get back on the bill. Senator Thurmond 
needs to leave tomorrow for an important family matter on Saturday. We 
will have votes on Saturday. We will be on at least one or two 
appropriations bills. If we should, by some miracle, finish this bill 
early tomorrow, we could go to Treasury-Postal tomorrow evening. If 
not, that will begin hopefully about 9 o'clock on Saturday morning. And 
there are two amendments there that may require some debate. Beyond 
that, it should not take very long, according to the managers.
  Following that, it would be our intention either to move to welfare 
or to the Work Opportunity Act, or the Interior Appropriations bill.
  So somebody asked me, what about Saturday. We have been saying for 
the last 2 weeks there will be votes on this Saturday and tomorrow. The 
day after tomorrow is Saturday, and there will be votes on Saturday, 
August 5.


                           Amendment No. 2089

  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk which 
originally was designated as being cosponsored by Senator Nunn. That 
was in error. Senator Nunn is not a cosponsor of the amendment that I 
sent to the desk, and so I would ask unanimous consent that his name be 
withdrawn as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have requested that the entire amendment 
not be read, but let me just point to the basic purpose behind the 
amendment and some of the pertinent language.
  Mr. President, we had extended debate during the course of the 
morning and afternoon dealing with the ABM Treaty. Senator Levin spent, 
I believe, roughly 6 or 7 hours debating this issue. And I think it has 
been resolved on a close vote but nonetheless resolved.
  I had intended and now do offer this amendment for the purpose of at 
least clarifying what my intent was in supporting the legislation as it 
was developed by the Armed Services Committee in the DOD authorization 
bill.
  Basically, I believe it should be our policy to develop a defensive 
capability against a limited or accidental launch of a nuclear weapon 
against the United States. I believe we have an absolute obligation to 
the American people to say that in the event that anyone were so mad as 
to launch an ICBM toward the United States or one should be launched 
accidentally, we ought to have some minimum capability of destroying 
that missile before it arrives on U.S. soil.
  I find it really quite astonishing to think that we would represent 
to the American people that a missile somehow has been fired, whether 
by accident or by miscalculation or madness, it is on its way to New 
York City, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, you name the city or town, and 
we have absolutely no way of stopping it. The best we can do is tell 
you that we will try to minimize the casualties; we will try to 
evacuate as quickly as possible after catastrophic damage has been 
done.
  I think that is unacceptable to the American people given the fact 
that we are now witnessing the proliferation of missile technology on a 
fairly pervasive basis. And so what this amendment does is to express 
the sense of Congress on this matter.

       Given the fundamental responsibility of the Government of 
     the United States to protect the security of the U.S., the 
     increasingly serious threat posed to the United States by the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic 
     missile technology, and the effect this threat could have in 
     constraining the options of the United States to act in time 
     of crisis, it is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) it is in the supreme interest of the United States to 
     defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
     attack, whatever its source;
       (2) the deployment of a multiple-site ground-based national 
     missile defense system to protect against limited ballistic 
     missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and 
     deterrence;
       (3) the policies, programs and requirements of subtitle C 
     of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes 
     specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which 
     anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to 
     the treaty.

  Mr. President, what I am saying in this amendment is that whatever we 
do, we can do it consistent with the treaty. I want to stay within the 
limits of the treaty. The treaty allows us to seek to negotiate 
changes.
  Originally we had a multiple-site ABM Treaty, two sites. We 
renegotiated it down to one site. With the changes of circumstances 
throughout the world, what we are asking is that we encourage the 
President to go to the Russians to seek to renegotiate the ABM Treaty 
for the purpose of allowing the Russians and the United States to have 
a effective capability against limited ballistic missile threats.
  And so in this amendment the President is urged ``to initiate 
negotiations with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty as 
necessary to provide for the national missile defense system as 
specified in section 235'' to protect us from a limited ballistic 
attack.
  And ``(5)''--and here is another key point--


[[Page S 11305]]

       If the negotiations fail, the President is urged to consult 
     with the Senate about the option of withdrawing the United 
     States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with provisions of 
     article XV of the treaty.

  Mr. President, basically what this amendment says is, there is a 
potential threat that we ought to be facing and that we should seek to 
negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty. That is contemplated by the 
treaty itself. So I am urging the President to seek to negotiate with 
the Russians, and in the event he is unsuccessful in those negotiations 
to gain amendments allowing the deployment by each party of a limited 
system, that he then come back to the Senate and consult with the 
Senate about whether we should stay in the ABM Treaty as it originally 
stands now or whether we ought to opt out as the treaty allows us to 
do.
  So this is a sense of the Senate that we ought to proceed with this 
system, that we ought to encourage the President and urge him to go and 
meet with the Russians and their negotiators to renegotiate the ABM 
Treaty to allow the deployment of a land-based system with multiple 
sites that would protect us against accidental launch or 
miscalculation, certainly not against an all-out attack by the 
Russians, but a limited type attack, so we can have the capability to 
defend ourselves.
  We urge the President to do this, seek this. In the event he is 
unsuccessful, we ask that he turn to the Senate and at least consult 
with us as to whether we should stay in the treaty or get out of the 
treaty.
  Mr. President, I believe that is a fair expression of the sentiment 
that was expressed during the debates within the Armed Services 
Committee. I believe it is a fair expression of the sentiment on this 
side of the aisle. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge all Members on both sides of the 
aisle to read this, of course, because some people may disagree with 
it, parts of it, particularly on my side of the aisle.
  I do not disagree with anything in the Cohen resolution. I think it 
is helpful in the sense that it points in the right direction for the 
President to negotiate changes rather than simply assert changes. And 
that is clear in paragraph 4. I think also that it is the correct 
procedure for the negotiations. If the negotiations fail with the 
Russians, the President is urged to consult with the Senate about the 
option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty under provision of article XV 
of the treaty.
  I agree with some of the findings. Some of the people on this side of 
the aisle may not agree with the findings. I do. This is very close to 
what we had in the Missile Defense Act that Senator Warner and I 
sponsored 2 or 3 years ago in the Missile Defense Act.
  What is the problem with it? There is no problem with it that would 
keep me from voting for it, but it does not correct any of the things 
that we pointed out as being what we considered --most of us on this 
side and a few on that side of the aisle--to be fatal flaws with the 
bill itself. What it does not do because it is a sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution, it does not change any of the operative provisions in the 
underlying bill. And the operative provisions have the force of law. So 
we have got sense-of-the-Senate legislation that cannot by its very 
nature change the force of law.
  So anyone who thinks there are problems in the underlying bill would 
not be comforted by this. This does not cure the problem. That is the 
reason I have not cosponsored it, not because I am not going to vote 
for it, not because it is not in the right direction, because it is. 
But it does not change the operative provisions of the bill which 
establish a number of legal restrictions on the President. This is, I 
believe, the first time I have seen provisions that restrict the 
President as to what he can negotiate. The underlying bill restricts 
the President of the United States in terms of his ability to 
negotiate.
  Now, I believe that will be challenged by many as unconstitutional. I 
do not try to make a judgment on it. But I imagine that those in the 
executive branch would assert it is unconstitutional on its face. 
Whether that is the case or not, in my view it is bad policy, because 
if the President of the United States cannot negotiate, who can? We do 
not have a negotiating team from the U.S. Senate that I know of. We 
have an arms control observer group, but we make it clear we never 
negotiate; we simply discuss. So if the President cannot negotiate 
these changes, even if they are changes that the majority wants, how do 
we get changes in the treaty?
  The Cohen amendment deals with one set of changes. And I think it 
appropriately says the President should negotiate the amendments to the 
ABM Treaty as necessary to provide for the national missile defense 
system specified in section 235. So the sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
does urge him to move in that direction.
  The restrictions on negotiations of the President, however, do not 
relate to that section; they relate to the section that we talked about 
at length earlier in the debate which gets to the demarcation point 
between theater ballistic missiles and strategic ballistic missiles. 
And the defense against strategic ballistic missiles is that restricted 
by the ABM Treaty. The provision on theater ballistic missiles is not. 
And that demarcation point is defined in the underlying bill as a 
matter of law, and the President in the underlying bill is told that he 
cannot negotiate on that point. He cannot do anything on that point. 
And, therefore, I do not see how the Russians would ever accept that.
  Now, maybe no one cares whether they accept it or not. But as I said 
earlier today, I do not think they have the option to go to defenses at 
this stage because of their economic condition. What they do have the 
option to do, and what they have said repeatedly they will do. So 
unless you believe they will not do what they said they are going to 
do, there is nothing in this amendment that changes the problem of the 
bill. And that is, it encourages, in fact it makes it clear to the 
Russians that we are going to move forward notwithstanding any concerns 
they may have on the ABM Treaty and that we will not comply with ABM 
Treaty in certain respects. And if they want to take action, then they 
will take action.
  What action will they take? In my opinion they will simply not ratify 
START II. They will not, in my view, continue to draw down their 
missile forces under START I.
  So, inadvertently, in the name of defending the United States and the 
people in the United States, the underlying bill, in my view, almost, 
not quite, because you cannot ever predict with certainty a foreign 
country's behavior, but it almost assures that the United States will 
end up with thousands of more missiles pointed at this country than we 
would otherwise have. I do not see how that improves our defense.
  We are basically saying we want to move forward in 10 years to defend 
against threats that may be here in 10 years, that are not here now. 
But the threat that is here now, that is, the SS-18's the SS-24's that 
are pointed at us now that we want to take down, and the two Republican 
presidents have negotiated successfully to get the Russians to take 
down, we do not worry about that threat. It is now being dismantled. We 
put provisions in here that are likely to require or at least to 
encourage the Russians to keep those missiles pointed at us. I do not 
see how I can go home and tell my people that I voted for an underlying 
provision in a bill that is likely to keep thousands of missiles that 
we have described as the foremost threat that is aimed at the United 
States that we spent 15 to 20 years trying to figure out how to either 
negate through a deterrence policy, through a policy of negotiations, 
one way or the other, either through defenses or negotiation that we 
finally had two Republican Presidents, President Reagan and President 
Bush, successfully concluded the negotiations--one of them is now being 
implemented, START I, the other is pending in the Russian Duma and in 
the Senate.
  So we are going to put a provision in here that says to the Russians, 
``We are going to go ahead anyway. And we are going to disregard the 
ABM Treaty. But you do what you choose.'' I think what they are going 
to choose to do is keep those missiles pointed at us. Now maybe 10 
years from now we will be able to defend against them. 2003 is the 
date. But understand, we are only talking about a thin defense, a thin 
defense against a few missiles and a Third 

[[Page S 11306]]
World country
 or an unauthorized launch or terrorist group that gets ahold of a 
ballistic missile or cruise missile. I want a defense against those. I 
am in favor of defense. I am in favor of amending the ABM Treaty, but I 
think we ought to do it through the procedure of international law and 
the procedure of American law, because a treaty is American law, and we 
are the ones who signed up for the ABM Treaty. It is our law now. It is 
the law of the land.

  A treaty is the law of the land. We are saying disregard it in the 
underlying bill. I do not understand the logic, Mr. President. I cannot 
understand the logic of taking a step in the name of defending the 
people of America that is likely to end up having thousands of warheads 
pointed toward us while we spend 10 years and billions of dollars to 
figure out how to defend against a threat that is not yet here. I do 
not understand that logic.
  Mr. President, I will vote for the Cohen amendment. It does not cure 
the underlying defects in the bill. I will have another amendment, in 
all likelihood. It depends on whether I have a chance to get it 
adopted. If I do not, then I will simply leave the bill as it is now 
and people can make their choice. But if I do have a chance to have it 
adopted, I will have an amendment that sets forth very clearly what our 
policy is. Succinctly what that would be is a policy, first of all, of 
coming forth with a defensive system in this country that protects 
against unauthorized launches, that protects against accidental 
launches, that protects against a third country defense, but that does 
so in compliance with the ABM Treaty.
  Second, we ask the President to try to amend the ABM Treaty with 
amendments that would allow us to deploy that kind of system.
  Third, if he fails to be able to amend it with the Russians--that is, 
if the Russians refuse--that we then consider our option of terminating 
our ABM obligations in accordance with article XV of the treaty itself, 
which says we can give 6 months' notice and terminate those 
obligations.
  Mr. President, to me, that is a sensible policy. In the meantime, we 
should not tie the hands of the President of the United States to 
negotiate. We ought to insist that anything that has the nature of a 
treaty come before us for approval. We should not let treaties be 
amended by the executive branch, but we should not prevent the 
President from negotiating. We should not prevent him from negotiating 
a demarcation point.
  I happen to agree with the demarcation point in the bill. I think it 
is perfectly reasonable. I do not mind putting it as a matter of 
findings. I do not mind saying this is the policy of the demarcation 
point. But I do not want the President to be prevented from saying to 
the Russians, ``This is what the Congress thinks and I would like for 
you to sign up to this.'' We preclude him from even doing that. He 
cannot negotiate anything.
  I do not believe that provision will stand, because I do not think it 
will become law. But if it does become law, I think it probably will be 
challenged on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, that is where we 
are.
  I urge my colleagues to agree with the findings in the Cohen 
amendment, to vote for it, because I think the provisions make sense. I 
think they are a step in the right direction, but it does not cure what 
I consider to be fatal flaws of the underlying provisions.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Cohen has 12 minutes; Senator Thurmond 
4 minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes and 40 seconds.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in addition to the fact this amendment 
highlights the flaws in the underlying legislation because of what it 
does not address, it still leaves the President's hands tied. He cannot 
negotiate. It still commits us to deploy a system which is in violation 
of the ABM Treaty. That all remains. But in addition to actually 
highlighting the flaws of the underlying bill and not curing it, this 
resolution raises two questions, in my mind.
  First, it says that the President is urged to initiate negotiations 
with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty. The underlying 
bill also has sense-of-the-Senate language which is exactly the 
opposite, which says the President should cease all efforts to modify 
U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
  The Cohen language says initiate it, presumably as soon as you can. 
In section 4, the President is urged to initiate negotiations to amend 
the treaty. The bill, which is left untouched, has sense-of-the-Senate 
language which says cease all efforts until the Senate has completed 
its review process. It is just totally inconsistent with the underlying 
language. That is No. 1. But No. 2 is a question to my good friend from 
Maine.
  When the resolution says that it is in the supreme interest of the 
United States to defend itself from the threat, if one votes for this 
resolution, does one thereby commit himself or herself to withdrawing 
from the ABM Treaty under the supreme interest provision in the ABM 
Treaty? In other words, would this vote be looked back at as a 
statement on the part of people voting for your resolution that, in 
fact, we should withdraw from the ABM Treaty because of a supreme 
national interest?
  Mr. COHEN. The answer to my friend is no. What the language of my 
amendment says is the President should, in fact, initiate negotiations. 
I believe we should seek to negotiate a provision to the ABM Treaty to 
allow for the construction and deployment of a multisite limited 
system. And you will see the second part of that is, if the President 
is unsuccessful, he is to return and consult with the Senate to see 
whether we should stay in the treaty or get out of the treaty under 
article XV.
  Mr. LEVIN. The language urging the President to negotiate in one part 
in your resolution, and the underlying bill says cease and desist all 
negotiations as to modify the treaty, do you view those as 
inconsistent?
  Mr. COHEN. I believe there is an appearance of an inconsistency that 
came about as a result of an attempt by the majority to prevent the 
President negotiating to apply the ABM Treaty to the theater missile 
defense system. That is where that confusion came about.
  I believe it is in our interest to urge negotiation on the part of 
the President to seek to revise the ABM Treaty in order to allow for 
deployment of a multiple site system here in this country and in 
Russia.
  I might point out that I disagree with the statement of my friend 
from Georgia----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Levin's time has expired.
  Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 1 minute. That with respect to section 238, 
I do not believe you can point to that language as preventing the 
President from negotiating. It simply says that the appropriated funds 
may not be obligated or expended by any official of the Federal 
Government for the purpose of prescribing, enforcing, or implementing. 
It does not prevent him from negotiating, but he could not implement 
any changes that would apply the ABM Treaty to theater missile 
defenses. The difference, he could not negotiate, he could not 
implement under the language of section 238.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield, because there is a 
subsection (B) that says take any other action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COHEN. At the direction of the majority leader, I yield back my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I think after this vote, I talked to the 
managers and what they would like to do, and I say this to all my 
colleagues, is to stay here. There are probably 25, 35 amendments that 
can be accepted, some on each side of the aisle. They are willing to 
stay here, and that will take a big amount of the amendments that are 
pending.
  We now changed our list and, hopefully, before we go out tonight or 
tomorrow morning, we will have an agreement these will be the only 
amendments in order. That will at least give us a finite list. It is 
pretty long. We have 190-some amendments and everybody wants 2 hours. 
So I do not think we can make that by tomorrow night, the way I look at 
it. But you have to be optimistic around here. I 

[[Page S 11307]]
know Senator Thurmond is, he is going to finish it by 6 tomorrow night, 
or earlier, more or less.
  This will be the last vote tonight, but I say to my colleagues on 
both sides, the managers are here, the staffs are here. A lot of the 
amendments have great merit and are going to be accepted. This is an 
opportunity to have your amendment accepted. Then the managers will 
determine what time we start tomorrow morning and whether we start on 
the agreement we have or some other amendment. That will be up to the 
managers.
  I thank my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Cohen has 8 minutes, and Senator Nunn 
has 1 minute.
  Mr. COHEN. I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen].
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] 
and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith] are necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], 
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], and the Senator from Louisiana 
[Mr. Johnston] are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 69, nays 26, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 358 Leg.]

                                YEAS--69

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--26

     Akaka
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Daschle
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Glenn
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Dodd
     Helms
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Smith
  So the amendment (No. 2089) was agreed to.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time the manager of the bill, the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator 
Thurmond, together with the ranking member, were anxious to accept a 
number of amendments which have been cleared on both sides. I 
anticipate we will undertake to do that in just a matter of a minute or 
two.
  Mr. President, if I could draw the attention of my distinguished 
colleague to an amendment by the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Chafee] 
which I believe has been cleared on both sides.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Virginia is correct. That amendment has 
been cleared. If you will give us just one minute, we want to make sure 
we have the right amendment.


                           Amendment No. 2095

    (Purpose: To improve the section establishing uniform national 
discharge standards for the control of water pollution from vessels of 
                           the Armed Forces)
  Mr. WARNER. On behalf of the Senator from South Carolina, Mr. 
Thurmond, I send to the desk an amendment which is submitted by the 
Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Chafee].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Chafee, for 
     himself, and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 2095.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the clerk note that I am acting on 
behalf of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond, 
and all amendments will be sent to the desk in Mr. Thurmond's name.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, this bill includes an amendment to the 
Clean Water Act based on a 5-year effort by the Navy to develop 
environmental standards that would apply to the non-sewage discharges 
from its ships. The Navy has a goal of building and operating 
environmentally sound ships and this amendment to the Clean Water Act 
will help them reach that goal.
  The Clean Water Act amendment in his bill was developed by the Navy 
and sent to the Senate by the administration in early June. In addition 
to consideration by the Armed Services Committee, this proposal was 
also reviewed by the Committee on Environment and Public Works which 
has jurisdiction over the Clean Water Act. As chairman of that 
committee, I sought comment on this administration proposal from 
members of the committee, the coastal States, the Coast Guard, EPA and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and from other 
organizations with an interest in coastal pollution problems.
  There was general support for this approach. It is seen as a net 
environmental improvement, because it provides for treatment of 
discharges from vessels that are not controlled today.
  Some concerns were expressed by the States. They wanted to be 
consulted before the rules are issued. They wanted to be sure that 
treatment systems used to control these discharges are the most 
effective, consistent with the mission of the Navy. And they wanted 
assurance that current environmental requirements like section 311 
dealing with oil spills would not be overridden.
  The Environment and Public Works Committee developed a set of 
amendments to the administration proposal to address those concerns. 
The committee then reported an original bill, S. 1033, on July 13. The 
amendment that Senator Warner and I are offering to the DOD 
authorization bill today is the text of the bill reported by the 
Environment and Public Works Committee. The committee also filed a 
report on S. 1033 which explains the provisions of our amendment and is 
to be looked to for legislative history on this amendment.
  We have agreed to move this amendment to the Clean Water Act on the 
DOD authorization bill to facilitate the Navy's efforts to develop 
environmentally sound ships. The Navy has taken the lead in this area 
and they should be rewarded for their initiative with speedy enactment 
of this proposal.
  With that said, let me address the substance of this amendment for a 
moment.
  Even though vessels are considered point sources of pollution under 
the Clean Water Act, EPA regulations have exempted many discharges from 
the permit requirements of the act. Currently, sewage discharges are 
regulated under section 312 of the Clean Water Act. It requires that 
each vessel be equipped with a marine sanitation device to treat sewage 
before it is discharged.
  But many of the other wastewaters like graywater from showers and 
sinks, bilge water from the hold of the ship, wastewater from the 
boiler or water from cleaning the deck or equipment are not regulated 
under the Clean Water Act. Some coastal States have taken an interest 
in these discharges, but there is no comprehensive Federal program.
  The amendment we are offering requires the Secretary of Defense and 
the Administrator of EPA to act jointly to 

[[Page S 11308]]
identify the non-sewage discharges from ships that need attention.
  For each discharge that has a significant adverse impact, EPA and DOD 
would identify an appropriation pollution control technology or 
management practice to reduce the pollution.
  These standards would only apply to ships of the Armed Forces and the 
Coast Guard.
  Once the Federal regulations are in place, the States would be 
preempted. A State could not impose its own, inconsistent, regulations. 
But if a State identified a particularly sensitive coastal or marine 
area, it could establish a so-called ``no-discharge zone'' where all 
discharges of a particular type would be banned.
  Mr. President, the Navy is to be congratulated for this effort. It 
will improve water quality in our estuaries and ocean waters. I am 
pleased that the Senate has moved this legislation quickly to assist 
the Navy in its efforts.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on this side 
of the aisle. I urge its adoption.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it is appropriate now to call for 
the vote.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2095) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the motion to table is 
agreed to.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2096

 (Purpose: To make funds available for the Troops to Teachers program 
                    and the Troops to Cops program)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I inquire of my friend from Virginia. We 
have two amendments I would like to present. I believe they have been 
cleared, but I want to check with my friend before I send them to the 
desk, by Senator Pryor and Senator Feinstein.
  The two amendments coupled together are the ``Troops to Teachers'' 
and the ``Troops to Cops'' program. The amendments provide $42 million 
for the ``Troops to Teachers'' program, offset from excess military 
personnel funds, and provides $10 million for the ``Troops to Cops'' 
program, offset from the same source. Mr. President, ``Troops to 
Teachers'' was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1993 as part of the Transition Assistance Program, designed 
to help service members affected by downsizing.
  Troops to Cops was added to the National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal year 1994. Individuals can receive a $5,000 stipend to 
assist in obtaining the necessary training and certification.
  In addition, if a service member is part of an early 15-year 
retirement, the individual will receive time or credit for up to 5 
years if he or she completes 5 years of teaching or law enforcement 
assignment.
  That was an amendment that I proposed that became law, and I think it 
is working very well.
  The school systems or law enforcement agencies that hire a 
participant receives funds to assist in paying the salary ranging from 
up to $25,000 for an individual's first year down to $2,500 for an 
individual's fifth year.
  There is a win-win program benefiting separating service members, 
helping them get employment, and helping our Nation. Frankly, we will 
never have this reservoir of talented people coming out into the job 
market from the military in this number of people in any period in the 
future that I can envision at this point because this is part of the 
drawdown in our military. We have literally tens of thousands of people 
in the military that are extremely well qualified in math and science 
and languages, and encouraging them and facilitating them going into 
teaching and going into law enforcement at the local level and helping 
the States and local governments, to me, is not only helping the State 
and local government but helping the military and strengthening our 
Nation.
  So these amendments provide for prudent steps.
  Troops to Teachers receives $65 million in fiscal year 1995. This 
amendment calls for $42 million, which is a reduced program. The 
drawdown is being reduced.
  These will not be permanent programs. After you get through the 
drawdown and you level off the military personnel, then you would not, 
in all likelihood, have these programs.
  The Troops to Cops program receives $15 million in fiscal year 1995. 
This amendment calls for $10 million, which is a substantial reduction.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Pryor for 
     himself, and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2096.
       On page 137, after line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 389. FUNDING FOR TROOPS TO TEACHERS PROGRAM AND TROOPS 
                   TO COPS PROGRAM.

       (a) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated 
     under section 431--
       (1) $42,000,000 shall be available for the Troops-to-
     Teachers program; and
       (2) $10,000,000 shall be available for the Troop-to-Cops 
     program.
       (b) Definition.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``Troops-to-Cops program'' means the program 
     of assistance to separated members and former members of the 
     Armed Forces to obtain employment with law enforcement 
     agencies established, or carried out, under section 1152 of 
     title 10, United States Code.
       (2) The term ``Troops-to-Teachers program'' means the 
     program of assistance to separated members of the Armed 
     Forces to obtain certification and employment as teachers or 
     employment as teachers' aides established under section 1151 
     of such title.


                           troops to teachers

  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to 
continue funding for the Troops to Teachers Program in the Department 
of Defense.
  Troops to Teachers is a Department of Defense Transition Program 
designed to assist separated military service members and other former 
DOD employees to become certified and obtain employment as teachers or 
teacher's aides. Congress established this program in 1992, and it has 
always enjoyed strong bipartisan support.
  Troops to Teachers provides up to $5,000 stipends to selected 
participants to help them become certified to teach, and grants of up 
to $50,000, paid over 5 years, to local education agencies for each 
former military service member they agree to hire.
  Troops to Teachers is helping former service members find productive, 
meaningful employment after leaving the military. By tapping the skills 
and experience these individuals possess, Troops to Teachers is 
improving the quality of our public school education nationwide. And by 
placing special emphasis on schools with a high concentration of 
students from low income families, this program provides teachers in 
areas where educators are in short supply.
  In the Department of Defense, the response to this program has been 
outstanding. Over 500 Troops to Teachers have recently been hired by 
school districts in 39 States. In addition, over 1,000 individuals 
scattered across 46 States are using this program to become certified 
to teach. Most importantly, there are over 9,000 applicants currently 
preparing to enter this program.
  These 9,000 former DOD personnel awaiting acceptance to this program 
are counting on these funds to begin a new life after the military. 
They are counting on our support.
  I mentioned earlier that Troops to Teachers has always enjoyed strong 
bipartisan support. In 1992, I was asked by former Senate majority 
leader George Mitchell to chair a task force on defense transition. The 
centerpiece of our task force report was a recommendation for Congress 
to help former military personnel get training, certification, and job 
placement required for employment in critical public service jobs, such 
as education, law enforcement, and medical services. The legislation 
that resulted from this recommendation created the Troops to Teachers 
and Troops to Cops Programs.
  That same year, a Republican task force convened and made an 
identical recommendation supporting the creation of Troops to Teachers. 
The 1992 report of the Senate Republican task force on adjusting the 
defense base stated,


[[Page S 11309]]

       The Task Force recommends that Congress adopt legislation 
     to
      encourage states to adopt alternative teacher certification 
     programs for separated and retiring servicemen. Not only 
     will this enable some former military personnel to put 
     their talents to productive use in public service, it will 
     help address the teacher shortage found in some 
     particularly urban, areas.

  This report goes on to say, ``The Task Force supports an expansion of 
the DOD program to pay for coursework of departing servicemen which 
meets reasonable state certification requirements.'' Finally, the 
Republican task force report concludes, ``The  cost  of  programs  
directly responding  to  problems  resulting from 
the declining defense budget . . . should be paid for out of the 
defense budget.''
  Mr. President, the Troops to Teachers program was designed by 
Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, in response to the needs of 
separating military personnel. But the primary responsibility of Troops 
to Teachers is taking care of the men and women who are leaving the 
military after years of dedicated service to our country. These 
individuals should not be penalized because they desire to work in a 
classroom instead of in a shipyard building submarines.
  Perhaps the best reason for continuing funding for this program is 
that it is a tremendous success. Just listen to what a few of its 
participants have said about their experiences.
  Take Ed Coet for example. Ed is 45 years old. He recently retired 
from the Army after last serving as a military intelligence officer in 
the gulf war. Now Ed teaches a class of 10 emotionally disturbed 
fourth-grade boys at Brookhaven Intermediate School in Killeen, TX. Ed 
recently said, ``My work as a teacher is every bit as challenging and 
important as anything I did in the Army. In the past, it was what I was 
doing for my country. Now all my kids are an extension of me. If they 
succeed, I succeed.''
  And then there is Arthur Moore, a retired Army staff sergeant from 
Baltimore, MD. Arthur is currently teaching fifth grade at Samuel 
Coleridge-Taylor Elementary School. About his experience Arthur said, 
``Every day I have to prove to them I really care, not just about 
teaching but about them.''
  And listen to what the school districts across America are saying 
about Troops to Teachers.
  The Jackson County Public School System in North Carolina said, ``Our 
teachers have exceeded all expectations. We are very pleased.''
  Beaufort County School District in South Carolina says, ``An 
outstanding program--all of our participants are excellent.''
  Isaac School District No. 5 in Arizona says, ``we are very fortunate 
to have an experienced, dedicated Troops to Teachers participant who 
bilingual.
  The military training and experience have assisted this individual in 
making the transition to teaching.''
  Mr. President, that is exactly what this program is all about--
helping military personnel make the transition into a productive life 
in public service. These individuals are the centerpiece of the 
program.
  Eliminating funding for Troops to Teachers would mean turning our 
backs on the military service members who served their country on the 
battlefield, and who now want to continue their service in the 
classroom. This program truly deserves our full support.
                             troops to cops

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas which provides $10 
million for the Troops-to-Cops Program and $42 million for the Troops-
to-Teachers Program. I am happy to be an original cosponsor of this 
important amendment.
  Senator Pryor has discussed the Troops-to-Teachers Program, and I 
would like to focus on the Troops-to-Cops Program.
  The program--administered by the Justice Department in coordination 
with the Department of Defense--provides $5,000 per officer for 
training to local police and sheriffs departments to hire former 
military personnel as law enforcement officers. This funding can be 
used to support the following: tuition at a police training academy; 
costs of local ``compliance'' training if the veteran attended an out-
of-state police academy; the costs of specialized training in community 
policing.
  Local law enforcement agencies can use Troops to Cops funds to pay 
for training of eligible recently separated military personnel.
  Troops to Cops was initially authorized in the 1994 DOD authorization 
bill. Last year, the Appropriations Committee provided $15 million for 
this program. The fiscal year 1995 funding will provide training 
assistance for 3,000 former military personnel who elect to become law 
enforcement officers. I am proposing to provide $10 million more in 
fiscal year 1996 to provide training for 2,000 more.
  For an investment of $25 million over 2 years, Congress has an 
opportunity to help provide good jobs for our former military personnel 
and make our streets safer. In my view, few Government programs offer 
such a win-win scenario as this program does. Troops to Cops fills two 
important needs: It helps our communities recruit quality law 
enforcement officers; At the same time it utilizes the tremendous 
wealth of skilled military personnel who are transitioning to new jobs 
as a result of defense downsizing.
  Troops to Cops is a transitional benefit for troops affected by 
downsizing. In fiscal year 1994 alone, 291,000 troops were separated 
from the armed forces.
  The Department of Justice is in the process of administering this 
program as a part of the overall COPS Program. Applications for the 
funds are due on August 15, 1995, and the COPS office anticipates 
making its awards by the end of September. The delay in implementation 
of this program is due to the emphasis on actually getting the crime 
bill's funding for officers to the police and sheriff's departments. 
Troops to Cops is follow-on funding to help make the program work.
  The Department of Justice is expecting applications for htis program 
to far exceed the ability they have to provide funding. And, the 
Department of Defense expects the demand among military personnel to 
far exceed the funding that is currently available for Troops to Cops.
  According to the Defense Department's Office of Transition Support 
and Services, one of the most asked about post-military careers at DOD 
job fairs is law enforcement. Many veterans want to work in law 
enforcment, and police and sheriffs departments are often eager to hire 
them.
  The $52 million authorized by this amendment en toto is fully offset. 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, section 431 of the bill 
contains $52 million more than is needed to implement the military 
personnel programs of the Department of Defense. So, this amendment 
does not increase spending over the original Armed Services Committee 
proposal.
  The Troops-to-Cops Program is supported by a variety of cities, 
police departments and veterans organizations, including: National 
Sheriffs' Association; city of Long Beach, CA; Los Angeles County 
Professional Peace Officers Association; city of Virginia Beach, VA; 
city of Los Angeles; city and county of Denver, CO; city of Miami, FL; 
Non-Commissioned Officers Association of the U.S.; Los Angeles Police 
Protective League; and The American Legion.
  Troops to Cops is a win-win program for defense conversion and law 
enforcement. We can give something back to our military personnel who 
served their country, as well as to our communities across the country 
to make their streets safer.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment which would authorized 
$10 million to continue the work of the Troops-to-Cops program.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of this amendment to 
support authorizing the Troops-to-Teachers Program. This program is a 
vital transition benefit for service members leaving the military 
because of downsizing. In 1993, the Congress authorized this innovative 
program which benefits both departing service members and school 
systems across our country which are having difficulty attracting 
quality teachers.
  Troops-to-Teachers has two parts. First, it provides financial 
assistance to service members to help them get the certification 
necessary to work as a teacher or teacher's aide. Second, it provides 
funds over a 5-year time frame to school systems that hire program 
graduates to defray the individual's 

[[Page S 11310]]
salary costs in decreasing increments. This allows the school system 
the time to find the means of paying for that teacher's salary.
  The statistics back up the value of the Troops-to-Teachers Program. 
Over 8,000 individuals have applied to the program; Over 800 
individuals are currently undergoing certification training in 45 
states; Over 300 individuals have been hired so far in 35 States; 150 
school districts nationwide are employing participants in this program.
  Clearly this program is a winner for all involved, both the men and 
women who have served their country and our children who are going to 
benefit from not just their teaching abilities, but their service as 
role models. I strongly support efforts to make sure that this program 
continues.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are prepared to accept the amendment. 
It is acceptable.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, Senator Pryor is the prime author of the ``Troops to 
Teachers'' amendment, and Senator Feinstein is the prime author of the 
``Troops to Cops'' part of this amendment.
  They have both worked diligently in this entire area, and in the 
transition of our military personnel, which has been a very large 
success.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Arkansas.
  The amendment (No. 2096) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2097

(Purpose: To ensure the preservation of the ammunition industrial base 
                         of the United States)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority 
leader, the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Dole, I offer an amendment which 
pertains to ammunition procurement and management. I send the amendment 
to the desk and ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia (Mr. Warner), for Mr. Dole, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2097.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 314, between lines 11 and 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 823. PRESERVATION OF AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE.

       (A) Review of Ammunition Procurement and Management 
     Programs.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     commence a review of the ammunition procurement and 
     management programs of the Department of Defense, including 
     the planning for, budgeting for, administration, and carrying 
     out of such programs.
       (2) The review under paragraph (1) shall include an 
     assessment of the following matters:
       (A) The practicability and desirability of using 
     centralized procurement practices to procure all ammunition 
     required by the Armed Forces.
       (B) The capability of the ammunition production facilities 
     of the United States to meet the ammunition requirements of 
     the Armed Forces.
       (C) The practicability and desirability of privatizing such 
     ammunition production facilities.
       (D) The practicability and desirability of using integrated 
     budget planning among the Armed Forces for the procurement of 
     ammunition.
       (E) The practicability and desirability of establishing an 
     advocate within the Department of Defense for ammunition 
     industrial base matters who shall be responsible for--
       (i) establishing the quantity and price of ammunition 
     procured by the Armed Forces; and
       (ii) establishing and implementing policy to ensure the 
     continuing viability of the ammunition industrial base in the 
     United States.
                       munitions industrial base

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the amendment I propose today requires the 
Secretary of Defense to initiate a review of the ammunition procurement 
and management programs of the Department of Defense.
  The munitions industrial base has undergone dramatic reductions in 
the years following the Vietnam war. Built principally during World War 
II, the base consisted of a large number of expansive, government-owned 
manufacturing plants combined with hundreds of private sector major 
component and end-item manufacturing plants, and thousands of second 
and third tier subcontractor facilities, all designed to produce large 
volumes of munitions to fight another worldwide conflict. The end of 
the cold war triggered a comprehensive reassessment and restructuring 
of the national security strategy. Concurrently, the ammunition 
requirements of the Armed Forces were precipitously reduced and the 
production of ammunition declined to the lowest level since before the 
Vietnam war. This reduced business for the industrial base has 
decimated what was once a versatile, robust, and energetic industry. Of 
the 286 major munitions companies which existed in 1978 only 52 are 
projected to be in business by the end of 1995, an 82 percent 
reduction. At the same time the Government production base has shrunk 
by over 40 percent from 32 to 19 facilities. Only 9 of those remaining 
19 plants are being actively workloaded with production.
  In light of these enormous changes, it is appropriate to review how 
the Department of Defense plans, budgets, conducts, and manages 
ammunition procurement and production. My amendment directs the 
Secretary to initiate such a review, aimed at restructuring the entire 
munitions infrastructure with three objectives in mind: Elimination of 
management/review layering in the planning, budgeting, and execution of 
ammunition programs; fixing the accountability for decisions; and 
reduction or elimination of Government ownership of production 
equipment and facilities, while preserving a robust and responsive 
ammunition production industrial base.
  Summed up, the overall objective of the study is to recommend those 
changes which will reduce the cost to the U.S. Government of providing 
munitions to our Armed Forces both in peace and during war while making 
the industrial base more responsive to our war fighters' needs.
  Mr. WARNER. I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other 
side.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on this 
side. I urge the Senate to approve the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Kansas.
  The amendment (No. 2097) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2098

 (Purpose: To modify the authority to transfer funds regarding foreign 
     currency fluctuations so that the authority does not apply to 
        appropriations for fiscal years before fiscal year 1996)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished Senator 
from South Carolina, Mr. Thurmond, I offer an amendment to modify 
section 1006, which is transfer authority regarding funds available for 
foreign currency fluctuations and eliminate the direct spending costs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia (Mr. Warner), for Mr. Thurmond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2098.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 328, line 19, strike out ``1994'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``1995''.
       On page 329, line 18, strike out ``1993'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``1995''.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, this amendment modifies section 1106, 
transfer authority regarding funds available for foreign currency 
fluctuations to eliminate the direct spending costs. When the committee 
adopted this provision during our markup, we 

[[Page S 11311]]
did so based on a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office 
which made this provision affordable. Later, after the bill was 
approved by the committee, CBO revised the cost estimate upward. The 
revised estimate is that this provision will cost $30 million in direct 
spending in fiscal year 1996.
  The amendment modifies the provision to make the authority effective 
in fiscal year 1996, eliminating the ability to use prior year funds.
  I understand this amendment is agreed to on both sides.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask my friend from Virginia if he would go 
to the next amendment and set this one aside very briefly.
  We need to do a little more checking on this amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand that the minority is willing 
to return to the Thurmond amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared, and I urge 
its adoption.
  Mr. WARNER. I urge the Chair to ask the question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
2098.
  The amendment (No. 2098) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2099

(Purpose: To provide a substitute for section 543, relating to military 
 intelligence personnel prevented by secrecy from being considered for 
                         decorations and award)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment by Senator Akaka. I send 
the amendment to the desk and ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Akaka, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2099.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Beginning on page 204, strike out line 8 and all that 
     follows through page 206, line 4, and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:

     SEC. 543. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL PREVENTED BY 
                   SECRECY FROM BEING CONSIDERED FOR DECORATIONS 
                   AND AWARDS.

       (a) Waiver on Restrictions of Awards.--(1) Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, the President, the Secretary of 
     Defense, or the Secretary of the military department 
     concerned may award a decoration to any person for an act, 
     achievement, or service that the person performed in carrying 
     out military intelligence duties during the period January 1, 
     1940, through December 31, 1990.
       (2) Paragraph (1) applies to any decoration (including any 
     device in lieu of a decoration) that, during or after the 
     period described in paragraph (1) and before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, was authorized by law or under the 
     regulations of the Department of Defense or the military 
     department concerned to be awarded to a person for an act, 
     achievement, or service performed by that person while 
     serving on active duty.
       (b) Review of Award Recommendations.--(1) The Secretary of 
     each military department shall review all recommendations for 
     awards of decorations for acts, achievements, or service 
     described in subsection (a)(1) that have been received by the 
     Secretary during the period of the review.
       (2) The Secretary shall begin the review within 30 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall 
     complete the review within one year after such date.
       (3) The Secretary may use the same process for carrying out 
     the review as the Secretary uses for reviewing other 
     recommendations for awarding decorations to members of the 
     armed force or armed forces under the Secretary's 
     jurisdiction for acts, achievements, or service.
       (4) The Secretary may reject a recommendation if the 
     Secretary determines that there is a justifiable basis for 
     concluding that the recommendation is specious.
       (5) The Secretary shall take reasonable actions to 
     publicize widely the opportunity to recommend awards of 
     decorations under this section.
       (6)(A) Upon completing the review, the Secretary shall 
     submit a report on the review to the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security 
     of the House of Representatives.
       (B) The report shall contain the following information on 
     each recommendation for an award reviewed:
       (i) A summary of the recommendation.
       (ii) The findings resulting from the review.
       (iii) The final action taken on the recommendation.
       (iv) Administrative or legislative recommendations to 
     improve award procedures with respect to military 
     intelligence personnel.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``active duty'' 
     has the meaning given such term in section 101(d)(1) of title 
     10, United States Code.
                 military intelligence personnel awards

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment that would 
improve section 543 of the pending measure, which concerns awards and 
decorations for military intelligence personnel.
  As my colleagues are aware, recommendations for the Medal of Honor, 
Distinguished Service Cross, and other awards must be submitted and 
acted upon within a certain time frame. For example, for the Army and 
Air Force, the Medal of Honor must be recommended within 2 years of an 
act, and awarded within 3; for the Navy, the applicable dates are 3 
years and 5 years, respectively. These limits were imposed by Congress 
to ensure that an award, and particularly the Medal of Honor, would be 
based on the most contemporaneous, and thus accurate, documentation.
  While these time limits may be appropriate in the vast majority of 
cases, they are not always appropriate in the case of military 
intelligence personnel who, because of the secrecy of their missions, 
could not be considered for the Medal of Honor or other awards within 
the 3 or 5 year statutory period. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center, 
which administers the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame, cites a 
number of individuals who are members of the Hall who are in precisely 
this situation.
  One example is the legendary COL Car Eifler, who performed 
extraordinary service during World War II, notably as the leader of the 
famous Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services in Burma. 
Under his command, the secret commando unit operated behind enemy 
lines, harassing Japanese troops and organizing and training Burmese 
natives in espionage and sabotage.
  During the course of the war, Detachment 101 cleared the enemy from a 
10,000 square mile area, sabotaged the Japanese railway system, and 
gathered important intelligence about enemy activities and 
capabilities. COL Eifler displayed extraordinary personal courage on 
numerous occasions, including one instance in which he commanded a 
small, unarmed vessel through 450 miles of Japanese controlled waters 
to rescue 10 crewmembers of a downed B-24 bomber in the Bay of Bengal.
  While COL Eifler received several citations, the covert conditions 
under which he operated prevented his being nominated for the 
Congressional Medal of Honor or the Distinguished Service Cross, either 
of which he clearly merits.
  Another example is LTC Richard Sakakida, who served as an Army 
undercover agent in the Philippines during the Second World War. LTC 
Sakakida was captured by the Japanese shortly after the fall of 
Corregidor and subjected to excruciating torture; incredibly, he 
steadfastly refused to divulge his mission as an American intelligence 
agent. Later, after gaining the confidence of his captors, he 
established a spy network within Japanese Army headquarters and was 
able to send important combat intelligence to the Allies through 
Filipino guerrillas whom he had recruited as couriers. Some of this 
information may have led to the destruction of a major Japanese naval 
task force preparing to invade Australia.
  During this period, he also engineered the escape of hundreds of 
Filipino guerrillas from prison, yet he himself remained behind in 
order to continue his intelligence activities. Today, because his 
mission was undertaken in complete secrecy,
 and because his direct superiors died or were killed during the war, 
he was never considered for an award for valor. Yet, now that his full 
story has become known, he is ineligible for awards such as the Medal 
of Honor or DSC because of the statutory deadlines that apply to such 
awards.

  Mr. President, these are but two examples of military intelligence 
operatives whose courageous deeds have never been fully acknowledged. 
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center has 

[[Page S 11312]]
identified other deserving individuals who were overlooked because of 
secrecy. Undoubtedly there are others, less well known, who have never 
been recognized for their intelligence-related accomplishments.
  Earlier this year, Mr. President, I had the pleasure of working with 
members of the Armed Services Committee on an initiative to assist 
deserving individuals such as COL Eifler and LTC Sakakida. Due largely 
to the efforts of my friend and colleague, Senator Coats, the chairman 
of the Personnel Subcommittee, the committee approved a provision in 
the pending measure, section 543, that attempts to address this issue.
  In brief, section 543 expresses the sense of the Senate that the 
military services should conduct a 1-year review of the records of 
military intelligence personnel to determine if they were prevented by 
the secrecy of their missions from being appropriately considered for 
the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, and other awards. 
Based on the review, section 543 authorizes the services to approve 
awards for deserving individuals notwithstanding the statutory time 
limitations governing such awards.
  However, since the provision was reported from committee, a number of 
technical shortcomings have been pointed out to me by the military 
services as well as by military intelligence veterans organizations. I 
have assembled their suggestions for improving section 543 in the 
pending amendment. My amendment does several things:
  First, it would require, rather than urge, the services to undertake 
the proposed review. Making the review mandatory is important because 
many of the affected individuals are veterans of World War II or Korea 
who are in their 60's, 70's, and 80's and not in the best of health. 
Mandating that the review be undertaken and completed by a date certain 
rather than leaving it to the military's discretion, would ensure that 
the cases of these older veterans will be considered before age takes 
its toll.
  Second, rather than requiring the military services to review the 
records of all military intelligence personnel, which would involve 
examining potentially millions of documents and files--a monumental, 
perhaps impossible task--my amendment would simply require the services 
to review only the records of those individuals for whom 
recommendations have been received by the services during the 1-year 
period. That is to say, the onus would be on the individual, or his or 
her supporters, to apply for consideration during the review period. 
This would considerably ease the administrative burden, and cost, that 
section 543 as currently drafted would impose on the military.
  Third, my amendment would allow the service Secretaries to reject an 
application or recommendation if there is a justifiable basis for 
concluding that the application is specious. Again, the purpose of this 
particular provision is to make the services' task easier by giving 
them the authority to reject at the outset any recommendation for an 
award that is, on its face, without
 merit.

  Fourth, it would require the services to take reasonable steps to 
publicize the opportunity to apply for awards during the 1-year review 
period. It would be a sad state of affairs, Mr. President, if certain 
deserving individuals were not to take advantage of the review 
opportunity through lack of notification. The services have an 
obligation to ensure that potential awardees are informed of the 
opportunity to apply for an award or decoration.
  Fifth, my amendment would require the services, upon completion of 
the review, to make any legislative or administrative recommendations 
to improve award procedures with respect to military intelligence 
personnel. These recommendations will be important in helping Congress 
and the services develop policies that will obviate problems of the 
kind which makes this legislation necessary.
  Finally, I should note that my amendment is almost identical in form 
and substance to another provision in the committee bill, section 542, 
which concerns awards for service during the Vietnam era. Thus, I 
believe there is ample justification and precedent for the amendment I 
am offering. Certainly if Vietnam veterans deserve a chance to be 
reviewed for acts of heroism, military intelligence officers from other 
wars whose heroism has been long-overlooked should be accorded a 
similar opportunity.
  Mr. President, we will soon be commemorating the 50th anniversary of 
V-J Day and the end of World War II. I can think of no better way to 
honor the courage and sacrifice of the men and women who served our 
country as military intelligence officers during that conflict and in 
subsequent wars than to enact this amendment.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank the chairman and 
ranking member of the Personnel Subcommittee, Senator Coats and Senator 
Byrd, as well as the chairman and ranking member of the full Committee, 
Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn, for their understanding and 
assistance on this matter. I would also like to recognize the efforts 
of their staff, including Andy Effron, P.T. Henry, and especially 
Charlie Abell, for the tremendous support they provided my staff.
  I ask unanimous consent that copies of letters in support of this 
initiative from the commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command and 
the presidents of the Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services and 
the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                              Chief, Military Intelligence Corps.,


                                       Department of the Army,

                                                Fort Huachuca, AZ.
     Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Akaka: I appreciate your continued support 
     concerning the Medal of Honor situation faced by Lieutenant 
     Colonel Richard Sakakida, and several other of our 
     unrecognized members of the Military Intelligence Corps from 
     World War II.
       I wholeheartedly concur that Lieutenant Colonel Richard 
     Sakakida should be awarded the Medal of Honor for his 
     valorous actions in covert operations during World War II. 
     Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Sakakida is not alone in 
     his unrecognized heroism. Due to the sensitivity and 
     classified nature of their missions, several other members 
     and nominees of the Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame 
     would certainly benefit from your legislation. These 
     individuals include Master Sergeant Lorenzo Alverado, 
     Specialist Harry Akune, Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, and Colonel 
     Carl Eifler. I support your efforts for legislation S. 566 
     that requires review of all World War II Military 
     Intelligence personnel. Recognition for their accomplishments 
     is long overdue.
       If you require further assistance or background 
     information, please contact Jim Chambers or Captain Vivian 
     Santistevan, Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, 
     (502) 533-1178/1181.
           Sincerely,
                                                Charles W. Thomas,
                                                Brigadier General.
                                              Veterans of OSS,

                                      New York, NY, June 20, 1995.
     Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
     Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Akaka: As President of the Veterans of the 
     Office of Strategic Services (VSS), which represents the men 
     and women who carried out the majority of US secret 
     intelligence and special operations activities during WW II 
     that were outside the traditional military structure, I am 
     writing to express our organization's strong support for your 
     efforts to secure appropriate recognition for certain former 
     military intelligence personnel who deserve same.
       As you know, there are many deserving individuals who 
     served in intelligence capacities during wartime who, because 
     of the classified nature of their missions, were never 
     appropriately considered for the Congressional Medal of 
     Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, or other awards prior to 
     the statutory deadline for official consideration for these 
     medals.
       Among others of our group who were unfairly precluded from 
     receiving appropriate consideration include from Col. Carl 
     Eifler, (who could not be put in for a Medal of Honor) to 
     Camille Lelong, known then as Lt. Jacques P. Pavel, a Jed 
     teammate of William Colby (who he put in for a Legion of 
     Merit, but was never awarded) and nisei Kay Sugahara (who 
     after internment, joined the OSS's Moral Operations Branch 
     and did extraordinary work in the Pacific before and 
     immediately after VJ Day, is now buried in Arlington, but 
     never received any recognition whatsoever).
       VSS wholeheartedly supports legislation that would waive 
     the time limits pertaining to the CMH and other medals for 
     those individuals who, because of the secrecy of their 
     operations, could and/or were not otherwise considered for 
     these awards within the prescribed normal military 
     limitation.
       With all best wishes,
           Yours truly,
                                              Geoffrey M.T. Jones,
     President.
                                                                    ____


[[Page S 11313]]

                                             Association of Former


                                        Intelligence Officers,

                                        McLean, VA, July 25, 1995.
     Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Akaka: As Executive Director of the 
     Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), I endorse 
     your efforts to secure recognition for military intelligence 
     veterans.
       I wholeheartedly encourage proposed legislation that would 
     require the military services to review the records of 
     military intelligence personnel who, because of the secrecy 
     of their work, were never appropriately considered for the 
     Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, or other award.
       The military should be required to review the records only 
     of those individuals who apply to be reviewed or whose 
     applications are submitted on their behalf. These individuals 
     could then be considered on a case-by-case basis. To ensure 
     that the military reviews the applications in a timely 
     manner, a statutory delimiting deadline for making a final 
     determination should be imposed, perhaps one year from the 
     date an application is received.
       Thank you again for your work on behalf of military 
     intelligence veterans.
           Sincerely,
                                                 David D. Whipple,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment establishes congressional 
findings concerning the potential for overlooking meritorious acts by 
those whose activities necessarily require secrecy.
  This establishes a 1-year period for review of recommendations and 
requests for awards for the period from 1940 to 1990. While the bill 
recognizes that persons deserving of awards may have been overlooked 
because their intelligence activities were necessarily secretive, it 
contains no provisions for review of existing procedures which are time 
consuming and not oriented toward cases which contain a presumption 
against reviewing cases more than 3 years old.
  The provision establishes a limited time of 1 year and limits review 
to those requesting or recommended for such a review.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment is satisfactory.
  I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Hawaii.
  The amendment (No. 2099) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2100

 (Purpose: To require the Secretary of the Army to review the records 
   relating to the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Asian-
Americans and Native American Pacific Islanders for service in the Army 
 during World War II to determine whether the award should be upgraded 
                         to the Medal of Honor)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have another amendment by the Senator from 
Hawaii, Senator Akaka. This amendment would require a review of awards 
to Asian-Americans and native American Pacific Islanders during World 
War II. It requires the review of awards to African-Americans to 
determine whether they should be upgraded.
  The Army has undertaken a review of World War II awards of the 
Distinguished Service Cross to determine whether any should be upgraded 
to the Medal of Honor. The review is requested based on a concern that 
some awards may have been downgraded due to prejudice.
  The amendment requests a similar review of awards to native American 
Pacific Islanders in view of the possible prejudice at that time 
against these groups.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Akaka, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2100.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 206, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:

     SEC. 544. REVIEW REGARDING AWARDS OF DISTINGUISHED-SERVICE 
                   CROSS TO ASIAN-AMERICANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS 
                   FOR CERTAIN WORLD WAR II SERVICE.

       (a) Review Required.--The Secretary of the Army shall--
       (1) review the records relating to the award of the 
     Distinguished-Service Cross to Asian-Americans and Native 
     American Pacific Islanders for service as members of the Army 
     during World War II in order to determine whether the award 
     should be upgraded to the Medal of Honor; and
       (2) submit to the President a recommendation that the 
     President award a Medal of Honor to each such person for whom 
     the Secretary determines an upgrade to be appropriate.
       (b) Waiver of Time Limitations.--The President is 
     authorized to award a Medal of Honor to any person referred 
     to in subsection (a) in accordance with a recommendation of 
     the Secretary of the Army submitted under that subsection. 
     The following restrictions do not apply in the case of any 
     such person:
       (1) Sections 3744 and 8744 of title 10, United States Code.
       (2) Any regulation or other administrative restriction on--
       (A) the time for awarding a Medal of Honor; or
       (B) the awarding of a Medal of Honor for service for which 
     a Distinguished-Service Cross has been awarded.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``Native American Pacific Islander'' means a 
     Native Hawaiian and any other Native American Pacific 
     Islander within the meaning of the Native American Programs 
     Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.).
       (2) The term ``World War II'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 101(8) of title 38, United States Code.
  requiring the review of distinguished service cross awards to asian 
  americans and native american pacific islanders during world war ii

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to S. 1026, 
the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense authorization bill. The 
amendment directs the Secretary of the Army to review the service 
records of Asian-Americans and Native American Pacific Islanders who 
received the Distinguished Service Cross to determine whether the award 
should be upgraded to the Medal of Honor.
  Under the direction of then-Acting Secretary John Shannon, the Army 
is reviewing all Distinguished Service Cross [DSC] awards given to 
African-American soldiers during World War II to determine whether any 
of these cases merited an upgrade to the Congressional Medal of Honor 
[CMH].
  Mr. President, I offer my amendment to ensure that the Army conducts 
a similar study for Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders who served 
during World War II. I am deeply concerned that this group of Americans 
may have also been discriminated against in the awarding of the CMH. 
The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II is a clear 
indication of the bias that existed at the time. This hostile climate 
may have impacted the decision to award the military's highest honor to 
Asians, particularly Japanese-Americans.
  The famed 100th Infantry Battalion/442 Regimental Combat Team, which 
performed extraordinary deeds in Europe, still has the unique 
distinction of being the most highly decorated unit of its size in 
American history. In fact, 47 individuals of the 442d Regimental Combat 
Team received the DSC. However, only one Japanese-American who served 
during World War II received the CMH; this award was given posthumously 
after the war only when concerns were raised that not one American of 
Japanese descent who served in World War II had received the medal.
  Mr. President, my amendment only serves to ensure fairness for Asian-
Americans and Pacific Islanders who so gallantly served their country 
during World War II. As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Allied victory over the Axis powers, I think it is timely and 
appropriate that we undertake such a initiative. I hope that my 
colleagues will support this important amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we find the amendment satisfactory and 
urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Hawaii, No. 2100
  The amendment (No. 2100) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  
[[Page S 11314]]



                           Amendment No. 2101

   (Purpose: To revise section 723, relating to the applicability of 
 CHAMPUS payment rules to health care provided by CHAMPUS providers to 
 members of the uniformed services enrolled in a health care plan of a 
                 Uniformed Services Treatment Facility)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Coats, I offer an 
amendment which modifies section 723 by striking the current section 
and replacing it with a new section which accomplishes the intended 
result of protecting Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities from being 
charged more than the CHAMPUS allowable costs for services provided by 
CHAMPUS providers to USTF enrollees who are treated when they are 
outside the USTF catchment area.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Coats, 
     proposes amendment numbered 2101.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       Beginning on page 290, strike out line 12 and all that 
     follows through page 291, line 14, and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:

     SEC. 723. APPLICABILITY OF CHAMPUS PAYMENT RULES IN CERTAIN 
                   CASES.

       Section 1074 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(d)(1) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with 
     the other administering Secretaries, may by regulation 
     require a private CHAMPUS provider to apply the CHAMPUS 
     payment rules (subject to any modifications considered 
     appropriate by the Secretary) in imposing charges for health 
     care that the provider provides outside the catchment area of 
     a Uniformed Services Treatment Facility to a member of the 
     uniformed services who is enrolled in a health care plan of 
     the Uniformed Services Treatment Facility.
       ``(2) In this subsection:
       ``(A) The term `private CHAMPUS provider' means a private 
     facility or health care provider that is a health care 
     provider under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
     Uniformed Services.
       ``(B) The term `CHAMPUS payment rules' means the payment 
     rules referred to in subsection (c).
       ``(C) The term `Uniformed Services Treatment Facility' 
     means a facility deemed to be a facility of the uniformed 
     services under section 911(a) of the Military Construction 
     Authorization Act, 1982 (42 U.S.C. 248c(a)).''.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this amendment modifies section 723, amount 
payable by uniformed services for health care services provided outside 
the catchment areas of the facilities, to perfect the provision.
  The amendment strikes the current section and replaces it with a new 
section which accomplishes the intended result of protecting the 
Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities from being charged more than 
the CHAMPUS allowable costs for services provided by CHAMPUS providers 
to USTF enrollees who are treated when they are outside the USTF 
catchment area.
  The Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities and the Department of 
Defense concur in this change. I understand this amendment is agreed to 
on both sides.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Indiana.
  The amendment (No. 2101) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
                           Amendment No. 2102

               (Purpose: To change a date in section 712)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. 
Coats] I offer an amendment which would change the date after which 
USTF enrollees are subject to the TRICARE uniform benefits. This change 
will enable the USTF's to enroll eligible personnel in the August-
September 1995 enrollment period under the current benefit program. Any 
enrollment after October 1, 1995, would be subject to the TRICARE 
uniform benefit.
  Mr. President, I send to the desk the amendment and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Coats, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2102:
       On page 285, line 14, strike out ``January 1, 1995'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``October 1, 1995''.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
immediate consideration.
  This amendment modifies section 712, provision of TRICARE uniform 
benefits by uniformed services treatment facilities, to change the date 
before which those enrolled in a USTF program would not be required to 
convert to the uniform benefit.
  Section 712 currently would grand father those enrolled in a USTF 
health care program on or before January 1, 1995. This amendment would 
change this date to October 1, 1995. This change will enable the USTF's 
to enroll eligible personnel in the August-September 1995 enrollment 
period under the current benefit program. Any enrollment after October 
1, 1995, would be subject to the TRICARE uniform benefit.
  I understand this amendment is agreed to on both sides.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Indiana.
  The amendment (No. 2102) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2103

  Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, on behalf of the Senators from 
Oklahoma, Mr. Nickles and Mr. Inhofe, I offer an amendment which will 
require the General Accounting Office to review the Department of 
Defense depot maintenance policy required in this bill.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other 
side. I think that is correct.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, that is correct. I have a brief statement I 
would like to make on behalf of the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I now ask the clerk to read the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Nickles, 
     for himself and Mr. Inhofe, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2103.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
     On page 76, insert the following after line 4:
       ``(f) Review by the General Accounting Office.--(1) The 
     Secretary shall make available to the Comptroller General of 
     the United States all information used by the Department in 
     developing the policy under subsections (a) through (d) of 
     this section.
       (2) Not later than 45 days after the Secretary submits to 
     Congress the report required by subsection (a), the 
     Comptroller General shall transmit to Congress a report 
     containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's proposed 
     policy as reported under subsection (a).

  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senate Armed Services 
Committee members and staff for working closely with me and my staff on 
this amendment. I also want to thank my friend and colleague Senator 
Inhofe and his staff who played a key role in getting this amendment 
adopted.
  This amendment adds the requirement that once the Department of 
Defense submits its report to Congress regarding depot maintenance as 
required in this bill, the GAO be given 45 days to review the 
information and the conclusions from the Pentagon's recommended depot 
policy and submit that analysis to Congress.
  In my view this is an appropriate and non-controversial amendment. By 
providing the Congress with an analysis of the Pentagon's proposal for 
depot maintenance the Congress will have an independent viewpoint on 
the recommended changes.
  This analysis will be critical as the Congress decides whether to 
adopt the 

[[Page S 11315]]
recommendations of the Pentagon or stay with the existing depot policy.
  Once again, I wish to thank the members and staff of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and Senator Inhofe for their cooperation and 
assistance in having this amendment included in this bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I support the Nickles amendment, which will 
strengthen the bill's provisions on depot maintenance workload.
  Section 311 of the bill requires the Secretary of defense to submit 
to Congress a comprehensive policy on the performance of depot-level 
maintenance and repair not later than March 31, 1996.
  The policy must: First, define purpose of public depots; second, 
provide for performance of core capabilities at public depots; third, 
provide sufficient personnel, equipment, and facilities at public 
depots; fourth, address environmental liability; fifth provide for 
public private competition when there is sufficient potential for 
realizing cost savings based on adequate private sector competition and 
technical capabilities; sixth require merit-based selection when 
workload of a depot is changed; seventh provide transition provisions 
for persons in DOD depots; and eighth address related issues on 
exchange of technical data, efficiency, and effects on the Federal 
workforce.
  The bill makes it clear that no changes may be made in the statutes 
requiring that at least 60 percent of the workload be preformed in 
public depots, and the requirements to for public/private competition 
for any change in workload requirements unless Congress enacts separate 
legislation approving or modifying the DOD policy.
  The Nickles amendment would require a detailed analysis by the 
General Accounting Office of DOD's proposed depot maintenance policy.
  GAO oversight is necessary to assess the validity of DOD data and 
studies.
  The importance of GAO report has been demonstrated in the base 
closure process, where their data provided important perspective to the 
BRAC Commission.
  While there may well be opportunities for increased contractor 
participation, these should be developed on the basis of careful 
analysis, not theoretical beliefs. Depot-level maintenance and repair 
activities are essential to wartime readiness and sustainability. The 
current system has proved to be highly effective in meeting national 
security needs, and should not be subjected to significant changes 
without a clear understanding of the consequences of a new policy.
  At the confirmation hearing for Deputy Secretary of Defense John 
White, he was closely questioned about the recommendations of the Roles 
and Missions Commission concerning privatization of depot workload.
  He acknowledged that the Commission did not conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of specific DOD functions to determine which should be 
privatized; that the recommendation reflected a general philosophical 
approach; that Commission did not develop a specific definition of the 
inherently governmental functions that should not be privatized; that 
the Commission had not developed a specific concept of what core 
capabilities should be retained; that there had been no analysis of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of current depots; and that the Commission 
did not have a specific plan for transitioning from public to private 
entities.
  He also agreed that it was very important to ensure that any workload 
assigned to the private sector be subject to adequate private sector 
competition.
  GAO review is needed to ensure that any changes in policy are 
developed on the basis of sound analysis rather than abstract 
philosophy.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I wish to express my thanks to Senator 
Thurmond and the staff of the Armed Services Committee for their 
diligence in working with Senator Nickles and me and our staffs on this 
amendment.
  This amendment requires the General Accounting Office to review the 
DOD report on depot maintenance required in the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1995 (S. 1026.), and report their findings to 
Congress within 45 days of the date of the report.
  This is a common sense, noncontroversial amendment. It simply 
provides a second opinion for members of Congress when the time comes 
to review the Department of Defense's recommended changes. This 
additional review will help Members sort through this complicated 
subject.
  Again, I thank the members and staff of the Armed Services Committee 
for their assistance in having this amendment included in the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma.
  The amendment (No. 2103) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2104

(Purpose: To make various amendments to the provisions relating to the 
                       Naval Petroleum Reserves)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senators McCain and 
Bingaman and Campbell, I send an amendment to the desk. This amendment 
further strengthens the safeguards established to ensure minimum 
value--excuse me, that would be maximum value, to ensure maximum value, 
Mr. President, to the taxpayers as a consequence of the sale of the 
Naval Petroleum Reserve. It is my understanding this amendment has been 
cleared on the other side.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, it is cleared as long as that word is 
``maximum'' value.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge it be adopted.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. McCain, for 
     himself, Mr. Brown, Mr. Bingaman, and Mr. Campbell, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 2104.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 572, line 19, strike out ``three months'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``five months''.
       On page 573, line 11, strike out ``fair market''.
       On page 574, beginning on line 9, strike out ``In setting 
     that price, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, 
     may consider'' and insert in lieu thereof ``The Secretary may 
     not set the minimum acceptable price below''.
       On page 574, at the end of line 19, insert the following: 
     ``Notwithstanding section 7433(b) of this title, costs and 
     fees of retaining the investment banker shall be paid out of 
     the proceeds of the sale of the reserve.''.
       On page 574, line 22, insert ``or contracts'' after 
     ``contract''.
       On page 575, line 3, insert ``or contracts'' after 
     ``contract''.
       On page 575, line 11, insert ``or contracts'' after 
     ``contract''.
       On page 575, line 17, insert ``or contracts'' after 
     ``contract''.
       On page 576, line 11, by inserting ``or purchasers (as the 
     case may be)'' after ``purchaser''.
       On page 578, line 17, by inserting ``or purchasers (as the 
     case may be)'' after ``purchaser''.
       On page 579, line 4, strike out ``a contract'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``any contract''.
       On page 579, line 12, insert after ``reserve'' the 
     following: ``or any subcomponent thereof''.
       On page 579, line 16, insert ``or parcel'' after 
     ``reserve''.
       On page 584, strike out line 11, and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:
     the committees.
       ``(m) Oversight.--The Comptroller General shall monitor the 
     actions of the Secretary relating to the sale of the reserve 
     and report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
     and the Committee on National security of the House of 
     Representatives any findings on such actions that the 
     Comptroller General considers appropriate to report to such 
     committees.
       ``(n) Acquisition of Services.--The Secretary may enter 
     into contracts for the acquisition of services required under 
     this section under the authority of paragraph (7) of section 
     303(c) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services 
     Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253(c)), except that the notification 
     required under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph for each 
     contract shall be submitted to Congress not less than 7 days 
     before the award of the contract.
       ``(o) Reconsideration of Process of Sale.--(1) If during 
     the course of the sale of the reserve the Secretary of Energy 
     and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
     jointly determine that--
       ``(A) the sale is proceeding in a manner inconsistent with 
     achievement of a sale price that reflects the full value of 
     the reserve, or

[[Page S 11316]]

       ``(B) a course of action other than the immediate sale of 
     the reserve is in the best interests of the United States,

     the Secretary shall submit a notification of the 
     determination to the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and the Committees on National Security and on 
     Commerce of the House of Representatives.
       ``(2) After the Secretary submits a notification under 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary may not complete the sale the 
     reserve under this section unless there is enacted a joint 
     resolution--
       ``(A) that is introduced after the date on which the 
     notification is received by the committees referred to in 
     such paragraph;
       ``(B) that does not have a preamble;
       ``(C) the matter after the resolving clause of which reads 
     only as follows: `That the Secretary of Energy shall proceed 
     with activities to sell Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 1 in 
     accordance with section 7421a of title 10, United States 
     Code, notwithstanding the determination set forth in the 
     notification submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Energy 
     on ____________.' (the blank space being filled in with the 
     appropriate date); and
       ``(D) the title of which is as follows: `Joint resolution 
     approving continuation of actions to sell Naval Petroleum 
     Reserve Numbered 1'.
       ``(3) Subsection (k), except for paragraph (1) of such 
     subsection, shall apply to the joint resolution described in 
     paragraph (2).''.
       On page 584, strike out line 20 and all that follows 
     through page 586, line 12, and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following:

     SEC. 3302. FUTURE OF NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES (OTHER THAN 
                   NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE NUMBERED 1).

       (a) Study of Future of Petroleum Reserves.--(1) The 
     Secretary of Energy shall conduct a study to determine which 
     of the following options, or combination of options, would 
     maximize the value of the naval petroleum reserves to or for 
     the United States:
       (A) Transfer of all or a part of the naval petroleum 
     reserves to the jurisdiction of the Department of the 
     Interior for leasing in accordance with the Mineral Leasing 
     Act (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) and surface management in 
     accordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
     (43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (B) Lease of the naval petroleum reserves consistent with 
     the provisions of such Acts.
       (C) Sale of the interest of the United States in the naval 
     petroleum reserves.
       (2) The Secretary shall retain such independent consultants 
     as the Secretary considers appropriate to conduct the study.
       (3) An examination of the value to be derived by the United 
     States from the transfer, lease, or sale of the naval 
     petroleum reserves under paragraph (1) shall include an 
     assessment and estimate, in a manner consistent with 
     customary property valuation practices in the oil industry, 
     of the fair market value of the interest of the United States 
     in the naval petroleum reserves.
       (4) Not later than December 31, 1995, the Secretary shall 
     submit to Congress and make available to the public a report 
     describing the results of the study and containing such 
     recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate to 
     implement the option, or combination of options, identified 
     in the study that would maximize the value of the naval 
     petroleum reserves to or for the United States,
       (b) Implementation of Recommendations.--Not earlier than 31 
     days after submitting to Congress the report required under 
     subsection (a)(4), and not later than December 31, 1996, the 
     Secretary shall carry out the recommendations contained in 
     the report.
       (c) Naval Petroleum Reserves Defined.--For purposes of this 
     section, the term ``naval petroleum reserves'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 7420(2) of title 10, 
     United States Code, except that such term does not include 
     Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 1.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I wanted to commend the Senator from New 
Mexico for his diligent work regarding this amendment. It takes another 
important step toward ensuring that the taxpayer receives a fair value 
for the reserve.
  The debate regarding the sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve is not a 
new one. As my colleagues know, the sale of the reserve was proposed by 
the Reagan, Bush, and now Clinton administration. President Clinton's 
budget reads ``Producing and selling this oil and natural gas is a 
commercial, not a governmental activity, which is more appropriately 
performed by the private sector.'' The sale of the reserve is advocated 
by groups like the National Taxpayers Union, the CATO institute and the 
Heritage Foundation. Furthermore, this year's Budget Act directs the 
sale of the reserve in fiscal year 1996.
  I want to make it clear that my goal, Senator Bingaman's goal and the 
goal of the committee has always been to sell this asset in a manner 
that protects the taxpayer and disposes the asset in a completely fair 
and open process that gives advantage to no one. To achieve this, the 
bill includes several provisions to ensure the Federal Government 
receives the maximum value for the field.
  Specifically, the bill directs the Secretary of Energy to hire five 
independent assessors to establish a value for the reserve. The 
Secretary, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, 
must use these assessments when establishing a minimum bid. The 
Secretary is not permitted to accept an offer below the minimum bid 
price.
  The independent assessors are required to include in the value of the 
field factors such as the equipment and facilities to be included in 
the sale, the estimated quantity of petroleum and natural gas in the 
reserve, and the anticipated revenue stream that the Treasury would 
receive from the reserve if it were not sold, as well as all other 
considerations affecting the value of the reserve.
  The legislation also requires consultation with several other 
agencies with expertise in these matters. It directs the Secretary to 
consult with the General Services Administration to ensure that the 
bidding process is open. In identifying the highest offer, the 
Secretary is required to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
  The Senate bill also includes a provision to address compliance with 
deadlines. In the event the Secretary is unable to comply with the 
timeliness identified in the bill, the Secretary in consultation with 
the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] is required to notify both 
the House National Security and Senate Armed Services Committees and 
submit a revised plan to complete the sale.
  It has been suggested that the sale of reserves in pieces may yield a 
better return to the Federal Government. The committee language allows 
for the Secretary to sell the reserve in pieces or as one unit, 
whichever returns the best value to the taxpayers.
  Finally, the legislation requires a 31-day delay before the Secretary 
can finalize an agreement to accept the highest responsible offer. This 
delay allows the Congress to stop the sale if it is deemed not to be in 
the best interest of the taxpayer and the Federal Government. In the 
event there is only a single bidder, a joint resolution of Congress 
would be required before approval of the sale.
  It has always been the committee's intention to do everything 
possible to ensure that the legislation results in the highest return 
for the Federal Government and dispenses of this property in the 
fairest manner possible. The committee reported legislation, contains 
many safeguards to help ensure that the interests of the taxpayer and 
the Nation are protected in the disposition of this asset.
  The amendment which I have crafted with Senator Bingaman goes even 
further. The amendment provides increased oversight of the sale by 
directing the General Accounting Office to monitor all aspects of the 
sale and report to the Armed Services Committee and the House National 
Security Committee.
  We have also clarified the process for establishing the minimum bid. 
The value established by the five independent assessors is based on the 
net present value of the reserve adjusted for any anticipated increases 
in tax revenues that would result if the reserve were sold. The 
Secretary is restricted from selecting a minimum bid price less than 
that value. This will ensure that the value received for the Elk Hills 
site is fair to the Federal Government.
  It also directs the Secretary of Energy in conjunction with the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to notify the House 
National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee if 
the sale is not proceeding in manner that will yield the maximum value 
for the Federal Government or if they determine that another course of 
action will receive a better value for the Federal Government.
  Once that notification has been made, the sale could not be completed 
unless the Congress approves a joint resolution in support of the bill. 
This would allow the administration the opportunity throughout this 
process to suggest an alternative way to deal with the reserve.
  Mr. President, the overriding concern of the committee was to ensure 
that 

[[Page S 11317]]
the taxpayers receive the maximum value for the reserve. We have taken 
several steps to accomplish this goal. The sale of this asset involves 
five Federal agencies in the sale of the reserve. It allows Congress to 
review the sale of the reserve for a month before it is finalized. In 
the event of a single bidder it requires our approval. Finally, it 
directs the Secretary and the Director of OMB to notify us if the sale 
is proceeding properly or if they have a better way of dealing with the 
reserve.
  As I said earlier, the debate regarding the Naval Petroleum Reserve 
has been going on for a long time. The passage of the Defense 
Authorization Act will not end this debate. We still have to work this 
bill out in conference with the House. In addition, we will have to 
address this issue during the budget reconciliation debate because this 
provision still falls short of the budget instructions. During the 
course of debate I look forward to the suggestions of my colleagues on 
how to further improve this bill. I hope my colleagues will join 
Senator Bingaman and me in supporting this amendment.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to thank the senior Senator from 
Arizona for his willingness to work with me on this amendment. This 
amendment basically puts every safeguard the Armed Services Committee 
staff or Senator McCain's staff or Senator Campbell's staff or my staff 
has come up with on the Elk Hills sale into the bill while remaining 
responsive to the mandate in the fiscal year 1996 concurrent budget 
resolution to sell the Elk Hills oil reserve in fiscal year 1996.
  As many of our colleagues know, the sale of the Nation's naval 
petroleum reserves was not initiated by the Armed Services Committee. 
The sale was initially recommended by the administration to take place 
over the next 2 years. The budget committees noted this and 
nevertheless decided to score the administration's proposal in such a 
way that the sale will have to take place during the coming fiscal year 
instead of over the next 2 years.
  Many of us on the Armed Services Committee have serious reservations 
about the pace of this sale. The National Academy of Public 
Administration has testified to serious concerns about selling the 
reserve in 1 year and about whether the taxpayers will get their 
money's worth if this sale is rushed. R. Scott Fosler, president of the 
National Academy of Public Administration, wrote Senator Thurmond on 
July 20 with his comments on the provision in the current bill. Let me 
cite the key paragraph in that letter:

       Every study of the management or privatization of Elk Hills 
     has documented the complexity of the process of divestment. 
     There are stubborn issues involving equity finalization, 
     California claims, and the establishment of true values which 
     are not likely to be disposed of in time to effect an 
     advantageous sale in one year. We, therefore, believe that 
     the most prudent and efficacious course would be (1) 
     establish the corporation as a management structure, (2) 
     direct the corporation to develop a plan to sell Elk Hills 
     (and possibly other reserves) within two or three years after 
     the activation of the operation. This approach would permit 
     an orderly, well-managed divestment process and would help 
     assure that the government received full value for the assets 
     sold.

  Mr. President, this option or any other option which would not result 
in the sale of Elk Hills and other reserves in fiscal year 1996 is not 
available to the Armed Services Committee under the budget resolution. 
I regret that. We only can sell these assets once. We should do it the 
right way. The Budget Committee should not be making the choices as to 
both the policy on selling the asset and the timing of that sale.
  So I support this amendment. It is the best we can do under current 
reconciliation instructions. Indeed it probably goes to the limit of 
those instructions and I commend the Senator from Arizona and the 
Senator from Colorado for doing that. But I will continue to question 
those instructions and urge that the Armed Services Committee seek the
 flexibility from the Budget Committee that would allow the Secretary 
of Energy to dispose of these fields in the way that will bring maximum 
benefit to the taxpayers, the current owners of these assets. When the 
Armed Services Committee discusses reconciliation next month, perhaps 
we can offer two options to the Budget Committee, the provision we are 
adopting today which meets their mandate to sell the reserve in 1 year 
and a second provision that would allow the Secretary to sell it over a 
more extended time period.

  Mr. President, this sale involves the 10th largest oil field in the 
Nation. Each year this oil field provides approximately $400 million 
into the public treasury. This is a very significant sale.
  Mr. President, I have been told that there are many uncertainties 
about this sale that would make a potential bidder very cautious. The 
exact share of the field which the Government owns and which Chevron 
owns is in question. The amount of oil in the field is in question. The 
State of California has a suit in the courts regarding that State's 
interest in the field.
  For all of these reasons, Mr. President, Senator McCain and I and 
others placed a number of safeguards into this legislation that protect 
the interests of the taxpayers when it was before the Armed Services 
Committee. This amendment, which is sponsored by Senators McCain, 
Campbell, and myself adds even further safeguards to ensure that we get 
a fair price in any sales that may take place of Elk Hills or its 
components if the Secretary chooses to sell the field in parcels.
  This amendment gives the Secretary of Energy the authority to stop 
the sale and report to the Congress if the sale is turning out to be a 
bad deal. It gives the Secretary the authority to recommend 
alternatives to the sale if the sale is turning out to be a giveaway. 
The amendment also sets up similar procedures for the sale of the oil 
shale reserves. Finally, Mr. President, this amendment contains several 
provisions to streamline the sale which have been requested by the 
Department of Energy to allow the sale to proceed as closely as 
possible to the schedule mandated by the Budget Committee.
  Mr. President, in conclusion, I wish to commend Senator McCain again 
for his effort to make the best of this situation. Decisions were made 
for his Readiness Subcommittee by the Budget Committee. He now has to 
implement those decisions and the provision in our bill as reported and 
the improvements being made today by this amendment represent his and 
the committee as a whole's best effort to do that given the information 
we had available in late June and now in early August.
  The Armed Services Committee does not normally deal with selling 
Government assets and certainly we are not experts in oil field 
transactions. We have produced a provision that I believe is a 
significant improvement on the provision in the House version of this 
bill. And perhaps with the help of the budget committees, we will be 
able to improve it further in conference on this bill or in the 
reconciliation bill where this matter will also be dealt with.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I want to thank the committee chairman, 
Senator Thurmond, and the ranking member, Senator Nunn, for working 
with me and with the senior Senator from Colorado to craft an amendment 
to the bill concerning the Naval Oil Shale Reserves.
  Section 3302 of the bill before us today would direct the Secretary 
of Energy to study the Naval Oil Shale Reserves and the Naval Petroleum 
Reserves, with the exception of the NPR 1 at Elk Hills, for the purpose 
of determining how the Federal Government, and the U.S. taxpayer, would 
best be served in the management and disposition of these reserves.
  I support that goal. Last year the Energy Committee, of which I am a 
member, passed my bill which would have directly transferred 
jurisdiction over the Naval Oil Shale Reserves from the Department of 
Energy to the Department of the Interior. Since that time the Armed 
Services Committee has raised a concern that we may not have the 
appropriate scale of information to determine how we best maximize the 
Federal interest in these resources. These are federally owned 
resources; in these days of tough, difficult decisions on how we reduce 
the federal deficit, it is critical to me that the Federal interest be 
protected.
  I commend the committee for addressing this issue. However I believe 
that this bill should take the next step. The amendment that I have 
worked out with the chairman and ranking 

[[Page S 11318]]
member of the Armed Services Committee simply provides the Secretary of 
Energy with the authority to take that next step and implement whatever 
course of action is recommended by the study. Indeed, the Department of 
Energy asked, and I strongly agreed, that the time for endless study of 
the oil shale reserves must end and we should move expeditiously to 
develop these resources.
  I have worked very carefully with the Department of Energy, whose 
staff requested nearly a dozen changes in the amendment, virtually all 
of which I made.
  Under my amendment, three options for disposition of these resources 
could be considered. The reserves could be competitively leased by the 
Department of the Interior just the same as the other millions of acres 
of federally owned, energy resource lands in America. They could be 
leased by the Department of Energy. And they could be sold by the 
Department of Energy.
  Some background may be appropriate. Two executive orders, in 1916 and 
1924, withdrew public lands for the purpose of establishing three Naval 
Oil Shale Reserves. The purpose of the reserves was to ensure the 
military sufficient oil from the oil shale in the event of a cutoff of 
strategic oil supplies during a war.
  Naval Oil Shale Reserve 1 (40,760 acres) and 3 (14,130 acres) are 
located in northwest Colorado near Rifle, and Naval Oil Shale Reserve 2 
(90,400 acres) is in eastern Utah. Ironically, the critical resource 
within these properties is not oil shale, but natural gas. Profitable 
development of shale oil currently is considered to be decades away.
  Management of the reserves was transferred from the Department of the 
Navy to the Department of Energy by the Department of Energy 
Organization Act in 1977. The Department of Energy has a cooperative 
agreement with the Bureau of Land Management to manage the surface 
resources of the reserves.
  The reserves located in Colorado are situated on portions of three 
large natural gas producing fields, the Parachute, Rulison, and Grand 
Valley, and are estimated to contain substantial natural gas 
hydrocarbons. There has been significant private natural gas drilling 
and extraction activity on the southern border of the third reserve 
since 1978. Since 1980, 277 private wells have been drilled contiguous 
to the boundaries of Reserve 1 and 2; and through fiscal year 1992, 89 
commercial producing gas wells were drilled by private industry within 
one mile of the boundary of the reserves.
  The Department of Energy determined in 1983 that the potential 
existed for drainage of natural gas from the reserves due to the 
private development outside of the reserves. To prevent drainage of 
public resources, the Department of Energy began a protection program, 
drilling 35 offset and communitization wells. According to the 
Department of Energy's Annual Report of Operations for fiscal year 
1992, natural gas production between fiscal years 1977 and 1992 
totalled 5.4 billion cubic feet. Revenues from the reserves totalled $5 
million between fiscal years 1977 and 1992; expenditures for the same 
period totalled $24.8 million.
  Clearly, this is a giant money loser under Department of Energy 
stewardship. These reserves should be revenue raisers, not simply a 
black hole for Energy Department spending and bureaucracy.
  Under the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, the 
Secretary of Energy has discretionary authority to undertake certain 
activities, such as oil and gas development in the reserves, but only 
as necessary to protect, conserve, maintain or test the reserves. 
Production for other purposes may take place only with the approval of 
the President and Congress. That production--for commercial purposes--
is the business we are doing today.
  Mr. President, I have worked closely with the Department of Energy 
these past months. The DOE leadership wants very badly to be able to 
end the study phase and get on with the development phase.
  Again, I want to thank the chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
for working with me on an amendment which will move us forward toward 
the actual development of these important natural resources in my 
State.
  Mr. WARNER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Arizona.
  The amendment (No. 2104) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2105

(Purpose: To extend the fiscal year 1993 project authorization for the 
   JP-8 fuel facility at the Los Alamitos Reserve Center, California)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Feinstein, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2105.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 433, in the table relating to the extension of 1993 
     project authorizations for the Army National Guard, insert 
     after the item relating to the project at Union Springs, 
     Alabama, the following:

California.........  Los Alamitos Armed  Fuel Facility.....   $1,553,000
                      Forces Reserve                                    
                      Center.                                           
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by 
both sides.
  This amendment by the Senator from California extends for 1 year, 
fiscal year 1993 project authorization for a $1.553 million fuel 
facility project at Los Alamitos Reserve Center in California.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment is acceptable. We urge its 
adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from California.
  The amendment (No. 2105) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
                           Amendment No. 2106

   (Purpose: To make the authority under section 648 subject to the 
                    availability of appropriations)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf 
of the senior Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Thurmond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2106.

  Mr. WARNER. I ask that further reading of the amendment be dispensed 
with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Beginning on page 275, strike out line 19 and all that 
     follows through page 277, line 18, and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:
       (a) Study Required.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall 
     conduct a study to determine the quantitative results 
     (described in subsection (b)) of enactment and exercise of 
     authority for the Secretary of the military department 
     concerned to pay an annuity to the qualified surviving spouse 
     of each member of the Armed Forces who--
       (A) died before March 21, 1974, and was entitled to retired 
     or retainer pay on the date of death; or
       (B) was a member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces 
     during the period beginning on September 21, 1972, and ending 
     on October 1, 1978, and at the time of his death would have 
     been entitled to retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10, 
     United States Code (as in effect before December 1, 1994), 
     but for the fact that he was under 60 years of age.
       (2) A qualified surviving spouse for purposes of paragraph 
     (1) is a surviving spouse who has not remarried and who is 
     not eligible for an annuity under section 4 of Public Law 92-
     425 (10 U.S.C. 1448 note).
       (b) Required Determinations.--By means of the study 
     required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall determine 
     the following matters:

[[Page S 11319]]

       (1) The number of unremarried surviving spouses of deceased 
     members and deceased former members of the Armed Forces 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1) who 
     would be eligible for an annuity under authority described in 
     such subsection.
       (2) The number of unremarried surviving spouses of deceased 
     members and deceased former members of reserve components of 
     the Armed Forces referred to in subparagraph (B) of 
     subsection (a)(1) who would be eligible for an annuity under 
     authority described in such subsection.
       (3) The number of persons in each group of unremarried 
     former spouses described in paragraphs (1) and (2) who are 
     receiving a widow's insurance benefit or a widower's 
     insurance benefit under title II of the Social Security Act 
     on the basis of employment of a deceased member or deceased 
     former member referred to in subsection (a)(1).
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than March 1, 1996, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security 
     of the House of Representatives a report on the results of 
     the study.
       (2) The Secretary shall include in the report a 
     recommendation on the amount of the annuity that should be 
     authorized to be paid under any authority described in 
     subsection (a)(1) together with a recommendation on whether 
     the annuity should be adjusted annually to offset increases 
     in the cost of living.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for immediate consideration.
  This amendment modifies section 648, annuities for certain military 
surviving spouses to eliminate the direct spending costs. When the 
committee adopted this provision during our markup, we did so based on 
a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office which made this 
provision affordable. Later, after the bill was approved by the 
committee, CBO revised the cost estimate upward. The revised estimate 
is that this provision will cost $40 million in direct spending in 
fiscal year 1996.
  The Budget Committee is forcing us to take this action under threat 
of placing a point of order against our bill. I have looked at every 
solution available to me to find a way to keep these annuities. I am 
disappointed that I am unable to retain the provision this year.
  The amendment modifies the provision to require the Secretary of 
Defense to conduct a study to determine how many forgotten widows would 
qualify for an annuity and to recommend the amount of such an annuity. 
The required study is to be delivered to the Armed Services Committee 
not later than March 1, 1996. This will give us time to consider the 
information in the report and develop legislation next year which will 
finally authorize providing this group of surviving military spouses 
the compensation they deserve. Once the committee has this study, we 
will be able to provide the Budget Committee and the Congressional 
Budget Office the data necessary to preclude the technical budgetese we 
faced this year from deterring us next year.
  I understand this amendment is agreed to on both sides.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe this amendment is acceptable on 
the other side.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we have no objection to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from South Carolina.
  The amendment (No. 2106) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2107

(Purpose: To require a review and report on United States policy on the 
          security of the national information infrastructure)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Kyl and Robb, I 
offer an amendment which requires the President to submit an assessment 
of the policy and plans for protecting the national information 
infrastructure and assessment of the national communications system.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other 
side of the aisle.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Kyl, for 
     himself, Mr. Robb, and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2107.

  Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 403, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:

     SEC. 1095. REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY ON PROTECTING THE 
                   NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST 
                   STRATEGIC ATTACKS.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report 
     setting forth the following:
       (1) The national policy and architecture governing the 
     plans for establishing procedures, capabilities, systems, and 
     processes necessary to perform indications, warning, and 
     assessment functions regarding strategic attacks by foreign 
     nations, groups, or individuals, or any other entity against 
     the national information infrastructure.
       (2) The future of the National Communications System (NCS), 
     which has performed the central role in ensuring national 
     security and emergency preparedness communications for 
     essential United States Government and private sector users, 
     including, specifically, a discussion of--
       (A) whether there is a federal interest in expanding or 
     modernizing the National Communications System in light of 
     the changing strategic national security environment and the 
     revolution in information technologies; and
       (B) the best use of the National Communications System and 
     the assets and experience it represents as an integral part 
     of a larger national strategy to protect the United States 
     against a strategic attack on the national information 
     infrastructure.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to propose an amendment to S. 1026, 
the Defense Authorization Act. I am pleased to introduce this amendment 
which will require the President to analyze all issues in developing a 
progressive, cohesive national policy toward protecting our ability to 
communicate, our defense structure, and our information.
  There is currently no defense against attacks on our Nation's 
information systems, which include our defense, telephone, public 
utility, and banking systems. Military officials have no ability to 
protect our country from cyberspace attacks, and no legal or political 
authority to protect our information systems against another country's 
offensive. Current CIA Director John Deutch said, at his Senate 
confirmation hearing, ``this is a very important subject * * * which we 
really don't have a crisp answer to.''
  We need to start looking for that answer now, since the problem is 
looming. A June 14 Wall Street Journal article reported that security 
experts were used to ``hack'' into 12,000 Defense Department computer 
systems connected to the Internet. The experts ``hacked'' their way 
into 88 percent of the systems, and 96 percent of the attacks were 
undetected. According to a June 1995 Federal Computer Week article, 
computer hackers are breaking into Defense systems by using highly 
automated tools. The article reported that the DOD's Center for 
Information Systems Security is receiving two computer attacks a day--
twice the rate of last year's intrusions. In 1994, the DOD recorded 255 
successful attacks.
  The threat is imminent. According to a 1994 report prepared by the 
National Communications System [NCS], no fewer than 30 countries are 
working on information warfare techniques. The administration must 
develop a comprehensive national policy that coordinates national 
security defense for both U.S. Government and private sector users of 
our National Information Infrastructure [NII]. My amendment seeks to 
analyze all critical issues involved in protecting our Nation's 
information infrastructure. These answers will provide a framework, I 
believe, toward developing our Nation's policy for defending against 
strategic attacks against the NII.
  As technology changes, we cannot allow ourselves to become vulnerable 
to attack on the nerve centers of our society and defense structure. We 
need to modernize our laws to protect against this very real threat. 
Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, director of C4 systems at the Pentagon, 
states that, ``a critical policy implication of the revolution in 
security affairs is the need to treat information and access to 
information as a vital national interest,'' and ``information warfare 
must become an important instrument of national security policy.''

[[Page S 11320]]

  Now is the time for Congress to be active. This amendment is intended 
to place an emphasis on an issue that must be addressed before our 
country's communications system is attacked. We must begin now to 
elevate our efforts to protect the national security interest of this 
country. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2107) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2108

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators McCain and 
Lieberman, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. McCain, for 
     himself and Mr. Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2108.

  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.   . IRAN AND IRAQ ARMS NONPROLIFERATION.

       (a) Sanctions Against Transfers of Persons.--Section 
     1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 
     (title XVI of Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
     amended by inserting ``to acquire chemical, biological, or 
     nuclear weapons or'' before ``to acquire''.
       (b) Sanctions Against Transfers of Foreign Countries.--
     Section 1605(a) of such Act is amended by inserting ``to 
     acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or'' before 
     ``to acquire''.
       (c) Clarification of United States Assistance.--
     Subparagraph (A) of section 1608(7) of such Act is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), other than urgent humanitarian 
     assistance or medicine;''.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I am offering an amendment to the 
Defense Authorization bill to assist the President in his efforts to 
deal with the growing threat to American interests from Iran. President 
Clinton clearly sought to address this threat with his May 6 Executive 
order establishing a full United States embargo of Iran. It is my hope 
that short of successfully encouraging other nations from trading with 
Iran, an extremely challenging task, the President will be able to use 
the authority in this amendment to encourage other countries to at 
least refrain from contributing to Iranian weapons capability.
  The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which I cosponsored 
with then-Senator Gore, established sanctions against third parties 
which assist Iran and Iraq in their efforts to rebuild their weapons 
capabilities. It was a start, but it did not go far enough. Efforts by 
Senator Lieberman and me last year to expand the legislation were 
unsuccessful.
  The 1992 bill was intended to target not only the acquisition of 
conventional weapons, but weapons of mass destruction as well. In the 
process of amending the bill to the 1993 Defense Act, however, the 
explicit references to weapons of mass destruction were dropped.
  The amendment I am offering today attempts to make these applications 
absolutely clear. It also removes from the proposed sanctions 
exceptions for assistance under the Freedom Support Act, thereby 
removing the benefit of the doubt Congress gave Russia in 1992. I am 
afraid Russia has used this exception to the detriment of United States 
policy in the Persian Gulf.
  The threat from Iraq is not an immediate concern. The most important 
aspect of our policy with regard to Iraq must be to remain firm on the 
U.N. embargo. But given the history of the Iraqi military build-up 
before the Gulf war, the sanctions included in the Iran-Iraq Act may at 
a later date be as important with regard to Iraq as they are currently 
in the case of Iran.
  The threat from Iran is more immediate. The Iranian build-up in the 
Persian Gulf is common knowledge. Its importation of hundreds of North 
Korean SCUD-C missiles, its intention to acquire the Nodong North 
Korean missiles currently under development, and its efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons are well-established--as is its conventional weapons 
build-up.
  Successive CIA directors, and Secretaries Perry and Christopher have 
all testified to the effect that Iran is engaged in an extensive effort 
to acquire nuclear weapons. In February, Russia signed an agreement to 
provide Iran with a 1000 megawatt light water nuclear reactor. The 
Russians indicate that they may soon agree to build as many as three 
more reactors--another 1000 megawatt reactor, and two 440 megawatt 
reactors.
  I have raised my concerns regarding this sale with the administration 
on a number of occasions. Under the amendment I am offering today, the 
President will be required to either invoke sanctions against Russia as 
a result of its nuclear deal with Iran or formally waive the 
requirement out of concern for the national interest. Let me be clear. 
My intention is not to gut United States assistance to Russia. It is to 
prevent Russia from providing Iran dangerous technology. If the 
President determines that invoking sanctions against Russia is a 
greater potential danger to the national interest than the potential 
danger of a nuclear armed Iran, then he has the authority under this 
amendment to waive the sanctions.
  We sent our Armed Forces to war in the Persian Gulf once in this 
decade. They endured hardship to themselves and their families. Some 
will live with the injuries they suffered in service to our Nation for 
the rest of their lives. And, as is the case with every war, some never 
returned. With the cooperation of our friends in Europe, whose own 
sacrifices to the effort to free Kuwait should not be forgotten, we 
must see that the service of these brave men and women was not in vain.
  Stability and security in the Persian Gulf is vital to the world 
economy and to our own national interests. Aggressors in the region 
should know that if we must, we will return to the Persian Gulf with 
the full force of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, our friends 
and adversaries elsewhere in the world should understand that the 
United States will do everything in its power to preclude that 
necessity. It is my sincere hope that his legislation will serve as an 
indication of just how serious we are.
  Mr. WARNER. I believe this is acceptable on the other side.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2108) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2109

  (Purpose: To provide funding for the activities of the Defense Base 
     Closure and Realignment Commission for the remainder of 1995)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Thurmond, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2109.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 468, after line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 2825. FINAL FUNDING FOR DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND 
                   REALIGNMENT COMMISSION.

       Section 2902(k) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 
     U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following;
       ``(3)(A) The Secretary may transfer from the account 
     referred to in subparagraph (B) 

[[Page S 11321]]
     such unobligated funds in that account as may be necessary for the 
     Commission to carry out its duties under this part during 
     October, November, and December 1995. Funds transferred under 
     the preceding sentence shall remain available until December 
     31, 1995.
       ``(B) The account referred to in subparagraph (A) is the 
     Department of Defense Base Closure Account established under 
     section 207(a) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and 
     Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 
     U.S.C. 2687 note).''.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am pleased to sponsor an amendment 
that would authorize the Department of Defense to fund the Base Closure 
and Realignment Commission for the remainder of calendar year 1995.
  The law establishing the Base Closure Commission authorized the 
Department of Defense to fund the operations of the Commission using 
fiscal year 1991 authorization. Unfortunately, the Department's 1990 
estimate of the Commission's operating expenses fell short of actual 
requirement. This shortfall is due to the extensive travel required of 
the Commission to visit each base on the Secretary of Defense's closure 
list and attend the numerous hearings required to make the process as 
fair and open as possible. Additionally, the Commission had to purchase 
a new computer system to support its operation.
  Mr. President, in my judgment the Base Closure Commission has 
provided a valuable service to the Nation. The funding, which is 
estimated to be less than $300,000 is necessary for the Commission to 
archive at files and prepare the appropriate closeout reports. I am 
advised that the Department of Defense is prepared to provide the 
necessary funds from existing authority, but needs this legislation 
authority.
  Mr. President, this is an appropriate use of the Defense Department 
funds and I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this relates to the Base Closure 
Commission for the remainder of the calendar year for 1995. It is my 
understanding it has been accepted on the other side.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we have cleared this amendment. I urge its 
adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2109) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as far as I know, this concludes the 
matters relating to the pending measure. On behalf of the distinguished 
majority leader, I am prepared to address some wrapup items for the 
evening.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Virginia and look forward to further 
debate on the bill tomorrow morning.

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