[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 126 (Tuesday, August 1, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8156-H8165]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1845
                  UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN JOINT EFFORTS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Metcalf). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is 
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the entire 
hour, but rise this evening to focus on an issue that will be heavily 
discussed tomorrow and later this week as we vote on the next fiscal 
year Defense appropriation bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is important that we approach defense 
spending in this day and age with a very cautious eye to what is 
happening, not just in the Soviet Union, but around the world. To that 
extent, I will be entering some documents into the Record this evening. 
I think Members should especially focus on, not just for the votes that 
will occur tomorrow and the rest of the week, but also for debate that 
we will be having further on in this session of Congress, during the 
conference process and as we begin to debate the relative importance of 
continuing within the confines of the ABM Treaty.
  First of all, Mr. Speaker, let me say I rise as a 9-year member of 
the National Security Committee and the current chairman of the 
Research and Development Subcommittee, and as someone who is not just a 
self-proclaimed hardliner when it comes to dealing with the former 
Soviet Union and now Russia, as well as those rogue nations around the 
world, but as someone who spent the bulk of my last 20 years working on 
building bridges with the Russian people.
  My approach to Russia is one of pragmatism. Reach out to the Russian 
people, work with them, build relationships on trust and mutual 
cooperation, but hold them accountable when they violate treaties on 
defense and foreign policy issues.
  My background is in Russian studies, my undergraduate degree is in 
that area. Twenty years ago I spoke the language fluently. I have 
traveled throughout the country, stayed in Russian people's homes, and 
I have this year hosted well over 100 members of the Duma in various 
meetings and sessions.
  Mr. Speaker, currently I am the cochair of the Russian-American 
Energy Caucus with my colleagues, the gentleman from Texas, Greg 
Laughlin, on the Republican side, and the gentleman from Maryland, 
Steny Hoyer, and the gentleman from Illinois, Glenn Poshard, on the
 Democratic side. Working with the 16 multinational energy 
corporations, we attempt to foster relationships that build bridges 
between our energy corporations and joint venture opportunities in 
Russia to allow them to bring in the hard currency they need. Most 
recently, this past year, we worked with our administration and the 
Yeltsin administration and members of the Duma to complete the final 
support and approval within the Duma for the Sakhalin project, a 
project that is in fact the largest energy project in the history of 
not just Russia, but the entire world, that will ultimately see 
approximately $10 to $15 billion of western investment through 
companies like McDermott Marathon go into the Sakhalin area for 
development of Russian energy resources.

  Mr. Speaker, we are also working on the Caspian Sea project, which we 
hope will provide a force to unify some of the warring factions down in 
the Caspian Sea area, and also further help stabilize the Russian 
economy through development of their energy resources.
  Mr. Speaker, I also cochair an effort working with the Duma members 
on environmental issues. Just last year I led a delegation of Members 
to Murmansk, the North Sea fleet, to talk about how we could work with 
them in finding ways of disposing of the Russian nuclear waste that is 
coming from the dismantlement of their ships and their submarines, as 
well as to try to help the Russians stop what has been a recurring 
practice over the past two decades of dumping nuclear reactors 

[[Page H8157]]
and nuclear waste into the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and even out 
in the East, in the Sea of Japan. That effort is paying tremendous 
dividends, and there is an ongoing effort right now among members of 
the parliaments of not just Russia, but the European Parliament, the 
Japanese Diet, and our Congress to focus on this as one of our major 
priorities, the stopping of all dumping of waste, especially nuclear 
waste, in the oceans of the world. To that extent we held a conference 
here in Washington just a month ago where we had attendees from Russia, 
Japan, Europe, and the United States in trying to form a cooperative 
relationship in dealing with these problems.
  Mr. Speaker, we are currently working with the Russian shipyard at 
St. Petersburg, the Baltic shipyard, to convert it to an environmental 
remediation center, where Russian workers who formerly
 built warships can be trained to dismantle old rusty vessels where the 
steel can be melted down and reused to benefit the Russian economy.

  Mr. Speaker, we are working in Siberia, Nizhneyansk, in a joint 
venture to establish environmental opportunities with American firms 
and Russian firms to create jobs and economic opportunity and to also 
help stabilize environmental problems in Russia.
  Third, Mr. Speaker, we are working on an effort to establish a joint 
Duma-Congress relationship between members of the Duma Defense 
Committee and members of our National Security Committee. Two months 
ago, the gentleman from South Carolina, Floyd Spence, chairman of the 
Committee on National Security, the gentleman from Louisiana, Bob 
Livingston, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
gentleman from California, Duncan Hunter, chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Military Procurement, and I met for 3 hours with five members of the 
Russian Duma Defense Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, the purpose of that meeting was to reach out to them and 
say look, we are not out to establish some kind of a dominant 
relationship over your people or your country, we are out to work with 
you, to change the whole notion of the way that we focus our efforts in 
the world, so that instead of building up more and more nuclear weapons 
and continuing this ridiculous posture of mutually assured destruction, 
to move toward a defensive posture where we asked the Russians and 
their leadership and their technical experts to work with us in 
developing defensive capabilities, much like Ronald Reagan first 
proposed some 10 years ago. In fact, we had that meeting, which was 
very successful, and we are currently planning on taking a group of 
similar leaders to Russia to continue that dialog with members of the 
Russia Duma Defense Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, all of these efforts are designed to show that yes, we 
must reach out to the Russian people, to their government, to their 
leaders, to show them that we sincerely want to work with them to bring 
about the economic reforms that they want, the political reforms, the 
freedoms that they long for. But at the same time, we must not 
underestimate what is happening within the former Soviet Union, and now 
Russian, military.

                              {time}  2000

  Many of those military leaders there today were in power during the 
Soviet regime. Many of the ideals and goals of those leaders are 
similar today to what they were then, and we must understand that.
  We must deal with the Russian leadership from a position of 
understanding while showing compassion and willingness to work with 
them to help stabilize their economy and their country.
  Mr. Speaker, before continuing, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia 
[Mr. Linder].
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the point being that we must 
continue to reach out to the Russian people and their leadership. As a 
Member of Congress, I pledge my efforts to reach out to members of 
their Duma. But we must also let them understand that we will not be 
shortsighted, that we will not allow blinders to be pulled over our 
eyes in terms of what is happening in their country.
  Mr. Speaker, it is not just talk or rhetoric that is important; it is 
the substance and actual extent of involvement of both countries in 
bringing about long-term peaceful relations. My own fear as a member of 
the Committee on National Security is that our two biggest security 
threats, as we approach the next century, involve terrorism throughout 
the world and in this country, and the proliferation of missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction. To that extent, we must understand what 
our threats are, what we can do about those threats and how we can work 
with our allies and countries like Russia to develop common defenses 
against those threats.
  Some in this body would have us believe that the Russians are no 
longer putting money into sophisticated weapons systems. Mr. Speaker, 
that is just not true.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the Record an article taken 
from the FBIS reports, which I scan on a daily basis. This article is 
taken from Moscow Kommersant-Daily, printed in Russian on July 20 of 
this year, entitled ``START II Treaty Ratification Seen Assured,'' and 
in it the author Aleksandr Koretskiy, goes through the determination 
that it is in Russia's best interest to ratify START II and, therefore, 
that will occur.
  What is interesting in the article, that we should be aware of, is 
that the Russians are still developing state-of-the-art military 
technology.

       A number of statements were made in the hearings,

these are hearings among the Duma members,

     each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. First, Russia 
     is developing, at the design stage so far, a new submarine 
     missile cruiser. To all appearances, its technological 
     performance will by far eclipse that of the American `Ohio' 
     type subs which form the basis of the U.S. nuclear forces 
     until the year 2020 at a minimum. In other words, Russia 
     plans for more than one day ahead despite the unprecedented 
     cuts in funds for military R&D.
       Second, a new missile for bombers is being developed which 
     will make it possible to keep them effective also into the 
     start of the next century at small cost. Work is in progress 
     also in other fields.

  The point of this article is that Russia, while it has certainly cut 
back its funds for the military, is still developing state-of-the-art 
technologies, not just to match what America has, but to give them an 
edge, an edge that we have to be able to deal with through the turn of 
the century.
  Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the Record:

               START II Treaty Ratification Seen Assured

       [Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: ``START II Hearings. Cuts 
     Are In Order Because There Are No Maintenance Funds'']
       [FBIS Translated Text] The ratification of the START II 
     treaty (on further cutting and limiting strategic offensive 
     weapons) will help Russia minimize the difference between its 
     nuclear potential and that of the United States. As for 
     Russia's counter-force potential, it will even grow 20 
     percent despite the cuts as a result of the implementation of 
     START II owing to a marked decrease in the corresponding 
     potential of the United States. Such is only the smaller part 
     of the arguments by those who advocate the ratification of 
     the treaty voiced in the course of the first open hearings in 
     the Duma. The final conclusions on the feasibility and, 
     perhaps, additional terms of ratification will be drawn in 
     September--there will be separate hearings on the financial 
     aspects of START II implementation. One can already today, 
     however, say with confidence: despite the pessimistic 
     forecasts of its opponents, the treaty will be ratified with 
     no special problems by the current State Duma.
       The treaty was signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in 
     Moscow 3 January 1993. Many a lance has been broken since 
     over the ratification problem both in Russia and the United 
     States: some congressmen are sure that START II considerably 
     lowers America's defense potential. A similar view, but as 
     applied to Russia, is also voiced by a number of Russian 
     deputies. The Russian politicians primarily doubt the 
     feasibility of what is at first sight an abrupt change in the 
     structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces: under the 
     treaty, the sea-based component of Russia's nuclear forces 
     should be upped from 30 percent to between 50 and 58 percent. 
     And this should be done by cutting the number of ground-based 
     missiles. Russia will in fact have to scrap the new 
     generation SS-18 and SS-19 ground-based intercontinental 
     missiles. Shifting the center of gravity to sea-based 
     missiles can take place only in theory: 90 percent of the 
     submarine missile cruisers were built before 1990, which 
     implies that their service life will be up in the year 2015. 
     Russia actually does not build new subs--their keels have 
     been laid but construction has been halted by lack of funds. 
     A relative stability will only prevail in strategic 
     aviation--the fleet of Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 bombers will be 
     cut under the treaty by as little as 24 bombers. By 1998, the 
     Air Force is supposed to have not more than 113 planes 

[[Page H8158]]
     whereas their number today is 137. and 53 of them are outside Russia (7 
     in Kazakhstan and 44 in Ukraine), for which reason no Russian 
     planes should be scrapped. Incidentally, it came to light 
     during the hearings that Moscow did not lose all interest in 
     Ukrainian strategic aviation at all--the Russian Air Force is 
     still counting on it.
       All the military strategy doubts of the politicians were 
     dispelled by Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the 
     General Staff. He thinks that by cutting the number of 
     warheads to 3,500, START II facilitates the formation of a 
     grouping of strategic offensive forces which is adequate to 
     that of the United States. Indeed, reducing the number of 
     warheads mounted on intercontinental missiles and submarine-
     based missiles does not call for remodeling or replacing the 
     MRV [multiple reentry vehicle] platform and the destruction 
     of the warheads removed from them, which gives potential 
     advantages--this creates the danger of a quick increase in 
     nuclear potential if the United States pulls out of the 
     treaty. In this case, the United States will have more 
     warheads than Russia by 55 percent. But this is still less 
     than what it would have had under START I. This is to say, 
     the United States is not getting a real edge, while Russia 
     retains the effectiveness of its nuclear forces in 
     retaliatory actions.
       As regards the change in the structure, Zhurbenko stated 
     that it would have to be altered in any case--most ground-
     based missiles are at the end of their useful life. They are 
     supposed to be replaced by new missiles which Russia does not 
     have. More accurately, there is no base for building heavy 
     missiles of the SS-18 and SS-19 type which are produced in 
     the Ukrainian ``Yuzhmash.'' In principle, industrial 
     cooperation could be arranged, but after Kiev joined the 
     Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this opportunity was lost. 
     As a result, Russia is able today to produce on its own only 
     one type of missile--the single warhead ``Topol,'' on whose 
     basis its ground based forces will be developing. Plans call 
     for production of two versions of this missile--one for the 
     existing mobile missile systems, and the new ``Topol-M'' 
     system.
       An important START II provision, the military thinks, is 
     the fact that, in the number of warheads, the treaty brings 
     U.S. nuclear forces down closer to a level which Russia is 
     objectively capable of maintaining. The Russian military, one 
     might say, dreamed of really counting in the warheads carried 
     by bombers provided for by START II. The thing is that under 
     START I, each Russian strategic bomber can carry 8 nuclear-
     tipped missiles (in reality this figure is 6), whereas a U.S. 
     Air Force bomber can carry 10 missiles (in reality 20).
       Generally, the military and diplomats convinced the 
     deputies: START II is almost manna as far as Russia is 
     concerned. At any rate, Russia cannot afford forces that the 
     USSR could have hardly maintained. The problem is not so much 
     direct funding but also the industrial and technological base 
     that ended up on the territory of independent CIS republics. 
     when all is said and done, we should also take account of 
     Russia's new geostrategic situation, different foreign policy 
     priorities, and the development of military technology.
       Apropos of technology. A number of statements were made in 
     the hearings, each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. 
     First, Russia is developing (at the design stage so far) a 
     new submarine missile cruiser. To all appearances, its 
     technological performance will by far eclipse that of the 
     American ``Ohio'' type subs which form the basis of the U.S. 
     nuclear forces until the year 2020 at the minimum. In other 
     words, Russia plans for more than one day ahead despite the 
     unprecedented cuts in funds for military R&D. Second, a new 
     missile for bombers is being developed which will make it 
     possible to keep them effective also into the start of the 
     next century at small cost. Work is in progress also in other 
     fields.
       The deputies' reaction to the reports of military and 
     independent experts and the nature of the questions asked 
     make it possible to claim: the Duma is not only going to 
     ratify START II, but it may also pass a special Russian 
     strategic nuclear forces development program with 
     corresponding funds.

  On the issue of a new superfighter, in a FBIS report summarizing a 
Moscow Interfax article, dated July 20 of this year, talking about the 
capabilities of the new Russian superfighter, and I will quote:
  ``The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its latest product, the 
superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow air show in August,'' this 
month, ``the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail Siminov, told a solemn 
meeting on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's 
birthday. Siminov told Interfax that Su-35 was a dramatically modified 
version of the Su-27 jet. However, the new aircraft differed from the 
original by its exceptional maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, 
new armament system to simultaneously destroy 6 ground and naval 
targets and artificial-intelligence computer.''
  He goes on to say, ```In the West, such fighters do not yet exist,' 
Siminov said. `The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other 
analogues will appear within the next five years,' he added.
  ``If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's 
superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first position in 
the world's arms market in the third millennium, Western experts say.
  ``At present, Russia's Air Forces have over 250 Su-27 fighters.''
  Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the Record:

                    Military, Nuclear & Space Issues

       Moscow, July 20.--The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its 
     latest product, the superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow 
     air show in August, the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail 
     Simonov, told a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 100th 
     anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's birthday.
       Simonov told INTERFAX that Su-35 was a dramatically 
     modified version of the well-known Su-27 jet. However, the 
     new aircraft differed from the original by its exceptional 
     maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, new armament 
     system to simultaneously destroy six ground and naval targets 
     and artificial-intelligence computer.
       ``In the West such fighters do not yet exist,'' Simonov 
     said. The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other 
     analogues will appear within the next five years, he added.
       If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's 
     superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first 
     position on the world's arms market in the third millennium, 
     western experts say.
       At present, Russia's air forces have over 250 Su-27 
     fighters.

  Mr. Speaker, evidence that Russia is still continuing to develop 
state-of-the-art technology. Not just for its own protection, but 
perhaps more significantly to begin to sell these conventional arms to 
other nations that may not have the same peaceful intentions as 
Russia's current civilian leaders and we have.
  Mr. Speaker, we witnessed this past year the selling of three Russian 
submarines to Iran. We have witnessed efforts to sell technology to 
China. As a matter of fact, I was aghast when I read that we were, in 
fact, allowing proliferation to occur involving the Russians in 
countries where we could have imposed sanctions and yet had backed down 
on repeated occasions.
  Mr. Speaker, this is an issue that this body has got to deal with, an 
issue that we have got to confront. it is important for Members, as we 
get ready to debate the issue of defense appropriations levels for next 
year and the defense conference process that will unfold in the fall, 
that we understand what is happening, based on the facts. It is 
important that we understand proliferation that is occurring throughout 
the world, not just by Russia, but by other countries.
  China is a perfect example. The Clinton administration, Mr. Speaker, 
to my mind, seems incapable of employing a toughness in terms of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  A good example of that is China's sale of missiles and missile 
technology to Iran and Pakistan. Classified evidence of these 
sanctionable transactions have been on the books since the President's 
first day in office.
  What has been the President's response? First, the State Department 
tried to sanction China's missile maker, the Great Wall Industries, but 
not long after, withdrew those sanctions. Then United States officials 
claimed that they had secured Chinese pledges not to proliferate.
  Evidence of Chinese missile proliferation to Iran and Pakistan 
continued and was leaked in the press last month. This evidence 
continues to mount. So far this administration has taken no new action.
  And then there is Russia, Mr. Speaker. Here the administration lifted 
sanctions that were imposed by the Bush administration against 
Glavkosmos, a Russian firm that violated the MTCR, missile technology
 control regime, guidelines. It had exported sensitive upper-stage 
rocket technology to India's Indian Scientific Research Organization, 
including production and integration technology. This know-how could 
help India extend the range of its missiles to reach Bejing and improve 
Indian upper rocket stages in general.

  In exchange for Russian pledges to stop such technology transfers to 
India, the administration, in September 1993, offered Moscow hundreds 
of millions of dollars in space cooperation projects.
  Mr. Speaker, I am not saying that we should not cooperate, but we 
have got to set a tone of firmness. When countries, whether it be China 
or Russia, 

[[Page H8159]]
violate proliferation agreements and violate understandings that we 
have, this administration has got to be firm. That has not worked.
  What Clinton officials have chosen not to do about MTCR violations, 
however, is far less disturbing than what they recently announced that 
they are planning to do. That is to make MTCR members of the nations 
that are violating the regime. The Clinton administration hopes this 
will encourage problem proliferators to become part of the 
nonproliferation solution. In fact, I think it is shortsighted 
diplomatic public relations that will trivialize the MTCR and, worse, 
turn the regime into a major proliferation promotion organization.
  How is this possible? Simple. Both U.S. law and the missile 
technology control regime guidelines discourage U.S. exporters and 
other members of the MTCR against selling missile technology to non-
MTCR members who have missile projects of concern or who have had a bad 
track record proliferating missile technology to other nations.
  Once these countries are made members of MTCR, which the Clinton 
administration proposes to do now, there is a legal presumption of 
approval for the very missile transfers that were previously barred, 
which means that once these countries are able to be a part of the 
MTCR, they can sell their missiles without any sanctions being 
available to the United States and other countries.
  Under U.S. law, a nation that becomes a member of the MTCR can no 
longer be sanctioned for importing the hardware or technology needed to 
complete dangerous rockets or missiles or export it to any MTCR member.
  What sort of nations might these be? Until the past few months, even 
the Clinton administration
 claimed that they included Brazil and Russia.

  Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record, with unanimous consent, 
articles where Brazil, in fact, has been working on the capability for 
rocket technology which they have purchased from Russia through the 
black market. And I will provide an article once again from the FBIS 
documents that Members can read.
  In addition, Brazil has made it known that they would like to have 
the capability that one of the most sophisticated Russian rockets 
offers in terms of a space launch capability.
  SS-25 is perhaps the most sophisticated intercontinental ballistic 
missile that Russia has today. It has a range of 10,500 kilometers. It 
can hit any city in any part of America with that range. It is a 
mobile-launched system, launched off of the back of a mobile-launch 
tractor that can be moved around the country. Russia has somewhere less 
than a thousand of these launchers throughout Russia and the former 
Soviet republics.
  Each missile battery has the potential of launching three missiles, 
which currently have nuclear warheads on them. However, what Russia has 
been doing for the past 2 years is, it has been trying to sell a 
version, a modified version, of the SS-25 to any country that, in fact, 
would want to have a space launch capability.
  What problems does this present for us? Well, imagine, Mr. Speaker, a 
missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Take the nuclear warhead 
off of that missile and modify it to become a space launch vehicle, and 
you can offer it for sale to anyone.
  Brazil has been very interested in acquiring this capability and, in 
fact, had a tentative deal worked out until the administration and 
Members of Congress, including myself, stepped up and said, ``We cannot 
allow this to go forward;'' and Brazil temporarily backed off. We 
understand Russia has had other discussions with other countries who 
would like to use this technology for space launch purposes.
  Now, you are not going to have a nuclear warhead on this missile, 
but, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about doing is giving other 
nations the capability that comes with a missile that has a range of 
10,500 kilometers. Furthermore, if you believe what the Clinton 
administration tells us in terms of the current command and control of 
the Russian nuclear arsenal, that all dissipates when you take the SS-
25,
 as modified, and you give it to a Russian profitmaking venture to 
market on the open market as a space launch vehicle.

  That is exactly what is happening today. In fact, several months ago, 
the world witnessed the first unsuccessful launch of an SS-25 modified 
rocket with an Israeli satellite on board from the Pozitiskiya 
Aerodrome. It was not successful, and the rocket and the satellite fell 
into the Sea of Okhotsk. The fact remains, Mr. Speaker, that Russia is 
aggressively trying to export this technology.
  Make no mistake about it, Mr. Speaker, I do not fear for the safety 
of our people from an all-out nuclear attack by Russia. That is not my 
concern. What I fear, Mr. Speaker, is the capability the Russians have 
with the SS-25 and the SS-18, which they are also currently trying to 
market for space launch purposes to a Third World rogue nation.
  You give any of the rogue nations of this world one of those missile 
launch systems, allow them then to put a conventional weapon on board, 
a conventional bomb or perhaps a chemical or biological weapon, and 
with the range of an SS-18 or an SS-25, our country and our people are 
under direct threat.
  Mr. Speaker, this is reality. This is not some hypothetical situation 
made up in some star wars movie. Mr. Speaker, this is what is occurring 
today inside of Russia as proliferation of these missiles is a top 
priority. As the Russians are looking for ways to bring in hard 
currency, they see one of the quickest ways as selling off this 
technology, like the SS-25 and the SS-18.
  Mr. Speaker, here is the real problem, besides the lack of attention 
and focus by the administration and the clear and consistent policy to 
call these acts when they occur, like the recent sale of rocket motors 
to China by the Garrett Engine Co., which are being used for fighter 
planes.
  But unless the administration takes some overt action this year, the 
technology will be transferred to China, which we think will allow them 
to increase the capability of their cruise missiles. This 
administration has remained silent on blocking that technology 
transfer.
  Again, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about, whether it is it is 
the SS-25, whether it is the SS-18, whether it is technology to help 
the Chinese improve their cruise missile capability, whether it is 
North Korea Taepo Dong-1 or -2, which has a range of 5,500 kilometers, 
which today could hit Guam or Alaska, Mr. Speaker, these are real 
situations that every Member of this body has to understand.
  No longer can this body vote in a vacuum. We must understand and 
recognize the facts as they are. The documents that I am placing in the 
Congressional Record today are factual statements by leaders in Russia, 
documented articles of situations occurring with China, North Korean 
developments in China. It will take only one of those systems to get in 
the hands of a rogue nation and then what do we do, Mr. Speaker?
                              {time}  2015

  General O'Neill, who is the administration's point person on missile 
defense, has said repeatedly in our congressional hearings this year 
that if a nation acquires the capability of an SS-25 or SS-18, or 
perhaps even a Taepo Dong II with a range of 5,500 kilometers, we, as a 
country, have no defense against an accidental or deliberate launch of 
one vehicle. We have no system available today, with all the money we 
spend on defense, with all the money we spend on military every year, 
we have no system available today to protect the American people from 
such a launch.
  Mr. Speaker, to me that is outrageous, and to most of our colleagues 
in this body that is outrageous, and that is why this year, in our 
defense bills, we have plussed up missile defense accounts by about 
$900 million in the House. Hopefully, through the conference process, 
we will come somewhere in between what the Senate plussed up, about 
$600 or $700 million, and what we plussed up.
  We focused on four specific areas, Mr. Speaker. We focused on theater 
missile defense to give our troops protection when they are in a 
theater of operation against an incoming missile attack, like we saw in 
Desert Storm with the Scud. In the world today, 71 nations have cruise 
missiles, have the capability of attacking our soldiers and our allies. 
The only systems we have in 

[[Page H8160]]
place today are the upgrades of the Patriot, quickly becoming outmoded. 
We have funded theater missile defense to allow us to continue to 
develop and deploy the most sophisticated theater based systems that 
money can buy, and our funding does that in this year's defense bill.
  The second thing we did, Mr. Speaker, is we plussed up national 
missile defense spending. This will give us the eventual capability to 
protect the mainland of America against the kind of rogue launch that I 
talked about earlier. If a rogue nation were to get an SS-25 or an SS-
18, or if North Korea would sell off a version of the Taepo Dong II, 
that we would be able to protect our people in this country from a 
single launch. We would not be able to protect our country if a massive 
launch were to occur, but, by all practical standards, we do not think 
that will happen.
  No one can assure us, however, that a rogue nation will not get the 
capability of one, two, or three missiles, or, say, a battery of SS-
25's that could be threatened to be launched against an American city. 
Today we have no protection for that, Mr. Speaker. Not one iota of 
protection. Our plus-up in the national missile defense account allows 
for $400 million of increased funding that, even with this level of 
funding, will not allow us to deploy a program, in General O'Neill's 
estimation, until approximately 4 years. Four years of vulnerability.
  If the people of this country see what has been happening around the 
world with terrorism, and see what happens when rogue nations and 
people like Saddam Hussein get capabilities beyond their ability to 
manage, we then are threatened, and for 4 years, under the 
administration's plan, we will have no protection, Mr. Speaker.
  The third area that we plussed up funding was for a program called 
Brilliant Eyes. Brilliant Eyes is a space-based sensor program that 
will allow us to see a missile when it is launched. We do not have that 
capability today. If a rogue country launches a missile, and the 
ultimate destination is America, today we do not have a system in space 
that can tell us that launch has occurred. Why is that important? It is 
important because it gives us more time to take that missile out once 
it is launched, and to take it out on the rise as opposed to on the 
descent. We plus-up the Brilliant Eyes program to give us that 
technical capability.
  The fourth thing we do in both the authorization and the 
appropriation bills is we plus-up funding for ballistic missiles by 
about $75 million so that we can enhance our ability to protect our 
troops and our country against the very real threat of ballistic 
missiles that dominate the world today.
  I mentioned, Mr. Speaker, 77 countries today have cruise missile 
capability. Seventy-seven countries. Twenty nations can build and are 
building cruise missiles today. Granted, some are very crude, like the 
Scud system that we saw used by Iraq over in Desert Storm, but, Mr. 
Speaker, some of them are extremely sophisticated and present real 
challenges to us from a defensive posture.
  Mr. Speaker, all the more reason why we have to focus on the threat 
that is out there and what is happening in these rogue nations. We have 
to understand that when we make a decision as to how much money we are 
going to spend on defense or on missile
 defense or missile proliferation activities that it must be based on 
sound scientific evidence.

  Mr. Speaker, another article I want to submit for the Record is a 
recent publication appearing in the Brooking Review written by Bruce 
Blair entitled ``Lengthening the Fuse'', and, by the way, Mr. Blair has 
been a witness at hearings, primarily brought in by Democrats to 
testify on missile proliferation issues. This article is must reading 
for every member of this body, because Mr. Blair now makes the case 
that from the standpoint of operational safety, Russian's nuclear 
posture today is more dangerous than it was during the cold war.
  He goes through the scenario of the possibilities for nuclear 
anarchy, from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious commanders in 
the field, to political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear 
weaponry and material on the global black-market.
  Mr. Speaker, another article I will submit for publication in the 
Record today is an article within the Russian news media focusing on 
the problems of the control of the nuclear arsenal and the lack of 
adequate dollars to fund those military personnel who are monitoring 
on-site the Russian nuclear arsenal.
  In that article there is discussion about the fact that you can have 
all the safeguards you want from a technology standpoint, but if the 
men and women who are monitoring those systems are not being paid, if 
they do have the quality of life issues that are important to them, the 
technical considerations go out the window, and that is the kind of 
threat that we have to fully assess.
  Mr. Blair goes through that in great detail, and some of the quotes 
in here are the kinds of quotes that Members have to look at and 
understand, because they are critical to our posture in terms of 
defending our people in this country against what could happen in the 
former soviet Union. Let me quote just one piece from this article.
  ``The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the dangers 
emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central 
problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy in 
the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia.''
  He goes on to say, and I quote, ``The specter of a catastrophic 
failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger.''
  Mr. Speaker, this is not some radical right wing conservation bashing 
the former Soviet Union. This is a respected individual who has studied 
the issue of command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. In 
fact, he goes on to say in his article that the Pentagon itself has 
conducted exercises to practice United States responses to nuclear 
anarchy in Russian, including scenarios that feature illicit strategic 
sites by Russian commanders. Can you imagine that, Mr. Speaker?
  We now have evidence that our own Pentagon leaders have done practice 
sessions that, in fact, would have us assume that nuclear anarchy has 
broken out in Russia and that perhaps the American mainland is at 
threat. That is being done, Mr. Speaker, at a time where we have no 
capability to defend our mainland against a nuclear attack, either 
isolated or perhaps a multiweapon or multilaunched nuclear attack.
  Another quote from Mr. Blair. ``From the standpoint of operational 
safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today then it was 
during the Cold ``War.'' Again a quote. ``The Pentagon has so 
internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply 
cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat, the risk 
of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control, into clear 
focus and perspective.''
  Another quote. ``If safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear 
planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public 
support, not the Pentagon, put it there.''
  Mr. Speaker, Bruce Blair has hit the nail on the head. We are not 
doing an adequate job of monitoring what is happening and what could 
happen in the former Soviet republics. Some would argue all is well.
  Perhaps I will submit another article for the Record with unanimous 
consent again, Mr. Speaker, that talks about what has recently happened 
in Belarus. Belarus, Mr. Speaker, is one of those former Soviet 
republics that happens to have nuclear weapon capability. Just in July 
of this year less than 1 month ago, what did the President of Belarus 
say about his country's agreement to put all the SS-25's back into 
Russia? There are 18 remaining in Belarus. He said, and this article 
was printed on July 6, 1995, in Moscow's Izvestiya, in Russia, he said, 
and this is Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the President of Belarus, that he 
had made a decision to stop the movement of the
 SS-25's back to Russia; that he was going to leave the remaining 18 
SS-25's in Belarus. He stated the reasons, which are in the article, 
which I will put in the Record, are twofold: First of all, it harms the 
national prestige of Belarus to give up the remaining parts of their 
nuclear arsenal; and, second, one day Russia and Belarus will be united 
again.

  Now, Mr. Speaker, this is not me talking, this is the President of 

[[Page H8161]]
  Belarus. I asked our State Department if we had gotten any 
clarification to this statement made by President Lukashenka of 
Belarus. They told me verbally we had; that he had denied that 
statement was made, even though it was printed both in Izvestiya and as 
well as on Moscow TV. To this date, Mr. Speaker, I have not had any 
statement from the State Department to refute the statement from the 
State Department to refute the statement by Mr. Lukashenka in terms of 
not complying with the agreed terms that Russia, Belarus, the United 
States, and the other former Soviet republics entered into to return 
those SS-25's back to Russia for dismantlement.
  Mr. Speaker, the problem continues. My bottom line concern is that 
the intelligence community is not giving us the full scoop and the full 
picture. I do not say this lightly, Mr. Speaker; and, in fact, in 
September of this year, we will have a full hearing on the command and 
control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. However, Mr. Speaker, we are 
also going to have something else in that hearing. We are going to look 
at what has been the posture of our intelligence community in bringing 
to the Members of Congress and to the American public the threat that 
exists.
  Mr. Speaker, we in this body need to base our decisions on fact. I am 
not an alarmist. I am not here to demagogue this issue. I am not here 
to call the Russian people an evil empire, because they are not. As I 
started my comments tonight, I am one who has devoted a significant 
amount of my personal time to building relations inside of Russia. I 
will match my efforts in those categories with any Member of this body 
in the area of Russian joint energy ventures, environmental 
cooperation, defense cooperation, economic cooperation, and I will 
continue that as I did on the House floor when I sided with the ranking 
member of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. Obey and the chairman of 
that committee, Mr. Livingston, in fighting back an effort to decrease 
Russian aid because of the importance of stabilizing their economy.
  However, Mr. Speaker, We cannot allow anyone to dumb down our 
intelligence. We cannot allow anyone to pull the cloud over our eyes to 
the extent that we do not know really what is happening. That would be 
the worst travesty that could be brought on this body, to have any 
administration, or the intelligence community, dumb down information 
that is important for us as we determine how much money to spend on the 
defense of the people of this country.
  We should not, Mr. Speaker, ever have any intelligence body think 
that they have to answer politically to some broader agenda of the 
administration of supporting the current Russian leadership. I support 
Boris Yeltsin. I support whoever the Russian people decide to have as 
their elected President. However, Mr. Speaker, we should never allow 
our support for the elected President of that country to downplay our 
understanding of the real threats that are there. That is my concern, 
Mr. Speaker. It is a concern that I think every American and every 
Member of this body has to understand and appreciate.
  General O'Neill came in before our subcommittee earlier this year and 
he said, ``Congressman, I am not satisfied with our intelligence 
assessment of the threat coming from Russia and other countries around 
the world in terms of nuclear proliferation, so I went to the 
intelligence community and I asked them to give me a new assessment, 
and that assessment is going to be published by the middle of June.''
  Mr. Speaker, the middle of June came, and then the end of June came, 
July 1 came, the middle of July, and yesterday July ended, and now this 
is August 1.
                              {time}  2030

  Mr. Speaker, we still have not gotten the upgraded intelligence 
assessment that General O'Neill asked for so that we can logically base 
our threat needs on what is out there.
  Mr. Speaker, that is an outrage. The intelligence community has got 
to get its act together. They have got to give us the focus. They have 
got to give us the real facts, not sensationalized numbers, the real 
facts in terms of what is occurring. And they have got to give us real 
assessments about whether or not there is a potential for a nuclear 
anarchy, as Mr. Blair stated in his article.
  Mr. Speaker, these issues go to the very core of what our Federal 
Government is all about, because in the end the primary purpose of a 
Federal Government is to protect and defend the American people, to 
protect and defend the American people from what I think are the two 
biggest threats that we are going to face in the next century: 
Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially 
missiles and nuclear missiles.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the first in what will be a series of 
discussions that we have to have in this body, and they will be based 
on fact. They will be based on articles published in Russian news 
media, reported in reports that every Member of Congress can get access 
to, and reported by other foundations and groups that are out there 
every day giving us the summaries of what is being said and what is 
occurring throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics.
  It is extremely important, Mr. Speaker, as we approach our debate 
tomorrow, as we approach the conference process, the ultimate debate on 
the ABM Treaty, that we have good intelligence, that has not been 
filtered, has not been whitewashed, has not been dumbed down, so that 
we can make intelligent decisions that in the end will allow us to 
protect the American people, because that is what our job is all about, 
protecting the American people.
  I hope my concerns will be shared by my colleagues in this body, and 
by the general public, who has to understand that today we have no 
protection in these areas. That is a shortcoming we are going to try to 
address in this budget process, which will hit the House floor 
tomorrow.
  Mr. Speaker, I will put into the Record the items I highlighted 
during my comments.
                [From the Brookings Review, Summer 1995]

                          Lengthening the Fuse

                          (By Bruce G. Blair)

       During the Cold War a massive array of opposing Soviet and 
     U.S. nuclear forces stood ready for launch on a moment's 
     notice. In accord with the perceived needs of deterrence, 
     strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were scattered around 
     the globe, carried by a host of ground, sea, and airborne 
     delivery systems, and primed to inflict instant apocalyptic 
     devastation in retaliation against any nuclear aggressor.
       Today, the ideological tensions of the Cold War have 
     dissolved, the urgency of the need for deterrence has 
     diminished, and the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals are 
     smaller. Yet thousands of warheads on both sides remain on 
     hair-trigger alert. And, by a bitter irony, the geopolitical 
     revolution that defused the Cold War confrontation has posed 
     a chilling new nuclear danger--loss of control. In an 
     atmosphere of political turbulence and economic duress, 
     Russia must now oversee the far-flung nuclear weaponry of the 
     Soviet Union, much of it still ready for instant launch. The 
     possibilities for nuclear anarchy are many--from unauthorized 
     use of weapons by rebellious commanders in the field, to 
     political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear 
     weaponry and material onto the global black market.
       But dangerous as these scenarios are, an effective and 
     realistic solution exists: an international agreement to take 
     all nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert, remove warheads 
     or other vital components from the weapons delivery systems, 
     and institute monitoring arrangements to verify compliance. 
     Such an agreement would drastically reduce the risk of a 
     catastrophic failure of nuclear control. But it would also 
     require nuclear planners to back away from their traditional 
     focus on deterrence--and to make a commitment to safety 
     instead.


                       safety always came second

       The vast nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers 
     during the Cold War were a product, of course, of deep 
     political and ideological antagonisms. But they were also a 
     product of the adversaries' commitment to deterrence, their 
     faith that rational decisionmakers would refrain from 
     striking first if they knew an opponent could retaliate with 
     devastating effect. War was to be prevented by ensuring that 
     each of the opposing forces was capable of retaliation 
     destructive enough and credible enough to override any 
     potential gain from striking first. The two defense 
     establishments deployed forces capable of retaliating against 
     tens of thousands of enemy targets--and to do so in the 
     moments between enemy missile lift-off and arrival.
       In all this, deterrence came first. Safety came second. Not 
     that safety's importance was lost on the rival strategic
      organizations. After all, neither would likely have survived 
     the political repercussions of a major failure in safety. 
     Much of their mundane activity revolved around safety 
     during peacetime. They strove to prevent the accidental, 
     inadvertent, or unauthorized detonation of even a single 
     weapon. Nuclear weapons received 

[[Page H8162]]
     continuous scrutiny, augmented on occasion by high-level special 
     investigations, to identify safety hazards and remedies. 
     Both sides evolved sophisticated weapon design principles 
     and operational procedures to preserve effective control. 
     On the essential point--nuclear detonation--the record was 
     perfect. On lesser but still critical points--notably, 
     nuclear accidents resulting in the dispersal of toxic 
     plutonium--it was nearly perfect.
       That deterrence took precedence over safety is nonetheless 
     demonstrable. If safety had been a governing influence at the 
     planning level, the strategic deployments would not have been 
     so large, so dispersed, and so geared to rapid use. At the 
     design and daily operational level, too, trade-offs between 
     safety and deterrence were regularly resolved in favor of 
     deterrence. For example, locks to prevent low-level U.S. 
     weapons commanders from firing strategic forces were not 
     installed on heavy bombers until the early 1970s, on 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles until the late 1970s. And 
     they were installed only after a finding that they would not 
     impede the wartime retaliatory mission. They were never 
     installed on ballistic missile submarines because of fears 
     that they would jeopardize the ability of submarine crews to 
     carry out authorized launches. And although the missile 
     propellants used in Trident and M-X missiles, as well as the 
     conventional explosives used in Trident warheads, are 
     relatively susceptible to accidental detonation, safety 
     requirements were waived for the sake of wartime performance.


                         Changing Perspectives

       Despite history's abrupt change of course with the end of 
     the Cold War, the established practice of deterrence, with 
     all its inherent danger, remains unchanged. Despite the 
     rollback of the nuclear arsenals set in motion by the 
     Strategic Arms Reduction treaties, nuclear policy and force 
     deployment on both sides are still directed toward deterring 
     deliberate attack. The nuclear confrontation is thus being 
     sustained by a dubious rationale that sustains hair-trigger 
     postures that undercut safety.
       In key respects both the U.S. and Russian nuclear 
     portfolios are actually being enlarged. Russia, for example, 
     has dropped nuclear ``no-first-use'' policy from its new 
     military doctrine and expanded the role of nuclear forces to 
     compensate for the sharp decline in its conventional 
     strength. The United States also appears reluctant to lower 
     further its nuclear profile, despite the evaporation of the 
     primary threat justifying nuclear vigilance during the Cold 
     War: Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The United States now 
     projects conventional superiority over all prospective 
     adversaries and thus can rely more on conventional and less 
     on nuclear forces. Accordingly, further reciprocal nuclear 
     reductions would be beneficial. Yet the U.S. security 
     establishment seems content with the numbers allowed under 
     START II and shows little interest in another round of 
     reductions.
       Prompting that reluctance are fears that Russia may revert 
     to authoritarian rule and revive nuclear hostility toward the 
     West. Despite the grim outlook for the rejuvenation of 
     Russia's economy and the projected steep decline in its 
     defense spending for the next decade or more, uncertainty 
     about the Kremlin's attitudes toward the outside world has 
     assumed critical importance in U.S. estimations of the future 
     nuclear threat and in planning U.S. nuclear posture through 
     at least 2005. The Pentagon strongly supports the traditional 
     U.S. strategic mission as an insurance policy. As Defense 
     Secretary William Perry put it in the 1994 Defense Department 
     annual report, ``these Cold War tools of nuclear deterrence 
     remain necessary to hedge against a resurgent Russian 
     threat.''
       U.S. nuclear planners also envisage new missions tied 
     loosely to contingencies in the third world. Although the 
     Pentagon plans to use conventional weapons in dealing with 
     weapons of mass destruction brandished by third-world states, 
     U.S. nuclear forces will doubtless play a major retaliatory 
     and deterrent role. The U.S. Air Force is identifying targets 
     in third-world nations that are developing weapons of mass 
     destruction--chemical, biological, and nuclear. And the U.S. 
     Strategic Command has assumed major responsibility for 
     planning both nuclear and nonnuclear strikes against these 
     targets, whose numbers could easily reach many hundreds and 
     might approach a thousand. China will also figure more 
     prominently in the global strategic balance as it modernizes 
     its ballistic missile forces. Any significant increase in the 
     nuclear threat China projects at the United States may well 
     prompt a review of U.S. nuclear planning, particularly the 
     decision in the early 1980s to remove China from the U.S. 
     strategic war plan.
       Like the United States and Russia, other charter nuclear 
     states are also disposed to invoke deterrence to justify 
     aggressive alert operations. Britain and France seem 
     committed to maintain a large portion of their nuclear forces 
     on active alert, while China's extensive program of strategic
      modernization could bring its ballistic missile forces to a 
     comparable level of combat readiness. Other states such as 
     India, Pakistan, and Israel appear heading down the same 
     path. In spite of strenuous international efforts to deny 
     membership in the nuclear club, de facto and aspiring 
     members not only have nuclear weapons programs but also 
     surely have plans if not current capabilities for 
     ``weaponization''--mating nuclear warheads with dispersed 
     delivery vehicles capable of rapid use. Intentions and 
     technical progress are difficult to gauge, but the general 
     picture is clear enough and does not bode well.
       The proliferation of advanced aircraft and ballistic 
     missiles with increasing range and accuracy certainly expands 
     delivery options. In the name of deterrence, emerging nuclear 
     states can be expected to equip, or prepare to equip quickly, 
     these delivery systems with nuclear weapons from their 
     stockpile. And the decision by the United States, Russia, 
     Great Britain, and France to preserve rapid reaction postures 
     sets an international standard that encourages emulation. 
     Moreover, if the history of the nuclear superpowers is a 
     reliable guide, and the classical dilemmas of nuclear 
     security come to bear strongly on regional dynamics, regional 
     rivals will be induced to shorten the fuses on their 
     arsenals. Absent effective international constraints, the 
     standards for daily combat readiness seem destined to rise.


                             safety first?

       There can no longer be any justification for putting 
     operational safety second. Not only is deterring a deliberate 
     nuclear attack a less demanding challenge today than it was 
     during the Cold War; ensuring safety has become more 
     demanding. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and 
     the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of 
     control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the 
     specter of nuclear anarchy in the former Soviet Union 
     animates U.S. policy toward Russia and drives U.S. support 
     for the Yeltsin government and Russia's fledgling democratic 
     institutions. Nor are weaknesses in nuclear control confined 
     to the former Soviet Union. Lacking sophisticated systems for 
     safety managing their arsenals, the aspiring nuclear weapon 
     states also face problems of control. And while deliberate 
     nuclear aggression growing out of regional tensions in areas 
     like South Asia, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, and 
     other potential hot spots is conceivable, the specter of a 
     catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms 
     even larger.
       If safety is to become the paramount goal of nuclear 
     security policy, the operational stance of the world's 
     nuclear forces--in particular, their high combat readiness--
     will have to change. The major defense establishments must 
     lower their alert levels and coax the rest of the world to 
     follow suit.
       To de-alert the bomber forces, bomber payloads would be 
     moved to storage facilities far away from the bombers'
      home bases. The retrieval and uploading of the payloads 
     would require elaborate, time-consuming, and observable 
     procedures. Similarly, warheads (or other vital components 
     such as guidance sets) would be removed from land-based 
     missiles and put in storage--a standard Soviet practice 
     for all land-based strategic forces until the late 1960s. 
     Although warheads could also be removed from ballistic 
     missile submarines (SSBNs), an attractive alternative is 
     to take guidance sets off the sea-based missiles and place 
     them in storage on board attack submarines (SSNs) deployed 
     at sea. Under routine practices, the components would 
     remain separated at all times and invulnerable to attack. 
     If necessary during a nuclear crisis, the SSBNs and SSNs 
     could rendezvous and quickly transfer the guidance sets. 
     The SSBNs could then install the components on all 
     missiles in about 24 hours.
       We should strive to further lengthen the fuse on all 
     nuclear forces, extending the time needed to bring them to 
     launch-ready status to weeks, months, and ultimately years.
       Taking all nuclear weapons off alert--adopting a stance of 
     universal ``zero alert'' in which no weapons were poised for 
     immediate launch--would not only create a strict 
     international standard of safety for daily alert, but also 
     ease nuclear tensions by removing the threat of sudden 
     deliberate attack. Certainly, a surprise or short-notice 
     nuclear strike by any of the major nuclear powers is already 
     implausible. But because all of them except China can mount a 
     strike with ease, their strategic nuclear forces, 
     particularly those of the United States and Russia, maintain 
     a daily posture of rapid reaction to deter it. A remote, 
     hypothetical scenario thus induces alert operations that feed 
     on themselves. Although designed only to deter, the 
     operations confer the ability either to strike back in 
     retaliation or to initiate a sudden attack. The opposing 
     forces create and perpetuate the very threat they seek to 
     thwart.
       In fact, an internationally monitored agreement to remove 
     all nuclear weapons from active alert status could serve much 
     the same purpose as traditional deterrence. Any initial 
     preparations to restore alert status prior to attack would be 
     detected and disclosed by monitors, allowing for 
     counterbalancing responses, thereby denying a decisive 
     preemptive advantage to any side contemplating redeployment 
     and sneak attack.
       Zero alert would thus eliminate the technical pretext for 
     sustaining tense nuclear vigils in the post-Cold War era. 
     Besides improving safety, it would relax the nuclear
      stances, bringing them into harmony with improved political 
     relations.


                           overcoming inertia

       Left to themselves, the nuclear establishments will never 
     adopt a zero alert posture. The bureaucracies that created 
     the standard practices of deterrence cannot be expected to 
     put safety before deterrence.
       Typical arms negotiations, for example, have little scope 
     for reining in aggressive alert practices. Even with the low 
     ceilings on strategic nuclear arsenals imposed by 

[[Page H8163]]
     START II at the turn of the century, the nuclear superpowers could 
     still keep thousands of warheads poised for immediate 
     release. The nuclear control systems that regulate force 
     operations are still generally peripheral to mainstream arms 
     control. If arms control were to proceed as usual, the 
     numbers of weapons would continue to drop, but their reaction 
     time would not change. The last weapon in the arsenal would 
     still be cocked on hair-trigger alert.
       The U.S. defense establishment is aware of the danger of 
     nuclear anarchy. Recognizing the unstable and transitional 
     character of the Russian political center, the Pentagon has 
     quietly initiated extensive military-to-military contacts to 
     nurture durable cooperation between the U.S. and Russian 
     military establishments. It has also conducted exercises to 
     practice U.S. responses to nuclear anarchy in Russia, 
     including scenarios that feature illicit strategic strikes by 
     Russian commanders. Furthermore, U.S. strategic war planners 
     are devising options that allow selective nuclear strikes 
     against breakaway units of the Russian nuclear forces as a 
     last resort to neutralize such units. The Pentagon is also 
     spearheading an effort to assist Russia in dismantling its 
     nuclear arms, an endeavor it portrays as an urgent priority 
     of U.S. national security.
       Taken to its logical conclusion, this policy thrust would 
     lead the Pentagon to make bold operational changes, including 
     some form of zero alert, to ensure the safety of nuclear 
     weapons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Yet the 
     Pentagon's overriding commitment remains deterring Russian 
     nuclear aggression.
       The review of the U.S. nuclear posture completed last 
     September exemplifies the Pentagon's parochial perspective. 
     The review advocates aggressive hedging against a turn for 
     the worse in U.S.-Russian relations. It ignores the safety 
     hazards that persist or grow as a result of aggressive 
     hedging. It advances a U.S. nuclear force structure and 
     operational posture that will reinforce Russia's reliance on 
     quick launch. From the standpoint of operational safety, 
     Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today than it was 
     during the Cold War. And current U.S. nuclear planning will 
     likely induce Russia to take yet more operational risks to 
     buttress deterrence.
       The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence 
     of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different 
     conceptions of nuclear threat--the risk of deliberate attack 
     and the danger of loss of control--into clear focus and 
     perspective. At the height of the Cold War nuclear planners 
     could argue, with some justification, that the danger of 
     deliberate attack necessitated putting safety second. Today 
     they cannot.
       Redirecting nuclear policy toward an emphasis on safety not 
     only addresses the danger of nuclear anarchy but would also 
     constrain the ability of any state to launch a sudden nuclear 
     attack. But if safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear 
     planning, it will be because public discussion and broad 
     public support--not the Pentagon--put it there.
                       [Russia National Affairs]

                    Military, Nuclear & Space Issues


           Grachev Urges Yeltsin To Rectify Finance Problems

       [Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by 
     unidenitifed correspondent; place and date not given; from 
     the ``I Serve Russia'' progam--recorded]
       [FBIS Translated Text] [Grachev] In the first half of the 
     financial year the situation is such that for the month of 
     June we were, for the first time this year, unable to finance 
     the personnel of the Army and the Navy. We were able to meet 
     only forty percent of the allowance for servicemean and wages 
     for blue and white-collar workers.
       We were practically totally unable to finance the military 
     complex enterprises. Food, fuel, and lubricating materials 
     have been financed to a very small extent.
       The president, therefore, as they say, ought to enter the 
     battle now, and this active efforts we will try to rectify 
     this problem.
                                                                    ____



             army's food supply said on `brink of disaster'

       [FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, July 17 (INTERFAX)--The 
     food supply of the Russian armed forces is on the brink of 
     disaster, chairman of the State Duma, or lower house, defense 
     committee Sergev Yushenkov (Russia's Choice) told INTERFAX 
     Monday.
       By July, the Russian army had ``even used its emergency 
     stocks'' as the supply of food for both officers and solders 
     became a ``most grave issue.''
       The committee held a closed meeting Monday involving 
     representatives of the Defense and Finance Ministries ``To 
     start stocking up with potatoes and vegetables for the 
     winter, the army is asked to immediately pay over 500 billion 
     rubles in advance.'' Yushenkov said.
       According to Yushenkov, the Defense Ministry has used about 
     1.7 trillion rubles for the military operations in Chechnya, 
     making its budget very restricted.
       The committee will recommend the State Duma to ask the 
     government to find means to supply the army with food and 
     prepare a corresponding amendment to the 1995 federal budget.
              government approves funding for iter project

       [Russian Federation Government directive No. 924-r, signed 
     by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation 
     Government; dated Moscow, 1 July 1995--from the ``Document'' 
     section]
       [FBIS Translated Text] With a view to honoring the Russian 
     Federation's commitments arising from the quadripartite 
     Agreement on the Joint Development of an International 
     Thermonnuclear Experimental Reactor [ITER] of 21 July 1992:
       1. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy's proposal, 
     coordinated with the Russian Ministry of Finance, regarding 
     the allocation of $1.55 million for the funding of the ITER 
     project, including $0.95 million for the upkeep of Russian 
     specialists at international project development centers and 
     for Russian experts' short-term assignment abroad and $0.6 
     million for the payment of the Russian Federation's annual 
     membership of the Joint Project Fund, is hereby adopted.
       2. In 1996 the Russian Ministry of Finance is to allocate 
     to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy the federal budget 
     appropriations necessary to honor the Russian Federation's 
     commitments as mentioned in Point of this directive stemming 
     from membership of the ITER project.
       [Signed] V. Chernomydrin, chairman of the Russian 
     Federation Government
       [Dated] Moscow, 1 July 1995
                                                                    ____



             rs-18 icbm under conversion into space booster

                            (By Anna Bakina)

       [FBIS Transcibed Text] Moscow July 17 (ITAR-TASS)--The 
     Russian Khrunichev space enterprise is converting the 
     intercontinental ballistic RS-18 missile into a new space 
     booster which is to be launched from the Russian northern 
     Plesetsk cosmodrome and, possibly, from the missile base in 
     the Far East which is also to become a space launching site.
       The ``Rokot'' craft will use the boosters of the first and 
     second stages of RS-18. Tass was told Monday by a spokesman 
     of the Khrunichev enterprise.
       Besides, the ``Breeze'' booster has been devleoped which 
     will allow to increase the payload launched to medium orbits. 
     Its equipment is capable of ensuring high-precision placing 
     of spacecraft into orbit, the necessary orientation of the 
     payload and power supplies to it during a seven-hour long 
     space flight.
       The spokesman said the new booster is planned to blast off 
     from the Plesetsk cosmodrome and, possibly from silos at the 
     Svobodny missile base in the Far East which is to be 
     developed into a space launching site.
       So far three successful ``Rokot'' test launches have been 
     carried out from silos at the Baykonur cosmodrome in 
     Kazakhstan. The latest launch orbited a RADIO-ROSTO satellite 
     for radio amateurs.
       Foreign offers of a joint use of the new booster have 
     already been received. Thus, the German Daimler Benz 
     Aerospace company and the Khrunichev enterprise created a 
     joint venture to market the ``Rokot'' for launching 
     satellites of up to 1.8 tonnes of weight to low orbits. The 
     first commercial launches are expected from the Plesetsk 
     cosmodrome in the end of 1997.
                                                                    ____



     Federal Assembly--Postponement of Kozyrev Duma Speech Detailed

       [From the ``Diplomatic Panorama'' feature by diplomatic 
     correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy 
     Terekhov, and others]
       [FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, July 14 (INTERFAX)--The 
     State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, has put off 
     till autumn a report by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, 
     originally scheduled for Friday.
       Kozyrev, however, was ready to address the Duma on Friday, 
     Valentina Matviyenko, a senior Foreign Ministry official told 
     INTERFAX.
       On Wednesday Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin informed the house 
     that, at Duma's demand, Kozyrev has been invited to report on 
     his ministry's performance during the so-called ``government 
     hour'' at Friday's evening session of the house. On Thursday, 
     however, the majority of leaders of Duma factions proposed 
     deferring the report until the house reconvenes after the 
     summer recess.
       ``The minister officially confirmed his readiness to speak 
     at the scheduled time and made proper amendments to his 
     schedule,'' said Matviyenko, head of the ministry department 
     for contacts with the country's regions, parliament and 
     public organizations.
       Last week Kozyrev already spoke in the Federation Council, 
     the upper house, she said. ``Apparently the lower house 
     deputies are busy with more important matters and found no 
     time to hear a report by the head of the top foreign policy 
     body of Russia,'' Matviyenko said ironically.
       Another senior Foreign Ministry official said on Friday the 
     postponement was ``discourteous, to say the least.''
       Kozyrev is not only foreign minister but also deputy of the 
     Duma, where he represents the Murmansk Region, the official 
     stressed in an interview with INTERFAX.
       ``Before canceling their decision, the deputies should have 
     thought about the fact that a minister's schedule is very 
     tight and that he is busy every minute of his working day. 
     So, if there was an arrangement for Kozyrev to speak in the 
     State Duma on July 14, (the house) should have stuck to it, 
     if only out of respect for the extreme business of the head 
     of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
     Federation,'' the official said.

[[Page H8164]]

       Moreover, Kozyrev was ``carefully preparing'' for the 
     address. ``Apparently in the autumn he will again have to 
     look for spare time and make amendments to his report,'' he 
     said.
             duma deputies treat election news `positively'

       [Report by Petr Zhuravlev and Gleb Cherkasov under the 
     ``Start'' rubric: ``Duma Elections Set for 17 December. Lower 
     House Finishes Forming Election Laws'']
       [FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin has set 17 December as 
     the date for the election of deputies to the Sixth (Second) 
     State Duma of Russia. The signing of the corresponding edict 
     was reported yesterday by the Kremlin press service, which 
     had received the decision of the head of state, who is still 
     in the hospital.
       Many observers do not think there is anything surprising 
     about the date itself--all election organizers and future 
     rivals did set their beads at the first Sunday after 12 
     December. The surprising thing is that the edict should 
     appear in July rather than in August. As a matter of fact, 
     the election law says that the president is supposed to 
     announce the voting day ``not later'' than four months in 
     advance, meaning that it is not against the law that the 
     elections have been called five months in advance. At the 
     same time, this may spoil things for many parties and blocs, 
     something Vyacheslav Nikonov (PRES) [Party of Russian Unity 
     and Accord] cited yesterday.
                          east-central europe

       Belarus Stops Arms Reductions. Izvestiya on 6 July reported 
     that Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has announced 
     that Belarus will suspend the withdrawal of nuclear missiles 
     from Belarus to Russia. Lukashenka said the decision to 
     withdraw the weapons was a political mistake made by the 
     previous leadership. He also commented that it was 
     unnecessary since Belarus and Russia may soon unite. RFE/RL 
     reported Stanislau Shushkevich, former chairman of the 
     Supreme Soviet, as saying the decision was a disgrace to 
     Belarus's international image. Shushkevich was head of state 
     when Belarus agreed to give up its inherited nuclear arsenal 
     of 81 single-warhead mobile SS-25 Topol missiles. So far, 63 
     missiles have been withdrawn and the remaining 18 were to 
     have been removed to Russia this month. Izvestiya commented 
     that the decision to stop nuclear reductions was also 
     prompted by financial considerations.--Ustina Markus, OMRI, 
     Inc.
 Azerbaijan--Azerbaijan: Transit Point for Nuclear Materials Smuggling

       [Article by N. Medzhidova: ``Our Borders Are Transparent to 
     Nuclear Materials Transshipment: Azerbaijan Accused of Being 
     One of the Main Routes for Nuclear Materials Smuggling'']
       [FBIS Translated Text] The Russian media have reported that 
     the principal routes for transshipment of atomic bomb 
     materials from Russia and other countries pass through 
     Ukraine and Azerbaijan. In addition, the German Bundestag's 
     Security Commission has prepared a report based on 
     intelligence service data regarding the disappearance of 
     nuclear materials and their sale on the black market. 
     According to DER SPIEGEL, former military officers and KGB 
     agents and corrupt officers in Russia's Northern Fleet, where 
     nuclear submarines are fueled, are involved in the smuggling 
     of radioactive materials. They are the ones who have created 
     this ``caravan rout'' between West and East. The bomb-making 
     materials are transshipped from Russia to other countries 
     mainly through Ukraine and Azerbaijan, continuing on through 
     the Bosporus. All transshipment into Western Europe passes 
     through Turkey, says DER SPIEGEL. German experts report that 
     a ``specialized international mafia'' is taking shape, and 
     that it includes Russian radioactive materials dealers. Most 
     likely this international mafia will find its place in a 
     black market where the buyers are Third World countries.
       We asked Fikret Aslanov, head of the Radiation Medicine 
     Department of the Azerbaijani Republic Center of Hygiene and 
     Epidemiology, a leading specialist on radiation safety and 
     candidate of medical sciences, to comment on this report.
       ``Unless steps are taken to tighten control over 
     radioactive materials, our republic could well be accused of 
     facilitating international terrorism and dealings in and 
     smuggling of these particularly dangerous substances. As a 
     rule, it is impunity that leads to the kind of violations 
     your newspaper has described.''
       One year ago in an article entitled ``Azerbaijan at Risk of 
     Becoming a Radioactive Dump'' we wrote about the illegal 
     importation of radioactive sources into the Azerbaijani 
     Republic, and in particular about the fact that in December 
     1993 a plane owned by U.S. owned Buffalo Airways delivered a 
     radioactive cargo from Amsterdam to Baku's Bina Airport in a 
     container weighing 763 kilograms. The container was shipped 
     by the French company Schlumberger under a contract with the 
     Azerbaijani Republic State Oil Company.
       The contract indicated that the customer and the executor 
     held each blameless in the event of any consequences. It was 
     unclear who was supposed to be liable in the event of a 
     radiation accident and pollution resulting from it, something 
     that would take a great deal of manpower and money to clean 
     up,'' said Fikret Aslanov.
       The airport's customs service did not note the fact that a 
     radioactive cargo had arrived, and customers agents, lacking 
     dosimeters, merely looked over the shipping documents that 
     arrived with cargo.
       A similar incident occurred in February 1994. Three boxes 
     weighing a total of 196 kilograms arrived at Bina Airport on 
     a charter flight from the United States, addressed to a 
     company called Ponder International Servis [sic]. According 
     to the bill of lading, the boxes contained radioactive 
     materials. No permit had been received to transship or import 
     these radiation sources. Furthermore, there was no document 
     indicating that the freight was insure in the vent of an 
     accident or other unforeseen occurrence.
       The illegality of both cases rests on the fact that 
     importation of radiation sources into the republic was 
     carried out without the knowledge of the republic's Ministry 
     of Health and Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversee 
     imports, exports, storage, use, transportation and disposal 
     of radioactive substances in accordance with ``Radiation 
     Safety Standards,'' ``Fundamental Sanitary Regulations'' and 
     the Azerbaijani Republic law ``On Sanitary and 
     Epidemiological Health.''
       Another recent incident also escaped the attention of those 
     agencies: a citizen of Azerbaijan was arrested by the Turkish 
     security service attempting to sell 750 grams of enriched 
     uranium. Our republic does not have any facility that would 
     use that kind of nuclear material. Therefore it is clear that 
     it was brought into Azerbaijan from somewhere else, passing 
     through all border controls, then was transferred to 
     Nakhichevan and subsequently carried to Turkey.
       There is no guarantee that similar incidents will not occur 
     over and over again. Currently the customs service does not 
     have any dosimetric instruments, and customs agents are not 
     informed about radioactively hazardous shipments. All these 
     things make our borders transparent not only for radiation 
     sources and wastes, but also, so it seems, for nuclear 
     materials.
       There is another interesting fact: according to information 
     from the Russian media, the removal of nuclear waste from the 
     Armenian Nuclear Power Plant and its resupply with nuclear 
     fuel is the responsibility of the Russian Atomic Energy 
     Agency. The question arises: by what routes are the necessary 
     equipment and other nuclear materials being delivered to 
     Armenia? This cannot be done by air for technical reasons. It 
     would have been impossible to deliver these materials by rail 
     through Georgia, because deliveries coincided exactly with 
     the height of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. That leaves 
     only one direct route: through Azerbaijan.
       Judging by all this, continued F. Aslanov, the 
     transshipment of nuclear materials and fuels was carried out 
     through Azerbaijani territory. The specially marked trains 
     traveled through under ``green light'' status, without 
     inspection. Even if Azerbaijan's government does not permit 
     Russia to transport this freight after the reopening of rail 
     connections, our republic is still not protected from this 
     radiation hazard: Russia's government, under the guise of 
     supplying military freight to the Russian separatist forces 
     deployed in Georgia (taking part in the Georgian-Abkhazian 
     conflict) and in order to equip six military bases in 
     Georgian territory (under the terms of a mutual agreement 
     with Russia) may transport nuclear fuel, radioactive 
     materials and wastes into Armenia in specially marked trains 
     sealed as ``particularly hazardous freight.'' (According to 
     preliminary estimates, the operations of the Armenian Nuclear 
     Power Plant will create approximately 14 metric tons of 
     radioactive waste annually. And Armenia is not capable of 
     disposing of that waste within its own territory).
       According to F. Aslanov it is therefore essential to 
     install automated radiation monitoring instruments at all 
     border crossings as quickly as possible. This is the only 
     solution to this situation. These installations will make it 
     possible to inspect even special trains without opening them. 
     The cost of each such instrument is $3,000-3,500--less than 
     the price of the foreign-manufactured automobiles that crowd 
     the streets of Baku. Our republic needs at least six of these 
     installations to ensure the public's safety from radiation 
     and prevent Azerbaijan from becoming a radioactive waste 
     dump.
       It is quickly becoming obvious that if emergency measures 
     are not taken we could find ourselves facing a variety of 
     consequences all at once: accidents like Chernobyl, and an 
     image as a country that facilitates international nuclear 
     terrorism.
            start ii hearings: `Paradoxical situation' seen

       [Report by Gennadiy Obolenskiy: ``Pentagon May State Its 
     All'']
       [FBIS Translated Text] The discussion of questions 
     connected with the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic 
     Offensive Arms II [START II] in continuing in U.S. 
     Congressional committees. In this connection, it would not be 
     out of place to recall that the limitations and reductions of 
     strategic offensive weapons envisaged in it, partially 
     already implemented, have only became possible under 
     conditions of the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty of 
     unlimited duration.
       This reminder is appropriate in connection with the 
     paradoxical nature of the situation that has taken shape 
     during the hearings. On the one hand, representatives of the 
     Pentagon and the administration as a whole are expressing a 
     clear desire for a real limitation of strategic offensive 
     weapons (of course, primarily Russian ones). And on the other 
     hand 

[[Page H8165]]
     they want to evade observing the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty 
     through agreeing with Russia the kind of parameters of so-
     called non-strategic anti-missile defense (or theater ABM) 
     which would make this system entirely capable of setting 
     strategic tasks too.
       The idea of conducting talks on demarcating strategic and 
     non-strategic ABM defense and agreeing on the specifications 
     of the latter in the form of a separate accord was proposed 
     to us by the Americans. Even the specific time schedules for 
     conducting them were outlined. Reports have appeared to the 
     effect that within the Pentagon's apparatus the accelerated 
     preparation of a draft of such an agreement has begun. But 
     the Americans themselves unexpectedly refused to continue the 
     talks. Why?
       Undoubtedly the emergence of a republican majority in the 
     U.S. Congress plays a fairly major role here. The Congressmen 
     have obviously decided not to be hasty as regards expanding 
     cooperation with Russia and will try to wring new concessions 
     from it. And in this connection, [they have decided] not to 
     be in any hurry with getting up the ABM accord proposed by 
     Washington shortly beforehand.
       But there is also another side to this matter. The 
     Americans' proposals on ABM defense have proved to be in 
     direct contradiction to the limitations on strategic 
     offensive arms envisaged by the START-II Treaty, and may 
     hinder its ratification. And after all, it is extremely 
     advantageous for the United States, and Washington is very 
     interested in its implementation. That is why it should be 
     expected that following the conclusion of the ratification 
     process, the Americans proceed to additional steps to ``push 
     through'' ideas in the sphere of anti-missile defense that 
     will in fact lead to the collapse of the ABM Treaty.
       Discussions can also be heard among independent American 
     experts to the effect that once it has achieved significant 
     reductions of Russian strategic offensive weapons, the 
     Pentagon will stake its all, and, using its own homespun 
     interpretations of the provisions of the ABM Treaty, will de 
     facto stop taking it into account. Particularly since in the 
     Pentagon's understanding, the ABM Treaty will not restrict 
     the theater ABM. Admittedly, at the same time, the fact that 
     this is a question of mobile ground-, sea-, and air-based ABM 
     systems, which are banned by this treaty, is being 
     deliberately kept quiet.
       And I would like to stress the following here. Until the 
     sides agree where the distinction between authorized and 
     banned activity lies in respect of such ABM systems, there 
     are no grounds for stating unilaterally that the creation of 
     a particular ABM theater of military operations systems 
     corresponds to the treaty and does not undermine it. 
     Otherwise, the entire process of arms control might as well 
     be scrapped.
       Although the rumors about a ``Russian nuclear mafia'' are 
     somewhat exaggerated, according to Mikhail Kulik, Northern 
     Fleet military prosecutor's office investigator for special 
     cases, cited by the paper CHAS PIK, there are criminal 
     groupings in the Northwest region that are busy trying to get 
     into depots containing nuclear materials.
       The conference in St. Petersburg was attended by atomic 
     energy specialists from Russia, the CIS countries, and 
     Lithuania, senior officials from the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency European Commission, representatives of the 
     European Fuel Cycle Consortium, and nuclear experts. It was 
     noted that the EU spent $400 million in 1991-1994 on 
     improving the system of safeguarding nuclear safety in the 
     countries on the territory of the former USSR. This involves 
     training specialists at Obninsk and developing a robot 
     capable of performing radioactivity measures, which is being 
     designed at the Radium Institute in St. Petersburg. It was 
     stressed that the EU is interested in importing nuclear 
     materials from Russia on the basis of proper agreements, 
     provided that effective international nonproliferation 
     guarantees are found.
                                                                    ____



          intelligence service on security of nuclear material

       [FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Russian Foreign Intelligence 
     Service [FIS] is not aware of a single case of weapons-grade 
     nuclear materials being smuggled out of Russia. This was 
     stated by the press secretary of the FIS director to the Ekho 
     Moskvy radio station.
       To recall, STERN magazine alleges that Viktor Sidorenko, 
     Russian deputy defense minister for nuclear energy, was 
     involved in the 1994 scandal when 239 grams of weapons-grade 
     plutonium was brought to Munich.
       ``There may be some minor theft from Russian civilian 
     nuclear installations, but the military nuclear network so 
     far appears to be sealed,'' Tatyana Samolis said.
       ``Only an expert analysis can reveal when the radioactive 
     materials were manufactured and where they come from. These 
     analyses have proved that there has been no smuggling of 
     weapons-grade nuclear materials from Russian territory,'' she 
     added. [passage omitted--reiteration of allegations that the 
     Munich plutonium was of European origin]
            Nuclear Safeguards Still Not `As We Would Like'

       [Report by Yuriy Kukanov: ``Rumors About a `Russian Nuclear 
     Mafia' Are Highly Exaggerated'']
       St. Petersburg.--Talk about the danger of nuclear terrorism 
     has clearly alluded to a ``Russian fingerprint'' in the 
     international smuggling of radioactive materials. Asked by 
     your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent to comment on reports 
     about German special services' involvement in an incident at 
     Munich airport in which a container of plutonium 239 from 
     Moscow was detained late August, Rolf Linkohr, president of 
     the European Energy Foundation and member of the European 
     Parliament, replied that he knew nothing about it. If it had 
     occurred, he said, there would have been a government crisis 
     in Germany.
       Anyway, he said, it is immaterial where nuclear materials 
     are being stolen--in the East or in the West. This view was 
     supported by his foreign colleagues attending the first 
     international meeting on cooperation between the European 
     Union, the CIS, and the Baltic countries in the sphere of 
     control over the use of nuclear materials, held in St. 
     Petersburg in mid-April. The main thing, they stressed, is to 
     combat this evil, create reliable national systems for 
     recording nuclear materials, and strengthen the rules 
     controlling their nonproliferation on the territory of the 
     CIS and the Baltic countries. The EU countries were not 
     mentioned.
       We must combat it, of course. But it is not very clear how, 
     if we do not know where the thefts are taking place. Lev 
     Ryabev, Russian first deputy minister of atomic energy, 
     flatly denied the story of a ``Russian fingerprint'' on 
     nuclear contraband. There are rigorous standards which enable 
     us to tell who fissile materials belong to. The data on the 
     isotope structures and composition of the permissible 
     impurities of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
     seized in West Europe unequivocally demonstrate their non-
     Russian origin.
       But in the Russian nuclear house, too, all is not as well 
     as we would like. The Atomic Energy Ministry representative 
     cited earlier had to admit that there have been 18 thefts of 
     nuclear materials in the past 18 months.
       He was referring to the ``Luch'' enterprise near Moscow and 
     a Moscow scientific research institution where several 
     hundred grams of highly enriched uranium materials were 
     stolen. Otherwise we are dealing with natural, depleted 
     uranium with a low, 235 isotope content, which poses no real 
     danger. In none of these cases has stolen material crossed 
     the state border. But it is worth pointing out that in the 
     50-year existence of the Soviet nuclear industry there have 
     been no incidents of that kind.
       It is difficult to block for certain all escape routes. The 
     country's checkpoints do not appear to be equipped with the 
     proper apparatus to enable them to detect and prevent 
     unauthorized exports of uranium and plutonium. Storage of 
     nuclear materials at Army depots is a worry. Three officers 
     are currently being tried in Severomorsk, accused of stealing 
     three fuel assemblies for submarine nuclear reactors 
     containing 4.5 kg of uranium. This is not the first time it 
     has happened in the Northern Fleet. But nuclear fuel for 
     submarines is still stored at depots like potatoes: The 
     criminals only had to contend with a standard barn-door lock.
        strategic missile troops said in financial difficulties

       [From the ``Vremya'' newscast]
       [FBIS Translated Text] Military experts have never doubted 
     that the design of Russian missile silos would enable them to 
     withstand any movement of the earth's crust. After all, these 
     silos are designed to withstand a nuclear attack by a 
     possible enemy. However, some experts point out that by the 
     year 2003, when the period of storage of Russian missile 
     rocket complexes which are kept in a combat-ready condition 
     comes to an end, the facilities where they are kept in 
     suspension will be rather dilapidated.
       However, the high command of the Russian strategic missile 
     troops, which is responsible for all land silos and mobile 
     missiles, says there is no concern about the technical 
     condition of the nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it also says 
     that insufficient funding for new developments in the nuclear 
     sector may lead to the complete nuclear disarmament of Russia 
     as early as 2005, when SS-33 [as heard] type missiles will 
     have outlived their potential.
       Today, the missile troops, who are constantly monitoring 
     the nuclear safety of Russia, live in accordance with the 
     favorite expression of their commander in chief: anyone can 
     be on combat alert when there is money, but try to do so 
     without it.
       Although the largest units of the Russian nuclear triad, 
     the strategic missile troops, are supposed to use only eight 
     percent of the Russian military budget, they say that they do 
     not see even a small part of this money.
       Yuriy Kononov, commander of the largest missile division in 
     Europe and based near Saratov, says the danger lies not in 
     earthquakes, but in the lack of money for the smallest part 
     of the Russian Armed Forces. The administrative 
     infrastructure is in disarray and there is a permanent danger 
     of electricity power cuts at command points. It seems that 
     Russia's nuclear safety does not depend on the design of 
     missile silos after all. [Video shows missile silos which 
     Russian strategic missile troops have for nuclear warheads; 
     facility in an unidentified location, servicemen and women 
     monitoring equipment, warheads being transported; Yuriy 
     Kononov, identified as commander of a missile division 
     stationed near Saratov, also shown]
     

                          ____________________