[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 126 (Tuesday, August 1, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11061-S11066]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                     OPPOSING CONSOLIDATION OF USIA

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I oppose consolidating the U.S. 
Information Agency.
  We need to ask two questions about this proposal to abolish USIA and 
merge its functions and personnel into an expanded State Department. 
First, will it result in a less costly set of information, cultural and 
exchange, and broadcasting programs in support of American foreign 
policy objectives? Second, will it enhance the effectiveness of these 
programs as we continue to readjust and redirect our foreign policy 
interests?
  Mr. President, the answer to both questions is ``no.''
  Let us look initially at the purported cost-savings of merging USIA 
into the State Department.
  There is a seductive logic to the argument that merging USIA into the 
State Department would result in substantial administrative cost-
savings. But the facts reveal otherwise.
  Managerially, USIA's overseas operations currently are well-
integrated with State's. USIA--like all departments and agencies 
operating from our Embassies and consulates--already reimburses the 
State Department for administrative support services, such as housing, 
computers, motor pools, and the like. Consolidation will not save any 
money overseas.
  Would there be savings in U.S. operations by merging USIA into the 
State Department? I do not believe so. Aside from its foreign press 
centers, the Agency by law has no domestic charter, no domestic 
presence. And we would not be able to eliminate the need for some sort 
of separate office space to house USIA's personnel and functions, since 
the State Department has none to spare.
  In fact, USIA on its own and in response to the President's and Vice 
president's reinventing Government initiatives has already achieved 
major and substantial cost-savings. In this regard, I believe that it 
is important to remember that the Agency constitutes only 6 percent of 
the total function 150 budget but accounts for 58 percent of the total 
savings wrung from the 150 account in the past 2 years.
  USIA has accomplished these savings by consolidating and 
restructuring its own activities. USIA now has RIF authority and is in 
fact closing overseas posts and bringing officers home, as well as 
cutting overseas and domestic positions and staff.
  By bringing together all of the U.S. Government's international 
broadcasting activities, USIA will save more than $400 million by 
fiscal year 1997 and eliminate 1,250 staff positions. By creating a new 
Information Bureau, USIA has reduced its policy and program staff by 30 
percent for an annual savings of $10 million. And by streamlining and 
downsizing its educational, cultural, and management functions, USIA 
has wrought savings of almost $15 million and eliminated 186 positions 
this year alone.
  The fact is, Mr. President, significant, real cuts are being made by 
USIA right now without consolidation. We cannot extract more savings by 
merging USIA into the State Department without sacrificing the very 
programs that support our foreign policy worldwide in the new 
information age.
  Will consolidation enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's 
information, broadcasting, and cultural and exchange programs? I do not 
think so for at least two reasons.
  First, the budget cuts raised by this bill for USIA--$118.6 million 
in fiscal year 1996 and an additional $81 million in fiscal year 1997--
are general reductions. In fact, they have nothing to do with 
consolidation and cannot be achieved by merging USIA into the State 
Department. To meet these spending levels, the Agency will have 

[[Page S11062]]
to make deep cuts in its overseas presence and its core programs.
  Second, USIA was carved out of the State Department in 1953 to 
fulfill a function--that of public diplomacy--that the State Department 
is inherently unable to perform. USIA was expanded in 1978--when 
State's Bureau of Cultural Affairs was abolished and its functions 
given to the Agency--when the State Department could not give high 
priority to programs that promote unofficial contacts between U.S. 
public opinion leaders and their foreign counterparts overseas.
  In other words, Mr. President, merging USIA back into the State 
Department flies in the face our historical experience. It is being 
proposed at precisely the time when the benefits of our cold war 
labors--democracy-building world wide--are just beginning to be 
realized in such far-flung places as Haiti, Angola, and Cambodia and 
require active, effective public diplomacy from USIA.
  Finally, I note that--at a time when businesses across America are 
creating more flexible, less centralized organizational structures, and 
we are seeking to emulate this move in the Federal Government--it is 
hard to understand why any of my distinguished colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle would advocate creating a mega-bureaucracy in the 
State Department.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose consolidating USIA.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I would now like to ask for the yeas and 
nays on amendment 2042, the amendment that is pending before the 
Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is not a sufficient second.
  Ms. SNOWE. I yield the floor.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I intend at the appropriate time to offer 
amendment No. 1964 on behalf of Senators Hatfield, Glenn, Simon, and 
Biden, and myself that would amend S. 908 in order to retain the 
independence of ACDA from the Department of State.
  The State Department authorization bill, S. 908, would, as reported, 
make meaningless serious and comprehensive efforts in recent years to 
strengthen and revitalize ACDA. Moreover, it would have this 
unfortunate effect without any significant savings with respect to 
ACDA. As a result, its true price would be high.
  As an aside, commenting on the words of the Senator from Maine, I 
appreciated her kind words about the Foreign Service, being the only 
Foreign Service officer in the Senate. I think all of us recognize what 
the Foreign Service does, and I appreciate the comments of Senator 
Snowe.
  S. 908 as reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, would 
abolish ACDA and place the retained functions and personnel in a single 
bureau of the Department of State. That bureau would be one of five 
under the control of an undersecretary also responsible for 
international narcotics, law enforcement, political-military affairs, 
humanitarian assistance, refugees, and migration affairs. We believe 
that what can only be described as a jumbled reorganization would be in 
error that could prove very costly to our Nation, and to our arms 
control efforts, for several reasons. First, this major downgrading of 
the arms control apparatus at a time in which major threats to our 
security are becoming both more diverse and more challenging is a 
dangerously shortsighted action. Second, it would muffle, if not 
silence, the arms control voice at several major levels. Third, it 
would deny the Secretary of State and the President the benefit of an 
independent perspective and judgment on arms control and 
nonproliferation issues. For these and other reasons, it would be 
inevitable that our ability to identify and implement effective arms 
control and nonproliferation activities would be diminished to the 
detriment of our national security interests.
  The amendment would require a serious and comprehensive effort to 
eliminate duplication and overlap within and between the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, while preserving 
the agency's independence and authorizing the appropriation of 
necessary operating funds.
  In the course of committee markup of the legislation, I offered an 
alternative proposal--that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency be 
retained and strengthened. At that time, my proposal was supported only 
by my Democratic colleagues. The amendment I intend to offer is more 
modest in that it does not shift important non-proliferation 
responsibilities to ACDA. Rather, it preserves the present 
relationship, leaving the issue of the further strengthening of ACDA to 
be resolved later. It also authorizes appropriations of $45 million in 
fiscal year l996 and in fiscal year l997, which allows for spending at 
current levels.
  I hope that a number of Senators of both parties--not just one, but 
both parties--who understand arms control and nonproliferation issues 
and appreciate the value of ACDA as a specialized agency at the center 
of these issues will join in supporting the amendment.
  Arms control activities were handled within the Department of State 
until 1961, when it was decided that a separate agency would be a 
better approach. As the final decisions were being considered, I 
remember going to the White House with the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 
Humphrey, and the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clark, to make the 
case that arms control was a matter of such central importance to the 
United States that it should be the responsibility of an agency created 
by and operating under statute.
  As I think we all can recall, when Senator Kennedy was running for 
President, he talked about it being a separate statutory agency. But 
when the time came and he was President, then the question came up 
whether he had the votes for it to be made a statutory agency or 
whether it should be set up by Executive order.
  The decision made, on the recommendation of Arthur Schlesinger, at 
that time to the President was that he stick to his guns and that we 
have it as a separate statutory agency. This was a decision that 
President Kennedy made at that time. I believe that decision really 
came out of the conversations Senators Clark, Humphrey, and I had with 
him then.
  McGeorge Bundy, who served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as 
National Security Adviser, recalled the decisions on ACDA earlier this 
year in testimony on this bill. He spoke of ``the requirements for 
first-class executive branch performance in the field of arms control. 
These requirements are well met in the present executive arrangements; 
they could be met only by most improbable good luck if the proposal 
before you (S. 908) should be adopted.''
  Mr. President, no American has left a greater mark on arms control in 
the modern era than Ambassador Paul H. Nitze. In a long and illustrious 
career, he has served Democratic and Republican administrations alike. 
He understands fully the value of ACDA within any executive branch. He 
wrote me on July 6 to say: ``This reorganization I believe to be ill-
advised; folding the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
into the State Department seems to me to be unnecessary and unwise.''
  I think when a man of wisdom and experience and the depth of 
knowledge of arms control, as in the case of Paul Nitze, takes a view 
like this, we all should take his view seriously.
  Ambassador Nitze continues,

       In my experience as an arms control negotiator, I always 
     found ACDA's input into the negotiating process to be expert, 
     insightful, and uniquely helpful. That input could well be 
     lost if the Agency does not remain independent. As recent 
     events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, nonproliferation 
     and arms control are more important than ever. Eliminating 
     ACDA from the diplomatic effort to protect our security would 
     be like eliminating the Marine Corps from the military 
     effort. While it will never replace its larger brethren on 
     the foreign policy team, ACDA plays an essential role as a 
     lean and flexible vanguard, always ready to aggressively 
     counter the threat weapons of mass destruction pose to our 
     national security.

  Paul Nitze concluded,

       The game has changed, but the stakes are at least as great; 
     our national survival still hangs in the balance. We should 
     be strenthening our nonproliferation team, not abolishing it. 
     ACDA is a key part of the best team possible to face the real 
     and growing threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
     terrorism. In this new era of opaque and unpredictable 
     threats to our security, the vigilance that saw us through 
     the Cold War should not be relaxed.


[[Page S11063]]

  (Ms. SNOWE assumed the chair.)
  Mr. PELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text 
of Ambassador Nitze's letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion 
of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. PELL. Madam President, the need for first-class arms control 
performance has not always been recognized. Accordingly, in the past 34 
years, the agency has had its ups and downs, but it has been central to 
some successes, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I Interim 
Agreement, Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, Biological Weapons 
Convention, Senate agreement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Intermediate 
Range Nuclear Forces [INF]
 Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention now pending before the Senate. 
While ACDA was not in charge of START I or START II, it did the bulk of 
the backstopping work.

  It is worthy of note that ACDA has fought alone in some key matters. 
The State Department opposed negotiation of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in order to please NATO allies. ACDA persevered and won. When 
the State Department wanted to eviscerate the ABM Treaty in the early 
1980's, ACDA fought for the traditional interpretation. Recently ACDA 
and the Energy Department have been supportive of the current nuclear 
testing moratorium and of a comprehensive test ban. The State and 
Defense Departments have been the foot draggers. Recent press reports 
allege that the administration sided with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff against ACDA and the Energy Secretary in its 
decision not to agree with the Russians to negotiate further strategic 
arms cuts beyond START II.
  In 1991, the Bush administration did not seem to hold ACDA in 
particular regard, and there was a general sense on the Hill that ACDA 
was both insignificant and ineffectual. Senator Simon proposed, and the 
committee and Senate agreed to, an amendment requiring that the State/
ACDA inspector general, Sherman Funk, investigate ACDA and report back 
with recommendations in December 1992. Mr. Funk ordered a very thorough 
study and analysis by an outside panel headed by Ambassador James 
Goodby. That panel explored all the options, including merger into 
State and concluded that ACDA should be kept independent and 
strengthened.
  The importance of the independence of ACDA can not be overemphasized. 
This was the same logic that President Kennedy used when he said it 
should be a statutory agency and it should be separate, and why he made 
the decision to have it set up by statute.
  Subsequently, I introduced legislation to strengthen and revitalize 
ACDA. At the same time, the new administration was considering a plan 
to merge ACDA into State. That subsequently rejected plan is the 
progenitor of the current majority plan to merge ACDA into State.
  After their review, the President, on the recommendation of Secretary 
Christopher, decided to retain ACDA and support the bill I had 
introduced as soon as some compromises were reached. That was done and 
the bill, with bipartisan support in both Houses was enacted last 
spring. These are the highlights of the revitalization legislation, 
which is now law.
  The bill enhanced the role of the ACDA in the areas of arms control 
and nonproliferation policy and negotiations in several ways: First, 
ACDA was given primary responsibility for all arms control negotiations 
and implementation fora, including negotiation of a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban; second, positions for Presidential Special 
Representatives for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament 
were created and placed under the ACDA Director; and third, ACDA's role 
in nonproliferation was underscored by giving the Agency primary 
responsibility for managing U.S. participation in the 1995 review 
conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and primary 
responsibility for other nonproliferation activities when so directed 
by the President.
  The bill improved ACDA's role regarding arms transfers and 
nonproliferation. ACDA was given mandatory prior consultation and 
review rights with respect to export licenses and other matters under 
both the Arms Export Control Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
  The bill strengthened the functioning of the Agency by eliminating a 
number of outdated or redundant reporting requirements and by 
disbanding the General Advisory Committee, thereby permitting the 
Agency to reassign personnel to other substantive areas.
  The results of the strengthening and revitalization are beginning to 
be seen. Officials of ACDA are effectively involved in bringing an arms 
control perspective to executive branch decision-making at various 
levels. The Agency was in charge of the critically important and 
successful effort this spring to secure the indefinite extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agency is currently running the efforts 
to achieve a comprehensive test ban in negotiations in Geneva. The 
Agency recently submitted a remarkably detailed and informative annual 
report to Congress that included a section dealing with the adherence 
of the United States to its arms control commitments and the compliance 
of other nations with their obligations under arms control agreements. 
Any Senator reading this compliance report, in either classified or 
unclassified form, would have to agree that ACDA is on top of various 
arms control problems and that it is willing to be open and forthright 
with the Congress regarding these matters and what can be done to deal 
with them.
  I am convinced that ACDA is on the right track now. Having decided to 
strengthen ACDA, it makes no sense now to abolish the agency and give 
its unique and specialized responsibilities to the Department of State. 
Within very real budgetary constraints, we need to stay the course and 
continue to strengthen ACDA. Our amendment would do just that.
  Mr. McGeorge Bundy also told the committee:

       Arms control--especially the limitation of nuclear danger--
     is not easy. It requires agreement among sovereign states who 
     often fear and mistrust each other. It can require limits on 
     weapons that a military service may initially prefer not to 
     limit. It requires technical understanding, political 
     sagacity, and coordination from the White House. What I would 
     emphasize in particular, from my own service with two 
     Presidents who were deeply and directly engaged in the effort 
     to limit nuclear danger, is that there must be a close and 
     continuous relation between the President and his staff and 
     the main center of arms control analysis and effort. The 
     government's senior people on arms control should have easy 
     access, as a matter of right and expectation, to the White 
     House.

  The value of independent access to the President as cited by Mr. 
Bundy cannot be overestimated. Many arms control and nonproliferation 
matters should be considered at the interagency level and decided by 
the President. To put arms control at a lower level within the 
Department of State would mean that the arms control voice would be 
muffled and key questions could be dealt with inside the Department. 
Under the present and preferred arrangement, the Director is the 
principal adviser on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation 
matter to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of State. Thus, the Agency can be actively engaged and 
effective at whatever level is appropriate.
  Much is made of the notion that abolishing agencies such as ACDA will 
save large funds. The ACDA budget is currently about $55 million. 
ACDA's core spending would remain at about $45 million under my 
amendment. The Vice President has set about the task of making all 
feasible reductions throughout Government, and indications are now that 
significant cuts can be made. With regard to ACDA and the State 
Department overlap, it is clearly largely within the Department, and 
there can be reasonable savings in areas in which the Department 
duplicates ACDA pointlessly. Beyond that, it is hard to imagine cuts 
that would not simply mean the termination of important programs.
  I conclude that there could be some relatively insignificant savings 
realized from the merger of ACDA into State, but the results would not 
be an improvement. It would amount to dollars saved very foolishly--at 
an unfortunately high price. Too much is at stake. We should not take 
steps that 

[[Page S11064]]
could lead to risks to our national security. In a challenging and 
threatening international environment, reasonable amounts spent on ACDA 
can only be seen as a sound investment.
                               Exhibit 1

                                          The Paul H. Nitze School


                            of Advanced International Studies,

                                     Washington, DC, July 6, 1995.
     Hon. Claiborne Pell,
     Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Claiborne: As a long term observer of U.S. foreign and 
     security policy, I write to you in opposition to the foreign 
     affairs reorganization bill soon to be considered by the 
     Senate. This reorganization I believe to be ill-advised; 
     folding the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
     into the State Department seems to me to be unnecessary and 
     unwise.
       In my experience as an arms control negotiator, I always 
     found ACDA's input into the negotiating process to be expert, 
     insightful, and uniquely helpful. That input could well be 
     lost if the Agency does not remain independent. As recent 
     events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea show, nonproliferation 
     and arms control are more important than ever. Eliminating 
     ACDA from the diplomatic effort to protect our security would 
     be like eliminating the Marine Corps from the military 
     effort. While it will never replace its larger brethren on 
     the foreign policy team, ACDA plays an essential role as a 
     lean and flexible vanguard, always ready to aggressively 
     counter the threat weapons of mass destruction pose to our 
     national security.
       The global security environment has changed radically in 
     recent years. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 
     biological weapons and the increasing flow of materials and 
     know-how from the former arsenals of communism are now the 
     chief threats to our nation. ACDA has been the champion of 
     nonproliferation within the U.S. Government for more than 
     thirty years. Without the 1968 Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the number of aspiring 
     nuclear powers confronting us today would be an order of 
     magnitude greater. The NPT would never have been achieved 
     without an independent ACDA balancing the bilateral interests 
     promoted by the State Department. Just two months ago, ACDA 
     led the interagency effort which made the NPT unconditionally 
     permanent. Organizing consensus for indefinite extension 
     among the nearly 180 parties to the NPT was a great 
     diplomatic victory for the United States. An independent ACDA 
     proved it could succeed in a post-cold war leadership role 
     that would have been impossible for it to play as part of the 
     State Department.
       The Soviet Union has collapsed under the weight of its own 
     bankrupt ideology and the global threat of communist 
     aggression has shattered. But the technology (and even the 
     very weapons and materials) used by the communists to 
     threaten our way of life continue to endanger our nation, 
     only now the danger comes from many sources instead of one. 
     The game has changed, but the stakes are at least as great; 
     our national survival still hangs in the balance.
       We should be strengthening our nonproliferation team, not 
     abolishing it. ACDA is a key part of the best team possible 
     to face the real and growing threat of nuclear, chemical, and 
     biological terrorism. In this new era of opaque and 
     unpredictable threats to our security, the vigilance that saw 
     us through the Cold War should not be relaxed.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Paul H. Nitze.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I strongly support Senator Helms 
initiative to reorganize our foreign affairs agencies--the time has 
come to restructure the Department of State, USIA, and ACDA to better 
serve American interests abroad in the new post-cold-war world.
  The combination of diminishing resources and increased international 
trade and economic competition require us to revise our priorities and 
approach and restructure our institutions.
  During my tenure on the Foreign Relations Committee and now on the 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I reached the same conclusion that 
many of my colleagues did--foreign aid is almost as unpopular as it is 
misunderstood.
  Time and time again I have addressed audiences that really believe 
that foreign aid represents at least 50 percent of our budget--if we 
just scaled it back to 5 percent we could balance the budget.
  Well, as most of us know, foreign aid hovers around 1 percent of the 
Federal budget, and is shrinking by the day.
  So why do so many people have the wrong impression?
  I think the problem stems from the fact that no one really knows what 
we do abroad or why? Sure they understand emergency food and medical 
support to a country that is experiencing an earthquake or similar 
natural disaster.
  But what does sustainable development mean and why is it important?
  Why are we the largest contributor to global family planning 
programs?
  Do we really need to fund the International Office of the Vine and 
Wine?
  I share the view of many Americans that think our aid does not 
support clear cut U.S. interests. And, central to this problem is the 
disconnect between the agencies administering foreign aid and foreign 
affairs.
  I commend Senator Helms for his ambitious effort to reorganize our 
bureaucracy to better serve our interests. His proposal to integrate 
our aid and interests in one agency closely tracks legislation I 
introduced earlier this year. I also support his emphasis on our trade 
and economic interests--assuring each regional bureau actually has a 
deputy responsible for trade and development will enhance our global 
standing and performance.
  The reforms outlined in S. 908 are essential to rebuilding American 
confidence in our foreign aid programs. The bill reduces waste and 
expensive duplication of agency efforts. And, in scaling back and 
focusing our resources and effort, we will strengthen the coherence and 
effectiveness of our programs and policies.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, prior to the Senator proceeding, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed a letter to the President of the 
United States from a series of groups with respect to this legislation.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                           Planned Parenthood,

                                                    July 26, 1995.
     President William Jefferson Clinton,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We urge you to oppose all efforts to 
     prevent the United States from sending an official delegation 
     to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, to be 
     held in Beijing, China in September. The UN Conference on 
     Women is predicted to be the largest UN conference ever held; 
     184 government delegations and over 6,000 NGO representatives 
     are expected to attend the UN meeting. The Conference will 
     adopt a Platform of Action which outlines critical actions 
     governments must take to advance women's rights and access to 
     resources in many areas including health, education, 
     economics, human rights and the environment. Our 
     organizations--representing millions of Americans--are deeply 
     concerned about attempts to stifle US participation in this 
     important global conference.
       In response to recent reports of increases in the number of 
     human rights abuses in China, there are efforts currently 
     underway in the Senate and House of Representatives to block 
     participation of a U.S. delegation the UN Conference on 
     Women. We strongly believe that human rights abuses in China 
     and in all nations must be confronted directly. Our 
     organizations abhor infringements upon the basic human rights 
     of all people. At the same time, we find the abuse, suffering 
     and inequities faced by millions of women worldwide equally 
     distressing. The purpose of the Fourth World Conference on 
     Women is to assess progress made in improving women's status 
     and seek real solutions to bringing women out of the cycle of 
     poverty, inequality and discrimination that continues to 
     entangle so many women and their families.
       American women should not be denied the voice of their 
     government at this high level international meeting. There 
     are appropriate vehicles for dealing with this matter 
     including multilateral and bilateral policy discussions with 
     the Chinese--not in the context of a world conference about 
     women's issues. The matters of women's health, human rights, 
     education, employment and political status are much too 
     important for the U.S.--or any nation--to ignore by sitting 
     on the sidelines of this prominent forum. The U.S. would be 
     doing an injustice not only to American women but to all the 
     world's women, if its voice is silent in Beijing.
       The decision to hold a women's conference in Beijing was 
     made years ago by many nations and agreed to by former U.S. 
     President George Bush and then Secretary of State James 
     Baker. While many would prefer that this conference be held 
     elsewhere, especially now that the Nongovernmental (NGO) 
     Forum has been forced to a less than adequate site some 
     distance outside of Beijing, we believe that U.S. attendance 
     is critical. In fact, it would be a victory for China, which 
     does not want to be criticized, for the U.S. to be absent 
     from this international event. What better forum to highlight 
     women's abuses in China and all other nations, than this 
     global conference of government delegates, NGOs and media? 
     The U.S. has been a leading advocate on human rights and 
     democracy. Further, it has been one of the strongest voices 
     at the UN for NGO access and accreditation. Restricting U.S. 
     participation in the Conference would undermine 

[[Page S11065]]
     our ability to use this conference as an opportunity to pressure China 
     on democracy and human rights issues.
       We, the undersigned, represent a wide array of citizen-
     based groups working to improve the lives of all people. We 
     focus on issues concerning human rights, economic and social 
     development, health, environment and women's rights.
       We urge you to oppose all efforts to prevent or restrict in 
     any way the United States' full participation in this 
     conference.
           Sincerely,
       American Friends Service Committee, American Association of 
     University Women, The African-American Institute, Bay Area 
     Friends of Tibet (San Francisco), Center for Women's Global 
     Leadership, Rutgers University, Douglass College, Centre for 
     Education, Development, Population, and Population 
     Activities, Chesrown Metzger International Group, Childhope, 
     Church Women United, Coalition for Women in Development.
       Delegation of Original Women of Philadelphia (DOWOP), The 
     Development Gap, Family Care International, Feminist Majority 
     Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Heifer Project 
     International, The Hunger Project, InterAction, Institute for 
     Policy Studies, International Center for Research on Women 
     (ICRW).
       International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (San 
     Francisco), Laubach Literacy International, MAP 
     International, Ms. Foundation for Women, National Audubon 
     Society, The National Black Women's Health Project, Oxfam 
     America, People for the American Way, Planned Parenthood 
     Federation of America, Population Action International.
       Population Communication, Save the Children, Tibetan 
     Association of Boston, Tibetan Association of Northern 
     California, Tibetan Rights Campaign (Seattle), Tibetan 
     Women's Association/East Coast (New York), United Church of 
     Christ, Board for World Ministries, United Church of Christ, 
     Coordinating Center for Women, U.S.-Tibet Committee (New 
     York), Utah Tibet Support Group (Salt Lake City), World Women 
     in Development and Environment.

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that such time 
be provided for me to speak in regard to this matter, Senate bill 908.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Madam President, the Foreign Relations Revitalization 
Act of 1995 represents an important step in establishing a coordinated 
and coherent foreign policy and a refocusing of our national priorities 
in this time of limited resources.
  We need our foreign relations to be conducted at the highest level of 
integration and coordination, and the highest level of representation 
of the interests of this country and of the American people. And a top 
priority must be to ensure that our influence is used to benefit our 
interests and to ensure respect for American leadership.
  Senate bill 908, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995, is 
a bill which will do that.
  I want to commend the Presiding Officer, and the chairman of the 
committee, Senator Helms, for his guidance and direction in crafting 
this important legislation that eliminates program duplication and 
establishes a sense of clarity in the conduct of foreign relations. 
This bill also streamlines the delivery of services by eliminating 
three agencies and consolidating their remaining functions within the 
Department of State. I believe this will strengthen the role of the 
Secretary of State and will enhance his ability to organize a foreign 
policy structure that will best serve our Nation.
  We will not be well served by a foreign policy that continues to flow 
from the mouths of many. This is a very important issue, and one that 
the full Foreign Relations Committee addressed on several occasions 
with witnesses appearing from the Agency for International Development 
[AID], U.S. Information Agency [USIA], and Arms Control Disarmament 
Agency [ACDA]. I found it interesting that some witnesses indicated 
that it was important that separate sub-interests of the United States 
be represented vocally and that there be a competition of sorts--a 
``good-cop, bad-cop'' approach to foreign policy, whereby the folks who 
handed out the foreign aid for the United States would maintain good 
relations with a particular client nation, while the Department of 
State would essentially hold the line in protecting United States 
interests.
  I find that to be somewhat troublesome. I think we need to speak with 
a single voice. I do not think someone should be handing out foreign 
aid to a country at a time when that very country is clearly acting 
against our interests.
  If we continue with a foreign aid proposal, it should be with an 
understanding that the person asking for coordination and cooperation 
in one arena is the same person that will be delivering foreign aid and 
the kind of assistance that this country gives to other nations that 
are developing.
  The network of competing fiefdoms can only undercut the authority of 
the Secretary of State in conducting foreign policy. This bill will 
change that. It would be difficult to believe that those individuals 
who have tried to represent our interests with a singular, clear voice, 
would not favor this reorganization. Thus, it is no accident that 
virtually every previous Secretary of State who has had experience in 
this arena supports this bill.
  I believe that it is no accident that all the former Secretaries of 
State that came to speak with us supported this concept, and supported 
it very clearly, as did the current Secretary before his voice was 
muffled by the Vice President and others who suggested that perhaps he 
should not have that opinion.
  Sadly, rather than grab the opportunity to play a constructive role 
in helping to shape this proposal, the administration sought instead to 
adopt a fighting posture, a fixed-bayonet, take-no-prisoner strategy.
  I was particularly troubled by the secret minutes of an internal AID 
staff meeting that were provided to members of our committee. In that 
internal staff meeting, the staff was advised that ``Our strategy is 
delay, postpone, obfuscate, derail. If we derail [the bill], we can 
kill the merger.''
  This has nothing to do with the merits of this particular proposal. 
It has to do with the preservation of the bureaucracy. The American 
people deserve better from public servants than to sit around the 
conference rooms of these agencies figuring out how to derail, 
obfuscate and delay the will of the American people.
  The American people not only deserve a sound foreign policy, they 
deserve to have individuals operating in our agencies so as to comply 
with the will of the Congress and the people, as expressed through the 
Congress.
  An entrenched group of Government bureaucrats has been diligent in 
their efforts to hold the line at any cost, by stonewalling and 
delaying the process. This represents precisely the attitude of 
Government that this last election was designed to change.
  People have signaled very clearly a distaste for this. They not only 
want our Government to reflect their wishes, they want the Government, 
when it reflects the America interests abroad, to do so coherently, 
concisely, and clearly.
  They think if we have a single voice in foreign policy representing 
the administration, be it Republican or Democrat, that single voice is 
most likely to get the job done, rather than if we have competing 
agencies, an agency handing out foreign aid resources, another agency 
asking for cooperation in some other area of the international arena.
  There is another point that ought to be made here, and that is while 
there has been wild speculation that this consolidation plan and the 
corresponding reductions in some foreign assistance accounts is 
undertaken, somehow our national prestige will be threatened. I think 
it is important to understand that national prestige is reinforced and 
enhanced when we operate with a clear, coherent, concise, 
understandable foreign policy. Speaking out of both sides of our mouths 
may be a habit that is understood politically in the United States. It 
is really not appreciated by the American people. It is certainly not 
appreciated in the international community, when various organizations 
from this country misrepresent our stated policy.
  On the related topic of our national prestige, it is my sense that 
our stock will rise on the exchange of the world's international 
community, when we let them know that we intend to seriously address 
our responsibilities.
  This reorganization plan correctly recognizes the fact that there is 
a direct correlation between our international prestige and our ability 
to express ourselves with clarity. Second, it recognizes a direct 
correlation between our international prestige and the fiscal health of 
this country. 

[[Page S11066]]

  If we do not have the ability to put our financial house in order, we 
will not be respected by countries around the world. If we continue to 
race down the road to bankruptcy, our influence will not be 
substantial.
  This is the first authorization measure to come before the U.S. 
Senate that makes good on the promise we extended to the American 
people when we passed the budget resolution; that is, to have a 
balanced budget, to put our financial house in order. I submit to you 
that living within those rules and setting our priorities, financially 
as well as refining and clarifying our message in the international 
community--all of these things have no promise whatever other than to 
raise the prestige of the United States and to set an example in the 
world community that we should be responsible.
  Unfortunately, there are those in this country who think that there 
cannot be any cuts at all in the foreign relations area. And the 
lobbyists came around with their buttons saying ``Just 1 percent.'' 
They said that since our foreign aid budget represents only 1 percent 
of the total Federal budget, it cannot be touched. I just want to point 
out that the ``Just 1 percent'' is actually $14.3 billion. And I 
believe it can be touched.
  Should it be abolished? I am not in favor of abolishing foreign 
assistance. But I am in favor of sending a signal around the globe that 
when American citizens are tightening their belts, and exercising 
fiscal responsibility, there will be some ripple effects in terms of 
our aid. Not that we are going to shut anything down, not that we are 
going to change our policy dramatically, but we need to send a clear 
signal that the shared sacrifice here at home should be matched by a 
certain degree of sacrifice around the world. If we did not have the 
courage to ask them to participate in that respect, they would lose 
some of their admiration for the way we do business and they would lose 
some of their respect for us, and we would lose some of our ability to 
influence events around the world.
  This administration seems to be following the same path as the 
foreign aid lobbyists leveling charges that this commonsense reform 
bill represents a dangerous shift toward isolationism. It is not a 
shift toward isolationism but rather a shift toward the development of 
respectable foreign policy. We have dealt with foreign situations but 
we have not had foreign policy. Policy is something that is coherent, 
that sticks together, that you can forecast, that you can predict. It 
has a philosophy about it. We have too many lawyers in the process and 
too few philosophers. We solved this problem, and we solved that 
problem, and we solved this other problem. But we never do it in 
accordance with a philosophy. And the philosophy should be a philosophy 
which keeps us from having additional problems.
  I remember when the leaders of the so-called foreign policy 
establishment of this administration came to talk to the committee 
about the North Korean situation and the problems which we had 
negotiating with the North Koreans over nuclear issues. I asked the 
leadership of this administration's foreign policy what it was about 
the way we solved that problem that would suggest to the rest of the 
world that we should not do the same things that the North Koreans had 
done. They said, ``Well, nothing. We think this is a unique situation, 
and it will not never happen anyplace else.'' So we could afford to 
make this a very sweet deal for the people who went against the U.S. 
interest because it could never happen again.
  I submit to you that is not foreign policy. It may have temporarily 
solved that problem. But that is not policy. That is just pragmatism at 
the moment, and does not look down the road.
  We need a foreign policy, and we need a Secretary of State with the 
capacity to articulate that foreign policy with clarity, with 
singularity, and coherently around the world.
  The administration has pursued a ``Chicken Little'' approach to 
denouncing the reorganization plan by issuing a series of gloom and 
doom forecasts about how passage of this bill will result in damaged 
American prestige abroad and the possible emergence of more Rwanda-type 
situations.
  Well, it is just not so. The sky will not fall if the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency is abolished. At the present time, the State 
Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA all have 
departments that are dedicated to pursuing arms-control-related 
functions. We have the ability to handle these issues in a coherent, 
rational, integrated, coordinated way if we make the changes that are 
in this important legislation which is before us.
  It is time that we prioritize. Some said we cannot afford to reduce 
our foreign aid at all in 1993. AID helped fund a visit to the United 
States by a group of Romanian architects so they could study U.S. 
architecture. Was this a priority for a country whose economic 
infrastructure was devastated by 40 years of Communist rule? I doubt 
it.
  Last week, the Washington Times reported that AID recently spent 
$175,000 to produce 3,000 of these gender analysis tool kits.
  I think the American people might wonder if the purchase of gender 
analysis tool kits is the right kind of priority setting.
  AID even floated a plan to help supply Moscow with street lamps. I 
know that crime has gotten to be a problem in Moscow. But it is a tough 
sell to say to the people of the United States of America, some of whom 
live in inner-city neighborhoods in the United States that make Moscow 
after dark look like a trip to Disney World, that we should spend 
millions of dollars putting street lights in Moscow, particularly at a 
time when Moscow was spending billions of dollars grinding up the 
people of Chechnya. I wonder.
  Again, it is a question of establishing priorities.
  In closing, and with great enthusiasm, I want to draw attention to 
the key features of this reform legislation. It says we do not have 
unlimited resources, we need to set priorities, and we need policy, and 
policy should not be articulated by contradictory messages issued by a 
variety of organizations. It says we must maximize our influence, and 
in order to maximize our influence, let us not speak with many voices 
in contradictory messages; let us speak with one voice so those who 
deliver the benefit can also be those who ask for the cooperation.
  It says that we in the United States of America will not sacrifice 
without expecting others to sacrifice along with us, because ultimately 
when we have the kind of fiscal integrity that we ought to have, the 
entire world will benefit. When our house is in order, we will be the 
leader that provides the kind of message and the kind of opportunity 
around the world which will lift the performance of many nations with 
us.
  We cannot spend as we have in the past in ways that are 
counterproductive. As the world desperately needs a leader--and there 
is only one--the United States must revamp its capacity to deliver that 
leadership with clarity and coherence, and the Foreign Relations 
Revitalization Act does that.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this measure, because it is a major 
step forward in our world leadership responsibilities.
  Thank you, Madam President.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, before the distinguished Senator from 
Missouri leaves for the policy luncheon, I want to say that he has made 
an extraordinarily brilliant speech. He has said it all, and he said it 
well. If I may reminisce just one moment, one of the first people I met 
in another State after I came to the Senate was a young man in Missouri 
named John Ashcroft. I went to Missouri to work with him on a little 
matter. I have admired him ever since. He has had a distinguished 
career, and he has already begun a distinguished career in the U.S. 
Senate. I thank the Senator.
  I yield the floor.

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