[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 127 (Wednesday, August 2, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1580-E1582]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA

                                 ______


                         HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, August 1, 1995
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, last week the Congress met in joint session 
to welcome South Korean President Kim Yong-sam.
  Four decades after the Korean war, South Korea enjoys a thriving 
economy and an open political system. Our security interests in Korea 
have been complemented by a growing American economic interest.
  The moving dedication of the Korean War Memorial was testimony to the 
blood shed by Americans to ensure Korea's future and to our continued 
interest in Korean prosperity. Mr. Hamilton, ranking member of the 
International Relations Committee, recently spoke on the state of 
American-Korean relations at an Asia society meeting.
  I commend Mr. Hamilton's remarks to my colleagues. His speech, ``The 
U.S. and South Korea: A Successful Partnership,'' provides an 
insightful review of our mutual interests:
      The United States and South Korea: A Successful Partnership

                          (By Lee H. Hamilton)


                            i. introduction

       South Korea has been much on our minds of late. We watched 
     with sorrow at the climbing casualty list from last month's 
     tragedy in Seoul. We also celebrated with the South Korean 
     people as survivors were miraculously pulled from the rubble 
     of the collapsed department store.
       South Korea captures our attention for other reasons, of 
     course. The Korean peninsula presents some of the most 
     challenging issues facing U.S. foreign policy. We are 
     concerned about North Korea's nuclear program, the 
     uncertainties of its leadership succession, and relations 
     between South and North Korea.
       Next week, we will welcome Korean President Kim Yong-sam to 
     Washington. We will bestow upon him the honor of addressing a 
     joint session of Congress. That is a true measure of the 
     importance of our friendship with South Korea. Our countries 
     have excellent bilateral relations, marked by a strong 
     security alliance and broad economic ties.


                       ii. south korea's success

       South Korea is a great success story.
       Consider Korea in 1945. It had been the victim of harsh 
     colonialism for 50 years. The defeat of Japan brought not 
     liberation, but division of the Korean nation along the 38th 
     parallel. Families were torn apart. Customary patterns of 
     trade, communication, and exchange were broken. Soviet 
     occupiers ravaged the northern half of the country.
       Five years later saw the resumption of warfare--all the 
     more bitter because it was Korean against Korean. Armies 
     surged up and down the peninsula, bringing death and 
     devastation. Millions lost their lives. Tens of millions more 
     were displaced.
       The 1953 armistice brought no real peace. The peninsula 
     remained divided. South Korea, the less prosperous half, was 
     saddled with huge defense burdens to guard against future 
     attack.
       What a difference a few decades have made! South Korea is a 
     thriving democracy. It is one of the world's most prosperous 
     countries. Per capita income, which did not reach even $100 
     until the 1960s, is now nearly $10,000. South Korea is no 
     longer a foreign aid recipient; it is a foreign aid donor. 
     The World Bank points to South Korea to show how a country 
     with few natural resources--other than its people--can 
     transform itself in a generation from one of the poorest 
     countries in Asia to one of the richest.
                    II. The U.S.-Korean partnership

       The Korean-American alliance is robust. It is a treaty 
     commitment, but also a mature friendship built on shared 
     commitments to democracy and free markets.
       In fact, South Korea is a major success story for American 
     foreign policy. A free and prosperous South Korea has 
     contributed to peace and stability in a strategic corner of 
     the world--where China, Russia and Japan intersect.
       Korea also is a close partner and friend. We share a keen 
     interest in regional stability, economic prosperity, and the 
     control of weapons of mass destruction. Together, we seek to 
     spread democracy and human rights to those Asian countries 
     through which the winds of freedom have yet to sweep.
       Nearly a quarter million Americans gave their lives in 
     three Asian wars in the past half century for those 
     objectives, but many times more Koreans died during that same 
     bloody period. We are linked by bonds of common sacrifice.
       One startling change in our relations has been the decline 
     in anti-Americanism in Korea. It was not long ago that Korea 
     saw widespread student demonstrations against the United 
     States and frequent demands that U.S. troops be withdrawn. 
     Today there is little of this discord.
       The presence of 37,000 American troops in Korea is, as you 
     might expect, an irritant from time to time. Crimes are 
     sometimes committed against the civilian population, and 
     South Korean critics complain that their court have only 
     limited jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen and their 
     dependents.
       But by and large, the South Korean people and their 
     government have grown accustomed to Americans: They are no 
     longer controversial or distasteful. The alliance is viewed 
     as mutually beneficial, a normal part of everyday existence. 
     South Koreans, for example, were relieved earlier this year 
     when the Clinton administration announced it would maintain a 
     100,000 troop level in East Asia.


              III. The U.S.-South Korean Security Alliance

       I need not dwell on the reasons for the Korean-American 
     security alliance. On the U.S. side, the stability of Asia is 
     critical to our overall security and prosperity, and our 
     security relationships with Korea and Japan are the linchpins 
     of our presence in Asia.
       For South Korea, the benefits are also clear. A hostile 
     North Korea still stations two-thirds of its 1.2 million man 
     army near the Demilitarized Zone. The North has enough 
     artillery targeted on Seoul to reduce it to rubble. It has 
     SCUD missiles and is developing longer-range ballistic 
     missiles. Its dictators have committed terrorist acts. It has 
     had, until recently, a secret nuclear weapons program 
     flaunting the will of the international community.
       This does not suggest the North could defeat the South in a 
     war. But it does point out the dangers. The Korean peninsula 
     remains the most dangerous flashpoint in Asia because of its 
     location, North Korea's militarization, and the nature of its 
     government. General Luck, the U.S. commander in Korea, 
     estimates a war on the peninsula could claim a million lives 
     and cost a trillion dollars. Thus, the money we invest in 
     peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is prudent.


                     iv. issues in the relationship

       Let me turn to several key issues in the U.S.-South Korean 
     relationship.
     
[[Page E1581]]


                    A. North Korea's Nuclear Program

       North Korea's secret efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are 
     a major threat to U.S. national security. A nuclear-armed 
     North Korea would also jeopardize the stability of the entire 
     region.
       Last October, the United States signed an agreement with 
     North Korea to freeze, and eventually eliminate, its nuclear 
     weapons program.
       This complex accord will be implemented in stages over a 
     decade or more. In essence, it is a trade. North Korea has 
     halted and will eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons 
     program, accepting extensive international inspections to 
     verify compliance. In exchange, the international community 
     will provide North Korea with alternative energy sources, 
     initially in the form of heavy fuel oil, and later with 
     light-water reactors that cannot easily be used to make 
     nuclear bombs.
       The agreement also envisions that we will move toward 
     normalization of political and economic ties between the 
     United States and North Korea, and a resumption of dialogue 
     between the two Koreas.
       This agreement does not address every concern we have about 
     North Korea. But it does provide us with an opening--one that 
     did not exist before--to lift the specter of a nuclear arms 
     race from the Korean peninsula, begin a process of meaningful 
     dialogue between the two Koreas, and come to grips with other 
     North Korean activities that concern us.
       This time last year, we were on the verge of a 
     confrontation with North Korea--a confrontation no one 
     wanted, and that held little hope of solving the problem of 
     North Korea's nuclear program. Voices in this city, and 
     pundits across the country, called for sanctions and even 
     military strikes.
       Today, because of the Geneva agreement, the North has 
     frozen its nuclear program and agreed to a step-by-step 
     process that will eventually eliminate that program.
       Some say the Agreed Framework is ``frontloaded'' in favor 
     of the North. I cannot agree. North Korea has already taken a 
     number of significant steps under the agreement.
       It has shut down its only operating reactor.
       It has halted construction on two new reactors.
       It has sealed its reprocessing facility and stopped 
     construction on a new reprocessing line.
       It has refrained from reprocessing its spent fuel rods, 
     which would have given the North enough plutonium for four or 
     five nuclear weapons.
       And it has admitted International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA) inspectors and U.S. technicians into its nuclear 
     facilities.
       In return, we have provided North Korea with $5 million of 
     heavy oil. We have also spent $10 million to ensure the safe 
     storage of the North's sent fuel rods--but this was 
     preferable to having Pyongyang reprocess those rods and 
     obtain enough plutonium for 4-5 nuclear weapons.
       North Korea will not get what it really wants--the light 
     water reactors--until well down the line--after all our 
     questions about its past nuclear activities has been 
     resolved. The agreement is frontloaded--but in our favor.
       Moreover, North Korea has agreed not only to resume IAEA 
     inspections of its nuclear facilities, but to exceed its 
     obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 
     It has agreed to refrain from reprocessing the spent fuel it 
     possesses, and to shut down its reprocessing facility--even 
     though the NPT permits reprocessing. This means the North 
     cannot obtain plutonium to manufacture nuclear weapons.
       This agreement is not based on trust, but on North Korea's 
     performance. The United States will have the means to verify 
     that the North is living up to its commitments. We will 
     pursue our interests by other means if North Korea does not 
     fulfill its obligations. We will not only cancel the deal--we 
     will respond firmly in other venues.
       Some critics maintain that we gave away too much, that we 
     could have gotten more from the North Koreans if only we had 
     been better negotiators. I have not seen any evidence to 
     support such claims.
       One question often asked is whether North wants this 
     agreement to succeed. Frankly, I don't know. We should expect 
     the North to reopen issues we thought were resolved, and to 
     issue threats designed to gain new concessions. 
     Implementation will be slow, and sometimes painful.
       Still, I am persuaded that this agreement is far preferable 
     to any other alternative--as sanctions, or military 
     escalation--at this time.
       This agreement does not guarantee that future relations 
     with the North will be without tensions and difficulties. But 
     it will serve U.S. national interests, if it is fully 
     implemented. It has the potential to defuse North Korea's 
     nuclear threat, promote stability on the Korean peninsula, 
     and lead to a more peaceful life for the people of Korea, 
     South and North.

                         B. South-North Dialog

       A dialogue between South and North Korea is also necessary 
     if we are to bridge our differences with North Korea.
       Recent events give us some grounds for optimism. Last month 
     officials from North and South Korea spent five days in 
     secret talks in Beijing. The result was an agreement by the 
     South to provide 150,000 tons of rice to help North Korea 
     meet its acute food shortage. A second round of talks between 
     the two Koreas began a few days ago.
       South Korea was careful during and after the talks not to 
     humiliate the North. This shows a level of political maturity 
     that bodes well for future South-North contacts. And it's not 
     unrealistic to expect further contacts.
       Just as ping-pong opened the door for substantive 
     discussions between the United States and the People's 
     Republic of China, so might rice set the stage for further 
     progress on family reunification, cultural and athletic 
     exchanges, trade and investment, and even a South-North 
     summit.
       One of the most pressing topics for South-North dialogue is 
     the security situation along the Demilitarized Zone. The 
     lessons we learned in central Europe during the Cold War can 
     be applied in Korea.
       Redeploying conventional forces, and great transparency, 
     can reduce the danger of war along the DMZ.
       Confidence-building measures, such as assigning liaison 
     officers to the headquarters of field commands, requiring 
     observers at military exercises, and limiting the size of 
     such exercises, would help reduce tensions.

                   C. Reunification and the Armistice

       On an issue of fundamental importance to the people of 
     Korea, there should be no doubt:
      The United States supports the peaceful reunification of 
     Korea. The division of the Korean peninsula, and of the 
     Korean people, is artificial and unnatural. Reunification 
     is clearly in U.S. interests: It will eliminate the danger 
     of a new Korean war.
       Reunification should be carried out by the Korean people 
     themselves, on terms acceptable to them.
       In recent years the North has insisted that the United 
     States and North Korea should negotiate a peace treaty to 
     replace the 1953 armistice agreement that ended the Korean 
     War. Some of our friends in the South have voiced concern 
     lest the United States, tired of its peacekeeping burdens, 
     take up North Korea on its suggestion.
       The United States has insisted, does insist, and will 
     continue to insist that any peace treaty to replace the 
     armistice agreement be negotiated between the two Koreas 
     themselves.
       I cannot emphasize this enough: The United States will not 
     permit North Korea to drive a wedge between itself and its 
     ally South Korea. As Ambassador Laney said earlier this year, 
     ``The United States will never play the role of an `honest 
     broker' between the two Koreas--because we are not neutral.'' 
     The United States will not deal with North Korea behind its 
     ally's back.

                       D. The Economic Dimension

       I have dealt with the security side of the U.S.-South 
     Korean partnership because it is so important. I can also 
     report that our economic ties are closer than ever.
       South Korea is our eighth largest trading partner.
       South Korean exports to the United States will probably 
     rise by 7 percent this year, to a level of $22 billion 
     dollars. South Korea is the sixth largest market for U.S. 
     exports, and the fourth largest market for U.S. agricultural 
     goods.
       American exports to South Korea may surpass $30 billion 
     this year. Let me put that in perspective: That is ten times 
     the amount of foreign assistance we provided to South Korea 
     over thirty-three years.
       Investment is also robust; the United States, with more 
     than $300 million in direct investment, is the largest 
     foreign investor in Korea.
       Nagging problems are a part of these close economic ties. 
     Unfair trade practices continue to restrict access by U.S. 
     firms to Korean markets. Korea still does not provide 
     sufficient protection for U.S. intellectual property. Indeed, 
     the United States recently kept Korea on the Special 301 
     ``priority watch list.''
       We also want Korea to open financial services markets, on 
     par with the access we provide to the U.S. market. South 
     Korea has given foreigners greater access to the bond market, 
     raised investment limits for stock holdings in Korean 
     companies, and allowed international organizations to issue 
     local currency bonds--but more needs to be done.

                 E. Democracy and Human Rights in Korea

       Had I been with you to address U.S.-South Korean relations 
     a few short years ago, I would have highlighted grave 
     American concerns about political freedom and human rights in 
     South Korea. Not so today.
       We have all been impressed in the last decade as South 
     Korea moved from military to civilian rule, from 
     authoritarianism to democracy, from closed to open politics. 
     We applauded when President Roh Tae Woo broke with Korea's 
     lengthy military tradition and opened the door to civilian 
     rule.
       We were thrilled two and a half years ago upon the 
     inauguration of President Kim Young-Sam--the longtime 
     dissident, political prisoner, and champion of Korean 
     democracy.
       In recent years we have seen considerable progress in human 
     rights as well, although even South Koreans would concede 
     that there is still room for improvement. The rule of law is 
     not yet assured for every citizen. Preventive detention 
     remains a problem. The labor movement is still handicapped by 
     restrictions. Still, most observers agree that movement on 
     human rights, if not always as swift as we might wish, is in 
     the right direction.
       As South Korea evolves into a prosperous democracy, the 
     bilateral relationship between Washington and Seoul deepens 
     and 

[[Page E1582]]
     matures. Our diplomats work closely together on issues far removed from 
     the Korean peninsula. We collaborate in the United Nations 
     and welcome Seoul's bid for membership on the Security 
     Council. We work together on issues involving APEC and the 
     ASEAN Regional Forum. Our partnership extends to global 
     environmental and population issues.
       Most important, perhaps, are the personal ties that link 
     our two nations together. The Korean-American community is 
     well represented in every state in the Union. A Korean-
     American, Jay Kim, now sits in the U.S. House of 
     Representatives.
       The South Korean ambassador tells me that several hundred 
     Korean children come here each year for adoption--a 
     particularly poignant manifestation of the ties we share. My 
     next door neighbors have two adopted Korean girls. And a 
     growing stream of students and tourists are turning the 
     Pacific Ocean into a land bridge.
                             v. conclusion

       Periodically, the press in both the United States and South 
     Korea report dangerous rifts between Seoul and Washington. A 
     week or two later, those ominous differences miraculously 
     disappear. Our relationship is durable, strong, and close.
       We will disagree from time to time. Our perspectives on 
     even key issues will not always coincide. But on the 
     fundamentals, our two peoples and our two governments are 
     united.
       We share a huge stake in maintaining peace on the Korean 
     peninsula and throughout East Asia.
       We share an interest in restraining North Korea's nuclear 
     ambitions and its conventional capabilities.
       We benefit from economic cooperation and increased trade 
     and investment.
       We are committed to the political freedoms that underlie 
     democracy.
       And we both are committed to the defense of the freedoms we 
     enjoy and cherish.
       In short, we have a sound basis for a lasting friendship.
       

                          ____________________