[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 126 (Tuesday, August 1, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11047-S11048]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                  FOREIGN RELATIONS REVITALIZATION ACT

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I intend to offer an amendment to the 
Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995 to assist the President in 
his efforts to deal with the growing threat to American interests from 
Iran. President Clinton clearly sought to address this threat with his 
May 6 Executive order establishing a full United States embargo of 
Iran. It is my hope that short of successfully encouraging other 
nations from trading with Iran, an extremely challenging task, the 
President will be able to use the authority in this amendment to 
encourage other countries to at least refrain from contributing to 
Iranian weapons capability.
  The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which I cosponsored 
with then-Senator Gore, established sanctions against third parties 
which assist Iran and Iraq in their efforts to rebuild their weapons 
capabilities. It was a start, but it did not go far enough. Efforts by 
Senator Lieberman and me last year to expand the legislation were 
unsuccessful.
  The 1992 bill was intended to target not only the acquisition of 
conventional weapons, but weapons of mass destruction as well. In the 
process of amending the bill to the 1993 Defense Act, however, the 
explicit references to weapons of mass destruction were dropped.
  The amendment I am offering today attempts to make these applications 
absolutely clear. It also removes from the proposed sanctions 
exceptions for assistance under the Freedom Support Act, thereby 
removing the benefit of the doubt Congress gave Russia in 1992. As I 
will explain later in my statement, Russia has used this exception to 
the detriment of United States policy in the Persian Gulf.
  To the current list of sanctions against persons assisting Iran and 
Iraq in its weapons programs, which already include procurement and 
export sanctions, the amendments we are offering today add the denial 
of visas, denial of commercial credit, and denial of authority to ship 
products across United States territory. To the list of sanctions 
against countries offering similar assistance, the amendment adds the 
denial of licenses for export of nuclear material, denial of foreign 
military sales, denial of the transfer of controlled technology, denial 
of the transfer of computer technology, suspension of the authority of 
foreign air carriers to fly to or from the United States, and a 
prohibition on vessels that enter the ports of sanctioned countries.
  The threat from Iraq is not an immediate concern. The most important 
aspect of our policy with regard to Iraq must be to remain firm on the 
U.N. embargo. But given the history of the Iraqi military buildup 
before the gulf war, the sanctions included in the Iran-Iraq Act may at 
a later date be as important with regard to Iraq as they are currently 
in the case of Iran. Once the embargo is lifted, there will be a great 
temptation for cash-strapped economies to resume sales of military 
hardware to Iraq. Outside forces may once again be compelled to 
maintain a balance in the region through arms sales and a dangerous 
escalation of firepower.
  It is also vitally important to prevent the reemergence of an Iraqi 
conventional military threat. One need only observe the origins of the 
weapons which constituted the Iraqi threat in 1990 to know that the key 
to any post-embargo containment strategy will depend on our ability to 
influence Iraq's trading partners in Europe, Russia, the People's 
Republic of China, and North Korea.
  The threat from Iran is more immediate. The Iranian buildup in the 
Persian Gulf is common knowledge. Its importation of hundreds of North 
Korean Scud-C missiles, its intention to acquire the Nodong North 
Korean missiles currently under development, and its efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons are well established--as is its conventional weapons 
buildup.
  Successive CIA directors, and Secretaries Perry and Christopher have 
all testified to the effect that Iran is engaged in an extensive effort 
to acquire nuclear weapons. In February, Russia signed an agreement to 
provide Iran with a 1,000 megawatt light water nuclear reactor. The 
Russians indicate that they may soon agree to build as many as three 
more reactors--another 1,000 megawatt reactor, and two 440 megawatt 
reactors.
  I have raised my concerns regarding this sale with the administration 
on a number of occasions. I have maintained that under the Freedom 
Support Act of 1992, which the Iran Iraq Act of 1992 was intended to 
reinforce, the President must either terminate assistance to Russia or 
formally waive the requirement to invoke sanctions out of concern for 
the national interest.
  The State Department has informed me that ``to the best of its 
knowledge, Russia has not actually transferred relevant material, 
equipment, or technology to Iran,'' and so there is no need to consider 
sanctions. I have been further informed that they are ``examining the 
scope of the proposed Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, and as 
appropriate, they will thoroughly evaluate the applicability of 
sanctions,'' presumably, if at a later date they can confirm the 
transfer.
  I have no reason to question the State Department's evaluation of the 
facts on the ground. However, I would note that there have been public 
reports of as many as 220 Russians employed at the site of the proposed 
reactor. There seems to be a dangerously obscure standard for 
determining when material, equipment, or technology useful in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons has actually been transferred, 
especially when as is the case with Iran, the reactor may already be 
partially complete.
  At what point in the construction of the reactors does the transfer 
become significant? Do we allow the Russians to build portions of the 
reactor which do not strictly involve the transfer of dangerous 
equipment or technology while Iran obtains the most vital assistance 
from other sources? Although I cannot make this determination myself, 
common sense and an appropriate sense of caution would dictate that any 
assistance provided Iran in its efforts to acquire nuclear technology 
is significant.
  The administration declined to identify the dispatch of technicians 
to the site as sufficient proof that a technology transfer was 
occurring. However, now that we are approaching the completion of site 
inspection and preparation, and nearing the start of the actual 
construction, it is my hope that the President will make another 
assessment of the situation.
  I would point out that although the administration may have technical 
grounds for arguing that it is not yet required to invoke sanctions, 
making a determination on the applicability of sanctions sooner rather 
than later would serve as necessary leverage in resolving the issue. My 
intention is not to gut U.S. assistance to Russia. It is 

[[Page S11048]]
to prevent Russia from providing Iran dangerous technology. Waiting to 
make a determination until the transfer is complete defeats the purpose 
of the sanctions.
  Ultimately, I fear that the reason the administration has not made a 
determination is that it does not want to jeopardize our relationship 
with Russia.
  Based on this assumption and anticipating that the State Department 
may at a later date find other ways to avoid compliance with the 
Freedom Support Act, the legislation we are introducing today makes the 
President's legal responsibility under the act more explicit.
  We sent our Armed Forces to war in the Persian Gulf once in this 
decade. They endured hardship to themselves and their families. Some 
will live with the injuries they suffered in service to our Nation for 
the rest of their lives. And, as is the case with every war, some never 
returned. With the cooperation of our friends in Europe, whose own 
sacrifices to the effort to free Kuwait should not be forgotten, we 
must see that the service of these brave men and women was not in vain.
  Stability and security in the Persian Gulf is vital to the world 
economy and to our own national interests. Aggressors in the region 
should know that if we must, we will return to the Persian Gulf with 
the full force of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, our friends 
and adversaries elsewhere in the world should understand that the 
United States will do everything in its power to preclude that 
necessity. It is my sincere hope that his legislation will serve as an 
indication of just how serious we are.


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