[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 128 (Thursday, August 3, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11227-S11321]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). Under the previous order, the
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 1026, which the clerk will
report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1026) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1996 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] is recognized to offer an amendment on which
there shall be 90 minutes for debate equally divided.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Senator from North
Dakota? The Senator from Nebraska has been attempting to make an
opening statement with regard to the measure before us. I am wondering,
after the Senator from North Dakota has made the presentation under the
unanimous-consent agreement, if both sides would agree to the Senator
from Nebraska having 10 minutes for an opening statement on the overall
measure without being charged to the time under the control by the
majority or the minority.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if I might respond to the Senator from
Nebraska, I have no objection. But my understanding is that the 9 to
10:30 time period for this amendment would result in a vote at 10:30,
and there are some leadership obligations that require that vote to
occur at 10:30, and by unanimous consent we have limited debate to an
hour and a half, 45 minutes to each side, on the amendment.
It might be the case that the Senator should give an opening
presentation immediately after the vote at 10:30.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator. That does not happen to agree with the
schedule of the Senator from Nebraska. But I will try again.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I might say that I have no objection. But
my understanding is that the 10:30 vote must occur at 10:30 because of
some leadership obligations by previous agreement.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Robert
Russell, a fellow on detail from the Department of Energy, be allowed
floor privileges during the debate of S. 1026.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 2087
(Purpose: To reduce the amount authorized to be appropriated under
Title II for national missile defense)
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself,
Mr. Bradley, Mr. Leahy,
[[Page S 11228]]
Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an amendment
numbered 2087.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 32, strike out line 14 and insert in lieu thereof
the following` ``$9,233,148,000, of which--
``(A) not more than $357,900,000 is authorized to implement
the national missile defense policy established in section
233(2);''.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we have by unanimous consent a time
agreement on this amendment, I understand 45 minutes to each side. I
yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. President, let me begin to describe this amendment. It is
painfully simple. There was $300 million added to the defense
authorization bill by the Armed Services Committee for something that
this country does not need and that the Secretary of Defense says he
does not want. The proposal that I lay before the Senate is to take the
$300 million back out.
This, it seems to me, is a very symbolic issue. The $300 million is
to build a national missile defense system with instructions it be done
on a priority or accelerated basis so that the deployment begins in
1999. Some said yesterday, well, this has nothing to do with star wars.
And, of course, that is not true at all. This is, in fact, national
missile defense, which includes a star wars component. It is the
building of missiles in order to create some sort of astrodome over our
country to block incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles.
It is the revival of a proposal offered in the early 1980's by then
President Ronald Reagan. Of course, times were different then. The
Soviet Union existed. We had a cold war that was in full force. We had
an active adversary and a real threat. Times have changed. Now we have
the dismantling and destruction of intercontinental ballistic missiles
in Russia. And, paradoxically, we are helping pay the bill to destroy
those missiles.
It is an irony that does not escape me this morning that the same
people who proposed $300 million in additional spending this year as
part of what will eventually be a $48 billion new project are also
saying they want to cut back on our contribution to help the Soviets
dismantle and destroy their intercontinental ballistic missiles. If
ever there is a disconnection, it seems to me it is in that logic.
To call this $300 million--or what eventually will be a $40 billion
program--``pork'' is I think unfair to pigs. Hogs carry around a little
meat. This in my judgment is pure, unadulterated lard.
I want to describe this proposal in the context of what the Secretary
of Defense has said. I am reading from a letter from the Secretary to
Senator Nunn:
This bill will direct the development for deployment by
2003 [incidentally, the early deployment by 1999] of a
multiple site system for national missile defense that, if
deployed, would be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. The
bill would severely strain U.S.-Russian relations and would
threaten continued Russian implementation of the START I
Treaty and further Russian consideration of the START II
Treaty. These two treaties will eliminate strategic launchers
carrying two-thirds of the nuclear warheads that confronted
the Nation during the cold war.
That is a statement of current administration policy.
S. 1026 would authorize appropriations for defense programs
that exceed by approximately $7 billion the administration's
FY 1996 request.
A $7 billion increase, this from folks who say they are opposed to
the Federal deficit.
Here is what the committee says:
The committee recognizes that deploying a multiple site NMD
system by 2003 will require significant investments in the
outyears.
And, incidentally, the Congressional Budget Office says anywhere from
$30 to $40 billion. But the committee avoids the issue. The committee:
. . . directs the Secretary of Defense to budget
accordingly.
This is very interesting. The Armed Services Committee says we are
going to build this. Here is $300 million you do not want to build
something we do not need, and it is going to cost $48 billion, and we
say to you, Mr. Secretary of Defense, ``budget accordingly.''
It does not say where he should get the money. It does not say they
are going to raise taxes to pay for it. It says to the Secretary of
Defense, budget accordingly.
Well, we all understand what that means. That means that the warriors
who fight so hard rhetorically to reduce the Federal budget deficit are
now wallflowers who decide they want to use the taxpayers' credit card
to go out and purchase a $48 billion national ballistic missile program
that this country does not need and cannot afford.
It seems to me we ought to ask two questions about these kinds of
proposals when they come to us. One is, do we need it? And the second
is, can we afford it?
On the first question, do we need it, do we need the $300 million
added to this budget, the Secretary of Defense says no.
Can we afford it? Even if we do not need it, can we afford it? Does
anybody in this room, living in a country that is up to its neck in
debt, with annual yearly deficits that are still alarming and a Federal
debt approaching $5 trillion, believe we can afford something we do not
need?
I am going to talk some about the system itself, but first I wish to
talk about the irony of being here in the Chamber at a time when we are
told repeatedly, week after week after week, that we do not have enough
money. We are told we do not have enough money to fully fund the
programs to be able to send kids to college. So we are going to budget
in a way that is going to make it harder for families to send their
kids to college because we have to tighten our belt. We are told that
we cannot afford to provide an entitlement that a poor child should
have a hot lunch at school in the middle of the day because we must
tighten our belt. We are told health care is too expensive and so we
must cut $270 billion from Medicare and a substantial amount from
Medicaid because we must tighten our belt.
So for the American family, the message is tighten your belt on
things like education, health care, nutrition. But when it comes to
security, we are told it is not time to tighten our belt; let us get
the wish lists out and let us get the American taxpayers' checkbook
out--or the credit card more likely--and let us decide to build a
project that the Secretary of Defense says he does not want money for
at this point.
Let me talk about the project itself.
This bill provides research and development funds in order to
accelerate the deployment of a national missile defense system. The
administration requested $371 million for its ongoing research and
development program. The Armed Services Committee says that is not good
enough for us. The committee wants $300 million more added to the
request because it wants to deploy the system in four years. The
committee is telling the Defense Department to build it. They are
saying that it does not matter to us what you think; it does not matter
to us whether you think we need it. We insist you build it.
I come from a State where the only antiballistic missile system in
the free world was built. It was built in the late 1960's and early
1970's. Less than 30 days after it was declared operational, it was
mothballed. In other words, in the same month that it was declared
fully operational it was also mothballed.
It is anticipated, because of our Nation's geography, that one of the
sites in a multiple site national missile defense system would be in
North Dakota. There would likely be one North Dakota site. And I
suppose some would say, well, that means jobs in your State; you ought
to support this.
I do not think it makes sense to support a defense initiative of this
type especially at this time in our country's history if you measure it
with the yardstick of a jobs program. Yes, this might include some jobs
in North Dakota, but it also will include the commitment and the
prospect of taking $40 billion from the American taxpayers to build a
project we do not need, with money we do not have, at a time when we
are telling a lot of Americans that we cannot make investments in human
potential for the future of this country.
There is an ancient Chinese saying:
If you are planning for a year, plant rice; if you are
planning for 10 years, plant trees; if you are planning for
100 years, plant men.
[[Page S 11229]]
I take ``plant men'' to mean ``educate your children.''
In this Chamber, we appropriately say that we have big financial
problems. We are choking on debt and must do something about it. We
have a lot of folks who talk a lot about it, gnash their teeth, who
wring their hands, and act like warriors on deficit reduction--until it
comes time for a bill like this. And then they say to us, boy, we have
threats; we have threats from North Korea; we have threats from Libya;
we have threats from Iraq.
What do those threats suggest we should do? What we should do is,
under the aegis of reform--which is the wrong ``re'' word; the real
``re'' word is not ``reform''; it is ``retread''--is resurrect and dust
off a proposal coming from the early 1980's, a cold war relic to build
a national missile defense system to put an umbrella over America to
protect against incoming missiles from some renegade country. Far more
important, in my judgment, is the threat from a suitcase bomb
somewhere; you start worrying about a nuclear device hauled in the
trunk of a car and parked at a dock in New York City; you start
worrying about a canister 3 inches high of deadly biological weapons.
That is far more likely a threat to this country than a terrorist
getting ahold of an intercontinental ballistic missile and attempting
to blackmail America.
Mr. President, I am most anxious to hear those who defend this kind
of spending on projects that are, in my judgment, worthless. So let me
at this point yield the floor and listen and then respond to some of
what I hear. I hope maybe the Senate, voting on this today, will decide
that it ought not spend $300 million we do not have on something the
Secretary of Defense says we do not need. That would seem to me to send
a powerful signal to the American people who in this body is serious
about the issue of the Federal deficit.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve my time.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the
Dorgan amendment. The Armed Services Committee has taken a hard look at
the ballistic missile defense programs and concluded that an increase
of $300 million is warranted--indeed, badly needed. If the United
States is to ever be defended against even the most limited ballistic
missile threats, we must begin now.
The administration's program for national missile defense is simply
inadequate. And in my view, the ballistic missile threat facing the
United States is significant and growing. This threat clearly justifies
an accelerated effort to develop and deploy highly effective theater
and national missile defenses. In the bill now before the Senate we
have done just this. The Missile Defense Act is a responsible and
measured piece of legislation that responds to a growing threat to
American national security.
There have been many arguments raised in opposition to the Missile
Defense Act of 1995. These are either false or seriously exaggerated.
Let me address three of the main objections that have been mentioned
repeatedly.
First, the Missile Defense Act of 1995 does not signal a return to
star wars. It advocates modest and affordable programs that are
technically low risk.
Second, it does not violate or advocate violation of the ABM Treaty.
The means to implement the policies and goals outlined in the Missile
Defense Act of 1995 are contained in the ABM Treaty itself.
Finally, the policies and goals contained in the Missile Defense Act
of 1995 will not undermine START II or other arms control agreements.
Russia has repeatedly agreed in the past that deployment of a limited
national missile defense system is not inconsistent with deterrence and
stability. The United States must not allow critical national security
programs to be held hostage to other issues when there is no
substantive or logical linkage between them.
Mr. President, I therefore would conclude by urging my colleagues to
oppose the amendment by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota.
This amendment would undermine a critical defense requirement and
further perpetuate the vulnerability of the American people.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I, too, rise in opposition to the amendment.
I would like to begin with a quote from Secretary Perry in this general
area now, that we have entered the post-cold war time. Secretary Perry
is quoted as saying:
The bad news is that in this era deterrence may not provide
even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We may be
facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles
and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future. And they
may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be
madder than MAD.
MAD, mutually assured destruction.
Mr. President, I think it is unfortunate that there are those who
seem to think that the American people should not be defended against
the one military threat which holds them at risk in their homes on a
daily basis. Simply stated, this amendment seeks to perpetuate what
many believe is truly an American vulnerability.
Yesterday there were only five Senators who opposed a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution that the American people should be defended against
accidental, intentional, or limited ballistic missile attack. Today the
Senator from North Dakota is attempting to cut $300 million from
national missile defense to ensure that American cities will in effect
remain undefended without this additional funding.
Senators yesterday voted in favor of defending the American people in
this new era that we are in. So today all Senators will have an
opportunity to demonstrate whether or not they are serious about a
national defense. If you believe, as the Senator from North Dakota so
honestly does, and has stated, that the United States should not be
defended against this particular potential for ballistic missile
attack, then support the amendment. But if you believe that the time
has come to get on with national missile defense, you should oppose
this amendment.
We have heard quite a bit about how there is no threat and how
investment in national missile defense is a waste of money. Let us
remember that more Americans died in the Persian Gulf war as a result
of one missile than any other single cause. I do not imagine that the
families of these victims would view missile defense investments as a
waste.
The argument that there is no threat to justify the deployment of a
national missile defense system I think is strategically shortsighted
and technically incorrect. Even if we get started today, by the time we
develop and deploy an NMD system we will almost certainly face new
ballistic missile threats to the United States. Unfortunately, it will
take almost 10 years to develop and deploy even a limited system.
Much has been made of the intelligence community's estimate that no
new threat to the United States will develop for 10 years. But the
intelligence community has confirmed that there are numerous ways for
hostile countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in
much less than 10 years by other than indigenous development. I would
point out the same intelligence has also prepared a chart that has been
displayed on the Senate floor showing the North Korean missile
programs, including the Taepo Dong II ICBM, which DIA says could be
operational in 5 years.
We see the size and the capability of destructive ability of these
various missiles. You have got the Scud-B, the Scud-C, the No Dong, the
Taepo Dong I and II. And these have not been tested. But it is very
capable for them to do that, the North Koreans to do that. And it is
estimated that they could go to this biggest one, which would be well
over the 1,000 kilometers, in 5 years or maybe less. And in developing
this system North Korea has demonstrated to the world that an ICBM
capability can emerge rapidly and relatively with little notice.
Nobody knows with certainty what the range of this potential new
missile would be. But we do know that it is approximately the size of
the Minuteman ICBM.
Even if we knew with certainty that no new threat would materialize
for 10 years there would still be a strong case for developing and
deploying a national
[[Page S 11230]]
defense system. Developing an NMD system would serve to deter countries
that would seek to acquire otherwise ICBM capability. A vulnerable
United States merely invites proliferation, blackmail, and even
aggression.
It has also been argued that the administration's NMD program costs
less than the one proposed in the defense authorization bill. Well, I
guess that is right. It usually does cost more to actually do something
about a problem than nothing, which is precisely what the
administration's program will do, I fear--nothing at all. They request
money. And they have requested almost $400 million this year. And yet
it is not enough to actually get the job done. The administration's
program has no deployment goal in sight. In effect, you know, it wastes
almost $400 million per year on a program designed never to achieve a
specific end. In my view, if we are not going to actually deploy
something we ought to take the rest of the NMD money and spend it on
something that will defend America.
The Senator from North Dakota has stated that the system we want to
build will cost $40 billion. But by the administration's own charts, it
states that it would cost less than $25 billion, including a full
space-based sensor constellation. How does this compare to the cost of
the F-22, the B-2 or other major new systems? I think it is a pretty
good investment relative to virtually anything else that DOD is
developing. What good does it do to be able to project power overseas
with modern and sophisticated weapons if we cannot secure our families
at home? Remember what we are talking about here.
It is not an insignificant amount, an additional $300 million
approximately, but you are talking about the cost of three or four
airplanes. You are talking about offensive weaponry, three or four
airplanes. We can move toward the ability to develop and deploy this
system.
One other chart I would like to refer to with regard to the national
missile defense program. The Bottom-Up Review just, I guess, 2 years
ago, projected the expenditures at this level for the national missile
defense. The administration fiscal year 1995 request was as you see up
to about, I believe it indicated about $500 million. And then in the
fiscal year 1996 it dropped down, and what this bill actually does is
basically a very small increase over what the administration's fiscal
year 1995 request was. So, talking about just enough increase to move
toward actual development and the ability to deploy within 10 years.
So this is a good-sense approach. It is one based on what the
administration had projected in its Bottom-Up Review and what it asked
for in 1995.
For those who argue that the Senate Armed Services Committee is
throwing money at ballistic missile defense, I point out that the
amount of this bill for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is
$136 million lower than the Clinton administration's own Bottom-Up
Review recommended for fiscal year 1996. It is also less than the
administration's own budget forecast in last year's plan.
All four of the defense committees in Congress have increased funding
for the national missile defense. In fact, the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee have
recommended a smaller increase than the House committees have. The
House has recommended an increase of $450 million.
In response to those who say the administration did not request this
increase, I point out the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has
made it clear on many occasions and with the administration's, I think,
tacit approval, that if more money was made available for ballistic
missile programs that they would want to spend $400 million on the
national missile defense program.
The bottom line is simple. If you think that the American people
should not be defended against ballistic missiles, then go ahead and
support this amendment. If you think that the time has come to do
something about an ever-increasing threat in this post-cold-war era,
then vote against this amendment.
I strongly urge my colleagues to put themselves on the side of
defending the American people at a very reasonable cost.
I yield the floor, Mr. President.
Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the time.
I was listening intently to the Senator from Mississippi. I was glad
he brought that up because the Senator from North Dakota has said over
and over and over again that this is a $40 billion program for the
future. I think it has to be clarified, and yet after we clarify it, I
suggest the Senator from North Dakota will continue to use $40 billion.
This is just not true.
The Senator from Mississippi talked about, according to the figures
of the administration, it was $24.2 billion. But I suggest that
includes the SMTS program, Brilliant Eyes, which is funded separately,
which can be taken off. It is closer to $18 billion.
We do have an investment today in the program of $38 billion. Some
people estimate it is more than that. Let us be conservative and say
$38 billion in what we call the SDI program, which some people like to
continue to use star wars to try to make the public of this country
believe that this is some fantasy, that it is not real. It is not
something we are handling today.
The SDI program, we feel, helped end the cold war by 5 years. What
kind of a value can we put on that? In fact, the Russian Ambassador to
the United States, Vladimir Lukin, stated that if it had not been for
SDI, the cold war would have gone on for 5 additional years.
The SDI program and its research led to systems, not fantasies, but
systems in place today, such as the Aegis system, cruisers and
destroyers, kinetic energy programs, the hit-to-kill technologies which
are used in the THAAD, the PAC-3, the Navy upper-tier defense systems.
These are not star wars; these are technologies. They are on line
today.
All we are trying to do is say that in 5 years from now, where many
in the intelligence community say we are going to be threatened by
perhaps North Korea or other technology that will reach the United
States--and this is something that most of the intelligence community
agrees with--we want to do something today that will be within the
confines of the ABM Treaty. We talked about that before. This is as
much as we can do to reach the point so that 5 years from today, we are
going to be able to defend the United States against missile attacks.
The Senator from North Dakota refers over and over again to the
suitcase bombs, to the ships and vans that deliver weapons. And on that
case, I agree with the Senator from North Dakota, I think he is right.
But we are already taking care of that. We are already working on that
program.
The Senator from North Dakota talks about intelligence estimates. I
asked yesterday on this floor, what if we are wrong, what if those
intelligence estimates he is saying where the threat is not there for
10 more years, what if we are right and it is 5 more years? What if he
is wrong? Look back to 1940 and Pearl Harbor. At that time our
estimates were wrong; North Korea in 1950, or more recently, Iraq in
1990. Our intelligence was wrong at that time.
The Senator relies on the cold war mutually assured destruction
program embodied in the triad of missile submarines, land-based
missiles and bombers, but we had all these things 5 years ago, and that
did not deter Saddam Hussein from using Scud missiles.
When the Senator points out that the administration says that $300
million to defend Americans from attack is not in our interest, he
ignores the fact that just 3 months ago, the director of the Pentagon's
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, with the administration's
blessing, said that they could spend $500 million more. That is $200
million more than the additional amount we are trying to put on that we
did put on in the Senate Armed Services Committee and our counterparts
in the other body to reach a system that would defend America.
The Senator from North Dakota is also citing the administration
supposedly defended our interests last year by spending $2 billion. We
are doing a lot of talking now about $300
[[Page S 11231]]
million. What about the $2 billion that we spent for humanitarian
missions that, by their own admission, in the Senate Armed Services
Committee, by the Secretary of Defense were really not to our vital
national security interests.
I am talking about Somalia and Haiti and Bosnia and Rwanda. We are
spending all this money. We are sending our troops all the way around
the world to defend violations of human rights. Certainly, I am not
insensitive to the ethnic cleansing that is going on and all these
human rights violations. But we are spending huge amounts for that. I
disagree with the foreign policy of the administration, and I do not
think we should be doing it. But if we are doing it, that is $2
billion, and we are talking $300 million right now to keep this on line
to be able to defend this country 5 years from now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from South Carolina yield 2
additional minutes?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I grant him 2 more minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. Finally, Mr. President, I must express my amazement with
the priorities of the Senator from North Dakota. He wants to cut $300
million from the missile defense. He says we have higher domestic
priorities. We heard about the nutrition programs, we heard about all
these social programs that seem to, in his mind, have a higher
priority.
I suggest to you that this $300 million is a relatively small amount
of money. The one bomb in Oklahoma City that wiped out the Murrah
Federal Building cost the taxpayers $500 million--one bomb.
I suggest if the Senator from North Dakota could have stood with me
in Oklahoma City on April 19, April 20, April 21, when they are sending
troops and volunteers into this building to pull out people who might
be alive in there, the hope was there that more would be alive, then
the fourth day came and the smell of death had enveloped the city, if
you could have been there, and what was going through my mind was, this
is just one building in one city, one missile could come in there and
wipe out every building in the city of Oklahoma City, in the city of
Sioux Falls, SD, in Bismarck, ND, in New York City, could wipe out the
entire thing.
Multiply that one thing, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
by 100, by 1,000. That is the threat that is out there. That is the
threat that can reach, according to many in the intelligence community,
this country within 5 years. We have to be ready for that. This should
be the highest priority. We are elected to defend America. That is
exactly what this is about today.
So, Mr. President, in the strongest of terms, I say this is the
minimum that we can do to keep on force, to have a national missile
defense system in place in 5 years when the threat is very real.
Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Initiative, reported by the Armed
Services Committee, puts our Nation on the right track to address the
growing missile threat to our country.
In the defense appropriations bill, which was reported last week, we
fully supported every element of that plan, and I congratulate Senators
Thurmond, Lott, and others who worked with them on this plan.
Every intelligence assessment available to the Congress indicates
that the threat posed to U.S. military forces is growing from ballistic
missiles, as is the threat to the United States itself.
There can be no greater imperative, as we allocate funding for
research and development for future systems, than to develop and deploy
an effective national missile defense system.
This matter has special significance to every citizen of my State of
Alaska. Already, North Korea is developing missiles that could attack
the military installations in Alaska.
Alaska-based F-15's, F-16's, and OA-10 aircraft will be the first to
respond to any attack on South Korea. On that basis, we are a target
for North Korea.
The distinguished Senator from North Dakota may be confident that his
State will not face that threat in coming years, and I share that
confidence. Our country was lucky in the gulf war. The ingenuity and
technical creativeness ensured that we had some minimal capacity to
respond to the Iraqi Scud missile threat.
We cannot, and must not, rely on luck to be ready to face the risk of
missile launches against my State and against the United States in
total. We must make the investment now to have ready a system to
deploy, if that is the decision of the President and Congress.
The additional funds proposed for authorization and appropriation for
national missile defense is a reasonable and affordable start for this
program.
I am here to urge all Members to support this initiative. I do so as
a Senator from a State that is seriously threatened today, and I
believe the funding authorized by this bill, already included in the
defense appropriations bill, is the proper way to start.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield such time as I may consume to
myself.
Mr. President, statements have been made that my position is I do not
want to defend America's cities against a very real threat--total
nonsense; absolute nonsense.
My position is that we should not be spending money we do not have on
something the Secretary of Defense says we do not need. Let me read
from a letter from Secretary of Defense William Perry to Senator Nunn:
The bill's provision would add nothing to DOD's ability to
pursue our missile defense programs and would needlessly
cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks.
The bill would require the United States to make a decision
now on developing a specific national missile defense for
deployment by 2003, with interim operational capability in
1999, despite the fact that a balanced strategic missile
threat has not emerged. Our national missile defense program
is designed to give us the capability for a deployment
decision in 3 years, when we will be in a much better
position to assess the threat and deploy the most
technologically advanced system available, if they think it
is needed.
This is not a case of somebody deciding we do not want to protect
America's cities. It is a case of saying we do not want to spend $300
million that the Secretary of Defense says we do not need to spend.
Let me respond to a couple of other things that have been said. This
is not about just $300 million. It is about $48 billion, according to
the Congresional Budget Office. I ask all the Senators who spoke here,
where are you going to get that money? You suggest that the Secretary
of Defense budget for it. I ask you, are you going to charge it? And
are you going to tax people for it? Where are you going to get the
money? Do you want to advance a notion now that you want to build a $50
billion new system, which by the way does, indeed, include star wars,
as page 59 of the bill says? I ask you, where are you going to get the
money for it?
Let me say to you, as well, that when you talk about the threat from
an intercontinental ballistic missile, as you have all talked about,
you understand and I understand--I have some material that I will not
read from on the floor, but it is material from Nobel laureates, from
veterans of the Manhattan project and from physicists who are experts
in this field, all of whom agree--and I think you would agree--that a
threat from a renegade country is far more likely as a result of a
cruise missile, which cannot be defended against by this system, than
it is from an intercontinental ballistic missile. A cruise missile is
easier to build and cheaper to build and more likely for them to get.
I ask you this question, if you are worried about protecting
America's cities: If you finished spending $48 billion to defend
against ballistic missiles, then tell me how that system defends
America's cities against the far more likely threat of cruise missiles.
The fact is that by building a national ballistic missile defense you
have done nothing to defend against a cruise missile attack on American
cities.
That is the point. The point here is that this is a weapons program
with a constituency. Like all weapons programs, it does not matter what
the climate is--it can be rain, snow, wind, or
[[Page S 11232]]
sleet; you can have a Soviet Union or not, and it could be 1983 or
1995--this weapons program has legs. It has jobs and it has
constituencies. This is out of step, makes no sense, and yet we see on
the floor of the Senate folks who come here and say, well, let us, this
year, stick $300 million more in this program than was asked for and
than is needed. Why? Because we want to defend America's cities.
Against what? Against a threat which the Secretary of Defense says does
not exist, and Nobel laureates and veterans of the Manhattan project
say does not exist.
If you are so all-fired worried about threats, let us focus on the
threats that the Nation will really face.
One additional thing. I think the Senator from Oklahoma makes the
point that I have been trying to make this morning when he talks about
the tragic bombing of Oklahoma City. It is not an intercontinental
ballistic missile with all of its sophisticated targeting that is the
likely way to attack against America. It is far more likely to be a
rental truck, a suitcase, a glass vial, a single-engine airplane. I
think the Senator from Oklahoma made the point I was trying to make.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DORGAN. I will not yield on my time.
Mr. INHOFE. I would like to respond to the Senator.
Mr. DORGAN. If the Senator would give time, I am happy to answer
questions. But we have 45 minutes equally divided.
I will at this time reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Minnesota, Senator Wellstone.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, let me just say that 5
minutes is not a lot of time to make the case. But I am in strong
support of the Dorgan amendment for a number of reasons. First of all,
I will talk policy, and then I will talk budget. There is no
significant long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States
now or in the immediate future. The head of the DIA stated:
We see no interest in or capability of any new country
reaching the continental United States with a long-range
missile for at least the next decade.
Mr. President, the national missile defense provides no defense
against the most likely future attacks on the United States, which will
not be delivered by missiles. We have seen that clearly in a tragic way
at the World Trade Center, the Federal building in Oklahoma City, and
the subway in Tokyo.
Mr. President, there are many arguments I could make about this
impossible dream. But let me just put it in a slightly broader context.
We have out here a bill that requests $7 billion more than the Pentagon
says it needs. We have out here with star wars a request for $300
million more than the Pentagon says it wants to spend or needs to
spend.
Mr. President, I think this amendment is about more than star wars.
It is about priorities. And if you look at requests for Head Start, it
is $3.9 billion, but the total cost of the next aircraft carrier, the
CVN-78, is $4.6 billion.
If you look at requests for police officers, housing, childhood
immunization, alongside star wars, the B-2, Pentagon budget, $7 billion
more in this bill than requested by the Pentagon itself, of the kind of
stories that are now coming out, Mr. President, about a variety of
different pork projects, all across the country, we have to ask
ourselves the question, what are we doing here?
I was on the floor of the Senate not too long ago, saying why are we
eliminating low-income energy assistance? I was talking about the poor
in the cold-weather State of Minnesota. We also could talk about
cooling assistance. This was during the time where we read that 450
people died, many elderly and poor.
On the one hand, we cut low-income energy assistance, we cut
education programs, we cut job programs, we cut all sorts of nutrition
programs, we are not investing in our children, and we have here a bill
that asks for $7 billion more than the Pentagon says it needs for our
national defense.
Now we have--for this impossible dream, many independent people
arguing it never will work anyway--a request for an additional $300
million.
Mr. President, the real national security for our country is not for
star wars in space. It is to feed children and educate children and
provide safety and security for people in communities, and job
opportunities for people on Earth.
This is outrageous. At the very time we have some of our deficit
hawks saying, ``Cut this nutrition program, cut low-income energy
assistance, cut legal services, cut job training, cut summer youth
programs, cut education programs, cut health care programs,'' we have
here a budget that asks for $7 billion more than the Pentagon wants,
and $300 million more for star wars--this impossible dream, this
fantasy--than is requested by our own defense people.
This is really a test, I say to my colleague from North Dakota, this
is a test case vote, as to whether or not we are serious about reducing
the deficit and investing in people in our country, investing in people
who live in the communities in our country. That is what this is about.
Senators, you cannot dance at two weddings at the same time. Maybe
you are trying to dance at three weddings at the same time. You cannot
keep saying you are for deficit reduction, you cannot keep saying you
are for children and education, you cannot keep saying that you are for
job opportunities, you cannot keep saying you are for veterans, you
cannot keep saying we will not cut Medicare, and at the same time
allocating more and more money for your pork military projects, and
adding to a military budget that the Pentagon itself says it does not
need. I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services
Committee for yielding time to discuss this amendment.
Going back to basics, the amendment is to cut $300 million from the
committee's request for funding for the Defense Department. The
committee has a $300 million increase from what the administration had
requested for this particular part of the budget. The House had
increased it $400 million. The Senate increase is less than the House
increase by $100 million. The Dorgan amendment is to cut $300 million
from the committee's request.
The primary arguments against the committee's mark are categorized
into two areas: First, the threat is not that great or that soon;
second, the money could be spent on other things.
First, talking about the threat, there is a suggestion here that the
threat is not imminent. The threat we are talking about is a threat to
relatively soon be able to attack the continental United States,
because this is the national missile defense part of the program we are
talking about.
Now, we all understand that eventually we will have to have a defense
against missiles that would either be accidentally or intentionally
launched against U.S. territory. The question is, how soon do we need
to begin preparing for that?
The Senator from North Dakota says we do not need to worry about it
yet because it will be maybe 10 years before the threat emerges. There
are two primary responses to it. First, it is wrong; and, second, we
are not taking into account the fact that it takes a long time to
develop the programs to respond to the offensive threat.
We have been working at this program for a long time. It has been 5
years yesterday, since the taking over of Kuwait by Iraq. Yet we are
not very far down the road in terms of improving our ability to defend
even against a missile like the Scud B that the Iraqis had. We are
talking here about much longer range missiles than the Scud B. We are
talking about missiles that could reach U.S. territory.
Now, at first we are talking about the State of Alaska or the
Territory of Guam. I know it is of interest to the Senator from North
Dakota.
In fact, we all would be very, very concerned about a threat to any
U.S. citizen, whether it be in Guam or whether it be in Alaska. It does
not have to be to the heartland of America.
What is the fact with regard to this threat? The person who last
headed the CIA just prior to the new Director, John Deutch, the then
Acting Director
[[Page S 11233]]
of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral William Studeman, made this
point just a few months ago. He said,
Our understanding of North Korea's earlier Scud development
leads us to believe that it is unlikely Pyongyang could
deploy Taepo-Dong I or Taepo-Dong II missiles before 3 to 5
years. However, if Pyongyang has foreshortened its
development program, we could see these missiles earlier.
What the acting CIA Director was saying is that they probably will
not have this missile that could reach the United States for 3 to 5
years.
Well, we cannot develop this system within 3 to 5 years. The bill
calls for some kind of a deployment, hopefully, by 1999. That is within
the timeframe that the CIA Director acknowledges the Taepo-Dong II
missile could be developed.
Now, what about the current CIA director? John Deutch said last year,
``If the North Koreans field that Taepo-Dong II missile, Guam, Alaska,
and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk.''
The point here is that North Korea, a belligerent state over whom we
have virtually no negotiating control, no diplomatic control, is
developing a weapon which the CIA says could potentially reach United
States territory in 3 to 5 years.
If the 3 years is correct, we cannot possibly have anything deployed
in time to meet that threat. Even if it is just used to blackmail us,
it is a tremendous threat. For those who say that there is no threat
here, the facts do not bear them out. The intelligence estimates do not
bear them out.
The other side of this argument is, well, there are other threats.
There could be a suitcase bomb. There is a cruise missile threat, and
of course the answer is yes, that is true. We are doing everything we
can to meet those threats as well.
It is a fallacy of logic to suggest that because there is some other
threat that, therefore, this is not a threat. That is the logic of the
Senator from North Dakota. Well, somebody might bring a suitcase bomb
over.
Well, we are working that problem very hard. The last three CIA
Directors have said that their primary concern is the proliferation of
these weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that can deliver
them.
As a matter of fact, there has not been a suitcase nuclear bomb
explode, but there have been missiles launched against U.S. forces. As
a matter of fact, as I said yesterday, fully 20 percent of our
casualties in the Persian Gulf were as a result of a Scud missile. We
did not have an adequate protection against the Scud missile.
We at least had the Patriot over there. We have nothing to protect
the people in the United States. I think the CIA Directors are a pretty
good source for the proposition that there is a potential threat out
there, and we will be lucky to be able to deploy a system in time to
meet that threat, if their statistics are correct.
Now, just one quick final point on the threat. The Senator from North
Dakota suggests that the triad is actually adequate here, but the same
Secretary of Defense that he is so fond of relying on has made it clear
that mutual assured destruction, the threat that we retaliate with
nuclear weapons against Iraq or some other country, is just not
credible.
As Secretary Perry said on March 8 of this year,
The bad news is that in this era, deterrence may not
provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold war. We
may be facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future,
and they may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they
may be madder than MAD.
And the M-A-D that he is referring to is the mutual assured
destruction doctrine, which the Secretary is saying is madness today.
That doctrine no longer works. We need a defense, not just the threat
of massive retaliation to prevent countries from launching missiles
against the United States.
Finally, let us talk about the amount here. First of all, as the
Senator from Mississippi pointed out earlier, the amount that is in the
Senate bill this year is less than the Clinton administration requested
last year in their 5-year budget. So in the 5-year plan the
administration sent up here last year, they were asking for more money
for this program than the committee has asked for this year. It is a
matter of timing, of when you spend the money. As I think I have
pointed out, even with this amount of money we will be lucky to be able
to field something that is effective by the time the threat is upon us.
Second, there is a suggestion here that the Secretary does not want
this because he has not asked for it. Obviously, we are all aware of
the politics within the Pentagon and the administration and not asking
for it is not the same as not wanting it. You will note in the letter
from the Secretary, nowhere does he say: Do not send us this $300
million, I do not want it and I will not spend it if you send it to me.
As a matter of fact, his spokesman on this issue, Gen. Malcolm O'Neill,
before the House committee just a few weeks ago, was asked if he could
spend this money, and here is what he said:
I have reviewed the BMD program, the impact of last year's
budget reductions and the schedule of several key programs in
order to recommend where additional resources could be best
applied.
Remember, the House is talking about $400 million in additional
resources. And he says:
These funds could be effectively used in several key BMD
programs to accelerate development efforts, preserve early
development options for a national missile defense system,
and to protect current theater missile defense system
acquisition schedules.
In other words, the expert in this area, the head of the program,
Gen. Mal O'Neill, made it clear to the House of Representatives if he
had this extra money he could effectively use it. I understand the
administration position is against this. We all understand that. But it
is not common sense when you recognize the speed with which this threat
could be upon us and the ability we have to develop a system that could
defend us.
When I say it is not common sense, I do not mean to denigrate the
Secretary of Defense. He is a fine public servant and is very concerned
about the future of our country. But reasonable people can differ about
the speed with which we ought to get on with this effort and the
priority of spending this money. I submit the weight of evidence from
the Central Intelligence Agency and from the other people who have
spoken on the issue is, we better get about this task right away.
The final point with regard to the money is that while we could be
spending this money on summer youth programs or Low Income Home Energy
Assistance--of course we could. But what is more important, defending
American lives or summer youth programs? We have to set priorities
around here. I submit, if a missile were launched against the State of
Hawaii or the State of Alaska, every one of us on this floor would be
denouncing the act and would be asking why that was allowed to happen?
Who sat by while this threat emerged? Who allowed this threat to evolve
to the point we could not defend our own citizens from a missile
attack? Those would be the questions asked on this floor.
Today that question can be answered because those people who seek to
cut these funds out of the committee bill will be the people
responsible for us not having a system at the time that the CIA
believes we are going to need to have it. That is the question before
the body. Do we go along with the leadership? Do we go along with the
committee, which is the body of expertise on this? Do we go along with
the Central Intelligence estimates, and do we go along to fund this
program to at least get us on a path to develop and deploy a system in
the time we need it? Or do we take the risk and roll the dice, spend
the money on summer youth programs or Low Income Home Energy Assistance
or the like?
I submit the decision today is that we should go along with the
committee's request here, support the committee and vote down the
Dorgan amendment which would cut the $300 million.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me yield a minute to myself before I
yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas.
I might say if ever there is an Olympic event called side stepping, I
have seen this morning several candidates for gold medals.
Let us not be confused about what the Secretary of Defense has said.
Here is a letter he sent last week. It says this:
[[Page S 11234]]
The bill's provisions would add nothing to DOD's ability to
pursue our missile defense programs and would needlessly
cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks.
That is not a letter from a Secretary who is undecided about whether
this is good policy or not. The Senator from Arizona says he just has
not asked us. The Senator says that of course, the Secretary would like
to get it this additional money.
Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DORGAN. This letter says he does not want it. He thinks it adds
excess costs and additional security risks to this country. So let us
not be confused about the message from the Secretary of Defense. He is
clear on this issue.
Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DORGAN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas. I will be
happy to yield momentarily for a question.
Mr. KYL. Briefly, can the Senator point anywhere in that letter where
he is referring to this $300 million? He is referring generally to this
bill, not to this $300 million.
Mr. DORGAN. In fact, he specifically refers to this $300 million in
this program, I say to the Senator from Arizona, in the following part
of this paragraph. I read it once before and I am not going to read it
again for you.
The point is, he is talking about developing specific national
missile defense for interim operational capability in 1999 and for full
deployment in 2003. That is exactly and specifically the program we are
now debating. If the Senator is asking, was the Secretary talking about
this issue, the answer is clearly, unequivocally, yes, that is exactly
what the Secretary was talking about in this letter.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from New Hampshire is
recognized.
Mr. SMITH. I thank the Senator from South Carolina for yielding, and
thank him for his leadership in support of the defense of the United
States of America.
I am very pleased that this amendment has been offered. I oppose it,
vehemently and strongly oppose it, but I am glad it has been offered
because it gives the American people a chance once and for all to see
just exactly what this debate is all about and who stands for what.
The Dorgan amendment would leave the American people completely
vulnerable to ballistic missile threats, completely vulnerable. It says
to our constituents, it is OK to protect Israel, protect France,
protect Germany, protect Italy, protect our allies, but not our folks
at home. Do not protect them.
The armed services bill, on the other hand, establishes a program to
defend all Americans, regardless of where they live, against a limited
ballistic missile attack. For the life of me, I do not understand how
anyone could use the argument it is OK to protect somebody in one area
of the country and not in another area of the country. How can one do
that and keep a straight face?
The Clinton program and the Dorgan amendment leaves the United States
hostage, completely, to the likes of Kim Jong Il and the Pyongyang
Communists. The intelligence community has suggested that North Korea
may well deploy an ICBM capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii within 5
years, and some talk maybe even as far as San Francisco in a very short
period of time, but the Senator from North Dakota thinks it is wrong
for us to defend these American citizens?
If the Senator disagrees with this assessment, let us look at the
statement of the recently confirmed Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, John Deutch. Dr. Deutch stated,
If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong II missile, Guam,
Alaska, and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at risk.
This is a serious, serious problem. The issue really boils down to
this. Twenty nations have acquired or are acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and the capability to deliver them, Iran, Syria, North
Korea, Libya, China, to name a few. That ought to put the fear of God
in us--just that, just thinking about those nations. And at least 24,
some of the same ones I just mentioned, have chemical weapons. And
approximately 10 more are believed to have biological weapons. And at
least 10 countries are reportedly interested in development of nuclear
weapons.
The international export control regime is failing to prevent the
spread of these technologies. They are being spread all over the world,
this missile technology, biological, chemical, nuclear, and the
capability to deliver them.
The Armed Services Committee, under the strong leadership of Senator
Strom Thurmond, recognizes that fact. This is a far-reaching,
farsighted, looking-ahead attempt to protect the United States of
America and its citizens in the outyears. You have to be thinking about
that today, not 50 years from now, because 50 years from now it will be
too late. You think about it today, and that is what the Senator from
South Carolina has done. Under his leadership we have provided, in the
Armed Services Committee, the opportunity to protect our citizens.
The Dorgan amendment would say that the continental United States,
Alaska, and Hawaii, are absolutely vulnerable to these threats. The
reckless leaders of North Korea, Syria, Libya, and others basically
have free access to our citizens. The choice is simple, really; really
simple. If you believe the American people should be protected against
limited accidental or intentional missile attacks--take your choice--
you should support the Armed Services Committee bill.
That is why we are on the committee. That is why we delve into these
matters in great detail. That is our specialty. That is what we are
there for, to understand these things and to present options to the
full Senate. But if you believe the American people should not be
defended and should be completely vulnerable, then you vote for the
Dorgan amendment.
It is ironic--and tragically ironic, frankly--that those who oppose
defending the American people hide behind the fig leaf of the cold war.
The cold war is over. And the technology and the philosophy that we use
to defend against it is also over. We do not have mutual assured
destruction anymore. We do not have a bipolar world anymore. These
people are not rational. Does anybody think Saddam Hussein is rational?
Would Saddam Hussein have used a nuclear missile in the Persian Gulf
war if he had the opportunity? You bet he would. He just does not have
it.
We do not have the capability to protect against this. It is very
interesting that focus groups have been held where we call a few people
into the room and interview them. We asked them, ``What would you do if
somebody fired a missile at the United States?'' In this group,
American citizens were put together in a room and they were asked,
``What would you do if someone fired a missile at the United States of
America?'' And every single one of those people said, ``We would shoot
it down.'' Guess what? We do not have the capability to shoot it down,
Mr. President. This amendment will make sure we do not have the
capability to shoot it down until it is too late.
So I urge my colleagues to defeat this very irresponsible amendment.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Arkansas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, first of all, I want everyone to
understand that the President's request already has $371 million in the
bill for a national ballistic missile defense system. The committee
added $300 million. So now we have $671 million, almost doubling what
the Pentagon requested. The Senator from North Dakota very sensibly and
wisely is trying to strike out the extra money. I hear people on that
side of the aisle saying, ``We are not trying to abrogate the ABM
Treaty. This does not abrogate the ABM Treaty.'' Really?
Here is what the ABM Treaty says:
Each party shall be limited at any one time to a single
area out of the two provided in Article III of the treaty for
deployment of antiballistic missile systems or their
components. . . .
English is the mother tongue. If you speak English, you understand
the word ``single.'' It means one. Our one site is now in North Dakota.
[[Page S 11235]]
Here is what this bill says. Here is what the language of the bill
clearly says if you speak the mother tongue.
It is the policy of the United States--to deploy a
multiple-site national ballistic missile defense system . . .
.
I want to emphasize that--``a multiple-site'' NBMD system.
And section 235 of the bill says:
The Secretary of Defense shall develop a national missile
defense system, which will attain initial operational
capability by the end of 2003 . . .
It shall include . . . ground-based interceptors deployed
at multiple sites . . .
Remember, the ABM Treaty bans multiple-site systems. If that in
itself is not compelling, there is more. This bill says we will decide
what is a national missile defense system, and what is a theater
missile defense system. We could not care less what the Russians think.
Do you think people in Russia, the former Soviet Union, who crafted
this treaty with us and that we ratified with, should have any say
about what we are going to do in abrogating the treaty?
I read a very interesting article the other day in the Washington
Post, an op-ed by someone named Sarah Roosevelt, who I do not know. She
said, ``Do not tweak the bear.'' Russia is an economic basket case.
They are a military basket case. They were a military basket case and
an economic basket case when Hitler decided he could take them with one
hand behind him. They did not have any choice but to allow millions of
their people to be slaughtered until they could arm and beat Hitler.
If I had asked this body 10 years ago standing beside my desk,
``Senators, what would you give to see the Soviet Union disappear, and
to see East Germany, Hungary, Poland, all of those nations free, how
much would you be willing to cut the defense budget in exchange for
that?''--10 years ago--I daresay a consensus in the body, the smallest
number would have been 30 percent, and a lot of people would have said
50 percent.
So what are we doing with this bill, which is the most irresponsible
defense bill I have seen in my 21 years in the U.S. Senate? We say we
are going to give to the Pentagon $7 billion which it doesn't even
want. What kind of insanity is sweeping over this body?
We spend already, without the additional $7 billion, twice as much as
our eight most likely enemies including China, Russia, North Korea,
Iraq, and Iran--twice as much; and, with NATO, twice as much as the
rest of the world combined. And in this bill we are putting an
additional $7 billion into defense.
If this bill goes to the President's desk in its present form and he
does not veto it--I am going to say publicly he is a very good friend
of mine, and I want him to be reelected--if he does not veto this bill,
I am going to be terribly disappointed.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from
Louisiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, there is an old song that says: ``You
keep coming back like a song.''
Mr. President, in spite of the end of the cold war, in spite of the
fact that the Russians are dismantling their nuclear weapons and we are
buying the plutonium and the enriched uranium, in spite of the fact
that there is no longer a threat from intercontinental ballistic
missiles to the United States, no longer targeted at this country, this
same issue, this military-industrial complex that the Defense
Department does not want, keeps ``coming back like a song.''
Mr. President, I have had amendments on this I guess four or five
times over the past few years; more than I think $25 billion ago. And
we have won it sometimes on the floor only to see it reversed by one
vote or by two votes. But, Mr. President, this really at this time in
our history is madness.
The biggest threat to this country right now is not from Russian
ICBM's and certainly not from Saddam Hussein, who is no conceivable
threat to the continental United States. Rather, the real threat to the
United States is from this kind of spending, which would start a new
cold war, which would hurt the economy of the United States and weaken
this country.
If you are really worried about nuclear weapons, I can tell you where
the threat would come. It is from a terrorist nuclear weapon which
could be easily brought into the United States in a suitcase.
Look, if they can smuggle bales of marijuana into this country
easily, they can easily smuggle into this country a suitcase bomb which
can be put into something the size of a briefcase. And so why are we
spending billions of dollars, even going into space-based lasers? Do
you know what it takes to drive a space-based laser? A nuclear bomb.
That is what it takes; otherwise, they do not have enough power.
That is what we are spending all this money for? What is the threat,
Mr. President? It is absolute madness. It is what President Eisenhower
warned against--the military industrial complex--which gets this
enthusiasm, gets it going; we have jobs out there in the economy. That
is what this thing is about. It is not about defending the United
States.
We really ought to go further than the Dorgan amendment. We ought to
do away with any thought of deploying any ballistic missile defense in
the continental United States. Do some research but do away with this
deployment. It makes no sense today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Alabama.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I wish to speak for a few minutes about
our ballistic missile defense program and the ABM Treaty with an eye
toward dismantling several myths about our missile defense program and
the scope of the ABM treaty. Unfortunately, many of the opponents of a
deployable national missile defense system, including the President,
confuse the central issues at hand in this debate through the
perpetuation of two central myths about national missile defense.
They maintain consistently that one, deploying a national missile
defense system is a return to star wars and two, that such a deployment
is an abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Neither of these claims has any
grounding in fact.
First, the opponents of a deployable NMD system would have the Senate
believe that in supporting NMD deployment we are committing ourselves
to a long-term research program that would cost this Nation tens of
billions of dollars.
In addition, they would have the Senate think that this system is a
space-based system modeled along the lines of the star wars program of
the 1980's. The deployed NMD system called for in this bill is neither
a distant technological dream, a space-based system, nor an overly
expensive investment for the American taxpayer. This legislation calls
for a deployable, multiple site, ground-based interceptor system by the
year 2003. Let me repeat--a ground-based interceptor system.
The current GBI configuration of a national missile defense system
builds off our current advances in theater missile defense--advances
that proceed from the concept of ground-based antiballistic missiles.
Such a system builds upon existing ground-based interception
technology--technology that is currently deployed or is being validated
through successful flight tests.
The only current limitation on rapid EKV development and deployment
is the funding strangulation placed on our NMD program by the current
administration. The centerpiece of this system, the Exoatmospheric kill
vehicle or EKV, has been in development for 5 years and has
demonstrated outstanding technological progress and achievements. The
EKV is a real piece of hardware designed to perform a mission that is
well within our current intercept capabilities. As opposed to tens of
billions dollars in outlays to develop and deploy a ground-based NMD
system, a deployable system will require a scant percentage of the
funding provided for space-based research in 1980's. In fact, this
year's authorization and appropriations bill call for an increase of
only $300 million for national missile defense--an amount that is
roughly a third of the cost of one destroyer.
The opponents of national missile defense also claim that the national
missile defense provisions in
[[Page S 11236]]
this authorization bill would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. While the ultimate goal of multiple site deployment of an NMD
system will require modifications to the ABM Treaty, nothing in the
range of the coming year's research and development efforts will in
fact, violate the constraints of the treaty. Therefore, the committee
has, wisely, asked only for a Senate study on the application and
relevance of the ABM Treaty to the current missile defense needs of
this country. The ABM Treaty is over two decades old. It is based upon
a doctrine of deterrence commonly known as mutually assured
destruction. While this doctrine was absolutely applicable to the
realities of the cold war, it has little place in a nonbipolar world of
rogue regimes and proliferating ballistic missile technology.
Unfortunately, the current administration continues to adhere not only
to a belief that the parameters of the treaty remain valid in today's
world, but seem determined to apply unilateral interpretations to the
treaty that limit not only our national missile defense program, but
also our theater missile defense systems--limitations beyond those
expressly contained in the treaty. Therefore, the committee has
recommended a provision that would codify TMD speed and range standards
for treaty compliance--standards derived from the administration's own
November 1993 proposal. Make no mistake, Mr. President, the global
political situation and the nature of the ballistic missile threat has
changed dramatically from the time of the ABM Treaty's ratification.
North Korea is nearing long-range ballistic missile capability. Just 2
months ago, the Chinese fired a truck-launched ICBM, demonstrating just
how easy it will be for rogue states to develop and launch ICBM's on
the cheap. Mr. President, the threat to the United States from long-
range ballistic missiles from rogue regimes will exist by 2003, if such
capabilities do not already exist.
It is absurd and irresponsible to continue to deny our citizens
protections from a real threat, especially if that protection can be
provided for limited cost and is based upon technology which is near
fruition. I strongly urge my colleagues to see through the myths
regarding national missile defense and resist any attempts to weaken
the commitment of this act to deploying an NMD system.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from
Ohio, Senator Glenn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the amendment
offered by my colleague from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, to strike the
$300 million that was added to the bill by the majority of the Armed
Services Committee for national missile defense [NMD].
The President had requested $371 million for NMD--and the committee
is proposing virtually to double that amount.
I do not believe that sensitive national security and diplomatic
issues should be allowed to sink into the unruly pit of partisan
politics. There have been appropriate lines drawn over the many years
of this Republic by the various political parties, and I think most of
us would have to agree that politics should stop at the water's edge
when it comes the most sensitive issues of our national defense and
security.
The language on national missile defense in the bill and the
committee report, however, vaults over this line in a manner that
infringes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive in
foreign policy, drains our Treasury, makes our country less secure, and
ultimately increases international strategic instability.
After having to listen to the litany of complaints by the current
majority party about tax-and-spend members of my own party, I find it
ironic to see the majority party has now embraced this same tax-and-
spend doctrine as the Rosetta Stone of that party's entire approach to
strategic defense.
This is all the more ironic given that the Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Perry--whose words can surely be taken as nonpartisan on this issue--
has stated quite clearly that, ``* * * a valid strategic missile threat
has not emerged.'' [Letter of Sen. Nunn, July 28, 1995] These words
echo the sentiments of our intelligence community. Gen. James Clapper,
the DIA Director, testified before the Armed Services Committee on
January 17, 1995, that ``* * * we see no interest in or capability, of
any new country reaching the continental United States with a long
range missile for at least the next decade.''
The ABM Treaty authorizes its parties to have a limited national
missile defense capability, but the terms of the treaty are quite clear
about what is permissible and what is not permissible. The committee
majority seems determined to plus-up those programs that will
inevitably drive us out of that treaty--a result that they earnestly
believe will serve the national security.
Yet will it truly serve our security to spend a fortune to erect
high-tech Maginot line defenses of dubious reliability against
nonexistent threats, while we continue to underfund efforts to address
clear and present dangers? I am speaking particularly of the challenges
we should be facing to prevent proliferation from occurring, as opposed
to just trying to cope with it after it is a fact of life as the
majority evidently prefers to do. Proponents of the current bill seem
more eager to prevent Qadhafi from launching a blizzard of nuclear-
tipped ICBM's at Chicago than in keeping Qadhafi from obtaining the
nuclear materials he will need to manufacture such warheads in the
first place. Let me say, it would be a much more efficient use of our
resources to focus our efforts on the latter type of problem. By the
way, if Qadhafi finally gets enough of that material, he will not need
to--and probably will prefer not to--attach the United States using
ballistic missiles. There are plenty of other ways to get the job done.
Will it serve our security to place in jeopardy the progress that has
been made in recent years in the START process to cut the size of the
United States and Russian nuclear arsenals? If we march forward blindly
into the future and eventually abrogate the ABM Treaty, does anybody
seriously believe that such an action will have no effect on Russia's
readiness to proceed with such cuts in its nuclear stockpile?
Will it serve our security to drain some $48 billion out of our
Treasury to build a national missile defense system? That is what the
Congressional Budget Office has estimated it will cost to build a
complex that covered Grand Forks, ND, and five other States. To this we
must add billions more for theater missile defense--which these days is
getting to look more and more like strategic missile defense. And the
costs just keep adding up. We must not forget the long-term costs of
operating and maintaining such facilities. The legacy we will leave to
future generations from this investment will not be a more secure
country, but a less secure world, and a towering pile of budgetary
IOU's.
Will it serve our security, in deploying an extensive national
strategic missile defense network, to drive China, Britain, and France
out of international negotiations aimed at further nuclear reductions?
Will it serve our security to jeopardize the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which was just extended indefinitely on the basis
of solemn commitments by the nuclear-weapon states both to conclude an
early comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests and new progress on
nuclear arms control and disarmament?
These are just some of my reasons for supporting the Dorgan amendment
today. We are standing on a slippery slope leading to the demise of the
ABM Treaty. The Dorgan amendment merely seeks to remove one large
banana peel from that slope. I urge all my colleagues in joining me in
endorsing his responsible proposal.
In summary, Mr. President, the President requested $371 million for
national missile defense. That was to do the basic research. And
somehow we come along now and want to say we are going to double that
amount; we are going to put another $300 million in here. And for what?
I do not understand the rationale of this whole thing except it seems
to me we have reversed parties here almost. Tax and spend, tax and
spend, tax and spend, that is what we have heard leveled at the
Democratic Party all these years. Now, here we are with something that
is not even needed and we are going to tax and spend, and now it is the
Republican tax
[[Page S 11237]]
and spend. I think that is a valid charge back at the Republicans on
this.
Tax and spend for what? The Secretary of Defense says that a balanced
strategic missile threat has not emerged. General Clapper, DIA
director, testified before the Armed Services Committee, and I quote
him:
We see no interest in or capability of any new country
reaching the continental United States with a long-range
missile for at least the next decade.
At the same time we are going to endanger the ABM Treaty, which
authorizes its parties to have a limited national missile defense
capability--limited. But the terms are quite clear about what is
permissible and what is not permissible.
I do not know why the majority is determined to plus up these
programs with something that will take a chance of eventually driving
us out of that treaty. I think it is ridiculous. Will it really serve
our security to place in jeopardy the progress that has been made in
recent years in the START process to cut the size of the United States
and Russian nuclear arsenals? If we march forward blindly into the
future and eventually abrogate the ABM Treaty, does anybody seriously
believe such an action will have no effect on Russia's readiness to
proceed with such cuts in its nuclear stockpile?
I just do not see how it is going to serve our security to drain $48
billion--$48 billion--out of our Treasury to build a national missile
defense system that is not needed. And that is not my figure. That is
what the Congressional Budget Office estimated it will cost to build a
complex that covers Grand Forks, ND, and five other States. That is $48
billion, and it does not even cover the whole country. That does not
even cover the theater missile defense, which I support.
I think it moves in the wrong direction. I do not see that it serves
our security in deploying an expensive national missile defense network
to drive China, Britain, and France out of the international
negotiations aimed at further nuclear reductions.
I am not sure either exactly what kind of system this is. Is this to
be an SDI system? The President provided research, and yet we do not
know what this system is. At best, it is going to be a $48 billion
operation just to cover five States. It literally makes no sense
whatsoever to take a chance of driving us out of the ABM Treaty when we
have no international intercontinental missile defense necessity for
this country at this time.
Let us do the research the President wanted. Let us continue on down
the road with that research, which I favor, voted for it, support
fully, and if we see a threat developing, we will have time to go to
what this provides prematurely.
I know my time has expired. I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, three quick rebuttals. First, to my
distinguished colleague from Ohio where he quotes General Clapper.
There are two fallacies in that argument I say. One, it is predicated
on a startup within a country to build it all the way up. But there are
open bids on the free market in this world today from many countries,
primarily Iran, Iraq, and others, that would buy a Chinese system which
could hit the United States within that lesser period than 10 years.
Also, it will take us 10 years to build the very system we are debating
here at this point in time. So there is a convergence, Mr. President,
in time and need for this system.
Shifting to another argument from the distinguished Senator from
Louisiana, who said it is madness. Well, let me tell you, Mr.
President, a little story of madness. The distinguished Senator from
Georgia; myself; the distinguished Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye];
and the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] were in Tel
Aviv on February 18, 1991. I remember it very well. It happened,
coincidentally, to have been my birthday. We were there in the Defense
Ministry when a Scud alert was sounded and in a very calm way we
participated with the others in putting on our gas masks. The Scud fell
some 2 or 3 miles away. We were not in danger.
May I say to my colleagues, when we went out the next morning to
visit the community that was struck and to talk to the people, that was
madness. That was madness, to see in their faces the attack by Saddam
Hussein for no military reason whatsoever, strictly to use that type of
weapon as a terrorist weapon, a single strike. Coincidentally, it was
the last to fall on Tel Aviv.
And I say, Mr. President, that same problem could happen, a single
one as a terrorist weapon to fall on this country, and we have an
obligation to the people of this country to invest this comparatively
small, modest sum to ensure against that.
Mr. NUNN. Would the Senator yield for a brief observation?
I remember that evening very well. And I do not want to say this with
much humor. There is not much humorous about anything regarding a Scud
missile attack. The Senator said we were not in danger. If the Senator
would amend that by saying we were not in danger because the target was
where we were, the Ministry of Defense, and the Scud missiles are
notoriously inaccurate. So we were probably in a safe place. But the
target was the Ministry of Defense, we found out.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I acknowledge that. I recall, if we want
to close off on a note of humor, the distinguished Senator from Georgia
said to me, ``Saddam Hussein just sent you a birthday present.''
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. How much time do I have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven minutes, thirty seconds. The Senator
from South Carolina has 2 minutes.
Mr. DORGAN. I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. I want to respond very briefly to my distinguished friend
from Virginia. He is talking about theater missile defense. I am all
for theater missile defense.
What we are talking about here is starting down a track that if we go
this route and violate the ABM Treaty, we have got the Russians at that
point of probably putting the coordinates back into their missiles or
ICBM's. We have plenty of time, according to the people that do the
estimates on these things, for Qadhafi and people like that before they
develop true intercontinental capability. I am all for the theater
missile defense that would have taken care of the situation that he is
talking about that he was in. But I think when we go down this track of
taking a chance of knocking out the ABM Treaty, which this does, if we
go ahead with this whole process, then I think we just--the greatest
likelihood is we are going to encourage the former Soviets, the
Russians, to go back on the track of missile activation again. I see
that as a real threat. That is an active threat. And I think this is
folly to go down that course.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
Senator from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. I will make this real quick.
After my remarks, the Senator from North Dakota made a couple of
comments. Let me respond to him. First of all, he said we do not have
any cruise missile defense in this bill. That is a greater threat. Let
me suggest to you if you read page 119, we have $140 million in here
for cruise missile defense. And I hope that no one believes that we
think that the missile threat is the only threat to America. There are
many other threats that are being addressed.
Now, the other thing is that the two Senators from Wisconsin and
North Dakota know very well that the defense budget is not causing the
deficit. We always hear about from the big spenders over there, ``Well,
we've got to do something about defense.'' The last 11 years our
defense budget has declined. And for that period of time for every $1
of defense cuts, we have had $2
[[Page S 11238]]
of increase in domestic spending. To be specific, in using 1995
dollars, in fiscal year 1985 the defense budget was $402 billion. Today
we are considering one that is $265 billion.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. the Senator's time has expired.
Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the way I see this, I do not intend to vote
for this amendment. I believe the money that is added here, the $300
million, which puts this budget back on national missile defense, about
where it was when President Bush left office, I think the money is
consistent with a limited thin defense but an effective defense against
limited attack against accidental launch or against third countries
that may develop a limited capability against the United States. What
is inconsistent with that is the language in this bill which will be
the subject for the next amendment which puts us in a position of
anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty, will be read like that in
Russia, with no reason to be in breach because we do not have any
programs in the next fiscal year that would in any way contravene that
treaty. So we are going to be paying a huge price for nothing because
of the language in this bill. So I will not favor the money striking
because the money is needed.
I will favor though the amendments that will try to correct this
language. If this language goes forward as it is, we are going to pay a
big price, probably not only in the failure of ratification of START II
but also in the Russians not complying or continuing to comply with
START I. So we are buying ourselves perhaps 6,000 or 8,000 warheads
pointed at America by the language in this bill. And I hope people
recognize that when we get to the next amendment. But I do not believe
the answer is to strike the money which everybody agrees at some point
we are going to need some kind of limited defense. The administration
agrees with that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is expired.
Mr. NUNN. Could I get another minute?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina does not have
any time.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Dorgan's amendment to
eliminate the Armed Services Committee add-on of $300 million for the
national missile defense system. If I am not already listed, I ask
unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor.
The committee funded increase of $300 million is an initial
downpayment on what the committee majority advertises as a multisite,
multilayered missile defense system designed to protect against a large
and sophisticated missile attack. The missile defense language in the
authorization bill makes clear that the system desired is one that will
violate the ABM Treaty and intercept a Soviet-type missile attack. The
$300 million plus-up in the bill is the first installment of a bill
that could grow to a staggering $48 billion cost according to a March
1995, CBO report. This $48 billion is in addition to the $35 billion we
have already spent on missile defense. Let no one misunderstand the
significance of this vote. This is the first of many expensive
installments to resurrect the Star Wars concept.
This vote is on a question of priorities. At a time when we are
significantly slashing domestic spending and making tough, painful
budgetary choices, it would be irresponsible to add $300 million into a
system concept designed to defend against a threat that does not exist
today and will not exist by the operational deployment date of 1999.
I believe we should send a powerful signal to the American public by
approving the Dorgan amendment and putting the Senate on record that
the domestic welfare of our citizens will not be sacrificed on the gold
plated alter of star wars. This vote is on a question of priorities. We
can ill-afford to shrug our shoulders and say ``what is $300 million''
at a time when we are asking all Americans to tighten their belts. As I
said earlier, a vote for this $300 million installment is only part of
a lengthy payment plan that will eventually drain our treasury by
another $40 to $50 billion. To buy into such a payment plan would be
the height of fiscal folly. I urge my colleagues to support the Dorgan
amendment.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to this
amendment which would severely reduce the funding needed to develop
missile defenses. In light of our experiences in the Persian Gulf war,
and the advanced weapon development programs of hostile countries such
as Korea, this amendment should be soundly rejected by the Senate.
The dangers of leaving our own country unprotected cannot be ignored.
Perhaps some Senators have forgotten that we had a demonstration of the
dangers of a ballistic missile attack just a few years ago. The picture
of an unprotected Israel being hit by Scud missiles chilled the hearts
of all Americans, but that incident would pale in comparison to the
consequences of a nuclear missile strike. It was reported in the news a
year ago that the North Koreans vowed to launch missiles at Tokyo
should armed conflict occur with South Korea. While their capability to
launch such an attack is questionable, the threat cannot be ignored.
It is my understanding that in reaction to this, Japan has approached
the Department of Defense to discuss the purchase of our THAAD missile
system. Unfortunately, THAAD will not be ready for deployment until the
turn of the century. I am sure that if Japan could have anticipated the
threat they now face, they would have invested in some type of missile
defense system much sooner. As it is, Japan will be vulnerable to North
Korean blackmail for years to come. They can only hope that North Korea
never carries out its threat.
Mr. President, we cannot allow the United States to be put in such a
vulnerable position. I firmly believe, however, that the present crisis
with North Korea clearly demonstrates that need to continue the
development of a national missile defense system. The cost of being
unprepared to defend ourselves is too great to be ignored.
I encourage my colleagues to join me in defeating this unwise
amendment.
Mr. DORGAN. I yield the remaining time to myself.
Mr. President, this has been a most unusual debate. I see a couple in
this chamber who are parents who have no doubt read their children the
Berenstain Bears books. One of the Berenstain Bear books talks about
the ``give me's.'' Talks about ``give me, give me, give me, give me
this, give me that, give me this.'' You know, it is interesting to me
as I read to my children and describe the Berenstain Bears books about
``give me,'' it reminds me a bit of the folks who come to this floor
with every conceivable project, every conceivable program in national
defense that is proposed by someone and says--they say, ``We have got
to build this. We have got to fund it. In fact, we cannot wait. We have
got to do it right now.''
I asked the question an hour and a half ago, where are you going to
get the money? Where is the money? The Congressional Budget Office says
this will cost $48 billion. I ask, where is the money? Are you going to
charge it? Are you going to tax people for it? Where are you going to
get the money? I have not heard one response in an hour and a half. And
I know why, because they do not have the foggiest notion where they are
going to get the money. They just have an appetite to spend it and
build this program.
Let me end where I began. This is $300 million the Secretary of
Defense says he does not want, and we do not need, that folks who say
they are opposed to the Federal deficit are now insisting we spend. To
describe this as pork is to give hogs a bad name. At least hogs carry
around a little meat. This is in my judgment pure lard to pay for a
program this country does not need and cannot afford.
Now let me respond to a couple of the things that have been said.
During this
[[Page S 11239]]
debate it has been said that this national defense program does not
violate the ABM Treaty. Supposedly, this does not violate the ABM
Treaty. How can anyone possibly say that? Of course it violates the ABM
Treaty. To understand that is only to be able to read. This bill calls
for many sites. The ABM Treaty only allows one. This bill calls for
more than 100 interceptors. The ABM Treaty limits this Nation to less
than 100 interceptors. This bill on page 59 calls for weapons in space.
The ABM Treaty forbids weapons in space. Of course this bill violates
the ABM Treaty. Let us not debate this issue with that kind of
representation.
This leaves us vulnerable, one speaker said. That what folks want to
do is defend France and Israel and leave us vulnerable. There is $371
million in this bill for ballistic missile defense. I am not touching
that.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Has the time expired on both sides?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has no time left.
The Senator from North Dakota has 2 minutes, 45 seconds. The Senator
from South Carolina has no time left.
The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we are told by some speakers that our
intention is to leave American cities vulnerable while at the same time
we defend Israel and France and Egypt and others.
Total nonsense. There is $371 million in this bill for a ballistic
missile defense system. All we want to do is take out the extra $300
million that was added that the Secretary of Defense says he does not
want and that we do not need. That is all we are trying to do.
I do not need to hear from folks about the threat to this country.
North Dakota has been ground zero for 40 years. If we seceded from the
Union, we would be the third most powerful country in the world--300
intercontinental ballistic missiles with Mark-12 warheads, a B-52 base,
we had a B-1 base. We understand about ground zero. They built an ABM
system in North Dakota, in fact, the only site in the free world. Spent
billions. Within 30 days after it was declared operational, it was
mothballed. Tell that to the taxpayers.
We understand about missiles and bombers and national defense, and we
understand about ground zero. But we also understand about Government
waste. We understand it when people say we cannot afford to send kids
to school; we are going to make it harder for parents to send their
kids to college; we cannot afford money for the elderly for health
care; we simply cannot afford money for nutrition programs; we have to
tighten our belts.
And then the same folks say that it is our priority to add money to a
system that the administration does not need. The Senator from
Louisiana said this is madness. He is absolutely correct. This makes no
sense at all. We ought to decide as a Senate what our priorities are.
The Senator from Ohio, a decorated combat veteran in service to this
country, stood up and said it the way that it is. Let us build things
that are necessary for the defense of this country.
I am for a strong defense, but I am not for wasting the taxpayers
money on boondoggles that we do not need and boondoggles that will not
work. Let us decide for a change that we mean what we say when we talk
about reducing the Federal budget deficit. Let us decide we cannot at
this point embark on a new venture, to spend $48 billion on a ballistic
missile program, a national defense missile system--yes, Star Wars,
because part of it will be based in space--at a time when we are up to
our neck in $5 trillion of debt, and when this year we will run a $170
billion deficit.
If we have some courage and common sense in this body, we will, in
this case, say, ``You can't add $300 million for something this country
doesn't need and for something the Secretary of Defense doesn't want.
To do so makes no sense.''
That is the ultimate threat to this country: That debt, this deficit,
this kind of mindless spending. That is the threat to America, and let
us decide to stand up and finally stop it.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. All time has
now expired.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
lay on the table amendment No. 2087. The yeas and nays have been
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell],
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 48, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 354 Leg.]
YEAS--51
Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brown
Burns
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Faircloth
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--48
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatfield
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Wellstone
NOT VOTING--1
Campbell
So the motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2087) was agreed
to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. SMITH. I move to table the motion.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in a moment I will send an amendment to the
desk which would strike language from the bill which violates the ABM
Treaty, which establishes unilateral interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
and which also would tie the President's hands in even discussing the
ABM Treaty with the Russians.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, however, that I now be
allowed to yield the floor to Senator Exon for 10 minutes, and then to
Senator Baucus for 5 minutes, without losing my right to the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, may
I ask the Senator from Michigan, as part of that, will he agree to a
time agreement on his amendment?
Mr. LEVIN. We are trying to see how much time will be required by
various speakers. We are trying to put that together right now. We are
working on that.
Mr. McCAIN. Also, reserving the right to object, following your
amendment, there will be no more amendments on this issue?
Mr. LEVIN. I cannot say that; I do not know that.
Mr. McCAIN. Again, reserving the right to object, I remind the
Senator from Michigan, we have now been on this single issue for all
intents and purposes for 2 days.
At this point, we will have thoroughly ventilated the ballistic
missile defense issue, and at some point we should acquire a list of
proposed amendments and be prepared to move forward. I hope it is
possible we could start reaching some time agreements.
The issue is a very important issue. I understand. It is critical. At
some point, I think we should move on to other issues. There are other
Members who plan on proposing amendments. I hope we can move forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to make an objection. Reserving the
[[Page S 11240]]
right to object, can I inquire of the Senator whether or not, given the
somewhat unusual procedure of asking two Senators be allowed to speak--
you now holding the floor--would the Senator include in his request
that those desiring to speak will not offer amendments?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to do that. It is not my understanding
they want to offer amendments.
I will modify my amendment. But I also will modify my UC in another
way.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, is it in order for a quorum to be called at
this point?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am sorry, I did not hear you.
Mr. LEVIN. Is it in order for a quorum call?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No, it is not. The Senator from Michigan has
the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. I object to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the most dangerous portion of this bill, in
my view, is its head-on assault on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
This is not a subtle issue. This is not an issue of interpretation.
That is a frontal, head-on assault which says that it is now going to
be the policy of the United States----
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, could we have order in the Senate? The
Senator is making a very important speech. He is entitled to be heard.
I make the point of order the Senate is not in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senate is not in
order. Will we remove the conversations, please, from the floor? Will
we remove the conversation over here on my left from the floor, please?
The Senator may proceed.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the language we are going to analyze, that
is in this bill, directly confronts the ABM Treaty and says it is the
policy of the United States--and these are the words of the bill--no
longer to abide by the ABM Treaty.
It does it in a number of ways throughout this bill, but the way in
which it does it first is by simply stating, in section 233, that ``It
is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site national
missile defense system.'' It goes on beyond that in section 233, but
that is a very clear statement of what the intention and what the
effect is, of this bill.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from Michigan yield for one second?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to withdraw my objection to the unanimous-
consent request of the Senator from Nebraska to speak for 10 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Arizona. While we were going back
to the unanimous consent, I would like to modify my UC in another way.
This relates to the question of how many amendments will there be on
this subject.
It was my intention originally to offer three different amendments
striking the bill in three different places. I believe there has been
some discussion between the ranking member and the chairman on this
subject. I am not positive. But my amendment strikes language in three
separate places and, rather than having three amendments striking three
different places, since the issue is generally the same, I would modify
my unanimous-consent request to make it in order that the amendment
that I send to the desk strike three different provisions.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator work on a time agreement for that
amendment?
Mr. LEVIN. We are working.
Mr. THURMOND. As I understand it, the Senator has one amendment; is
that correct?
Mr. LEVIN. I have one amendment touching the bill in three different
places rather than having three amendments. This is the only amendment
on ABM that this Senator has. But there are other Senators who may have
other amendments.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Michigan.
If he wants to proceed with his unanimous-consent request, I will not
object.
Mr. LEVIN. As modified?
Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Is it necessary,
when a unanimous-consent request is made, is it necessary for a Senator
to reserve the right to object to get the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. When a unanimous-consent request is made, the
Senator making the request retains the floor. Others may ask for a
right to reserve the right to object at the sufferance of the Senator
having the floor.
Mr. BUMPERS. But is it necessary for a Senator to be recognized? When
a request is made for a unanimous-consent agreement, is it necessary
for the Senator to say ``I reserve the right to object'' in order to
state whatever he wishes to state or she wishes to state?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the appropriate process to proceed.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, my question is, is it necessary?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is appropriate.
Mr. BUMPERS. But it is not necessary, is it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair says it is an appropriate process.
Is there objection now to the UC?
If there is confusion here, will the Senator restate his unanimous-
consent request, please?
Mr. LEVIN. I am not sure the confusion relates to my unanimous-
consent request. I will be happy to restate my unanimous-consent
request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If you would.
Mr. LEVIN. That is, I now be allowed to yield the floor for 10
minutes to the Senator from Nebraska. Following his 10-minute remarks,
without offering an amendment, that the Senator from Montana be
recognized for 5 minutes, and that he is not intending to offer an
amendment. And that, then, I retain my right to the floor.
It is now part of the modified UC that it be in order in the
amendment, which I will send to the desk, that it touch the bill in
three places.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Nebraska is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my friend from
Michigan, Senator Lott, and others for their cooperation. I would
simply say, we have just gone through an exercise in futility, although
finally successful. Had the Senator allowed me to proceed, I would have
been almost through with my statement at this time. But at least I
appreciate the consideration that has been offered by both sides.
There has been some criticism about the possibility of redundancy
with regard to this authorization bill, particularly with regard to
ballistic missile defenses. I simply say, this is the time to pause,
this is the time to reflect, this is the time, if you will, to take
some time. Because what we are about, in this authorization bill, is
going to have long-range, possibly serious implications, in the view of
this Senator, who has worked on these matters for a long, long time.
Later in the day, I believe, probably my colleague from Arkansas,
Senator Bumpers, will be addressing some of the issues that I will be
addressing now, and he will probably be referencing a statement that
came out of Moscow today with regard to what the Russians are doing and
not doing and thinking as we proceed in this area.
Certainly, the policies regarding the national security interests of
the United States should not be dictated by Moscow. But certainly,
since we are talking about the possible violation if not the outright
violation of treaties that we are a party to and a part of, we are
talking about serious business here. And whatever redundancy is
necessary to get that message across should be the order of the day.
Mr. President, I rise to offer my thoughts on the fiscal year 1996
National Defense Authorization Act. Rarely in my 17 years in the U.S.
Senate have I come to the floor to take issue with a Defense
authorization bill reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
As a member of the committee, I have usually been satisfied that the
reported bill was the product of a bipartisan effort to further advance
our national security objectives.
[[Page S 11241]]
To my dismay, the content and philosophy embodied in this year's bill
is a significant departure from those of previous years. Crafted with
little bipartisan consultation, the bill reported out of the committee
represents a regrettable and potentially harmful U-turn in our national
security policy that will, unless corrected, return the United States
to the confrontational cold war policies of the 1980's that predated
the fall of the Soviet Empire.
While much in the committee bill is laudable and will greatly enhance
the readiness and capabilities of our Armed Services, I am fearful that
these constructive elements of the authorization bill will be offset by
misguided efforts to defend against threats that do not exist and
hostile attempts to scuttle international agreements intended to
enhance our security through peaceful means. As originally drafted--I
emphasize ``originally drafted''--in the Armed Services Committee, this
bill attempted to: abolish the Department of Energy; gut the
cooperative threat reduction program responsible for the removal of
thousands of Russian nuclear warheads from their missiles; prevent the
administration from carrying out a number of important nuclear non-
proliferation agreements relative to North Korea and the former Soviet
Union, and purchase unwanted B-2 bombers at a potential cost totaling
tens of billions of dollars.
While the majority of the Armed Services Committee was successful in
overturning these and other astonishing hardline recommendations, many
provisions remain in the reported bill that will return us to the cold
war mentality of yesteryear. Among the most objectionable of these
reversals are bill provisions that: advocate violation of the
antiballistic missile treaty; as has been briefly addressed and will be
addressed more so by the Senator from Michigan on an amendment that I
am a cosponsor of.
Add over $500 million in star wars missile defense funding; endanger
ratification of the Start II Treaty, and resurrect at least two
battleships.
Let me repeat that because this is an old battle that this Senator
has carried on against unneeded, unwanted, and useless battleships.
It resurrects at least two battleships at a cost of nearly a $0.5
million a year with untold future modernization and operations costs;
and, mandates the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
These are just a few of the things that I think are terribly wrong
with this bill.
The defense authorization bill is rife with legislative initiatives
and reshuffled spending priorities intent on rekindling an arms bazaar
that will have both domestic and international repercussions. The bill
includes $7 billion--let more repeat that this bill includes $7
billion--in additional spending above the administration's request, a
large majority of which has been siphoned off for the purchase of
ships, planes, trucks, and other weapons not requested by the Pentagon.
The so-called readiness debate we used to hear so much about is dead
after only a year. The real winners in the committee reported bill are
the defense contractors who stand to receive billions of dollars in
unexpected weapons buys.
While our domestic spending accounts are being squeezed tighter and
tighter--and while the polls are showing very clearly that with all the
hoopla the standing in the public with the newly created Congress is
going down and down. The people are catching on.
So I emphasize again, Mr. President, while our domestic accounts are
being squeezed tighter and tighter, this bill contains a Christmas list
or unexpected gifts for home State contractors that carry staggering
price tags: $770 million more for missile defense contracts; a $650
million downpayment for two more DDG-51 destroyers; $1.3 billion for
the unrequested LHD-7 assault ship; 12 more F-18's than asked for and
the list goes on. Add in to this mix a committee initiative
establishing a loan guarantee program for defense contractors to export
their weapons overseas and you can understand why defense contractors
throughout the country are popping champagne corks: Christmas has
indeed come early.
But the bill to the taxpayer is not complete at the committee passed
authorization of $264.7 billion. There is a built-in cost overrun. In
the rush to fund these and other unrequested multibillion dollar
weapons, the committee majority did not fund the anticipated expenses
for ongoing Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Bosnia. This
outstanding bill, the cost of which will in the mean time come out of
Pentagon operation accounts, will come due next year and I warn my
colleagues to not be surprised when this $1.2 billion expense is funded
in part by more domestic spending cuts. Ironically, this built-in cost
overrun is nearly identical to the cost of the LHD-7 add-on. I would
hope that the Senate will reconsider this issue during floor debate and
decide to place the operations funding of our troops in the field
overseas above the cost of building an unneeded naval vessel.
While the funding priorities in this bill are questionable to say the
least, there should be no doubt as to the design and effect of the bill
on arms control and international relations. The defense authorization
bill before the Senate takes aim at scuttling the ABM Treaty by
requiring that the United
States break out of the treaty and deploy a multiple site national
missile defense system by 2003. Caught in the cross hairs of the
committee's aim is the START II Treaty as well. Although this arms
control agreement is a good deal for the United States as well as
global security, the defense authorization bill does its best to see
that it is killed in the cradle. That is precisely what will happen if
the bill provision to break out of the ABM Treaty is approved.
Ratification of START II will be blocked by the Russian Duma and the
new alliance between our two countries will, in turn, be irreparably
damaged, thrown into a resumption of the cold war, and still higher
defense budgets. The bill is filled with jabs at Moscow designed to
create distrust toward the United States and harm our new alliance. As
if breaking out of the ABM Treaty and derailing START II Treaty
ratification is not enough, the bill adds $30 million for a new
antisatellite weapons program, it attacks and limits the Nunn-Lugar
program that has been responsible for the safe and accountable
disarming of over 2,500 former Soviet nuclear warheads, it cuts Energy
Department nonproliferation, arms control, and verification funding, it
recommends reconstituting our nuclear weapons manufacturing complex at
untold billions of dollars while at the same time advocating the
resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing. This last committee
initiative is contrary to U.S. policy and is designed to scuttle
ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations and any prospect of
reaching a treaty agreement. I will have a great deal more to say about
the issue of nuclear testing later on during the consideration of this
bill.
In summary, I am concerned with the tone and substance of the bill.
The level of micromanagement placed on the Pentagon and the Department
of Energy is unprecedented and harmful to our Nation's standing in the
international community. Many of the committee initiatives are driven
by a desire to defend against a superpower threat to U.S. security that
simply does not exist. At a time when our one-time enemies are now
allies and the world community is committed more than ever before to
the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the committee bill is at odds
with reality and in strong need of amendment before it can properly
serve our Nation's security interests.
At a time when American leadership in the world community is strongly
needed, we cannot be viewed as a nation living in the past, jousting
with imaginary dragons in order to lay claim to the mantle of being
``strong on defense.'' We are a strong country, the preeminent military
power in the world by far. But we must also be forward looking and
recognize that it is in our national interest as well as in the
interest of other nations to encourage arms control and alliances based
on collective security. It is unfortunate that some feel more
comfortable in an adversarial environment than in one based on
cooperation and a lowering of superpower antagonism.
Like a beehive, the world in 1995 has the capacity to be both
dangerous and peaceful. If handled properly, the hive can be benign and
capable of producing sweet honey. If agitated, however, it can become
hostile and threatening. The defense authorization bill in its present
form is a sharp stick ready to be jabbed into the hive. The design and
[[Page S 11242]]
intent of the bill is to agitate the world community to the ultimate
detriment of ourselves. This is not the time in history to rekindle the
rhetoric of the cold war. I urge my colleagues to support amendments
that will correct these and other self-defeating elements of this
flawed legislation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana has 5 minutes.
Mr. BAUCUS. Thank you, Mr. President.
Vietnam Moving Wall Opening Ceremony
Mr. President, this morning, the Vietnam Moving Wall--the portable
replica of the Vietnam War Memorial--came to Bozeman, MT. I would like
to offer my thanks and congratulations to retired Col. Ron Glock and
Jim Caird for their hard work in making it all happen, and say a few
words in honor of this solemn occasion.
Walls generally divide people. But this wall unites us. It unites us,
as Montanans and Americans, in reverence and gratitude to the Americans
who gave their lives in Vietnam.
The Vietnam War Memorial allows people to touch the names of their
friends and their relatives, and remember those individuals who touched
our lives so deeply. And the Moving Wall, as it travels our country,
allows each of us to honor their lives and their gifts, and remember
the lessons of history.
The young people who were born after the war--many of them now
entering adulthood--have a chance to experience and understand the
magnitude of a war where we lost over 50,000 Americans.
The families and comrades in arms see their brothers, fathers, and
friends given the honor which is their due.
And we all learn again the lesson of the cost of war.
So today we come together to honor and remember all those we lost in
Vietnam, and in particular those who went off to war from Bozeman and
Montana State and whose names we can read on the Wall today:
David Jay Allison, Jack Herbert Anderson, Alan Frederick Ashall,
Richard DeWyatt Clark, Air Force Capt. Charles Glendon Dudley, whose
mother is present at the opening ceremony this morning, Glenn Charles
Fish, James Francis Fuhrman, Raymond LeRoy Gallagher, Edward Joseph
Hagl, Hal Kent Henderson, James D. Hunt, Lyle Albert Johnson, Ronald
George Jordet, Patrick Joseph Magee, Ronald John Moe, Stephen Stanford
Oviatt, Duane Kenneth Peterson, Jimmy Dee Pickle, Dean Andrew Pogreba,
Alexander Pomeroy, Roger Paul Richardson, Anton John Schonbrich, Donald
William Seidel, Larry Max Smith, Jerry Wayne Snyder, Arthur Lee
Stockberger, Johnnie Bowen West- ervelt, Robert Vincent Willett, Jr.,
and Alvy Eugene Wood.
May the Lord bless them and grant them eternal peace.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Michigan retains the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, this bill is a head-on assault on the ABM Treaty.
There is nothing subtle about it. Unlike our existing policy which
permits us to consider whether or not we wish to withdraw from the
treaty at the appropriate time, if and when there is a threat and after
we have done the research and development to see how much it would cost
to put up a national defense and after we have gathered together the
information that we need and the impacts that we need in order to make
that decision on a reasonable basis, this bill decides now that it is
the policy of the United States to pull out of the ABM Treaty. It makes
no bones about it. The language of section 233 says:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
site national missile defense system.
That is a clear breach of the ABM Treaty. Article III of the ABM
Treaty says:
Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems at more
than one site.
The ABM Treaty has permitted us to do a number of things. First, it
is permitting arms reduction in offensive weapons. Without the ABM
Treaty, the Russians are not going to be reducing their offensive
weapons, as they have agreed to in START I and we hope they will ratify
in START II. That process is going to be ended because if they are
going to be facing missile defenses, they are going to be increasing
the number of offensive weapons rather than decreasing the number of
offensive weapons.
They have told us that. So the ABM Treaty has allowed us to do the
most important single thing we are probably doing right now in the
nuclear strategic world, which is to reduce the number of offensive
nuclear weapons.
The ABM Treaty has also allowed us to avoid a defensive arms race,
where a defense is installed and there is a countermeasure to the
defense, and then there is a counter-countermeasure to the defense, and
then there is a counter-counter-counter, and on and on ad infinitum.
But first and foremost, what is going on right now is the dramatic
reduction of offensive arms, and we have been told by the Russians--and
I am going to read from General Shalikashvili's letter in just a moment
about how seriously he takes this issue--they are going to stop the
reduction of offensive arms and forget the ratification of START II.
That is what the stakes are in this discussion. This is not some
theoretical discussion about defenses. This is a premature decision to
destroy a treaty which is allowing us now as we speak to reduce the
number of offensive weapons that threaten us, that face us, that are
aimed at us now.
The bill also States in section 235 that to implement the policy that
I just read in section 233:
The Secretary of Defense shall develop an . . .
operationally effective national missile defense system which
will attain initial operating capability by the end of the
year 2003.
It shall be developed in a way which includes ground-based
interceptors deployed at multiple sites.
There we go again with the multiple-site breach of the ABM Treaty.
Section 235 also provides for an interim operational capability. It is
all laid out very specifically as to the deployment schedule for the
ABM system.
Now, this is a head-on collision. This again is not like our current
law provides, that we are going to continue to do research and
development on nationwide defenses, on strategic missile defenses. This
bill decides now that it is the policy to deploy such a system before
we have done the research and development and before we have concluded
our negotiations with the Russians in an effort to make such a
nationwide defense system permissible under an amended treaty.
This is not a question of interpretation. This is the head-on clash,
this is the trashing of the ABM Treaty. This is the establishing of a
policy now to pull out of the ABM Treaty. I cannot think of anything
much more shortsighted than this. It is a provocative move to commit
ourselves now to deploy an illegal national defense system, the ABM
Treaty be damned. This is going to wreck the START treaty which was a
landmark arms reduction treaty which was achieved by President Bush,
and it is going to spark a buildup of offensive weapons instead of the
reduction of offensive weapons which we have been trying to achieve.
Now, General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of
Staff, wrote me the following on June 28:
While we believe that START II is in both countries'
interests regardless of other events, we must assume such
unilateral U.S. legislation could harm prospects for START II
ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader
security relationship with Russia as well.
The Secretary of Defense has weighed in in strong opposition to these
missile defense provisions saying, in a letter to Senator Nunn dated
July 28:
These provisions would put us on a pathway to abrogate the
ABM Treaty. The bill's provisions would add nothing to the
DOD's ability to pursue our missile defense programs and
would needlessly cause us to incur excess costs and serious
security risks.
Secretary Perry's letter continues as follows:
. . . certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty would be
very damaging to U.S. security interests. By mandating
actions that would lead us to violate or disregard U.S.
Treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment date of
a multiple-site NMD system [national missile defense
system]--the bill would jeopardize Russian implementation of
the Start I and Start II Treaties, which involve the
elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons.
[[Page S 11243]]
And Secretary Perry's letter went on to say the following:
The bill's unwarranted imposition, through funding
restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation
interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions,
and would raise significant international legal issues as
well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the
President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.
And he concluded as follows in his recent letter to Senator Nunn:
Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly
modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national
security interests of the United States.
That is pretty strong language. Here is the Secretary of Defense,
telling us this language, unless it is eliminated or significantly
modified, will ``* * * threaten to undermine fundamental national
security interests of the United States.''
Not only would this committee decision to deploy missile defenses
destroy a treaty which has been a cornerstone of global nuclear arms
control for over 20 years, it would increase the threat to the United
States by leaving more nuclear weapons pointed at us and it would, in
addition, poison our relationship with Russia, a relationship which is
improving and beginning to stabilize. Now, why do we want to risk that?
Why do we want to hand the hard-liners in the Russian Duma an excuse to
block the ratification of the Start II Treaty and resume an offensive
arms race, instead of continuing and accelerating the dismantlement of
nuclear strategic weapons? There is no new threat of massive nuclear
missile attack on the continental United States requiring a decision
now to pull out of the ABM Treaty.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Clapper,
said:
We see no interest in or capability of any new country
reaching the continental United States with a long range
missile for at least the next decade.
For several years, we have had a bipartisan consensus in Congress for
continuing research on national missile defense that is consistent with
the ABM Treaty. We have had a consensus that we should preserve the
option to decide later to deploy a national missile defense system if
the threat increases or if it proves financially feasible, or both. At
the same time, we have had a national or bipartisan consensus that we
should seek ABM Treaty understandings or changes that are mutually
agreeable between the United States and Russia, and we should be doing
these things simultaneously. We should be doing research and
development of national missile defenses. We should be seeking
understandings and modifications of the ABM Treaty while these research
activities are continuing, and we should keep the option open when the
time comes to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
This bill before us breaks that bipartisan consensus, and instead
decides now that it is the policy of the United States to trash the ABM
Treaty and to withdraw from it. This bill commits us to meet a
deployment program that is simply reckless because it is so
intentionally provocative to the Russians without any military benefit
to us because our present program is unconstrained by the ABM Treaty.
What we are doing now in missile defense research is unconstrained by
the treaty.
We do not need to make this decision now to trash a treaty which is
allowing us to reduce the number of offensive weapons that threaten us.
That is what is so reckless about this language. It prematurely commits
us to a course of action which we need not take now and maybe never
need to take. We do not know that.
We have had a bipartisan consensus to keep an option open. This wipes
out that bipartisan consensus. Now, there is another provision in this
bill which is threatening to our security in the eyes of Secretary
Perry, and that is the one that sets a demarcation line between short-
range and long-range missiles. Defenses against the former are
permitted. Defenses against the long-range missiles are not.
What is the demarcation line? What is the range? We have been trying
to negotiate that with the Russians as to what is the precise line
between a short-range missile and a long-range missile. We put a
proposal down on the table which we hope is going to be adopted. This
bill incorporates our proposal as U.S. law.
We, in this bill, unilaterally adopt the proposal that the
administration is making at a negotiating session and saying they
cannot deviate from their proposal. Now, that is a rather unusual way
to negotiate: You are sitting down with the other side, trying to reach
an agreement, and your Congress back there unilaterally puts into
domestic law what your first proposal is. Now, what would we think if
the Duma did the same thing? We say we would like a range of 3,500
kilometers and the Duma says, unilaterally, the ABM Treaty means a
range of 3,000 kilometers. Now, what would our reaction be? We are
sitting at a negotiating table with the Russians, trying to figure out
a demarcation line, and the Russians unilaterally make their own
interpretation and make it their law, and tell their President he
cannot deviate from that law. He cannot even sit down with the
Americans to talk about it. He cannot even listen.
Under this bill, the President's people are not even allowed to
listen to a Russian proposal because that would involve the expenditure
of funds; that is, travel funds. So you can kiss goodbye those
negotiations. And, by the way, the language in this bill says it is the
sense of the Senate that the President cease all negotiations for a
year. That is just sense-of-the-Senate language. But there is the power
of the purse that is used here to prevent the President or the
President's people from implementing any Presidential policy relative
to the ABM Treaty. Negotiations to set a demarcation line are over.
Now, this is a country that has thousands of nuclear weapons that we
have been in a cold war with, that we are trying to improve our
relationship with, and we have had some real successes. And now we put
one stick, two sticks, three sticks right in their eyes. For what? A
new threat? Has our research carried us to the point where we now can
even make a decision as to whether we can effectively and cost-
efficiently deploy such a system? We are not at that point now.
The ABM Treaty does not constrain our research and development. That
is why Secretary Perry said that the bill's unwarranted imposition
through funding restrictions of a unilateral demarcation interpretation
would jeopardize these reductions and would raise significant
international legal issues, as well as fundamental constitutional
issues regarding the President's authority over the conduct of foreign
affairs.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters from General
Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, June 28, 1995.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin. Thank you for your letter and the
opportunity to express my views concerning the impact of
Senator Warner's proposed language for the FY 1996 Defense
Authorization Bill on current theater missile defense (TMD)
programs.
Because the Russians have repeatedly linked the ABM Treaty
with other arms control issues--particularly ratification of
START II now before the Duma--we cannot assume they would
deal in isolation with unilateral US legislation detailing
technical parameters for ABM Treaty interpretation. While we
believe that START II is in both countries' interests
regardless of other events, we must assume such unilateral US
legislation could harm prospect for START II ratification by
the Duma and probably impact our broader security
relationship with Russia as well.
We are continuing to work on TMD systems. The ongoing
testing of THAAD through the demonstration/validation program
has been certified ABM Treaty complaint as has the Navy Upper
Tier program. Thus, progress on these programs is not
restricted by the lack of a demarcation agreement. We have no
plans and do not desire to test THAAD or other TMD systems in
an ABM mode.
Even though testing and development of TMD systems is
underway now, we believe it is useful to continue discussions
with the Russians to seek resolution of the ABM/TMD issue in
a way which preserves our security equities. Were such
dialogue to be prohibited, we might eventually find ourselves
forced to choose between giving up elements of our TMD
development programs or proceeding unilaterally in a manner
which could undermine the ABM Treaty and our broader security
relationship with Russia. Either alternative would impose
security
[[Page S 11244]]
costs and risks which we are seeking to avoid.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: I write to register my strong
opposition to the missile defense provisions of the SASC's
Defense Authorization bill, which would institute
Congressional micromanagement of the Administration's missile
defense program and put us on a pathway to abrogate the ABM
Treaty. The Administration is committed to respond to
ballistic missile threats to our forces, allies, and
territory. We will not permit the capability of the defenses
we field to meet those threats to be compromised.
The bill's provisions would add nothing to DoD's ability to
pursue our missile defense programs, and would needlessly
cause us to incur excess costs and serious security risks.
The bill would require the U.S. to make a decision now on
developing a specific national missile defense for deployment
by 2003, with interim operational capability in 1999, despite
the fact that a valid strategic missile threat has not
emerged. Our NMD program is designed to give us the
capability for a deployment decision in three years, when we
will be in a much better position to assess the threat and
deploy the most technologically advanced systems available.
The bill would also terminate valuable elements of our TMD
program, the Boost Phase Intercept and MEADS/Corps SAM
systems. MEADS is not only a valuable defense system but is
an important test of future trans-Atlantic defense
cooperation.
In addition, certain provisions related to the ABM Treaty
would be very damaging to U.S. security interests. By
mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard
U.S. Treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment
date of a multiple-site NMD system--the bill would jeopardize
Russian implementation of the START I and START II Treaties,
which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic
nuclear weapons. The bill's unwarranted imposition, through
funding restrictions, of a unilateral ABM/TMD demarcation
interpretation would similarly jeopardize these reductions,
and would raise significant international legal issues as
well as fundamental constitutional issues regarding the
President's authority over the conduct of foreign affairs.
These serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed
Senate review of the ABM Treaty before considering such
drastic and far-reaching measures.
Unless these provisions are eliminated or significantly
modified, they threaten to undermine fundamental national
security interests of the United States. I will continue to
do everything possible to work with the Senate to see that
these priorities are not compromised.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the bill does not stop there.
Mr. KENNEDY. I wonder if the Senator will yield for a question, or
does he prefer to finish.
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield for a question.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I have been listening with great interest
to the Senator's comments, and I find them enormously persuasive.
Does the Senator agree with me that these negotiations on SALT I and
SALT II have been worked out in a very comprehensive way by Republican
Presidents, Democratic Congresses, Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Secretaries
of Defense? They were all negotiated not just as a way of trying to
ease some pressure on the Soviet Union, but were negotiated because
they were considered to be in the United States national security
interest. It was Republicans and Democrats alike, after debate and
discussion in the course of the hearings with the Foreign Relations
Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and over a very difficult
and complex period of time, as to the nature of the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that these were put
into place because the leaders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
leaders of our military establishment, the Secretaries of Defense, the
Secretaries of State, Presidents of the United States--Republican in
these instances in terms of the SALT agreements--believed that they
were in our national security interest.
As I understand from the Senator's excellent presentation, just by
reviewing the particular words and phrases that are included in the
defense authorization bill, the provisions that are included in the
legislation, that this is effectively saying that a majority, in this
case probably in terms of the vote, are expressing a counterview; that
somehow they have better knowledge of the security interests and the
nature of the nuclear threat to the American people than that long-term
negotiating process that took place by those who were very sensitive to
the security interests, the role of the United States and the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Can the Senator comment briefly on the historic context? I found very
persuasive the particular details.
Second, does the Senator from Michigan, if he assumes that all of
this was done in our security interest, believe that this is an
extraordinary action on the floor of the U.S. Senate, when we are
having our challenge in our relationship between China and the United
States--we recently have heard about two military officers who were
actually arrested in China; we have the tragic circumstances around Mr.
Wu who has been apprehended, and the human rights violations--a range
of different challenges that we are having with one of the other great
world powers, China?
Our Secretary of State is involved in trying to work out at least
some kind of modus operandi with the Chinese. As a student of history
and as one of the leaders in the U.S. Senate on the whole issue of arms
control policy, does the Senator from Michigan feel that we should be
unilaterally abrogating the solemn treaty of the United States with the
Soviet Union on nuclear weapons that will certainly, in a very
significant way, put in serious threat our relations with the Soviet
Union? Does this make any sense?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is right. The Secretary of State has written a
letter to Senator Nunn dated August 2, which I also want to print in
the Record, which addresses the questions which the Senator from
Massachusetts has raised.
These arms reduction treaties, starting with the ABM Treaty, which is
limiting arms, and then going to START I and START II--START II is
before us now, supported by the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee--these have been negotiated by Democratic and Republican
administrations alike. These are not partisan treaties.
President Nixon is the one who negotiated the ABM Treaty. This is a
Republican President who strongly believed that the ABM Treaty was in
our security interest, and I believe every single President since has
supported keeping the ABM Treaty, modifying it at times. We have had
protocols to it, we have had interpretations to it, but it has allowed
us to reduce offensive arms. So it has had broad bipartisan support in
administration after administration.
The Secretary of State points that out when he says in his letter to
Senator Nunn that ``successive administrations have supported the
continued viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and
enhance our national security.'' And the Secretary of State points out
that these unilateral interpretations ``would immediately call into
question the commitment to the treaty and have a negative impact on
United States-Russian relations and on Russian implementation of the
START I Treaty and Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.''
The START II Treaty is going to come to the floor of the Senate one
of these days, I understand with the support of the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, negotiated by a Republican President. It
allows us to significantly reduce, dramatically reduce, the number of
offensive nuclear weapons which we face.
We are told by General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that for us
to trash the ABM Treaty will threaten the ratification of the START II
Treaty. It makes absolutely no sense in terms of the bipartisan
consensus which has been put together for these treaties over the years
and in terms of reducing the number of offensive weapons. So I agree
with the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator's conclusion be that should the
violation of the ABM Treaty--and I think the Senator has made that case
both with regard to the multiple-site issue and also for the unilateral
declaration on the theater and strategic systems, which are in the
process of being negotiated, and the unilateral action or statement or
sense-of-the-Senate resolution, that as far as our chairman of our
Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to
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the President of the United States as well as the Secretary of State--
those who have responsibility in the nature of both defense policy in
this area and diplomacy--that the counteraction will be an action by
the Soviet Union which will result in more nuclear missiles being
pointed toward the United States, there will be more nuclear missiles
pointed to the cities in my State, there will be more nuclear missiles
pointed to cities in the Senator's State, and that there will be less
security in terms of the citizens of our Nation from the dangers of
nuclear war?
Finally, let me just ask the Senator, how does the whole Nunn-Lugar
effort fit into this whole process? We have been involved in the very
recent times with a bipartisan effort to try and help and assist the
dismantling of Soviet weapons systems. For the obvious reason, as the
Senator and others have pointed out, we believe that kind of reduction
is in our security interest.
There have been difficulties in terms of the expenditure of funds and
other factors which I know that the Armed Services Committee and DOD
are interested in. The Congress has been reviewing that effort in terms
of trying to see further action in the dismantling of nuclear weapons.
Does he think that this kind of unilateral action will enhance that
whole kind of effort for further dismantlement, or does the Senator
believe that whole effort will be undermined in a significant way as
well?
Mr. LEVIN. I think the Nunn-Lugar effort is totally undermined,
because instead of being willing to dismantle weapons, which Nunn-Lugar
helps them achieve, our best experts in the State Department, the
Defense Department say they are going to go the other way, they are
going to stop the dismantlement and stop the ratification of START II,
because now they are going to be told by the U.S. Senate that it is the
American policy to put up defenses to their weapons, and that means in
order for whatever they have left after START II to be effective, they
are going to have to have more, not less, in order to overcome whatever
defense.
This is a very threatening thing, we have to understand, to us. This
is a threat to our security, what is going on in this bill language,
because instead of seeing offensive weapons aimed at our States
continuing to be reduced, the numbers of those weapons are suddenly
going to go up instead of down. At a minimum, we are going to see the
termination of these dramatic reductions which we have been able to
achieve under START I and START II.
Mr. KENNEDY. I know the Senator has further comments to make, but I
want to ask him, as I understand the situation we are facing in the
Soviet Union--we are facing local elections that are going to be taking
place in the next year.
It is also a commitment in terms of the Presidential election which is
to take place next year--there is movement in terms of the Soviet Union
and, as I understand it, in terms of the political process and activity
of increasing involvement and intensity and increasing United States
investments.
Obviously, there are the creaking problems of a new nation finding
itself in terms of trying to develop democratic institutions in that
nation. Does the Senator, as someone who is a student both of the
Soviet Union and the recent history of this time, does he think that
this will help to stabilize the nature of the political discussion in
the Soviet Union? As he has pointed out, the reduction of these nuclear
arms was done because we believed they were in the security interests
of the United States. As the Senator pointed out, if we take this
action, that will be threatened.
Does he believe, as well, that if the Soviet Union did this action to
the United States, there could be a counteracting reaction here in the
Senate and among the American people? Does he anticipate that this may
very well have some factor and force in terms of the domestic politics
and defense politics of the Soviet Union?
Mr. LEVIN. This unilateral action in setting the dividing line
between short-range and long-range missiles, which has been subject of
the negotiations, suddenly is yanked out from those negotiations, the
U.S. Senate usurps this and puts into American law what it believes the
demarcation line is and prohibits the President from negotiating any
other demarcation line. At the same time, we establish the policy of
the United States to deploy a system which clearly violates the ABM
Treaty.
Doing those things will play into the hands of the most rabid, anti-
Western political forces in Russia. We are going to pay a terrible
price, not just in having more weapons face our States, we are also
going to pay a terrible price in terms of lending unwitting support to
the very anti-Western forces in Russia which are creating so much
difficulty already, not just for Russia, but for the rest of the world.
Mr. KENNEDY. Finally, the Senator spent a great deal of time in
recent years, along with others, in terms of the meaning of the ABM
Treaty. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. All of us were
enormously impressed during the 1980's and 1990's when the ABM Treaty
issue and related issues were being reviewed as to the meaning. I think
all of us who followed this whole issue in terms of arms control and
the ABM Treaty are very mindful of the expertise which the Senator from
Michigan has.
I hope at some time during the debate that at least included in this
record, there will be some references to that review and that study, so
that those that may be newer Members of this body can have some
appreciation for the extensiveness and the depth of the hearings that
were held on the meaning and significance of the ABM Treaty, which was
challenged and reviewed and reviewed. So that the presentation will be
given the weight that it should have. I think some reference or
incorporation of some past discussion of that history is important for
the understanding of the Senators.
I thank the Senator. I hope that our colleagues listen carefully to
the excellent presentation. I find it absolutely persuasive. We have
not gotten into if the Soviet Union takes corresponding action, what
will be the corresponding action here in the United States. I think
anybody who has followed the arms issue with the Soviet Union can
predict that very easily and with certainty, not only with the cost but
the instability that will be brought about.
So I thank the Senator. I think it has been a very important
presentation. I think, in many respects, this may very well be either
the first or second most important vote that we will have this year. I
hope our colleagues give it attention.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. He reminds us that
we had a debate here, and there was an effort made by Senator Nunn and
myself, and many others, to avoid a unilateral reinterpretation of the
ABM Treaty during the 1980's. This Senate has had a long history in not
undermining treaties or not undermining chief executives who are aimed
at negotiating treaties. We have an advise-and-consent function that is
very different from putting into American law unilateral
interpretations and prohibiting Presidents from even negotiating
relative to treaties.
Senator Nunn's leadership during the 1980's on the whole ABM issue--
and the Senator from Massachusetts was correct, he was deeply involved
in it, as well--was part of a long-time bipartisan effort, generally,
on the part of the Senate to avoid this kind of unilateral
interpretation of treaties being put into American law and undermining
the executive branch in their negotiating function, as well.
Now, Mr. President, the language in this bill, by saying that
``appropriated funds may not be obligated or expended by any official
for the purpose of implementing any executive policy that would apply
the ABM Treaty to the research, development, or deployment of a missile
defense,'' means the President and the President's representatives
cannot even listen at a negotiation. They cannot even use travel money.
``Appropriated funds are prohibited here from being obligated or
expended by any official for the purpose of implementing an executive
policy that would apply the ABM Treaty to the deployment of a missile
defense.''
That is section 238(b). In another subsection: ``Or from taking any
other action to provide for the ABM Treaty to be applied to the
deployment of the missile defense.''
That is what the ABM Treaty is all about.
[[Page S 11246]]
So this language does three things. First, it unilaterally says what
the demarcation is between short-range and long-range, and makes that
the law of the United States. It prohibits the President of the United
States from negotiating anything other than that. He cannot even listen
to anything other than that.
It does one other thing. This is some of the most, I think, extreme
language I have read in any bill, almost on any subject that has come
to the floor because, under this language, if there were a test that
violated this definition of a long-range system, nobody could act to
stop it, because it says here that ``appropriated funds may not be
expended by any official to implement any policy that applies the U.N.
treaty to the deployment of a missile defense.''
What happens if you have a test here of an ABM system against a
missile with a range of 4,000 kilometers, clearly in violation of the
demarcation line, by this new demarcation line. Under this language,
until the test is completed, the prohibition on the use of any funds to
stop that test stands.
This language says that ``unless and until there is an ABM qualifying
flight test of a system, this prohibition stands.''
This language goes so far as to say that even if there is going to be
a flight test of an ABM system against a missile, with a range that
clearly violates this unilateral declaration, that nobody can stop that
illegal action on our part, which is admittedly illegal under this
unilateral definition because the flight test has not occurred. Unless
and until the flight test is completed, this restriction stands.
The ABM Treaty cannot be used to stop a test, even if it is illegal,
by the definition in this bill.
Now, if we want to talk about language which is so excessive, this
fits the test. That is what it says, what I guess is the frosting on
the cake. What the bill provides is that we will have a commission to
look at this whole thing. On page 61 of this bill, section 237, it says
that the Senate should undertake
. . . a comprehensive review of the continuing value and
validity of the ABM Treaty, with the intent of providing
additional policy guidance on the future of the ABM Treaty
during the second session of the 104th Congress.
Now, in addition to undertaking a comprehensive review of the ABM
Treaty, we were are also told in subsection B we should consider
establishing a select committee to carry out the review, and to
recommend such additional policy guidance on future application of the
ABM Treaty, as the select committee considers appropriate.
Now, that is a little bit like having the hanging first, and then the
trial. This bill says it is our policy to trash the ABM Treaty; this is
the dividing line unilaterally; the President cannot negotiate anything
else. But it is our policy now under this bill to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty. That is what this bill says.
Then the same bill that says that says: But we are going to have a
study; we are going to have a comprehensive review of the continuing
validity of the ABM Treaty.
We ought to have the study before we trash the treaty. Looking at the
committee report on page 119, it says:
The committee believes that Congress should undertake a
comprehensive review of the continuing value and validity of
the ABM Treaty, with the intent of making a well-informed and
carefully considered recommendation on how to proceed by the
end of the 104th Congress.
That is supposed to be the purpose of this comprehensive review.
On page 120, the majority says it is prudent--prudent--to dedicate a
year to studying all ABM Treaty-related issues and alternatives, and
recommends the review of the continuing value and validity--a careful
1-year review, the report says--of the continuing value and validity of
the ABM Treaty. Why not do the ``careful'' study before we decide to
trash the treaty?
If it is prudent to have a 1-year study of the ABM Treaty's value, is
it not prudent to have the review prior to saying it is the policy of
the U.S. Government to trash the ABM Treaty? Does not prudence dictate
that you withhold your conclusion until after the study?
If the purpose of our ``comprehensive careful 1-year review'' is to
make a study of the value of the ABM Treaty, for heaven's sake, we
should withhold the conclusions until after the study. That is not what
this bill does. This bill says it is the policy of the United States to
deploy a multiple-site system. That is an illegal system under the ABM
Treaty. That is why Secretary Perry says that these serious
consequences argue for conducting the proposed Senate review of the ABM
Treaty before considering such a drastic and far-reaching measure. He
underlines the word ``before.''
It seems to me it is just absolute common sense that we do not reach
conclusions and implement those conclusions the way this bill does,
with initial operating capability, with a date set, 2003. There is an
IOC of 2003 for a national missile test, an interim capability mandated
by the bill for this system.
We are mandating violations of a treaty when at the same time in
another part of the bill we say we are studying the continued validity
of that treaty. That makes no sense at all.
Mr. President, I will be sending an amendment to the desk which
addresses these three issues that I have just outlined. It will strike
the words that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a
multiple-site system, since that is directly violative of the ABM
Treaty; we will also strike the language which sets forth in permanent
law what the demarcation line is between long-range and short-range
missiles, since that is the subject of negotiations; and we will also
strike the language which prevents the President from even discussing
any matters relative to the ABM Treaty with the Russians.
Amendment No. 2088
(Purposes: (1) To strike section 233(2); (2) To strike section
237(a)(2), which states that the President should cease all efforts to
clarify ABM Treaty obligations; (3) To strike Section 238, which
establishes a unilateral interpretation of the ABM Treaty and prohibits
treaty-compliance efforts)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, at this point, I send the amendment to the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kyl). The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr.
Exon, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Kennedy, Mr.
Feingold, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Biden, Mr. Moynihan,
Mr. Harkin, Mr. Jeffords, and Mr. Pell, proposes an amendment
numbered 2088.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 52, strike out lines 20 through 25.
On page 62, strike out lines 8 through 11.
Beginning on page 63, strike out line 11 and all that
follows through page 65, line 24.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the distinguished manager of the bill on
the majority side, Senator Thurmond, is anxious to get a time
agreement.
I wonder if I might inquire of the distinguished ranking member as to
the progress we are making on that. Many Senators are working on their
schedules. Many Senators are anxious to engage in the debate on this
particular amendment, I think at the convenience of the Senate. And
this means to keep this momentum that we have this morning going
forward, I wonder if I might inquire as to this.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I think we ought to
inquire of the Senator from Michigan as to his intentions.
We talked about a time agreement. The Senator from Michigan informed
me he would prefer to come to the floor and determine how many people
wanted to speak on this amendment.
I welcome a time agreement. I hope we can reach one. Perhaps the
Senator from Michigan could give an indication of his feeling at this
point.
Mr. LEVIN. I do not have the final figure yet, but it is
approximately--and there are a couple more Senators we must consult
with--2\1/2\ hours on this side that will be needed so far. We think
that is fairly close to the total, but we are not quite there yet.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is a period of time considerably
longer than I had hoped. That would mean if this side were to require
an equal amount, we would be 5 hours.
Credit, perhaps, is being given on the 2\1/2\ hours for this time, so
we are beginning as of this moment.
Mr. LEVIN. That would be 2\1/2\ additional hours, but that is not
quite yet the total. There are two other Senators
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we have yet to hear from that we believe want to speak, and we have not
heard how much time.
Mr. NUNN. If I may say to my friend from Virginia, the Senator from
Michigan made such a powerful speech on this subject, with the
intervention of the Senator from Massachusetts, and I plan to make a
speech on it, and I know the Senator from Nebraska plans to speak,
perhaps by the time our colleagues hear these speeches, they will not
feel the need to speak as long on this subject. That remains to be
seen.
I hope we can cut that time down. I will work with the Senator from
Michigan. This is an important amendment. This is the heart of the bill
in terms of the opposition to the bill. This is the heart of it.
While I would like to accelerate this process and will work hard to
do that, I do think that once this matter is settled one way or the
other on this amendment, and perhaps on another amendment that may
follow if this one fails, I think once we do that, we will begin to
make a lot more progress on the bill.
So, I say to my friend from Virginia and my friend from South
Carolina, I know they want to move this bill, I will continue to work
with them to see if we cannot reach some time agreement.
Mr. President, I would like to be recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might say, I thank my distinguished
colleague. It is very reassuring to hear him say we can try to reduce
the amount of time. Because the majority leader is very anxious to have
this bill completed, as you know, on the timetable this week. I hope we
can reduce the amount of time.
I see the Senator from Michigan indicating----
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if Senator Exon has a question?
Mr. EXON. No, I was going to follow up on some of the remarks that
had been made by the other Senators on this matter. The Senator from
Georgia probably wishes to do the same.
Mr. NUNN. Has the Senator from Nebraska had a chance to make a
statement this morning?
Mr. EXON. Yes, I got that statement made.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am going to make some remarks on the Levin
amendment and I am going to try to cut my remarks down. I think this is
a very important amendment. I support the amendment. I would like to
lay out what I consider to be the defects in the bill as it now exists
and why I think this amendment is important and why I will support the
amendment.
If this amendment fails I anticipate another amendment in this area.
Mr. President, the defects in the majority's Missile Defense Act of
1995 are simple and straightforward. First, the Missile Defense Act
constitutes what, in law, I would call--reflecting back years ago on my
law school courses--I would call this an anticipatory breach of the ABM
Treaty. Only in this case, it is not a contract, as in law school. The
bill before us proposes to breach an international treaty, the treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, now succeeded by Russia, on the limitation of the
antiballistic missile systems known as the ABM Treaty. Thus the Missile
Defense Act if we pass it, if it became law, puts this body on record
as directing the United States to knowingly violate an existing
international treaty without first seeking amendments to the treaty and
without reference to the provisions in the treaty which permit either
party to withdraw upon 6 months' notice.
The ABM Treaty was entered into, not as a sacred document to be
adhered to forever, but rather as a document that reflected the
security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States at
that time. I am not wedded to every word in the ABM Treaty, as I will
review in a moment. I do believe amendments are in order. But why not
negotiate the amendments? Why act as if there is no treaty? That is
what this bill does.
If we cannot negotiate the amendments, if the Russians will not budge
after a good-faith effort, why not then consider whether to withdraw
from the treaty under the provisions of the treaty? That is the way you
get out of a treaty if you do not feel it is in your national security
interests.
The second problem with the Missile Defense Act is that this breach
is wholly unnecessary to the conducting of the near-term missile
defense program run by the ballistic missile defense organization. In
other words, we are basically serving notice that the treaty is going
to be breached and it is not getting us anything in the next fiscal
year--nothing. There is no program in this bill that would violate the
ABM Treaty in the next fiscal year.
Enactment of the Missile Defense Act authorizes no activity by the
ballistic missile defense office during fiscal year 1996 that would
otherwise be proscribed by the ABM Treaty.
So, what we have is we are asked to take a gratuitous poke at the eye
of the Russians, while helping to persuade them that the United States
Congress is bent on resurrecting what some have called star wars.
In my view the Russians do not have the resources to compete in this
arena in the near term. So they will certainly be frustrated, in the
sense that they see us moving to breach the ABM Treaty when they do not
have the resources to compete. They just simply do not have the
finances to compete.
But, what they do have is thousands of missiles. Not a few hundred,
but thousands of missiles that they are supposed to dismantle under
START I, and they already are doing that under START I, and thousands
more missiles they are supposed to dismantle under START II, which has
been negotiated, and signed by President Bush but is now pending
ratification both in the Duma and here in the Senate.
What they can do very easily is they can simply continue to target
those thousands of missiles at the United States. That is likely to be
their response to what they see as a breach of the ABM Treaty.
Do we really, on the floor of the U.S. Senate, after going through
the Reagan administration, the Bush administration, basically
negotiating carefully arms control agreements and trying to carry them
out, getting thousands of nuclear warheads dismantled, do we want to
turn around and do something in this bill that is going to say to the
Russians, in effect: We are going to break out of the ABM Treaty. Now
whatever you do is up to you?
I know what they are going to do. I believe I know what they are
going to do. They do not have billions of dollars to conduct defenses
now. They may in the future. In the future I think it is in their
interests also to have some defenses. I think both countries ought to
have some limited defenses against accidental launch, against any kind
of unauthorized launch or against a Third World country that emerges as
a threat. I think we ought to have those kind of defenses. I think the
Russians ought to, too.
But if we strike out unilaterally they are going to do what we would
do if we were in their circumstances. What is that? We would not
dismantle our strategic offensive forces. We would find a way to
proliferate the offensive forces because those offensive forces are
going to have defenses that they have to contend with. And, what the
Russians would fear, as we would fear, is that the combination of going
to a lower START level, dismantling warheads, going down to START II,
doing that, limiting the number of warheads; then having the United
States embarked on a breach of the ABM Treaty, saying we are clearly
going to deploy defenses without regard to negotiation, without regard
to amendments, without regard to the provisions of the treaty--the
combination of those two things says to them: Limited warheads,
defenses by the United States, possible preemptive attack. We would
never do that. We know that. But they do not know that just like we do
not know that about them. That is the basis of our deterrence policy.
We do not know that and we are not going to bank on it.
But the combination limiting the number of warheads, defenses in this
country that basically breach the ABM Treaty, plus a preemptive attack,
means that they would lose the ability to retaliate.
That is paranoia. But the whole equation of deterrence for years has
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been based on both sides being somewhat paranoid. And not irrationally
so, based on the former confrontation all over the globe.
This breach of the ABM Treaty is wholly unnecessary. This poke in the
eye to Russia leads to a third problem. That problem is one with
serious, perhaps even tragic consequences. While enactment of the
Missile Defense Act permits nothing within our own missile defense
programs that we cannot already do in the next fiscal year, it may very
well persuade the Russians that we have abandoned our obligations under
the ABM Treaty.
Perhaps the majority does not really want to do that. If so, we have
room to work out wording that would change that impression in this
bill. The Russians have repeatedly told us, those in the executive
branch as well as those of us in the Senate who have met with them on
many occasions, they have told us of the importance they attach to
continued compliance with the ABM Treaty by both parties. And they have
suggested if they conclude we are abandoning the ABM Treaty
unilaterally, this would call into question Russia's continued
compliance with their international agreements.
Thus we may be jeopardizing START I and START II, thousands of
warheads that would continue to be pointed at the United States, it
will take us 10 or 12 years at best to build the defenses, yet we have
a chance of dismantling thousands of warheads that are aimed at us.
Which is more cost effective? Embarking on a unilateral course
without regard to the people we entered into the treaty with? Or
negotiating with them, and determining what we would do if negotiations
fail?
Why do we want to get thousands more warheads pointed at the United
States? I do not. I do not think anybody in this body does. I do not
think the American people do. That is the result of where we are
heading, unless this bill is changed.
Mr. President, it is not only the two START agreements, it is also
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. That is the treaty where the
Russians dismantled and continue to dismantle literally thousands--they
are moving at least thousands and thousands of tanks and other
threatening equipment, artillery tubes under the CFE Treaty in Europe.
They already are frustrated by that treaty. They already are making
signs that this treaty causes them big problems. It is going to be a
problem whether we pass this amendment or not. But, if we pass this
amendment, it is going to be a bigger problem very quickly.
The two START treaties, if fully entered into force, will reduce by
three-fourths the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads in their
arsenal--a far greater reduction of nuclear warheads potentially
threatening the United States than any defensive system could possibly
offer or that we have any capability of developing and paying for in
the next 10 years. Three-fourths of the warheads are coming off under
START I and START II.
Do we really want to jeopardize that? The Russians have complained
frequently about the enormous cost to them of compliance with these two
START treaties and the CFE. But so far they are complying. We may reach
a point where they do not. But they are so far complying. How much more
will it cost us in our own defense budget if the START treaties go by
the boards? Also, many Members are aware the Russians have been
seeking relief from the limitations imposed under the CFE Treaty on
the level of conventional forces and equipment they are permitted to
station on their volatile southern flank. If the full Senate adopts the
Missile Defense Act, this will give them a plausible excuse to ignore
the CFE limits on stationing forces and equipment. To repeat, Mr.
President, all of these serious consequences and costs may be brought
upon us by adoption of the Senate Armed Services Committee majority's
Missile Defense Act, which itself allows us to do no more than we
already planned to do in the short run, unless the bill is changed.
The fourth problem with the Missile Defense Act is that it tries
legislatively to have it both ways: the Senate Armed Services Committee
majority wants the ABM Treaty to go away, and legislates as though it
had already gone away; yet they do not take the straightforward
approach of using legal remedy. Mr. President, if the Senate believes
adherence to the ABM Treaty is no longer in our national interest, then
we should have availed ourselves of a straightforward and honorable
resolution. Under article XV, paragraph 2, of the ABM Treaty, the
United States can withdraw from the ABM Treaty, after giving 6 months
notice to Russia. Is the Senate ready to take that step? Or will we
adopt the language of the Missile Defense Act to squeeze past, a direct
confrontation with the ABM Treaty, by pretending that it is not there.
It seems to me that is the course we are on, pretending it is not
there.
This unwillingness to confront the ABM Treaty head-on, Mr. President,
leads to the fifth problem with the Missile Defense Act. By ignoring
the ABM Treaty, rather than proposing U.S. withdrawal from it, the
Senate Armed Services Committee majority are forced to try to negate
its effect by the following legislative device: They restrict the use
of appropriated funds to enforce our obligations under the ABM Treaty.
In attempting to negate the treaty in this way, Mr. President, the
Senate Armed Services Committee majority sets up a direct
constitutional conflict between the executive and the legislative
branches regarding responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and
the enforcement of this Nation's international obligations.
Mr. President, consider what is at stake here. Should the Missile
Defense Act approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee majority be
enacted in the next couple of years, we stand to gain nothing, but we
stand to lose a great deal: we could lose the agreed drawdowns of
nuclear arsenals under START I and II; we could lose the CFE Treaty's
constraints on Russian conventional force deployments near troubled
areas.
Now, some in the Senate Armed Service Committee majority will argue
that the Missile Defense Act does not really breach the ABM Treaty,
because only some subsequent testing or deployment action would
technically place us in violation of the treaty.
They will argue this by saying that only some subsequent testing or
deployment would technically place us in violation of the treaty.
Mr. President, this is too clever by one-half. If the Russian
Republic were to announce tomorrow that it no longer intended to meet
the timetable for reduction of nuclear systems under the START I
Treaty, that it was not going to renegotiate them, that it simply was
going to move forward as if START I did not exist, and that there was
nothing we could do about it, would the Senate Armed Services Committee
come to the Senate floor to calmly inform us that this is not a breach
of their obligations under the treaty? Would they argue that the START
I Treaty can only be breached once the deadline for implementing
reductions is past? Or would they say instead, as I think would be the
case, breach is inevitable, and based on what the Russians have told
us, we should now move to prepare for this breach and take the
necessary security precautions?
I think that the majority--and I would be in that majority--would say
let us assume that they are going to do what they say they are going to
do; they are going to breach the treaty, and we had better start
recognizing that.
To recap, Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee's
Missile Defense Act provision has major problems: First, it abandons
United States adherence to the ABM Treaty; second, abandoning adherence
now is unnecessary--we can conduct an effective missile defense program
in the near-term while continuing adherence; third, abandoning
adherence now is likely to impose huge costs on us, if Russia declines
to carry out some of its legal obligations in response to our breach;
fourth, the Senate Armed Services Committee bill abandons adherence by
stealth, rather directing the administration to use the legal
withdrawal procedures contained in the treaty; and fifth, by failing to
use the legal option, the Senate is forced to try to compel the
executive branch to abandon adherence by usurping certain powers of the
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executive branch over the conduct of foreign policy, a move that raises
serious constitutional issues, and
could lead to this act never becoming law even if it passed as is.
Mr. President, I do not want any Senator to misconstrue my message
regarding the ABM Treaty, and I am sure there will be people on this
side who will not listen to the latter part of this message. I am not a
diehard supporter of the ABM Treaty as some sacred document that cannot
be changed. I think that would be a mistake in view of this treaty.
Circumstances change. The circumstances surrounding the treaty's
establishment have changed significantly since it was entered into in
the early 1970's. Therefore, either the treaty itself must be changed
to reflect the new realities, or the Congress and the President must at
some point make the decision that the treaty's usefulness has ended and
exercise our legal right to withdraw from the treaty.
The ABM Treaty condition contains provisions for renegotiation;
indeed, that is precisely what the Clinton administration has been
trying to do at Geneva, and they really need the backing of Congress to
do that. Thus, it is not a foregone conclusion that the treaty cannot
be amended by mutual agreement to allow us to deploy the missile
defenses we consider necessary to meet our national security
requirements. But Russia must understand that these negotiations must
make progress and that the time period available for negotiations is
not infinite. It is finite.
I think that message needs to go forth to the Russians clearly. It
would be useful if it went forth in a united way from both the
administration and from the Congress. But we will not have any united
message because we are going to be too busy deciding whether there is
an anticipatory breach by ignoring any negotiations and by ignoring the
treaty itself.
Mr. President, I intend to vote in favor of the amendment by the
Senator from Michigan; I hope it is successful. If it fails to pass, I
believe the Senate then will face a major dilemma. I believe that,
unless the problems I have outlined above are dealt with, this bill
faces a bleak future. The administration is already on record that the
House version of the Missile Defense Act is unacceptable, as is the
provision in this bill as passed by the committee.
Thus, the prospects for an outcome in conference that will become law
are indeed bleak unless we make some fundamental changes.
The Senator from Michigan seeks to correct the flaws by striking
whole sections. If this approach is shown to be unacceptable to a
majority of Senators present and voting, then the only remaining
possibility will be to try to modify the language. And I will certainly
have an amendment to do that after we decide what happens on this
amendment.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have worked for many years with my
distinguished colleague from Georgia, and more often than not we have
had a joinder of views and positions. But on this we are strong
opponents.
I was the author of a number of provisions in this bill which are the
subject of the strike of my good friend, the Senator from Michigan.
I vigorously oppose the Senator's amendment.
Mr. President, it is my understanding the administration is
orchestrating a full court press to defeat the Missile Defense Act of
1995 and in particular section 238 of that act which was known as the
Warner amendment during our markup.
I was the author of the previous Missile Defense Act, and the Missile
Defense Act of 1995 builds on the act that was put in in I believe
1991.
Therefore, it seems to me that it is a logical sequence of
legislative steps by the Congress to build on the foundation that we
laid in 1991.
I have tried for many years together with a number of my colleagues
through many, many legislative initiatives to ensure that the men and
women of the Armed Forces are not once again sent into harm's way
unless they are provided with the most effective defenses that not only
we can buy with the dollars but that we can devise with the brains. I
wish to emphasize that--devise with the brains.
My basic premise is that successive administrations have used the ABM
Treaty as a means to limit the use of the intellectual capacity of the
United States to develop the most efficient, the most cost-effective
and the most technically sound and reliable systems for the defense
against short-range ballistic missiles.
We failed in many respects during the gulf war. The crude Scud
missile was utilized by the Iraqi military forces not only against the
coalition of allied military forces but against the innocent people,
the defenseless people of Tel Aviv.
Israel was not a combatant in the gulf war, yet Saddam Hussein rained
down upon those innocent people the Scud missile, not for military
purposes but solely for terrorist purposes.
Here we are some several years later still wrestling with the
fundamental question: Are we going to unleash the full magnitude of the
brains of this Nation, working with other nations, and in particular
Israel, to devise the finest and most technically capable system to
defend against the short-range missile?
That is what this is all about--that is that section of the strike
that goes to the Missile Defense Act of 1995.
Over 30 nations now have short-range ballistic missiles--30 nations.
Talk about the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is between the United States
of America and the former Soviet Union. And at that time in 1972 there
was not even on a drawing board, so far as anybody can recall, an idea
about a short-range system. Today, there are 30 nations with some
measure of capability, and yet we are sitting here dealing with this
archaic act, treaty, whatever you wish to call it, saying that it
should stand there as a guardian against the ability of this country to
devise our best systems.
Seventy-seven nations have cruise missiles, the flat trajectory. Many
of the systems that we are looking at now to deter the ballistic
missile also have a technical capability of being adapted to defend
against the cruise missile.
As the gulf war demonstrated, the threat such missiles pose to the
men and women of the Armed Forces is real, immediate, and growing. At
this very moment and while we are debating this issue, all across the
world are men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces on watch as a means to
deter against attack, many of them within the range of the short-range
ballistic systems posed as a threat by these 30 nations.
How many recall the incident in the gulf war which resulted in the
largest number of American casualties? It was a single Scud missile
that landed on a barracks killing and wounding the greatest number of
Americans during that war.
Are we to say to the American people, particularly the mothers and
fathers, the uncles and aunts, the loved ones of those on duty in
places throughout the world today that this could happen once again
because the United States will not unleash its full brain power to
devise the best system to defend against that type of weapon?
If you look at the balance between the launch pad of a short-range
system, that is fairly elementary. You can cobble that together. We
know that from the crude Scud missile system. You can put it together.
But the defense, the interceptor, the electronics needed to bring that
missile into the bore sight of some weapon, that is many times more
costly than the launch system. But we are going to stand here, if I
listened correctly to the proponents of this amendment and once again
go back to a treaty of 1972 and allow it to stand, stand there and
block the full resources, mental and dollarwise of this great Nation to
prevent another incident like we experienced in the gulf.
In the judgment of this Senator, we must accelerate the development
and deployment of highly effective land- and sea-based theater missile
systems to protect our troops, defenses that are not artificially or
wrongfully limited, constrained by this ABM Treaty.
Therefore, Mr. President, it was in April of this year that I
introduced an amendment along with dozens of cosponsors to clearly
establish a policy for the United States of America which states that
the ABM Treaty does not apply to short-range theater ballistic systems.
[[Page S 11250]]
In effect, this legislation is intended to prevent the Clinton
administration from making the ABM Treaty in effect a TMD treaty. That
is what is underway and has been underway for some several years, to
take this 1972 treaty and somehow wrap it around the short-range
system. Despite administration claims that this provision is
unconstitutional, I carefully chose the congressional power of the
purse as the vehicle to get congressional views on the issue of ABM-TMD
demarcation, to take those into consideration.
Contrary to the assertion of its critics, this provision does not
prohibit negotiations with the Russians. I listened to this this
morning. I cannot believe it. That is a weak reed to walk out on, I say
to the proponents of the Levin amendment, a very weak reed to walk out
on.
Instead, the provision would in effect prohibit the implementation of
any resulting agreement which would have the effect of making the ABM
Treaty a TMD treaty. That was the purpose of my legislation. I have
tried in the past, and many others have tried, but to no avail to
ensure that the Senate of the United States would be involved in
decisions the administration might make in the demarcation
negotiations.
Last year, I sponsored legislation requiring that any international
agreement entered into by the President that would substantially modify
the ABM Treaty be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent
pursuant to our constitutional authority on treaties.
Despite that legal requirement, it became clear to me during the
administration briefings on the demarcation issue--and I will say to
their credit, particularly to a former Senate Armed Services staff
assistant, Robert Bell, there has been considerable consultation on
this demarcation series of negotiations, but we have not been able to
present what I regard as a convincing argument.
I repeat, despite that legal requirement of last year, it became
clear to many of us here in the Senate during these briefings on the
demarcation that the administration had no intention of submitting any
demarcation to the U.S. Senate, no intention, despite the fact that the
administration's negotiating position would result in an international
agreement that would impose major new limitations on the United States.
Therefore, many of us saw the need to act, and act we did. And as a
consequence, we have before us today a bill that will give this country
needed protections. Regrettably, one of our colleagues, joined by
others, is wishing to strike that provision.
Mr. President, the ABM Treaty was never intended to limit or restrict
theater missile defense systems. That is clear. The administration, in
a sense, concedes the point. In addition, I had the opportunity to
discuss this issue with two individuals who were intimately involved in
the ABM Treaty negotiations at that period of time, 1972. I was
privileged to be the Secretary of the U.S. Navy and was in Moscow
primarily for the purpose of the Incidents of the Sea Agreement with
the delegation that signed the ABM Treaty. These were persons that I
had worked with for some several years prior thereto in the Department
of Defense. The ABM Treaty was not a matter primarily in any respect
under the jurisdiction of the military departments. But nevertheless,
the military departments, including, of course, the Navy Department,
had access to the negotiations, the papers, and were asked from time to
time for views on this issue.
So I do have a contemporary recollection firsthand of this period of
time in history. And I went back and talked with my former colleague,
Dr. John Foster, who at that time was the head of the research and
development section in the Department of Defense, an eminent scholar,
mathematician, physicist. And he reassured me that the issue of short-
range systems was not a product in any respect of the treaty. I
likewise talked to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was
the National Security Adviser during that period of time. And he also
reaffirmed just a short time ago that theater missiles were never
contemplated during the ABM Treaty negotiations.
Specifically, according to Dr. Kissinger, the focus of the
negotiation was on defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles
because they were the only systems that were then in existence.
Unfortunately, the administration appears intent on concluding an
agreement with the Russians that would severely limit the technological
development and deployment of United States theater missile defense
systems, an agreement that would transform the ABM Treaty, in my
judgment, into a TMD treaty.
These are examples of what the administration has been doing, is
table proposals; that is, put on the table for discussion with the
Russians, proposals that would accept performance limitations on the
TMD systems. The ABM Treaty does not even impose performance
limitations on the strategic systems.
Second, the administration initially accepted a Russian proposal to
prohibit deployment of the Navy upper-tier system, a system that was
subsequently deemed to be treaty compliant by the administration.
Initially they put that on the table as a proposal.
The negotiations clearly then and indeed now are headed in the wrong
direction. In my view, it is time for the Congress to act to pave the
way for the development of the most capable, most cost-effective
theater missile defense system to protect the lives of the men and
women of our Armed Forces. My legislation does just that. It would
prohibit the obligation or expenditure of any funds by any official of
the Federal Government for the purposes of prescribing, enforcing or
implementing any Executive order, regulation or policy that would apply
the ABM Treaty or any limitation or obligation under such treaty to
research, development, testing or deployment of a theater missile
defense system, upgrade or component. The standard which I have used in
this legislation to define the demarcation line between antiballistic
missile defenses are limited by the ABM Treaty.
Let me repeat that. The standard which was used in this legislation
and adopted by the Senate Armed Services Committee to define the
demarcation line between antiballistic missile defenses which are
limited by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses which are not so
limited by the treaty, is the one, the very one used by the
administration at the beginning of the demarcation negotiations in
November 1993. That is, a missile defense system which is covered by
the ABM Treaty is defined as a missile defense system that has been
field tested against a ballistic missile with, one, a range of more
than 3,500 kilometers, or, two, a maximum velocity of more than 5
kilometers per second.
Put simply, if a missile defense system does not have a demonstrated
field-tested capability to counter intercontinental ballistic systems,
it should not be limited in any way by the ABM Treaty. Without this
legislation, Mr. President--I acknowledge that the current occupant of
the chair was a most valuable participant in drawing up this
legislation--without this legislation, Mr. President, the Senate will
have no role to play in an international agreement which will impose
major new obligations and restrictions on the military capabilities of
the United States. This is an issue which is vital to our national
security and which can be ignored no longer.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question?
Mr. WARNER. Yes. Two sentences, and then I will be happy to yield. We
will no doubt debate this issue at length, as we are doing right now.
And I welcome the debate, and I urge all to support those who seek to
defeat the amendment by our distinguished colleague from Michigan.
I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. I cannot speak for the Senator from Michigan. Of course, he
is on the floor to speak for himself.
What I hear the Senator from Virginia say is his main purpose is to
protect the theater missile defense systems and to have a demarcation
point of definition between those systems and the strategic systems
that would be affected by the ABM Treaty. Assuming that is the
Senator's main objective, it seems to me we can reach some agreement on
this because that is not the language that gives me the problem. I do
not think it is the language
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that gives the Senator from Michigan the problem. It is all language
that basically states we are going to deploy national missile defenses
with multiple sites without any negotiation and without any regard to
the ABM Treaty, which has nothing to do with theater missiles. That is
all strategic and it is all clearly involved with the ABM Treaty.
But if the Senator's main goal is to protect the theater missile
defense system and have a demarcation more than a definition, as long
as there is some flexibility for the administration so that there is
not an absolute ruling out of any administration efforts--because
somebody has got to negotiate this demarcation point no matter what we
say--if that is the Senator's goal, I agree with him on the demarcation
point. I think that is a very sensible point. If that is the Senator's
goal, then there is no reason we cannot find a way, whatever happens on
the Levin amendment, to deal with this language,
because that is not the language we are trying to take out of this
bill.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in reply, that is encouraging to hear the
views from my distinguished colleague. The Levin amendment,
nevertheless, strikes the Missile Defense Act of 1995, which in turn
incorporated in the committee markup the Warner provision, which I have
just addressed.
Do I understand that there is some thought about amending the Levin
amendment to----
Mr. LEVIN. No.
Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator from Michigan stated----
Mr. LEVIN. I want to go through the language of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and apologize for jumping in without
being recognized.
My amendment strikes the language in the bill which commits us to
deploy a system which clearly violates the ABM Treaty. It leaves the
language about deploying as soon as possible highly effective theater
missile defenses. That is in the bill. It is left in the bill. I was
surprised to hear the Senator from Virginia say the issue here is
whether we want to deploy theater missile defenses. Boy, that is not
the language we are after. We left that language in there.
Section 233 says:
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) deploy as soon as possible highly effective theater
missile defenses capable of countering existing and emerging
theater ballistic missiles;
We did not touch that. It is the next paragraph we touched. The next
paragraph says it is the policy of the United States:
(2) deploy a multiple-site national missile defense system.
. .
Which I am absolutely confident my friend from Virginia will agree
that a multiple-site national missile defense system is inconsistent
with the ABM Treaty, just as I concede that the ABM Treaty does not
prohibit theater missile defenses. It does not and we should proceed to
deploy those, and we are.
By the way, General Shalikashvili says the ABM Treaty does not
constrain our development of theater missile defenses. He said in his
letter to me ``the progress on these programs''--referring to theater
missile defenses--``is not restricted by a lack of a demarcation
agreement.''
Just as I would be the first to concede, indeed proclaim, that the
ABM Treaty does not restrict theater missile defenses, I hope my friend
from Virginia will agree that his language in section 233(2) that it is
a policy to deploy a multiple-site national defense system that would
violate the treaty unless the treaty were amended. We are seeking to
try to amend this treaty. Yes, theater missile defenses are not
constrained by the ABM Treaty, nor should they be, nor are they. But it
is the language in subparagraph (2) that makes it the policy to deploy
a multiple-site national defense system which clearly violates the ABM
Treaty, which is the first target of the amendment.
So we leave in the theater defense language in subparagraph (1). We
do not touch that.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator address section 238?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
Mr. WARNER. That is the provision of the Senator from Virginia, and
that is subject to the strike.
Mr. LEVIN. It is the bill that I am addressing in three different
places. In section 238----
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is the subject of the amendment of
the Senator from Virginia and the subject I just covered in my floor
remarks. Looking at the Senator's amendment at the desk, in section 3,
it says ``to strike section 238 which establishes a unilateral
interpretation of the ABM Treaty and prohibits treaty compliance
efforts.''
Mr. LEVIN. Section 238 does establish the dividing line between long-
range and short-range missiles. It does it unilaterally, it does it in
law. The reason that that is inappropriate is these are the subject of
negotiations now, should be the subject of negotiations. If the Duma
established a range of 4,000 kilometers for a short-range missile, I
think the Senator from Virginia would be on his feet saying, ``What,
the Russian legislative body is unilaterally determining what is a
short-range system and they said 4,000 kilometers? What is going on? We
thought this was the subject of negotiations, this is bad faith. You
have a Russian legislative body unilaterally saying 4,000 kilometers?''
Yes, we should not be establishing in law--in law--the demarcation
line between the two when two things are true: One is the subject of
ongoing negotiations and two, and this is critically important, is that
General Shalikashvili told us that the absence of a demarcation line,
having been agreed to, is not a constraint on the research and
development of the theater missiles that we all support. In other
words, it is not constraining us. So for us to prematurely,
unilaterally have the Congress say this is the demarcation line between
long-range and short-range does great mischief in terms of reaching an
agreement with the Russians on a bilateral basis and militarily does
not achieve anything for us because the absence of a demarcation line
is not constraining the research and development of theater missiles.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question
and observation?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think it is important, and I state this
only for my own view and the Senator from Michigan can respond. There
is a difference in making a finding and saying that this is where the
Congress thinks the demarcation line ought to be and passing a line
saying this is the way it is. Passing a law knocks out the executive
branch of Government, if they sign the law and if it is constitutional,
in any kind of negotiation. So you do not even have the ability under
this bill, the way I read it now, for the President to say to the
Russians or his Ambassador to say to the Russians, this is what the
Senate passed. I believe the bill is so sweeping in its denial of
executive authority to have any negotiations on this point that I do
not think they would be able to inform the Russian Duma or the Russian
leadership, Yeltsin and others, as to what the Senate did.
If the Senator wants to say this is where we think the line ought to
be, and this is what we believe the administration ought to negotiate
with the Russians, and this is what we think the Russians ought to
accept, or these are the sensible findings we make, that would be a
totally different matter. It is when you put it in law so it knocks out
not only the Russians from having any say whatsoever in it, no
negotiations, no say, no response, it knocks out even the President and
the executive branch.
First of all, I do not think this will become law, but if it does,
you will have almost an absurd situation. In fact, there is some
language in here that is so broad that it might be interpreted if this
became law to preclude the U.S. Senate from even debating it again. It
says no Federal official. We are Federal officials, last time I got my
paycheck. We are included in that, too. We cannot even talk about it
once it is passed.
I think the Senator's language goes much further than the Senator's
intent. That is what I think we need to work on, and if we can make
findings on demarcation and urge the President forward and urge him to
take this position, then I believe we can reach some
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consensus. It is the law part of it that bothers me.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may reply----
Mr. NUNN. I believe I was to ask a question. That is a question mark
at the end.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Chair observes the Senator
from Michigan has the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia to
answer the question without losing my right to the floor.
Mr. WARNER. The three of us who are now engaged in debate and,
indeed, the occupant of the chair and others have been in the briefings
on the negotiations of this demarcation issue.
As I said in my remarks, it was the fear that the administration
would not come back to the U.S. Senate for ``advise and consent'' that
has required this Senator and others to take this action. We cannot sit
here knowingly, allowing the administration to go forth with a
demarcation which would, in our collective judgment, not be in the best
interest of this country, and the only way we would have a means to
express that would be through the advice-and-consent procedure.
And the administration, very forthrightly, said they would not bring
it back. And that is the reason we acted.
Mr. KYL. Will the Senator yield to me for 1 minute?
Mr. LEVIN. Yes.
Mr. KYL. I want to add to the comments of the Senator from Virginia
that at least some of us on this side have sent no fewer than five
letters to the President on this subject asking to be consulted and
advised, suggesting that the administration, frankly, was going too far
in these discussions with the Russians and asked him not to do so.
As the Senator from Virginia just noted, one of the reasons for
finally putting the language in the bill is that our entreaties have
gone unheeded, the administration has gone forward. This is apparently
the only way we can get their attention. We had 50 Senators, all
Republicans, urging the administration not to go forward, and they did
so anyway. That is the reason for finally acting in a legislative way.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. LEVIN. As the Senator from Georgia said, it is very different to
give a recommendation to the President, which is one thing. To put into
law what we believe the demarcation line is unilaterally, saying that
the President cannot deviate from it, and he cannot negotiate even an
improvement from our perspective. By the way, this language even goes
beyond that. This language literally, when you read it, would prevent
an official of the United States from stopping a test which violates
this demarcation line by its own terms. In other words, let us assume
that we were testing an ABM system against a missile that had a range
of 4,000 kilometers. This language says that until it is flight tested,
this prohibition is in place. That is what the language says. The
Senator from Virginia and I have worked a long time on lots of bills
together. But this language violates common sense because you could not
even stop a test from occurring, which, by the terms of this bill,
violates the ABM Treaty. That is how extreme this language is.
I yield the floor at this point.
Mr. WARNER. I will be very brief. The Senator from Michigan put in a
letter of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili. I
wish to put in the Record at this point in our colloquy my reply to
General Shalikashvili and in the spirit of total fairness, again his
reply back to my letter. Clearly, we disagree.
I would like to read one paragraph to the Senator. I said to the
general:
Unfortunately, that is exactly what is happening. Our
ongoing TMD efforts--in particular THAAD and Navy Upper
Tier--have been artificially limited by ABM Treaty
considerations. For example, neither system has been allowed
to incorporate space-based sensors because of concerns that
the use of such sensors would not be ABM Treaty-compliant.
This despite the fact that all of the military experts with
whom I have consulted have assured me that we could develop
and deploy more cost-effective and technically capable TMD
systems if such systems incorporated space-based elements.
Mr. President, that is it, clear and simple. It is right there.
I ask unanimous consent to have those letters printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, July 18, 1995.
Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your June 28
letter to Senator Levin concerning the impact of the ``Warner
Amendment,'' which prohibits the application of the ABM
Treaty to U.S. theater missile defense systems.
I introduced this amendment in April with only one goal in
mind--to rapidly provide the brave men and women of the Armed
Forces with the most technically advanced, cost-effective
theater missile defense systems which the United States is
capable of producing. As you well know, over 30 nations
currently possess short-range ballistic missiles. The Gulf
War demonstrated that such missiles pose a threat to our
troops which is real, immediate and growing.
In my view, work on defenses against these missiles should
not in any way be constrained by restrictive and erroneous
interpretations of the ABM Treaty--a Treaty which was never
intended to limit or restrict theater missile defenses.
I was there, General, in Moscow in May 1972 when this
Treaty was signed. Further, as Secretary of the Navy, I knew
and had access to the people conducting the negotiations and
preparing the working papers for those negotiations. I have
since--recently--spoken with some of thee people to confirm
that short-range systems were not the subject of their work.
The ABM Treaty was intended only to apply to strategic, long-
range systems. It should not now be stretched to cover the
short-range, or theater, systems.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what is happening. Our on-
going TMD efforts--in particular THAAD and Navy Upper Tier--
have
been artificially limited by ABM Treaty considerations. For
example, neither system has been allowed to incorporate
space-based sensors because of concerns that the use of
such sensors would not be Treaty-compliant. This despite
the fact that all of the military experts with whom I have
consulted have assured me that we could develop and deploy
more cost-effective and technically capable TMD systems if
such systems incorporated space-based elements. And I
might add that this is not a new problem. This course was
followed by previous administrations as well as the
current one.
My amendment establishes a clear demarcation line between
anti-ballistic missile defenses which are limited by the ABM
Treaty, and theater missile defenses which are not. The
demarcation standard which I selected for my amendment is the
one used by the Clinton Administration at the beginning of
the demarcation talks in November 1993, and one that was
accepted by the Russians at that time. It is a standard
which, to my knowledge, has not been disputed by either party
to the negotiations.
Contrary to the assertion in your letter, my amendment does
not prohibit the Administration from conducting demarcation
negotiations with the Russians. Instead, the amendment would,
in effect, prohibit the implementation of any agreement which
might result from those negotiations which would have the
effect of making the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty. To remain on
solid Constitutional grounds, I carefully chose the Congress'
power of the purse as the vehicle to ensure that
Congressional views on this issue are taken into
consideration.
I, and many of my colleagues, have grave reservations about
the direction the Administration has been pursuing in the
demarcation talks with Russia. It appears that the
Administration is intent on concluding an agreement with the
Russians that would severely limit the technological
development and deployment of a U.S. theater missile defense
system. For example, reportedly over the objections of senior
military
officers, the Administration earlier this year tabled a
proposal which would impose performance limitations on our
theater missile defense systems, and accepted a Russian
proposal to prohibit the deployment of the Navy Upper Tier
system--a system that was subsequently deemed to be
Treaty-compliant by the DoD. The negotiations are clearly
headed in the wrong direction. A change of course is in
order.
Your letter mentioned the potential impact my amendment
might have on Russian ratification of START II. I might point
out that START II Treaty ratification by the Russian Duma is
in doubt for reasons having nothing to do with the ABM Treaty
or U.S. theater missile defense efforts. Put simply, many
Russians do not want to give up their multiple warhead ICBMs,
as called for under START II. We must not hold our TMD
efforts hostage to Russian threats concerning START II
ratification, or any other issue.
While I share your desire to maintain a good security
relationship with the Russians, I am not willing to sacrifice
vital and legitimate U.S. defense efforts in the interest of
that security relationship.
I think you would agree with me that our goal should be to
provide our troops with the best defenses that our technical
experts are capable of producing. I believe that my amendment
advances that goal.
Thank you for your attention.
Sincerely,
John Warner.
____
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The Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1995.
Hon. John Warner,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Warner: Thank you for your letter and strong
support of efforts to protect US troops from the theater
missile threat. The explanation and clarification of the
intent and effect of your amendment are sincerely
appreciated.
Since the beginning of the demarcation discussions, the
first priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been
protecting US troops. I share the view that the ABM Treaty
was never intended to limit theater missile defenses, and
agreed to an initial demarcation approach to the Russians
based on the standard specified in your amendment. As you
note, the Russians appeared to accept the limiting parameters
of 3500 km and 5 km/sec for testing against theater ballistic
missiles, but pushed for interceptor performance limits as
well.
In June 1994, in an effort to each early, acceptable
demarcation agreement, some limits on interceptor velocity
were proposed by the United States. As negotiations
progressed, a subsequent proposal for an interim agreement
which would have deferred some unresolved issues--such as
deployment of Navy Upper Tier--was also proposed. The
Russians rejected both US approaches.
The May 1995 Joint Summit Statement was an effort to move
the negotiations away from technical parameters back to a set
of principles which would preserve both the ABM Treaty and
our ability to test and deploy needed theater missile
defenses. The latest US negotiating position was based on
that joint statement and was intended as just the sort of
``change of course'' you suggest.
The Chiefs and I have been fully involved in developing US
positions and have never lost sight of our first
responsibility to protect US forces. We are unanimous in our
commitment to develop and field highly capable theater
missile defense systems. While cueing from space-based
sensors has yet to be incorporated into those systems, this
is currently in our plans.
With regard to broader security issues, the linkage between
the ABM Treaty and START II has been stressed repeatedly by
the Russians with US military representatives in many fora,
including discussions with members of the Duma. While there
are, of course, other factors at play in the Duma
considerations, one must assume that unilateral US
legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification
and probably impact our broader security relationship as
well.
In closing, the priority goal has been to provide the US
Armed Forces with best defenses technical experts are capable
of producing. But we also seek to reconcile requirements for
protection from theater ballistic missiles with further
strengthening of the framework of strategic stability,
including strategic arms reduction and the ABM Treaty. We are
working to achieve both these goals.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment to
strike the missile defense provisions in the bill, because, if passed
as is, I think this language will greatly complicate the work of our
military and of our diplomats in the years ahead. I have been
interested to hear that one of the reasons we have this in the bill,
apparently, is because we have sent a number of letters, or some
Members have sent a number of letters to the President, and did not get
a response. They either got no response or one they did not like, so
they decided to put it in legislation.
I can only say that I think taking that kind of action, when the
leadership, in negotiating treaties and in seeing they are adhered to,
is a function of the executive branch, does not ring very strongly with
me, because I can remember--I could probably go back to the files and
bring out a dozen or more letters I wrote during the Reagan
administration, during those 8 years and during the 4 years of the Bush
administration, and I may have gotten responses to some of those but
certainly not to all of them. That did not mean to me that I took over
what the constitutional powers of the President are and put into law
things that would have tried to put my view into law, as opposed to
what treaty requirements were or what treaties had been negotiated.
I say further that I think we are, obviously, talking a lot here
about the demarcation between theater missile defense and national
missile defense. That is a legitimate thing to try and work out. But to
take over and unilaterally on the part of the Congress define language
that would change the ABM Treaty or have that potential, I think, is
wrong. I think we have to tread very carefully when we do that.
I think this could possibly harm our efforts to proceed with nuclear
arms reduction, not just with Russia, when we try and negotiate these
things with China, Britain, and France. It will raise new threats to
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially its cornerstone,
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT. It could establish an
extremely undesirable new method for unilaterally reinterpreting
treaties, thus setting up a precedent that will obviously be used
against us in the years ahead.
I think it could establish programs that would cost us a fortune. It
could divert money from military needs that are, in my opinion, much
more vital to the country and ultimately leave America substantially no
safer as a result. It tramples on the President's constitutional
responsibilities as Commander in Chief and as the individual in charge
of American foreign policy. In short, I think this would be a very bad
mistake for this country.
I would like to begin with a few comments about the general level of
partisanship that we have seen from the proponents of these provisions
on the ABM Treaty. I hasten to add that I think missile defense should
not be a partisan affair. All Americans understand that (a), the
national interest may require the deployment of U.S. forces in unstable
areas around the world. This bill contains some very undesirable
features, I feel, that, if enacted, could greatly complicate the work
of our military and our diplomats in the years ahead.
Let me talk about ballistic missile defense. So (a), the national
interest may require deployment of U.S. forces in unstable regions
around the world; and (b), these forces may be the targets of missile
attacks, including missiles delivering weapons of mass destruction; and
(c), such forces must be protected. That is something I am sure we can
all agree on.
Now, though the committee has approved many of the administration's
requested theater missile defense projects, the majority's refusal to
yield on several controversial proposals dealing with key missile
defense issues gives these proposals the quality of partisan ultimata
rather than a sound foundation for policy. In other words, it is either
or else.
Similarly, the bill's heavy emphasis on investing in expensive
hardware for missile defense detracts from an equally, if not more
important, goal: Pursuing means to reduce the numbers and performance
characteristics of offensive missiles that may be fired against us in
theater conflicts. This goal typically requires significant
improvements in export controls, intelligence capabilities, analytic
capabilities for the conduct of arms control and nonproliferation
verification activities,
better coordination between our military and our diplomats and other
such means.
The committee, however, is placing inordinate reliance upon technical
fixes to counter missile attacks, rather than strengthening efforts to
slow our halt of the proliferation of such missiles in the first place.
This position is unfortunate, since the latter will ultimately prove to
be a better investment of scarce taxpayers' dollars.
With respect to the missile defense provisions the bill does support,
many of these would considerably erode the stable consensus that exists
to support ballistic missile defense efforts, would jeopardize both
antiballistic missile, ABM and START II treaties, usurp the President's
constitutional powers with respect to the conduct of foreign relations
and the performance of the role of Commander in Chief, or otherwise
erode, rather than enhance, U.S. national security.
These conclusions, to me, follow from an examination of the following
provisions of the bill: First, the bill mandates, as a statutory policy
objective, an action that would violate the ABM Treaty. It establishes
a policy of deploying a multiple-site national missile defense network
by the year 2003. That is in violation.
Second, the majority places into U.S. law a formal definition of an
ABM-permissible ballistic missile defense system. We can justifiably
assume, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John
Shalikashvili, has warned, any such statutory definition could
jeopardize prospects for early ratification of the START II Treaty in
the
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Russian Parliament and negatively impact our broader security
relationship with Russia.
It seems only prudent that before the Congress ventures off with a
unilateral interpretation of a major bilateral arms control accord, we
should consider very carefully several implications of such an action.
They would include: Is this the type of precedent we wish to
establish as a basis for treaty interpretation? Do we want to set an
example that can lead the Duma to legislate its own preferred
definitions of vital terms of Russia's arms control and disarmament
treaties?
In other words, what if the Russian Duma, what if we had word coming
through or had pictures on TV this evening on the news that the Russian
Duma is unilaterally deciding to put a new interpretation into the ABM
Treaty. What would we do? I know what we would do. We would think the
whole thing is null and void if they went ahead and legislated
preferred definitions of vital terms of Russia's arms control and
disarmament treaties.
If Russia deployed enough ballistic missile defense sites containing
missiles just falling below the dictated threshold, could they
collectively acquire an ability to counter United States strategic
nuclear forces? What will be the reactions of China and other powers if
the United States moves away from its ballistic missile defense
restraints?
I point out that these agreements are hammered out word by word by
word over agonizingly long negotiations. The ABM Treaty was no
exception to that. To change some of that wording, or to change an
interpretation of it unilaterally, means that our word in any other
treaty that we might have with any other place around the world--
whether China, Russia, wherever--is not going to be looked at as being
worth very much.
While the committee majority has raised the specter of structural
nuclear disarmament--a term that is supposed to describe our alleged
inability to expand our nuclear arsenal in the event of future
threats--it ironically ignores completely the effects on our deterrent
force of releasing Russia from the treaty obligations that prevent it
from acquiring a national missile defense capability.
The Russians are not going to just stand by and see us reinterpret
that treaty without feeling free to go their own way. They will no
longer be bound by that agreement that was hammered out over a long
period of time.
So, if the opponents in the ongoing missile defense debate have their
way, and that ``fearsome beast,'' the ABM Treaty, is finally slain, the
credibility of America's strategic missile forces would almost
immediately be called into question as Russia begins to deploy its own
large-scale national missile defense force.
What would prevent them from doing it? Certainly not the treaty that
we would have violated at the time. It seems to me, if the majority is
truly interested in avoiding this structural nuclear disarmament, as it
is called, it should do all it can to ensure that U.S. nuclear
deterrent retains its credibility. This is exactly what the ABM Treaty
helps to achieve, by barring Russia from creating its own national
strategic missile defense system.
The treaty accomplishes this, moreover, without the need for a
diplomatically and financially costly expansion of our offensive
nuclear capabilities. So-called deficit hawks in Congress today should,
therefore, love the ABM Treaty, not revile it. It works to preserve our
deterrent and saves plenty of money at the same time. One of the
estimates by CBO has indicated that even a partial national missile
defense system would cost about $48 billion, at a time when we really
do not need it, as testimony and as the letters from the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated.
I am afraid our colleagues in the majority, however, have turned a
collective blind eye to these considerations. They appear to believe
that unilateral United States actions to ensure against our own
national missile vulnerability will instantly translate into a safer
America and not lead Russia to reduce its vulnerability to our own
strategic missile attacks.
In its enthusiasm not to miss an opportunity to bash the ABM Treaty,
the majority is urging a course of action that can weaken our nuclear
deterrent capability, can stimulate an offensive nuclear arms race, and
eventually funnel tens or hundreds of billions of dollars into
elaborate strategic national missile defense schemes, none of which, of
course, will ever free American citizens from risk of nuclear attack.
The bill seems to enshrine into law what is known as the fallacy of
the last move, which holds that any increment in our own security will
take place without any detrimental side effects. I lose a lot more
sleep over the side effects than I do over the slogan of ``structural
nuclear disarmament.''
The Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings, coupled with the
Tokyo gas attacks should serve as a sobering reminder that weapons of
mass destruction can be delivered by a variety of means other than
missiles. It does not mean we are not concerned about missiles. We are.
Furthermore, our intelligence officials have repeatedly testified the
United States will not face a new missile threat until sometime in the
next century.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. James
Clapper, testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence last
January: ``We see no interest in or capability of any new country
reaching the continental United States with a long-range missile for at
least the next decade.''
We should not permit a fixation with delivery systems to distract our
attention from the important goal of halting the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Third, the majority voted down on a straight party vote a proposal by
Senator Levin to ensure that America's theater missile defense systems
will not be given strategic antiballistic missile capabilities, a
proposal that was essentially a restatement of existing law, existing
law under the ABM Treaty.
Fourth, the majority insisted on almost doubling the size of the
administration's request for national missile defense projects, despite
the majority's complete inability to identify any new foreign threat
against which such a defense would be directed.
I do not believe that a highly conjectural North Korean missile
threat to the Aleutian Islands sometime in the 21st century is
sufficient grounds for America to abandon the ABM Treaty. I doubt North
Korea will even manage to survive as a country by that time. It may
not, anyway.
Furthermore, there is a fundamental contradiction in the majority's
willingness to write a blank check on behalf of national missile
defense and yet apply the sternest possible accounting standards for
the more modest sums that we authorized elsewhere in this bill to such
programs as humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief.
I would add, the systems we are talking about have yet to be
invented. We made some progress in setting up systems, or doing some
research in years past, but to mandate at this point we will have any
of these systems by the year 2003, which is what is in the systems we
are proposing here, is wishful thinking. Some of the claims under star
wars were made back some years ago. I talked to the people at the
Pentagon who were working in these areas, who had some confidence in
those systems, or said they did. I thought some of the claims were so
preposterous I went out to some of the laboratories where work was
going on on the so-called star wars system. The scientists who were
working on the systems out there almost laughed about some of the
claims being made on star wars at that time. It was not just a matter
of having the money to deploy, to cut the hardware and deploy it. We
had not yet invented the systems. Yet we are talking about now we can
set up a national missile defense system, just a partial one, for $48
billion, with equipment that has yet to be invented and certainly
should not be deployed on a timetable between now and the year 2003.
Within 8 years, we are supposed to now have this and it has to be
deployed. And that is ridiculous.
Star wars before was talking about deformable laser mirrors, 12 feet
across, that could take lasers of a power not yet invented, and focus
it on a spot out there several hundred miles in space the size of a
golf ball. At least
[[Page S 11255]]
the first step would be to focus it on a mirror in space that could be
deformed, then focus it in turn on a spot the size of a golf ball
several hundred miles away on a missile coming up at a changing rate of
speed, and keep it focused on that area. We do not have the computer
capacity nor the technology yet developed to enable us to do some of
those things that were claimed years ago.
Now we are saying we have some different systems. But those systems
are anything but proven and are anything but systems that should be set
up on a time schedule that would have to be in place by law by the year
2003.
What do we think the Soviets would be doing all this same time? I
know what the Duma would probably do, our counterpart over there in
Russia. The Duma probably is going to say, OK, if all bets are off on
the ABM Treaty, then the very first thing we are going to do is put all
the coordinates back in on American targets we just took out of our
missiles in agreement with the Americans, back just a few months ago.
To me, that would be very silly if we did anything that might lead them
into that kind of activity.
Yet, if the Russians were doing the same thing we are debating here
today, I can guarantee the first thing I would be doing on the floor
would be demanding we put their coordinates back in our missiles if
they were advocating abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying a missile
defense system that neither side thought we needed to deploy.
Much has been written about the dangers of new isolationism as a
foreign policy doctrine. Its companion in defense policy I guess would
be called a fortress America. Nothing is more reflective of this
doctrine than the current bill's fundamentally misguided policy
approaches on nuclear testing and the ABM Treaty.
So I am still hopeful a new bipartisanship will emerge in the years
ahead, however, behind policies that reflect a greater awareness of the
costs of a modern national defense, a greater sensitivity to
international reactions to U.S. defense actions, greater appreciation
of the unexploited potential that lies in creative international
solutions to security problems, and a greater emphasis on preventing
proliferation rather than trying to manage it. If we abrogate the ABM
Treaty or put language in here, in this legislation, or permit language
to stay in that allows the Duma, in its own right, to start
reinterpreting the ABM Treaty, then I do not see any option but what we
are into an arms race again. Just as we spent probably most of the past
decade taking some of those dangers down, reducing our arms, taking the
targeting out of our missiles and the Soviets took it out--the Russians
took it out of their missiles, I think we are in danger of reversing
this whole direction, this trend that has been set in place over the
past 10 years, and to cope with a threat that is not out there, by the
best testimony we have from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and spend a lot of money in the whole
process, $48 billion for a very limited defense system that will not be
a full national missile defense. It would be, basically, a missile
defense that covers five States.
So I support the change proposed by the Senator from Michigan. I hope
our colleagues will look at this very, very carefully. If we are to put
into law something that encourages the ABM Treaty to be questioned and
the Soviets to have less confidence in the American willingness to
abide by that treaty, I think we will have made a drastic mistake in
the Senate of the United States.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Order Of Procedure
Mr. DOLE. I will just take a minute. I want to see if we cannot get
agreement on time here. We have been on this amendment since 11
o'clock. I have been listening to people ask for time agreements. We
are not even close to a time agreement.
This bill is dying on the floor. This may be a very important
amendment, but we intend to complete action on this bill by tomorrow
night or I do not see when it comes up again. Because Friday--Saturday
we will do appropriations bills, maybe one or two appropriations bills.
Maybe late Saturday afternoon we can start on welfare reform, and then
late in the week take up the defense appropriations bill.
If we want to pass the DOD bill we have to have cooperation. If we do
not want to pass it, I assume we can take 6 or 7 hours on this
amendment. It has been 2\1/2\ hours.
Is there any indication, any willingness to enter into a time
agreement at this point? The Senator from Michigan----
Mr. LEVIN. If that is addressed to me, we are very willing to enter
into a time agreement. Two Senators who wanted to speak have already
spoken. There is one now who says he is willing to give up his time. I
am adding it up and I will come up with a figure in about 2 minutes,
now.
Mr. DOLE. I will just wait until the Senator adds it up. If we do not
get it now, it may be another hour.
Title 31
Mr. KYL. Will the majority leader yield so I may make an announcement
on behalf of Senator Thurmond? This is a very important announcement
for all Members of the Senate. Senator Thurmond and Senator Domenici
propose to offer a substitute amendment to title 31 of Senate bill
1026. This amendment contains numerous changes. In order to allow all
Senators an opportunity to review it, copies of the amendment will be
available in the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I thank the majority leader for yielding.
Mr. NUNN. I believe, if I may just add to the statement of my
colleague from Arizona, that is the energy section of the bill that has
been worked on for 2 or 3 days.
Mr. KYL. That is correct.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, when the Senator from Michigan adds the time
there, we may want some time on the other side of the amendment.
Hopefully not as much. I do not think it would take as much.
Mr. LEVIN. We need 1 hour and 50 minutes on this side.
Mr. DOLE. Say 2 hours on that side, and 1 hour on this side? So we
could vote, then, by maybe 4:30, depending on how much time we use? I
do not think we need 2 hours on this side. I just want to get the time
agreement.
If there is no objection, let me propose this consent agreement.
I ask unanimous consent that there be 3 hours on the Levin amendment
prior to a motion to table, to be divided 2 hours for Senator Levin or
his designee, 1 hour for Senator Thurmond or his designee, no second-
degree amendments or amendments to the language proposed to be stricken
be in order prior to a failed motion to table, and any second-degree
amendment or amendment to the language proposed to be stricken be
relevant to the first-degree amendment, and that following the
conclusion or yielding back of time, Senator Thurmond or his designee
be recognized to table the Levin amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I do not
intend to object, did the unanimous consent preclude second-degree
amendments?
Mr. DOLE. No, not until after a motion to table, if it is not tabled.
Mr. LEVIN. It would be open to second-degree amendments which are
relevant.
Mr. DOLE. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. EXON. Reserving the right to object, I would hope we are about to
be in a place where we could agree to this. I heard the leader say that
there would be no second-degree amendments. Now I understand. I was not
clear.
If I understand correctly, the amendment offered under the unanimous
consent agreement by the majority leader, if we agree to this time
agreement, as he has just spelled out, there would be no allowable
second-degree amendment to the Levin amendment until after a tabling
motion.
Mr. DOLE. That is correct.
Mr. EXON. After a tabling motion, then a second-degree amendment
would be in order.
Mr. DOLE. That is what we have done here the last several times.
Mr. EXON. I have no objection.
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object for one more moment, in the
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event that it is not tabled, then in the event more second-degree
amendments are offered, there is not in this unanimous consent any time
limit on those second-degree amendments.
Mr. DOLE. That is true. This only refers to this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, under this time agreement I would like to
yield myself 20 minutes, and I ask to be notified when that 20 minutes
has expired.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, since the Senator from Ohio just spoke in
favor of the amendment, I thought I would take some of our time to
speak in opposition to the amendment.
It seems to me that the arguments in favor of the amendment boil down
to three: First of all, variations of the theme of the ABM Treaty is
relatively sacrosanct; second, we have to do everything possible to
avoid riling the Russians, doing something they may not like; and,
third, that we should not limit the power of the President.
Let me discuss each of those arguments in turn. First of all,
regarding the 1972 ABM Treaty, I think it is important to recognize
that the ABM Treaty has, since its inception in 1972, been under the
process of negotiation. There have been discussions going on between
our two countries almost throughout that period of time. So the fact
that we may be talking about making changes in it is nothing new, and
it has never been interpreted as a breach or an anticipatory breach of
treaty for the United States to be stating that we want to change a
particular part of the agreement. As a matter of fact, the original ABM
Treaty called for two national ballistic missile sites, not one. That
was amended to one site. And one of the things that is being called for
in the underlying legislation here is multiple sites.
I think almost all of us would agree that it does not make sense for
us to deploy an ABM system in this country if we cannot have multiple
sites. It just will not be effective. So that is our stated policy in
the legislation. That is nothing new. It is nothing that the Russians
should get excited about. As a matter of fact, I am not even sure what
their position would be. I would not be surprised at all if they would
agree that multiple sites are appropriate. So I do not think that is a
big problem with the policy stated in the bill for multiple sites.
The second point under this first argument is that demarcation, as
called for in legislation here, does not violate the ABM Treaty. As a
matter of fact, the administration has already been demarking what is
appropriate testing for a theater ballistic missile system, and has
already been discussing that with the Russians.
Bob Bell, former staff member of the committee, a prominent
specialist at the National Security Council, told the National Defense
University that, ``We have already reached an agreement with the
Russians that you can shoot at a target that goes 5 kilometers per
second and not have it captured as an ABM.'' The problem here is, of
course, that the negotiations that the administration has been engaging
in went further than that, and accepted, at least temporarily, Russian
demands that the proposed demarcation also include a speed limit on the
United States' interceptor of 3 kilometers per second, which would in
effect dumb down our system to the point where it would not be as
robust as we would want it to be.
The point here is that you cannot argue demarcation per se is a
violation of the ABM Treaty. The administration has done it. That has
been policy. The question before us is whether or not we will in
legislation demark that limit at which we can test our theater
ballistic missile system since it has never been a part of the ABM
Treaty. I think that is an important point for us to make. Again, the
ABM Treaty only limits strategic systems. It does not limit theater
systems.
All the demarcation in the Warner language does is to define the
level of testing that can be engaged in for theater systems. There
should not be anything wrong with that. The administration has already
engaged in demarcation. As a matter of fact, in a speech before the
National Defense University, again referring to Bob Bell, he ably
explained that this question of identifying the demarcation between ABM
and TMD has been an issue for as long as the treaty has been around,
and, as a matter of fact, it has changed. One of the things he said is,
what is a TMD and what is not a TMD goes back to the ratification
hearings and the negotiations themselves.
During the Senate hearings on the ABM Treaty in 1972, then-Director
of Defense Research and Engineering, Johnny Foster, was asked by
Senator Proxmire, ``Where is the line? Where is the distinction between
the two?'' He said, ``If you shoot a missile interceptor at a target
that goes faster than 2 kilometers per second, that is an ABM.''
Of course we all know that demarcation is unacceptable today. That is
the point. Technology changes. It has been 23 years since the ABM
Treaty was adopted.
What we are trying to do in this legislation is to keep up with the
times. As a matter of fact, our own Defense Department has made the
point that the treaty has not kept up with the times, and the gentleman
who is now the CIA Director, John Deutch, has made the point that the
treaty, the ABM Treaty, constrains us in ways that technology should
not anymore. And, as a result, it seems to the committee--and it seems
to me--that it is important for the United States to draw this
demarcation so that we can test the systems that we could ultimately
deploy against theater threats.
Why is it important to have the language in the bill? Because the
administration in effect proposes to dumb down our TMD. And that is the
problem. In both the Patriot system and the THAAD system earlier, we
dumbed them down. The reason the Patriot could not be any more
successful in the gulf war was because of decisions made right after
the ABM Treaty that in effect preclude the use of certain sensors to
enable it to be more robust.
We have done the same thing with the THAAD system in taking out
certain software and making certain hardware changes that precluded it
from being as robust as it otherwise would be in meeting these threats.
We cannot do this anymore. And we should not dumb down our TMD system.
Our demarcation language in the bill merely proscribes tests against
strategic missiles, as I said, and that enables us then to continue to
test the theater system in a way that would make it effective against
future threats.
Let me quote, as a matter of fact, from General Shalikashvili. He has
been quoted before. Let me first of all quote a January 3 memo to
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch. Here is what he said General
Shalikashvili said:
The United States should make no further concessions and
even start thinking about rolling back the U.S. negotiating
position.
The reason that General Shalikashvili, I believe, made that statement
is because he understood that the position that Bob Bell had negotiated
with the Russians that I referred to earlier was as far as this country
should go; that if we went any further, we would arbitrarily be putting
limits on our theater systems in ways that we should not do. That would
make them less capable of meeting future threats. That is why he said
at that time that we should make no further concessions and even start
thinking about rolling back the U.S. negotiating position.
That is the real position of General Shalikashvili. That is the
position which is embodied in this legislation, to make no further
concessions with regard to this demarcation.
Finally, with respect to this argument that the ABM Treaty is sort of
sacrosanct, I want to make this point. There is no anticipatory breach
in the bill at all because, of course, there are two specific
conditions. No. 1, there can be amendments to the ABM Treaty. That is
all we are suggesting should eventually occur here. But it is suggested
that maybe the Russians will not agree with the policies stated in the
bill, and they will not agree to those negotiations or to our position.
The United States can always withdraw from the ABM Treaty after
having given 6 months' notice if that is
[[Page S 11257]]
deemed to be in the interest of the United States. So should we deem it
to be in the interest of the United States to act in ways that the
Russians would deem inimical to continuation with the ABM Treaty, they
can either negotiate or the United States can step out of the treaty.
The bill itself does not violate the treaty.
I want to make that point crystal clear.
There is some notion that has been seeping into this debate that
somehow there is still a cold war going on here.
The cold war is over. The Soviet Union, with whom we negotiated the
ABM Treaty, is no longer even in existence. The threats that the
theater ballistic missiles are designed to thwart are not necessarily
threats emanating from the Soviet Union or now Russia but, rather, are
threats coming from countries like North Korea and Iraq and Iran, and
countries of that sort.
Therefore, we cannot be proscribed from acting against those threats
because of an ABM Treaty with the Russians. We need to proceed to
develop theater missiles that can protect the United States, protect
our forces deployed abroad, and protect our allies against these
theater threats, whether they come from Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or
whatever. So the ABM Treaty really ought not to stop us from doing it.
The second point is that it would cause the Russians to react
negatively. It would not be a reason for the United States to forego
actions which are clearly in our national interest. The argument that
is being made here is the same argument that was used against the
Reagan initiatives that in fact today are credited with ending the cold
war. Maybe the Russians will react badly to this. Well, as it turned
out, by taking bold action, we were able to win peace through strength.
The cold war is over because of the initiatives we took and because we
did not listen to those who said the Russians might react badly to this
if we do it. So I do not necessarily think that is a good argument.
I again refer to the now CIA Director, John Deutch, on the ABM
Treaty. In some respects, the technology has exceeded the limits of the
ABM Treaty, and we have to go forward with the technology to protect
ourselves not just from Russian threats but from threats around the
rest of the world. And the problem of waiting for the Russians to agree
is that this is no longer a bipolar world and we have these other
threats to be concerned about.
It is also, I think, an important point to make that the Russian Duma
is not likely to ratify the START II Treaty in any event, and this is
clear from a variety of things that come out of Russia. So to suggest
that the action we take here is going to prevent Russia from ratifying
the START II Treaty is not relevant.
Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Relations Committee, Vladimir Lukin
said:
We need big money to carry out these reductions [in START
II], and we don't have it. We do not want to ratify this
treaty and then not be able to comply with its terms. We will
have to wait until we see how to pay for our promises.
That is the reason--or at least that is one of the reasons--nothing
to do with what we are talking about today.
Others suggest that ratification should be tied to other
international issues.
The Speaker of the Federation Council, their upper chamber, Vladimir
Shumeyko, said:
We closely link [START II] ratification with the overall
situation existing between Russia and NATO. . . We consider
the perseverance of NATO as a stumbling block to our
cooperation in the era of disarmament and advancement on the
road to peace.
And still others see START II as inimical to Russian interests.
Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, said:
If this treaty [START II] is fully implemented, the United
States will almost double its superiority, while the damage
to Russia's national security will be unrecoverable.
There are many more quotations that I could cite.
The point is there are a lot of reasons why a lot of Russians do not
want to ratify the START II Treaty. It is not because of what we are
doing in this legislation here today.
Finally, let me just refer to this notion of anticipatory breach. If
we are going to use that legal doctrine here, we also ought to refer to
the equitable doctrine of clean hands.
I will not take the time here to recite the numerous instances of
Soviet and Russian violations of treaties that we have negotiated, but
they are numerous. And in some respects we have chosen to ignore those
violations because we believe that it is important to continue the
dialog and to keep the process moving. But the fact is it would be
anomalous for the Russians to consider that a policy we state today
that in no way involves a violation of the treaty is some kind of a big
deal when they are in violation of a variety of treaties, and should my
colleagues desire we can put that information in the Record.
The final argument that is given as a reason to support the amendment
of the Senator from Michigan is that the language of the bill ties the
President's hands. What we do here is two things. We call for a study
to determine what the administration should negotiate relative to the
ABM Treaty. We are not saying what the administration has to negotiate.
We are saying let us have a study and pick those areas where we want to
make a change. One of them I think is going to be clear. We should not
go forward in this country to deploy a national defense missile system
at one site. That would not make sense. So one of the items clearly is
going to be let us ask the Russians to negotiate this multiple site.
That is the only way we should deploy a national system. And I do not
see what the problem with that is.
In the meantime, we are saying let us not use defense funds to
continue, the administration should not use the 050 account to continue
to make concessions to the Russians on matters that ought to be either
the subject of further negotiation or at least the administration ought
to come to the Senate to discuss them with us.
That is the final point I wish to make here. We have been trying for
months to get the administration to work with us. That is what advice
and consent is all about. And it is true that there are prerogatives of
the administration that are important to be protected, and I do not
want to step on those. But it is also true that the Senate has
prerogatives. We have the right of advice and consent, and thus far the
administration has generally ignored the position that at least those
of us on this side have taken. What we are asking in this legislation
is that you not go any further--in fact, we are demanding that the
administration go no further in the direction of making further
concessions to the Russians in ways that would limit our ability to
develop our theater systems which can be used not just against Russians
but against other potential threats; that they do not do that; that
they not use defense funds for that purpose. That is why we are saying
it is important for us to be talking to the administration.
If the administration wants to get together with us and talk about
what they can do, if they want to submit the changes to the Senate,
then well and good. So far that has not been the administration's
position.
So with regard to the argument that we are stepping on the
administration's prerogative, I would just note that the administration
has been ignoring the Senate and its advice and consent prerogatives,
and it is time for us to be giving a little advice and asking for the
ability to consent to what the administration is doing.
Mr. President, the bottom line here is that the Armed Services
Committee came up with a very good bill, and I wish to commend the
chairman of the committee, Senator Thurmond, who is here; Senator Lott
is a member of the committee; Senator Warner made an excellent
statement here this morning in opposition to the amendment of the
Senator from Michigan, and I believe that it would be in the best
interests of the United States for this body to agree with the Armed
Services Committee to vote down the amendment of the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield 20 minutes to the Senator from
Nebraska.
[[Page S 11258]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have been listening and waiting very
patiently for my turn to make some remarks on this matter. I had
hesitation about the unanimous-consent agreement because this is one of
the most important matters, if not the most important matter in my view
that I have been a part of in my 17 years in the Senate.
Notwithstanding the desire to move on briskly, I simply say that I
hope, regardless of political affiliation, we will all take a very
close look at what we may be about to do unless the Levin, et al,
amendment, of which I am proud to be an original cosponsor, is passed.
I have been listening to the Senator from Arizona and his rather
interesting remarks, and during those remarks the Senator from Arizona
mentioned the names of several very prominent administration officials,
including Bob Bell at the White House, National Security Council. He
mentioned the present CIA Director, the former second man at the
Department of Defense. He mentioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Shalikashvili.
I simply want to say that I am not indicating the Senator from
Arizona has misrepresented any of the statements that those individuals
have made, but I have checked, while the Senator from Arizona was
addressing the Senate, with Bob Bell at the White House. Bob Bell tells
me that, notwithstanding the name dropping, all of the individuals
mentioned by the Senator from Arizona to substantiate his position of
being against the Levin amendment is not shared by anyone in the
administration including each and every one of the officials mentioned
in support of his argument by the Senator from Arizona.
This is a tremendously important matter. My judgment is that this
should not come down to a party-line vote.
I am afraid it is going to be a party-line vote. Maybe if we can just
reach a few Republicans. I would guess at this time that we would not
lose more than one or two Democratic votes, two at the most, on this
side of the aisle, maybe none, which means that we Democrats are
talking to five, six or seven of our Republican friends asking that
they look very closely at this before they vote against the Levin
amendment.
I thought it was rather ironic a couple hours ago while I was on the
floor at that particular time there were four Senators on the floor.
There was Senator Nunn, for whom I have great respect and with whom I
have worked closely for 17 years; there was the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, my dear friend, and no one has more respect in this
body, in the view of this Senator, than my friend Strom Thurmond from
South Carolina; there was John Warner, who came to the Senate the same
time as this Senator. And the four of us happened to be here on the
floor.
There have been many very important statements made and, I thought,
well thought out by Members on both sides of this issue. It is an issue
that may not be clear-cut in some people's minds. For 17 years, I
believe, on national defense matters I have stood hand in hand with the
Senator from South Carolina, the Senator from Virginia and others. I do
not know that we have been very far apart, if far at all, on many
issues. I can include Senator Lott, a Member of the Senate that I work
very closely with; Senator Levin; and others.
I simply say that we are at a point where I do not feel it is fair to
indicate people are in bad faith on that side of the aisle on the
matter. I just hope they will listen to the pleas that we are making on
this side. Maybe a good way to put it is, I think they know not what
they do. They are not badly intentioned. I think they know not what
they do.
To put this in perspective, I would like to ask a question of the
Senator from Michigan on this matter that may put this in some kind of
perspective as far as this Senator sees it. Notwithstanding the
protestations to the contrary, if the Levin amendment is not adopted, I
feel that we have gone a long way down the road to disrupt some of the
advances that have taken place over the last few years with regard to
downplaying the role of dependence on nuclear devices. It is this
Senator's feeling--and I am wondering to what degree this is shared by
my friend and colleague from the State of Michigan. Senator Levin and I
came here at the same time. We have sat side by side on the Armed
Services Committee. We have generally agreed. And I would generally
include him in that group of bipartisan Senators, Democrats and
Republicans, that have worked hand in hand on critical defense matters.
Without losing my right to the floor, I want to ask Senator Levin
this question: If your amendment striking basically the references to
the ABM Treaty fails, it is the opinion of this Senator that such
action, if your amendment fails, will probably end any chance of
finally completing in a successful fashion the implementation of the
START I treaty. In all likelihood, further, it will scuttle any chances
of cooperation to obtain ratification of the START II treaty and then
further eliminations of the number of nuclear warheads that were
planned to follow on beyond that. I think it drives a stake through the
heart of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I think it certainly would do
great harm to any chances that we have with regard to the
nonproliferation treaties that we are interested in. And last and
certainly not least, I would think this action very likely would go a
long way to maintain a conventional forces understanding in Europe
meaningful from the standpoint of seeking some form of stability in the
world. All of these things, I think, have a very grave threat of
extinction if we proceed in the fashion that the ABM Treaty language
that the Senator from Michigan is trying to strike as it came out of
the committee remains.
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is right. In my view and, even more important
by far, in General Shalikashvili's view when he says in his letter to
Senator Warner, the following:
With regard to broader security issues, the linkage between
the ABM Treaty and the START II has been stressed repeatedly
by the Russians and U.S. military representatives in many
forums, including discussions with many Members of the Duma.
While there are, of course, other factors that play in the
Duma consideration, one must assume that unilateral U.S.
legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification
and probably impact our broader security relationship as
well.
And it is that broader security relationship that I think my good
friend from Nebraska is referring to. And I do agree with his
assessment of the impact. But again, our top military officer agrees,
our Secretary of Defense agrees, our Secretary of State agrees with
that assessment.
Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from Michigan. Let me summarize, if I
can, some of the overall problems that I see with this measure that I
partially addressed in remarks this morning.
The way this came out of the committee it attacks the limits of the
Nunn-Lugar proposal that has been responsible for the safe and
accountable disarming of over 2,500 former Soviet Union warheads. It
cuts the Energy Department nonproliferation arms control and
verification funding. It recommends reconstituting our nuclear weapons
manufacturing complex at untold billions of dollars, while at the same
time advocating the resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing. This
last committee initiative is contrary to U.S. policy, and it is
designed to scuttle ongoing comprehensive test ban negotiations and any
prospect of reaching a treaty agreement.
I will have some more to say about this later on as we go into other
particular issues under consideration in this bill. Let me simply say,
though, I am concerned with the tone and the substance of the bill and
the level of micromanagement placed on the Pentagon and the Department
of Energy is unprecedented and harmful to our Nation's standing in the
international community. Many of the committee initiatives are driven
by a desire to defend against a superpower threat to U.S. security that
simply does not exist. At the same time, when one-time enemies are now
allies and the world community is committed more than ever before to
the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the committee bill is at odds
with the reality and the strong
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need of amendment before it can properly serve our Nation's security
interests. At a time when American leadership in the world community is
strongly needed, we cannot be viewed as a nation living in the past,
jousting with our imaginary dragons in order to lay claim to the mantle
of being strong on defense. We are a strong country, the preeminent
military power of the world by far. But we must also be forward looking
and recognize that it is in our national interest as well as the
interest of other nations to encourage arms control and alliances based
on collective security. It is unfortunate that some feel more
comfortable in an adversarial environment than in one based on
cooperation and lowering of superpower antagonism.
Like a beehive, the world in 1995 has the capacity to be both
dangerous and peaceful. And handled properly, the hive can be benign
and capable of producing sweet honey. If agitated, however, it can
become hostile and threatening. The defense authorization bill in its
present form is a sharp stick ready to be jabbed into the hive. The
design and intent of the bill is to agitate the world community to the
ultimate detriment of ourselves. This is not the time in history to
rekindle the rhetoric of the cold war. I urge my colleagues to support
the amendment that will correct these and other self-defeating elements
of this flawed legislation.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, a defense bill must meet threats, real
threats, not shadows or ghosts of threats disappeared.
Our military leaders and our intelligence services have properly
identified the threats our Nation faces.
They have come before us and told us what threats we face.
We have ignored much of their counsel and drafted a bill addressed to
the realities of yesterday and a dark view of a possible future tens of
years away.
This provision if enacted will take a step toward abrogating the
antiballistic missile treaty, scuttling the START II Treaty, and
launching us back into the arms race of the cold war.
This bill includes many weapons systems designed to match a missile
threat from the Soviet Union that does not exist. Due to the diligent
efforts of former President Bush, President Clinton, our diplomats and
Senators like Mr. Nunn and Mr. Lugar, we have been able to
substantially curtail that threat, to destroy hundreds of the missiles
that used to be aimed at our nations, and to divert the targeting of
the others that still remain.
Since 1991, the Nunn-Lugar program has helped the states of the
former Soviet Union to destroy their weapons of mass destruction and
reduce the threat posed by proliferation of these weapons. This program
remains an example of concise policy designed to meet an identified
threat and has significantly improved our national security.
We cannot stress to the appropriate degree how important arms control
efforts have been to our national security. Today, as a result of
bipartisan efforts from different administrations, Russia is planning
to eliminate 6,000 nuclear warheads that formerly were directed toward
our Nation. That is far more than any national missile defense could
hope to destroy.
It would be a shame if the other provisions of this bill caused this
progress to be in vain.
Therefore, I reject the provisions in this bill that if enacted will
most likely resurrect an arms race between the United States and
Russia.
By unilaterally deciding what the ABM standard is in regard to
missile interceptors, the Senate would disrupt the negotiating process
currently underway. Not only is this an unwarranted intrusion into the
normal working of foreign policy, this provision dangerously increases
the risk that the ABM and other weapons treaties will be abrogated
completely by the Russians.
Later this year the Russian Duma was to vote on the ratification of
START II. After they see the provisions in this bill regarding the ABM
treaty, and realize how we plan to have a missile defense system that
could theoretically counter an attack on the United States, the
incentive to destroy the thousands of weapons called for in START II
will be greatly diminished.
Regardless of what we tell them, the Russians will logically be
thinking, why destroy our missiles when we may need them to get through
a U.S. missile defense system?
Though its proponents claim this measure will protect us from a
change in Russian policy, this measure will only further destabilize
our relations and cause the hardliners in Russia to question our
commitment to START II.
We would be throwing away a chance to destroy literally thousands of
nuclear weapons on the faint hope that we can build an impenetrable
missile defense system.
To justify the national missile defense system now when the Soviet
threat is gone, the supporters of this bill are countering the views of
our professional military and intelligence personnel and telling the
American people a threat exists elsewhere when in fact it does not.
The supporters of this bill say that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or
Libya now have or will have shortly the ability to launch a missile
that can reach our shores. That is simply not the case.
The report to this bill specifically notes the possible threat from
the North Korean Taepo Dong II missile, which the report claims may
have the range to hit Alaska. Since this weapon is in development, we
do not in fact know that this missile will be capable of that range.
But with North Korea in such dire straits economically and the growing
possibility of its opening, with reunification with the south
increasingly likely, should we spend billions on a missile defense
system that probably won't work to counter a threat that may never
exist?
Our professional military and intelligence personnel, the people who
have the training, the knowledge, and the access to the most sensitive
of information to judge these threats, say there is no threat from any
indigenously developed missile for the next 10 years. Yet the
supporters of these provisions do not believe those who know the most
about this subject.
This presumed threat does not justify spending the tax money of
American citizens on unproven and untested antiballistic missile
defense.
This bill adds $300 million this year toward a national missile
defense system. In 1993, the GAO reported that the cost of such a
system would total $35 billion and a CBO estimate from earlier this
year pegged the cost at $48 billion. As we know from past estimates,
these estimates would probably be low.
The bill calls for the deployment of this system even though it is
unproven and untested.
Under the most likely of scenarios, the nuclear umbrella this would
create would be a leaky one that fails to completely protect our Nation
if the nonexistent threat were to become real. With nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons, anything less than 100 percent certainty will
not suffice.
One clear lesson from history is that in military affairs, those who
concentrate their efforts on defense are bound to fail. In the 1930's
and 1940's France felt secure behind the Maginot Line. Their defensive
posture was outwitted and decimated by a German Army dedicated to the
offensive. When it comes to threats to the United States today, the
means chosen to deliver a weapon of mass destruction would very likely
be something other than a missile. It may be a cliche that the best
defense is a good offense, but it is also true. We should look to
counter any incipient threat from rogue nations through a robust
offensive capability.
If someone is intent on attacking the United States, they need not be
rocket scientists to figure out our Nation's vulnerabilities. Why spend
millions of dollars on missiles whose launch we can instantly trace and
respond to with enough devastating force to destroy an entire
civilization? No, our potential adversaries would most likely seek the
path of least resistance. The delivery system posing the greatest
threat is the rental truck, not a ballistic missile. We face that real
threat through offensive actions against rogue nations and terrorist
groups.
We can support and focus our offensive capability through intense
intelligence activities, so our policymakers and military commanders
know most about what countries or groups are developing weapons of mass
destruction, delivery systems, and the characteristics and locations of
these systems. Next, the full diplomatic and economic
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powers of our Nation can be used to counter the threat that may
develop. Then, if the developers cannot be dissuaded in peacetime, the
weapons themselves can be destroyed either preemptively or in war.
I have heard other Senators state that the United States is
vulnerable to an accidental ballistic missile attack. The truth is, the
situation today is the same as it has been for 30 years. We have
managed to survive this long because governments have stressed proper
security and operating procedures for these terrible weapons. Nations
understand the gravity of a mistake when nuclear weapons are involved.
That is why the launching of one of these missiles involves so many
intricate, redundant steps with multiple built-in safeguards.
Yes, Murphy's law is true. Accidents can happen. But to have an
accidental ballistic missile launch, several accidents must occur.
Several redundant safeguard systems would have to fail all in the
proper sequence at the precise moment, not just multiple failures of
equipment but also multiple failures of human judgment, communication,
and authority.
I am no statistician, but I bet the likelihood of all that occurring
simultaneously is far more remote than other Senators have led the
public to believe. It would be far more likely that an interceptor
missile in the national missile defense aimed at a moving target would
miss its mark. The threat of an accidental ballistic missile launch
toward our shores does not meet even the lowest threshold to qualify as
a legitimate threat.
Again, I say to my colleagues, we need to have a rational assessment
of the threats our Nation faces. And the threat we face from a Russia
with several thousand more nuclear weapons is far greater than the
threat from a Russia that abides by the START II agreement.
Mr. EXON. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Kerrey be listed as a
cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. EXON. I ask the Chair how much time is remaining of the time
assigned to the Senator from Nebraska?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six and a half minutes.
Mr. EXON. I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at this
time, I be allowed to yield in this order: 8 minutes to Senator Simon;
15 minutes to Senator Kerry; 8 minutes to Senator Bingaman, and that
they be recognized in that order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. SIMON. Madam President, it was just a few days ago when Senator
Byrd, in the middle of a series of votes, was acknowledged for his
14,000th vote in a row. He got up and, among other things, he said
there is a growing and excessive partisanship in this body.
I was on the subway this morning with Senator Lugar, and some young
eager student asked me what was different from when I came here. I
said, ``The body, the Congress as a whole, is more partisan than it
used to be.''
I mention that because if we end up with a straight party vote on
something as vital to the future of our Nation as this is, we have not
done our two parties a favor. I think the Levin amendment is extremely
important to the security of our country.
If we just decide we are going to abrogate the ABM Treaty on our own,
we are going to interpret it the way we want to, and that is what this
amendment calls for, we are going to raise fears all over the world. We
are going to be playing into the hands of the Russian hardliners. No
one should misunderstand that for a moment. If we pass this bill
without the Levin amendment, the Russian hardliners are going to say,
``We're going to have to stop this elimination of nuclear warheads.
We're going to have to move in the other direction.''
Unilaterally to say this is what the ABM Treaty is going to be--and
among other things in this bill it says, no U.S. official, presumably
the Department of Defense, can discuss with any other country what the
ABM Treaty means. That is a restriction on freedom of speech, among
other things, that is unwise.
What we have is the present course where we are gradually reducing
the nuclear threat, the arms threat in the world where we have moved
from the great threat being nuclear annihilation, to the great threat
being instability around the world, and we are going to move to a world
where the threat is both instability and a nuclear threat.
Our present course reduces the nuclear danger. I happen to think we
are spending way too much on arms. We are spending more than the next
eight countries combined. If you take a look at the 1973 defense
appropriations and add the inflation factor to it, we are spending more
today than we were in 1973. That is when the Berlin wall was up, that
is when we were in Vietnam, that is when we had almost twice as many
troops in Europe.
I think some sensible reduction in arms expenditure is desirable and,
frankly, I think even the high number requested by the administration
would not be there but for the sensitivity of the President, because he
was not part of the military, he does not want to look like he is
antimilitary. But this $7 billion increase is just unwarranted.
On top of that, to say we are going to just unilaterally decide what
the ABM Treaty means, on top of that to escalate the nuclear threat, I
think, just does not make any sense at all, and it is going to waste
billions and billions and billions of dollars in addition to increasing
the threat to our country.
If this bill passes in substantially the present condition, then I
think the President of the United States has no option but to veto it,
and I will strongly urge the President to veto it.
We have to move away from an arms race. This bill, without the Levin
amendment, increases the probability of an arms race.
Madam President, I yield whatever time I may have left to Senator
Levin.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized
for 15 minutes.
Mr. KERRY. Thank you, Madam President.
Madam President, I want to congratulate the Senator from Michigan and
also thank the Senator from Illinois for his comments with respect to
this amendment. It seems that some of our colleagues in this body, in
the wake of losing the former Soviet empire and the monolith of
communism as targets of their opposition, now have lost their compass.
They seem unsure of where to direct their energies and our taxpayers'
money, and so are struggling to find another opponent at which to throw
this Nation's treasure--regardless of the costs or risks entailed.
The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and we are well into
implementation of the START I Treaty limiting nuclear weapons and on
our way to a START II Treaty to dismantle strategic delivery systems
and further limit nuclear weapons.
So we are on a course where the compass clearly points toward
reduction in the number of nuclear weapons present in our world, toward
the reduction of risk to our citizens and our society itself from an
aggressor's attack, toward the control and reduction of weapons, and,
indeed, toward the creation of stability in our world's political
equation.
As all of us who grew up in the 1950's and 1960's understand, nuclear
deterrence is built on the concept of mutually assured destruction.
``They'' can destroy ``us,'' ``we'' can destroy ``them,'' so neither
chooses to destroy the other because nobody knows what would be left.
In effect, that has maintained a state of rough peace--even if an
uneasy peace--since the end of World War II. Certainly there have been
surrogate wars and smaller skirmishes and client-state struggles around
the globe, but the great nuclear powers have never seen fit to attack
each other because of the belief that the damage that would be returned
would be unacceptably great.
Now, in 1995, we are no longer faced with Soviet expansionism, a
Soviet desire to exploit every conceivable Western weakness, and, in
every way short of initiating an all-out conflict, a Soviet desire to
achieve and maintain the
[[Page S 11261]]
advantage in every competitive situation. We no longer stare across the
North Pole at thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads targeted on
America's cities, its industrial and military facilities, and its
governmental and social lifelines. Yet in the bill that is before the
Senate today, we have a provision that unilaterally abandons--and, I
would argue, effectively nullifies--one of the critical ingredients
that has brought us to the point where the compass is pointing in the
right direction.
The Antiballistic Missile--or ABM--Treaty is a keystone to this arms
control progress--which already has made huge contributions to the
security and safety of our Nation and its people, and offers the
promise of even greater safety and security in the foreseeable future.
The bill brought before the Senate by the Republican-controlled Armed
Services Committee establishes as our national policy that we will have
a national missile defense system at ``multiple locations,'' which
violates the ABM Treaty. It says that we will develop defense systems
against theater ballistic missiles without regard to the ABM Treaty
restrictions. It prohibits our President from even negotiating on this
subject. It prohibits any interference with TMD missile testing that is
self-apparently illegal under the ABM Treaty which our Nation signed
and this very body ratified.
The bill before us unilaterally obliterates the ABM Treaty, Madam
President.
Anyone who understands the history and psyche of the Russian people
knows that they adamantly insist on realistic means of defending their
nation. Fundamental to their willingness to enter into arms control
agreements, and to continue to abide by them, is a requirement that
their strategic weapons systems be effective in order to serve as a
real deterrent to aggression against their nation, and an effective
means of retaliation if that deterrence fails.
If the United States moves ahead unilaterally to build a system that
can defend successfully against their strategic forces, we undo a
delicate balance, and in the process almost surely destroy the
willingness of the Russian nation to continue to honor arms control
agreements that further damage their side of the balance-of-power
equation.
Madam President, nuclear deterrence is already tricky enough. But it
really has always rested on each nation's perceptions of the others'
forces and of the threat that is poised against it. We hold the upper
hand with respect to that today, relative to every country on the face
of this planet.
Today, to break out of the ABM Treaty, or signal our intention to do
so, is to invite a return to the days of suspicion and
countersuspicion, and far more dangerously, to invite a diminishment of
the stability of our current world order. It is not perfect, of course,
but I think few would argue with the assertion that it is better than
it was for the 40 years between 1949 and 1989.
We do not attack each other, because we know to do so would be to beg
the ultimate destruction. But if we develop a capacity to knock down
anything that could be sent at us, we have changed the threat
perception--the perception of whether a balance exists--changed it in
our own mind, and changed it for those who are our adversaries.
Changing the threat perception or the perception of whether a balance
exists initiates the very hopscotching process that is the simple
history of the entire cold war. We detonated the first atom bombs; the
Soviets followed. We detonated the hydrogen bomb; they followed. We put
long-range bombers in the air with nuclear weapons; they followed. We
developed intercontinental ballistic missiles; they followed. We
developed long-range submarines with ballistic missile capability; they
followed. We developed multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle
or MIRVed nuclear warheads; they followed. Every single major episode
of the cold war consisted of a first effort by the United States to
develop technology that would give us an advantage. In every case, the
Soviets responded by countering that advantage. After the Berlin wall
fell, finally it became evident that this was an insane and vicious
circle, consuming precious resources in our Nation and bankrupting the
Soviet Union--in more than one respect.
But now, at long last, that threat has receded. The Soviet Union is
no more. And the threat of ballistic missile attack of the United
States is virtually nil--and will be virtually nil for many years.
Only Russia and China today can reach the United States with a
nuclear warhead carried on an ICBM. All our intelligence agencies agree
that there is no significant threat of such a missile attack today from
either of those nations. Russia, while one must respect the military
power still at its disposal, including intercontinental ballistic
missiles, is not in any wise prepared to engage our Nation in an armed
conflict. China has some strategic ballistic missile capability, but
not anywhere close to enough to initiate a war with the United States.
We are the only remaining superpower.
And our intelligence community further agrees that no other nation
will be able to develop the ability to hit the United States with
ballistic-missile-conveyed weapons of mass destruction for a minimum of
10 years.
Let me share with my colleagues an excerpt from the prepared
statement of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at
a public hearing on January 10 of this year on the threats faced by our
Nation. General Clapper said, in part:
We see no interest in or capability of any new country
reaching the continental United States with a long-range
missile for at least the next decade.
Then-Acting Director of Central Intelligence Adm. William Studeman,
in response to questions asked at that same hearing, replied that
No new countries have emerged with the motivation to
develop a missile to target CONUS and the four that we
previously identified--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya--
are at least a decade away.
The administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of
State are all opposed to the missile defense and ABM provisions of this
bill. Let me share the Secretary of State's letter with the Senate. In
a letter to the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he
says:
I am writing to you to express my deep concern over certain
provisions in S. 1026. Specifically, it contains missile
defense and ABM Treaty-related provisions that raise serious
constitutional foreign policy and national security concerns.
Unless these provisions are removed or modified, I will
oppose this bill.
If enacted into law, the provisions related to missile
defenses and the ABM Treaty would put the U.S. on a path to
violate the ABM Treaty by developing for deployment a non-
compliant, multi-site, National Missile Defense by the year
2003. Such a program is unnecessary and would place the START
I and START II treaties at risk.
I know that the Secretary of Defense also has opposed these
provisions.
Successive administrations, this one included, have supported the
continued viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and
enhance our national security.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have the entire letter
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of State,
Washington, DC. August 2, 1995.
Dear Senator Pell: I am writing to you to express my deep
concern over certain provisions in S. 1026, the Senate's
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1996. Specifically,
S. 1026 contains missile defense and ABM Treaty related
provisions that raise serious constitutional, foreign policy
and national security concerns. Unless these provisions are
removed or modified I will oppose this bill.
If enacted into law, the provisions related to missile
defenses and the ABM Treaty would put the U.S. on a path to
violate the ABM Treaty by developing for deployment a non-
compliant, multi-site National Missile Defense (NMD) by the
year 2003. Such a program is unnecessary and would place the
START I and START II Treaties at risk.
Successive Administrations have supported the continued
viability of the ABM Treaty as the best way to preserve and
enhance our national security. Not only has it been critical
to preventing an arms race, but it has also made possible the
extraordinary progress that both Republican and Democratic
Administrations have made in reducing strategic offensive
arms. Our allies, including Britain and France, also view the
ABM Treaty as crucial to strategic stability and the
viability of their own independent nuclear deterrents.
[[Page S 11262]]
Another provision seeks unilaterally to impose a solution
to the on-going negotiations with the Russians on the ABM/TMD
demarcation. By prohibiting the obligation and expenditure of
funds to implement Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty according
to any interpretation except the interpretation specified in
the bill, the bill would infringe upon the President's
exclusive responsibility for the execution of the law and
would impair the conduct of foreign relations consistent with
U.S. treaty obligations.
Further, such actions would immediately call into question
the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty, and have a negative
impact on U.S.-Russian relations, Russian implementation of
the START I Treaty, and Russian ratification of the START II
Treaty. This would leave thousands of warheads in place that
otherwise would be removed from deployment under the two
Treaties, including all MIRVed ICBMs such as the Russian
heavy SS-18.
There is no need now to take actions that would lead us to
violate the Treaty and threaten the stabilizing reductions we
would otherwise achieve--and place strategic stability at
risk. We have established a treaty-compliant approach to
theater missile defense that will enable us to meet threats
we may face in the foreseeable future--and one that preserves
all the benefits of the ABM, START and START II Treaties.
I hope that you will join with me to ensure that future
generations enjoy the benefit of these treaties and remove
these provisions that place these benefits at risk.
Sincerely,
Warren Christopher.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, we do not need to abrogate the ABM Treaty
in order to defend against a threat that does not exist, and will not
exist for at least 10 years. Indeed, there are many things that we can
do while remaining in full compliance with the ABM Treaty to prepare a
defense, should the decision be that such preparations are warranted
and their cost is justified. And we always retain the option, under the
terms of the treaty, to withdraw from the treaty under its terms, or to
negotiate modifications to the treaty if the Russians will agree to our
objectives.
I might add, respectfully, that there are other ways to respond to a
perceived threat that do not require building $40 billion systems that
we do not even know will work when they are completed. We could use
permissive action links; we could be negotiating harder with the
Russians, and others, to take steps to prevent any kind of accidental
launch; we could pursue the activities supported by Nunn-Lugar program
funding, including strengthening Russian government controls over their
nuclear weapons, safely and surely dismantling surplus nuclear weapons
and delivery systems, and preventing technicians from transferring
dangerous technologies to rogue states; we can provide for integral
systems that literally destroy a missile before it is launched if
someone tries to fire it without authorization.
Indeed, under the terms of the ABM Treaty, we already are allowed to
develop an antiballistic missile defense system in one location, and we
started to do some years ago in Grand Forks and then we decided it was
too expensive and we gave it up.
But that is not the course this bill takes, Madam President. The
missile defense and ABM provisions of this bill are an exercise in
sheer lunacy. This is an attempt to create from thin air a reason to
continue the numbingly expensive defense systems that the demise of the
cold war has made superfluous--while simultaneously threatening the
tremendous progress we have made in reducing the threat to our people
from nuclear weapons.
The effect of this bill is to jettison the current, real,
demonstrable protections of the START I and START II Treaties in
exchange for spending a minimum of $40 billion to develop a system to
attempt to defend our Nation against ballistic missiles--an entirely
theoretical system that may or may not function as designed.
There are some Senators who have argued that we must be prepared,
even if the risk is small and distant, for the possible threat of a
potential aggressor nation developing and choosing to use against the
United States a ballistic missile carrying a weapon of mass
destruction. Others have said that the biggest risk is that some rogue
nations may purchase such systems from either Russia or China. Mr.
President, the fact is that if such nations wish us ill, and choose to
act on those wishes, there are far less expensive, far faster, far
easier, and far less technically complicated and failure-prone ways to
wreak ill on the United States--ways against which a national missile
defense system would be powerless to defend.
Should a rogue nation, for whatever reason, choose to pursue
development and fielding of a ballistic missile system capable of
reaching our Nation, that capacity is so far down the road, so prone to
detection, and so capable of being preemptively neutralized if
necessary, that the world should not shudder at the notion that we are
somehow defenseless.
The main threats to our Nation today are from terrorists rolling
bombs, nuclear or conventional, into our cities in cars or trucks, or
carrying them in suitcases. Or cruise missiles launched from offshore.
These are threats that the $40 billion-plus national missile defense
system either cannot defend against at all, or against which the system
could defend only incompletely.
The biggest threat of all, Madam President, is one right before our
faces. It is the very same threat with which we have lived for the
duration of the cold war, and which we finally reduced dramatically and
are reducing further by the arms control treaties which are constructed
on the bedrock foundation of the ABM Treaty. Trashing the ABM Treaty
will rekindle the strategic/nuclear arms race with Russia, because even
in its current condition of economic distress, Russia will do whatever
is necessary to ensure it has an effective deterrent and retaliatory
capability. Russia, at a minimum, will retarget its ICBM's and SLBM's
on American cities, industries, and military installations. It will
stop retiring and disassembling nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
The progress toward a safer world that was so painstakingly and
painfully achieved over two decades by Presidents of both parties would
be demolished. Surely, in a world that lacks the Soviet empire, in a
world where we do not have the same kind of threat we have lived with
for the last 50 years, we do not have to turn around and create a new
arms race.
Let us review the effects of this provision of the bill: In one
sweeping movement, we are effectively demolishing--unilaterally--a
treaty to which our Nation is a party and which this Chamber ratified.
This action simply ignores procedures to withdraw legally from a treaty
we determine no longer is in our best interests.
We are countenancing in law the known, deliberate violation of U.S.
law.
We are pushing Russia to cease abiding by the terms of START I and
halt progress to implementation of START II.
We are tying the hands of our President in terms of negotiating arms
control agreements.
And we are launching this Nation on the course of spending a minimum
of $40 billion for an untried, untested missile defense system that
will not protect against the greatest threats of attack on this Nation.
The people of this Nation have long ago concluded that we in the
Congress often make decisions and laws that make no sense to them. The
provisions of this bill that pertain to missile defense and, in
particular, to the ABM Treaty, result from fanning the flame of an
irrational fear built on a fiction--a fiction with which none of our
senior intelligence community officials agrees, and that has no basis
in our foreign policy history, in our arms control history, or in
current threat analysis. If the Senate approves these provisions, it
will take one of the most outrageously nonsensical steps it has taken
in my 11 years of service here.
I strongly support the amendment of the Senator from Michigan in
deleting the offensive language from this bill. I believe Senate
adoption of his amendment is absolutely essential. Without approval of
this amendment, I will vote against this bill and urge all Senators to
do the same. I will join with other Senators to urge the President to
veto it--a step he already has indicated he expects to take if these
provisions are not acceptably modified.
I believe this bill is destined for the trash heap if the amendment
is not approved. I hope it will be approved by an overwhelming vote.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I opposed this bill when it was being
considered in the Armed Services Committee. The main reason I did so
were the
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provisions in the bill entitled the Missile Defense Act of 1995.
I believe these provisions will do this Nation's security more harm
than good, by ensuring that START II will not be ratified by the
Russian Duma.
Madam President, I am not going to repeat the analysis which Senator
Levin, Senator Nunn, Senator Exon, Senator Kerry, and various others
have already made about the specific provisions that the Levin
amendment would strike. They are clearly the most provocative of the
provisions on missile defense that the bill contains and the ones that
are most certain to incite the Russians to react.
I would like, however, to ask my colleagues how we, here in this
Senate, would react if the Russian Duma passed a defense bill that
contained the following provisions: First, how would we react if the
Russians adopted a provision that committed Russia to deploy a
multisite antiballistic missile defense by the year 2003, with an
interim capability by the year 1999, which constituted an anticipatory
breach of the ABM Treaty and that added hundreds of millions of dollars
in ruble equivalence in order to pursue that goal.
How would we react here in this Senate if the Russians adopted a
provision that revived a space-based missile defense program, in the
hope that it would allow Russia to dominate space in the long run,
while providing a second layer of missile defense for that country?
How would we react here in this Senate if the Russians adopted a
provision that unilaterally resolved the theater missile defense
demarcation line at a point that would clearly make the American
theater missile defense systems beyond Patriot violations of the ABM
Treaty in Russia's view?
How would we react here in this Senate if the Russian Duma adopted a
provision that limited President Yeltsin's ability to retire strategic
weapons systems before START II is ratified by the U.S. Senate?
Finally, how would we react in this body if the Russians adopted a
provision that proposed to resume hydronuclear testing with yields up
to hundreds of tons of TNT, which is a level that is not usually
associated with the term hydronuclear.
Madam President, if that bill were to pass the Russian Duma, the din
on this floor would be deafening. Member after Member would stand up
and declare that the right wing had won the internal political
controversy in Russia, that the cold war was back on, and that in light
of this deeply provocative attack by the Russian Duma, ratification of
the START II Treaty was out of the question.
I am certain that at least 34 Senators here would dispatch a letter
to the President declaring their opposition to START II, and demanding
a defense supplemental bill be submitted to the Congress so we could
react to what has happened.
Now, of course, if we do this sort of thing, in this defense bill
that we are now considering on the floor, I presume the expectation is
that the Russians would not be similarly provoked.
Madam President, I do not buy that assumption. The one thing that the
Russian industrial base could effectively compete with us on is
fabricating nuclear weapons and missiles. Some of that base is in the
Ukraine and would have to be revived in Russia.
I, for one, do not want to take the chance that the extreme
provisions in this bill will reignite the arms race. I, for one, do not
want to subscribe it a double standard in our dealings with the
Russians, now that the cold war is over.
The extreme and provocative actions by our so-called
``conservatives'' in this bill, in my view, will undoubtedly play into
the hands of those who consider themselves conservative from a Russian
perspective--those, in many cases, in Russia at least, who are bent on
unraveling START II and other arms control efforts.
The only thing that is attempting to be conserved by this
transnational alliance would be the cold war.
Madam President, I urge my colleagues, as many others have this
afternoon, to support Senator Levin's effort to strike the most extreme
provisions of this bill. If they are not struck, I trust that the
President would veto the bill. I hope that is not necessary. I hope
that we can act appropriately on this amendment and this bill can be
improved to an extent that the President could sign it. Thank you. I
yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, in sitting here in the past few moments
listening to the debate, I am somewhat surprised at the level of
rhetoric that is currently being used.
We heard Senator after Senator get up and say this declaration in the
DOD authorization bill is one to violate the ABM Treaty, or to signal
our intent to do so. They say this is a unilateral abrogation of the
treaty against a fictional threat.
I point out to my colleagues that nothing in this bill calls for the
abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Nothing in this bill calls for us to
violate the treaty.
Fictional threat? I wonder how our supporters on the other side feel
about the fictional threat that was launched against the state of
Israel? What if the state of Israel had no defensive systems? What if
they had no Patriots to defend against the Scud missile?
I wonder how many would take the floor and say it is tough luck that
they are out of business. All we had to have is a few Scud missiles
carrying chemical warheads land in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem and wipe out
their populations. They had no defensive mechanism available against
it.
We are talking about something quite different in terms of ICBM
threats. I recall the debate on the threat from Iraq, during the debate
on the Persian Gulf war. I remember those citing estimates by our CIA
and our DIA and other intelligence agencies at that time. They said, we
cannot give you an estimate. It could be 1 year, it could be 10 years,
and we are guessing it is closer to 10 years than 1 year.
Following the war with Saddam Hussein, I think we came to an entirely
different conclusion. We discovered that Saddam had achieved much
greater progress toward that goal than we had been aware of.
Members on the other side say this should not be a partisan issue.
Why is it that every time the Republican majority suggests a policy, it
is partisan, but when everybody on that side lines up and vote against
it, it is not partisan.
This is not a partisan issue. It ought to be bipartisan. We ought to
say, as a body, that we are concerned about the proliferation of
technology--missile technology--in the world. We are concerned when we
see major powers selling technology to potential enemies. We are
concerned when we see China, for example, selling technology to other
countries that may pose a threat to us in the future. We ought to be
concerned about the proliferation of technology that one day--and we
cannot predict when that one day will be--will pose a threat to our
population.
Now, admittedly, if we were to engage in a war with the former Soviet
Union, that would not involve a limited attack or an accidental launch
against us. That would be a massive exchange, against which there is no
defense.
I am one who, at different times over a number of years, has stood on
this floor opposing the notion of having a so-called dome over the
United States to protect us from an all-out attack. I never believed it
was possible to do so and led the effort to defeat spending money in
pursuit of that kind of system.
But I have also stood on the floor with the Senator from Georgia,
Senator Nunn, when he expressed concern about limited attacks, about
accidental launches, about what we would do if suddenly received a
message stating: ``Sorry, some accidental launch has taken place. There
is an ICBM headed for New York City or Washington, DC, or Los
Angeles,'' and all we can do is wait for it to hit?
We are talking about constructing a system that will protect against
a limited attack or accidental launch and nothing more, and it is all
to be done in accordance with the ABM Treaty.
The ABM Treaty as originally written called for multiple site
defenses, two sites for each side. We renegotiated that treaty--at that
time with the Soviets--to one site. Now we are saying, in view of the
proliferation of technology, we ought to renegotiate it to
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allow each of us, the Russians and the United States, to have some
minimal capability to protect our respective countries against an
accidental launch or a limited attack. We can do that within the ABM
Treaty.
The ABM Treaty explicitly anticipates ``changes in the strategic
situation'' and provides a means to negotiate amendments to deal with
such changes. It also allows for us to pull out of the ABM Treaty upon
6 months' notice.
Following what I hope will be the defeat of the Levin amendment, I
intend to offer an amendment--perhaps joined by the Senator from
Georgia, perhaps not--to make it clear that we intend to act in
accordance with the ABM Treaty. We intend also to call upon the
President to seek to negotiate with the Russians to allow each side to
develop and deploy a limited system to protect our respective countries
against this proliferation threat. And if the President should fail to
do so, it will be my recommendation that the President come back and
report to the Congress and then seek our advice as to whether or not we
should continue with the ABM Treaty or at that time should indicate our
desire to withdraw.
That is all within the ABM Treaty. And contrary to what is being
represented here on the floor this afternoon, we are not seeking a
unilateral abrogation. I do not want to see that. I hope, later on
during the course of this afternoon, I can make that very clear with
explicit language that will resolve any doubts about that. We want to
continue to act in accord with the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty allows us
to negotiate to seek amendments. We want to see if we cannot negotiate
with the Russians to allow for a deployment on a land-based system with
multiple sites--and the Russians would have the same right to do so--to
protect us against miscalculation or accident.
Madam President, there is an assumption in all of this debate that
somehow the threat will only come from the former Soviet Union. I do
not make that assumption. We are concerned about what is taking place
on a global basis. We are concerned about potential threats from other
sources. We cannot predict who they are, where they may be, or how far
along the line of technology development they have proceeded. But we
cannot face our constituents in good conscience and say: ``Sorry we
failed to take any measures to protect you. Our only defense is to
launch an all-out attack on whomever launched that missile.'' That is
our only option today. Is that a rational, sound option, to say if you
launch one or two missiles against the United States, we end up
launching ours against yours?
What we need to do is to have a limited protective system. That is
what the Armed Services Committee seeks to do in this authorization. I
intend, following the debate and conclusion of the Levin amendment, to
offer an amendment to make that very clear.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I will just yield myself 1 minute and
then I will yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the language of this bill which we strike
says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site
national missile defense system. A multiple site national defense
system is not allowed by the ABM Treaty. Period.
It also says we should negotiate. That is great. But it is very
precise, and we tried to get these words out in committee and we
failed. I am very glad to hear from the Senator from Maine he does not
support abrogating the treaty and he will offer language making it
clear we want to stay inside the ABM Treaty. That is what my amendment
does. That is precisely what my amendment does, is to strike the
language which says that it is the policy of the United States to
deploy a multiple site system--which violates the ABM Treaty.
There is one other provision in here. The Senator from Maine talks
about, ``We should negotiate,'' and I surely agree with him on that,
too. It is stated right here in language which the amendment will
strike, if it succeeds, that it is the sense of the Senate the
President should cease all efforts to modify or clarify obligations
under the ABM Treaty.
So while the Senator from Maine, in a way that I fully support, says
he thinks we should negotiate changes in the ABM Treaty, the bill has
language, which the Levin amendment will strike, which says that for 1
year pending this study the President should not seek to modify, to
clarify obligations under the ABM Treaty.
So I think the amendment which the Senator from Maine says he will
oppose actually gets exactly at the language which I believe he
basically will oppose as well, at least from the statement he gave this
afternoon on the floor, that is to make it clear we are not now going
to declare we are going to violate the ABM Treaty. The purpose of the
Levin amendment is to strike the language in the bill that says we are
going to violate the ABM Treaty. It is clear, as you can read it. ``It
is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site system.''
That is what is not permitted by the ABM Treaty. That is the language,
specifically targeted, rifleshot language that we seek to remove from
this bill.
Now I will yield to the Senator from Massachusetts 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized
for 15 minutes.
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
Madam President, I listened to the interventions of my friend and
colleague from Maine and the response from the Senator from Michigan,
Senator Levin, about whether the provisions in question effectively
abrogate the ABM Treaty. I would like to refer to the committee report
which I believe gives us an answer. The report reads, ``The committee
acknowledges that many of the policies and recommendations contained in
the Missile Defense Act of 1995, if implemented, would require relief
in one form or another from the ABM Treaty.''
It cannot be much clearer than that. This language, agreed upon by
the majority of the members of the committee, acknowledges that many of
the policies and recommendations contained in the Missile Defense Act
of 1995, if implemented, would require relief from the ABM Treaty.
It is the purpose of the amendment of the Senator from Michigan to
remove those particular provisions that would require such relief.
Those who oppose his amendment want to maintain the provisions in the
Missile Defense Act of 1995 which effectively will emasculate the ABM
Treaty.
There is no question--certainly there was no question on the minds of
any of the members of the Armed Services Committee--as to what was
intended, and the Senator from Michigan has outlined in careful detail
those parts of the ABM Treaty that are inconsistent with the provisions
included in this bill. So we should be under no illusion about what was
intended by the majority of the members of the Armed Services Committee
and what the remedy will be if the amendment of the Senator from
Michigan is accepted.
Madam President, during the course of the debate on the issue, some
on the other side have argued that we need to build and deploy a
national missile defense to protect our citizens against the accidental
and unauthorized launch of Russian nuclear missiles. The Defense
Department has looked at this matter. It is not a new issue. It is not
a new argument. It is a matter that was considered and has been
considered in its various forms over recent years in the fashioning and
shaping of the START I, START II and the ABM treaties. During that
consideration, the Defense Department determined that the best way to
defend our Nation against accidental launches is to do two things:
first, reduce the number of nuclear missiles in the Russian arsenal,
thereby reducing the likelihood of an accidental launch. Republicans
understood that. President Nixon understood it when he advanced the ABM
Treaty. President Bush understood it when he advanced the START I and
START II treaties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various
Secretaries of Defense and State understood it as well.
There must be some new revelation that has come over the members of
our committee to undermine that very
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basic and fundamental concept embraced by Republicans and Democrats,
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, and members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. They agreed that the most important thing that can be done for
the security of the United States was to achieve nuclear arms
reductions. These agreements were initiated and supported because
Presidents over a long period of time believed that they were in the
interest of the security of the American people, and of the nations of
the globe.
The Missile Defense Act would undermine these achievements, the
successful arms reductions negotiated in START I and START II. We have
been warned of that. The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of State have outlined the statements, comments, and
conditions of Russian leaders that indicate they would not go forward
to ratify START II if the ABM Treaty is abrogated.
Before taking the second step to protect our Nation against the
unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear missiles one must
understand that the Soviet Union is not our adversary and that it is
not our ally. We can expect one form of conduct from our adversary and
another from our ally. But the Soviet Union is neither.
So the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have recognized a
second step, which they have put into practice, that will be further
undermined if the Levin amendment is not agreed to, and that is to work
cooperatively with the Russians to assure firm command and control over
our respective forces. For example, in 1994 we reached the nuclear
detargeting agreement with the Russians. We agreed that our nuclear
missiles deployed in silos or on submarines would not be targeted
against each other--an important step.
The Russian missiles are not targeted against us today. I do not want
to see them retarget their missiles on our territory because they have
additional concern about the United States breaking out of the ABM
Treaty. Our friends on the other side cannot guarantee that. We cannot,
as supporters of the Levin amendment, guarantee it. But we can say with
some degree of predictability that the arguments for changing that
policy of retargeting and increasing instability are further advanced
by the defeat of the Levin amendment.
We agreed in 1994 that we would change the targeting of our missiles
both on land and on the seas, and, in that way, if there were an
accidental launch of a Russian nuclear missile, it would not land on
United States cities but harmlessly in the ocean. We achieved this
important agreement through cooperative discussions, not by mandates
such as those included in this particular proposal that would mandate
the President's negotiating position on the demarcation between theater
missile defenses and strategic defenses. We get it through cooperative
methods, not by sending bulletins to the Russians. We did it through
cooperation, and it has worked and is working, and we are safer and
more secure today because of that.
How are we going to make similar progress if there is no cooperative
relationship with the Russians? How are we going to do that? We have
not heard an explanation of how cooperation will continue if this bill
is not amended. Once again, the key to United States-Russian nuclear
safety is maintaining the productive relationship we have struck since
the end of the cold war: to continue with the START reductions and
cooperative threat reduction efforts. And the best way to protect
Americans from unauthorized and accidental launches of Russian missiles
as maintained by the Defense Department is through cooperative
measures, not through active defenses.
There are two efforts--continued reductions in strategic nuclear
weapons and the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs--that
we must ensure will continue. There is no question that there would be
serious damage to these efforts if we allow this bill to put
cooperative ventures at risk.
Finally, Mr. President, in the committee report on this bill, there
is the discussion in the section on the Missile Defense Act that states
that in the near term, national missile defense deployments serve to
stabilize mutual deterrence by reducing prospective incentives to
strike first in a crisis.
That has been an issue that has been debated by Republicans and
Democrats for as long as I can remember, for as long as we have been
talking about strategic nuclear weapons. That was the argument when we
were looking at star wars, and it has been resurrected even with the
changed world conditions.
I have great difficulty understanding the logic behind this point. If
we were to deploy a national missile defense, we would be degrading the
effectiveness of the Russian offensive missiles. And as anybody who
follows strategic nuclear policy understands, any time you degrade the
effectiveness of a nation's missiles, you shorten the fuse on those
missiles in a time of crisis, you increase the incentives for the other
side to strike first.
Mutual deterrence remains as the ultimate guarantor of our safety
from nuclear attack. There are ways to make deterrence more stable and
more secure. That is through negotiation of arms reductions and
negotiations on command and control agreements that improve the safety
of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
I believe that is the way to go, and all of those efforts will be
advanced by the acceptance of the Levin amendment.
Madam President, I strongly support the amendment to save the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty from unilateral abrogation, which would be the
result if this bill is enacted in its present form. Since the United
States and the Soviet Union signed this landmark treaty in 1972, it has
been the cornerstone of United States nuclear arms control policy. By
insuring that nuclear arsenals remain effective deterrents, the ABM
Treaty has brought stability to the nuclear relationship for the past
quarter century.
Unilaterally discarding the ABM Treaty would severely undermine the
cooperative United States-Russian strategic relationship. Just as the
United States is beginning to reap the greatest rewards from the
strategic nuclear policy constructed on the foundation of the ABM
Treaty, many Members of Congress want to throw it all away.
The START I and START II accords, signed by President Bush, would
verifiably eliminate three-quarters of all the nuclear weapons ever
pointed at the United States. Through the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat
reduction Program, the Russians are actually accepting United States
help to dismantle their nuclear weapons, a situation that none of us
would have dared imagine only a decade ago.
The bill's provision is a clear and present danger to the ABM Treaty.
It would turn United States-Russian cooperation into mistrust. We would
be discarding tangible present advances in arms control for the
illusion of future security through a national missile defense system
that will cost billions of dollars above and beyond the huge defense
burden we already carry in this era of deep budget cuts.
The only way that opponents of the ABM Treaty could develop a
rationale in support of the offending provisions in this bill is by
misrepresenting the nature of nuclear threats to the United States in
the post-cold war era, the value of the ABM Treaty today, and the need
for building and deploying strategic defense in the near future.
Five transparent myths underlie the case for building national
missile defenses and abrogating the ABM Treaty. Once the myths are
exposed, the case for abrogating the ABM Treaty crumbles.
Myth No. 1 is that the ABM Treaty is a cold war relic whose value
disappeared with the demise of the former Soviet Union, so that we can
abrogate the ABM Treaty at no cost to United States security.
The cold war may have ended, but nuclear deterrence still remains as
the centerpiece of U.S. nuclear security.
The end of the cold war and the relaxation of military tensions
between the United States and the Soviet successor states have not made
the ABM Treaty obsolete. The nature of nuclear weapons and their
massive destructive power has not changed. No matter how much the
opponents of the ABM Treaty wish it were otherwise, effective mutual
deterrence is what keeps Americans safe from nuclear war.
Today, 6 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and nearly 4 years
after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the
United States and
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Russia is in transition. Russia is no longer our adversary, but it is
not our ally either. Although we see no apparent tensions that could
lead to nuclear conflict, prudence dictates that we structure our
remaining nuclear arsenals to achieve the most stable nuclear
deterrence possible.
The end to the hostile relationship allows us to cooperate much more
extensively than in the past to solidify and stabilize nuclear
deterrence at much lower levels of nuclear weapons. Over the past 6
years, we have managed to use this change in the relationship in a way
that leaves deterrence more stable, and the American people safer than
at any time since the beginning of the cold war.
Consider the progress we have made in recent years. In 1991,
President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty. Two
years later, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the START II
Treaty, which will reduce the number of Russian nuclear warheads
pointed in our direction from 10,000 to 3,500.
In addition, through cooperative initiatives, the so-called Nunn-
Lugar programs, we are working with the Russians to assist them in
dismantling their nuclear warheads, thereby substantially reducing the
Russian arsenal's threat to the United States and substantially
reducing the likelihood that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands
of renegade regimes or terrorists.
The ABM Treaty is the indispensable foundation for these steps.
Abrogating the treaty would jeopardize all of these important advances,
and endanger the future of United States-Russian nuclear relations.
Some argue that the ABM Treaty is obsolete because deterrence is no
longer needed. They pretend that we can rely on missile defenses to
protect the American people from nuclear war. This is the same
preposterous argument we heard during the 1980's, when star wars was
oversold as a miracle protection from the nuclear threat.
SDI never came close to meeting the standards of operational
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness that the Reagan administration
said would be necessary to make the transition from deterrence to
defense. No technical advances since the abandonment of that ill-
conceived and wasteful adventure make the reality today any different.
Defense cannot replace deterrence, and we would be foolish to try it.
The ABM Treaty is not obsolete. It is still the foundation for stable
deterrence, and it deserves to be maintained.
The second myth is that the Russians will not mind if we abrogate the
ABM Treaty. It is said that we can deploy a national missile defense
and still maintain a cooperative strategic relationship with Moscow.
This groundless assertion is refuted by the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and most important of all, by
the Russians themselves.
Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in a June 28 letter to Senator Levin stated that undermining the ABM
Treaty will make START II ratification by the Russian parliament highly
unlikely. In the letter, he addresses this issue clearly. He writes:
While we believe that START II is in both countries'
interests regardless of other events, we must assume such
unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for START II
ratification by the Duma and probably impact our broader
security relationship with Russia as well.
General Shalikashvili is the top military officer in the Nation. He
has had extensive contacts with senior Russian military officers. In
his view, enactment of legislation that harms the ABM Treaty will
damage our cooperative security relationship with the Russians at the
very moment when we are trying to move forward in arms control.
Secretary of Defense Perry, in a letter to Senator Nunn, the ranking
member of the Armed Services Committee, feels the same way. He writes
that the provisions in this bill ``would jeopardize Russian
implementation of the START I and START II treaties, which involve the
elimination of many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons.'' Secretary
Perry understands full well the damage this bill would inflict on U.S.
security, which is why the administration strongly opposes these
provisions.
The Russians themselves feel the same way. At the May summit in
Moscow, President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed a joint
statement that commits both nations to upholding the ABM Treaty, and to
developing and deploying theater missile defense systems in compliance
with the Treaty. It is reckless to think that the Russians will watch
us violate this commitment without a response that will set back the
cause of our mutual security.
At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on June 29, Russian
Foreign Minister Alexander Kozyrev reaffirmed the commitment of the
Yeltsin government to ratify the START II Treaty, ``subject to strict
compliance with the ABM Treaty.''
It could not be any clearer. If we abrogate the ABM Treaty, we will
not have START II, much less START III. We will not have cooperative
threat reduction. And we may well not have a comprehensive test ban and
other arms control agreements we need in the years ahead.
The third myth underlying the proposed abrogation of the ABM Treaty
is that we face the threat of ballistic missile attack from renegade
nations that will achieve this capability in the near future.
This myth squarely contradicts the conclusions of the U.S.
intelligence community and the Pentagon leadership.
Lt. Gen. James Clapper, Jr., the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, testified before the Armed Services Committee in January that
``we see no interest in or capability of any new country reaching the
continental United States with a long range missile for at least the
next decade.'' Secretary Perry endorsed this judgment in testimony
before the Armed Services Committee this year.
Concern about future ballistic missile threats to U.S. territory is
the basis for the Clinton administration's research and development
program on national missile defenses. This reasonable level of spending
on anti-missile defenses will put the United States in a position to
rapidly deploy such a defense if unforeseen threats arise in the near
future. It makes sense to spend a modest amount on R&D. It makes no
sense to throw billions of dollars into deploying what may be an
unnecessary system sooner.
Myth No. 4 is that a multi-site national missile defense can be
deployed over the next decade for a modest cost. This assertion is a
fantasy. This year's bill plans to spend $671 million on national
missile defense, an increase of $300 million over the administration's
request. But this increment is only the tip of a very large iceberg.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, deploying a single-site
national missile defense would cost $29 billion to complete and $16.5
billion of the total would be spent over the next 5 years. This
estimate does not include the cost of building additional sites, which
the pending bill calls for, and it does not include the cost of
operating and maintaining the system once it is operational.
Other costs will be higher too. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty will
doom START II, and saddle us with a nuclear stalemate with the Russians
at cold war levels. We will have to maintain our strategic nuclear
arsenal at its current size, not the greatly reduced level under START
II. If we proceed with this bill, we will be spending tens of billions
of tax dollars in a way that increases the nuclear threat to the United
States. The American taxpayer was taken for a long and expensive and
unnecessary ride by star wars in the 1980s. It makes no sense to repeat
that experience in the post-cold war era.
Myth No. 5 is that we need to discard the ABM Treaty in order to
build and deploy effective theater missile defenses to protect U.S.
forces in the field. The fact is, the United States can do both. We can
comply with the ABM Treaty, and we can create effective theater missile
defense systems.
The ABM Treaty strictly limits development and deployment of
strategic missile defenses. But it expressly allows the signers to
deploy theater missile defenses. The United States is already
developing advanced theater missile defenses that may have significant
capability to defeat strategic offensive missiles.
As a result, the Clinton administration has entered into negotiations
with
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Russia to determine which systems will be permitted under the ABM
Treaty. By so doing, the President is using one of the key features of
the treaty--its flexibility to update and revise the Treaty as
developments demand.
This bill, however, prevents the effective negotiation of any
boundary between theater and strategic defenses. It would deny the
President the power to negotiate this clarification of the treaty in a
way that will best serve our national security.
By attempting to achieve by legislative mandate what the President
should negotiate, the bill will undercut the basic constitutional
allocation of treaty-making powers between the President and Congress.
It is wrong to legislate an ideological negotiating position while
rational negotiations are underway. This step sets an extremely
dangerous precedent for the future, and could result in the collapse of
the ABM Treaty.
It is time to cut through the myths and misrepresentations. Our
national security is at stake. It makes no sense to sacrifice real and
verifiable reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal, in exchange for a
multibillion dollar national missile defense that will leave us less
secure. A decade ago, we should have left star wars in Hollywood where
it belonged--and that is where this senseless sequel belongs too.
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Madam President, I yield whatever time remains back to the Senator
from Michigan.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator from South
Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized
for 10 minutes.
Mr. SMITH. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. President, the other side in this debate, Senator Levin and
others, assert that somehow this bill is going to violate the ABM
Treaty or require us to violate the ABM Treaty. Those are the terms
that we have heard used--violate or require us to violate the treaty.
My friend, Senator Levin, is a very accomplished attorney, and I
respect his intellect very much, but this is just patently false. There
is no requirement to violate any treaty in this legislation we have
written. Nothing in this bill violates the treaty, nothing. If it did,
if the language in here were to violate the treaty, why does the
distinguished Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, in comment after
comment talk about an anticipatory breach down the road?
If there is an anticipatory breach down the road, the way I read that
is there is not any breach yet. There is not any violation of anything.
We are anticipating it. Well, you can anticipate anything you want, but
the facts speak for themselves. This does not violate the ABM Treaty,
period. Nothing in this bill violates the ABM Treaty. It is simply
patently false to say that it does.
Now, in 2003--that is the deployment date for ground-based multiple
sites--in 2003, yes, we could do that, but it is not 2003. This is
still 1995 as I looked at the calendar, and I do not quite understand
the logic here of how it is that we are violating something that we
have not violated yet. We are anticipating a violation, but we are not
violating anything. So I am having trouble understanding the semantics,
and I think that is probably the intent of the opposition here, to make
sure that others have trouble understanding the semantics so that we
can confuse and obfuscate and hide the real truth, which is that we are
not violating any treaty at all in this language.
Now, article XIII, which the Senator from Michigan and others are
aware of, is very clear on this, about what our rights are under this
treaty. There is nothing hidden about it. I have a copy of the treaty
right here in my hand, and it says:
To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this treaty, the parties shall establish
promptly a standing consultative commission within the
framework of which they will--
Among other things,
consider possible changes in the strategic situation which
have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty.
Surely, my colleagues will admit there have been strategic changes
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Second:
Consider as appropriate possible proposals for further
increasing the viability of this Treaty including proposals
for amendments.
We have a right to amend the treaty. And finally it says under
article XV, Mr. President, that:
Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests and it
shall give notice of its decision to the other party 6 months
prior to the withdrawal from the Treaty.
So we are not violating any treaty with this language. If someone is
saying we are anticipating the violation of the treaty, fine; we can
anticipate anything we want to. But it is simply wrong to say that we
are violating this treaty or that we do not have the right to change
this treaty or to withdraw from this treaty or whatever the parties
wish to do. It is right there. It is written. It is clear. It is
indisputable. It is fact.
I am kind of surprised to hear that we are going to automatically
violate this treaty if we decide that we, in the United States of
America, want to defend America against attack.
Well, you know what? We do not violate the treaty, but if we had to
defend America I would violate the treaty--that happens to be this
Senator's personal opinion--because I do not think I am worshiping at
the altar of a treaty. I did not know that a treaty was forever and
that we could not change the provisions.
We have the right to change this treaty. It was written to change,
just like the Constitution was written with a possibility to amend it.
This treaty was written to change it, to even withdraw from it if it is
in the national security interests of a nation to do so.
Those are the facts. I suggest to my colleagues that the end of the
cold war is just the kind of change the treaty is referring to. That is
the kind of strategic change that this treaty is referring to, the end
of the cold war, the end of a bipolar world. We are now in a multipolar
world with threats that we do not really know how to calculate, with
weapons that are different and in the hands of some who may be more
inclined to use them than even the old Soviet Union. Our colleagues who
support the Levin amendment, if we are to put this in perspective, are
the same people who day after day, day after day, year after year,
argue the cold war is over and therefore we should adapt our defense
program to the changed environment.
That is a good argument. The cold war is over. We must adapt. We are
adapting. We have downsized our military. We are changing some of the
priorities in our weapons systems. That is fine. But why are they
fighting so hard, Mr. President, to preserve the most obvious relic of
the cold war, the ABM Treaty? The ABM Treaty, the AntiBallistic Missile
Treaty, the relic of the cold war, deals with a bipolar world, deals
with a concept of mutual assured destruction, that if one side fires at
the other, the other will fire back; therefore, the first side will not
fire. That is the whole logic here, but is not a bipolar world.
Does anybody believe that Saddam Hussein would be reasonable and
rational, or perhaps Qadhafi in Libya? Are we dealing with rational
people in some of these fundamentalist and other nations around the
world today? I think not, and the American people know that.
Frankly, those who wrote this treaty knew that, that we were not
always going to have the same situation in the world. The treaty is
between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no Soviet
Union anymore. Even if we agree that Russia is the successor to the
Soviet Union--which frankly is an open question--there are many other
nations now, legitimate nations of the world that were part of that old
Soviet Union. It is not just Russia. Russia is not the automatic
successor to the Soviet Union.
It is clear that this treaty does not include the nations that
threaten us the most. The nations that threaten us most: Libya, North
Korea, Syria, Iran, Iraq, China, they did not sign the ABM Treaty. They
do not have anything to do with the ABM Treaty. So why are
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we locked to an ABM Treaty? Why are we locked to an ABM Treaty that
does not even deal with the countries that are threatening us?
The answer is very simple. We should not be. And the treaty founders,
those who authored that treaty, knew it. We are not standing on the
brink with Russia. In fact, Yeltsin says Russia is no longer targeting
us with missiles. This is no longer bipolar. It is multipolar.
The Levin amendment would leave us perpetually locked into an
outdated posture of confrontation with the former Soviet Union, the
past, the cold war. Let us step into the 21st century. Let us look at
the threat today, not yesterday. We have an obligation here in this
Senate to look ahead, to protect the future, and this language does it.
This language does it. It encourages a cooperative transition away,
away from mutual assured destruction toward mutual assured security--
not destruction.
The Levin amendment would leave America completely vulnerable to
ballistic missile attack. It would strike this language, gut the
essence of the bill, restrict our ability to make theater defenses as
technologically capable as possible.
The SASC bill says all Americans deserve to be protected and ensures
that our national security and theater defense programs are targeted
toward the specific threats which confront us today, not yesterday.
The Levin amendment would perpetuate the policy again of mutual
assured destruction, even though the cold war is over. Do not take my
word for it. Henry Kissinger, who helped develop the doctrine, agrees
that mutual assured destruction is no longer relevant; not even
appropriate, yet Senator Levin would continue a policy that I believe
is absurd, that leaves our Nation defenseless while being locked into a
policy, a relic that belongs in the dustbin of history.
It is time to move on, Mr. President. It is time to move into the 21st
century.
Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-seven seconds.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, and
I thank the Senator from South Carolina for yielding.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield the Senator from Arkansas 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. President, I heard the Senator from Maine a moment ago say that
there is not anything in this bill that abrogates the ABM Treaty
between Russia and the United States.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I cannot hear very well. Is the Senator
using his microphone?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator using his microphone?
Mr. BUMPERS. I thought I was. I see it lying on the floor.
Most people say, ``I heard your speech awhile ago, and when I stuck
my head out the window I could really hear it.''
Is this better? I apologize.
As I was about to say, the Senator from Maine awhile ago said there
was not anything in this bill that would abrogate the ABM Treaty. I do
not know how more forcefully you can abrogate the treaty than to pass
this bill. Now, obviously, it is not going to be abrogated until the
Soviet Union gets a stomach full of this kind of stuff and withdraws
from the treaty, which they have a right to do on 6 months' notice.
But, first of all, I want you to look at the language of the treaty. As
I said this morning, English is the mother tongue. That is what we
speak. That is what we write. And here is what the mother tongue says
in article I of the 1976 Protocol of the ABM Treaty. ``Each party shall
be limited at any one time''--limited at any one time--``to a single
area out of the two provided in article III of the treaty for
deployment. . .''
You see the word ``single''? That means one. ``Single'' and ``one''
are the same.
Here is what the bill says. Section 233, ``It is the policy of the
United States to . . . deploy a multiple-site''--``multiple,''
colleagues, is more than one. ``. . .United States to . . . deploy a
multiple-site national ballistic missile defense system.''
Section 235, two sections down, ``The Secretary of Defense shall
develop . . . national missile defense system, which will attain
initial operational capability by the end of 2003.'' It shall include
``Ground-based interceptors deployed at multiple sites''--not two;
maybe a half a dozen. And the treaty is very specific that we shall be
limited to one.
And people have the temerity to get up on this floor and, I assume,
try to deceive the American people into believing this is a perfectly
harmless, innocent little bill. Oh, I wish I missed the cold war like
some of my colleagues do. There are colleagues in this place that
cannot sleep at night since the cold war ended and will do anything to
resurrect it. There are defense contractors who cannot stand the demise
of the Soviet Union. I do not know why it bothers them. We certainly
have not cut defense spending any.
When the Senator from Maine mentioned the people of Israel, he was
talking about a theater missile defense system which virtually every
person in this body has strongly supported. We are not talking about
theater missiles. We are talking about headed toward an antiballistic
missile system in direct contravention of our word as a nation with our
name on a treaty that either means something or it does not.
Oh, the arrogance in this bill drives me crazy. First, we will say
where the demarcation line is between whether something is a theater
missile or an antiballistic missile system. We will decide. And if the
Russians do not like it, as we used to say when I was a kid, they can
take it or lump it. We will deploy on multiple sites. And if the
Russians think that violates the treaty, which it clearly does, they
can take it or lump it.
This bill says ``the Senate.'' Now, you think about the President of
the United States, who negotiates treaties and who is talking to the
Russians right now about trying to resolve some of these ABM questions.
What does this bill say? The Senate--not the President--the Senate will
appoint a group of Senators to review ``continuing value and validity
of the ABM Treaty.'' We will decide whether it has any value, whether
it has any continuing validity. That would be insulting enough. What
else do they say? This committee will recommend policy guidance, and
the President--Mr. President, you will ``cease all efforts to modify,
clarify or otherwise alter this treaty,'' et cetera, et cetera. The
arrogance of a bill that says to the President, ``Stop it. Quit trying
to work something out. We will decide whether this treaty has value or
not.''
The arguments on the other side about how this bill does not abrogate
the treaty, all it does is set out a whole host of things which lead
unalterably toward a flagrant violation of the treaty and abrogation of
the treaty. No self-respecting nation--and Russia is one--will sit idly
by while we construe the treaty any way we want to. And they are
expected to sit idly by and say, ``Yes, yes, yes.''
I have never heard as much third-grade sophistry in my life as I
heard when the Senator from Michigan offered his amendment. On June 21,
President Yeltsin submitted the START II Treaty, not negotiated by Bill
Clinton, negotiated by George Bush--a good treaty. It should be
ratified by both sides immediately. George Bush should say he wants it
put on his epitaph that he negotiated START II. So when President
Yeltsin appointed his Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozynev, and his Defense
Minister, Pavel Grachev, then the President of the Russian party, to
negotiate with the Duma and ratify START II, a spokesman for the Duma
said:
The ratification process would undoubtedly be influenced by
progress in the attainment of a Russian-American agreement on
the delineation of the strategic and tactical antimissile
defense system. The observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty depends
on this.
The role of this treaty remains unchanged in creating
conditions for cutting down strategic offensive weapons.
Can you blame Russia? Be fair-minded for about 10 seconds. That is
unusual around here. But try it. Be fair-minded for about 10 seconds.
If the roles were
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reversed, if the Russians were passing laws to abrogate the ABM Treaty,
would we ratify START II? We would take it to the men's room, is what
we would do with it.
Well, Mr. President, both nations have saved billions of dollars by
not building antiballistic missile systems. We have a lot of Senators,
I say, who just can hardly handle the end of the cold war. How many
times have I stood at this desk trying to keep this Nation from
spending $2 billion resurrecting a bunch of old rusty buckets called
battleships. Two billion dollars. Where are they? In mothballs right
where everybody knew they were going. Two billion dollars already gone.
I stood here pleading with this body, ``Don't buy all these D-5
missiles, you can't possibly use that many.'' And the Star Wars battle
which I thought was over.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. I ask for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 additional minutes.
Mr. BUMPERS. All I heard was, ``The chiefs want it, the Secretary
wants it,'' and now the chiefs do not want this. They did not even want
the $7 billion that was added in committee, and they certainly do not
want all this language in the bill. Chairman Shalikashvili does not
want it. Nobody wants it except the Armed Services Committee.
Our bombers are not on alert. Our cities are not targeted. For the
first time in 40 years the American people can get a decent night's
sleep. So what are we going to do? We are going to say, ``Wake up,
remember the good old days when you couldn't sleep at night for fear of
a nuclear war? They are going to bring it back to you in spades.''
There are a lot of things wrong with this bill. I said this morning,
and I say again, in my 21 years in the Senate, this is, by far, the
worst defense bill that has ever been presented on this floor.
Oh, the arrogance of power. Every great nation that has indulged in
the arrogance of power, as this bill does, has lived to regret it. The
Senator from New Hampshire said we have not violated the ABM Treaty
``yet,'' ``we're just going to interpret it any way we want to and we
are going to build a system and we will decide where the demarcation
line is.'' Do you think the Russians are going to take something that
they feel is prejudicial to their security? The last guy to
underestimate Russia was Adolf Hitler. They are on their hunkers, but I
will tell you, they will starve their people before they will be
humiliated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. I ask for 1 additional minute.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute.
Mr. BUMPERS. I have watched on Discovery Channel for the past 2
months and on PBS all these battles of World War II, a lot of them the
Russians against the Germans. Twenty-two million Russians died. They
starved to death by the thousands at Leningrad and in Stalingrad.
I am not suggesting we be afraid of Russia. I am suggesting that the
world will be eminently better off if the two superpowers of this world
can agree. The American people really do not understand the details of
this. Do you know what the American people do? They elect you and me to
do responsible things. They elect us expecting that we will know
something about it and that we will protect the American people.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BUMPERS. I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield to Senator Chafee 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned over this bill's
provision affecting the ABM Treaty, and I would like to discuss my
support for the Levin amendment. Let me give a little bit of history.
The ABM Treaty was agreed to 20 years ago. What does it do? We hear a
lot about the ABM Treaty, but what does it do? What is the key part of
it? The thrust of it was to prevent the United States or the Soviet
Union from gaining the ability to unilaterally --that is one side
alone--to launch a ballistic missile attack against the other without
the possibility of retribution. In other words, the whole purpose of
the treaty was to prevent either side from employing a defensive system
to shoot down incoming missiles, because that would, in effect,
encourage one side to launch an attack knowing that they would be
protected from any retaliation.
Since that time, the geopolitical situation in the world has changed.
The Soviet Union no longer exists and the Warsaw Pact has collapsed.
There has also been rapid technological advances that could not have
been predicted at the time that the ABM Treaty was signed.
Given these dramatic changes, I certainly understand the interest to
take a look at this ABM Treaty. It has been 20 years. It is appropriate
to have modifications and to look at it again. But, the point I want to
make is, the changes to this treaty, or any other treaty, for that
matter, must be negotiated by the President of the United States, in
consultation with his military and diplomatic advisers and, obviously,
with confirmation by the Senate.
Such changes should not be dictated by the legislature, either the
House or the Senate.
Let us look at what S. 1026 does in regard to the ABM Treaty. This is
what it says:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
site national missile defense system.
The ABM Treaty says each nation can only have one ABM site, one site
in each nation. This says ``No, no, we are changing that policy.''
It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
site national missile defense system.
That policy is clearly in violation of the ABM Treaty. We are going
to hear arguments back and forth, does that mandate that there be
multiple sites? It can be argued both ways, and it obviously is an
arguable point. But there is no question but we are declaring that it
is the policy of the United States to have multiple sites.
Whether that is a mandate or not, I do not know, but certainly I do
not want any part of it. We have gotten along with the ABM Treaty for
20 years. If we want changes, let us negotiate them. Let us not have
them emerge from this Senate dictating in a way or declaring it is a
policy to have these multiple sites.
What else does the bill we are debating today do? It prohibits ``any
missile defense or air defense system or system upgrade or system
component that has not been flight tested in a unilateral,'' and here
we go ahead and define what is an ABM qualifying flight test.
Next, it goes on--here is an important point, Mr. President--it
states the sense of Congress that:
. . . the President should cease all efforts to modify,
clarify, or otherwise alter U.S. obligations under the ABM
Treaty pending the outcome of a Senate review.
Look, who is in charge around here? Is it the Senate of the United
States, or is it the President under his constitutional powers? We say,
no, he cannot do anything until we have a Senate review of the treaty.
How long is that going to last? It could last 3 years; it could last 10
years. During all of that time, the President's hands would be tied. I
really do not think that is what we want.
The provisions of this bill constitute an unwarranted usurpation of
Presidential authority to conduct foreign policy on the most sensitive
of national security matters.
Mr. President, Congress simply should not be in the business of
dictating to the President how to interpret, how to implement, or how
to renegotiate a binding treaty of the United States. As a Republican
Senator, I would never impose those kinds of conditions on a Republican
President, and as a Republican Senator, I do not suggest that they
should be imposed on a Democratic President.
Secretary of Defense William Perry has warned that these provisions
would jeopardize Russian implementation of the Reagan and the Bush--who
are they? Republican Presidents--Reagan-Bush negotiated START I and
START II Treaties. These treaties involve the destruction of thousands
of nuclear warheads.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili has similarly cautioned
that the bill's ABM provisions should
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probably impact our broadened security relationship with Russia. I do
not argue with the premise that the United States ought to pursue
missile defense technologies in order to deter potential aggressors who
have made substantial progress in this field. Yes, we ought to do some
work in that area.
I also do not oppose appropriate modifications of the 20-year-old ABM
Treaty that are negotiated by the President. But this bill simply goes
too far. Congress must not legislate such specific modifications to the
treaty.
So, Mr. President, I am in support of the Levin amendment and urge my
colleagues to support it.
So I want to thank the Chair and thank the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the amendment by the Senator from
Michigan attempts to hold on to the cold war status quo that we have
come to know as mutual assured destruction. But is the cold war not
over?
Mr. President, the United States should not be reluctant to reassess
the continuing value and validity of the ABM Treaty. The Defense
authorization bill does not advocate abrogation of the ABM Treaty, but
it does firmly acknowledge that the strategic and political
circumstances that led to the ABM Treaty have changed.
The Levin amendment is a backward rather than a forward looking
amendment. We should be looking forward and attempting to foster a new
form of strategic stability that is not based on mutual assured
destruction. Think about it--5 years after the end of the cold war,
with all the political changes that have occurred, the United States
and Russia have not fundamentally altered the strategic posture that so
characterized the cold war.
All Senators should agree that the ABM Treaty is technically and
geopolitically outdated. While the treaty requires the United States
and Russia to remain vulnerable to each other's threats, it has the
effect of requiring the United States to remain vulnerable to threats
posed by other countries. Countries like North Korea are developing
intercontinental ballistic missiles, while missile and nuclear
technologies are practically available on the open market. Let me quote
former Deputy Secretary of Defense and current Director of Central
Intelligence John Deutch:
The 1972 ABM Teaty does not conform with either the changed
geopolitical circumstances or the new technological
opportunities of today. We should not be reluctant to
negotiate treaty modifications that acknowledge the new
realities, provided we retain the essential stabilizing
purpose of the treaty.
It has also become clear that vulnerability to missile attack neither
stabilizes nor enhances deterrence. The Persian Gulf war demonstrated
this clearly. Israel, a country with an extremely credible retaliatory
threat, came under repeated attack during the war. For a variety of
complicated reasons Israel simply did not retaliate. Perhaps most
ironic, the reason that Saddam Hussein launched missiles at Israel was
precisely to provoke retaliation. Secretary of Defense Perry recognized
this point in a recent speech: ``The bad news is that in this era,
deterrence may not provide even the cold comfort it did during the cold
war. We may be facing terrorists or rogue regimes with ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future, and they
may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than
MAD.'' And yet, the amendment of the Senator from Michigan seems to
deny that things have changed.
On the subject of change, let me quote Secretary Perry again: ``We
now have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not on
MAD, not on mutual assured destruction, but rather on another acronym,
MAS, or mutual assured safety.'' This is precisely what the Missile
Defense Act of 1995 calls for. Its language almost mirrors Secretary
Perry's statement.
We must not allow a 20-year-old treaty to prevent the United States
from responding to legitimate and growing security threats. Stated
simply, the ABM Treaty as it now stands prevents the United States from
deploying a national missile defense system that could protect all
Americans against even a limited ballistic missile attack. The
authorization bill says that it is time to begin changing this. There
is a real and growing threat. It will take us 8 years to develop the
system called for in the bill. By that time the United States could
face a variety of new and unpredictable threats, including a North
Korean ICBM.
I would also point out that the ABM Treaty was meant to be a living
document. Article XIII recognizes the possibility that changed
circumstances would require the treaty to be modified. Articles XIV and
XV provide the procedures for making such changes. The argument that
this bill violates the treaty is simply false. All the means for
achieving the policies and goals in the Missile Defense Act of 1995 are
contained in the ABM Treaty itself.
We should also remember that the ABM Treaty was originally a
multiple-site treaty. For those who so resist any change to the treaty,
I would remind them that the Senate voted to amend the treaty in 1974.
It did not upset the Russians then and it should not upset them today
if we restore the treaty's multiple-site aspect.
In fact, the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to
amend the treaty in ways that are fully compatible with the Missile
Defense Act of 1995. Deployment of a multiple-site national missile
defense system should not be viewed by the Russians as threatening or
in any way undermining their confidence in deterrence.
There is no substantive reason why a U.S. policy to develop such a
system should undermine START II, as has been argued by the Senator
from Michigan. START II has plenty of problems, but the ABM Treaty
should not be one of them. Allowing the Russians to use the ABM Treaty
as a distraction from the real problems would be a major mistake. Among
other things, it would lead Russia to believe that it has a veto over a
wide range of United States national security policies. Remember that
they have linked START II ratification to things like U.S. NATO policy.
Is the Senator from Michigan suggesting that we hold our NATO policy
hostage to START II as well?
Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that we should not try to
reaffirm the cold war on the floor of the Senate 5 years after its
demise. We should welcome the opportunity to establish a more normal
relationship with Russia that is not a mutual hostage relationship. We
should pursue what Secretary Perry termed mutual assured safety and
reject the Levin amendment with its embrace of mutual assured
destruction.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Rhode Island 10
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I strongly support the Senator from Michigan
and my other colleagues in their effort to amend the missile defense
sections of the defense authorization bill.
The amendment would strike from the bill language that mandates
action that would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The
ABM Treaty, approved overwhelmingly by the Senate following extensive
and thorough hearings by the Committee on Foreign Relations, has served
in the intervening years as the centerpiece of modern arms control. The
treaty has served to guarantee that neither side could threaten to
neutralize the offensive forces of the other, with the result that we
had years of strategic stability followed currently by major reductions
in the strategic offensive arms of both sides. Various attacks have
been made upon it over the years, largely by people who would prefer an
unbridled strategic offensive arms race, but the treaty's benefits have
been so clear that these assaults have been repelled.
The present favorable strategic arms environment has been achieved
under the umbrella of the ABM Treaty. It probably would have been
impossible to reach the present situation in which we are moving away
from heavy dependence on strategic defensive arms were it not for the
ABM Treaty.
The amendment also corrects an additional problem with the bill in
that it
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unilaterally interprets the ABM Treaty's meaning for theater missile
defenses. The bill would arbitrarily impose a demarcation line between
theater and strategic missile defenses that would tie the President's
hands as he is trying to negotiate this very matter with the Russians.
It is those negotiations that should determine the outcome, not some
arbitrary judgment in an authorization bill.
Secretary of Defense Perry noted to Senator Nunn his strong
opposition to these provisions. He said, ``Unless these provisions are
eliminated or significantly modified they threaten to undermine
fundamental national security interests of the United States.''
Secretary of State Christopher wrote me yesterday to point out that
the provisions under discussion here ``raise serious constitutional
foreign policy and national security concerns.''
The Secretary continued:
Further, such actions would immediately call into question
the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty, and have a negative
impact on U.S.-Russian relations, Russian implementation of
the START I Treaty, and Russian ratification of the START II
Treaty. This would leave thousands of warheads in place that
otherwise would be removed from deployment under the two
Treaties, including all MIRVed ICBMs such as the Russian
heavy SS-18.
There is no need now to take actions that would lead us to
violate the Treaty and threaten the stabilizing reductions we
would otherwise achieve--and place strategic stability at
risk. We have established a treaty-compliant approach to
theater missile defense that will enable us to meet threats
we may face in the foreseeable future--and one that preserves
all the benefits of the ABM, START and START II Treaties.
Mr. President, the Missile Defense Act portion of the bill, sections
233-235 simply does not warrant approval by the U.S. Senate. The policy
it sets forth is neither realistic nor wise. It gives a sense of
urgency that is not justified by any known facts.
There is no obvious danger from theater-range missiles that must be
countered. As we all know, the Patriot missile system proved to be both
highly effective and appropriate to the threat we faced in Desert
Storm. An effort is now under way to upgrade the Patriot system over
time to meet the threat in future years.
It is quite easy to overstate the missile threat this country might
conceivably face, but it is important to understand that the missile
technology control regime [MTCR] has done much to reduce the potential
threat we will face from ballistic missiles. At present there are very
few nations who have even the potential to mount new missile threats
against us that could not be handled by planned systems. The provision
states the policy that the United States should deploy a missile system
that is highly effective against ballistic missile attacks on the
United States, to be augmented over time to provide a defense against
larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. This proposal
seems to me highly unrealistic.
Few Members of this body can seriously believe that any deployed
missile system could be highly effective against any limited missile
attack, much less a larger attack. While it is true that, under certain
circumstances, ballistic missile defenses could shoot down incoming
ballistic missile warheads, I would not wish to place a wager that no
warheads would get through to bring on havoc and destruction nor would
I want to risk my family or any other American lives on the supposition
that any reasonable level of spending for a multiple site national
missile defense system would do much of anything other than squander
major parts of the national treasure.
The bill specifies that we should seek a cooperative transition to a
regime that does not feature mutual assured destruction and the
offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability.
This provision of the bill gives the impression that we do not
understand what mutual assured destruction meant for our security
during the cold war. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty essentially
guarantees that neither side can develop the sort of ballistic missile
defenses that would prevent the other side from effectively attacking
in a nuclear confrontation. The fact of assured destruction of a mutual
nature kept both sides at bay.
Since the cold war has ended, the United States and Russia have
embarked upon cooperative ventures that are moving us away from the
confrontations of the past. We are working with them to dismantle their
weapons, to ensure the safe storage of nuclear weapons material, and to
implement such agreements as START I and, prospectively, START II. If,
as envisioned in this bill, the United States were to violate or
abrogate the ABM Treaty, the people on both sides rather than the
treaty structure itself would be victimized. Moreover, such action
could sabotage the current movement toward greater cooperation and
throw us back to an era of confrontation as it jeopardized prospects
for continued reductions in the START process and beyond.
Under the provisions of this bill, the Secretary of Defense is
directed to develop an affordable and operationally effective national
defense system with an initial operational capability by the end of
2003. If all goes well, that time is just about when the major
reduction of the American and former Soviet nuclear arsenals by two-
thirds is to have been completed.
I doubt that any Member can contemplate a situation in which the
United States would go at top speed toward deployment of a national
missile defense system and the Russian response would be passive
acceptance. They might well match our system. They might well deploy a
larger, more capable system. They might well bring to an end the
reductions that are so clearly in our own national interests. They
might well engage in other activities of a bellicose nature that we
would find hard to bear. And that would require reactions on our part.
It could well incite an action/reaction phase in our national defense
activities that would be ruinously expensive and that would, in the
end, increase the dangers to us rather than permitting the present
continuous reduction in the strategic nuclear threat.
To me it is important that we stop to think what it is we are doing
if we follow this path. In response to an uncertain threat, a threat
that has not yet materialized, and a threat that might well be handled
through diplomatic efforts, we would be preparing to obligate tens of
billions of dollars. We would do this in the mistaken belief that we
would somehow be better protected. Whereas the truth of the matter is
that, even if we were able to afford and to deploy an effective
national defense structure, our potential adversaries would still have
the option of sending nuclear weapons our way by air, by land, or by
sea. At some point in the future if some despot were to contemplate
attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon under the misbegotten
notion that he would teach us a lesson, it is hard to imagine that he
would be deterred if informed that we had a new national missile
defense.
Mr. President, this has been a rather difficult year in which many of
us have tried to come to grips with the fact that our national deficits
are alarming and must be curbed. We are required by the Constitution,
to ``establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'' If we lose sight of the
several objectives that must be met, we risk the very well-being of our
country. I remember well that a distinguished predecessor, Senator
Stuart Symington of Missouri, was fond of pointing out to the committee
that the key to a sound defense is a strong economy.
A key to a sound government is a demonstrated ability to keep various
activities in proper focus and proper order, so that the whole Nation,
not just the defense industry, would benefit.
It will not profit us if we sink further in educational quality, if
we deny more of our young people the opportunity of a good education at
the elementary and secondary levels and reduce the quality of our
institutions of higher education, if we increase the misery of those
who have no homes and who are hungry all in the interest of saving
money, only to turn around and waste it on unnecessary defenses. It
does not seem a wise idea to this Senator.
It is easy to say that one is for strong defenses. All of us are
pledged to support strong defenses and we will do so. But the United
States will stand first among nations because it continues to be strong
in all of its endeavors, keeps
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proper balances, and meets other standards of a great, modern nation.
Mr. President, the strategic arms competition between the United
States and the former Soviet Union has dwindled away. The ABM Treaty is
serving as a very stabilizing force in this promising environment.
Further reductions should be achievable.
It would be extremely foolish to place all of this in jeopardy. It
makes no sense to give the Russians cause to back away from their START
commitments or to engage in a dangerous strategic defensive arms race.
It makes no sense--when so many human needs are so obvious throughout
our Nation--to jeopardize what has been achieved in controlling and
reducing strategic arms and to spend billions for dubious purposes when
there are so many other desperate calls upon our resources.
Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for
his initiative. I am happy to be a cosponsor of his amendment. I hope
that the Senate will once again prove its wisdom with regard to the ABM
issue and vote overwhelmingly in favor of this amendment.
In conclusion, I am reminded of the question as to how we will be
remembered in history, as succeeding generations look back at us, just
as we often have looked back on ancient history from the floor of the
Senate. I hope that we can be like Athens and not like Sparta--meaning
put more emphasis on the civilian side of our economy, the economic
side and the education side, and less on the military side. I yield the
floor.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield such time as may be required by the
distinguished and able Republican leader.
Mr. DOLE. I thank the Chair.
I would like to commend the members of the Armed Services Committee
who, under the able leadership of the distinguished chairman, Senator
Thurmond, and the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], have
done a first rate job on the defense authorization bill. In particular,
I would like to congratulate the Armed Service Committee for the
forward-looking Missile Defense Act contained in this bill.
The Missile Defense Act is unique because it does not just authorize
appropriations for individual programs, it also provides a strategic
logic--principles, premises, and policies--thereby integrating these
programs into a coherent and comprehensive approach.
In my view, the approach adopted in this bill is very compelling on
four important points.
First, this legislation firmly establishes the critical imperative of
defending the United States of America from ballistic missiles.
Morally, rationally, and constitutionally this must be our top
priority.
Why is this important now? Very simply because the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is
dramatically increasing. I would like to commend the distinguished
junior Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] for highlighting this threat, as
well as the need to defend America against it, in his amendment.
The Missile Defense Act notes that weapons can be acquired by our
potential adversaries far more quickly than they can produce them
indigenously.
Mr. President, we cannot wait around for years until this threat is
literally on our doorstep. We must prepare now.
And so, I am very pleased with the national missile defense
architecture established in the Missile Defense Act. This architecture
includes ground-based interceptors, fixed ground-based radars and
space-based sensors. The bill establishes a deployment goal of 2003 and
provides an additional $300 million to support that goal. In my view,
that is a good start, but frankly for something as important as
defending our citizens, I would like to see an increase to ensure that
we will be able to meet the 2003 date.
Second, the Armed Services Committee's bill deals with the thorny ABM
Treaty questions through an intelligent two-step approach:
Step 1: It addresses what missile defenses are covered by the ABM
Treaty, namely by establishing the following standard: Those actually
tested against a ballistic missile with a range of over 3,500
kilometers and a reentry velocity of over 5 kilometers per second. This
is the standard proposed by both Presidents Bush and Clinton. The point
is that we should not drag theater systems into a treaty which was
never intended to cover them.
Step 2: Contrary to wild administration accusations, the bill
reviews where we go next with regard to the ABM Treaty. I think we
need to set straight what this bill does and does not do.
It does not set us on a collision course with the ABM Treaty by
mandating abrogation.
Indeed, it does not mandate any particular outcome.
It does recognize that an effective multiple site defense of the
United States is inconsistent with the treaty as things stand today.
The key here is that an effective defense requires multiple sites.
It does call for a year of careful consideration of these matters
before we decide how to proceed on the ABM Treaty. The bottom line is
that the bill recognizes what we all should be aware of--that mutual
assured destruction, the doctrine underlying the ABM Treaty is not a
suitable basis for stability in a multipolar world, nor for an
improving relationship with Russia. Our goal should be, as outlined in
this legislation, to seek a cooperative--and I stress cooperative--
transition to a more suitable regime to this post-cold-war era.
The third aspect of this bill that is noteworthy is
that it establishes a cruise missile defense initiative. In view of
the fact that potential adversaries now have access, in varying
degrees, to the technologies necessary to build effective cruise
missiles, this measure is on the mark and reflects considerable
foresight. It is my understanding that in addressing cruise missiles,
the committee has in no way detracted from the emphasis placed on
ballistic missiles which are a current and rapidly growing threat.
Finally, I would like to commend the establishment of a theater
missile defense core program. The rationale behind theater missile
defense is to deny a potential adversary the option of escalating by
attacking or just threatening to attack U.S. Forces, coalition
partners, or vital interests. The key elements of this core program are
three systems already being pursued by the Clinton administration--
namely Patriot-3, Navy lower tier, and THAAD--as well as one critical
addition: Navy upper tier. The committee has wisely added $170 million
to Navy upper tier.
Mr. President, just imagine trying to put together the Desert Storm
Coalition if Saddam Hussein could have credibly threatened London,
Rome, Istanbul, or Cairo with ballistic missiles. We cannot allow our
political and military flexibility to be hindered. Therefore, our
objective must be to prevent placing our forces, or those of our
allies, needlessly in harm's way--with systems such as THAAD and Navy
lower tier.
Furthermore, the United States must have the ability to project a
regional ballistic missile defense capability where and when we need
it. Navy upper tier give us that capability.
Mr. President, I would also like to note that the bill does save some
money by terminating the boost phase intercept program and adding a
lesser amount to explore fulfilling the same mission with an unmanned
air vehicle [UAV], in conjunction with Israel. Given Israel's expertise
in UAV's and its keen interest in a boost phase interceptor, this makes
sense to me.
In addition I would like
to emphasize that the programs and approach contained in the Missile
Defense Act should be viewed as an integral part of our counter-
proliferation strategy. If our adversaries know that their hard-gained
missiles will be of no use against America and its allies, they may
well be dissuaded from acquiring them in the first place.
Before I conclude, I would like to address the issue of how much all
of this costs. It costs $3.4 billion. This is a substantial price tag,
but does not represent even 2 percent of the total Department of
Defense budget. More importantly, however, in considering the costs
associated with missile defense, we need to keep in mind how the threat
to our Nation's security and to our interests has changed.
For two centuries, oceans protected us. Now technology gives even
relatively weak adversaries the hope of attacking or blackmailing the
United States. This bill takes concrete steps
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to protect us and sends the clear message that we will defend
our homeland with our superior technology. Moreover, America
has, and will continue to have, vital interests around the
globe which must be protected, as well.
Therefore, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject the measure
offered by the Senator from Michigan--or any other amendment which
would weaken or threaten the Missile Defense Act.
Just let me indicate, having visited briefly with the chairman, that
it is his hope, and it will happen, we will be here late tonight, and
hopefully during this next vote we can line up serious amendments. Last
night sort of fizzled out. Nothing very serious happened after 8:30. So
tonight we would hope to have amendments up until a late hour and then
conclude action on this measure tomorrow.
This is a very big amendment. It has taken a long time. It is now
5\1/2\ hours into this one amendment and I think that should be, with
30 minutes to go, that should be enough time on this amendment. But
this is a very substantial amendment. It is one of the more important
amendments. It certainly deserves a lot of consideration.
But, again, I would just say to my colleagues in the nicest way I
can, that a lot of people want to have an August recess and they would
like to have it start in August. We are trying to work that out, and
much will depend on the cooperation of our colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.
First I ask unanimous consent Senator Nunn be added as a cosponsor of
the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it has been said that this language in the
bill is not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. I just want to simply
read the language. It speaks for itself. The ABM Treaty says that the
parties undertake to deploy an ABM at no more than one site. The bill
says it is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple site
defense system.
It also has been said, quoting here Mr. Deutch, that we should be
willing to modify the ABM Treaty. And we surely should. Those
negotiations are taking place right now. I believe we should try to
modify the ABM Treaty. I would like to see a negotiated capability to
deploy defenses--a negotiated capability to deploy defenses. The
current Missile Defense Act provides that as something we should seek
to obtain through negotiations.
But what does the bill say about negotiations and modifying the
treaty? The bill says it is the sense of the Senate that the President
should cease all efforts to modify the United States' obligations under
the ABM Treaty. So, on the one hand, people are saying we should be
willing to modify--indeed we should. We should be willing to negotiate
to change it--indeed we should. And, on the other hand, there is a
sense of the Senate that the President should cease until the Senate is
done with its study, which will happen sometime next year. And then
there is a prohibition on the spending of funds. Which, the way I think
I read it, and any reasonable interpretation, is that the President may
not change the demarcation line that is set forth in this bill through
negotiations.
But the reading of this bill leaves, I think, only one conclusion,
and that is that the treaty says multiple sites are not allowed. The
bill says we will deploy--it is our policy to deploy multiple sites. I
cannot think of a clearer conflict, and it should not be fudged or
papered over, because I think it was the obvious intent of the sponsors
of that language.
I yield the floor. I also ask unanimous consent that Senators Daschle
and Kerry be added as cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 5 minutes to the able Senator from Alabama [Mr.
Heflin].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of providing a
system to protect the citizens of the United States from ballistic
missile attack.
There are two parts to the Levin amendment. The first provision
strikes the goal of the Missile Defense Act of 1995--a multiple site
deployment designed to protect the United States. The second provision
strikes the demarcation provision for theater defenses.
My concern is with the first provision of this amendment. I support
deployment. I fully believe the goal of the Missile Defense Act must be
to deploy defenses to protect the United States as soon as possible. As
I stated many times before, I strongly believe we should act within the
ABM Treaty and deploy a single site defense immediately. I also believe
it is important that the administration begin serious treaty
negotiations to allow the deployment of additional ABM sites. This
means that the long-range goal of our negotiations with the Russians
must be a multiple site, ground-based deployment.
A statement of a national policy to deploy a multiple site defense
system to protect the United States is far from violating the ABM
Treaty. Many of my colleagues have called this language different
things, such as a statement to plan to breach or an anticipatory breach
of the ABM Treaty.
By anticipatory breach I assume they mean that something like
``conspiracy to agree to commit a breach of the ABM Treaty.'' A breach
does not ripen until it actually occurs.
The treaty clearly defines what constitutes a breach. Deploying
multiple missile defense sites today would be a breach. Stating a goal
of deploying multiple sites would only be a breach if there is no legal
way to perform such a deployment within the confines of the treaty.
Fortunately, there are two legal ways. The first is a new protocol to
the treaty. This may be possible to negotiate. You do not know until
you try. Remember, the original treaty allowed two sites. It was a
subsequent agreement that limited us to just one site. A second option
is to actually withdraw from the treaty. It is our legal right to
withdraw with 60-days notice. In summary, Mr. President, while there
are legal methods to deploy multiple sites within the framework of the
ABM Treaty, there can be no anticipatory breach.
I further support replacing the stated goal in the committee version
of the bill with a new goal calling for the deployment of a treaty
compliance system coupled with immediate negotiation for additional
sites. This was a goal of the bipartisan Missile Defense Act of 1991.
Unfortunately, in striking out the goal of a multiple site deployment,
Senator Levin's amendment also strikes out the only statement that the
goal of the United States is to protect our people from a nuclear
missile attack. To me, this is unacceptable.
As for demarcation provisions, I share many of Senator Levin's
concerns. I believe we should leave the President the flexibility to
negotiate modifications to the treaty as required with the guarantee of
a Senate ratification to safeguard against unacceptable provisions.
I regret that the two distinct separate provisions are in the same
amendment.
Mr. President, unless there can be some compromise--and I hope that
there can be some compromise--on the goal of the Missile Defense Act I
will have to vote against the Levin amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, if anyone else has an amendment, we
would like for them to come forth now. We are ready to go forward with
this bill.
I would like for both sides to notify their Members on the hotline
that we are ready to vote on this bill.
In the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the quorum call
not be counted against the remaining time we have left in view of the
fact we only have about 4 or 5 minutes at the most left.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Nebraska has
about 5\1/2\ minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of the amendment to
eliminate numerous objectionable provisions on missile defense
contained in the pending authorization bill. There was no more
contentious issue in the Armed Services Committee markup of this bill
than the issue of missile defense. The committee was divided 11 to 10
on numerous unsuccessful votes to amend the missile defense language.
There is a good reason for the controversy surrounding this section of
the bill. No single issue is more deserving of amendment than this one.
The committee bill is nothing short of a power grab on the part of
the Senate Armed Services Committee. The slim majority that approved
the missile defense provisions in the bill is not satisfied with simply
making foreign policy; it wants to override the foreign policy position
of the President of the United States, our Commander-in-Chief and the
person in which the Constitution vests the power to make foreign
policy.
The committee bill in its present form moves to end our Nation's 23-
year participation in the ABM Treaty and move aggressively to deploying
multiple missile defense sites throughout the United States. More
specifically, it defines our national missile defense policy in terms
that not only abrogate our Nation's treaty obligations but also sets in
motion a disastrous course of events that will profoundly threaten our
national security. That is right, Mr. President, contrary to how it is
being advertised by the proponents, the national missile defense system
called for in this bill will harm, not enhance, our national security.
By voting our intention to break out of the ABM Treaty, we will be
feeding the paranoid rhetoric of the militaristic, conservative wing of
the Russian Duma looking to place Russia back in an adversarial
relationship with the United States. Members of this body must not
ignore the sobering consequences of breaking out of the ABM Treaty and
strengthening the hand of Russian extremists. Not only will withdrawing
from the ABM Treaty endanger our new alliance with Russia, it will
likely sink future ratification of the START II Treaty and further
implementation of the START I Treaty. The language in this bill is a
dagger pointed at the heart of a whole array of arms control
agreements, least of which is the ABM Treaty. It will imperil a whole
generation of arms control agreements which will in turn have far-
reaching consequences both domestically and internationally. It will
hasten the return to a time of bigger Defense budgets, an arms race in
space, larger nuclear arsenals and a general erosion of global
security.
To best describe what type of national missile defense system is
envisioned by this bill, I will read directly from section 233 of the
bill. It states:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy a multiple-
site national missile defense system that (a) is highly
effective against limited ballistic missile attacks on the
territory of the United States, and (b) will be augmented
over time to provide a layered defense against larger and
more sophisticated ballistic missile threats.
This is no different from the flawed star wars concept pushed by
President Reagan during the height of the cold war. In their rush to
revive this concept of a shield against a Soviet missile attack, the
committee majority is willing to trample the ABM Treaty along with
START I and START II, and the START agreements that were contemplated
to follow.
As a Nation, we have spent $35 billion in taxpayers' money on
ballistic missile defense since 1983. The costs of implementing the
type of system envisioned in the bill could easily reach or exceed that
amount. No one knows for sure. A CBO report in March of this year,
prepared at my request, estimates that a single site--not a multiple
site, but a single site--system could cost $29 billion to complete.
Additional sites necessary to provide the protective umbrella called
for in the bill would cost an additional $19 billion, for a grand total
of $48 billion. Is this the fiscal commitment we are ready to endorse?
I think not. By voting for the missile defense provisions in the bill,
that is exactly the road the Senate will be supporting--$48 billion for
a Star Wars system all over again.
By the way, it may not work as advertised. After already spending $35
billion, there is no high degree of confidence that we can
operationally deploy the technology capable of intercepting a large and
sophisticated strike against the United States by the year 2003. I call
it ridiculous. The technology is far from proven and like the Maginot
Line following World War I may be the wrong defense against the
emerging threat, easily circumvented by a terrorist nuclear attack
employing a delivery means other than a ballistic missile.
While the superpower threat has disappeared and the cold war is over,
there seems to be a wave of nostalgia sweeping over some in the Senate
to gain a renewed sense of mission and purpose by reconstituting the
threat facing the United States. The testimony provided to the Armed
Services Committee by both military and intelligence witnesses are in
agreement that an enemy ballistic missile threat against the United
States does not exist and will not emerge, if at all, well past the
2003 deployment mandate in the bill. I am struck by the irony that in
trying to defend against a nonexistent threat we would by our rash
actions be unwittingly fostering the very threat we profess to
originally be addressing. In other words, our actions would be a self-
fulfilling prophesy.
Mr. President, Senator Levin and others have already spoken to the
numerous flaws contained in this bill language. I simply ask each
Senator to read the language in the bill closely before voting on the
amendment. The words speak for themselves. The only proper action is to
support the Levin amendment and strike the objectionable sections of
this bill that have been outlined by many of us who have studied this
issue.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back any remaining time
assigned to me by Senator Levin.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from
Delaware.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Michigan.
I wish to thank the Senator from Nebraska, who, I might add, as a
member of this committee, has fought against what seems to be the most
perverse development in our military budget and planning in the last 4
years. The idea that now of all times in our history we need to
overturn what was a centerpiece of two successive Republican Presidents
seems to me to be a little bit bizarre. But, Mr. President, to state
the obvious, I rise in support of the amendment of the senior Senator
from Michigan, Senator Levin.
Mr. President, the so-called National Missile Defense Act of 1995 is
a hodgepodge of contradictory provisions that, if implemented, would
jeopardize our national security beyond anything that I have witnessed
since I have been in the U.S. Senate. The bill before us represents a
frontal assault on the ABM Treaty. I heard yesterday some sort of, how
can I phrase it, interesting questions posed by some of our Republican
friends--asking Senators, ``Are you for missile defense? Are you for
mutual assured destruction?'' I would point out that the reason why we
are where we are and we are dismantling missiles and we are diminishing
the prospect of nuclear confrontation by super or former superpowers is
because the policy of mutual assured destruction has worked pretty darn
well. But I will get back to that in a minute.
This bill represents a flat, frontal assault on the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. First, it would force us to violate the ABM Treaty by
mandating dangerous unilateral infractions of that treaty. Then, it
would jettison the
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entire treaty by requiring the development of a national missile
defense system by the year 2003. In a final strange and, I think,
unexplainable twist, it goes on to call for a select committee to
review a treaty that is effectively being declared null and void by the
very same bill.
Now, either the folks who wrote this into the bill do not understand
what our nuclear strategy has been thus far--and I know they do--or
this is incredibly poor draftsmanship or there is a perverse game being
played here.
The first two parts of what is before us--not the amendment, but
absent the amendment--by definition, destroy the ABM Treaty. Then the
third part is to set up a select committee to review the treaty that we
are legislatively destroying.
Now, I assume that may be because there is not enough work or enough
committee assignments for Senators. They want to have other committees
because maybe they get additional staff. I do not know. But, I mean,
why in the devil do you need the third part if you are doing away with
the first two parts? But at any rate, taken together, these provisions
would simply eviscerate the ABM Treaty, which has provided the basis
for our strategic arms reductions over the past 20 years.
The most likely immediate consequence of gutting the ABM Treaty would
be that the Russian Duma, their Congress, would refuse to approve the
START II Treaty, which is, quite frankly, a jewel in the crown of
President Bush's, and prior to that President Reagan's, foreign policy
initiatives. With START II unratified, the hopes for further strategic
arms reduction would be dashed--which, I might add, I think is the real
purpose of this initiative by the majority. They did not like START II
to begin with. They did not like START I. They do not like the idea of
our having to talk about further reductions in the amount of nuclear
warheads that exist in the world.
But make no mistake about it that if we pass this, why if you were
sitting in the Russian Duma, why if you were a Russian or anyone else
for that matter, would you conclude that it is a good idea to follow
through with the destruction of your existing nuclear arsenal? Why
would you do that? I think I understand. I think that is the underlying
purpose of the legislation before us.
This singular achievement of the Bush administration, the START II
Treaty, is the basis upon which we moved to even further reductions--
and, along with it, the significant enhancement of the security of
Americans that we all hoped would be the byproduct of winning the cold
war. Now, I do not know what you all are going to tell your kids. I do
not know what you are going to tell your family and friends after you
tell them how we won the cold war, but there is a greater need for
nuclear weapons.
Now they say, well, this is not about nuclear weapons; this is about
the ability to prevent our being attacked by nuclear weapons. I will
not go into all the science which Senator Nunn and others have talked
about here, but the one thing for certain about how you deal with an
ABM system is you overwhelm it. You build more offensive systems. It is
a lot easier and a lot cheaper to build offensive systems than it is to
build defensive systems. As an old bumper sticker from my generation
used to say, ``One nuclear bomb that gets through could ruin your
day.'' One hydrogen bomb dropping on Manhattan can ruin your day. So
all you have to do, without even having the technology, is overwhelm
the system. And it is cheaper to do that.
Now, I know what my friends are thinking. They say, ``Boy, we have
got the Russians in a great spot. They are broke. Let's take advantage
here. They are not going to be able to do this.''
Well, at a minimum, folks, I do not know why they are going to go
ahead and destroy what they have, if, in fact, we are going to adopt
this policy. The most likely immediate consequence of cutting the ABM
Treaty, as I said, will be the elimination of the START regime.
Mr. President, what troubles me most about the provisions on the ABM
Treaty is their reckless unilateralism. Article VI-A of the ABM Treaty
contains two provisions that have been in place for years. First, it
bans both parties from giving ABM systems the capacity to counter
strategic ballistic missiles; and, second, it bans testing of such
systems in an ABM mode.
The bill before us would effectively collapse these two provisions
into one by asserting than an ABM system is actually not an ABM system,
unless it has been field tested as a system. In other words, it must
have a demonstrated capacity--a demonstrated capacity--of being an ABM
system.
Now, there is a reason why when we did the ABM Treaty we insisted
that you violate the treaty first, if you demonstrate a capacity to set
up a system, or second, if such a system could be deployed in such a
capacity even if it has not been tested.
Now, it might be useful at this juncture to cite the case of
Krasnoyarsk radar, which we debated for months and months on the floor
of the Senate not too many years ago. Some of the same people here were
on the floor then pointing out how the Russians were violating the ABM
Treaty and we could not do business with them and could not trust them.
Now some of the same people are here saying we should do what we told
the Russians they could not do.
A gentleman who is gone, a very bright fellow whom we all respected,
from Wyoming, Senator Wallop, was on the floor day in and day out
warning us about the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviet Union built this
giant radar in Siberia in the 1980's. Although the radar was never
turned on, that is, its capacities were never demonstrated as would be
required now, we argued that it had the inherent capability of an ABM
system and constituted a violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets
asserted that since the system had never been tested, it was permitted
under the ABM Treaty.
Eventually, through the good offices of my conservative friends and
some of us who joined them, the Russians tore down the radar. If, in
fact, the Armed Services Committee provisions that are contained in the
bill prevail, absent being amended by the Senator from Michigan, they
would be able to keep the radar.
It would not be a violation of the ABM Treaty. I wonder how many of
my friends over there would be saying, ``You know, no problem, we
understand. We think there should only be one test.''
I wonder what my friend Senator Thurmond would be saying then. I
wonder what my friends over on the right would be saying. They would be
apoplectic, because although it had not been turned on and
demonstrated, it clearly had the inherent capability and, therefore,
was in violation of the ABM Treaty.
I would like to point out to my colleagues that there is no legal
basis for a unilateral amendment to the ABM Treaty. It seems like I
have been fighting this, along with Senator Nunn, Senator Levin, and
others, for the last decade. The Reagan administration tried a frontal
attack on this in the early eighties saying, ``We are going to
reinterpret the ABM Treaty.'' If you do not like what it says,
reinterpret it. Well, we won that fight, and little did I think we
would be back here having this fight.
It would be better to come out here and just declare the treaty null
and void and have a Senate vote saying it contravenes our national
interest to be part of the ABM Treaty any longer. At least we would be
honest with the people here. At least we would be telling the truth.
But this is a charade.
I point out to my colleagues, again, that there is no legal basis for
the unilateral amendment of the ABM Treaty, or any other treaty, for
that matter. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties serves as a
source of customary international law and provides guidance in this
matter. According to its provision, a treaty is to be interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms.
The two prongs of section 6(A) of the ABM Treaty are clear: One is
aimed at constraining demonstrated capabilities, and the other is aimed
at constraining inherent capabilities. In other words, this provision
was intended to prevent testing against strategic missiles and
development of systems that have the ability to counter such missiles.
To say that only the testing, or demonstrated capacity, standard is
relevant would represent a clear departure from the obligation set
forth in the treaty.
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A second area in which the provisions of this bill would mandate
unilateral action with regard to the ABM Treaty is defining the
demarcation line between strategic and theater missiles. The bill
before us would arbitrarily set that mark at a peak reentry velocity of
5 kilometers per second and an effective range of 3,500 kilometers. The
so-called 5/3,500 threshold may, in fact, be a legitimate demarcation
line.
Guess what? The treaty says you negotiate those things. You negotiate
them. That is what the existing treaty demands.
Mr. President, these amendments to the ABM Treaty affirm that we will
define unilaterally the line between a strategic missile system and a
theater missile; and we will declare unilaterally our ballistic missile
defenses are in compliance with the ABM Treaty. Forget the fact that
the very issues are now being negotiated with the Russians. We are
going to do what we want.
As my young 14-year-old daughter's friends often say, ``Why don't we
get real here?'' Let us just declare the treaty null and void and stop
this. At least that would have the integrity of allowing others to
trust making a treaty with us again. At least it is straightforward,
and almost every treaty including the ABM Treaty says if this is not in
our national interest, the President can declare it so and we are out.
So let us not wreck the ABM Treaty. Do not wreck this President's or
future Presidents' ability to negotiate treaties of consequence with
people when we can come along and just redefine them midstream, when we
either think the other party is extremely vulnerable or we want to do
something that the treaty does not suggest.
I want to ask the rhetorical question: If we did not need an
antiballistic missile system when the Soviet Union had over 12,000
nuclear warheads all aimed at the United States or things of vital
interest to us, why in the devil do we need it so badly now?
As Senator Nunn explained, such a system is not the thing that is
going to prevent a Qadhafi or some Third World screwball from
detonating a nuclear weapon in the United States. They will bring it in
by ship, smuggle it in, reassemble it in the basement of the World
Trade Tower, and blow us up. They are not going to wait until they have
an intercontinental ballistic capability to do it.
This is nuts, with all due respect. If there is any lingering doubt
about whether the provisions I have referenced are meant to scuttle the
ABM Treaty, I hope we disabuse ourselves of that.
The ABM Treaty is based on a very simple, yet powerful premise that
has been tested and proven to be valid--and that is that the
development of defenses against strategic ballistic missiles is
inherently destabilizing. Were the Russians to develop a shield against
strategic ballistic missiles, what would be our reaction? We would do
the same thing they are likely to do if this provision becomes law--
that is, maintain the means to overwhelm those defenses.
Or would we say, ``You know, it's good for everybody, that they are
now impervious to attack as long as we keep our missiles at the same
number. We do not have that capability, but we are going to trust them;
we have no problem.'' We know we would rush to do that.
Or would we sit here and say, ``My Lord, the only thing we know for
sure we can do, and do it more cheaply, is build more intercontinental
ballistic missiles and theater ballistic missiles, for that matter, so
that no matter how many of these brilliant pebbles or whatever else is
in the sky, we can just send enough in so that a few will get
through.''
But we are going to expect the Russians to say, ``Don't worry, we
know those good old Americans would never, ever do anything like this
to us; therefore, we don't have to worry. We'll continue to dismantle
our missiles, and we won't attempt to do the same thing and all will be
well.''
One of the first assignments I was sent on abroad was in 1978 on the
so-called SALT Treaty. I was asked to take a group of new Members of
the Senate to meet with Mr. Brezhnev, then the leader of the Soviet
Union. We sat down and negotiated what were referred to as conditions,
Senate understandings that we had attached to the SALT Treaty.
In the middle of the conversation, as I was pointing out how we would
never do anything bad, Brezhnev looked at me and said through an
interpreter: Let me make sure I understand this.
He said, ``I would like to remind you that as bad as you think we
are, we never dropped a nuclear bomb on anybody. As bad as you think we
are, you are not as good as you think you are. You expect us to say we
know you would never attack us with nuclear weapons when, in fact''--I
am not judging whether it was right or wrong--``you have already
demonstrated when your national interests are at stake, you will use
atomic weapons.'' That is kind of a compelling point.
If we are going to take such a brazen step as trashing a treaty that
has helped to lessen the prospect of nuclear Armageddon for over two
decades, you would think that there is a good reason behind it. Well,
there is none that I can discern.
Instead, we are asked to accept the dubious justifications contained
in a couple of paragraphs of this year's Defense authorization bill.
One justification is that mutual assured destruction and its
corollary--deterrence--is no longer relevant after the cold war. That
is right, folks, traditional deterrence is dead because the bill before
us has declared it passe.
Mr. President, you cannot delegislate deterrence. That concept is
grounded in the fundamental interaction among States.
In a continued elaboration of flawed logic, the bill goes on to
assert that with traditional deterrence dead, both the United States
and Russia will be encouraged to reduce their offensive strategic
arsenals.
This bizarre line of reasoning reveals a failure to grasp the
fundamental counter-intuitive interaction between offense and defense
that gave rise to the ABM Treaty in the first place.
As long as we have a potentially adversarial relationship with
Russia--in other words, as long as we are not dealing with a Canada, or
a France, or a Britain--our sense of security will depend on the
confidence we have in our retaliatory capability.
Anything that undermines confidence in retaliatory capability--which
is what strategic missile defenses do--will increase the reluctance of
one side or the other to reduce offensive strategic forces.
One implicit aspect of the bill's analysis is correct--the Russians
do not have the economic means to develop an ABM system on a par with
what we are capable of developing with the expenditure of a large
portion of our treasure. But they do have a stockpile of surplus
warheads which they could deploy to respond to our national missile
defense system.
With our planned deployment of a national missile defense system, the
Russians, now feeling less certain of their retaliatory capability,
will opt for the next best alternative--they will ignore their
remaining commitments under Start I and they will refuse to ratify
Start II.
It will not end there--they are likely to begin expanding their
strategic forces to overcome missile defenses. We will respond by
expanding our forces and by developing even more robust missile
defenses, and so on. In short, we will restart the spiral of escalating
nuclear deployments that marked the worst days of East-West
confrontation.
What a cruel irony that would be--after the cold war, when we could
have achieved significant reductions in strategic arms--we will instead
have created the kind of bankrupting, paranoia-driven arms race that
the ABM Treaty sought to prevent, and, indeed, did prevent during the
cold war.
Another justification for scuttling the treaty could be called the
Barbarians are at the gates argument. According to this line of
reasoning, there are numerous rogue States on the verge of acquiring
advanced tactical and strategic ballistic missiles. And we urgently
need to develop the means to counter this imminent threat to our
national security.
This is a crucial matter, and one which deserves more careful
analysis than has been employed to date. I know about the estimates
that say that some countries are only a decade away from having long
range ballistic missile delivery capability. But I question the
validity of those analyses.
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Many other reputable studies by experts in the field indicate that
the nations causing the greatest worry to the Defense Department will
not acquire long range delivery systems for the next 20 to 30 years, if
ever. Even Defense Department data reveal that 97 percent of the Third
World missile threat comes from theater ballistic missiles with a range
of 1,000 kilometers or less.
The delivery system of choice of rogue states targeting the United
States with weapons of mass destruction will not be ballistic missiles.
There are plenty of ways to circumvent defenses without even using
missiles. These are the threats on which we should focus our ever-
scarcer resources, not on the alarmist scenarios that are being touted
by the proponents of national missile defense.
If a national missile defense can be rendered ineffective by an
overwhelming Russian attack, and if such a system is many times more
capable than what is required to contend with the Third World theater
ballistic missile threat, then we are left to ask a basic question--
what are we spending tens of billions of dollars to defend ourselves
from?
I think that the only logical conclusion is one that is not
explicitly stated, but begins to emerge if you read carefully between
the lines. The real reason for going on a crash program to develop a
national missile defense system is that there are some who don't care
that the ABM Treaty will be jettisoned because, in their view, arms
reduction per se is not in our national security interest.
If our deployment of a national missile defense causes the Russians
to abandon START II, that fits right in with their strategy. Such a
move by the Russians will provide the excuse they need to argue for
maintaining and perhaps even expanding a large United States strategic
arsenal.
I realize that there are others who might vote for a national missile
defense system because, upon first glance, it seems to be a way to
render strategic ballistic missiles obsolete. I know that not everyone
who supports a missile defense wants an arms buildup. Some may honestly
believe that a national missile defense is a path to future arms
reduction.
But I would hope that those who do want arms reduction will realize
the essential paradox of defense and offense where strategic ballistic
missiles are concerned. The more you try to defend, the more the other
side will buildup. This has been borne out by experience. In this
manner, a well-meaning attempt to reduce the effectiveness of strategic
weapons by building a robust defense could have the perverse impact of
leading to a new and costly arms race.
In closing, I would just like to remind my colleagues who remain
skeptical about the usefulness of the ABM Treaty, that the START
treaties--in which both sides have agreed to cut their strategic
arsenals by a total of two-thirds--were concluded without the United
States having deployed a single strategic defensive system.
The ABM Treaty has served the purpose of arms reduction remarkably
well. We should seek to build upon its successes, not scuttle it for an
ill-defined and perilous course.
Finally, let me say that if Senators are going to stand on the floor
and say they are going to vote against the Levin amendment but they
support START I and START II, then I respectfully suggest that they go
read this legislation. I do not know how you can say that.
If a Senator is going to say, ``I support the ABM Treaty but I am
against the Levin amendment,'' I suggest he or she go read the
legislation before us. If a Senator comes to the floor and says, ``By
the way, I not only do not like the doctrine of mutual assured
destruction, I do not support START I, START II, or the ABM Treaty,''
then I say vote against this amendment, because then you will be
intellectually honest. It is a legitimate position to take. But let us
not kid the American people and the world and say we support reducing
the number of nuclear weapons, we support START I, we support START II,
we are even for a START III, which we are contemplating, and we are for
the ABM Treaty but, by the way, we are going to vote for this
legislation. You cannot do both and be intellectually honest about it.
So, as they say, pick a team, pick a side, pick a position, but do
not pretend you are on both sides because you cannot be against Levin
and for the ABM Treaty. You cannot be against Levin and for the START
II agreement. You cannot be against Levin and for further reduction in
the nuclear arsenals of the major powers in the world.
I thank my colleague from Michigan, and I yield the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Levin-
Exon-Bingaman-Glenn amendment, to the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996, to strike provisions of the bill which would
directly lead to our violation of the ABM treaty. This treaty is vital
to American national security.
The Missile Defense Act would lead to violations of the ABM Treaty in
two crucial ways.
First, it would establish a deployment plan for a national missile
defense. If a national ballistic missile defense were deployed, it
would blatantly violate the treaty.
Second, before any national missile defense system can be deployed,
it must be tested. Fully testing this type of system would violate the
ABM Treaty.
The ABM Treaty is the diplomatic foundation of our intercontinental
ballistic missile reduction strategy. It was possible to negotiate and
ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START, which is currently
being implemented, and negotiate START II, which awaits ratification by
this Senate and the Russian Duma because of the strategic groundwork
laid in the ABM Treaty. Abandoning or violating the ABM Treaty would
threaten the strategic ballistic missile reductions under these two
treaties which, when implemented, would verifiably eliminate the
intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying two-thirds of Russia's
nuclear warheads.
Further, abandoning our treaty obligations jeopardizes our future
relationship with Russia. The Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations
have worked hard to not only strengthen the strategic relationship
between our nations, but economic, cultural, and diplomatic
relationships as well. We have achieved measurable strategic reductions
because of the foundation of trust the ABM Treaty provides. To
jeopardize this trust, especially while START II waits precariously for
ratification, is simply unwise. If the ABM Treaty is abandoned, the
casualty may very well be the future of nuclear arms reductions with
Russia.
While it is true that the ABM Treaty was ratified at the height of
the cold war and that its outlook is bipolar in nature, the fact
remains that the greatest ballistic missile threat to the United States
is still located in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union.
The ABM Treaty gives a sense of security to the Russian government
which allows them to move forward toward reducing their stockpiles of
nuclear weapons under both START and START II.
Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Shalikashvili, has felt it necessary to declare that United States
abandonment of the ABM Treaty could harm both the prospects for START
II ratification by the Duma and our broader security relationship with
Russia. In addition, abandonment of the treaty could threaten the
continued dismantlement of nuclear weapons under START. Again, if we
abandon our commitments under the ABM Treaty, we stand to lose the
verified elimination of thousands of nuclear missiles currently aimed
at the U.S. Our national security priority should be to greatly reduce
this ICBM threat.
My support of the ABM Treaty does not negate my willingness to see a
national ballistic missile defense system studied. We should continue
our research and development programs for a national ballistic missile
defense system and should always look toward our future defense needs.
Turning to the issue of theater missile defense, I also believe
deeply that we must develop and deploy this type of system which does
not violate the ABM Treaty. Development and deployment of this type of
system is technologically feasible and is permissible under the ABM
Treaty. Most of the
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theater ballistic missile defense systems currently in development and
being tested are ABM Treaty compliant. In fact, the joint summit
statement from the May Clinton/Yeltsin Summit delineates a set of
principles that provides that both sides can deploy effective theater
ballistic missile defense systems within the framework of the ABM
Treaty.
Because theater ballistic missile defense is entirely possible under
the ABM Treaty, is it not the better path to both maintain the ABM
Treaty thus protecting the elimination of thousands of intercontinental
ballistic missiles under START and START II and to develop and deploy a
theater ballistic missile defense system that could both protect future
theater ballistic missile threats to American shores and current
theater ballistic missile threats to American and Allied troops
overseas?
Let us continue our research and development programs for a national
ballistic missile defense, let us continue to develop and work to
deploy a theater ballistic missile defense, but let us oppose
abandoning the ABM Treaty and thus lose our opportunity to eliminate
thousands of Russia's intercontinental ballistic missiles.
It is in our national security interest to continue to support the
ABM Treaty until the great threat of Russian ICBMs aimed at the United
States is substantially reduced under START and START II. Until this
important process is completed, let us work to deploy a theater missile
defense system and continue our research towards the development of
national ballistic missile defense system.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, today, I received a letter from the
Honorable Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State. I will take a few
seconds to read a short paragraph:
I commend the Committee's decision to set a course for
deployment of a National Missile Defense system to protect
all Americans. Development of such a system is long overdue.
I believe that such a deployment will actually enhance
deterrence. . . The ABM Treaty is unable to help the United
States deal with one of the most significant post-Cold War
security threats: the proliferation of long-range ballistic
missiles. In fact, the ABM Treaty now stands in the way of
our ability to respond in an effective manner.
I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
record, as follows:
August 3, 1995.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Thurmond: I am writing to congratulate you on
your recent markup of the Defense Authorization Bill,
especially the provisions in the bill dealing with ballistic
missile defense and the ABM Treaty. With the bill soon to be
debated on the Senate floor, I wanted to present my views on
a number of related issues.
The time has clearly come for the United States to consider
either amending the ABM Treaty or finding some other basis
for regulating U.S.-Russian strategic relations. The ABM
Treaty was born of a different era, characterized by a
different set of strategic and political circumstances. As I
said in my testimony before your committee earlier this year,
when things have changed so much, we must not fear changes in
our Cold War treaty arrangements if such changes are in our
best interest.
I commend the Committee's decision to set a course for
deployment of a National Missile Defense system to protect
all Americans. Development of such a system is long overdue.
I believe that such a deployment will actually enhance
deterrence and provide the basis for deeper offensive
reductions. Our experience with the ABM Treaty has shown that
a lack of defense neither promotes offensive reductions nor
otherwise enhances stability. More important, the ABM Treaty
is unable to help the United States deal with one of the most
significant post-Cold War security threats: the proliferation
of long-range ballistic missiles. In fact the ABM Treaty now
stands in the way of our ability to respond in an effective
manner.
I am also pleased to see that the Committee has passed the
legislation introduced by Senator Warner, which establishes a
clear demarcation between permitted Theater Missile Defense
systems, and strategic defenses limited by the ABM Treaty. It
is essential that the ABM Treaty not be extended to cover
systems that were never intended to be limited, such as
Theater Missile Defense systems. Such systems are too
important to be held hostage to arbitrary and unnecessary
negotiations. I find it hard to believe that the Clinton
Administration objects to having its own demarcation standard
codified into law. Such a move seems entirely appropriate and
consistent with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
I believe that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 is an
important step in the right direction. It is a measured and
well-focused response to a dramatic threat to United States
national interests.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, is the leader ready to proceed?
Mr. DASCHLE. Yes.
Mr. LOTT. I will withhold. I understand the Senator from Texas may
have some remarks, if the Senator would like to wait, or would he like
to proceed?
Mr. DASCHLE. I am prepared to speak, but if the Senator has been on
the floor, I am happy to defer to her.
Mr. THURMOND. How much time does the Senator from Texas want?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Two or three minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I think there is a fundamental issue
here, and that is, as the world changes, is the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. Congress going to continue to meet the challenges of the new world
that we face today?
The world has changed since the ABM Treaty. No longer are we a
bipolar world. We now know--and it has been published often in
newspapers--that there are numerous countries that have nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. Do they have the ability to attack
the United States with these weapons? We believe that some might.
So the question is: Are we going to unilaterally disarm our ability
to defend our shores from a potential attack? That is the issue. We
cannot, in any way, limit our capability to meet the challenges of the
post cold war, multipolar world that we are living in today.
So I hope that we will not do anything that will lessen our ability
to defend our shores. We must have a theater ballistic missile defense.
We must continue to go forward to make sure we have the technology to
defend ourselves against any incoming missiles, or to defend our armed
services in any theater in which they may be fighting. That is the core
issue today.
So I hope that our colleagues understand the significance of this
argument. This is not, in any way, partisan; it ought not be in any way
a matter for discussion, really; it is a matter of priorities and what
our leadership role is. I hope that we will put aside partisan views on
this issue and look at our responsibility to defend our shores and our
future generations.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the
Democratic leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.
Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Michigan for the time.
Mr. President, I want to also thank him for offering this amendment,
and I commend Senators Exon, Bingaman and Glenn for cosponsoring it. I
believe that the vote on this amendment may be one of the most critical
votes that we cast this year. There are many provisions in this bill
that I, along with many of the people on this side of the aisle--and I
suspect beyond the beltway--strongly oppose. However, perhaps the most
objectionable provisions in this bill--and potentially the most
damaging to the long-term security interests of the United States--are
those calling for the United States to deploy multiple-site national
missile defenses by the year 2003.
As Senator Levin and others have already pointed out, committing this
country to deploying a multisite national missile defense system at
this time would have very damaging consequences for our national
security. The Levin amendment would retain the strategic policies that
have kept this country safe now for a half century.
I strongly support the Levin amendment for several reasons.
First, I am concerned that any effort by the United States to deploy
theater missile defenses could jeopardize several important treaties
negotiated under both the Clinton and Bush administrations. For
instance, the provisions could hold up implementation of
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the START Treaty; imperil Russian ratification of the START II Treaty,
which requires Russia and the United States, as everyone here knows, to
reduce their long-range nuclear weapons from 8,500 to 3,500; and
possibly impact the conventional forces in Europe Treaty, which calls
for the reduction of heavy weapons, such as tanks and combat aircraft
throughout NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.
Second, I am concerned that deployment of national missile defenses
in the United States could undermine U.S. nonproliferation efforts. For
instance, China could withhold support for the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty if the United States violates or renegotiates the ABM Treaty.
Needless to say, Chinese resistance to the CTB could induce other
regional powers to follow suit, thus eroding support for the
Nonproliferation Treaty. Moreover, deployment of theater missile
defenses would make other nuclear countries, like China, Britain, and
France, less willing to enter into future nuclear reduction treaties.
Third, as has been pointed out several times during this debate,
nothing in the treaty precludes the Department of Defense and the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office from conducting the program as
currently planned for at least the next year or two. Let me repeat
that. The ABM Treaty will not constrain our ballistic missile defense
efforts for at least the next year or two.
Therefore, we have ample time to weigh the threats this Nation faces
and debate the appropriate response. We need not march off
precipitously on a path that leads us to unilateral abrogation of one
treaty, and the probable breaking of several others.
Mr. President, let me make it clear, I am not saying that we should
never consider making changes to the ABM Treaty or any other treaty.
Circumstances change and security requirements must be modified
accordingly.
Even the Constitution, the greatest document drafted by this country,
has been modified 26 times. What I am saying is that this is neither
the time nor the manner to modify the treaty.
For all these reasons, I strongly support the Levin amendment and
urge my colleagues to do the same.
I yield such time as I have remaining to the author of the amendment,
the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire about the remaining time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and eighteen seconds for the
Senator from South Carolina, and 6 minutes for the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. LOTT. Due to the fact that we only have 1 minute and 18 seconds,
we will reserve our time to see if the Senator from Michigan would like
to use the balance of his 6 minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I understand the Chair is saying there is 6 minutes
remaining. I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. President, the language in the bill which this amendment would
correct does three things.
First, the language sets forth a head-on clash with the ABM Treaty.
Words have clear meaning by the way they have consequences, too, which
we will get to in a moment.
Section 233 says it is the policy of the United States to deploy
multiple site national defense missiles. The ABM Treaty prohibits such
defenses. You cannot get much clearer than that without a formal
abrogation document. What this bill says is the policy to do it is not
allowed by the ABM Treaty.
In addition, section 235 of the bill says that to implement the
policy established in that earlier section, the Secretary of Defense
shall develop an affordable and operationally effective national
missile defense system, which will attain initial operational
capability by a specified year.
``Shall'' and ``will;'' these are very clear and very strong words.
Second, the bill says that the line between short-range and long-
range missile defenses is a specific line. We are doing it by U.S. law.
Now, it is the same demarcation which is being negotiated between
Russia and us. What we are doing is usurping the negotiations and
transferring them from wherever they are being negotiated to the floor
of the U.S. Senate. If the Duma did that, we would not stand for it for
one moment--any of us--I hope. So there is a unilateral interpretation
of the ABM Treaty in this bill which would be stricken by this
amendment.
Third, the bill says it is a sense of the Senate that the President
shall not negotiate--these are the words--sense of the Senate the
President should cease all efforts to clarify U.S. obligations under
the ABM Treaty.
We have heard a lot about the need to modify. By the way, I think
most would agree that the ABM Treaty should be modified. At least many
of us, including myself.
Here it is said in section 237, that it is the sense of the Senate
that the President should cease all efforts to modify, clarify, U.S.
obligation. Both words are used--modify and clarify.
On the floor, we hear a lot about we ought to try to modify this
treaty, and we should. Section 237 says the President shall cease all
efforts to modify or clarify our obligations under the treaty. That
section would also be stricken.
Mr. President, this language in this bill which the amendment would
strike will dash the hopes of our generation for a new relationship
with Russia, following the end of the cold war. That is what Secretary
Perry tells us. That is what General Shalikashvili tell us.
This is why Secretary Perry has written us the following:
Certain provisions [in this bill] related to the ABM Treaty
would be very damaging to U.S. security interests. By
mandating actions that would lead us to violate or disregard
U.S. treaty obligations--such as establishing a deployment
date of a multiple-site NMD system--the bill would jeopardize
Russian implementation of the START I and START II Treaties,
which involve the elimination of many thousands of strategic
nuclear weapons.
We cannot get much more serious than this. It has never been more
important to read words in a bill than it is now because what our
Secretary of Defense is telling us; that the elimination of offensive
weapons aimed at us is jeopardized if we unilaterally move to trash the
ABM Treaty or interpret the ABM Treaty the way this bill does.
That is why this debate is worth 5 hours--indeed, maybe 5 days. That
is the seriousness of the language that is in this bill.
Then the Secretary of Defense goes on to say that, ``The bill's
unwarranted imposition through funding restrictions, of a unilateral .
. . demarcation interpretation would similarly jeopardize these
reductions . . .''
Now, we have a treaty. Treaties should mean things. They should have
significance. When the Russians violated it, we tried to hold them
accountable. So, I believe, the Duma will point to our action in saying
that this gives them an excuse to, instead of reducing nuclear weapons,
to stop those reductions, to keep the numbers where they are, and,
indeed, increase them, in order to now deal with these new defenses
which this bill commits us to build.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LOTT. We do have at least one more speaker. Could I ask unanimous
consent we have 10 additional minutes, 5 on each side?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, does that then supersede whatever time we
have left?
Mr. LOTT. It would begin now, when all existing time expires, which
is within about 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President. We have talked about this now
for 3\1/2\ hours, and we have got a little bit longer to go.
I think it has been said every argument has been made on both sides
by this time. When the Senator from Texas stood up and talked about
this being a different world, I have to emphasize that this is a
different world than it was back in 1972.
In 1972, we had two superpowers. We had the USSR and the United
States, and we had a treaty that took place back then that was
controversial at that time, the ABM Treaty between two parties. One of
those parties does not even exist anymore. The world is totally
different. The threat is not there from the Soviet Union because the
Soviet Union is not there anymore.
If we stop and look at the comparison that we have today, we are
living under
[[Page S 11280]]
a treaty that says that we can defend ourselves overseas, we can defend
ourselves in a theater missile environment, but we cannot defend our
own country.
Now, I think we have to look at it and say, is the environment we are
in today a more dangerous environment than it was in 1972? I think
there is some argument, very persuasive argument, that there is. We
have heard quoted several times on this floor a statement by Jim
Woolsey, who is the Security Adviser to President Clinton, said that we
know of between 20 and 25 nations that have developed or are developing
weapons of mass destruction--either nuclear, chemical, or biological--
and they are working on the missile method to deliver those weapons of
mass destruction.
I think that a case can be made that the environment we are in today
is far more serious, far more dangerous, to our Nation's security than
it was when we could identify who the enemy was.
At that time, of course, the enemy was the U.S.S.R.
I will share with you a conversation I had with Dr. Henry Kissinger.
We all know he was the architect, back in 1972, of this controversial
antiballistic missile treaty. He said at that time he felt it was the
right thing to do.
At that time the mutual destruction mentality that we had seemed to
make sense. ``We only have two countries in the world who are capable
of developing and delivering any form of destruction of that nature, so
let us just both make ourselves so we are vulnerable to the other
one.'' Maybe it made sense then. I am not sure that it did.
But the other day, in a private conversation with me--and he said it
is fine to quote him--he said: For us to be living under that treaty
today is insane. And he said, and this is a direct quote, ``It's nuts
to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.''
I do not know whether that is in the letter that the distinguished
Senator from South Carolina submitted for the Record. I suggest words
to that effect are there, but it is a lengthy, two-page letter. In that
letter he describes it.
This is the person who was the architect of the ABM Treaty. So all I
am saying, Mr. President, is today it is a different world. Today it is
a world not with two superpowers but with a superpower, the United
States--if we want to call ourselves that--and many other semi-
superpowers or quasi-superpowers, any of which, if they have the
technology, can deliver weapons of mass destruction to the United
States.
I agree with Henry Kissinger; it is nuts to make a virtue out of our
vulnerability, which is exactly what we have been doing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to Senator Dorgan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by
the Senator from Michigan. I think this is awfully important. I know it
has taken an awful lot of time on the Senate floor today, but I think
it is worth the amount of time it has taken. This is an enormously
important amendment. This amendment strikes the language in the bill
that is brought to the floor by the Armed Services Committee that will
abrogate the ABM Treaty. In my judgment, it is reckless to do what is
done in this bill in a manner that will abrogate that treaty.
We had a long debate this morning on the subject of funding, $300
million added to the bill for a national missile defense system. That
amendment that I brought to the floor to strip the $300 million out
lost by a vote of 51 to 48. I hope we will revisit that issue in an
appropriate way and we will achieve a different result. That was
important.
But this is even more important. I hope the Senate, on this
amendment, will understand the dimensions of this amendment offered by
the Senator from Michigan. The ABM Treaty is the foundation of the arms
agreements which we have reached with the Soviet Union and Russia and
others. I think it is critically important that we agree to this
amendment this afternoon and strike the language in the bill brought to
the floor, that I think jeopardizes, literally jeopardizes, our
security by weakening the arms control agreements that are now in
place.
I congratulate the Senator from Michigan for a long, hard fight. I
hope when the votes are counted we will find, in this circumstance, he
prevails--he prevails for the good of this country and for the future
of our children.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, could I inquire on the remainder of time on
both sides of the aisle?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 minute and 33 seconds left on the
majority side and 3 minutes and 50 seconds left on Senator Levin's
side.
Mr. LOTT. I reserve the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the cold war is over. But there are some
remnants that remain, including about 8,000 nuclear warheads on Russian
soil. Those warheads are being dismantled. They are being dismantled as
part of the START I agreement and START II agreement. The dismantling
of those warheads is critical to our security.
The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs says that the continuing
dismantlement of Russian warheads that threaten us is jeopardized if we
undermine the ABM Treaty. Because instead of dismantling warheads, the
Russians will now be faced with the threat of defenses, which means
they would be tending to increase the warheads in order to overcome
those defenses.
So there are a number of treaties which are at issue. There is the
ABM Treaty, but there is also a START I Treaty and a START II Treaty.
When General Shalikashvili tells us, as he has in writing, that we
must assume that unilateral United States legislation could harm
prospects for START II ratification by the Duma, and probably impact
our broader security relationship with Russia as well, we should
listen.
And when the Secretary of Defense says that the study which is
referred to in this bill should be completed before we decide to deploy
sites in violation of the ABM Treaty instead of vice versa--we should
not be now committing to deploy multisites when they violate a treaty
which we are then going to study--so what the Secretary of Defense last
said is these serious consequences argue for conducting the proposed
Senate review of the ABM Treaty before--underlined--before considering
such drastic and far-reaching measures.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is up. Who yields time?
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, has all time expired?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is approximately 1 minute, 31 seconds on
your side, approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on the side of the
Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I have the authority of the majority leader
to use leader time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I understand correctly what the Senator
from Michigan said a minute ago--did I hear him say the ``threat of
defense''? The ``threat of defense,'' did the Senator say that?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. Our having defenses to the Soviets
means that instead of getting rid of their offensive weapons, they will
need more. That is not what I am saying, though. That is what General
Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry are saying, far more important than
what this Senator was saying.
Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator, but I just want the American people to
think about that terminology. The threat of defense. Maybe that should
be the description of what the Levin amendment is all about. Defense--
who does it scare in America? Our defense scares the Russians? The MAD
era is over, thank God. Let us admit it. Let us let it go. Times have
changed. The threat of defense, to me, is not a scary idea.
We are not saying, do it now. We are saying, let us move forward with
development, let us have some plans, let us begin some specificity, let
us have enough money to really do the job. Let us not have enough money
to waste. Let us have enough money to do the job. Let us have enough
money to deploy.
[[Page S 11281]]
Yes, we should be reasonable. We should think it through. But does
any Senator here, or any American, think that the Senator from Maine is
going to support language that is going to be dangerous and
irresponsible? That is ridiculous. The Senator from Virginia, Senator
Warner, who has worked on this for years and years and years and was
one of the coauthors, with the Senator from Georgia, of the missile
defense language of 1991, these are not irresponsible people.
Can we continue to work together to try to move into this new era to
move beyond ABM? Yes. Let us do it rationally and reasonably. But let
us do it. What is this absolute infatuation, this clinging to ABM? It
is time to move on.
We have a letter from Dr. Kissinger that has been referred to. But I
know a lot of Senators on both sides of the aisle have a lot of respect
for Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger's letter is very telling. I am going
to read every word of it because it really sums up where we are today.
It is addressed to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Senator Thurmond. It is dated August 3. He also testified
before the Armed Services Committee very clearly and very succinctly
about what we should do and how we should move into the present and
forget the past. This language is about the future, how do we get there
and plan to get there. By clinging to ABM, are we trying to, as a
matter of fact, stop a movement toward defense and start the movement
toward the next generation? I fear that is what is involved.
Here is what Henry Kissinger had to say:
August 3, 1995.
Dear Senator Thurmond: I am writing to congratulate you on
your recent markup of the Defense Authorization Bill,
especially the provisions in the bill dealing with ballistic
missile defense and the ABM Treaty. With the bill soon to be
debated on the Senate floor, I wanted to present my views on
a number of related issues.
The time has clearly come for the United States to consider
either amending the ABM Treaty or finding some other basis
for regulating U.S.-Russian strategic relations. The ABM
Treaty was born of a different era, characterized by a
different set of strategic and political circumstances. As I
said in my testimony before your committee earlier this year,
when things have changed so much, we must not fear changes in
our Cold War treaty arrangements if such changes are in our
best interest.
I commend the Committee's decision to set a course for
deployment of a National Missile Defense system to protect
all Americans. Development of such a system is long overdue.
I believe that such a deployment will actually enhance
deterrence and provide the basis for deeper offensive
reductions. Our experience with the ABM Treaty has shown that
a lack of defense neither promotes offensive reductions nor
otherwise enhances stability. More important, the ABM Treaty
is unable to help the United States deal with one of the most
significant post-Cold War security threats: the proliferation
of long-range ballistic missiles. In fact the ABM Treaty now
stands in the way of our ability to respond in an effective
manner.
I am also pleased to see that the Committee has passed the
legislation introduced by Senator Warner, which establishes a
clear demarcation between permitted Theater Missile Defense
systems, and strategic defenses limited by the ABM Treaty. It
is essential that the ABM Treaty not be extended to cover
systems that were never intended to be limited, such as
Theater Missile Defense systems. Such systems are too
important to be held hostage to arbitrary and unnecessary
negotiations. I find it hard to believe that the Clinton
Administration objects to having its own demarcation standard
codified into law. Such a move seems entirely appropriate and
consistent with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
I believe that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 is an
important step in the right direction. It is a measured and
well-focused response to a dramatic threat to United States
national interests.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger.
eThis is a name, this is a voice, although sometime not
understandable, one that we all recognize, that has influenced so much
of what has happened in this area over the past 30 years, I guess. Yet,
he takes such a strong stand. Why are we so afraid of this?
So I think that we should defeat the Levin amendment. I know there
are negotiations between the Senator from Maine, Senator Cohen, and
Senator Nunn, and perhaps some others for some improvements. I am
always willing to look at that. I think we can do that. But first we
must defeat the Levin amendment. We must move into the era of reality.
The argument has been made that the Missile Defense Act of 1995 will
undermine START II ratification, and perhaps even damage broader United
States-Russian relations. This argument is fundamentally rooted in a
cold war view of the world. It assumes an adversarial, bipolar
relationship between the United States and Russia. Essentially, it
projects the United States-Soviet rivalry into the present day by
suggesting that missile defenses, even limited defenses, are
destablizing.
I do not believe that. Times have changed. Yes, there is some
opposition to this, and there are those in the Soviet Union that will
argue that the START II Treaty may be in trouble. But if it is, there
is plenty of evidence that it is for other reasons: money. We have
quotes from the Russians saying they just do not have the money to
implement it or for them to be able to tie START II and ABM. We cannot
allow that.
They have even tried to link other things to ratification of START II
such as expansion of NATO, which they oppose. It is clear that Russia
is willing to play the START II card on a number of issues. We must
reject this linkage lest we encourage Russia to believe that they
possess a veto over U.S. foreign and national security policy.
Of course, we should cooperate with Russia and not disregard their
legitimate security concerns. But this is what START II ratification is
all about. This agreement is manifestly in both countries interest and
should not be held hostage to other issues.
Before we conclude that a U.S. national missile defense program will
undermine START II, we should examine what impact such a system would
actually have. In reality, the NMD system envisioned by the Missile
Defense Act of 1995 would in no way undermine Russian confidence in the
effectiveness of their strategic deterrent. Even a multiple-site
deployment will not significantly alter Russia's ability to threaten
the United States.
Given this, I believe there is no basic rationality to these
connections. Even President Yeltsin himself recommended a global
defense system shortly after he assumed office. During the Bush
administration, there was tentative agreement between the
United States and Russia on amending the ABM Treaty to allow
for up to five sites and unlimited deployments of sensors, including
space-based sensors. Since then, many Russian officials have
reconfirmed that a limited NMD deployment would not in any way
undermine their deterrent posture.
We must also recall that the ABM Treaty has already been amended
once, and that the original treaty did allow for the deployment of more
than one site. In fact, I think multiple sites was in the original
treaty. During the negotiations that led up to the signing of that
treaty in 1972, the Russians were even willing to agree to as many as 5
sites with 100 ABM interceptors each.
So there is a long history here of an understanding really of what
ABM means and the recognition that we need or may need and should move
toward multiple sites.
But let me begin to conclude with these two points. Why is this
legislation needed? The proliferation of ballistic missiles of all
ranges, along with weapons of mass destruction, poses an ever-
increasing threat to the United States and its interests. I think there
is a lot of evidence that shows that, even from administration
officials. We must get started now if the United States is to counter
these threats in time. Ten years? Is that a rush? There is an orderly
plan here.
The administration has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to
extend the ABM Treaty to theater missile defense systems which have not
and have never been covered, as I understand it, by treaty.
What the legislation does not do is it does not signal a return to
star wars. It advocates a modest and affordable program that is
technically low risk. It does not violate, as I understand it, or
advocate violation of the ABM Treaty. The means to implement the
policies and the goals outlined in the Missile Defense Act of 1995 are
contained in the ABM Treaty itself.
So I urge that we take this step. Is it a step? Yes. Is it different
from last year or 2 years or 3 years ago? Absolutely. Times are
different. In order to
[[Page S 11282]]
make that step, though, we must first defeat the Levin amendment.
I yield the floor, Mr. President.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, do I have any time left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and twenty seconds.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, just last May our President and the Russian
President issued a joint statement following a summit. One of those
statements was that the United States and Russia are each committed to
the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.
That is how important the ABM Treaty is to the Russians.
Should they be afraid of our defenses? Should they be threatened by
our defenses? Gosh, we do not think so because we are good guys.
The truth of the matter is they are. What is the proof of that?
General Shalikashvili's statement and Secretary Perry's statement,
which says flatout that if we act in this way to undermine the ABM
Treaty, we jeopardize the reduction in START I and START II. So we are
not afraid of defenses. We should be afraid of 8,000 Russian warheads
which probably now will not be dismantled if we jeopardize a treaty
which has provided some strategic stability. That is the threat to us,
the 8,000 warheads which are currently being dismantled, reduced under
START I and II, which now will probably not be dismantled according to
two pretty important folks, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili.
That is current evidence of what the stakes are here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from South Carolina controls 1 minute 26 seconds.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, has the distinguished Senator from Michigan
yielded all time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, he has.
Mr. LOTT. I believe we are ready to proceed.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we are willing to yield back any time
remaining if they are and we will proceed to a vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
table the Levin amendment No. 2088. The yeas and nays are ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 51, nays 49, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 355 Leg.]
YEAS--51
Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brown
Burns
Campbell
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Faircloth
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Packwood
Pressler
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--49
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Hatfield
Heflin
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nunn
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Wellstone
So the motion to table the amendment (No. 2088) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
motion was agreed to.
Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Amendment No. 2089
(Purpose: To express the sense of Congress on missile defense of the
United States)
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen], for himself and Mr.
Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 2089.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following:
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles of all ranges is a global problem that is
becoming increasingly threatening to the United States, its
troops and citizens abroad, and its allies.
(2) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible
changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on
the provisions of this Treaty''.
(3) Articles XIII and XIV of the ABM Treaty establish means
for the Parties to amend the Treaty, and the Parties have
employed these means to amend the Treaty.
(4) Article XV of the ABM Treaty establishes means for a
Party to withdraw from the Treaty, upon 6 months notice, ``if
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--Given the fundamental
responsibility of the Government of the United States to
protect the security of the United States, the increasingly
serious threat posed to the United States, the increasingly
serious threat posed to the United States by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile technology,and the effect this threat could have in
constraining the options of the United States to act in time
of crisis, it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the supreme interest of the United States to
defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack, whatever its source;
(2) the deployment of a multiple site ground-based national
missile defense system to protect against limited ballistic
missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and
deterrence;
(3) the policies, programs, and requirements of subtitle C
of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes
specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which
anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to
the Treaty;
(4) the President is urged to initiate negotiations with
the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty as necessary
to provide for the national missile defense systems specified
in section 335 to protect the United States from limited
ballistic missile attack; and
(5) if these negotiations fail, the President is urged to
consult with the Senate about the option of withdrawing the
United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, may we have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor. The
Senate will come to order.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I am going to yield to the minority leader
in just a moment. I just want to indicate that during the course of the
debate on the Levin amendment, I indicated that I would be sending an
amendment to the desk for consideration that would, I think, clarify
the intent of the Armed Services Committee, as far as the ABM Treaty is
concerned.
My understanding is that the minority leader wishes to proceed at
this point and introduce another measure dealing with welfare. I am
prepared to yield to him if that is his desire, or we can continue to
debate the amendment that I have now offered. But I am prepared to
yield the floor for as much time as the minority leader needs, and then
I will come back to my amendment following his statement.
Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Maine for his courtesy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.
Mr. DASCHLE. I seek the floor using my leader time to make a
statement unrelated to the bill. If I can do that and then return to
the bill just as soon as we complete the statements, I prefer to do
that. I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Maine.
[[Page S 11283]]
Mr. COHEN. Senator Nunn is a principal cosponsor of the amendment I
just sent to the desk.
Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will we be able to get a time agreement on
this amendment? Is it going to be accepted? We just spent 7 hours on
the last amendment. If this bill is not finished by tomorrow night, I
think it is gone. I hope we can get a time agreement, if it is
necessary to have it.
Mr. COHEN. If the leader will yield, I think we can have a fairly
short time agreement. I think Senator Nunn and I are working through
really modifying this amendment to make sure we have broad bipartisan
support for it. It should not take very long. If the leader wants to
propose a time agreement----
Mr. LEVIN. Will the leader withhold offering a time agreement until
we can see the amendment?
Mr. NUNN. I will say to the majority leader, if he will yield, I
would like to have a time agreement on this amendment no longer than an
hour equally divided. I believe we would be better to put that
unanimous-consent request after the minority leader makes his
statement.
Mr. BUMPERS. If the majority leader will yield, I wonder if it is
possible to sequence the amendments so the Members will have some idea
as to the sequence. I am not pleading for mercy, but I have to go to a
funeral in my State this weekend, with absolutely no reservation. I
have to leave here tomorrow night. I have a couple of amendments, and I
would like to offer them before I leave. I think it would be
expeditious for the Senate if we can get some lined up and some
sequence and time agreements, maybe 30 minutes or an hour. I think we
got the tough ones out of the way. The rest should not take that much
time.
Mr. DOLE. I think that is an excellent idea. Senator Daschle and I
may be starting to put it together, to rotate back and forth on the
sequence of amendments. I think the Senator from Arizona wants to do
the same thing. Maybe we can do the Senator's this evening if he has to
be gone tomorrow.
Mr. DASCHLE. I yield to the manager of the bill.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I just want to say that we have spent a
long time now just on a few amendments. I hope we can get reasonable
time agreements and finish up this bill. I am saying that we can finish
this bill in a reasonable time tomorrow, if we stay here tonight and
work a reasonable time and do not take too much time on any one
amendment. Most of the people know how they are going to vote; it is
just a matter of voting. I hope we are all together.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, given that, I will use my leader time,
and Senator Dole and I will have an opportunity to go off the floor and
talk.
I will yield to the Senator from Maryland, and following that, the
distinguished Senator from Louisiana, for remarks regarding the Work
First welfare reform plan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
(The remarks of Ms. Mikulski and Mr. Breaux pertaining to the
introduction of S. 1117 are located in today's Record under
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the
Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment 2089 offered
by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] and the Senator from Georgia [Mr.
Nunn].
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe that language is still being
worked out by Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn, and I believe that
language will be resolved very quickly and with a commensurate time
agreement.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment No. 2089,
offered by the Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending
amendment be set aside in order to allow Senator McCain to proceed with
his amendment, and that there be a time limitation of 2 hours equally
divided.
Mr. McCAIN. They are not ready for the time agreement.
Mr. COHEN. I ask unanimous consent that we set aside the pending
amendment to allow Senator McCain to proceed with offering his
amendment dealing with Seawolf. And, during the course of that time for
debate, if we, Senator Nunn and I, come to the floor with our
amendment, we then go off the McCain amendment and return to the Cohen-
Nunn amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if I may repeat, my understanding of the
parliamentary situation is that we temporarily set aside the Cohen
amendment while negotiations continue on that amendment in order to
take up the Seawolf amendment. It is also my understanding that a time
agreement on the Seawolf is being negotiated. On the McCain amendment,
there are negotiations going on, and I ask that the clerk keep time so
that it will apply once the unanimous-consent agreement is reached for
the purposes of moving forward.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct with respect to the
parliamentary situation. The clerk will keep time on the McCain
amendment.
Amendment No. 2090
(Purpose: To delete funding for procurement of a third Seawolf
submarine, and to prohibit expenditures of fiscal year 1996 funds and
prior fiscal year funds for procurement of such submarine)
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk, and I ask
for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), for himself and Mr.
Roth, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Grams, proposes an amendment
numbered 2090.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 30, after the matter following line 24, insert the
following:
SEC. 125. SSN-23 SEAWOLF CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINE.
(a) Deletion of Funding.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the total amount of the funds
authorized under section 102(a)(3) for the Navy for fiscal
year 1996 for shipbuilding and conversion is reduced by
$1,507,477,000.
(b) Prohibition.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this Act, funds available for the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 1996 and, except as provided in paragraph
(2)(B), funds available for the Department of Defense for any
preceding fiscal year may not be obligated or expended for
procurement of a third SSN-21 Seawolf class attack submarine
or for advance procurement for such submarine.
(2)(A) Funds available for the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 1996 may not be used for paying costs incurred
for termination of any contract for procurement of a third
SSN-21 Seawolf class attack submarine, including any contract
for advance procurement of such submarine.
(B) Only the funds available for the Department of Defense
for fiscal years before fiscal year 1996 for procurement of
an SSN-23 Seawolf attack submarine may, to the extent
provided in appropriations Act, be used for paying costs
described in subparagraph (A).
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, for the information of my colleagues who I
know are interested in this amendment, especially my friends from
Connecticut, the pending unanimous-concept agreement is 1 hour equally
divided on each side, which would mean that, unless the Cohen amendment
intervenes, there would be a vote approximately 2 hours from now since
I anticipate that there would be a time agreement agreed to very
shortly, which I would like to propound as soon as it is agreed to.
Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to terminate the
Seawolf submarine program and delete $1.6 billion included in the
fiscal year 1996 national defense authorization bill for attack
submarine programs.
Mr. President, before I get into details, I want to talk about why it
is
[[Page S 11284]]
that I oppose the Seawolf submarine. Mr. President, if this were the
cold war, I would be standing here as a staunch advocate of the Seawolf
submarine. It is a technological marvel. It is a state-of-the-art
weapons system, and it is perhaps one of the finest weapons of war that
has been produced by the enormously capable industrial base of this
country.
But, Mr. President, I oppose the Seawolf submarine simply on the
grounds that we are experiencing a justified decline in the defense
budget. We are having to make very, very difficult decisions. This year
we are authorizing the appropriations of funds for a very small number
of ships, submarines, airplanes and tanks. And we simply cannot afford
a submarine that costs almost $5 billion per submarine for the first
two, and around $4 billion per submarine for the third.
Mr. President, you are going to hear the argument propounded on the
floor that the Russians are ahead of the United States, that they are
devoting every waking hour to developing a fast, quiet submarine, and
that, unless we build the Seawolf submarine, the Russians will pass us
and pose some grave threat to our national security.
Mr. President, I am sure that the Russian Defense Minister, General
Grachev, is having a meeting with his top military advisers, and he is
saying to them: ``Guys, we have a little problem in Chechnya. We have
taken a few thousand casualties. We have spent a few billion rubles.
Although there is a tenuous cease-fire, it is by no means clear that we
are going to be through in Chechnya for many years. We have a few
battalions down there in Georgia to take care of that situation. We
have Russian troops everywhere around what we now call the `near
abroad' that used to be the Soviet Union practically, and certainly to
the south and to the west. We have our military officers who have come
back from Eastern Europe living in boxcars with their families because
we cannot afford to build houses for them, some of them living in
tents. Recent conscriptions show that less than half of those
conscripted are even showing up, much less being actually inducted into
the military. Our fleets at Sevastopol and Vladivostok are rusting at
the pier. Recent Western visitors have attested to that. We cannot even
afford the oil required to allow them to go out on exercises. But
forget all of that, guys. Our primary concern is fast, quiet
submarines.''
Mr. President, give me a break. Fast, quiet submarines are not the
priority of the Russian military today. And I might say that up in room
407, the secret room to which only a privileged few are allowed, is the
CIA document that I would urge my colleagues to read that I have not
read--that I have not read--but I know the content of, that raises into
serious question the assumptions that the Russian priority is fast,
quiet submarines. In fact, you do not have to go to room 407 to figure
that out. All you have to do is read the newspaper to discover that the
Soviet Union has enormous challenges as far as where they spend their
defense dollars which are, as we all know, dramatically declining.
So for us to base our continued support on the Seawolf submarine on a
perceived threat to our national security, frankly flies in the face of
the facts at hand.
Mr. President, the amendment is straightforward. It prohibits
expenditure of any defense funds for a third Seawolf submarine. It
eliminates the noncompetitive language in the Senate bill. Section 121
directs the allocation of the first new submarine contract to the
Electric Boat shipyard and the second contract to the Newport News
shipyard. In short, the amendment seeks to terminate the Seawolf
program without making a judgment on a follow-on attack submarine
program.
In total, the amendment would delete $1.6 billion from the
committee's recommendation for shipbuilding. The fact is that, like the
B-2 bomber and many other cold war weapons systems, the Seawolf
submarine has little or no place in the military force of the future.
It is a costly relic of the longstanding tensions between the United
States and the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the reasoning which
led the committee to reject additional funding for the B-2 bomber
program did not extend to the committee's action on attack submarine
programs. The committee chose to authorize funding for a third Seawolf
submarine and to delay cost-saving competition for the follow-on new
attack submarine until sometime in the next century.
Mr. President, it is noted--it should be noted with interest--that we
entered into the deliberations of the Senate Armed Services Committee
bent on competition as to where the next submarine would be built. That
was between the two remaining and major shipbuilding corporations, and
now we came out with no competition until sometime in the next century
designating one submarine for one shipyard and designating one for
another, and just to make sure there was proper support, of course, we
threw in an amphibious ship.
After all, the Seawolf program has already cost nearly $11 billion,
or more than $5 billion per submarine. Since the contracts for the
first two Seawolf submarines were originally signed, their procurement
costs have increased by $1.4 billion. The third Seawolf submarine is
estimated to cost more than $2.4 billion, slightly more than last
year's estimate.
Because of these increasing costs, the Congress included in last
year's defense authorization legislation a cost cap procurement of the
first two Seawolf submarines. As a result of the legislative cost cap,
the Navy instituted a new program management team, which has been
successful so far in containing the costs of these two submarines.
Hopefully, no further taxpayer dollars will be required to finish them.
However, the cost cap would not apply to a third submarine, if one is
authorized, which could therefore cost much more than the $2.4 billion
currently estimated by the Navy.
As we know, in the past 10 years, defense budgets have declined.
Since 1985, it has declined in real terms by 35 percent, and we will
probably experience another 10-percent reduction by the turn of the
century.
These significant reductions have meant that the Pentagon has
canceled or delayed nearly all of its force modernization programs for
the future. And it has meant that marines deployed on the U.S.S. Inchon
off the coast of Somalia returned home to spend time with their
families and friends for 10 days before being sent off to the coast of
Haiti.
Even with the increased resources, the committee was unable to begin
to redress all of the recognized deficiencies in current and future
force structure. At the same time, the committee approved funding for
the third Seawolf submarine, $1.5 billion, that I would rather see
allocated to programs with a mission in the likely potential conflicts
of the future.
Those who continue to support the program argue that procuring a
third submarine is necessary to counter an enduring submarine threat. I
do not find that argument to be persuasive.
As we all know, the Navy earlier this year published and widely
distributed a very slick booklet advertising proliferation of
conventional submarines in Third World countries and emphasizing the
growing number and technological sophistication of Russia's attack
submarine force. Their conclusion? Buy the Seawolf submarine to meet
this growing threat.
Mr. President, I already discussed earlier the problems that the
Russians face and the disarray of their economy, the disarray of their
society, the problems in Chechnya, et cetera.
At a hearing this year before the Seapower Subcommittee, the General
Accounting Office witness testified that the intelligence analysis upon
which the Navy based its claim of a growing Russian submarine threat
was incomplete and in some cases disputed within the intelligence
community.
At the same hearing, the Congressional Research Service witness
testified that a third Seawolf submarine is not necessary to fulfill
the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirement for 10 to 12 stealthy attack
submarines by the year 2012.
Thus, military requirements do not support authorization of an
additional submarine. The Armed Services Committee report flatly states
that the Navy's argument of an operational requirement for the SSN-23
was not compelling as a reason to build another Seawolf submarine.
Another argument on behalf of the Seawolf program is the requirement
to
[[Page S 11285]]
maintain a two-shipyard submarine industrial base.
I am fully aware of the portion of the submarine industrial base that
is in my State of Arizona, thanks to the efficiency of General Dynamics
and Electric Boat. There are $62 million worth of contracts in the
State of Arizona. I suspect that most Members of Congress have been
advised in detail about the financial advantages to their constituents
of continued nuclear submarine production at Electric Boat shipyard.
Mr. President, if we continue to base our support for weapons systems
on whether there are defense contracts in our State or congressional
districts, we will be doing an enormous disservice to the American
taxpayer. We no longer have that luxury, if we ever did.
I believe the committee's authorization of $1.5 billion to complete
the third Seawolf submarine amounts to a capitulation to the
administration's submarine industrial base arguments. It is clear from
the committee's explanation of its recommendations to authorize the
third Seawolf submarine that cost considerations took second place to
industrial base arguments. No other reasoning could explain the
committee's action.
The Navy's stated policy is to maintain the two nuclear-capable
shipyards currently in operation in the United States, Newport News in
Virginia and Electric Boat in Connecticut. Under this policy, Newport
News would build only carriers, although it is capable of building
submarines, and Electric Boat would build only submarines. It is not
capable of building carriers.
However, separate analyses by the Navy and by Newport News
Shipbuilding Co. demonstrate that maintaining one nuclear-capable
shipyard is cheaper than maintaining two yards. I am not sure how deep
an analysis that might have required. For the period of fiscal year
1996 to 2012, the Navy estimates savings of $1.9 billion while Newport
News estimates a savings of $5.8 billion if we had one shipyard instead
of two.
Yet, the committee chose to endorse at least through the end of this
century that part of the administration's industrial base policy which
requires maintaining two nuclear-capable shipyards.
The committee explicitly directed that the first new attack submarine
be built at Electric Boat, but in a departure from the administration's
policy then directed that the second would be built at Newport News.
What a surprise.
The committee appeared to support the concept of competition for the
submarine's procurement but then chose to delay implementing cost-
saving competition between the two shipyards until sometime in the next
century--I might add, having the beneficial effect of pleasing everyone
involved.
Under the committee's recommendation, however, future competition for
the third and later submarines will not necessarily result in a winner-
take-all contract award which could mean that both shipyards would stay
in business indefinitely.
Essentially, the committee kicked the can down the road, granting one
submarine contract to each shipyard without addressing future
competition. The result is that the taxpayers will see no savings from
competition until sometime in the next century, if at all.
Because of this arbitrary delay in imposing competition for submarine
procurement, the committee found it necessary to accept the Navy's
contention that building the third Seawolf submarine at Electric Boat
was required to maintain Electric Boat shipyard as a viable competitor
in the future. Thus, the committee authorized $1.5 billion for the SSN-
23, an overly expensive submarine for which the threat will not
materialize in the foreseeable future.
A more than adequate alternative to procuring a third Seawolf
submarine and beginning the new attack submarine program in fiscal year
1998 as planned is extending the service life of the existing attack
submarine force.
Currently, as of May 1, 1995, the U.S. attack submarine force
consists of 83 SSN's. The Bottom-Up Review stated a long-term
requirement for a force of only 45 to 55 attack submarines. In order to
reduce the current force to the required levels, the Navy plans to
retire rather than refuel a substantial portion of the SSN-688 class
submarines. The Navy plan would mean scrapping submarines with an
average of 18 years of service life remaining.
I might add, Mr. President, that those ships were built with an
average service life of 30 years.
The cost of buying replacement submarines far exceeds the cost of
refueling existing submarines as well as the estimated savings from
decommissioning existing submarines.
For example, $1.5 to $2 billion is the estimated cost of a new attack
submarine while the estimated savings from early decommissioning is
only $600 to $700 million. Clearly, if the newest of the Navy's SSN-688
class submarines were retained in inventory throughout the remaining
service life, the Bottom-Up Review requirement for 45 to 55 attack
submarines could be met well into the next century at a cost much less
than the cost of buying the SSN-23 and buying new attack submarines on
an noncompetitive basis.
Terminating the Seawolf program and deferring a decision on a follow-
on attack submarine program would provide needed time to reassess the
need for and the design of a follow-on program. Such a decision,
however, requires that we clearly face the stark reality of declining
defense budgets and the future budgets which require tough decisions
about sustaining duplicative infrastructure at a cost of billions of
dollars.
The fact is that there are currently two nuclear-capable shipyards in
the United States, Electric Boat and Newport News. How much of our
scarce defense dollars are we willing to spend to maintain two
shipyards capable of producing nuclear-powered submarines at $4 to $5
billion a copy? The price is very steep.
Mr. President, I yield at this time to the distinguished chairman,
who I think is ready to propound a unanimous-consent request.
Mr. THURMOND. I wish to thank the able Senator from Arizona.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now
be a total of 2 hours of debate prior to a motion to table on an
amendment to be offered by Senators McCain, Roth, Feingold, and Grams
regarding the Seawolf submarine, with the time equally divided between
Senators McCain and Cohen; I further ask that no second-degree
amendments be in order prior to a vote on a motion to table, and that
upon expiration or yielding back of time the Senate proceed to a vote
on or in relation to the McCain amendment.
Mr. COHEN. Reserving the right to object.
Mr. President, could we also indicate that the time that has been
consumed to this point also be included in that 2-hour period?
Mr. THURMOND. That is correct, Mr. President, the statement made by
the able Senator from Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. I ask unanimous consent that upon disposition of the
first McCain amendment, Senator McCain be recognized to offer an
amendment regarding Seawolf cost cap and immediately after the clerk
reports that amendment Senator Dodd be recognized to offer a relevant
second-degree amendment and that there be a total of 10 minutes of
debate equally divided in the usual form on both amendments. I further
ask unanimous consent that upon the expiration or yielding back of the
time on the second amendment, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in
relation to the Dodd amendment, followed immediately by a vote on or in
relation to the McCain amendment, as amended, if amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Thank you.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-two minutes.
Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President in their ongoing efforts to convince the
Congress to spend another $1.5 billion on a militarily unnecessary
program Seawolf proponents argue that so much
[[Page S 11286]]
money has already been spent on the third Seawolf that it would be
foolish to terminate the program now. They argue that terminating the
third submarine would save only $315 to $615 million.
Mr. President, never once in the 12 years that I have been in
Congress have the proponents of a program that was up for cancellation
not argue that it was more expensive to cancel a program that it was to
keep it alive. I guess going back to that old Vietnam philosophy we had
to destroy it in order to save it.
Mr. President, even if the savings are only $615 million, that is
still a lot of money to most Americans. However, I must point out that
a careful look at the facts shows that these claims are, at best,
misleading.
CBO estimates that savings from terminating the Seawolf submarine
could amount to between $1.1 and $1.3 billion. In a May 15, 1995 letter
report, CBO concluded that: ``Canceling the third Seawolf would save
about $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1996, minus $500 million in potential
expenses over the next 5 years.''
In an updated July 28 letter report, CBO refined their estimate of
the potential expenses to be in the range of $300 to $500 million.
CBO concluded that ``the net savings from canceling the SSN-23 could
amount to between $1.1 and $1.3 billion * * * . ''
Now, I am sure those that run the shipyards would strongly contest
those figures. I would rather rely on the Congressional Budget Office,
an organization that clearly has much less at stake than the respective
shipyards.
Obviously, in claiming that terminating the third Seawolf would
result in little or no savings, the submarine's supporters use inflated
figures. Let me explain some of the fallacies of their statements.
A document being circulated on Capitol Hill asserts that termination
costs allegedly using a Navy estimate are $500 million to $800 million.
The facts do not support this assertion.
In a June 8 response to my questions about the Seawolf program, the
Navy stated: ``If work were to be stopped today on SSN 23 the total
additional liability beyond the $438 million expended would be $215 to
$290 million.'' That is $285 to $510 million less than the contractor
claims. It is also a significant amount of termination liability for
less than $900 million in existing contracts. And the Navy admits that
the amount of termination liability is entirely negotiable.
In addition, $484.6 million of prior year appropriations for the
Seawolf submarine remained unexpended as of June 8, according to the
Navy. Termination costs could be paid out of these unspent funds,
saving even more money for the taxpayers.
The Navy estimates the impact of terminating the Seawolf would have a
cost impact on existing and future contracts at Electric Boat shipyard,
totaling $700 million to $1 billion. These estimates include some very
questionable assumptions.
CBO notes a significant area of difference in their estimates and the
Navy's, since the Navy included $130 million to $340 million for
anticipated increased overhead on future contracts at Electric Boat.
CBO did not include these costs in their estimate because their amounts
and even whether they will be incurred at all depend on future
decisions of the administration and the Congress.
Nor did CBO include the Navy's claims to other potential costs in the
hundreds of millions of dollars for unspecified future claims. In their
own estimates, the Navy has been unable to attach any estimated dollar
amount to these potential claims for such things as environmental
cleanup, severance pay, and depreciation.
The total estimated cost of the third Seawolf submarine is $2.4
billion, including more than $900 million already appropriated. The
question we need to ask is, what are the sunk costs in that submarine
today?
$438 million of prior year appropriations have already been spent and
cannot be recovered.
Using the Navy's own estimates, an additional $420 to $650 million
would have to be spent to pay contract termination costs and increased
overhead expenses on other existing contracts at Electric Boat.
Adding these two amounts together results in approximately $850
million to $1.1 billion in total funding required if the third Seawolf
were terminated today. That's $1.3 to $1.6 billion less than the
estimated cost of the submarine. Or, in other words, that's $1.3 to
$1.6 billion in savings for the American taxpayer.
In my view and in the view of our highest ranking military officers,
the priorities for U.S. defense spending are near-term readiness,
quality of life for our military personnel and their families, and
future force modernization to meet the likely challenges of the future.
In my discussions with these officers, they say emphatically that
strategic lift, tactical air forces, amphibious forces, and advanced
conventional munitions procurement are the types of programs most
urgently required to adequately equip our forces. The Seawolf submarine
is not mentioned.
There is no question that the Seawolf submarine is a technological
marvel. Everyone associated with its development, design, and
construction should be rightfully proud of this stellar example of
American skill and ingenuity. The Seawolf program must be reviewed in
the context of funding high-priority military requirements with a
seriously inadequate defense budget.
The debate over the Seawolf program is not about the merits of a
weapons system, rather, it is about priorities. All of us want to
ensure that our military forces have the best equipment and are the
best prepared to deal with the potential threats of the future. For all
the reasons discussed above, particularly the declining defense budget,
we simply cannot afford to buy another Seawolf submarine.
I cannot support spending another $1.5 billion on a militarily
unnecessary jobs program. I cannot support procurement of a
noncompetitive follow-on submarine when our existing submarine force
remains capable and can be maintained into the next century.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support my amendment to strike
funding for the third Seawolf submarine.
Mr. President, I have several letters here. Citizens Against
Government Waste says:
The Seawolf program is a Cold War relic designed to meet a
threat that no longer exists. Russia can not afford to
maintain its submarine fleet and at our current naval level,
the U.S. is well defended on the seas against any potential
threat of the future. Adding a third Seawolf adds little to
defense--
The only convincing argument: It is a great jobs program--
while taking much-needed resources from other necessary
defense programs. . .. We applaud you for introducing this
amendment and encourage your colleagues to support this
amendment.
Mr. President, the National Taxpayers Union says:
If members of Congress are truly serious about balancing
the budget, they must refrain from setting costly precedents
by continuing to fund unnecessary and outdated programs. . ..
Today, our nation faces a far more destructive threat--a
national debt racing toward $5 trillion. Winning this war
requires a different kind of weapon--fiscal discipline.
Congress should consider scrapping the Seawolf entirely.
That is from the National Taxpayers Union.
And from the Citizens for a Sound Economy:
On behalf of Citizens for a Sound Economy and our 250,000
members nationwide. . .. At a time when all Federal spending
is undergoing increased congressional scrutiny, the
Department of Defense like other federal agencies, must find
ways to get spending under control. . ..
Congress should not approve the Navy's request for $1.5
billion to start building a third Seawolf submarine. That's
$1.5 billion that could be put to better use by taxpayers
themselves.
And, finally, Mr. President, from the Council for a Livable World.
. . .. we believe it to be unconscionable to spend $1.5
billion for white elephants that would have no other mission
than to serve as floating museum pieces.
I am not sure I agree with that last comment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that several documents related
to this subject be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[[Page S 11287]]
Council for Citizens
Against Government Waste,
Washington, DC, July 28, 1995.
Hon. John McCain,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McCain: The Council for Citizens Against
Government Waste (CCAGW) supports your amendment to the
Department of Defense (DoD) Authorization canceling the third
Seawolf submarine (SSN-23), saving taxpayers nearly $1.5
billion over the next five years.
The Seawolf program is a Cold War relic designed to meet a
threat that no longer exists. Russia can not afford to
maintain its submarine fleet and at our current naval level,
the U.S. is well defended on the seas against any potential
threat of the future. Adding a third Seawolf adds little to
defense, while taking much-needed resources from other
necessary defense programs.
When the next phase in the submarine program, the New
Attack Submarine, begins construction in 1998, there will be
a shipyard fully prepared to begin construction, most likely
at a cheaper cost. Why add the unnecessary burden of building
an archaic third submarine as we are preparing to move into a
new phase of naval defense? Advocates of the third Seawold
muster only one convincing argument: It's a great jobs
program.
This Congress' mission must be to reevaluate how all
taxpayer money is spent. When looking at the changes the Navy
is making in its submarine defenses, we cannot continue to
fund outdated programs like Seawolf, leaving other programs
more vulnerable to the budget ax! We applaud you for
introducing this amendment and encourage your colleagues to
support this amendment.
Sincerely,
Tom Schatz,
President.
Joe Winkelmann,
Chief Lobbyist.
____
National Taxpayers Union,
Washington, DC, July 31, 1995.
Attn: Defense LA
Dear Senator: The 300,000-member National Taxpayers Union
is pleased to support Senator McCain's amendment to the FY 96
Defense Authorization bill which would eliminate $1.5 billion
to procure a third Seawolf submarine.
Seawolf continues to be plagued by numerous problems: it is
behind schedule and has incurred cost overruns. Already, $1.4
billion more has been spent over the original estimate,
costing taxpayers a total of nearly $11 billion, or more than
$5 billion per submarine. The third Seawolf estimate to cost
more than $2.4 billion, slightly more than last year's
estimate. A third submarine, however, would be exempt from
the cost cap that applied to the first two, which could
drastically increase its price tag. If members of Congress
are truly serious about balancing the budget, they must
refrain from setting costly precedents by continuing to fund
unnecessary and outdated programs.
In the very year when Congress has pledged to make progress
towards balancing the budget, some lawmakers would pull this
policy in the wrong direction. The Cold War has ended, and
with it the submarine threat that endangered the Seawolf
program. Today, our nation faces a far more destructive
threat--a national debt racing towards $5 trillion. Winning
this war requires a different kind of weapon--fiscal
discipline.
Congress should considers scrapping Seawolf entirely. At
the very least, however, members should reject any additional
subsidies for this relic of a bygone era. They can reaffirm
their commitment by voting YES on the McCain Amendment.
Sincerely,
Jill Lancelot,
Director, Congressional Affairs.
____
Citizens for a Sound Economy,
Washington, DC, June 27, 1995.
Senator John McCain,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McCain: On behalf of Citizens for a Sound
Economy and our 250,000 members nationwide, I would like to
extend support for your proposed deletion of $1.5 billion in
funding for the Navy's third Seawolf submarine. At a time
when all federal spending is undergoing increased
congressional scrutiny, the Department of Defense, like other
federal agencies, must find ways to get spending under
control.
The United States' Seawolf submarine program was a Cold War
undertaking to make the best submarine force in the world
even better. However, given the fall of the Soviet Union, and
the weakened Russian economy, a third Seawolf submarine (and
its $4 billion plus price tag) no longer can be justified.
Recognizing the need to prioritize tight defense dollars,
President Bush tried unsuccessfully in 1992 to stop the
Seawolf program after the completion of one submarine. In
today's fiscal climate, the case against a third submarine is
even more compelling.
Moreover, in terms of time and cost, the Seawolf program is
indicative of too many major defense programs--it has been
marked by schedule delays and cost overruns. In fact, by the
time Congress capped the spending level on the first Seawolf
submarines at $4.759 billion just last year, the program
already had cost $2 billion more than originally anticipated.
Congress should not approve the Navy's request for $1.5
billion to start building a third Seawolf submarine. That's
$1.5 billion that could be put to better use by taxpayers
themselves.
Sincerely,
Paul Beckner,
President.
____
Washington, DC, July 27, 1995.
Support Amendment To Cancel Third Seawolf
Dear Senator: We urge you to support the amendment by
Senator McCain to prohibit funding for the third Seawolf
submarine.
The Congress is working hard to fulfill its commitment to
reduce government waste. The Seawolf submarine, conceived
over a decade ago to counter a specific Soviet threat, lacks
a mission and should be cut.
The program has been plagued by repeated cost increases and
scheduled delays. Last year Congress voted to cap the cost of
the first two submarines at $4.759 billion. However,
finishing the third Seawolf will require at least an
additional $1.5 billion and will push the current estimate
for the total program cost to over $12.9 billion, or $4.3
billion each.
It is widely acknowledged that the case for building the
third Seawolf is founded entirely on ``industrial base''
arguments. However, many of the skills associated with
submarine production would be maintained in other industries
and submarine-unique skills would be maintained through
ongoing submarine maintenance and repair activities.
It is our judgment that Congress should resist pressure to
continue this funding simply to preserve jobs. We understand
the concerns and fears of the people of Connecticut and Rhode
Island. We strongly support assisting the people and the
communities affected by the program termination in their
adjustment to a difficult situation. However, at the same
time, we believe it to be unconscionable to spend $1.5
billion for white elephants that would have no other mission
than to serve as floating museum pieces. There are too many
other desperate needs in this society--to say nothing of a
federal budget deficit of $250 billion--to build this cold
war relic.
Funding a missionless Seawolf is a waste of national
resources. We urge you to support the McCain amendment to end
this program.
Sincerely,
Jim Matlack, American Friends Service Committee; Darryl
Fagin, Americans for Democratic Action; Timothy
McElwee, Church of the Brethren, Washington Office;
John Parachini, Committee for National Security; John
Isaacs, Council for a Livable World; Joe Volk, Friends
Committee on National Legislation; Maurice Paprin, Fund
for New Priorities in America; Kay van der Horst,
International Center for Technology Assessment; J.
Daryl Byler, Mennonite Central Committee, Washington
Office; Howard Hallman, Methodists United for Peace
with Justice; Christopher Paine, Natural Resources
Defense Council; Kathy Thornton, NETWORK: A National
Catholic Social Justice Lobby;
Monica Green, Peace Action; Bob Musil, Physicians for
Social Responsibility; Caleb Rossiter, Project on
Demilitarization and Democracy; Robin Caiola, 20/20
Vision, National Project; Jennifer Weeks, Union of
Concerned Scientists; Robert Alpern, Unitarian
Universalist Association; George Crossman, United
Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society; Jerry
Genesio, Veterans for Peace; Edith Villastrigo, Women
Strike for Peace; Susan Shaer, Women's Action for New
Directions; Tim Barner, World Federalist Association.
____
[From the New York Times, July 30, 1995]
Quietness Argument for Sub Won't Wash
To the Editor: I have a lot of respect for Secretary of the
Navy John Dalton; I hate to see him fall prey to the sharks
who are trying to justify the spending of $1.5 billion for
the third Seawolf submarine (letter, July 24).
Although I disagree with almost everything in his letter, I
would like to focus on his assertion that ``the quietest
submarines in the world today are operated by the Russians.''
This allegation is like the ``missile gap'' or the ``bomber
gap'' or the ``readiness gap.'' When these were scrutinized,
it was found they did not exist. Their sole purpose was to
justify unwarranted defense spending. Does this ``quietness
gap'' exist?
There are two aspects to quieting a submarine. The first
takes place when the submarine is built. To say that our
submarines are not built as well as Russian submarines
condemns the very shipyard we are trying to keep operating.
The second aspect of quieting is in the operation of the
ship. Is Secretary Dalton telling us that the crews of our
submarines are not as well trained or as competent as the
Russians?
I never met a submarine officer who did not think our
submarines were the best in the world--by far. I am sorry to
see this proud group stoop to chicanery to justify an
unnecessary weapon.
John J. Shanahan.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
[[Page S 11288]]
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Rhode
Island wish to have?
Mr. PELL. Five minutes.
Mr. COHEN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to the
amendment offered by my colleague from Arizona, Mr. McCain.
The Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization Act authorized a third
Seawolf submarine, commonly referred to as SSN-23. In 1992, Public Law
102-298 appropriated $540.2 million for advance procurement of critical
long-lead items for SSN-23. Subsequent to this action, roughly another
$400 million has been appropriated and spent on SSN-23 thus far, for a
total of $920 million.
This amendment, which would deauthorize funding required for the
completion of SSN-23, is opposed by the administration, is inconsistent
with previous congressional action, and contradicts the findings of the
Bottum-Up Review, the elaborate defense posture plan prepared by the
Department of Defense as the blueprint for future weapon acquisition.
In the Bottom-Up Review, the administration concluded that construction
for the third Seawolf is the best, most cost-effective way to preserve
the submarine industrial base. After much sober thought, numerous
elaborate studies, and several thorough debates in this Chamber, the
Department of Defense has concluded that completion of the third
submarine would bridge the gap until we begin construction of the new
attack submarine in fiscal year 1998.
Sustained, low-rate production is the most effective way to preserve
the technology, design, and unique skills necessary to maintain our
submarine industrial base. If a production gap occurs, the Navy has
determined, and many observers concur, that the highly specialized
submarine vendor base, consisting of over 1,000 firms in more than 40
States, will be jeopardized.
Mr. President, in addition to preserving unique skills and
technology, completing the SSN-23 makes economic sense. In a recent
letter to Chairman Thurmond, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, state:
Completing SSN-23 is right for the taxpayer and right for
our defense needs. The cost to complete SSN-23 is $1.5
billion. If SSN-23 were canceled, between $700 million to $1
billion in direct costs will still be incurred to existing
contracts and to the New Attack Submarine program without
acquiring a submarine. Thus, the net cost of building SSN-23
at this point in the program is approximately $500 million to
$800 million.
Moreover, completing the SSN-23 also makes sense from a security
viewpoint. In the same letter mentioned above, Secretary Perry and
General Shalikashvili state that ``cancellation would deprive our Armed
Forces of a needed military capability to counter the growing number of
deployed improved Akula class submarines which are quieter than our
improved 688 attack submarines.''
Mr. President, SSN-23 is a necessary bridge for the entire submarine
industry to be able to produce the more affordable and technologically
advanced new attack submarine. The DOD's plan, as approved by the Armed
Services Committee, is the only plan which will preserve this critical
industrial base as well as permit long-term competition in the
submarine industry. Furthermore, this plan will assist in our national
strategy to maintain our margin of undersea superiority, a truly
critical area.
The Senate has, on several occasions, thoroughly debated and voted on
this matter. And each year, the Senate decided to continue this program
for the reasons I stated above.
It would seem to me irrational and imprudent to cancel a program
which would cost less to complete than to eliminate. It does not make
sense from either a fiscal or national security viewpoint. The
administration and the DOD strongly oppose this amendment, and I urge
my colleagues to reject it.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter I mentioned
above be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1995.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The submarine funding decisions now
before Congress are pivotal to maintaining our margin of
undersea superiority and capability to design and produce
nuclear submarines efficiently. The Department's plan
maintains both these national objectives by building a final
SEAWOLF in FY 1996 and a lead New Attack Submarine in FY
1998. This approach is the lowest cost plan to counter real
world threats while shifting to a more affordable and capable
submarine.
Completing SSN-23 is right for the taxpayer and right for
our defense needs. The cost to complete SSN-23 is $1.5
billion. If SSN-23 is canceled, between $700 to $1,000
million in direct costs will still be incurred to existing
contracts and to the New Attack Submarine program without
acquiring a submarine. Thus, the net cost of building SSN-23
at this point in the program is approximately $500 to $800
million. Cancellation would deprive our Armed Forces of a
needed military capability to counter the growing number of
deployed improved Akula class submarines which are quieter
than our improved 688 attack submarines.
The House National Security Committee in its bill supported
submarine modernization by endorsing the national commitment
to preserve two nuclear capable shipbuilders and by providing
full funding for the continued development and advance
procurement for a FY 1998 attack submarine. The Department
appreciates HNSC's support in this aspect.
On the other hand, we take exception to the proposed HNSC
alternative industrial bridge plan. This plan spends nearly
$1 billion to avoid building SSN-23 and to build a technology
demonstrator submarine in place of a needed operational New
Attack Submarine. The House plan poses execution problems in
that it is under-funded and creates significant future
financial liability. Moreover, it causes SSN-21 and SSN-22 to
be one-of-a-kind submarines which would drive up
construction, operating, and support costs.
We believe the Department's plan merits the full support of
Congress. It is the most straightforward and lowest cost
approach to sustaining attack submarine force level
requirements, while preserving two nuclear capable
shipbuilders to provide the option for competition.
We ask your support for this very important program.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. COHEN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for
10 minutes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, first, I ask unanimous consent that
Edward Foster, a legis fellow in my office, be given the privilege of
the floor for the duration of the debate on S. 1026.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, it has been used on many occasions
before, but in the famous words of Yogi Berra, ``It is deja vu all over
again,'' with regard to the Seawolf. I rise in opposition to the
amendment of my friend from Arizona which would terminate the SSN-23,
the third and final Seawolf nuclear attack submarine.
I am going to make three points in opposition to the amendment. The
first is that in finishing the Seawolf submarine, we are not just
involved in a make-work project. It will produce a submarine that will
be of military value immediately and, in fact, will be the best nuclear
attack submarine in the world and will help us close what I will call a
submarine gap that has opened up between Russia and the United States
in favor of Russia.
Second, I will argue that the construction or the finishing of the
third Seawolf is part of a carefully designed plan by the Pentagon to
lead us to the construction of the new attack submarine, a smaller
version of the Seawolf, smaller and less expensive.
Mr. President, no one seems to disagree with the contention that we
need to build more submarines for our national security in the future
as the older attack submarines live out their lifespan. What we are
seeing in opposition to this amendment is that the best way to get to
the next stage, which we all seem to agree on, is to complete the
Seawolf submarine, the SSN-23, and to preserve the military-industrial
base that is necessary to get to the new attack submarine and to create
competition in building that submarine.
[[Page S 11289]]
And finally, just as a matter of business common sense, we have spent
almost a billion dollars on the third Seawolf already. It does not make
sense not to complete it.
Mr. President, let me go to the first argument. We are not debating
production of a weapon which has no use or which no one wants. On the
contrary. Everyone, and I stress everyone, involved in the national
security of our Government has spoken out loudly and clearly that they
want this submarine to be produced and that the Navy needs it for its
military value, not just because it enables us to produce the next
generation of attack submarines at a lower price into the next century.
So let us not be confused as to what is fat and what is muscle in the
defense budget that we are debating today. The President asked Congress
to authorize this submarine, it is part of his budget and part of the
plan which the Department of the Navy has laid out for shipbuilding
into the next century.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, has
told us why we need this submarine. He has said:
Cancellation would deprive our Armed Forces of a needed
military capability to counter the growing number of deployed
improved Akula-class submarines--Russian subs--which are
quieter than our improved 688 attack submarine.
And the quietness of a submarine is critical to its effectiveness.
Mr. President, I will speak more about that in a moment.
The Secretary of Defense, continuing our national security
administration, has urged us to stay with the Navy plan and to
authorize the SSN-23. Secretary Perry has said:
We believe the Department's plan merits the full support of
Congress. It is the most straightforward and lowest-cost
approach to sustaining attack submarine force level
requirements.
Secretary of the Navy Dalton and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Boorda have spent numerous hours testifying before congressional
committees and meeting with individual Members of Congress to explain
why they are convinced that the Seawolf is essential to our future
security.
Secretary Dalton has said:
The builders of this submarine * * * are a national
treasure in knowledge and skills * * *. We are gambling with
a national treasure if we do not take steps to preserve it.
And Admiral Boorda, the top warfighter in the Navy today, says:
The Seawolf class submarine will ensure continued undersea
superiority, a position the United States cannot give up.
Mr. President, I note also that as you listen to the best thinkers
when they talk about the future of warfare and security citing
particularly the technological revolution that is occurring in warfare,
the submarine will play an increasingly central role because of its
stealth, which is to say obviously that it is hard to detect at its
best.
It is under water, and because of the enormous range of capacities it
has, not only to perform the traditional attack submarine function of
hitting targets in the water or under the water, but being able to fire
cruise missiles from standoff positions unseen at targets on the land,
as was done in the gulf war, being able to perform intelligence
missions, being able to drop special forces into difficult situations,
being able to move in shallow water and, in fact, being able to perform
intelligence functions with very sophisticated technical equipment from
a standoff, safe position.
Mr. President, there are many times on military authorizations when
the Congress substitutes its judgment for that of the administration
which is in power. I believe, however, that this is one time when we
ought to listen carefully to the military experts and give them, as we
always should, the benefit of the doubt.
The Armed Services Committee of this Senate spent many hours in
hearings earlier this year seeking the views of those experts, and we
all listened with care. And it is with some satisfaction that I note
the strong support which the completion of the third Seawolf, after
hearing all that testimony, received from members of the committee. The
SSN-23 is necessary and essential because it has military value and
meets valid military requirements.
Some have said that this submarine will serve no purpose, that there
is no need or threat. I respectfully say that these allegations are
wrong. We know that Russia, no matter what else has happened to its
military apparatus, has continued to produce nuclear attack submarines
after the end of the cold war. We know, as well, that these submarines
are quieter than their predecessors--some because of better designs in
their production and others because of backfitting of newer and
quieting technologies. These submarines which Russia is putting to sea
today are quieter than most of our existing fleet of attack submarines.
For the first time in the history of undersea warfare, the United
States does not have a qualitative edge over its potential adversaries
in the stealth of the submarines which are taking our young sailors to
sea to protect our national security. That is a fact, I would guess,
that most persons are not aware of, but it is one that each of us must
be unsettled by.
Mr. President, I know it is counterintuitive because the general
impression is that the Russian military is falling apart. But they have
made a conscious decision, no matter what else is happening in their
military, to invest in attack submarines. I think we should take a look
at their reasoning and think about it as we plan our national security
in the future.
Listen to the words of the Russian Defense Minister, Gen. Pavel
Grachev, who said a couple of years ago, June 8, 1993:
A nuclear submarine fleet is the future of the armed
forces. The number of tanks and guns will be reduced, as well
as the infantry, but a modern navy is a totally different
thing.
The underlying reality today is that the Russian political and
military leadership has decided that they want to keep Russia a global
military power. To do so, they have scaled down much of their military
capacity and programming, but there are several key components critical
to remaining a global military power, and at the top of that list--
particularly when it comes to strategic weapons but also the attack
submarine function--is submarines.
Much is made of the fact that the Russian surface ships are seen
sitting in piers rusting, with no crews, undertrained crews, or
rebellious and dissatisfied crews. But nobody has made those assertions
about the Russian submarine forces because they are just not true. We
know that Russia has in the water today about six submarines with
fourth generation quieting technology. These improved Akula-class subs
which are in the water today are quieter at tactical operating speeds
that the best American submarines currently in our inventory cannot
match.
Further, we know that the Russian Navy has under construction and
will launch in the next year or so the lead ship of a new class of
submarines which will be even quieter than the Akula, better armed and
with improved sensors. The lead ship has
been named the Severodvinsk, the first true multimission submarine in
the Russian inventory. These are all facts that are generally agreed
upon by the entire U.S. intelligence community.
There is also no disagreement within the intelligence community that
the Russian Navy is returning to submarine operating patterns last seen
in the mid-1990's. We are observing once again deployments of a
submarine force capable of worldwide operations--and this includes
renewed operations in the Western Atlantic.
Thus, my view--and I believe the view of the senior military
leadership in this country--is that there is a real threat which must
be addressed and this Seawolf addresses it quite well. In short, there
is a valid military requirement for SSN-23.
The Joint Staff examined submarine force level requirements necessary
to support the Bottom-Up Review and concluded that the U.S. Navy needs
10 to 12 Seawolf-quiet submarines by the year 2012. Since the Russian
Navy has 6 fourth-generation-quiet submarines in the water today which
are quieter than our 688I submarines with more under construction, the
United States military needs to establish a stable low rate of
production of submarines with Seawolf-level quieting. The Navy view is
that completion of the SSN-23 is the
[[Page S 11290]]
most critical and timely contribution to achieving this essential
warfighting capability.
The bottom line then in my view, after having questioned every
witness who came before the Army Services Committee on this subject
this year, is NOT that SSN-23 would be militarily helpful as one
analyst asserted, but that it is essential to meeting valid military
requirements.
Fourth, completing the third Seawolf is part of a plan which has been
carefully developed by the Navy to ensure that this country can regain
the tactical superiority it needs in undersea warfare and that we can
maintain a national treasure, to use Admiral Boorda's description--the
submarine industrial base in its broadest sense, in its entirety--which
we will need in the future. And we should note, that future is not very
far off as I have already demonstrated.
Some critics try to argue that the Navy's plan--building SSN-23 and
then a new attack submarine which will be more affordable and more
focused on the threats of the 21st century--is not well thought-out or
based on analysis. These charges are flat wrong. In the past 3 years,
there have been some 14 different studies which have examined the
submarine industrial base. The consensus of these studies has been that
the most cost-effective approach to sustaining our ability to design
and build nuclear submarines is through low-rate production of
submarines. One does not learn or create the skills necessary to build
these highly sophisticated ships and their many unique components in a
short period of time. If this industrial base is shut down, as we will
risk if SSN-23 is not authorized, the costs of regenerating these
essential skills will be prhibitive--if in fact they can be
regenerated.
Let me turn then to a point which is often made when considering this
subject and which does a disservice to this debate and to this body.
Some people try to describe the third Seawolf as a jobs program--an
attempt to keep people working in spite of the fact that there is no
sense to the program
anymore. Obviously, each of us in our own way wants to preserve jobs
in our own State, and I, no less than any of our colleagues. But the
fact is that even if this third Seawolf is built--as I believe it
should and will be--the level of employment at Electric Boat in
Connecticut and Rhode Island will go from a high of some 23,000 5 years
ago to less than 14,000 by the end of this year and some 6,000 by the
year 2000. That means some 17,000 workers at Electric Boat have or are
going to lose their jobs as part of the effort to maintain our ability
to build submarines into the next century.
The managers at Electric Boat do not have any allusions that the cold
war still exists. They have been actively reengineering and downsizing
for a number of years to ensure that their company--a company with a
long and proud history of submarine construction, a company made up of
skilled and dedicated workers who don't get rich doing the work they
do, but do take great pride in producing the world's finest submarines
to protect our way of life--can continue to make submarines in the next
century.
Those who might claim that the Seawolf is just a jobs program for two
northeastern States--or that the Navy plan is submarines for everyone--
are wrong and their observations are a disservice to the broader issues
involved here, and an offense to the people whose jobs are going to be
lost, even with the building of the third Seawolf.
Mr. President, we have been here before on this issue. But, I believe
the issues I have raised today are more relevant and more important
than ever before. The cold war is over--no one who supports the Seawolf
believes otherwise. But that does not mean that this incredible
submarine--the first of which has already been christened and is in the
water at Groton today--is not militarily necessary and vital to our
national security.
This has not been a perfect program. What weapons system ever is? For
that matter, when was the last time an automobile was designed and
produced without some problems? But the program is on a sound footing
today. It will produce a submarine which has been requested by the
President and the Department of Defense and will meet a valid military
requirement. This issue has been studied at length by the Armed
Services Committee under the leadership of Senator Thurmond and, in
particular, in the Seapower Subcommittee under the probing and
thoughtful leadership of its chairman, Senator Cohen.
I urge my colleagues to support the Armed Services Committee position
on this issue and to vote to authorize and complete construction of the
third Seawolf. I will vote against the amendment by my colleague from
Arizona and urge all Senators to do the same.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, shortly, I believe there will be an
agreement on the Nunn-Cohen amendment which was set aside for the
purpose of this amendment, and we will return to it.
I would like to inform my colleagues that the distinguished chairman
of the committee is ready to propound a unanimous-consent agreement of
all remaining amendments. We have been on this bill since 9 o'clock
yesterday morning. We intend to stay very late tonight, at least until
we have a complete list of amendments with time agreements associated
with them. Right now it is being hotlined to all the offices to get a
list of the amendments.
The chairman is going to propound a unanimous-consent agreement
within a very short period of time. We have had sufficient time to
determine what amendments we have to this bill, and the only way we are
going to move forward and get done by tomorrow evening, which is the
expressed desire of the majority leader, is to get the amendments in
and then we will begin to propound a unanimous consent on that and the
ensuing time agreements.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Rhode
Island.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from Rhode Island is
recognized for 8 minutes.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, despite the end of the cold war and
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, I think we can all
agree that the United States still needs capable and effective military
forces, and indeed that is why we are voting right now, very shortly,
on a $264 billion appropriation, or authorization, for the U.S.
military services. I do not think anybody in this body will argue that
the United States will always be a maritime nation. Indeed, Mr.
President, 95 percent of our export/import tonnage is carried by ship.
That is an astonishing figure to me. Yes, 5 percent is carried over
land to Canada and Mexico, or by air; but 95 percent is carried by
ship.
During the time I spent in the Navy Department, I learned that
submarines are a relatively inexpensive way for a potential adversary
to disrupt international commerce.
Far too often, the press reports that the Navy does not really need
the Seawolf. We are told that it is a ship solely designed to confront
the Soviet Navy on the open ocean. This allegation is simply not true.
I would like to refute it. The fact of the matter is that the third
Seawolf has a valid military mission and will be instrumental in
enabling the Navy to fulfill its national security obligations around
the world.
Now, yes, the Soviet Union is gone, and its military forces inherited
by Russia are undergoing substantial downsizing. There is no question
about that. It is also very clear that the Russian Navy--in particular,
its submarine force--has not been scaled back in the manner other
components of the Russian military service have been. For example, it
is estimated that by the year 2000, which is only 5 years from now,
Russia will have about 122 submarines in its fleet, more than half of
which will be advanced third-generation vessels. Already today, Russia
has several operational submarines that are quieter than the quietest
United States submarine at sea. Russia's latest submarine will be
operational by the year 2000--the one under design now--and is expected
to rival the capabilities of our best attack submarines.
To illustrate these advances, I would like to insert in the Record a
February 12 article from Defense News documenting recent Russian
undersea efforts.
I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[[Page S 11291]]
[From the Defense News, Feb. 6-12, 1995]
Russia Pours Resources Into Submarine Improvement--Better Weapons,
Sensors Will Pose Challenge to West
(By Robert Holzer)
Washington.--Despite enormous economic difficulties, the
Russian government continues to invest in submarines and is
expected to field a more advanced sub force by 2000,
according to U.S. Navy intelligence estimates.
While the total number of submarines in the Russian Navy's
inventory will decline from today's level of 181 to 122 by
2000, the overall quality of that force will increase
markedly, with more than half the fleet composed of more
advanced third-generation submarines, according to the Navy's
analysis.
``They are getting more out of their programs now in terms
of research and development,'' Norman Polmar, a Washington-
based submarine design consultant and an expert on the
Russian Navy, said Feb. 1. ``They are putting a lot of
resources into submarines.''
Moreover, the Russians have started developing a new
submarine class, called the Severodvinsk, that will be
operational by 2000 and is expected to rival the capabilities
of the best U.S. Navy attack submarines.
``Designed to emphasize improvements in quieting, sensor
performance and weapons delivery, Severodvinsk is projected
to outperform today's most advanced Western submarines in
many respects,'' according to the January 1995 report
``Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade,''
prepared by Navy intelligence.
The Russian Navy also is improving its mix of sea-based
weapons, according to the Navy's report, and has two
significant new weapon programs under development.
One is described as an extremely fast rocket-powered
torpedo that has no equivalent in the U.S. or other Western
navies. The other is a new type of antiship cruise missile
that would be launched from the torpedo tubes of future
submarines and the Oscar II cruise missile-carrying
submarine.
To achieve marked improvements in its submarine fleet, the
Russian military is making sacrifices in strategic bomber and
rocket forces, surface ships, and tank, artillery and
infantry capabilities, the report said.
Third-generation submarines will climb to 51 percent of the
Russian submarine fleet by 2000, compared with only 28
percent today, according to the Navy's report.
The percentage of less advanced, second-generation subs
remaining in the inventory will decline to 46 percent from
today's level of 68 percent, according to the report.
The performance difference between second- and third-
generation submarines is fairly dramatic, Navy sources said,
noting that third-generation Russian submarines incorporate
advances in quieting and improved propulsion systems,
enhancing the submarine's undersea stealth.
Improved Russian submarine performance could greatly impact
U.S. and Western views of antisubmarine warfare and lead to a
reassessment of needed capabilities to counter this potential
threat, Navy sources and military experts said.
``With the improved Akula submarine, they have already
achieved acoustic parity with the [U.S. Navy's Los Angeles-
class] SSN-688s, and that is frightening,'' retired Vice Adm.
Bernard Kauderer, president of the Annandale, VA-based Naval
Submarine League, said Feb. 1.
Akula is an attack submarine that incorporates many of the
advances the Russians have made in reducing the radiated
noise of their submarines.
``We need to continue our research and development programs
and produce new submarines,'' Kauderer said.
Mr. CHAFEE. Thankfully, today Russia is not a major adversary, and I
am hopeful that this administration and future ones will indeed
strengthen U.S.-Russian relations. We are all for that.
However, in these uncertain times, unforeseen political instability
or a rise in anti-West nationalism could result in Russia becoming a
genuine undersea threat in the future. That is a big nation.
Perhaps more importantly to the United States in the near term is
Russia's sale of its very capable submarines to potential United States
adversaries abroad, a move that poses a very serious challenge to our
Navy.
There are many nations that recognize the cost effectiveness of
submarines, even relatively unsophisticated ones: diesel power, for
example.
Listen to this statistic, Mr. President. According to the Office of
Naval Intelligence, more than 600 submarines are operational in the
navies of 44 countries. That is an astonishing statistic. Mr.
President, 44 nations have submarines. I must say, I have difficulty
adding up what the 44 are.
Iran recently purchased two Kilo-class submarines from Russia. These
vessels are operational today. Who would ever have thought Iran would
have submarines? A third Kilo submarine is scheduled for delivery from
Russia to Iran this year.
In addition, China--that great inland land-based power--intends to
buy as many as 22 diesel-powered submarines from Russia over the next 5
years in its quest to enhance its military capability in the South
China Sea.
What about North Korea? Who ever thought of North Korea as a great
military power? Who would have thought it is an undersea threat? Yet it
possesses, if you can believe it, the world's fourth largest submarine
force and could use these submarines in a variety of belligerent
coastal missions.
Yes, the cold war is over and we are grateful for that. However, I
think we ought to recognize that the world is still a dangerous place.
That is why we have this massive defense bill before us.
Undersea threats remain a fact of life that we ask our military
forces to address. I am convinced that completion of the Seawolf
program with its third Seawolf will give the United States the ability
to respond to these still potent undersea threats.
Contrary to what we sometimes hear in the press, the Seawolf's
capabilities are more than the ability to engage the former Soviet
Union in open ocean conflict. The Seawolf would be used to strike both
land and sea targets with its cruise missiles, making it a versatile
platform against any potential adversary. It will allow the Navy to
covertly and quickly exert special operation forces.
The Seawolf will be given a wide variety of missions in our Navy of
the future. As the director of submarine plans, Adm. Dennis Jones, said
recently, ``We must fundamentally change the way we will fight in the
future.'' Included among the undersea missions is a demonstration over
the next year to assess how a submerged submarine can control an
unmanned aerial vehicle. This new mission and others are described in a
June 12 article from the Defense News that I ask be printed in the
Record, Mr. President.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Defense News, June 12, 1995]
U.S. Subs Gear For Broader Mission--Force Explores UAVs, Communication
Links
(By Robert Holzer)
Washington.--Shedding decades of self-imposed isolation
patrolling the open ocean, U.S. Navy submariners may soon
control unmanned vehicles and stealthily communicate with
each other in operations close to enemy shores.
Long accustomed to operating independently and focused
almost exclusively on countering the Soviet submarine threat,
the U.S. submarine force seeks added capabilities in
communications, sensors and weapons to perform shallow-water
missions.
``One constant is that things are changing, not only for
us, but for our enemies,'' Rear Adm. Dennis Jones, director
of submarine plans, said in a June 6 briefing to the Naval
Submarine League's annual symposium in Alexandria, Va. ``We
must fundamentally change the way we will fight in the
future.''
To accomplish this, the submarine force will conduct a
demonstration effort over the next year to assess how a
submerged submarine can control an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV), Jones said.
Pentagon officials say the Navy will test the Predator UAV
in this role. Built by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems
Inc., San Diego, the Predator emerged over the last year as a
priority system in U.S. military plans.
The Predator is a high-altitude endurance UAV that can
loiter aloft for more than 60 hours without refueling. It can
fly as high as 12,100 meters and carry a 180-kilogram
payload. The payload can include sensor packages that provide
instant imagery, even at night and in bad weather, to
tactical commanders.
The Pentagon is dispatching several Predators now to
monitor the situation in Bosnia, military sources said.
Because submarines usually are the first weapon systems
deployed off a potential enemy's coastline, often conducting
clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance days or weeks
before a crisis erupts, linking those operations with UAVs
makes good tactical sense, military experts said.
``There is a lot of flexibility with that concept,'' Norman
Polmar, a naval expert here, said June 7, noting that a
submarine could simply leave the UAV operating over an area
for an extended period and then come near the surface to tap
into the data the system collected during its reconnaissance.
Submarines may even launch UAVs and retrieve them later at
sea, Polmar said.
Although the submarine force has augmented its
communication capabilities over the last several years,
conveying information and data between submerged submarines
is a new area of emphasis, Rear
[[Page S 11292]]
Adm. Richard Buchanan, commander of Submarine Group 2 with the Atlantic
Fleet, said June 7.
The service already has conducted several tests of
underwater communications, which even included the
transmission of imagery, Jones said.
``This is a revolution unto itself,'' Jones said. ``If
information doesn't go easily from submarines to joint task
force commanders, then we will be bypassed as seeming too
difficult.''
To prevent this, the submarine force will field a number of
communication improvements over the next few years that will
yield tremendous increases in capability, Navy officials
said.
These include the capability by 1998 to transmit video to
other subs or ships nearly instantaneously, and by 2000,
Super High Frequency satellite links that will vastly
increase the amount of data that submerged vessels can
transmit and receive.
Mr. CHAFEE. I hope I have helped to dispel the myth that the
submarine is a relic of the cold war and we no longer need submarines.
To the contrary, the Seawolf is a very relevant military platform to
face the threat of the post-Soviet world. For these reasons, I urge my
colleagues to join me in opposing the McCain amendment.
I thank the Chair and thank the Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Maine. I will try and see if I
cannot shave off some of those moments to move this along. I want to
underscore and support the comments of the Senator from Arizona, trying
to move this process along.
I am tempted to repeat what I have repeated on other occasions in
this body or elsewhere the words of the famous Congressman from
Arizona. Having listened to an extensive debate and been the fourth or
fifth speaker, he announced to the audience that everything had been
said on the subject but not everyone had said it. So I will take a few
moments to share some thoughts about the pending matter.
Let me begin by commending my colleague from Connecticut, Senator
Lieberman, who serves on the committee, the chairman of the
subcommittee, Senator Cohen of Maine, and of course my colleagues from
Rhode Island as well.
My colleagues will be pleased to note that if we can successfully
defeat this amendment, this may be the last debate on the Seawolf
program, because this is the last Seawolf. That in itself may cause
significant support to move in our direction, having heard for the last
number of years on numerous occasions from colleagues across the
country of their desire that this issue be resolved once and for all.
So I urge my colleagues to oppose the McCain amendment and once and
for all put the Seawolf issue to bed, having completed the third
program.
Mr. President, I will underscore many things that have been said by
my colleagues from Connecticut and Rhode Island about the importance
here--and it needs to be emphasized, it would be another matter indeed
if we were talking about a world in which this technology had lost its
appeal. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending upon your perspective,
that is not the case.
In fact, there are, as the junior Senator from Rhode Island pointed
out, 44 nations that possess this technology. In fact, it seems to be
growing in its appeal.
Again, I emphasize what has been said about Russia. All of us are
deeply pleased with what has occurred in the collapse of the Berlin
Wall, the end of the cold war. Again, I think we all appreciate the
lack of clarity as to which direction Russia is going in. We all hope
that it is going to continue to move in the direction of a democratic
State which does not pose a threat to its neighbors or to others.
I do not think anyone would be prepared to stand on this floor today
and say with absolute certainty that they were convinced that was going
to be the ultimate result. If we cannot state that with absolute
certainty, or the degree of certainty that seems to be the prudent
course, to be mindful of the kind of technology that is being expanded
and developed, and it is significant.
In fact, we are told by those who watch these efforts far more
closely than most of us, that today Russia is developing a technology
in submarine arenas that will approximate the quietness that we have
been able to achieve with our technology, and as my colleagues know, in
submarine technology the quietness of a submarine is one of the most
critical elements of all.
So, the first point is, of course, that we still see a global threat,
that there are nations that never before possessed this technology that
are acquiring it.
Second, Mr. President, the industrial base argument which was made in
the past but I think needs to be made here as well, there are no less
than 10 unique submarine technologies that will perish if this
amendment is adopted. I am not talking about large corporations with
thousands of workers. I am talking about facilities with literally the
last of the craftsmen--men and women--with knowledge and skill to
create and build unique components of our Nation's submarine fleet.
Likewise, if this amendment should pass, the final legion of
dedicated and professional workers who build the final product will
disappear, and that is not an exaggeration.
Let me tell my colleague something about those workers. Some of them
have been building submarines literally for decades. Most are members
of entire families that have passed that knowledge on between
generations. These are craftsmen, I say to my colleagues. They are the
final artists of a very unique industry that America must not abandon.
Let me give an example of what I am talking about. It can take up to
7 years to replace a fully qualified Navy nuclear welder capable of
welding the 3-inch steel hulls of the Seawolf class submarine. Mr.
President, 7 years to acquire that technology. That is the
apprenticeship, yard time, evaluations, and, finally, qualification to
perform the delicate welds in and around the nuclear reactor area of
this submarine. Seven years to acquire that skill level.
I suggest to my colleagues, and I think they would agree, we should
not abandon that capability.
As for cost, I agree with the Navy plan to go to a smaller, less
expensive submarine program. But to get there, we have to finish what
we have started. We have to complete this final boat of the Seawolf
class.
Remember, there were 23 of these boats we talked about. We are now
down to three. I say to my colleagues that to complete the program
here, to stop the program when it is 45 percent complete, I think, is
penny wise and pound foolish.
So, Mr. President, again I underscore the terrific work done by my
colleague from Connecticut on the Armed Services Committee in making
this case. I appreciate immensely the support of the chairman of the
subcommittee, the Senator from Maine, and others who have stood with us
on this program over the years. It is obviously important to us in
Connecticut.
But my colleague from Connecticut, my colleagues from Rhode Island,
could not in good conscience stand here and ask our colleagues from
across this country to support a program that did not contribute
significantly to the long-term security needs of our Nation. No matter
how important it is to us on a parochial level, that is not a
justification to ever support one of these programs. As important as
that is to us, the importance of this program is its contribution to
the long-term national security needs of our Nation.
For those reasons, and with all due respect and affection for the
author of this amendment, I urge the rejection of the proposal.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Pennsylvania.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of
the subcommittee for yielding this time. I want to start out by
congratulating the Senators from Connecticut for their fine work on
this project, particularly Senator Lieberman, my colleague in the Armed
Services Committee, for his outstanding work on this program.
I come here as someone who in the past has been an opponent of the
Seawolf. In fact, I introduced a bill back in 1991 which called for
eliminating the 29 Seawolf submarines that were on the boards because I
thought it was too costly, that it was a cold war
[[Page S 11293]]
relic, that 29 of these submarines was far too many, the threat was not
out there for that kind of expenditure of, really, tens of billions of
dollars.
Having watched what has happened since 1991, and since I introduced
that resolution, I have seen the number of Seawolf submarines go from
29 to 3, and I have seen the Russian Navy still be the focal point, as
was said earlier. What I have seen in response, in the past 4 years
since the fall of the Soviet Union, is the Russians keeping their eye
on the ball of maintaining their capacity, their submarine capacity as
really their focal point as to how they are going to be a world threat,
militarily. That is where they have invested their money.
So, while I would not stand up here and support another 27 Seawolf
submarines, I will say that, given the threat that is out there, given
the legitimacy of the dollars invested and the capability of the
Russian fleet, nuclear submarine fleet and attack submarine fleet, that
this is a wise investment for us.
I repeat what the junior Senator from Connecticut said. We have a
situation right now--and I agree with him, I do not think the American
public realizes this--where the Russians are in fact ahead of us in a
very important military capability and that is submarines. They are
ahead of us. They have quieter ships than we do.
That is stealth. You hear so much about stealth technology when it
comes to the Air Force. That means you cannot see it on the radar and
you can go in there and do things before anybody sees you. Stealth in a
submarine is how quiet it is. If you cannot hear them you cannot find
them. That is the situation we are in right now. We are sending our
submariners out there, into the oceans of this world, in a sense
blind--deaf to the threats that the former Soviet Union, the Russians
are now putting forward. This is our response and it is an appropriate
one. It is an appropriate place to invest those dollars.
We do so recognizing if we pull the plug on the third Seawolf we will
waste a whole lot of money. Already, as has been said many times, $900
million is already appropriated for this submarine. We have over a
third of the costs already in the submarine. To close it down would
cost even more.
There are disputes. The Senator from Arizona, whom I greatly
respect--I admire his ability to go into this defense budget and try to
find areas where he believes there is waste. I respect that. There are
some substantial disagreements as to the CBO calculations for the cost
savings of the Seawolf submarine, discontinuing the Seawolf submarine.
The Navy, in a document that was transmitted to me, says that they
underestimate a lot of the costs, that they do not recognize that by
shutting off this third Seawolf we will likely end production of any
kind of ships at Electric Boat, in Connecticut. They do not count for
the shutdown of that facility or the costs that would be incurred in
future shipbuilding as a result of having just one shipyard. I think it
is a substantial one, not just for our industrial base--which I happen
to believe is important--but for the competitiveness that is necessary
to get high-quality, low-cost ships in this country.
I want to mention just one final thing. I want to talk about the
industrial base, not from a State that has a huge submarine industrial
base, although we have some. I will say one of the other reasons I
support this third Seawolf is because I do believe we do need an
industrial base of skilled technicians and companies that can produce
this kind of very high-quality, demanding, and very specific high-
quality work. If we do not continue this bridge, which the third
Seawolf turns out to be, into the new attack submarine, we will not
only have that new attack submarine cost more as a result, but I think
we may not end up with as good a product.
So I come here as a reformed Seawolf opponent who understands this is
a project, an investment that is worthwhile to combat a serious threat
to preserve an industrial base that is essential to the military
capability, production capability of our country. I support it
wholeheartedly and oppose the amendment of the Senator from Arizona.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. President, the GAO report was before the Armed Services Committee
on May 16, 1995 as follows: On page 6:
. . . there is disagreement about a number of issues
including Russia's defense spending priorities, Russia's
ability to maintain its operating tempo and readiness and
maintenance levels, and the future Russian force structure
levels and production programs.
The GAO report goes on to say:
The ONI report [Office of Navy Intelligence report] does
not address other factors that should be considered in
determining the overall superiority of United States and
Russian submarines, such as sensor processing, weapons,
platform design, tactics, doctrine and crew training.
Public reports, news accounts and, more importantly, other DOD
publications, including the Annual Director of Naval Intelligence
Posture Statement, present other information on some of the factors
that affect submarine superiority. For example, these reports note:
. . . a decline in the operating tempo of Russian
submarines, order of battle, and construction programs.
They also note:
Morale and discipline have deteriorated, personnel
shortages are serious, and the frequency and scope of naval
operations, training, readiness and maintenance have
declined.
Somebody said earlier, one of the Senators from Connecticut, I
believe, we ought to use common sense here. Let us use common sense.
Common sense shows us the condition of Russia today, the state of their
military. This military could not even defeat the Chechnyans. To
believe, somehow, they come from some kind of superior shipyard with
superior workmanship and with superior quality of personnel flies in
the face of common sense.
Mr. President, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
I will quote the New York Times, Sunday, July 30, 1995:
To The Editor:
I have a lot of respect for Secretary of the Navy John
Dalton. I hate to see him fall prey to the sharks who are
trying to justify the spending of $1.5 billion for the third
Seawolf submarine.
* * * * *
The allegation is like the ``missile gap'' or the ``bomber
gap'' or the ``readiness gap.'' . . . Does this ``quietness
gap'' exist?
There are two aspects to quieting a submarine. The first
takes place when the submarine is built. To say our
submarines are not built as well as Russian submarines
condemns the very shipyard we are trying to keep operating.
The second aspect of quieting is in the operation of the
ship. Is Secretary Dalton telling us that the crews of our
submarines are not as well trained or as competent as the
Russians?
I never met a submarine officer who did not think our
submarines were the best in the world--by far. I am sorry to
see this proud group stoop to chicanery to justify an
unnecessary weapon.
--John J. Shanahan, Vice Admiral, retired.
Let us use some common sense when we evaluate whether we need to
spend another couple of billion dollars on a weapons system for which
there is no compelling requirement.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor and strong supporter
of the amendment by Senator McCain to terminate the third Seawolf
submarine.
I want to thank the Senator from Arizona for his leadership on this
issue and for his constant and tireless efforts to scour the defense
budget--and, indeed, the entire Federal budget--for wasteful and
unnecessary spending.
Like the Senator from Arizona, I believe we must build a strong
military that can respond to the rapidly changing threats America faces
in the post-cold war world.
The Seawolf submarine, which was developed to counter a specific
Soviet threat during the cold war, is simply outdated and irrelevant in
this new era.
Mr. President, if we're going to buy military equipment that's behind
the times, the least we could hope for is to get it at a cut-rate
price. But this is not the case. The third Seawolf will cost $2.4
billion bringing the grand total for this program to more than $7
billion for just three submarines.
I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to terminate the
Seawolf and save the taxpayers a minimum of $1.3 billion. Moreover,
these savings could increase in future years as we determine the most
efficient way to construct the next generation of nuclear submarines.
[[Page S 11294]]
As the Senator from Arizona has repeatedly pointed out, this funding
is needed for higher priority defense programs that will truly enhance
our military readiness.
The McCain amendment has been strongly endorsed by a number of
Government watchdog organizations, including the National Taxpayers
Union, Citizens Against Government Waste, and Citizens for a Sound
Economy.
Mr. President, let's stand with these groups and show the American
taxpayers that the Congress supports responsible spending that will
yield a strong and strategically sound national defense.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-four minutes and thirty-two seconds.
Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 10 minutes.
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Senator from Arizona, who
is a good friend and someone I have worked with since I came to the
Senate and long before that time. He was advising me on military
matters when he was with the Navy.
Bismark once observed that there are two things that do not change in
this life: One is history and the other is geography.
Going back historically, we can look at the period of time during
World War II. At that time we had over 5,000 ships in our inventory. We
are now looking at downsizing to in the neighborhood of 340 or 348
ships.
So we have come from having such an armada of 5,000 ships capable of
fighting during World War II down to about 340 to 350 ships. Obviously,
they are much more capable today than they were in the past. But as the
numbers have come down, we have insisted that the capability increase.
And that is because the oceans have not diminished in size and
geography has not changed. The oceans are still roughly the same size.
Our commitments have not diminished in any significant degree. We still
are an island nation.
As my colleague from Rhode Island has said, we are likely to remain a
naval power for the foreseeable future, hopefully for the indefinite
future. Our commitment is to maintain the sealanes of communication.
That is our lifeblood, and no nation should ever have the capability of
being able to interrupt that, to cut off that flow, to cut off the
blood supply, the oxygen supply. We depend upon having access to the
open ocean and having that access unchallenged.
So looking at history and looking at geography, we can say, well, we
have downsized. The reality is the cold war is over. It does not mean
there are no dangers left in this world. They are of a different
magnitude and a different type. But they are dangers nonetheless.
As most of my colleagues who have spoken in opposition to the Senator
from Arizona, the one thing we keep reminding ourselves is that the
Russians, notwithstanding the state of their economy, continue to
produce submarines. Now, they may not be operating at the same tempo
that our submarines are operating, the morale of their sailors may be
at a much lower level than the morale of our sailors, but that, too,
can change.
What has not changed is the number. They are still producing roughly
the same numbers of submarines that they were at the height of the cold
war. Some of that is no doubt due to fact that it is just inertia and
it is a jobs program for the Russians. They have to do something. They
might as well do something that they have been working on. They have to
build more ships.
But the numbers ought to be of concern to all of us because at some
point in time the tides might change. Our relationship with the
Russians might change. It might get better. It might get worse. We do
not know. We have no way of predicting the future. And we should never
structure our forces or our industrial base predicated upon the
unknown; that since we cannot foresee the future, we should simply
conform our industrial base to what exists currently. That would be a
prescription for future disaster.
So we have to plan for the future taking into account the unknown,
taking into account history, taking into account geography, and try to
plan as best we can given the resources that are available.
That, I believe, is what the Navy has done. The Navy has said we
would like to have two nuclear-capable shipyards. We are not prepared
at this point in time to say there should be only one yard in America
producing nuclear-capable ships--one yard--namely, Newport News. That
may be the situation sometime in the future. We may not be able to
afford more than one yard.
But the Navy is unwilling, given the unforeseeability of the future,
given the sort of chaotic situation which exists in the world today, to
take that chance at this point in time. They are saying, ``We are not
willing to put all of our eggs in one basket. We do not know whether
there will be a surreptitious attack upon that location. We do not know
whether it will be a bolt out of the blue. We did not know whether it
will be a natural catastrophe. We are unwilling to take the risk to put
all of our shipbuilding into one yard.''
We would like to see Electric Boat continue. And make no mistake
about it, you cancel the third Seawolf and EB is out of business. They
will shut down. Their 7,000 or 8,000 or 9,000 workers--whatever that
figure is now--will be out of work. That may please the National
Taxpayers Union and it may please the various groups that have come out
in favor of this amendment saying it will save money. I do not think it
will save money. It will put people on the welfare rolls. It will put
them out of work. It will increase the deficit, no doubt, because we
will simply have to pay for those welfare recipients and not have any
income or revenues coming in from the taxpayers themselves.
So I am not sure it would be an appropriate tradeoff. If we were only
engaged in one public works program, if we were simply talking about
public works or dead-end jobs, sweeping streets, cleaning up garbage,
that would be one thing. But we are talking about here highly skilled
individuals, people who work for years to develop the capability of
designing and then constructing the most complicated ships in the
world--nuclear submarines.
It takes, as the Senator from Connecticut, Senator Dodd, indicated, 7
years to build a ship.
Ironically, I was just at a launching of the U.S.S. Maine in
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME. That ship, a Trident
submarine, was launched. It was built by Electric Boat and commissioned
at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The president of the EB yard was there
and pointed out that in World War II Electric Boat was cranking out
about two ships a month, or about one every other week. We are now down
to producing one a year, or one and a half a year.
So times have changed, and we have to change accordingly. But it does
not mean that we should sever the ability of this country to maintain
an industrial capacity of skilled working people who are contributing
substantially to our national security.
I can agree with much of what my colleague from Arizona has said. We
come to a different conclusion on this. We are trying to keep Electric
Boat in competition with Newport News for a little longer, at least
because the Navy is unsure at this point whether or not we will ever
have to build more than one ship a year, whether we will be able to
support two yards. I think they are not prepared to say we can only
afford one yard.
I believe Admiral Boorda, or read the writings of Admiral Shanahan
and others. But I would put that up against Admiral Boorda. I do not
think Mike Boorda would come to the Congress or to the U.S. Senate and
misrepresent the facts. I do not think that he would suggest that this
is something that is really necessary when it is not, that it is simply
a jobs program for the Navy or for EB. I think that he is persuaded
that the Navy does in fact need this ship in order to get us to the
follow-on.
If you terminate the Seawolf right now, EB is not going to be in
competition. That is very clear. We might as well say that Newport News
will be the only yard that will then build the follow-on to the
Seawolf, the Centurion, or whatever it is going to be called.
That is a policy decision that we will be making here on the floor of
the Senate, and some are prepared to make it. I do not for 1 minute
question my friend from Arizona. He is someone who is expert in the
field. He is someone who has dedicated himself to the
[[Page S 11295]]
Navy. We just come out on a different end of the judgment on this one.
But I do not for a moment want to put us in the position of making
the policy judgment that we only need one yard in this country to
produce aircraft carriers and submarines. That is what it ends up
being. Newport News will be the only shipyard in the country producing
all of our nuclear-capable ships into the future.
I think that is a risk that the Navy is not willing to bear at this
point in time. I think it is a risk that we as Senators should not be
willing to bear at this time. And I think in view of the fact that we
have spent the $900 million on the third Seawolf, in view of the fact
we have come down from 23 to 3, in view of the fact that we would have
termination liabilities, we at least ought to get a ship out of it
which allows EB to be in a competitive position to compete head to head
with Newport News on the follow-on ships.
For those reasons, Mr. President, I hope that we defeat the amendment
of my friend from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. President, I always respect and appreciate, and even enjoy, the
comments of my old and dear friend from Maine. Usually he and I are on
the same side on most issues. On this side, I pay careful attention to
his words since they are always well thought out and extremely
edifying.
Again, we find, as he mentioned, ourselves on opposite sides of this
issue.
Mr. President, if we had a defense budget that we had all during the
1980's, I would still have some questions about this weapons system,
primarily because I still believe that our money could be spent much
more wisely in other areas. But we really do not have the kinds of
funds that I believe would allow us to afford this ship.
I received a letter on July 28 from the Congressional Budget Office,
so I can illuminate my friends as to what kind of money we are talking
about.
After briefly reviewing those savings, the accompanying
attachment focuses on the implications of consolidating
construction of all nuclear powered ships at a single
shipyard.
CBO's analysis suggests that such a consolidation could
result in savings of between $2.4 billion and $3.7 billion
(in 1996 dollars) over the life of the new attack submarine
program, which is currently slated to acquire some 30 ships
between 1998 and 2020. That amount is less than one
contractor claims could be saved through consolidation, but
more than the Navy's own estimate. Consolidation could also
lead to a somewhat smaller shipbuilding work force: CBO
estimates that at most 3,300 shipyards jobs are at issue, and
the reduction resulting from consolidation might be
substantially less. Essential skills for producing nuclear-
powered ships--many of which reside in the suppliers and
subcontractors to the shipyards--would be retained whether or
not production was consolidated.
Signed by June O'Neill, who, as we all know, is the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
Mr. President, I wish to make one additional comment. That is that I
think we ought to look at history also, and the history of Russia is
that they have primarily been a land empire. They have concentrated
their focus on expansion of their empire to adjacent areas. It was not
until well into the cold war that the Soviet Union began to build a
fleet and when they built that fleet, it was primarily for strategic
purposes and for the delivery of strategic weaponry. I do not believe
that the Russians contemplate a strategic confrontation with the United
States any time soon. Again, it is common sense, as has been said on
this floor on many occasions.
Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 24 minutes 55 seconds.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, a $1\1/2\ billion vote deserves serious
consideration by this body in this time of fiscal crisis. Throughout
the defense budget debates in the 6 years since the cold war ended, I
have been routinely amazed--and disappointed--that the Senate cannot
bring itself to terminate one of the most expensive, outdated, poorly
managed, cold war programs in the entire budget--namely, the Seawolf
submarine program.
Mr. President, there are several reasons to support the amendment
that Senator McCain and I are offering. First, the Seawolf is a cold
war weapon with no modern mission. It was originally conceived as the
ultimate United States weapon against Soviet ballistic missile
submarines. It would operate 1,000 feet beneath the seas, quieter than
the seas themselves. Its special sensors and computer systems would
detect Soviet nuclear submarines well before the Seawolf could be
observed.
If this Nation were still in the grip of the cold war, we would
probably be justified in procuring further Seawolf submarines. But, the
cold war is over, and the system has no mission in the post-cold war
world. Consequently, it should be terminated immediately.
Second, this program is poorly managed and the problems are such that
I have little faith in the Navy's estimate of how much money the
taxpayers will be required to spend. The General Accounting Office now
says that average cost of the first two subs will be well over $5
billion. Moreover, there are significant cost overruns in virtually
every aspect of this program. According to the GAO, the design contract
was overrun by 131 percent, the production contract on the first sub is
overrun by about 80 percent, and the average unit cost is overrun by
about 250 percent.
Giving this hog more feed is not going to make it any leaner. The
design for the first submarine is currently in its fifth revision and
is more than half a million hours behind schedule, even though
production began several years ago. With the proposed design changes in
the SSN-23, additional delays and cost overruns are inevitable.
A third reason to terminate the Seawolf program is to restore
accountability for the Navy's poor acquisition management. There is no
incentive for industry to perform efficiently as long as funding is
guaranteed. The guise of the submarine industrial base should not
remove the Navy's accountability for the Seawolf's 250 percent cost
overrun. This program is a dud, and we ought to let it fizzle out.
A fourth reason to kill the Seawolf program is that funding a third
Seawolf submarine takes money away from more important needs. It is
untenable to require service men and women to live off food stamps so
that $100,000 a year defense contractors can remain employed in an
endeavor that does not add to our national security. We have all heard
stories of shortfalls in military readiness, due to lack of funds.
A fifth reason not to fund a third Seawolf submarine is that there
are more cost-effective means of protecting the industrial base. One
alternative approach to maintaining the submarine industrial base is
allowing it to work on commercial projects, which Electric Boat is
currently pursuing and should do so more aggressively in the future.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the costs of other
alternatives, such as overhauls and modernization efforts, are much
less than building and maintaining a third Seawolf.
We must also keep in mind that engineering expertise is being
protected by work on the new attack submarine and design changes on the
first two Seawolves. Furthermore, the submarine deactivation workload
will ensure an industrial base well into the future. Finally, the Navy
announced its intent to increase its reliance on commercial
technologies in building the new attack submarine, and reduce its
reliance on the submarine industrial base.
Several years ago, when Senator McCain and I have moved to stop
funding for the Seawolf, we garnered very few votes. Then, 2 days
later, President Bush terminated the program in recognition that the
cold war was over. Time and again, the program has been kept alive for
political, rather than military, purposes. We can no longer afford to
spend $1.5 billion for such reasons. I encourage my colleagues to vote
to support our amendment.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, due to the exigencies of the hour and the
efficiency of my friend from Connecticut, and, as my other friend,
Senator Lieberman, said, much of this debate has been covered in years
past, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time if my
colleagues are so prepared. Senator Cohen is prepared to yield it back.
Mr. COHEN. I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
[[Page S 11296]]
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I would move to table the----
Mr. McCAIN. I say to my friend, if we do, we will bring up the
amendment again and again until we get an up-or-down vote.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion be
a tabling motion, as in keeping with the previous unanimous-consent
agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can make a motion to table.
Mr. COHEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further
proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have been asked to announce that the
vote on this amendment--I ask unanimous consent that it be an up-or-
down vote----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN [continuing]. Will occur at 8:10. In the meantime, Mr.
President, I would like to announce that on this side we have all of
the amendments. We would appreciate it if those on the other side would
complete their list of the amendments so that the distinguished
chairman can move forward with the unanimous consent, at least so that
we can finalize the list of amendments. We hope to be able to do that
between now and 8:10, when the vote will take place. Also, Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur at 8:10.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. I ask my friend from Maine if he is ready to move
forward?
Mr. COHEN. No.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that the quorum call be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that my
leader time be extended by an additional 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Daschle pertaining to the introduction of S. 1117
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Vote on Amendment No. 2090
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question occurs
on the McCain amendment No. 2090.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 30, nays 70, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 356 Leg.]
YEAS--30
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bingaman
Bond
Bradley
Brown
Bumpers
Burns
Coats
Conrad
Domenici
Dorgan
Feingold
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Harkin
Hatfield
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lugar
McCain
Murray
Pressler
Roth
Shelby
Stevens
Wellstone
NAYS--70
Abraham
Akaka
Bennett
Biden
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Exon
Faircloth
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Graham
Gregg
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kyl
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Santorum
Sarbanes
Simon
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
So the amendment (No. 2090) was rejected.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Several Senators addressed the chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I wonder if I could have the attention of
all Members here so I can tell them where we are.
It is my understanding we might be able to line up three votes here--
or three amendments, which will be debated tonight and voted on first
thing in the morning if votes are necessary.
I think the first will be an amendment by the Senator from Arizona,
which will be second-degreed by the Senator from Connecticut. I am not
sure that will require a vote. It may or may not require a vote.
Then there is a DOE matter which will take, I understand, about 2
hours of debate.
Then Senator Bumpers, we want to accommodate him because he has a
personal problem tomorrow. We would like to take at least one of his,
debate one of his amendments tonight and the other the first thing in
the morning.
Will that be satisfactory?
Mr. BUMPERS. That will be satisfactory.
Mr. DOLE. So if that took that much time, it would be about 11:30.
It would seem to me, those who are involved can stay here and debate
those and then have those two votes first thing tomorrow morning, if
that is all right with the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. That will be all right if we can get through the
debate--all but the voting. We have a lot of amendments tonight to act
on.
Mr. DOLE. I understand that.
Mr. BUMPERS. If the majority leader will yield for a question, I have
one amendment I would like to offer tonight. I am willing to settle for
a 30-minute time agreement. I would like very much to go in front of
the DOE amendment, which will take 2 hours, if that will be all right.
It will be very helpful to me.
Mr. COHEN. Which one is it?
Mr. DOLE. Can you give us some indication of what the amendment was?
Mr. BUMPERS. There is a provision in the bill that sets up a new
method--directs the Department of Defense to set up a new method for
financing arms sales. My amendment will strike that provision. It is a
very simple amendment. Everybody will understand it.
Mr. DOLE. If I can get consent, Senator Bumpers offers his amendment
regarding export loan guarantees. There will be 30 minutes for debate
divided in the usual form, with no second-degree amendments to be in
order, and following the conclusion or yielding back of the time the
Senate lay aside the amendment. That will follow the amendments by
Senator McCain and----
Mr. McCAIN. If the leader will yield, I think the majority leader's
unanimous consent is excellent. But I would point out we still do not
have the list of amendments from the other side. I hope we could, at
least by the close of business, get a complete list of amendments which
would then be propounded as a unanimous-consent agreement before we
leave tonight. So at least it will narrow down the total number of
amendments if we are to have any prospect whatsoever of finishing
tomorrow night.
Mr. NUNN. If the leader will yield, we are working on that list. We
will have a copy of it in another hour or so.
Mr. DOLE. Hopefully you are working it down.
[[Page S 11297]]
Mr. NUNN. We are doing our best to work it down.
Mr. DOLE. Because let me indicate again, on Saturday we start off
with the Treasury-Post Office appropriations bill, and I am not certain
when this bill will be back again. So, hopefully, if we can accommodate
the manager, who has been working very hard--he lost 5 hours yesterday.
We had 7 hours today on one amendment. They are trying to catch up
here. So if we can keep our amendments to a minimum, I am certain it
will help the managers, who have done a good job.
We do want to accommodate the Senator from Arkansas. He has a funeral
to attend tomorrow.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, let me correct that. I am sorry, I misled
the leader. I am leaving here tomorrow night.
Mr. DOLE. That is fine. We still want to accommodate the Senator from
Arkansas.
Is there any objection to the request on his amendment?
Mr. CHAFEE. He goes first under the request?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, is the Thurmond amendment
going to come before the Bumpers amendment?
Mr. DOLE. The amendment by Senator McCain will be next. That will be
second-degreed by Senator Dodd. Following disposition of that, it will
be Senator Bumpers' amendment, 30 minutes. Following that will be the
DOE amendment which will take about 2 hours.
Mr. McCAIN. And amendments to the DOE bill will be in order?
Mr. DOLE. Amendments to the DOE bill will be in order but we would
like to have the votes on those tomorrow morning.
Mr. REID. Reserving right to object, I have no objection to the
unanimous-consent request as far as it relates to the amendment of
Senator McCain or the amendment of Senator Bumpers. But I do not
consent to anything relating to the Thurmond amendment, the DOE.
Mr. DOLE. Let us get this part and then I will make the next request.
Is there objection to this?
Mr. GORTON. Reserving the right to object, I say to the majority
leader, on the DOE amendment I have some severe reservations.
Mr. DOLE. I have not made that request yet. That is going to be next.
All right?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Now, if I can have the DOE.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I understand we are not going to be able to
get an agreement. I will propose the consent agreement. So it may be we
will have to have additional votes this evening. But I am going to ask
consent, when Senator Thurmond offers an amendment regarding title 31
of the bill, and immediately after reading of the amendment, Senator
Exon be recognized to offer a second-degree amendment to the Thurmond
amendment, and there be 45 minutes of debate under the control of
Senator Thurmond and 90 minutes under the control of Senator Exon.
Further, following the expiration or yielding of time, the Senator
from Nevada, Senator Reid, be recognized to offer an amendment in the
second degree regarding tritium, on which we will have 60 minutes, 40
minutes to Senator Reid, 20 minutes to Senator Thurmond,
and that the Senate proceed to vote on or in relation to the Exon
amendment and on or in relation to the Reid amendment followed
immediately by a vote on the Thurmond amendment, as amended, if
amended.
Mr. GORTON. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. DOLE. We cannot get an agreement.
Does anybody else have any amendments that we can get agreements on?
Why do we not go ahead? Let us go ahead and have the debate on this
amendment and go ahead and have a vote on the first Bumpers amendment.
Then we will try to determine what we can figure out in the next 30
minutes.
Amendment No. 2091
(Purpose: To limit the total amount that may be obligated or expended
for procurement of the SSN-21, SSN-22, and SSN-23 Seawolf class
submarines)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk and I ask
for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment
numbered 2091.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 30, after the matter following line 24, insert the
following:
SEC. 125. SEAWOLF SUBMARINE PROGRAM.
(a) Limitation of Costs.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), the total amount obligated or expended for procurement
of the SSN-21, SSN-22, and SSN-23 Seawolf class submarines
may not exceed $7,187,800,000.
(b) Automatic Increase of Limitation Amount.--The amount of
the limitation set forth in subsection (a) is increased after
fiscal year 1995 by the following amounts:
(1) The amounts of outfitting costs and post-delivery costs
incurred for the submarines referred to in such subsection.
(2) The amounts of increases in costs attributable to
economic inflation after fiscal year 1995.
(3) The amounts of increases in costs attributable to
compliance with changes in Federal, State, or local laws
enacted after fiscal year 1995.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I make a point that the Senate is not in
order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order?
Amendment No. 2092 to Amendment No. 2091
(Purpose: To propose an alternative limitation on the amount that may
be obligated for procurement of the Seawolf class submarines.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senator from
Connecticut is recognized to offer a second-degree amendment.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk
and ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) proposes an
amendment numbered 2092 to amendment No. 2091.
On page 1, line 7, strike out ``$7,187,800,000'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``$7,223,659,000''.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I make a point of order that the Senate is
not in order. I know the Chair has a problem. But these are important
amendments, and I hope the Chair will keep order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
Mr. DODD. I yield to my colleague from Arizona.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President I know what my amendment is about. I would
be prepared to ask my friend from Connecticut what his is. But I would
like to briefly explain mine.
Last year the Congress adopted an amendment to the DOD bill which
caps the procurement cost for the first two Seawolf submarines at $4.75
billion, the total amount identified by the Department of Defense as
necessary to complete construction of these two systems.
The amendment was necessary to control escalating costs of the
program. Therefore, I offer an amendment to expand the existing cost
caps to include the third Seawolf submarine, the provision establishing
a procurement cost cap of $7.2 billion on the three Seawolf submarines.
The provision allows for the same automatic increases for inflation
and labor law changes as the existing cap. It also exempts the future
costs of outfitting in postdelivery for the submarines.
These are costs which will undergo congressional review and require
authorizations and appropriations in the future.
For reasons which are not clear to me, the other body this year is
recommending a repeal of the cost cap on
[[Page S 11298]]
SSN-21 and SSN-22. I do not believe we can allow a return to the
uncontrollable cost escalations we have seen on the first two
submarines. I believe that imposing the same strict cost controls on
the third Seawolf would be to the advantage of the American taxpayer.
I yield to my colleague from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona.
Let me make this very brief. I happen to agree with my colleague from
Arizona on this amendment. We disagreed obviously on the previous
amendment. But the Senator from Arizona is absolutely correct in what
he is trying to do here.
We have a second-degree amendment that absolutely modifies the
amendment being offered by the Senator from Arizona--modifies it up by
$30 million, which I think we can reach agreement on here.
This is a mature program. I think a case can be made about cost
containment provisions on defense procurement. In the early stages you
ought to be somewhat careful about it when you are dealing with a
mature program. That is what this is. This is a mature program. I think
injecting some fiscal discipline into these programs can be helpful.
I am confident that this amendment will offer no problems at all. We
have talked to the contractors and to the Navy. We ought to be able to
complete the program with caps that are suggested by these two
amendments.
So, Mr. President, I hope that there will be no need for a rollcall
vote on this. We think it does the job.
Again, I support what our colleague from Arizona is doing. It is the
proper and appropriate approach that should be taken on matters such as
this.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, very briefly, we disagree with our
friend from Arizona whether or not to finish the third Seawolf. We do
not disagree on the question of whether or not there should be a cost
cap. There should be. I hope we will agree to the second-degree
amendment. We disagree on the question of whether we should complete
the third Seawolf. The Senate has spoken now on that question.
On the question that the Senator from Arizona now raises as to
whether there should be a cost cap, there is no disagreement. Senator
Dodd and I and all the others who support the Seawolf feel probably
even more strongly that there should be a cost cap.
So I hope we can agree on a number and leave it at that.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, before we voice vote this, because it has
been accepted on both sides, I would like to extend my congratulations
to the two Senators from Connecticut and to the Senator from Maine on a
significant victory in maintaining the Seawolf submarine. I obviously
strongly disagree. But their arguments and the work they did indicated
that a clear majority of the Senate chooses to maintain the procurement
of this weapons system. And I congratulate them on their success.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back the remaining time?
Mr. McCAIN. I yield back the time.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I would like to thank my friend from
Arizona for his gracious statement and say to him that, given a choice,
I would much rather have him on my side than against me, having real
strength and conviction, and this is one of those cases where I end up
after a fight respecting somebody more than I did before.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks
of my colleague from Connecticut.
My friend from Arizona and I have been with each other over these
many years. And there is no better fighter, no more honest Member of
our body, no person who brings more integrity to a debate, and I
appreciate how fairly he raised this issue and gave us an opportunity
to address it.
Mr. President, I would also like to commend our respective staffs, my
colleague from Connecticut for his staff, and mine, Bob Gillcash, who
has done a tremendous job over the years on these issues, this one
particularly and many others as well.
I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The question
is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut in the
second degree.
The amendment (No. 2092) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on amendment No. 2091,
as amended.
The amendment (No. 2091), as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2094
(Purpose: To strike the bill's provision concerning Defense Export Loan
Guarantees)
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers], for himself, Mr.
Feingold, Mr. Simon, and Mrs. Boxer, proposes an amendment
numbered 2094.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike line 1 on page 353 through line 16 on page 357.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, we have a 30-minute agreement on this,
but perhaps because it is a very straightforward, simple amendment, we
may be able to do it in less time than that, and I hope we can.
Right now, the United States totally dominates the foreign arms
market. We sell 53 percent of all the arms in international trade. We
also have four separate methods of financing these sales which help
maintain our position of dominance.
First of all, the Arms Export Control Act allows the President to
commit the U.S. Government to a loan guarantee or a grant.
Second the Export-Import Bank can finance any sale of technology as
long as it is nonlethal. So we sell a lot of military hardware to
countries that are financed by the Export-Import Bank.
Third we have foreign military financing which is a part of the
foreign aid bill. We pick out the countries and give them grants to buy
our weapons. We say here is $1 billion for you and $1 billion for you.
Come and buy whatever weapons you want until you use up that $1
billion. We can also subsidize loans with this program.
Fourth we have foreign military sales. Under this program the U.S.
Government or a U.S. company sells arms to a foreign government.
The bill we are debating says four methods of financing arms are not
enough. We have to have another one. And it directs with virtually no
guidance the Defense Department to set up a program exactly like OPIC.
Senators know what OPIC is. You pay a little fee and you get your loan
guarantee.
That is all there is to this amendment. I say four is enough. Let me
read you though just for entertainment purposes a list of the countries
that arms sales merchants in this country will be selling arms to by
simply paying a small fee to this new organization that the Defense
Department is ordered under the bill to set up.
You are not looking at another S&L scandal, but you are looking at
something that has the potential for a mini-S&L. We just got through
writing off $7.1 billion to Egypt and $300 million to Jordan.
I do not want to refight those battles, but how do you feel about
Burundi? Do you want to give loan guarantees to them? They already buy
weapons from us.
Here is a list of roughly 100 countries that the contractors, the
arms merchants of this already country sell arms to.
Now, the arms merchants are hot for this, and I do not blame them.
How would you like to be able to sell $100 million worth of weapons to
some Third World nation where 50 percent of the people are starving to
death for a
[[Page S 11299]]
little simple fee you pay on the front end?
Incidentally, there is not even a prohibition in this against
financing the fee. Let us assume you have a $10 million sale. Let us
assume the fee is $500,000. Just add that on. Make it a $10.5 million
loan. Finance the whole thing. There is no prohibition against it.
But here is Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Namibia,
Senegal, Zambia, Zimbabwe--100 of them. And someday in the future they
will pay a little fee, and we will sell arms to them on credit. And the
American taxpayer will assume the risk.
Now, Mr. President, I have a moral compunction about this. I make no
bones about it. I have some moral reservation about how many arms we
sell abroad. We keep forgetting that our weapons last longer than our
friendships.
Do you know where the contras down in Nicaragua got most of their
arms? They were the arms we left in Vietnam. The Vietnamese inherited a
cache of weapons that would choke a mule, and a lot of them went to the
contras in Nicaragua. What happened to all the Stingers we sent to
Afghanistan? Why, our good friends the Iranians have about 30 of them.
As I said, we sell 53 percent of all the arms sold in the world, and
the Pentagon estimates by the year 2004 we will be selling 59 percent.
That is 59 percent of all the arms sales, and somebody will say,
``Well, if we don't do it, somebody else will.'' I heard that argument
the first year I was in the Senate, and I still hear it. I say let
someone else then.
This may influence some of you--The White House strongly supports
this amendment. The administration does not want another method of
financing weapons. And the Pentagon says this can only marginally
affect the number of weapons that we are going to be selling abroad.
Mr. President, in 1993-1995, that time period, we sold $53 billion
worth of weapons. Let me ask you this: Who here believes that this
Nation is safer and stronger because we are selling anywhere from $10-
to $20 billion worth of weapons abroad each year?
Now, Mr. President, let me say to my colleagues this is not the
biggest item in this bill, but it is just another provision in which we
ought not to get involved. I promise you we are going to be financing
weapons to countries, and we are going to be forgiving the debts. We
are going to be picking up all these bad loans. It is a very generous
method. And there are a lot of Third World countries that will jump on
this thing like a chicken after a June bug, and obviously the arms
merchants will be tickled to death to sell the weapons.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the
remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. President, the Bumpers amendment proposes to strike the language
in the bill creating a self-financing defense export loan guarantee
program at the Department of Defense. I underscore the fact that it is
self-financing. All of the Members who support this measure also have a
moral compass. The program provides financing to a very select list of
countries for defense sales that meet all, all of the existing export
controls and nonproliferation policies of the United States.
It is also important to note that this authority is not limited
strictly to arms. In many cases American companies lose bids to
maintain or upgrade previously sold U.S. military equipment because
they cannot offer financing. The program in the defense authorization
bill will allow U.S. companies and American workers to compete on a
level playing field with our international competitors.
Today, almost every major arms exporter provides financing to support
the export of their domestic products and services. Indeed, some
purchasers now make financing a requirement before a company can bid on
a proposed purchase. The program is financed by fees paid by the buyer
or the seller.
The list of eligible countries--and it was interesting Senator
Bumpers went down a list of a number of countries, but the list of
eligible countries is limited to our NATO allies, nonmajor allies,
Central European countries moving toward democracy, and selected
members of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group. Of the 185
members of United Nations, we only allow 37 countries to be eligible
for these loan guarantees.
I would ask unanimous consent that the list of these 37 countries be
printed in the record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
List of Eligible Countries
1. Albania.
2. Australia.
3. Belgium.
4. Brunei.
5. Bulgaria.
6. Canada.
7. Czech.
8. Denmark.
9. Egypt.
10. France.
11. Germany.
12. Greece.
13. Hong Kong.
14. Hungary.
15. Iceland.
16. Indonesia.
17. Israel.
18. Italy.
19. Japan.
20. Luxembourg.
21. Malaysia.
22. Netherlands.
23. New Zealand.
24. Norway.
25. Philippines.
26. Poland.
27. Portugal.
28. Romania.
29. Singapore.
30. Slovakia.
31. Slovenia.
32. South Korea.
33. Spain.
34. Taiwan.
35. Thailand.
36. Turkey.
37. U.K.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. When similar legislation was proposed 2 years ago,
the Commerce Department and the Department of Defense expressed support
for the export loan guarantee program. The American companies continue
to lay off thousands of defense workers each month. This program will
help us avoid paying unemployment to defense workers and help us
preserve the U.S. defense industrial base.
That is a winning combination. At a time when U.S. procurement of
military equipment has reached all-time lows and we are all familiar
with that in basics such as ships, planes, and trucks, it makes sense
to sell these systems to our friends and our allies assuming those
countries qualify for the equipment under our existing export controls.
Now, the House-passed defense authorization bill includes similar
language, and in a strong bipartisan vote the House voted 276-152 to
keep the language in the bill. So, I urge my colleagues to reject the
Bumpers amendment and allow us to have this sort of bridge for our
defense contractors and American workers.
With that, Mr. President, I would reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from
Connecticut.
Mr. THURMOND. How much time do you want?
Mr. DODD. Three minutes, 4 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Connecticut 3
minutes.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered by
the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers].
Mr. President, I do not believe that section 1053--defense export
loan guarantees--should be deleted or amended in any way.
I believe the language in the bill strikes the right balance. It
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish a program to issue
export guarantees for financing of sales or long term leases of defense
articles or services to certain countries.
Under the provision contained in the bill, U.S. companies would be
eligible to seek export financing guarantees to countries that are
members of NATO, to countries designated as major non-NATO allies, to
countries in Central
[[Page S 11300]]
Europe, provided the Secretary of State has first designated such
country as having a democratic government, and to certain non-communist
member countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC]
organization.
This financing won't be free. Companies will be required to pay
appropriate fees and interest charges comparable to those that non-
defense exporters are charged by the U.S. Export/Import Bank.
During a period of reduced funding for purchases of weapons systems
and other defense equipment, I believe that defense exports can make a
significant difference with respect to whether our domestic industrial
base will be sustained at levels sufficient to protect our national
security.
I would remind my colleagues that we are not going to be the first
country to offer such a program. We are way behind our allies and major
trading partners on that score. Many of them make no distinction
between defense and non-defense exports in their export assistance
programs.
The international defense market is incredibly competitive. Despite
the fact that the U.S. defense industry produces some of the best
equipment in the world, competitive financing can make or break the
sale.
Since 1989, I have been trying to convince my colleagues that we have
got to equip our defense exporters so that they can compete on a level
playing field.
In 1989, I was successful in getting a much narrower defense export
financing program operational for 1 year--fiscal year 1990. During the
brief life of that program, a United States company--Sikorsky won a
highly competitive contract to sell Black Hawk helicopters to Turkey.
That sale totalled $1 billion and enabled some people in my State to
remain employed who might otherwise have lost their jobs--that is not
to say that significant numbers of Connecticut workers haven't been
severely impacted by defense spending cut backs.
The time has come to stop treating Americans employed in the defense
industry like second class citizens. They deserve comparable support
from their Government as they struggle to feed their families and pay
their bills.
The provision that the Arms Services Committee included in the
pending bill has been carefully crafted so as not to impinge on U.S.
Export/Import Bank financing. It will be a program operated in the
Department of Defense.
Nor should my colleagues be concerned that somehow we will be fueling
the arms race with this program. No sale under this program will go
forward until it has been fully vetted by all appropriate agencies to
ensure that the sale is in the national interest.
Mr. President, I believe that it is long past time for such a program
to exist and I strongly oppose the amendment offered by Senator Bumpers
to prevent that from happening.
To sum up, for my colleagues, this is an area where the Senator from
Idaho and I are in full agreement. In fact, before he arrived in the
Senate this was an issue of great interest to me. As I mentioned
earlier, in 1989, I was successful in having a very modest, 1 year,
defense export financing provision included in the fiscal year 1990
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. In the 1 year that this
provision was in effect it made a significant difference.
I believe we have to be pragmatic about these matters. If every other
country would back away from this kind of financing, then there would
be no reason for us to be establishing such a program. But that isn't
likely to happen anytime soon. I can personally tell my colleagues that
other nations engage in very supportive financing schemes to assist
their defense industries.
As to the assertion that this provision will permit the sales of arms
all around the world, I would say to my colleagues that is not
accurate. I personally would not support a blanket authorization to
finance the sale of defense equipment to every country around the
globe.
The provision in the bill does not propose that approach. As I said
earlier, the provision limits access to such financing to a select
number of countries, including NATO allies, major non-NATO allies,
certain non-communist members of APEC, and several democratic countries
in Central Europe, provided they remain on the democratic track.
Moreover, I would say to my colleagues, at a time when we are
reducing defense expenditures for obvious reasons, an intelligent,
well-thought-out financing scheme makes sense. It allows us to market
defense equipment to nations with strong democratic institutions, who
are our allies. It is a way of maintaining an industrial base without
having to go the taxpayers in this country to support it.
The Senator from Idaho has been involved in this for some time. My
colleague from Connecticut and I have met with numerous people over the
years on this issue. I will tell you, in 1989, had this body not
supported the particular effort we made, we would have lost a $1
billion contract to the French or the Germans. I am telling you from
personal experience, that a program such as the one proposed in this
bill can make a difference.
So with all due respect to my colleague from Arkansas, these are not
Third World countries and not a wholesale financing scheme to any
corporation that comes along. Nor is it meant to be in competition with
the Export-Import Bank.
If we fail to approve this program, we put in possible jeopardy the
industrial base of our country. So for those reasons, I respectfully
urge the rejection of the amendment offered by Senator Bumpers.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered
by my distinguished colleague, Senator Bumpers, of Arkansas. It would
remove a very important program from the bill we have discussed in our
committee and on the floor for the last several years.
According to studies conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment
and others, the defense industry is laying off 20,000 workers every
month and will continue to do so every month throughout the decade. One
way to preserve these jobs is to help our industries export more
defense products to our friends and allies. Export loan guarantees is
the one way to put U.S. defense contractors on a level playing field
with our foreign competitors.
Other countries such as France and Great Britain provide such finance
guarantees to their industries, and we should do likewise. The loan
guarantee program establishing section 1053 is a no-cost program for
U.S. taxpayers. The eligible countries are restricted to 37 of our
allies and friends, and the controls on the sales of sensitive
technologies are in no way relaxed.
I urge my colleagues to reject this amendment.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina
yield?
Mr. THURMOND. How long?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. No more than 5 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Can you go with less than that?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will try my best.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 3 minutes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator is a tough negotiator. I thank the Senator
from South Carolina.
As my colleagues before me have said, I thank the Senator from Idaho
for his leadership on this.
I oppose the amendment offered by Senator Bumpers. The point is that
this is an attempt to help the defense industry of our country and our
defense workers whose jobs are endangered for a reason that we are
happy about, the end of the cold war. But they are not happy about it.
And we ought to try the keep that base alive by helping them sell
abroad.
The fact is that there is no source of export financing for arms
exports available to American firms except at high commercial rates.
The fact is that other countries are helping their firms dramatically
with financing. I can give you one example. In Connecticut, where a
Connecticut company actually moved over 70 good jobs from Connecticut
to Canada in order to qualify for the export financing that the
Canadian Government offers.
Mr. President, this program is not only self-financing but it is
limited. Let me come back to the references that my friend from
Arkansas made to Burundi and Chad and Senegal and Zambia, et cetera, et
cetera. High-risk countries are ruled out of participation in this
program under this law. I refer my friend from Arkansas to section
[[Page S 11301]]
2540 of the bill. You have to be a member of NATO. You have to be a
country designated as a major non-NATO ally. I think we are thinking
here of countries like Israel. You have to be a country in Central
Europe that has changed its form of government, and you have to be a
non-communist country that was a member nation of the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation group, which includes countries like Korea,
Singapore, et cetera. This is a good program: self-financing; protect
jobs; protect the military industrial base.
I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. REID. I would ask if everyone would withhold while I ask for the
unanimous-consent request.
I ask unanimous consent that Larry Ferderber a congressional fellow
assigned to my office be allowed floor privileges during the pendency
of the action.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, in just a moment I will yield to my good
friend from Maryland, but I just want to make a couple of points.
You know, the Senator from Connecticut just talked about jobs. I have
to tell you this is one place where I consider that the worst of all
arguments is to create jobs so we can sell weapons abroad.
As I said, those weapons always have a tendency to get into terrorist
hands. They get into all kinds of hands. They wind up half the time
being used against us. And in addition to that, an awful lot of the
arms sales in this country are quid pro quo. We will sell you so many
weapons, but we will also create so many jobs in your country that
would otherwise be in the United States. It is a trade-off.
And when it comes to who is creditworthy, you have Mexico. We are
bailing them out right now. They are eligible to buy weapons under
this. Chile, they are eligible. All of the Pacific rim, 37 nations on
here. I promise you even some of those nations in Central Europe are
lousy credit risks. They are fine and we wish them well, but they are a
lousy credit risk. We have no business setting up yet a fifth way to
sell weapons in addition to the four we already have.
Finally, let me just read this White House position for whatever this
is worth to my colleagues.
``The bill would require the Secretary of Defense to
establish a program to issue loan guarantees and surety
against losses arising from the financing of defense exports
to certain countries. The administration opposes this program
because the administration has not found it necessary given
the availability of existing authority for transactions of
this type and the substantial American presence in
international markets for military equipment.''
Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished friend from
Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes.
Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in very strong support of the
Bumpers amendment. I hear all these assertions by the opponents of this
amendment that it is necessary in order to make the United States
competitive in the arms market. The fact of the matter is, the United
States absolutely dominates the international arms market right now--
right now--and the U.S. percentage of the world's arms market has
increased markedly over the last few years, ever since the implosion of
the Soviet Union and other developments that have taken place.
So I say to my colleagues, first of all, the assertion that you need
this program in order to be able to sell the arms does not square with
the facts. The reality is we dominate the international arms market.
Second, I hear it asserted in some way as though there is no risk
here. I think the term ``self-financing'' was used as though this thing
is absolutely certain to pay its way. Clearly, that is not the case.
Why are they seeking a Government guarantee? They are seeking a
Government guarantee in order to insure against the risk which they
otherwise would encounter in the private market. So, obviously, there
is some risk connected with these arms sales; in some instances,
potentially very heavy and substantial risks.
As my colleague from Arkansas has pointed out, there are a series of
programs right now to encourage these arms sales. Others say what these
other countries do. None of these other countries have anything like a
foreign military loan program and a foreign military gift program the
way the United States does. So we are already making very substantial
provision for arms sales. Of course, those programs are very tightly
controlled and circumscribed to ensure that the national interests of
the United States are provided for.
The administration has not sought this. It is my understanding that
the Pentagon--in fact, I will ask my colleague from Arkansas, is it, in
fact, correct that the Department of Defense is resistant to this
proposal?
Mr. BUMPERS. Absolutely. The Defense Department says it is not
needed, and the administration says it is not needed. As the Senator
said, we have 53 percent of the arms market now, headed for 59. It is
not as though we are not competitive.
Mr. SARBANES. That is the worldwide market. If you isolate some of
the areas, including some of the areas that are covered in this bill,
the U.S. percentage rises substantially over that.
Mr. BUMPERS. Exponentially.
Mr. SARBANES. A lot of the places that it does not, a lot of the NATO
producers make their own arms. You standardize their products and you
direct that to meet their standardization purposely.
Some of the countries provided for here are high-risk countries--a
country in Central Europe that recently changed its form of national
government. Financially, those are high-risk countries. Some of the
Asian countries carry risks with them.
I am not quite clear where this comes from. The administration does
not want it. They are not proposing it. They are resistant to it. We
dominate the arms market. I can understand the makers of arms want as
many underwrites as they can possibly find. I think that is a given,
and Members will recognize that. But whether it is wise to use money
this way and to incur these kinds of risks by these guarantees,
obviously there is a risk connected, and the provision recognizes that.
To get up and assert somehow that this is a freebie, in every respect
defies the basic rationale of the provision that is in the bill.
So I urge my colleagues to support the Bumpers amendment. We ought
not to start down this path. We have dealt with this issue before.
Let me simply say this. The last time we had such a provision in the
law, it was extended out to cover other countries as well. When it
first comes before you, it gives you a short list. Then the next year
that list gets added to. Then the year after that, it gets added to.
And pretty soon they say, ``Well, we have to make this comprehensive
now. We have covered so many countries that there is an insult
connected with leaving a country out from this program.'' So then you
make it comprehensive.
That is exactly what will happen--I am prepared to predict that on
the floor tonight--if this provision stays in the legislation. I hope
my colleagues will support the Bumpers amendment.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose the amendment
offered by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] that would eliminate
the defense export loan guarantee provision in this bill.
I believe that the loan guarantee provision will help maintain and
may help to create jobs as our Nation reduces defense spending here at
home. By aiding the sale of ``made in the USA'' military items to our
close allies, we can lessen the pain of defense downsizing for hundreds
of thousands of defense and aerospace workers across the country.
The entire Nation and, in particular, my home State of California,
has been hard hit by defense downsizing, not to mention the recent base
realignment and closure list. Hundreds of thousands of defense related
jobs have been lost in California in the last 2 years, and this number
is sadly expected to rise.
Continued exports of defense goods is vital to maintaining
California's industrial resources. We can help to ease the transition
for defense and aerospace
[[Page S 11302]]
workers by providing these loan guarantees, by establishing defense
conversion programs, and through other initiatives. It is our duty to
help in any way we can to provide good, high-quality jobs for the
hundreds of thousands of dedicated workers who have contributed to U.S.
national security.
The defense export loan guarantee provision in this bill does not, in
any way, eliminate the many existing safeguards that protect against
risky proliferation. Loan guarantees would be limited to friendly
countries specified in the bill--including our NATO allies, major non-
NATO allies, the democratic states of Eastern Europe, and the member
nations of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APFC]. Further,
congressional oversight of these foreign military sales would not be
lessened. All foreign military sales would still have to be reviewed by
Congress as required by the Arms Export Control Act.
This defense export loan guarantee program offers an opportunity to
assist our defense workers and improve our economy. I strongly believe
that this provision is vital to our defense and aerospace industry and
is essential to the preservation of hundreds of thousands of high-
quality, good paying jobs in California and throughout the Nation.
I urge my colleagues to support this provision and oppose the Bumpers
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Idaho.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee for his courtesy.
We continually hear references to a variety of countries. I just want
to drive the point home. The list of the 37 countries that are eligible
for these loan guarantees are allies and friends--allies and friends.
You can keep reading all the countries all night long, but there are
only 37 that are eligible, and also those 37 countries come under the
entire export control and nonproliferation policy of the United States.
This language simply grants the authority to the administration to
allow the loan guarantees. It does not require the administration to do
so. It is an authority to do so.
So, Mr. President, again, I urge my colleagues to reject this
amendment because the language is here that is going to finally
accomplish what we have been setting out to do for a number of years.
With that, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield the remaining 3 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I must say that I do not understand the opposition to this program
that the Senator from Idaho and I and the Senator from Colorado have
sponsored. We have the model for this in the private sector. It is the
Eximbank, and it works very well to put American companies on a level
playing field and protect American jobs.
Look, if somehow we were on the verge of achieving disarmament
worldwide, I would say we should not be the only country out there
selling weapons. The fact is, there is an active arms market worldwide.
Why tie one hand behind our manufacturers when they go out to compete
with other countries' manufacturers for contracts?
The fact is that we have a lot on the line. We have some defense
companies that could close up and make our country less secure in the
future, undercut our industrial base. The fact is, we could lose
thousands of jobs without this kind of support. So I do not apologize.
I think this is just giving the Department of Defense an asset to
protect defense companies and the people who work for them and put us
on an even playing field with other manufacturers around the world.
My friend from Idaho is absolutely right. Everything done here must
be licensed under the Export Administration. There is no danger of
proliferation in that sense. And I come back and say, Mexico was
mentioned by the Senator from Arkansas, Chile was mentioned. They
simply would not qualify. Of those 37 countries, the program mechanics
are structured so that defaults are very, very unlikely.
I think this bill is good for America's national security and good
for those who work in America and will not at all increase the
proliferation of weapons throughout the world.
I thank the Chair. I hope my colleagues will vote against the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Since time has expired on both sides, I ask for the
yeas and nays on this amendment.
Mr. BUMPERS. How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas has 1 minute.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I heard some ingenuous arguments, but the
Senator from Connecticut saying we need to level the playing field when
we already have 53 percent of the market headed for 60 percent is
ingenuous. I do not know how much more you can level this field.
But I would like to ask, on my time, the Senator from Idaho to tell
me one country that we are going to finance under this provision that
cannot buy weapons right now and to which you would want to provide
loan guarantees.
Name one.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. If the Senator will yield, Greece and Turkey are two
countries.
Mr. BUMPERS. Why can they not buy weapons now?
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. They need to finance it, and they are allies.
Mr. BUMPERS. They cannot afford the weapons so we are going to sell
them with loan guarantees under this new program?
Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, both of those countries
receive financing under the foreign military loan program, with all of
the conditions and restraints of that program. Both of those countries
receive financing under that currently.
Mr. BUMPERS. And military financing. We have given both of those
countries billions of dollars of weapons over the years under the
foreign aid bill.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, to conclude, Greece and Turkey are
allies, and I am proud to stand with the American workers that would
provide necessary materials to our allies.
Mr. BUMPERS. The whole reason this provision should be struck from
the bill is because the only countries that need it are those whose
credit is so bad that they cannot get weapons under the four existing
programs for selling military equipment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
The question is on agreeing to the Bumpers amendment No. 2094.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan]
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote.
The result was announced--yeas 41, nays 58, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 357 Leg.]
YEAS--41
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Conrad
Daschle
Domenici
Exon
Feingold
Ford
Glenn
Gramm
Grassley
Harkin
Hatfield
Hollings
Johnston
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Pryor
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Wellstone
NAYS--58
Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Breaux
Brown
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Faircloth
Feinstein
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Grams
Gregg
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pressler
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
[[Page S 11303]]
NOT VOTING--1
Dorgan
So the amendment (No. 2094) was rejected.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. DOLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as we debate the fiscal year 1996 National
Defense authorization bill, I want to join with my friend and
colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from Idaho, in commending
the Navy for its successful utilization of the Small Business
Innovation Research Program in its development of the multipurpose
processor. The multipurpose processor will be used to reduce risk and
provide affordable technology for the new nuclear submarine, which will
be developed within the next few years, as well as for the current U.S.
submarine fleet.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I agree with my colleague, the
distinguished senior Senator from Virginia. The American people demand
that we continually look for the most cost effective solutions to our
problems. That fact is particularly true with regard to Defense
spending. The multipurpose processor is truly a cost effective and
worthwhile program. It will provide our submarine fleet with a common
open system processor which allows rapid insertion of advancing
technologies while also protecting our previous investments in complex
software. I therefore join with Senator Warner in commending the Navy
for its initiative and leadership in this area.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Idaho, with whom I have the distinct pleasure of serving on both the
Armed Services and the Small Business Committees. It is indeed
noteworthy that the two of us are engaging in this colloquy because the
multipurpose processor program combines the best interests of our
Nation's defense with those of American small business. Many innovative
products developed by small business have contributed significantly to
the strength of our Armed Forces over the years and I trust, with
continued congressional support for the Small Business Innovation
Research Program, they will continue to do so well into the future.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I agree with my colleague on that
point as well. The continued success of American small business is
vitally important to the economic health of our Nation. The
multipurpose processor program is an important example of how a small
business, Digital System Resources, Inc., has made an important
contribution to the Nation's defense. Appropriately, American small
business should be given every opportunity to continue to make
contributions to the national defense as well as to the other sectors
of our economy.
medicare--eligible military retirees
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the Defense authorization bill now before
the Senate contains the following provision:
``(1) * * * the Secretary of Defense should develop a program to
ensure that covered beneficiaries who are eligible for Medicare * * *
and who reside in a region in which the TRICARE program has been
implemented have adequate access to health care services after the
implementation of the TRICARE program in that region; and
``(2) to support strongly, as a means of ensuring such access, the
reimbursement of the Department of Defense by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services for health care services provided such beneficiaries
at the medical treatment facilities of the Department of Defense.''
Our military retirees are entitled to the medical benefits which they
have been promised. When the TRICARE system is fully implemented,
Medicare-eligible military retirees can receive care in military
hospitals only on a space available basis. Consequently, these retirees
are being put at the back of the line and in some cases must change
health care providers after years of care in military treatment
facilities. I am very concerned about this.
There must be an alternative to the current situation. Medicare funds
should be transferred from the Department of Health and Human Services
to the Department of Defense, so Medicare-eligible retirees will be
able to use military health care facilities, with the costs covered by
their Medicare benefits. I urge the approval of this legislation.
civilian manpower and airlift operations
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to enter into a colloquy with the
distinguished majority leader and the chairman of the committee.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, if my friend from Connecticut would yield. I
am aware of the issue the Senator seeks to discuss and would be happy
to enter into a colloquy on this matter.
Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague for his time. It is my understanding
that the committee staff has reviewed the measure and has approved it.
Specifically, this amendment seeks to restore funding to the Air Force
Reserve operations and maintenance account for restoration of funds for
civilian manpower and airlift operations support.
The U.S. Air Force Reserve has historically provided service-wide
critical airlift and logistics support to our national defense. A
perfect example of this effort is the medical airlift capability for
our forces. With over 70 percent of our national medical aircrew
manpower coming from the active Air Force Reserves, reductions in
operation and maintenance at this point seems unreasonable.
Mr. DOLE. I have to agree with my colleague. I think Members would be
interested to know that almost 45 percent of all heavy lift performed
by the Air Force is provided by Air Force Reserves crewmembers. Another
25 percent occupy tactical airlift cockpits. There is no question where
our Nation turns in time or need for airlift support.
Mr. DODD. I could not agree more. The Air Force Reserve is the very
backbone of our national airlift and I ask my colleagues to join with
me in this amendment to restore the necessary and requested funds to
maintain this vital program.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for raising this
important issue. I had previously directed the respective committee
staff to review this matter and have included a funding adjustment in
the manager's amendment. This adjustment would add $10 million to the
Air Force Reserve account and reduce the Department of Defense wide
activities by $10 million.
Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague and good friend from South Carolina.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I join my friend from Connecticut in
thanking the distinguished Senator and chairman of the committee for
his cooperation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, if I could have my colleagues' attention?
If I can just suggest the absence after quorum for 1 minute, we are
about to type out the consent agreement. If we can reach an agreement
there will be no more votes this evening. If not, we will just have to
work through it.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me indicate to my colleagues that there
will probably be additional votes tonight. There will be an amendment
by Senator Cohen, 30 minutes equally divided--15 equally divided.
Mr. FORD. On what?
Mr. COHEN. This is on the ABM Treaty.
Mr. NUNN. I did not hear the request.
Mr. DOLE. Fifteen minutes equally divided on a Cohen amendment.
Is there any objection to that?
Mr. NUNN. I would suggest 30 minutes because most people on this side
have not read the amendment.
Mr. DOLE. Thirty minutes equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. No second-degree amendments. That would be followed by an
amendment by the Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn. As I understand,
there is not any time agreement on
[[Page S 11304]]
that so we do not know when that vote will come. So that we will do
those two tonight at least.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
This is the time agreement we wanted to obtain earlier. We could not
do that. So I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow morning, after
consultation with the managers--they can determine when to bring it
up--Senator Thurmond be recognized to offer an amendment regarding
title XXXI of the bill; that immediately after the reading of the
amendment, Senator Exon be recognized to offer a second-degree
amendment to the Thurmond amendment, and that there be 45 minutes of
debate under the control of Senator Thurmond and 90 minutes of debate
under the control of Senator Exon; further, that following the
expiration or yielding of time, the Exon amendment be laid aside and
Senator Reid be recognized to offer his amendment on tritium on which
there be 60 minutes, to be divided 40 minutes under the control of
Senator Reid and 20 minutes under the control of Senator Thurmond; and
following that debate, the amendment be laid aside and Senator McCain
be recognized to offer an amendment on competition, on which there be
10 minutes for debate, to be equally divided in the usual form; to be
followed by a vote on or in relation to the Exon amendment, to be
followed by a vote on or in relation to the Reid amendment, to be
followed by a vote on or in relation to the McCain amendment, to be
followed by a vote on the Thurmond amendment, as amended, if amended.
So we are talking about four amendments.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, everything is
right except in the transcription, 45 should be 70 under the control of
Senator Thurmond-- 90 and 70.
Mr. DOLE. I said 90--
Mr. BRYAN. Seventy, Mr. Leader, under the control of Senator
Thurmond.
Mr. DOLE. Did I short him? Good. I gave him 45 minutes.
He wants 70.
Mr. REID. We talked about that all night.
Mr. DOLE. Make that 70 instead of 45.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Hopefully, when this happens tomorrow sometime, we will not
take all this time, but we may. That would be 3 hours plus four votes.
You are talking about a big, big time.
I would also ask consent--to accommodate Senator Bumpers --that
following the disposition of this agreement, whenever it occurs, the
previous unanimous consent, Senator Bumpers offer his amendment on
defense firewalls, 1 hour of debate to be equally divided in the usual
form, no second-degree amendment be in order, and that following the
conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate vote on or in relation
to the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Now, I might say to my colleagues, I know there are dozens
of amendments out there. We are trying to accommodate those who have
the shortest times. If we have 20 minutes equally divided or 30
minutes, we will try to rotate back and forth. It seems to me, if we
are going to finish the bill, if everybody gets 2 hours, 3 hours, 4
hours, it is going to be 4 o'clock tomorrow afternoon before we take up
2 or 3 amendments here, and we cannot be on this bill Saturday.
I am not certain when we will get back on the bill. Senator Thurmond
needs to leave tomorrow for an important family matter on Saturday. We
will have votes on Saturday. We will be on at least one or two
appropriations bills. If we should, by some miracle, finish this bill
early tomorrow, we could go to Treasury-Postal tomorrow evening. If
not, that will begin hopefully about 9 o'clock on Saturday morning. And
there are two amendments there that may require some debate. Beyond
that, it should not take very long, according to the managers.
Following that, it would be our intention either to move to welfare
or to the Work Opportunity Act, or the Interior Appropriations bill.
So somebody asked me, what about Saturday. We have been saying for
the last 2 weeks there will be votes on this Saturday and tomorrow. The
day after tomorrow is Saturday, and there will be votes on Saturday,
August 5.
Amendment No. 2089
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk which
originally was designated as being cosponsored by Senator Nunn. That
was in error. Senator Nunn is not a cosponsor of the amendment that I
sent to the desk, and so I would ask unanimous consent that his name be
withdrawn as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have requested that the entire amendment
not be read, but let me just point to the basic purpose behind the
amendment and some of the pertinent language.
Mr. President, we had extended debate during the course of the
morning and afternoon dealing with the ABM Treaty. Senator Levin spent,
I believe, roughly 6 or 7 hours debating this issue. And I think it has
been resolved on a close vote but nonetheless resolved.
I had intended and now do offer this amendment for the purpose of at
least clarifying what my intent was in supporting the legislation as it
was developed by the Armed Services Committee in the DOD authorization
bill.
Basically, I believe it should be our policy to develop a defensive
capability against a limited or accidental launch of a nuclear weapon
against the United States. I believe we have an absolute obligation to
the American people to say that in the event that anyone were so mad as
to launch an ICBM toward the United States or one should be launched
accidentally, we ought to have some minimum capability of destroying
that missile before it arrives on U.S. soil.
I find it really quite astonishing to think that we would represent
to the American people that a missile somehow has been fired, whether
by accident or by miscalculation or madness, it is on its way to New
York City, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, you name the city or town, and
we have absolutely no way of stopping it. The best we can do is tell
you that we will try to minimize the casualties; we will try to
evacuate as quickly as possible after catastrophic damage has been
done.
I think that is unacceptable to the American people given the fact
that we are now witnessing the proliferation of missile technology on a
fairly pervasive basis. And so what this amendment does is to express
the sense of Congress on this matter.
Given the fundamental responsibility of the Government of
the United States to protect the security of the U.S., the
increasingly serious threat posed to the United States by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic
missile technology, and the effect this threat could have in
constraining the options of the United States to act in time
of crisis, it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the supreme interest of the United States to
defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack, whatever its source;
(2) the deployment of a multiple-site ground-based national
missile defense system to protect against limited ballistic
missile attack can strengthen strategic stability and
deterrence;
(3) the policies, programs and requirements of subtitle C
of title II of this Act can be accomplished through processes
specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which
anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to
the treaty.
Mr. President, what I am saying in this amendment is that whatever we
do, we can do it consistent with the treaty. I want to stay within the
limits of the treaty. The treaty allows us to seek to negotiate
changes.
Originally we had a multiple-site ABM Treaty, two sites. We
renegotiated it down to one site. With the changes of circumstances
throughout the world, what we are asking is that we encourage the
President to go to the Russians to seek to renegotiate the ABM Treaty
for the purpose of allowing the Russians and the United States to have
a effective capability against limited ballistic missile threats.
And so in this amendment the President is urged ``to initiate
negotiations with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty as
necessary to provide for the national missile defense system as
specified in section 235'' to protect us from a limited ballistic
attack.
And ``(5)''--and here is another key point--
[[Page S 11305]]
If the negotiations fail, the President is urged to consult
with the Senate about the option of withdrawing the United
States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with provisions of
article XV of the treaty.
Mr. President, basically what this amendment says is, there is a
potential threat that we ought to be facing and that we should seek to
negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty. That is contemplated by the
treaty itself. So I am urging the President to seek to negotiate with
the Russians, and in the event he is unsuccessful in those negotiations
to gain amendments allowing the deployment by each party of a limited
system, that he then come back to the Senate and consult with the
Senate about whether we should stay in the ABM Treaty as it originally
stands now or whether we ought to opt out as the treaty allows us to
do.
So this is a sense of the Senate that we ought to proceed with this
system, that we ought to encourage the President and urge him to go and
meet with the Russians and their negotiators to renegotiate the ABM
Treaty to allow the deployment of a land-based system with multiple
sites that would protect us against accidental launch or
miscalculation, certainly not against an all-out attack by the
Russians, but a limited type attack, so we can have the capability to
defend ourselves.
We urge the President to do this, seek this. In the event he is
unsuccessful, we ask that he turn to the Senate and at least consult
with us as to whether we should stay in the treaty or get out of the
treaty.
Mr. President, I believe that is a fair expression of the sentiment
that was expressed during the debates within the Armed Services
Committee. I believe it is a fair expression of the sentiment on this
side of the aisle. I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge all Members on both sides of the
aisle to read this, of course, because some people may disagree with
it, parts of it, particularly on my side of the aisle.
I do not disagree with anything in the Cohen resolution. I think it
is helpful in the sense that it points in the right direction for the
President to negotiate changes rather than simply assert changes. And
that is clear in paragraph 4. I think also that it is the correct
procedure for the negotiations. If the negotiations fail with the
Russians, the President is urged to consult with the Senate about the
option of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty under provision of article XV
of the treaty.
I agree with some of the findings. Some of the people on this side of
the aisle may not agree with the findings. I do. This is very close to
what we had in the Missile Defense Act that Senator Warner and I
sponsored 2 or 3 years ago in the Missile Defense Act.
What is the problem with it? There is no problem with it that would
keep me from voting for it, but it does not correct any of the things
that we pointed out as being what we considered --most of us on this
side and a few on that side of the aisle--to be fatal flaws with the
bill itself. What it does not do because it is a sense-of-the-Senate
resolution, it does not change any of the operative provisions in the
underlying bill. And the operative provisions have the force of law. So
we have got sense-of-the-Senate legislation that cannot by its very
nature change the force of law.
So anyone who thinks there are problems in the underlying bill would
not be comforted by this. This does not cure the problem. That is the
reason I have not cosponsored it, not because I am not going to vote
for it, not because it is not in the right direction, because it is.
But it does not change the operative provisions of the bill which
establish a number of legal restrictions on the President. This is, I
believe, the first time I have seen provisions that restrict the
President as to what he can negotiate. The underlying bill restricts
the President of the United States in terms of his ability to
negotiate.
Now, I believe that will be challenged by many as unconstitutional. I
do not try to make a judgment on it. But I imagine that those in the
executive branch would assert it is unconstitutional on its face.
Whether that is the case or not, in my view it is bad policy, because
if the President of the United States cannot negotiate, who can? We do
not have a negotiating team from the U.S. Senate that I know of. We
have an arms control observer group, but we make it clear we never
negotiate; we simply discuss. So if the President cannot negotiate
these changes, even if they are changes that the majority wants, how do
we get changes in the treaty?
The Cohen amendment deals with one set of changes. And I think it
appropriately says the President should negotiate the amendments to the
ABM Treaty as necessary to provide for the national missile defense
system specified in section 235. So the sense-of-the-Senate resolution
does urge him to move in that direction.
The restrictions on negotiations of the President, however, do not
relate to that section; they relate to the section that we talked about
at length earlier in the debate which gets to the demarcation point
between theater ballistic missiles and strategic ballistic missiles.
And the defense against strategic ballistic missiles is that restricted
by the ABM Treaty. The provision on theater ballistic missiles is not.
And that demarcation point is defined in the underlying bill as a
matter of law, and the President in the underlying bill is told that he
cannot negotiate on that point. He cannot do anything on that point.
And, therefore, I do not see how the Russians would ever accept that.
Now, maybe no one cares whether they accept it or not. But as I said
earlier today, I do not think they have the option to go to defenses at
this stage because of their economic condition. What they do have the
option to do, and what they have said repeatedly they will do. So
unless you believe they will not do what they said they are going to
do, there is nothing in this amendment that changes the problem of the
bill. And that is, it encourages, in fact it makes it clear to the
Russians that we are going to move forward notwithstanding any concerns
they may have on the ABM Treaty and that we will not comply with ABM
Treaty in certain respects. And if they want to take action, then they
will take action.
What action will they take? In my opinion they will simply not ratify
START II. They will not, in my view, continue to draw down their
missile forces under START I.
So, inadvertently, in the name of defending the United States and the
people in the United States, the underlying bill, in my view, almost,
not quite, because you cannot ever predict with certainty a foreign
country's behavior, but it almost assures that the United States will
end up with thousands of more missiles pointed at this country than we
would otherwise have. I do not see how that improves our defense.
We are basically saying we want to move forward in 10 years to defend
against threats that may be here in 10 years, that are not here now.
But the threat that is here now, that is, the SS-18's the SS-24's that
are pointed at us now that we want to take down, and the two Republican
presidents have negotiated successfully to get the Russians to take
down, we do not worry about that threat. It is now being dismantled. We
put provisions in here that are likely to require or at least to
encourage the Russians to keep those missiles pointed at us. I do not
see how I can go home and tell my people that I voted for an underlying
provision in a bill that is likely to keep thousands of missiles that
we have described as the foremost threat that is aimed at the United
States that we spent 15 to 20 years trying to figure out how to either
negate through a deterrence policy, through a policy of negotiations,
one way or the other, either through defenses or negotiation that we
finally had two Republican Presidents, President Reagan and President
Bush, successfully concluded the negotiations--one of them is now being
implemented, START I, the other is pending in the Russian Duma and in
the Senate.
So we are going to put a provision in here that says to the Russians,
``We are going to go ahead anyway. And we are going to disregard the
ABM Treaty. But you do what you choose.'' I think what they are going
to choose to do is keep those missiles pointed at us. Now maybe 10
years from now we will be able to defend against them. 2003 is the
date. But understand, we are only talking about a thin defense, a thin
defense against a few missiles and a Third
[[Page S 11306]]
World country
or an unauthorized launch or terrorist group that gets ahold of a
ballistic missile or cruise missile. I want a defense against those. I
am in favor of defense. I am in favor of amending the ABM Treaty, but I
think we ought to do it through the procedure of international law and
the procedure of American law, because a treaty is American law, and we
are the ones who signed up for the ABM Treaty. It is our law now. It is
the law of the land.
A treaty is the law of the land. We are saying disregard it in the
underlying bill. I do not understand the logic, Mr. President. I cannot
understand the logic of taking a step in the name of defending the
people of America that is likely to end up having thousands of warheads
pointed toward us while we spend 10 years and billions of dollars to
figure out how to defend against a threat that is not yet here. I do
not understand that logic.
Mr. President, I will vote for the Cohen amendment. It does not cure
the underlying defects in the bill. I will have another amendment, in
all likelihood. It depends on whether I have a chance to get it
adopted. If I do not, then I will simply leave the bill as it is now
and people can make their choice. But if I do have a chance to have it
adopted, I will have an amendment that sets forth very clearly what our
policy is. Succinctly what that would be is a policy, first of all, of
coming forth with a defensive system in this country that protects
against unauthorized launches, that protects against accidental
launches, that protects against a third country defense, but that does
so in compliance with the ABM Treaty.
Second, we ask the President to try to amend the ABM Treaty with
amendments that would allow us to deploy that kind of system.
Third, if he fails to be able to amend it with the Russians--that is,
if the Russians refuse--that we then consider our option of terminating
our ABM obligations in accordance with article XV of the treaty itself,
which says we can give 6 months' notice and terminate those
obligations.
Mr. President, to me, that is a sensible policy. In the meantime, we
should not tie the hands of the President of the United States to
negotiate. We ought to insist that anything that has the nature of a
treaty come before us for approval. We should not let treaties be
amended by the executive branch, but we should not prevent the
President from negotiating. We should not prevent him from negotiating
a demarcation point.
I happen to agree with the demarcation point in the bill. I think it
is perfectly reasonable. I do not mind putting it as a matter of
findings. I do not mind saying this is the policy of the demarcation
point. But I do not want the President to be prevented from saying to
the Russians, ``This is what the Congress thinks and I would like for
you to sign up to this.'' We preclude him from even doing that. He
cannot negotiate anything.
I do not believe that provision will stand, because I do not think it
will become law. But if it does become law, I think it probably will be
challenged on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, that is where we
are.
I urge my colleagues to agree with the findings in the Cohen
amendment, to vote for it, because I think the provisions make sense. I
think they are a step in the right direction, but it does not cure what
I consider to be fatal flaws of the underlying provisions.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Cohen has 12 minutes; Senator Thurmond
4 minutes.
Mr. NUNN. How much time do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes and 40 seconds.
Mr. NUNN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in addition to the fact this amendment
highlights the flaws in the underlying legislation because of what it
does not address, it still leaves the President's hands tied. He cannot
negotiate. It still commits us to deploy a system which is in violation
of the ABM Treaty. That all remains. But in addition to actually
highlighting the flaws of the underlying bill and not curing it, this
resolution raises two questions, in my mind.
First, it says that the President is urged to initiate negotiations
with the Russian Federation to amend the ABM Treaty. The underlying
bill also has sense-of-the-Senate language which is exactly the
opposite, which says the President should cease all efforts to modify
U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.
The Cohen language says initiate it, presumably as soon as you can.
In section 4, the President is urged to initiate negotiations to amend
the treaty. The bill, which is left untouched, has sense-of-the-Senate
language which says cease all efforts until the Senate has completed
its review process. It is just totally inconsistent with the underlying
language. That is No. 1. But No. 2 is a question to my good friend from
Maine.
When the resolution says that it is in the supreme interest of the
United States to defend itself from the threat, if one votes for this
resolution, does one thereby commit himself or herself to withdrawing
from the ABM Treaty under the supreme interest provision in the ABM
Treaty? In other words, would this vote be looked back at as a
statement on the part of people voting for your resolution that, in
fact, we should withdraw from the ABM Treaty because of a supreme
national interest?
Mr. COHEN. The answer to my friend is no. What the language of my
amendment says is the President should, in fact, initiate negotiations.
I believe we should seek to negotiate a provision to the ABM Treaty to
allow for the construction and deployment of a multisite limited
system. And you will see the second part of that is, if the President
is unsuccessful, he is to return and consult with the Senate to see
whether we should stay in the treaty or get out of the treaty under
article XV.
Mr. LEVIN. The language urging the President to negotiate in one part
in your resolution, and the underlying bill says cease and desist all
negotiations as to modify the treaty, do you view those as
inconsistent?
Mr. COHEN. I believe there is an appearance of an inconsistency that
came about as a result of an attempt by the majority to prevent the
President negotiating to apply the ABM Treaty to the theater missile
defense system. That is where that confusion came about.
I believe it is in our interest to urge negotiation on the part of
the President to seek to revise the ABM Treaty in order to allow for
deployment of a multiple site system here in this country and in
Russia.
I might point out that I disagree with the statement of my friend
from Georgia----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Levin's time has expired.
Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 1 minute. That with respect to section 238,
I do not believe you can point to that language as preventing the
President from negotiating. It simply says that the appropriated funds
may not be obligated or expended by any official of the Federal
Government for the purpose of prescribing, enforcing, or implementing.
It does not prevent him from negotiating, but he could not implement
any changes that would apply the ABM Treaty to theater missile
defenses. The difference, he could not negotiate, he could not
implement under the language of section 238.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield, because there is a
subsection (B) that says take any other action.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. COHEN. At the direction of the majority leader, I yield back my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I think after this vote, I talked to the
managers and what they would like to do, and I say this to all my
colleagues, is to stay here. There are probably 25, 35 amendments that
can be accepted, some on each side of the aisle. They are willing to
stay here, and that will take a big amount of the amendments that are
pending.
We now changed our list and, hopefully, before we go out tonight or
tomorrow morning, we will have an agreement these will be the only
amendments in order. That will at least give us a finite list. It is
pretty long. We have 190-some amendments and everybody wants 2 hours.
So I do not think we can make that by tomorrow night, the way I look at
it. But you have to be optimistic around here. I
[[Page S 11307]]
know Senator Thurmond is, he is going to finish it by 6 tomorrow night,
or earlier, more or less.
This will be the last vote tonight, but I say to my colleagues on
both sides, the managers are here, the staffs are here. A lot of the
amendments have great merit and are going to be accepted. This is an
opportunity to have your amendment accepted. Then the managers will
determine what time we start tomorrow morning and whether we start on
the agreement we have or some other amendment. That will be up to the
managers.
I thank my colleagues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Cohen has 8 minutes, and Senator Nunn
has 1 minute.
Mr. COHEN. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. NUNN. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen].
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms]
and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith] are necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd],
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], and the Senator from Louisiana
[Mr. Johnston] are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 69, nays 26, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 358 Leg.]
YEAS--69
Abraham
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Bond
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Exon
Faircloth
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Heflin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kerrey
Kohl
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--26
Akaka
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Bumpers
Byrd
Daschle
Dorgan
Feingold
Glenn
Harkin
Hatfield
Kennedy
Kerry
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Pell
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Wellstone
NOT VOTING--5
Dodd
Helms
Inouye
Johnston
Smith
So the amendment (No. 2089) was agreed to.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time the manager of the bill, the
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator
Thurmond, together with the ranking member, were anxious to accept a
number of amendments which have been cleared on both sides. I
anticipate we will undertake to do that in just a matter of a minute or
two.
Mr. President, if I could draw the attention of my distinguished
colleague to an amendment by the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Chafee]
which I believe has been cleared on both sides.
Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Virginia is correct. That amendment has
been cleared. If you will give us just one minute, we want to make sure
we have the right amendment.
Amendment No. 2095
(Purpose: To improve the section establishing uniform national
discharge standards for the control of water pollution from vessels of
the Armed Forces)
Mr. WARNER. On behalf of the Senator from South Carolina, Mr.
Thurmond, I send to the desk an amendment which is submitted by the
Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Chafee].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Chafee, for
himself, and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 2095.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'')
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the clerk note that I am acting on
behalf of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Thurmond,
and all amendments will be sent to the desk in Mr. Thurmond's name.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, this bill includes an amendment to the
Clean Water Act based on a 5-year effort by the Navy to develop
environmental standards that would apply to the non-sewage discharges
from its ships. The Navy has a goal of building and operating
environmentally sound ships and this amendment to the Clean Water Act
will help them reach that goal.
The Clean Water Act amendment in his bill was developed by the Navy
and sent to the Senate by the administration in early June. In addition
to consideration by the Armed Services Committee, this proposal was
also reviewed by the Committee on Environment and Public Works which
has jurisdiction over the Clean Water Act. As chairman of that
committee, I sought comment on this administration proposal from
members of the committee, the coastal States, the Coast Guard, EPA and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and from other
organizations with an interest in coastal pollution problems.
There was general support for this approach. It is seen as a net
environmental improvement, because it provides for treatment of
discharges from vessels that are not controlled today.
Some concerns were expressed by the States. They wanted to be
consulted before the rules are issued. They wanted to be sure that
treatment systems used to control these discharges are the most
effective, consistent with the mission of the Navy. And they wanted
assurance that current environmental requirements like section 311
dealing with oil spills would not be overridden.
The Environment and Public Works Committee developed a set of
amendments to the administration proposal to address those concerns.
The committee then reported an original bill, S. 1033, on July 13. The
amendment that Senator Warner and I are offering to the DOD
authorization bill today is the text of the bill reported by the
Environment and Public Works Committee. The committee also filed a
report on S. 1033 which explains the provisions of our amendment and is
to be looked to for legislative history on this amendment.
We have agreed to move this amendment to the Clean Water Act on the
DOD authorization bill to facilitate the Navy's efforts to develop
environmentally sound ships. The Navy has taken the lead in this area
and they should be rewarded for their initiative with speedy enactment
of this proposal.
With that said, let me address the substance of this amendment for a
moment.
Even though vessels are considered point sources of pollution under
the Clean Water Act, EPA regulations have exempted many discharges from
the permit requirements of the act. Currently, sewage discharges are
regulated under section 312 of the Clean Water Act. It requires that
each vessel be equipped with a marine sanitation device to treat sewage
before it is discharged.
But many of the other wastewaters like graywater from showers and
sinks, bilge water from the hold of the ship, wastewater from the
boiler or water from cleaning the deck or equipment are not regulated
under the Clean Water Act. Some coastal States have taken an interest
in these discharges, but there is no comprehensive Federal program.
The amendment we are offering requires the Secretary of Defense and
the Administrator of EPA to act jointly to
[[Page S 11308]]
identify the non-sewage discharges from ships that need attention.
For each discharge that has a significant adverse impact, EPA and DOD
would identify an appropriation pollution control technology or
management practice to reduce the pollution.
These standards would only apply to ships of the Armed Forces and the
Coast Guard.
Once the Federal regulations are in place, the States would be
preempted. A State could not impose its own, inconsistent, regulations.
But if a State identified a particularly sensitive coastal or marine
area, it could establish a so-called ``no-discharge zone'' where all
discharges of a particular type would be banned.
Mr. President, the Navy is to be congratulated for this effort. It
will improve water quality in our estuaries and ocean waters. I am
pleased that the Senate has moved this legislation quickly to assist
the Navy in its efforts.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on this side
of the aisle. I urge its adoption.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it is appropriate now to call for
the vote.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2095) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the motion to table is
agreed to.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2096
(Purpose: To make funds available for the Troops to Teachers program
and the Troops to Cops program)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I inquire of my friend from Virginia. We
have two amendments I would like to present. I believe they have been
cleared, but I want to check with my friend before I send them to the
desk, by Senator Pryor and Senator Feinstein.
The two amendments coupled together are the ``Troops to Teachers''
and the ``Troops to Cops'' program. The amendments provide $42 million
for the ``Troops to Teachers'' program, offset from excess military
personnel funds, and provides $10 million for the ``Troops to Cops''
program, offset from the same source. Mr. President, ``Troops to
Teachers'' was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1993 as part of the Transition Assistance Program, designed
to help service members affected by downsizing.
Troops to Cops was added to the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 1994. Individuals can receive a $5,000 stipend to
assist in obtaining the necessary training and certification.
In addition, if a service member is part of an early 15-year
retirement, the individual will receive time or credit for up to 5
years if he or she completes 5 years of teaching or law enforcement
assignment.
That was an amendment that I proposed that became law, and I think it
is working very well.
The school systems or law enforcement agencies that hire a
participant receives funds to assist in paying the salary ranging from
up to $25,000 for an individual's first year down to $2,500 for an
individual's fifth year.
There is a win-win program benefiting separating service members,
helping them get employment, and helping our Nation. Frankly, we will
never have this reservoir of talented people coming out into the job
market from the military in this number of people in any period in the
future that I can envision at this point because this is part of the
drawdown in our military. We have literally tens of thousands of people
in the military that are extremely well qualified in math and science
and languages, and encouraging them and facilitating them going into
teaching and going into law enforcement at the local level and helping
the States and local governments, to me, is not only helping the State
and local government but helping the military and strengthening our
Nation.
So these amendments provide for prudent steps.
Troops to Teachers receives $65 million in fiscal year 1995. This
amendment calls for $42 million, which is a reduced program. The
drawdown is being reduced.
These will not be permanent programs. After you get through the
drawdown and you level off the military personnel, then you would not,
in all likelihood, have these programs.
The Troops to Cops program receives $15 million in fiscal year 1995.
This amendment calls for $10 million, which is a substantial reduction.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Pryor for
himself, and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered
2096.
On page 137, after line 24, add the following:
SEC. 389. FUNDING FOR TROOPS TO TEACHERS PROGRAM AND TROOPS
TO COPS PROGRAM.
(a) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
under section 431--
(1) $42,000,000 shall be available for the Troops-to-
Teachers program; and
(2) $10,000,000 shall be available for the Troop-to-Cops
program.
(b) Definition.--In this section:
(1) The term ``Troops-to-Cops program'' means the program
of assistance to separated members and former members of the
Armed Forces to obtain employment with law enforcement
agencies established, or carried out, under section 1152 of
title 10, United States Code.
(2) The term ``Troops-to-Teachers program'' means the
program of assistance to separated members of the Armed
Forces to obtain certification and employment as teachers or
employment as teachers' aides established under section 1151
of such title.
troops to teachers
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to
continue funding for the Troops to Teachers Program in the Department
of Defense.
Troops to Teachers is a Department of Defense Transition Program
designed to assist separated military service members and other former
DOD employees to become certified and obtain employment as teachers or
teacher's aides. Congress established this program in 1992, and it has
always enjoyed strong bipartisan support.
Troops to Teachers provides up to $5,000 stipends to selected
participants to help them become certified to teach, and grants of up
to $50,000, paid over 5 years, to local education agencies for each
former military service member they agree to hire.
Troops to Teachers is helping former service members find productive,
meaningful employment after leaving the military. By tapping the skills
and experience these individuals possess, Troops to Teachers is
improving the quality of our public school education nationwide. And by
placing special emphasis on schools with a high concentration of
students from low income families, this program provides teachers in
areas where educators are in short supply.
In the Department of Defense, the response to this program has been
outstanding. Over 500 Troops to Teachers have recently been hired by
school districts in 39 States. In addition, over 1,000 individuals
scattered across 46 States are using this program to become certified
to teach. Most importantly, there are over 9,000 applicants currently
preparing to enter this program.
These 9,000 former DOD personnel awaiting acceptance to this program
are counting on these funds to begin a new life after the military.
They are counting on our support.
I mentioned earlier that Troops to Teachers has always enjoyed strong
bipartisan support. In 1992, I was asked by former Senate majority
leader George Mitchell to chair a task force on defense transition. The
centerpiece of our task force report was a recommendation for Congress
to help former military personnel get training, certification, and job
placement required for employment in critical public service jobs, such
as education, law enforcement, and medical services. The legislation
that resulted from this recommendation created the Troops to Teachers
and Troops to Cops Programs.
That same year, a Republican task force convened and made an
identical recommendation supporting the creation of Troops to Teachers.
The 1992 report of the Senate Republican task force on adjusting the
defense base stated,
[[Page S 11309]]
The Task Force recommends that Congress adopt legislation
to
encourage states to adopt alternative teacher certification
programs for separated and retiring servicemen. Not only
will this enable some former military personnel to put
their talents to productive use in public service, it will
help address the teacher shortage found in some
particularly urban, areas.
This report goes on to say, ``The Task Force supports an expansion of
the DOD program to pay for coursework of departing servicemen which
meets reasonable state certification requirements.'' Finally, the
Republican task force report concludes, ``The cost of programs
directly responding to problems resulting from
the declining defense budget . . . should be paid for out of the
defense budget.''
Mr. President, the Troops to Teachers program was designed by
Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, in response to the needs of
separating military personnel. But the primary responsibility of Troops
to Teachers is taking care of the men and women who are leaving the
military after years of dedicated service to our country. These
individuals should not be penalized because they desire to work in a
classroom instead of in a shipyard building submarines.
Perhaps the best reason for continuing funding for this program is
that it is a tremendous success. Just listen to what a few of its
participants have said about their experiences.
Take Ed Coet for example. Ed is 45 years old. He recently retired
from the Army after last serving as a military intelligence officer in
the gulf war. Now Ed teaches a class of 10 emotionally disturbed
fourth-grade boys at Brookhaven Intermediate School in Killeen, TX. Ed
recently said, ``My work as a teacher is every bit as challenging and
important as anything I did in the Army. In the past, it was what I was
doing for my country. Now all my kids are an extension of me. If they
succeed, I succeed.''
And then there is Arthur Moore, a retired Army staff sergeant from
Baltimore, MD. Arthur is currently teaching fifth grade at Samuel
Coleridge-Taylor Elementary School. About his experience Arthur said,
``Every day I have to prove to them I really care, not just about
teaching but about them.''
And listen to what the school districts across America are saying
about Troops to Teachers.
The Jackson County Public School System in North Carolina said, ``Our
teachers have exceeded all expectations. We are very pleased.''
Beaufort County School District in South Carolina says, ``An
outstanding program--all of our participants are excellent.''
Isaac School District No. 5 in Arizona says, ``we are very fortunate
to have an experienced, dedicated Troops to Teachers participant who
bilingual.
The military training and experience have assisted this individual in
making the transition to teaching.''
Mr. President, that is exactly what this program is all about--
helping military personnel make the transition into a productive life
in public service. These individuals are the centerpiece of the
program.
Eliminating funding for Troops to Teachers would mean turning our
backs on the military service members who served their country on the
battlefield, and who now want to continue their service in the
classroom. This program truly deserves our full support.
troops to cops
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas which provides $10
million for the Troops-to-Cops Program and $42 million for the Troops-
to-Teachers Program. I am happy to be an original cosponsor of this
important amendment.
Senator Pryor has discussed the Troops-to-Teachers Program, and I
would like to focus on the Troops-to-Cops Program.
The program--administered by the Justice Department in coordination
with the Department of Defense--provides $5,000 per officer for
training to local police and sheriffs departments to hire former
military personnel as law enforcement officers. This funding can be
used to support the following: tuition at a police training academy;
costs of local ``compliance'' training if the veteran attended an out-
of-state police academy; the costs of specialized training in community
policing.
Local law enforcement agencies can use Troops to Cops funds to pay
for training of eligible recently separated military personnel.
Troops to Cops was initially authorized in the 1994 DOD authorization
bill. Last year, the Appropriations Committee provided $15 million for
this program. The fiscal year 1995 funding will provide training
assistance for 3,000 former military personnel who elect to become law
enforcement officers. I am proposing to provide $10 million more in
fiscal year 1996 to provide training for 2,000 more.
For an investment of $25 million over 2 years, Congress has an
opportunity to help provide good jobs for our former military personnel
and make our streets safer. In my view, few Government programs offer
such a win-win scenario as this program does. Troops to Cops fills two
important needs: It helps our communities recruit quality law
enforcement officers; At the same time it utilizes the tremendous
wealth of skilled military personnel who are transitioning to new jobs
as a result of defense downsizing.
Troops to Cops is a transitional benefit for troops affected by
downsizing. In fiscal year 1994 alone, 291,000 troops were separated
from the armed forces.
The Department of Justice is in the process of administering this
program as a part of the overall COPS Program. Applications for the
funds are due on August 15, 1995, and the COPS office anticipates
making its awards by the end of September. The delay in implementation
of this program is due to the emphasis on actually getting the crime
bill's funding for officers to the police and sheriff's departments.
Troops to Cops is follow-on funding to help make the program work.
The Department of Justice is expecting applications for htis program
to far exceed the ability they have to provide funding. And, the
Department of Defense expects the demand among military personnel to
far exceed the funding that is currently available for Troops to Cops.
According to the Defense Department's Office of Transition Support
and Services, one of the most asked about post-military careers at DOD
job fairs is law enforcement. Many veterans want to work in law
enforcment, and police and sheriffs departments are often eager to hire
them.
The $52 million authorized by this amendment en toto is fully offset.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, section 431 of the bill
contains $52 million more than is needed to implement the military
personnel programs of the Department of Defense. So, this amendment
does not increase spending over the original Armed Services Committee
proposal.
The Troops-to-Cops Program is supported by a variety of cities,
police departments and veterans organizations, including: National
Sheriffs' Association; city of Long Beach, CA; Los Angeles County
Professional Peace Officers Association; city of Virginia Beach, VA;
city of Los Angeles; city and county of Denver, CO; city of Miami, FL;
Non-Commissioned Officers Association of the U.S.; Los Angeles Police
Protective League; and The American Legion.
Troops to Cops is a win-win program for defense conversion and law
enforcement. We can give something back to our military personnel who
served their country, as well as to our communities across the country
to make their streets safer.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment which would authorized
$10 million to continue the work of the Troops-to-Cops program.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of this amendment to
support authorizing the Troops-to-Teachers Program. This program is a
vital transition benefit for service members leaving the military
because of downsizing. In 1993, the Congress authorized this innovative
program which benefits both departing service members and school
systems across our country which are having difficulty attracting
quality teachers.
Troops-to-Teachers has two parts. First, it provides financial
assistance to service members to help them get the certification
necessary to work as a teacher or teacher's aide. Second, it provides
funds over a 5-year time frame to school systems that hire program
graduates to defray the individual's
[[Page S 11310]]
salary costs in decreasing increments. This allows the school system
the time to find the means of paying for that teacher's salary.
The statistics back up the value of the Troops-to-Teachers Program.
Over 8,000 individuals have applied to the program; Over 800
individuals are currently undergoing certification training in 45
states; Over 300 individuals have been hired so far in 35 States; 150
school districts nationwide are employing participants in this program.
Clearly this program is a winner for all involved, both the men and
women who have served their country and our children who are going to
benefit from not just their teaching abilities, but their service as
role models. I strongly support efforts to make sure that this program
continues.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are prepared to accept the amendment.
It is acceptable.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, Senator Pryor is the prime author of the ``Troops to
Teachers'' amendment, and Senator Feinstein is the prime author of the
``Troops to Cops'' part of this amendment.
They have both worked diligently in this entire area, and in the
transition of our military personnel, which has been a very large
success.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Arkansas.
The amendment (No. 2096) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2097
(Purpose: To ensure the preservation of the ammunition industrial base
of the United States)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority
leader, the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Dole, I offer an amendment which
pertains to ammunition procurement and management. I send the amendment
to the desk and ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia (Mr. Warner), for Mr. Dole,
proposes an amendment numbered 2097.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 314, between lines 11 and 12, insert the following:
SEC. 823. PRESERVATION OF AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE.
(A) Review of Ammunition Procurement and Management
Programs.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
commence a review of the ammunition procurement and
management programs of the Department of Defense, including
the planning for, budgeting for, administration, and carrying
out of such programs.
(2) The review under paragraph (1) shall include an
assessment of the following matters:
(A) The practicability and desirability of using
centralized procurement practices to procure all ammunition
required by the Armed Forces.
(B) The capability of the ammunition production facilities
of the United States to meet the ammunition requirements of
the Armed Forces.
(C) The practicability and desirability of privatizing such
ammunition production facilities.
(D) The practicability and desirability of using integrated
budget planning among the Armed Forces for the procurement of
ammunition.
(E) The practicability and desirability of establishing an
advocate within the Department of Defense for ammunition
industrial base matters who shall be responsible for--
(i) establishing the quantity and price of ammunition
procured by the Armed Forces; and
(ii) establishing and implementing policy to ensure the
continuing viability of the ammunition industrial base in the
United States.
munitions industrial base
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the amendment I propose today requires the
Secretary of Defense to initiate a review of the ammunition procurement
and management programs of the Department of Defense.
The munitions industrial base has undergone dramatic reductions in
the years following the Vietnam war. Built principally during World War
II, the base consisted of a large number of expansive, government-owned
manufacturing plants combined with hundreds of private sector major
component and end-item manufacturing plants, and thousands of second
and third tier subcontractor facilities, all designed to produce large
volumes of munitions to fight another worldwide conflict. The end of
the cold war triggered a comprehensive reassessment and restructuring
of the national security strategy. Concurrently, the ammunition
requirements of the Armed Forces were precipitously reduced and the
production of ammunition declined to the lowest level since before the
Vietnam war. This reduced business for the industrial base has
decimated what was once a versatile, robust, and energetic industry. Of
the 286 major munitions companies which existed in 1978 only 52 are
projected to be in business by the end of 1995, an 82 percent
reduction. At the same time the Government production base has shrunk
by over 40 percent from 32 to 19 facilities. Only 9 of those remaining
19 plants are being actively workloaded with production.
In light of these enormous changes, it is appropriate to review how
the Department of Defense plans, budgets, conducts, and manages
ammunition procurement and production. My amendment directs the
Secretary to initiate such a review, aimed at restructuring the entire
munitions infrastructure with three objectives in mind: Elimination of
management/review layering in the planning, budgeting, and execution of
ammunition programs; fixing the accountability for decisions; and
reduction or elimination of Government ownership of production
equipment and facilities, while preserving a robust and responsive
ammunition production industrial base.
Summed up, the overall objective of the study is to recommend those
changes which will reduce the cost to the U.S. Government of providing
munitions to our Armed Forces both in peace and during war while making
the industrial base more responsive to our war fighters' needs.
Mr. WARNER. I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other
side.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on this
side. I urge the Senate to approve the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Kansas.
The amendment (No. 2097) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2098
(Purpose: To modify the authority to transfer funds regarding foreign
currency fluctuations so that the authority does not apply to
appropriations for fiscal years before fiscal year 1996)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished Senator
from South Carolina, Mr. Thurmond, I offer an amendment to modify
section 1006, which is transfer authority regarding funds available for
foreign currency fluctuations and eliminate the direct spending costs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia (Mr. Warner), for Mr. Thurmond,
proposes an amendment numbered 2098.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 328, line 19, strike out ``1994'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``1995''.
On page 329, line 18, strike out ``1993'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``1995''.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, this amendment modifies section 1106,
transfer authority regarding funds available for foreign currency
fluctuations to eliminate the direct spending costs. When the committee
adopted this provision during our markup, we
[[Page S 11311]]
did so based on a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office
which made this provision affordable. Later, after the bill was
approved by the committee, CBO revised the cost estimate upward. The
revised estimate is that this provision will cost $30 million in direct
spending in fiscal year 1996.
The amendment modifies the provision to make the authority effective
in fiscal year 1996, eliminating the ability to use prior year funds.
I understand this amendment is agreed to on both sides.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask my friend from Virginia if he would go
to the next amendment and set this one aside very briefly.
We need to do a little more checking on this amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand that the minority is willing
to return to the Thurmond amendment.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared, and I urge
its adoption.
Mr. WARNER. I urge the Chair to ask the question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
2098.
The amendment (No. 2098) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2099
(Purpose: To provide a substitute for section 543, relating to military
intelligence personnel prevented by secrecy from being considered for
decorations and award)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have an amendment by Senator Akaka. I send
the amendment to the desk and ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Akaka,
proposes an amendment numbered 2099.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Beginning on page 204, strike out line 8 and all that
follows through page 206, line 4, and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SEC. 543. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL PREVENTED BY
SECRECY FROM BEING CONSIDERED FOR DECORATIONS
AND AWARDS.
(a) Waiver on Restrictions of Awards.--(1) Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the President, the Secretary of
Defense, or the Secretary of the military department
concerned may award a decoration to any person for an act,
achievement, or service that the person performed in carrying
out military intelligence duties during the period January 1,
1940, through December 31, 1990.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to any decoration (including any
device in lieu of a decoration) that, during or after the
period described in paragraph (1) and before the date of the
enactment of this Act, was authorized by law or under the
regulations of the Department of Defense or the military
department concerned to be awarded to a person for an act,
achievement, or service performed by that person while
serving on active duty.
(b) Review of Award Recommendations.--(1) The Secretary of
each military department shall review all recommendations for
awards of decorations for acts, achievements, or service
described in subsection (a)(1) that have been received by the
Secretary during the period of the review.
(2) The Secretary shall begin the review within 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall
complete the review within one year after such date.
(3) The Secretary may use the same process for carrying out
the review as the Secretary uses for reviewing other
recommendations for awarding decorations to members of the
armed force or armed forces under the Secretary's
jurisdiction for acts, achievements, or service.
(4) The Secretary may reject a recommendation if the
Secretary determines that there is a justifiable basis for
concluding that the recommendation is specious.
(5) The Secretary shall take reasonable actions to
publicize widely the opportunity to recommend awards of
decorations under this section.
(6)(A) Upon completing the review, the Secretary shall
submit a report on the review to the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security
of the House of Representatives.
(B) The report shall contain the following information on
each recommendation for an award reviewed:
(i) A summary of the recommendation.
(ii) The findings resulting from the review.
(iii) The final action taken on the recommendation.
(iv) Administrative or legislative recommendations to
improve award procedures with respect to military
intelligence personnel.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``active duty''
has the meaning given such term in section 101(d)(1) of title
10, United States Code.
military intelligence personnel awards
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment that would
improve section 543 of the pending measure, which concerns awards and
decorations for military intelligence personnel.
As my colleagues are aware, recommendations for the Medal of Honor,
Distinguished Service Cross, and other awards must be submitted and
acted upon within a certain time frame. For example, for the Army and
Air Force, the Medal of Honor must be recommended within 2 years of an
act, and awarded within 3; for the Navy, the applicable dates are 3
years and 5 years, respectively. These limits were imposed by Congress
to ensure that an award, and particularly the Medal of Honor, would be
based on the most contemporaneous, and thus accurate, documentation.
While these time limits may be appropriate in the vast majority of
cases, they are not always appropriate in the case of military
intelligence personnel who, because of the secrecy of their missions,
could not be considered for the Medal of Honor or other awards within
the 3 or 5 year statutory period. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center,
which administers the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame, cites a
number of individuals who are members of the Hall who are in precisely
this situation.
One example is the legendary COL Car Eifler, who performed
extraordinary service during World War II, notably as the leader of the
famous Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services in Burma.
Under his command, the secret commando unit operated behind enemy
lines, harassing Japanese troops and organizing and training Burmese
natives in espionage and sabotage.
During the course of the war, Detachment 101 cleared the enemy from a
10,000 square mile area, sabotaged the Japanese railway system, and
gathered important intelligence about enemy activities and
capabilities. COL Eifler displayed extraordinary personal courage on
numerous occasions, including one instance in which he commanded a
small, unarmed vessel through 450 miles of Japanese controlled waters
to rescue 10 crewmembers of a downed B-24 bomber in the Bay of Bengal.
While COL Eifler received several citations, the covert conditions
under which he operated prevented his being nominated for the
Congressional Medal of Honor or the Distinguished Service Cross, either
of which he clearly merits.
Another example is LTC Richard Sakakida, who served as an Army
undercover agent in the Philippines during the Second World War. LTC
Sakakida was captured by the Japanese shortly after the fall of
Corregidor and subjected to excruciating torture; incredibly, he
steadfastly refused to divulge his mission as an American intelligence
agent. Later, after gaining the confidence of his captors, he
established a spy network within Japanese Army headquarters and was
able to send important combat intelligence to the Allies through
Filipino guerrillas whom he had recruited as couriers. Some of this
information may have led to the destruction of a major Japanese naval
task force preparing to invade Australia.
During this period, he also engineered the escape of hundreds of
Filipino guerrillas from prison, yet he himself remained behind in
order to continue his intelligence activities. Today, because his
mission was undertaken in complete secrecy,
and because his direct superiors died or were killed during the war,
he was never considered for an award for valor. Yet, now that his full
story has become known, he is ineligible for awards such as the Medal
of Honor or DSC because of the statutory deadlines that apply to such
awards.
Mr. President, these are but two examples of military intelligence
operatives whose courageous deeds have never been fully acknowledged.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center has
[[Page S 11312]]
identified other deserving individuals who were overlooked because of
secrecy. Undoubtedly there are others, less well known, who have never
been recognized for their intelligence-related accomplishments.
Earlier this year, Mr. President, I had the pleasure of working with
members of the Armed Services Committee on an initiative to assist
deserving individuals such as COL Eifler and LTC Sakakida. Due largely
to the efforts of my friend and colleague, Senator Coats, the chairman
of the Personnel Subcommittee, the committee approved a provision in
the pending measure, section 543, that attempts to address this issue.
In brief, section 543 expresses the sense of the Senate that the
military services should conduct a 1-year review of the records of
military intelligence personnel to determine if they were prevented by
the secrecy of their missions from being appropriately considered for
the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, and other awards.
Based on the review, section 543 authorizes the services to approve
awards for deserving individuals notwithstanding the statutory time
limitations governing such awards.
However, since the provision was reported from committee, a number of
technical shortcomings have been pointed out to me by the military
services as well as by military intelligence veterans organizations. I
have assembled their suggestions for improving section 543 in the
pending amendment. My amendment does several things:
First, it would require, rather than urge, the services to undertake
the proposed review. Making the review mandatory is important because
many of the affected individuals are veterans of World War II or Korea
who are in their 60's, 70's, and 80's and not in the best of health.
Mandating that the review be undertaken and completed by a date certain
rather than leaving it to the military's discretion, would ensure that
the cases of these older veterans will be considered before age takes
its toll.
Second, rather than requiring the military services to review the
records of all military intelligence personnel, which would involve
examining potentially millions of documents and files--a monumental,
perhaps impossible task--my amendment would simply require the services
to review only the records of those individuals for whom
recommendations have been received by the services during the 1-year
period. That is to say, the onus would be on the individual, or his or
her supporters, to apply for consideration during the review period.
This would considerably ease the administrative burden, and cost, that
section 543 as currently drafted would impose on the military.
Third, my amendment would allow the service Secretaries to reject an
application or recommendation if there is a justifiable basis for
concluding that the application is specious. Again, the purpose of this
particular provision is to make the services' task easier by giving
them the authority to reject at the outset any recommendation for an
award that is, on its face, without
merit.
Fourth, it would require the services to take reasonable steps to
publicize the opportunity to apply for awards during the 1-year review
period. It would be a sad state of affairs, Mr. President, if certain
deserving individuals were not to take advantage of the review
opportunity through lack of notification. The services have an
obligation to ensure that potential awardees are informed of the
opportunity to apply for an award or decoration.
Fifth, my amendment would require the services, upon completion of
the review, to make any legislative or administrative recommendations
to improve award procedures with respect to military intelligence
personnel. These recommendations will be important in helping Congress
and the services develop policies that will obviate problems of the
kind which makes this legislation necessary.
Finally, I should note that my amendment is almost identical in form
and substance to another provision in the committee bill, section 542,
which concerns awards for service during the Vietnam era. Thus, I
believe there is ample justification and precedent for the amendment I
am offering. Certainly if Vietnam veterans deserve a chance to be
reviewed for acts of heroism, military intelligence officers from other
wars whose heroism has been long-overlooked should be accorded a
similar opportunity.
Mr. President, we will soon be commemorating the 50th anniversary of
V-J Day and the end of World War II. I can think of no better way to
honor the courage and sacrifice of the men and women who served our
country as military intelligence officers during that conflict and in
subsequent wars than to enact this amendment.
Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank the chairman and
ranking member of the Personnel Subcommittee, Senator Coats and Senator
Byrd, as well as the chairman and ranking member of the full Committee,
Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn, for their understanding and
assistance on this matter. I would also like to recognize the efforts
of their staff, including Andy Effron, P.T. Henry, and especially
Charlie Abell, for the tremendous support they provided my staff.
I ask unanimous consent that copies of letters in support of this
initiative from the commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command and
the presidents of the Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services and
the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Chief, Military Intelligence Corps.,
Department of the Army,
Fort Huachuca, AZ.
Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Akaka: I appreciate your continued support
concerning the Medal of Honor situation faced by Lieutenant
Colonel Richard Sakakida, and several other of our
unrecognized members of the Military Intelligence Corps from
World War II.
I wholeheartedly concur that Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Sakakida should be awarded the Medal of Honor for his
valorous actions in covert operations during World War II.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Sakakida is not alone in
his unrecognized heroism. Due to the sensitivity and
classified nature of their missions, several other members
and nominees of the Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame
would certainly benefit from your legislation. These
individuals include Master Sergeant Lorenzo Alverado,
Specialist Harry Akune, Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, and Colonel
Carl Eifler. I support your efforts for legislation S. 566
that requires review of all World War II Military
Intelligence personnel. Recognition for their accomplishments
is long overdue.
If you require further assistance or background
information, please contact Jim Chambers or Captain Vivian
Santistevan, Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence,
(502) 533-1178/1181.
Sincerely,
Charles W. Thomas,
Brigadier General.
Veterans of OSS,
New York, NY, June 20, 1995.
Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Akaka: As President of the Veterans of the
Office of Strategic Services (VSS), which represents the men
and women who carried out the majority of US secret
intelligence and special operations activities during WW II
that were outside the traditional military structure, I am
writing to express our organization's strong support for your
efforts to secure appropriate recognition for certain former
military intelligence personnel who deserve same.
As you know, there are many deserving individuals who
served in intelligence capacities during wartime who, because
of the classified nature of their missions, were never
appropriately considered for the Congressional Medal of
Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, or other awards prior to
the statutory deadline for official consideration for these
medals.
Among others of our group who were unfairly precluded from
receiving appropriate consideration include from Col. Carl
Eifler, (who could not be put in for a Medal of Honor) to
Camille Lelong, known then as Lt. Jacques P. Pavel, a Jed
teammate of William Colby (who he put in for a Legion of
Merit, but was never awarded) and nisei Kay Sugahara (who
after internment, joined the OSS's Moral Operations Branch
and did extraordinary work in the Pacific before and
immediately after VJ Day, is now buried in Arlington, but
never received any recognition whatsoever).
VSS wholeheartedly supports legislation that would waive
the time limits pertaining to the CMH and other medals for
those individuals who, because of the secrecy of their
operations, could and/or were not otherwise considered for
these awards within the prescribed normal military
limitation.
With all best wishes,
Yours truly,
Geoffrey M.T. Jones,
President.
____
[[Page S 11313]]
Association of Former
Intelligence Officers,
McLean, VA, July 25, 1995.
Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
U.S. Senate, Hart Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Akaka: As Executive Director of the
Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), I endorse
your efforts to secure recognition for military intelligence
veterans.
I wholeheartedly encourage proposed legislation that would
require the military services to review the records of
military intelligence personnel who, because of the secrecy
of their work, were never appropriately considered for the
Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, or other award.
The military should be required to review the records only
of those individuals who apply to be reviewed or whose
applications are submitted on their behalf. These individuals
could then be considered on a case-by-case basis. To ensure
that the military reviews the applications in a timely
manner, a statutory delimiting deadline for making a final
determination should be imposed, perhaps one year from the
date an application is received.
Thank you again for your work on behalf of military
intelligence veterans.
Sincerely,
David D. Whipple,
Executive Director.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment establishes congressional
findings concerning the potential for overlooking meritorious acts by
those whose activities necessarily require secrecy.
This establishes a 1-year period for review of recommendations and
requests for awards for the period from 1940 to 1990. While the bill
recognizes that persons deserving of awards may have been overlooked
because their intelligence activities were necessarily secretive, it
contains no provisions for review of existing procedures which are time
consuming and not oriented toward cases which contain a presumption
against reviewing cases more than 3 years old.
The provision establishes a limited time of 1 year and limits review
to those requesting or recommended for such a review.
I urge adoption of the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment is satisfactory.
I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Hawaii.
The amendment (No. 2099) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2100
(Purpose: To require the Secretary of the Army to review the records
relating to the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Asian-
Americans and Native American Pacific Islanders for service in the Army
during World War II to determine whether the award should be upgraded
to the Medal of Honor)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have another amendment by the Senator from
Hawaii, Senator Akaka. This amendment would require a review of awards
to Asian-Americans and native American Pacific Islanders during World
War II. It requires the review of awards to African-Americans to
determine whether they should be upgraded.
The Army has undertaken a review of World War II awards of the
Distinguished Service Cross to determine whether any should be upgraded
to the Medal of Honor. The review is requested based on a concern that
some awards may have been downgraded due to prejudice.
The amendment requests a similar review of awards to native American
Pacific Islanders in view of the possible prejudice at that time
against these groups.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Akaka,
proposes an amendment numbered 2100.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 206, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:
SEC. 544. REVIEW REGARDING AWARDS OF DISTINGUISHED-SERVICE
CROSS TO ASIAN-AMERICANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS
FOR CERTAIN WORLD WAR II SERVICE.
(a) Review Required.--The Secretary of the Army shall--
(1) review the records relating to the award of the
Distinguished-Service Cross to Asian-Americans and Native
American Pacific Islanders for service as members of the Army
during World War II in order to determine whether the award
should be upgraded to the Medal of Honor; and
(2) submit to the President a recommendation that the
President award a Medal of Honor to each such person for whom
the Secretary determines an upgrade to be appropriate.
(b) Waiver of Time Limitations.--The President is
authorized to award a Medal of Honor to any person referred
to in subsection (a) in accordance with a recommendation of
the Secretary of the Army submitted under that subsection.
The following restrictions do not apply in the case of any
such person:
(1) Sections 3744 and 8744 of title 10, United States Code.
(2) Any regulation or other administrative restriction on--
(A) the time for awarding a Medal of Honor; or
(B) the awarding of a Medal of Honor for service for which
a Distinguished-Service Cross has been awarded.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``Native American Pacific Islander'' means a
Native Hawaiian and any other Native American Pacific
Islander within the meaning of the Native American Programs
Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 2291 et seq.).
(2) The term ``World War II'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101(8) of title 38, United States Code.
requiring the review of distinguished service cross awards to asian
americans and native american pacific islanders during world war ii
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to S. 1026,
the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense authorization bill. The
amendment directs the Secretary of the Army to review the service
records of Asian-Americans and Native American Pacific Islanders who
received the Distinguished Service Cross to determine whether the award
should be upgraded to the Medal of Honor.
Under the direction of then-Acting Secretary John Shannon, the Army
is reviewing all Distinguished Service Cross [DSC] awards given to
African-American soldiers during World War II to determine whether any
of these cases merited an upgrade to the Congressional Medal of Honor
[CMH].
Mr. President, I offer my amendment to ensure that the Army conducts
a similar study for Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders who served
during World War II. I am deeply concerned that this group of Americans
may have also been discriminated against in the awarding of the CMH.
The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II is a clear
indication of the bias that existed at the time. This hostile climate
may have impacted the decision to award the military's highest honor to
Asians, particularly Japanese-Americans.
The famed 100th Infantry Battalion/442 Regimental Combat Team, which
performed extraordinary deeds in Europe, still has the unique
distinction of being the most highly decorated unit of its size in
American history. In fact, 47 individuals of the 442d Regimental Combat
Team received the DSC. However, only one Japanese-American who served
during World War II received the CMH; this award was given posthumously
after the war only when concerns were raised that not one American of
Japanese descent who served in World War II had received the medal.
Mr. President, my amendment only serves to ensure fairness for Asian-
Americans and Pacific Islanders who so gallantly served their country
during World War II. As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the
Allied victory over the Axis powers, I think it is timely and
appropriate that we undertake such a initiative. I hope that my
colleagues will support this important amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we find the amendment satisfactory and
urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Hawaii, No. 2100
The amendment (No. 2100) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
[[Page S 11314]]
Amendment No. 2101
(Purpose: To revise section 723, relating to the applicability of
CHAMPUS payment rules to health care provided by CHAMPUS providers to
members of the uniformed services enrolled in a health care plan of a
Uniformed Services Treatment Facility)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Coats, I offer an
amendment which modifies section 723 by striking the current section
and replacing it with a new section which accomplishes the intended
result of protecting Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities from being
charged more than the CHAMPUS allowable costs for services provided by
CHAMPUS providers to USTF enrollees who are treated when they are
outside the USTF catchment area.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Coats,
proposes amendment numbered 2101.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Beginning on page 290, strike out line 12 and all that
follows through page 291, line 14, and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SEC. 723. APPLICABILITY OF CHAMPUS PAYMENT RULES IN CERTAIN
CASES.
Section 1074 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with
the other administering Secretaries, may by regulation
require a private CHAMPUS provider to apply the CHAMPUS
payment rules (subject to any modifications considered
appropriate by the Secretary) in imposing charges for health
care that the provider provides outside the catchment area of
a Uniformed Services Treatment Facility to a member of the
uniformed services who is enrolled in a health care plan of
the Uniformed Services Treatment Facility.
``(2) In this subsection:
``(A) The term `private CHAMPUS provider' means a private
facility or health care provider that is a health care
provider under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services.
``(B) The term `CHAMPUS payment rules' means the payment
rules referred to in subsection (c).
``(C) The term `Uniformed Services Treatment Facility'
means a facility deemed to be a facility of the uniformed
services under section 911(a) of the Military Construction
Authorization Act, 1982 (42 U.S.C. 248c(a)).''.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this amendment modifies section 723, amount
payable by uniformed services for health care services provided outside
the catchment areas of the facilities, to perfect the provision.
The amendment strikes the current section and replaces it with a new
section which accomplishes the intended result of protecting the
Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities from being charged more than
the CHAMPUS allowable costs for services provided by CHAMPUS providers
to USTF enrollees who are treated when they are outside the USTF
catchment area.
The Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities and the Department of
Defense concur in this change. I understand this amendment is agreed to
on both sides.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Indiana.
The amendment (No. 2101) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2102
(Purpose: To change a date in section 712)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Indiana [Mr.
Coats] I offer an amendment which would change the date after which
USTF enrollees are subject to the TRICARE uniform benefits. This change
will enable the USTF's to enroll eligible personnel in the August-
September 1995 enrollment period under the current benefit program. Any
enrollment after October 1, 1995, would be subject to the TRICARE
uniform benefit.
Mr. President, I send to the desk the amendment and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Coats,
proposes an amendment numbered 2102:
On page 285, line 14, strike out ``January 1, 1995'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``October 1, 1995''.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
immediate consideration.
This amendment modifies section 712, provision of TRICARE uniform
benefits by uniformed services treatment facilities, to change the date
before which those enrolled in a USTF program would not be required to
convert to the uniform benefit.
Section 712 currently would grand father those enrolled in a USTF
health care program on or before January 1, 1995. This amendment would
change this date to October 1, 1995. This change will enable the USTF's
to enroll eligible personnel in the August-September 1995 enrollment
period under the current benefit program. Any enrollment after October
1, 1995, would be subject to the TRICARE uniform benefit.
I understand this amendment is agreed to on both sides.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Indiana.
The amendment (No. 2102) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2103
Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, on behalf of the Senators from
Oklahoma, Mr. Nickles and Mr. Inhofe, I offer an amendment which will
require the General Accounting Office to review the Department of
Defense depot maintenance policy required in this bill.
Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by the other
side. I think that is correct.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, that is correct. I have a brief statement I
would like to make on behalf of the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I now ask the clerk to read the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Nickles,
for himself and Mr. Inhofe, proposes an amendment numbered
2103.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 76, insert the following after line 4:
``(f) Review by the General Accounting Office.--(1) The
Secretary shall make available to the Comptroller General of
the United States all information used by the Department in
developing the policy under subsections (a) through (d) of
this section.
(2) Not later than 45 days after the Secretary submits to
Congress the report required by subsection (a), the
Comptroller General shall transmit to Congress a report
containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's proposed
policy as reported under subsection (a).
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senate Armed Services
Committee members and staff for working closely with me and my staff on
this amendment. I also want to thank my friend and colleague Senator
Inhofe and his staff who played a key role in getting this amendment
adopted.
This amendment adds the requirement that once the Department of
Defense submits its report to Congress regarding depot maintenance as
required in this bill, the GAO be given 45 days to review the
information and the conclusions from the Pentagon's recommended depot
policy and submit that analysis to Congress.
In my view this is an appropriate and non-controversial amendment. By
providing the Congress with an analysis of the Pentagon's proposal for
depot maintenance the Congress will have an independent viewpoint on
the recommended changes.
This analysis will be critical as the Congress decides whether to
adopt the
[[Page S 11315]]
recommendations of the Pentagon or stay with the existing depot policy.
Once again, I wish to thank the members and staff of the Senate Armed
Services Committee and Senator Inhofe for their cooperation and
assistance in having this amendment included in this bill.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I support the Nickles amendment, which will
strengthen the bill's provisions on depot maintenance workload.
Section 311 of the bill requires the Secretary of defense to submit
to Congress a comprehensive policy on the performance of depot-level
maintenance and repair not later than March 31, 1996.
The policy must: First, define purpose of public depots; second,
provide for performance of core capabilities at public depots; third,
provide sufficient personnel, equipment, and facilities at public
depots; fourth, address environmental liability; fifth provide for
public private competition when there is sufficient potential for
realizing cost savings based on adequate private sector competition and
technical capabilities; sixth require merit-based selection when
workload of a depot is changed; seventh provide transition provisions
for persons in DOD depots; and eighth address related issues on
exchange of technical data, efficiency, and effects on the Federal
workforce.
The bill makes it clear that no changes may be made in the statutes
requiring that at least 60 percent of the workload be preformed in
public depots, and the requirements to for public/private competition
for any change in workload requirements unless Congress enacts separate
legislation approving or modifying the DOD policy.
The Nickles amendment would require a detailed analysis by the
General Accounting Office of DOD's proposed depot maintenance policy.
GAO oversight is necessary to assess the validity of DOD data and
studies.
The importance of GAO report has been demonstrated in the base
closure process, where their data provided important perspective to the
BRAC Commission.
While there may well be opportunities for increased contractor
participation, these should be developed on the basis of careful
analysis, not theoretical beliefs. Depot-level maintenance and repair
activities are essential to wartime readiness and sustainability. The
current system has proved to be highly effective in meeting national
security needs, and should not be subjected to significant changes
without a clear understanding of the consequences of a new policy.
At the confirmation hearing for Deputy Secretary of Defense John
White, he was closely questioned about the recommendations of the Roles
and Missions Commission concerning privatization of depot workload.
He acknowledged that the Commission did not conduct a comprehensive
analysis of specific DOD functions to determine which should be
privatized; that the recommendation reflected a general philosophical
approach; that Commission did not develop a specific definition of the
inherently governmental functions that should not be privatized; that
the Commission had not developed a specific concept of what core
capabilities should be retained; that there had been no analysis of the
efficiency and effectiveness of current depots; and that the Commission
did not have a specific plan for transitioning from public to private
entities.
He also agreed that it was very important to ensure that any workload
assigned to the private sector be subject to adequate private sector
competition.
GAO review is needed to ensure that any changes in policy are
developed on the basis of sound analysis rather than abstract
philosophy.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I wish to express my thanks to Senator
Thurmond and the staff of the Armed Services Committee for their
diligence in working with Senator Nickles and me and our staffs on this
amendment.
This amendment requires the General Accounting Office to review the
DOD report on depot maintenance required in the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1995 (S. 1026.), and report their findings to
Congress within 45 days of the date of the report.
This is a common sense, noncontroversial amendment. It simply
provides a second opinion for members of Congress when the time comes
to review the Department of Defense's recommended changes. This
additional review will help Members sort through this complicated
subject.
Again, I thank the members and staff of the Armed Services Committee
for their assistance in having this amendment included in the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma.
The amendment (No. 2103) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2104
(Purpose: To make various amendments to the provisions relating to the
Naval Petroleum Reserves)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senators McCain and
Bingaman and Campbell, I send an amendment to the desk. This amendment
further strengthens the safeguards established to ensure minimum
value--excuse me, that would be maximum value, to ensure maximum value,
Mr. President, to the taxpayers as a consequence of the sale of the
Naval Petroleum Reserve. It is my understanding this amendment has been
cleared on the other side.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, it is cleared as long as that word is
``maximum'' value.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
Mr. NUNN. I urge it be adopted.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. McCain, for
himself, Mr. Brown, Mr. Bingaman, and Mr. Campbell, proposes
an amendment numbered 2104.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 572, line 19, strike out ``three months'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``five months''.
On page 573, line 11, strike out ``fair market''.
On page 574, beginning on line 9, strike out ``In setting
that price, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director,
may consider'' and insert in lieu thereof ``The Secretary may
not set the minimum acceptable price below''.
On page 574, at the end of line 19, insert the following:
``Notwithstanding section 7433(b) of this title, costs and
fees of retaining the investment banker shall be paid out of
the proceeds of the sale of the reserve.''.
On page 574, line 22, insert ``or contracts'' after
``contract''.
On page 575, line 3, insert ``or contracts'' after
``contract''.
On page 575, line 11, insert ``or contracts'' after
``contract''.
On page 575, line 17, insert ``or contracts'' after
``contract''.
On page 576, line 11, by inserting ``or purchasers (as the
case may be)'' after ``purchaser''.
On page 578, line 17, by inserting ``or purchasers (as the
case may be)'' after ``purchaser''.
On page 579, line 4, strike out ``a contract'' and insert
in lieu thereof ``any contract''.
On page 579, line 12, insert after ``reserve'' the
following: ``or any subcomponent thereof''.
On page 579, line 16, insert ``or parcel'' after
``reserve''.
On page 584, strike out line 11, and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
the committees.
``(m) Oversight.--The Comptroller General shall monitor the
actions of the Secretary relating to the sale of the reserve
and report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and the Committee on National security of the House of
Representatives any findings on such actions that the
Comptroller General considers appropriate to report to such
committees.
``(n) Acquisition of Services.--The Secretary may enter
into contracts for the acquisition of services required under
this section under the authority of paragraph (7) of section
303(c) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253(c)), except that the notification
required under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph for each
contract shall be submitted to Congress not less than 7 days
before the award of the contract.
``(o) Reconsideration of Process of Sale.--(1) If during
the course of the sale of the reserve the Secretary of Energy
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
jointly determine that--
``(A) the sale is proceeding in a manner inconsistent with
achievement of a sale price that reflects the full value of
the reserve, or
[[Page S 11316]]
``(B) a course of action other than the immediate sale of
the reserve is in the best interests of the United States,
the Secretary shall submit a notification of the
determination to the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and the Committees on National Security and on
Commerce of the House of Representatives.
``(2) After the Secretary submits a notification under
paragraph (1), the Secretary may not complete the sale the
reserve under this section unless there is enacted a joint
resolution--
``(A) that is introduced after the date on which the
notification is received by the committees referred to in
such paragraph;
``(B) that does not have a preamble;
``(C) the matter after the resolving clause of which reads
only as follows: `That the Secretary of Energy shall proceed
with activities to sell Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 1 in
accordance with section 7421a of title 10, United States
Code, notwithstanding the determination set forth in the
notification submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Energy
on ____________.' (the blank space being filled in with the
appropriate date); and
``(D) the title of which is as follows: `Joint resolution
approving continuation of actions to sell Naval Petroleum
Reserve Numbered 1'.
``(3) Subsection (k), except for paragraph (1) of such
subsection, shall apply to the joint resolution described in
paragraph (2).''.
On page 584, strike out line 20 and all that follows
through page 586, line 12, and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
SEC. 3302. FUTURE OF NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES (OTHER THAN
NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE NUMBERED 1).
(a) Study of Future of Petroleum Reserves.--(1) The
Secretary of Energy shall conduct a study to determine which
of the following options, or combination of options, would
maximize the value of the naval petroleum reserves to or for
the United States:
(A) Transfer of all or a part of the naval petroleum
reserves to the jurisdiction of the Department of the
Interior for leasing in accordance with the Mineral Leasing
Act (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) and surface management in
accordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(B) Lease of the naval petroleum reserves consistent with
the provisions of such Acts.
(C) Sale of the interest of the United States in the naval
petroleum reserves.
(2) The Secretary shall retain such independent consultants
as the Secretary considers appropriate to conduct the study.
(3) An examination of the value to be derived by the United
States from the transfer, lease, or sale of the naval
petroleum reserves under paragraph (1) shall include an
assessment and estimate, in a manner consistent with
customary property valuation practices in the oil industry,
of the fair market value of the interest of the United States
in the naval petroleum reserves.
(4) Not later than December 31, 1995, the Secretary shall
submit to Congress and make available to the public a report
describing the results of the study and containing such
recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate to
implement the option, or combination of options, identified
in the study that would maximize the value of the naval
petroleum reserves to or for the United States,
(b) Implementation of Recommendations.--Not earlier than 31
days after submitting to Congress the report required under
subsection (a)(4), and not later than December 31, 1996, the
Secretary shall carry out the recommendations contained in
the report.
(c) Naval Petroleum Reserves Defined.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``naval petroleum reserves'' has the
meaning given that term in section 7420(2) of title 10,
United States Code, except that such term does not include
Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 1.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I wanted to commend the Senator from New
Mexico for his diligent work regarding this amendment. It takes another
important step toward ensuring that the taxpayer receives a fair value
for the reserve.
The debate regarding the sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve is not a
new one. As my colleagues know, the sale of the reserve was proposed by
the Reagan, Bush, and now Clinton administration. President Clinton's
budget reads ``Producing and selling this oil and natural gas is a
commercial, not a governmental activity, which is more appropriately
performed by the private sector.'' The sale of the reserve is advocated
by groups like the National Taxpayers Union, the CATO institute and the
Heritage Foundation. Furthermore, this year's Budget Act directs the
sale of the reserve in fiscal year 1996.
I want to make it clear that my goal, Senator Bingaman's goal and the
goal of the committee has always been to sell this asset in a manner
that protects the taxpayer and disposes the asset in a completely fair
and open process that gives advantage to no one. To achieve this, the
bill includes several provisions to ensure the Federal Government
receives the maximum value for the field.
Specifically, the bill directs the Secretary of Energy to hire five
independent assessors to establish a value for the reserve. The
Secretary, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget,
must use these assessments when establishing a minimum bid. The
Secretary is not permitted to accept an offer below the minimum bid
price.
The independent assessors are required to include in the value of the
field factors such as the equipment and facilities to be included in
the sale, the estimated quantity of petroleum and natural gas in the
reserve, and the anticipated revenue stream that the Treasury would
receive from the reserve if it were not sold, as well as all other
considerations affecting the value of the reserve.
The legislation also requires consultation with several other
agencies with expertise in these matters. It directs the Secretary to
consult with the General Services Administration to ensure that the
bidding process is open. In identifying the highest offer, the
Secretary is required to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
The Senate bill also includes a provision to address compliance with
deadlines. In the event the Secretary is unable to comply with the
timeliness identified in the bill, the Secretary in consultation with
the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] is required to notify both
the House National Security and Senate Armed Services Committees and
submit a revised plan to complete the sale.
It has been suggested that the sale of reserves in pieces may yield a
better return to the Federal Government. The committee language allows
for the Secretary to sell the reserve in pieces or as one unit,
whichever returns the best value to the taxpayers.
Finally, the legislation requires a 31-day delay before the Secretary
can finalize an agreement to accept the highest responsible offer. This
delay allows the Congress to stop the sale if it is deemed not to be in
the best interest of the taxpayer and the Federal Government. In the
event there is only a single bidder, a joint resolution of Congress
would be required before approval of the sale.
It has always been the committee's intention to do everything
possible to ensure that the legislation results in the highest return
for the Federal Government and dispenses of this property in the
fairest manner possible. The committee reported legislation, contains
many safeguards to help ensure that the interests of the taxpayer and
the Nation are protected in the disposition of this asset.
The amendment which I have crafted with Senator Bingaman goes even
further. The amendment provides increased oversight of the sale by
directing the General Accounting Office to monitor all aspects of the
sale and report to the Armed Services Committee and the House National
Security Committee.
We have also clarified the process for establishing the minimum bid.
The value established by the five independent assessors is based on the
net present value of the reserve adjusted for any anticipated increases
in tax revenues that would result if the reserve were sold. The
Secretary is restricted from selecting a minimum bid price less than
that value. This will ensure that the value received for the Elk Hills
site is fair to the Federal Government.
It also directs the Secretary of Energy in conjunction with the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to notify the House
National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee if
the sale is not proceeding in manner that will yield the maximum value
for the Federal Government or if they determine that another course of
action will receive a better value for the Federal Government.
Once that notification has been made, the sale could not be completed
unless the Congress approves a joint resolution in support of the bill.
This would allow the administration the opportunity throughout this
process to suggest an alternative way to deal with the reserve.
Mr. President, the overriding concern of the committee was to ensure
that
[[Page S 11317]]
the taxpayers receive the maximum value for the reserve. We have taken
several steps to accomplish this goal. The sale of this asset involves
five Federal agencies in the sale of the reserve. It allows Congress to
review the sale of the reserve for a month before it is finalized. In
the event of a single bidder it requires our approval. Finally, it
directs the Secretary and the Director of OMB to notify us if the sale
is proceeding properly or if they have a better way of dealing with the
reserve.
As I said earlier, the debate regarding the Naval Petroleum Reserve
has been going on for a long time. The passage of the Defense
Authorization Act will not end this debate. We still have to work this
bill out in conference with the House. In addition, we will have to
address this issue during the budget reconciliation debate because this
provision still falls short of the budget instructions. During the
course of debate I look forward to the suggestions of my colleagues on
how to further improve this bill. I hope my colleagues will join
Senator Bingaman and me in supporting this amendment.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to thank the senior Senator from
Arizona for his willingness to work with me on this amendment. This
amendment basically puts every safeguard the Armed Services Committee
staff or Senator McCain's staff or Senator Campbell's staff or my staff
has come up with on the Elk Hills sale into the bill while remaining
responsive to the mandate in the fiscal year 1996 concurrent budget
resolution to sell the Elk Hills oil reserve in fiscal year 1996.
As many of our colleagues know, the sale of the Nation's naval
petroleum reserves was not initiated by the Armed Services Committee.
The sale was initially recommended by the administration to take place
over the next 2 years. The budget committees noted this and
nevertheless decided to score the administration's proposal in such a
way that the sale will have to take place during the coming fiscal year
instead of over the next 2 years.
Many of us on the Armed Services Committee have serious reservations
about the pace of this sale. The National Academy of Public
Administration has testified to serious concerns about selling the
reserve in 1 year and about whether the taxpayers will get their
money's worth if this sale is rushed. R. Scott Fosler, president of the
National Academy of Public Administration, wrote Senator Thurmond on
July 20 with his comments on the provision in the current bill. Let me
cite the key paragraph in that letter:
Every study of the management or privatization of Elk Hills
has documented the complexity of the process of divestment.
There are stubborn issues involving equity finalization,
California claims, and the establishment of true values which
are not likely to be disposed of in time to effect an
advantageous sale in one year. We, therefore, believe that
the most prudent and efficacious course would be (1)
establish the corporation as a management structure, (2)
direct the corporation to develop a plan to sell Elk Hills
(and possibly other reserves) within two or three years after
the activation of the operation. This approach would permit
an orderly, well-managed divestment process and would help
assure that the government received full value for the assets
sold.
Mr. President, this option or any other option which would not result
in the sale of Elk Hills and other reserves in fiscal year 1996 is not
available to the Armed Services Committee under the budget resolution.
I regret that. We only can sell these assets once. We should do it the
right way. The Budget Committee should not be making the choices as to
both the policy on selling the asset and the timing of that sale.
So I support this amendment. It is the best we can do under current
reconciliation instructions. Indeed it probably goes to the limit of
those instructions and I commend the Senator from Arizona and the
Senator from Colorado for doing that. But I will continue to question
those instructions and urge that the Armed Services Committee seek the
flexibility from the Budget Committee that would allow the Secretary
of Energy to dispose of these fields in the way that will bring maximum
benefit to the taxpayers, the current owners of these assets. When the
Armed Services Committee discusses reconciliation next month, perhaps
we can offer two options to the Budget Committee, the provision we are
adopting today which meets their mandate to sell the reserve in 1 year
and a second provision that would allow the Secretary to sell it over a
more extended time period.
Mr. President, this sale involves the 10th largest oil field in the
Nation. Each year this oil field provides approximately $400 million
into the public treasury. This is a very significant sale.
Mr. President, I have been told that there are many uncertainties
about this sale that would make a potential bidder very cautious. The
exact share of the field which the Government owns and which Chevron
owns is in question. The amount of oil in the field is in question. The
State of California has a suit in the courts regarding that State's
interest in the field.
For all of these reasons, Mr. President, Senator McCain and I and
others placed a number of safeguards into this legislation that protect
the interests of the taxpayers when it was before the Armed Services
Committee. This amendment, which is sponsored by Senators McCain,
Campbell, and myself adds even further safeguards to ensure that we get
a fair price in any sales that may take place of Elk Hills or its
components if the Secretary chooses to sell the field in parcels.
This amendment gives the Secretary of Energy the authority to stop
the sale and report to the Congress if the sale is turning out to be a
bad deal. It gives the Secretary the authority to recommend
alternatives to the sale if the sale is turning out to be a giveaway.
The amendment also sets up similar procedures for the sale of the oil
shale reserves. Finally, Mr. President, this amendment contains several
provisions to streamline the sale which have been requested by the
Department of Energy to allow the sale to proceed as closely as
possible to the schedule mandated by the Budget Committee.
Mr. President, in conclusion, I wish to commend Senator McCain again
for his effort to make the best of this situation. Decisions were made
for his Readiness Subcommittee by the Budget Committee. He now has to
implement those decisions and the provision in our bill as reported and
the improvements being made today by this amendment represent his and
the committee as a whole's best effort to do that given the information
we had available in late June and now in early August.
The Armed Services Committee does not normally deal with selling
Government assets and certainly we are not experts in oil field
transactions. We have produced a provision that I believe is a
significant improvement on the provision in the House version of this
bill. And perhaps with the help of the budget committees, we will be
able to improve it further in conference on this bill or in the
reconciliation bill where this matter will also be dealt with.
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I want to thank the committee chairman,
Senator Thurmond, and the ranking member, Senator Nunn, for working
with me and with the senior Senator from Colorado to craft an amendment
to the bill concerning the Naval Oil Shale Reserves.
Section 3302 of the bill before us today would direct the Secretary
of Energy to study the Naval Oil Shale Reserves and the Naval Petroleum
Reserves, with the exception of the NPR 1 at Elk Hills, for the purpose
of determining how the Federal Government, and the U.S. taxpayer, would
best be served in the management and disposition of these reserves.
I support that goal. Last year the Energy Committee, of which I am a
member, passed my bill which would have directly transferred
jurisdiction over the Naval Oil Shale Reserves from the Department of
Energy to the Department of the Interior. Since that time the Armed
Services Committee has raised a concern that we may not have the
appropriate scale of information to determine how we best maximize the
Federal interest in these resources. These are federally owned
resources; in these days of tough, difficult decisions on how we reduce
the federal deficit, it is critical to me that the Federal interest be
protected.
I commend the committee for addressing this issue. However I believe
that this bill should take the next step. The amendment that I have
worked out with the chairman and ranking
[[Page S 11318]]
member of the Armed Services Committee simply provides the Secretary of
Energy with the authority to take that next step and implement whatever
course of action is recommended by the study. Indeed, the Department of
Energy asked, and I strongly agreed, that the time for endless study of
the oil shale reserves must end and we should move expeditiously to
develop these resources.
I have worked very carefully with the Department of Energy, whose
staff requested nearly a dozen changes in the amendment, virtually all
of which I made.
Under my amendment, three options for disposition of these resources
could be considered. The reserves could be competitively leased by the
Department of the Interior just the same as the other millions of acres
of federally owned, energy resource lands in America. They could be
leased by the Department of Energy. And they could be sold by the
Department of Energy.
Some background may be appropriate. Two executive orders, in 1916 and
1924, withdrew public lands for the purpose of establishing three Naval
Oil Shale Reserves. The purpose of the reserves was to ensure the
military sufficient oil from the oil shale in the event of a cutoff of
strategic oil supplies during a war.
Naval Oil Shale Reserve 1 (40,760 acres) and 3 (14,130 acres) are
located in northwest Colorado near Rifle, and Naval Oil Shale Reserve 2
(90,400 acres) is in eastern Utah. Ironically, the critical resource
within these properties is not oil shale, but natural gas. Profitable
development of shale oil currently is considered to be decades away.
Management of the reserves was transferred from the Department of the
Navy to the Department of Energy by the Department of Energy
Organization Act in 1977. The Department of Energy has a cooperative
agreement with the Bureau of Land Management to manage the surface
resources of the reserves.
The reserves located in Colorado are situated on portions of three
large natural gas producing fields, the Parachute, Rulison, and Grand
Valley, and are estimated to contain substantial natural gas
hydrocarbons. There has been significant private natural gas drilling
and extraction activity on the southern border of the third reserve
since 1978. Since 1980, 277 private wells have been drilled contiguous
to the boundaries of Reserve 1 and 2; and through fiscal year 1992, 89
commercial producing gas wells were drilled by private industry within
one mile of the boundary of the reserves.
The Department of Energy determined in 1983 that the potential
existed for drainage of natural gas from the reserves due to the
private development outside of the reserves. To prevent drainage of
public resources, the Department of Energy began a protection program,
drilling 35 offset and communitization wells. According to the
Department of Energy's Annual Report of Operations for fiscal year
1992, natural gas production between fiscal years 1977 and 1992
totalled 5.4 billion cubic feet. Revenues from the reserves totalled $5
million between fiscal years 1977 and 1992; expenditures for the same
period totalled $24.8 million.
Clearly, this is a giant money loser under Department of Energy
stewardship. These reserves should be revenue raisers, not simply a
black hole for Energy Department spending and bureaucracy.
Under the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, the
Secretary of Energy has discretionary authority to undertake certain
activities, such as oil and gas development in the reserves, but only
as necessary to protect, conserve, maintain or test the reserves.
Production for other purposes may take place only with the approval of
the President and Congress. That production--for commercial purposes--
is the business we are doing today.
Mr. President, I have worked closely with the Department of Energy
these past months. The DOE leadership wants very badly to be able to
end the study phase and get on with the development phase.
Again, I want to thank the chairman of the Armed Services Committee
for working with me on an amendment which will move us forward toward
the actual development of these important natural resources in my
State.
Mr. WARNER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Arizona.
The amendment (No. 2104) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2105
(Purpose: To extend the fiscal year 1993 project authorization for the
JP-8 fuel facility at the Los Alamitos Reserve Center, California)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of
Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Feinstein,
proposes an amendment numbered 2105.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 433, in the table relating to the extension of 1993
project authorizations for the Army National Guard, insert
after the item relating to the project at Union Springs,
Alabama, the following:
California......... Los Alamitos Armed Fuel Facility..... $1,553,000
Forces Reserve
Center.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared by
both sides.
This amendment by the Senator from California extends for 1 year,
fiscal year 1993 project authorization for a $1.553 million fuel
facility project at Los Alamitos Reserve Center in California.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the amendment is acceptable. We urge its
adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from California.
The amendment (No. 2105) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2106
(Purpose: To make the authority under section 648 subject to the
availability of appropriations)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf
of the senior Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Thurmond.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond,
proposes an amendment numbered 2106.
Mr. WARNER. I ask that further reading of the amendment be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Beginning on page 275, strike out line 19 and all that
follows through page 277, line 18, and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
(a) Study Required.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall
conduct a study to determine the quantitative results
(described in subsection (b)) of enactment and exercise of
authority for the Secretary of the military department
concerned to pay an annuity to the qualified surviving spouse
of each member of the Armed Forces who--
(A) died before March 21, 1974, and was entitled to retired
or retainer pay on the date of death; or
(B) was a member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces
during the period beginning on September 21, 1972, and ending
on October 1, 1978, and at the time of his death would have
been entitled to retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10,
United States Code (as in effect before December 1, 1994),
but for the fact that he was under 60 years of age.
(2) A qualified surviving spouse for purposes of paragraph
(1) is a surviving spouse who has not remarried and who is
not eligible for an annuity under section 4 of Public Law 92-
425 (10 U.S.C. 1448 note).
(b) Required Determinations.--By means of the study
required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall determine
the following matters:
[[Page S 11319]]
(1) The number of unremarried surviving spouses of deceased
members and deceased former members of the Armed Forces
referred to in subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1) who
would be eligible for an annuity under authority described in
such subsection.
(2) The number of unremarried surviving spouses of deceased
members and deceased former members of reserve components of
the Armed Forces referred to in subparagraph (B) of
subsection (a)(1) who would be eligible for an annuity under
authority described in such subsection.
(3) The number of persons in each group of unremarried
former spouses described in paragraphs (1) and (2) who are
receiving a widow's insurance benefit or a widower's
insurance benefit under title II of the Social Security Act
on the basis of employment of a deceased member or deceased
former member referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than March 1, 1996, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security
of the House of Representatives a report on the results of
the study.
(2) The Secretary shall include in the report a
recommendation on the amount of the annuity that should be
authorized to be paid under any authority described in
subsection (a)(1) together with a recommendation on whether
the annuity should be adjusted annually to offset increases
in the cost of living.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for immediate consideration.
This amendment modifies section 648, annuities for certain military
surviving spouses to eliminate the direct spending costs. When the
committee adopted this provision during our markup, we did so based on
a cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office which made this
provision affordable. Later, after the bill was approved by the
committee, CBO revised the cost estimate upward. The revised estimate
is that this provision will cost $40 million in direct spending in
fiscal year 1996.
The Budget Committee is forcing us to take this action under threat
of placing a point of order against our bill. I have looked at every
solution available to me to find a way to keep these annuities. I am
disappointed that I am unable to retain the provision this year.
The amendment modifies the provision to require the Secretary of
Defense to conduct a study to determine how many forgotten widows would
qualify for an annuity and to recommend the amount of such an annuity.
The required study is to be delivered to the Armed Services Committee
not later than March 1, 1996. This will give us time to consider the
information in the report and develop legislation next year which will
finally authorize providing this group of surviving military spouses
the compensation they deserve. Once the committee has this study, we
will be able to provide the Budget Committee and the Congressional
Budget Office the data necessary to preclude the technical budgetese we
faced this year from deterring us next year.
I understand this amendment is agreed to on both sides.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe this amendment is acceptable on
the other side.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we have no objection to this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from South Carolina.
The amendment (No. 2106) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2107
(Purpose: To require a review and report on United States policy on the
security of the national information infrastructure)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Kyl and Robb, I
offer an amendment which requires the President to submit an assessment
of the policy and plans for protecting the national information
infrastructure and assessment of the national communications system.
Mr. President, I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other
side of the aisle.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Kyl, for
himself, Mr. Robb, and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an amendment
numbered 2107.
Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 403, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
SEC. 1095. REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY ON PROTECTING THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST
STRATEGIC ATTACKS.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report
setting forth the following:
(1) The national policy and architecture governing the
plans for establishing procedures, capabilities, systems, and
processes necessary to perform indications, warning, and
assessment functions regarding strategic attacks by foreign
nations, groups, or individuals, or any other entity against
the national information infrastructure.
(2) The future of the National Communications System (NCS),
which has performed the central role in ensuring national
security and emergency preparedness communications for
essential United States Government and private sector users,
including, specifically, a discussion of--
(A) whether there is a federal interest in expanding or
modernizing the National Communications System in light of
the changing strategic national security environment and the
revolution in information technologies; and
(B) the best use of the National Communications System and
the assets and experience it represents as an integral part
of a larger national strategy to protect the United States
against a strategic attack on the national information
infrastructure.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to propose an amendment to S. 1026,
the Defense Authorization Act. I am pleased to introduce this amendment
which will require the President to analyze all issues in developing a
progressive, cohesive national policy toward protecting our ability to
communicate, our defense structure, and our information.
There is currently no defense against attacks on our Nation's
information systems, which include our defense, telephone, public
utility, and banking systems. Military officials have no ability to
protect our country from cyberspace attacks, and no legal or political
authority to protect our information systems against another country's
offensive. Current CIA Director John Deutch said, at his Senate
confirmation hearing, ``this is a very important subject * * * which we
really don't have a crisp answer to.''
We need to start looking for that answer now, since the problem is
looming. A June 14 Wall Street Journal article reported that security
experts were used to ``hack'' into 12,000 Defense Department computer
systems connected to the Internet. The experts ``hacked'' their way
into 88 percent of the systems, and 96 percent of the attacks were
undetected. According to a June 1995 Federal Computer Week article,
computer hackers are breaking into Defense systems by using highly
automated tools. The article reported that the DOD's Center for
Information Systems Security is receiving two computer attacks a day--
twice the rate of last year's intrusions. In 1994, the DOD recorded 255
successful attacks.
The threat is imminent. According to a 1994 report prepared by the
National Communications System [NCS], no fewer than 30 countries are
working on information warfare techniques. The administration must
develop a comprehensive national policy that coordinates national
security defense for both U.S. Government and private sector users of
our National Information Infrastructure [NII]. My amendment seeks to
analyze all critical issues involved in protecting our Nation's
information infrastructure. These answers will provide a framework, I
believe, toward developing our Nation's policy for defending against
strategic attacks against the NII.
As technology changes, we cannot allow ourselves to become vulnerable
to attack on the nerve centers of our society and defense structure. We
need to modernize our laws to protect against this very real threat.
Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, director of C4 systems at the Pentagon,
states that, ``a critical policy implication of the revolution in
security affairs is the need to treat information and access to
information as a vital national interest,'' and ``information warfare
must become an important instrument of national security policy.''
[[Page S 11320]]
Now is the time for Congress to be active. This amendment is intended
to place an emphasis on an issue that must be addressed before our
country's communications system is attacked. We must begin now to
elevate our efforts to protect the national security interest of this
country. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.
Mr. WARNER. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2107) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2108
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators McCain and
Lieberman, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. McCain, for
himself and Mr. Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered
2108.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
SEC. . IRAN AND IRAQ ARMS NONPROLIFERATION.
(a) Sanctions Against Transfers of Persons.--Section
1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992
(title XVI of Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended by inserting ``to acquire chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons or'' before ``to acquire''.
(b) Sanctions Against Transfers of Foreign Countries.--
Section 1605(a) of such Act is amended by inserting ``to
acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or'' before
``to acquire''.
(c) Clarification of United States Assistance.--
Subparagraph (A) of section 1608(7) of such Act is amended to
read as follows:
``(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), other than urgent humanitarian
assistance or medicine;''.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I am offering an amendment to the
Defense Authorization bill to assist the President in his efforts to
deal with the growing threat to American interests from Iran. President
Clinton clearly sought to address this threat with his May 6 Executive
order establishing a full United States embargo of Iran. It is my hope
that short of successfully encouraging other nations from trading with
Iran, an extremely challenging task, the President will be able to use
the authority in this amendment to encourage other countries to at
least refrain from contributing to Iranian weapons capability.
The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which I cosponsored
with then-Senator Gore, established sanctions against third parties
which assist Iran and Iraq in their efforts to rebuild their weapons
capabilities. It was a start, but it did not go far enough. Efforts by
Senator Lieberman and me last year to expand the legislation were
unsuccessful.
The 1992 bill was intended to target not only the acquisition of
conventional weapons, but weapons of mass destruction as well. In the
process of amending the bill to the 1993 Defense Act, however, the
explicit references to weapons of mass destruction were dropped.
The amendment I am offering today attempts to make these applications
absolutely clear. It also removes from the proposed sanctions
exceptions for assistance under the Freedom Support Act, thereby
removing the benefit of the doubt Congress gave Russia in 1992. I am
afraid Russia has used this exception to the detriment of United States
policy in the Persian Gulf.
The threat from Iraq is not an immediate concern. The most important
aspect of our policy with regard to Iraq must be to remain firm on the
U.N. embargo. But given the history of the Iraqi military build-up
before the Gulf war, the sanctions included in the Iran-Iraq Act may at
a later date be as important with regard to Iraq as they are currently
in the case of Iran.
The threat from Iran is more immediate. The Iranian build-up in the
Persian Gulf is common knowledge. Its importation of hundreds of North
Korean SCUD-C missiles, its intention to acquire the Nodong North
Korean missiles currently under development, and its efforts to develop
nuclear weapons are well-established--as is its conventional weapons
build-up.
Successive CIA directors, and Secretaries Perry and Christopher have
all testified to the effect that Iran is engaged in an extensive effort
to acquire nuclear weapons. In February, Russia signed an agreement to
provide Iran with a 1000 megawatt light water nuclear reactor. The
Russians indicate that they may soon agree to build as many as three
more reactors--another 1000 megawatt reactor, and two 440 megawatt
reactors.
I have raised my concerns regarding this sale with the administration
on a number of occasions. Under the amendment I am offering today, the
President will be required to either invoke sanctions against Russia as
a result of its nuclear deal with Iran or formally waive the
requirement out of concern for the national interest. Let me be clear.
My intention is not to gut United States assistance to Russia. It is to
prevent Russia from providing Iran dangerous technology. If the
President determines that invoking sanctions against Russia is a
greater potential danger to the national interest than the potential
danger of a nuclear armed Iran, then he has the authority under this
amendment to waive the sanctions.
We sent our Armed Forces to war in the Persian Gulf once in this
decade. They endured hardship to themselves and their families. Some
will live with the injuries they suffered in service to our Nation for
the rest of their lives. And, as is the case with every war, some never
returned. With the cooperation of our friends in Europe, whose own
sacrifices to the effort to free Kuwait should not be forgotten, we
must see that the service of these brave men and women was not in vain.
Stability and security in the Persian Gulf is vital to the world
economy and to our own national interests. Aggressors in the region
should know that if we must, we will return to the Persian Gulf with
the full force of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, our friends
and adversaries elsewhere in the world should understand that the
United States will do everything in its power to preclude that
necessity. It is my sincere hope that his legislation will serve as an
indication of just how serious we are.
Mr. WARNER. I believe this is acceptable on the other side.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2108) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2109
(Purpose: To provide funding for the activities of the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission for the remainder of 1995)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Thurmond, I send an
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond,
proposes an amendment numbered 2109.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 468, after line 24, add the following:
SEC. 2825. FINAL FUNDING FOR DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION.
Section 2902(k) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10
U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following;
``(3)(A) The Secretary may transfer from the account
referred to in subparagraph (B)
[[Page S 11321]]
such unobligated funds in that account as may be necessary for the
Commission to carry out its duties under this part during
October, November, and December 1995. Funds transferred under
the preceding sentence shall remain available until December
31, 1995.
``(B) The account referred to in subparagraph (A) is the
Department of Defense Base Closure Account established under
section 207(a) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and
Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10
U.S.C. 2687 note).''.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am pleased to sponsor an amendment
that would authorize the Department of Defense to fund the Base Closure
and Realignment Commission for the remainder of calendar year 1995.
The law establishing the Base Closure Commission authorized the
Department of Defense to fund the operations of the Commission using
fiscal year 1991 authorization. Unfortunately, the Department's 1990
estimate of the Commission's operating expenses fell short of actual
requirement. This shortfall is due to the extensive travel required of
the Commission to visit each base on the Secretary of Defense's closure
list and attend the numerous hearings required to make the process as
fair and open as possible. Additionally, the Commission had to purchase
a new computer system to support its operation.
Mr. President, in my judgment the Base Closure Commission has
provided a valuable service to the Nation. The funding, which is
estimated to be less than $300,000 is necessary for the Commission to
archive at files and prepare the appropriate closeout reports. I am
advised that the Department of Defense is prepared to provide the
necessary funds from existing authority, but needs this legislation
authority.
Mr. President, this is an appropriate use of the Defense Department
funds and I urge adoption of the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this relates to the Base Closure
Commission for the remainder of the calendar year for 1995. It is my
understanding it has been accepted on the other side.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we have cleared this amendment. I urge its
adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2109) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as far as I know, this concludes the
matters relating to the pending measure. On behalf of the distinguished
majority leader, I am prepared to address some wrapup items for the
evening.
Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Virginia and look forward to further
debate on the bill tomorrow morning.
____________________