[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 126 (Tuesday, August 1, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8076-H8109]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


              BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, 
I call up House Resolution 204 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 204

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
     XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo 
     applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
     first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General 
     debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed 
     three hours equally divided and controlled 

[[Page H8077]]
     by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
     International Relations. After general debate the bill shall 
     be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The 
     bill shall be considered as read. No amendment shall be in 
     order except an amendment in the nature of a substitute 
     offered by the Minority Leader or his designee. That 
     amendment shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for 
     one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and 
     an opponent, and shall not be subject to amendment. At the 
     conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
     Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with 
     such amendment as may have been adopted. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and any 
     amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion 
     except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. 
     The motion to recommit may include instructions only if 
     offered by the minority leader or his designee.

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Beilenson], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for 
purposes of debate only.
  (Mr. DIAZ-BALART asked and was given permission to include extraneous 
material in the Record.)
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 204 is a structured 
rule providing for the consideration of S. 21, a bill to terminate the 
U.S. arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Self-Defense Act of 1995. In addition to the 1 hour for debate on this 
rule, the rule provides for 3 hours of general debate, equally divided 
and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
Committee on International Relations. It also makes in order an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, if offered, by the minority 
leader or his designee, which would be debatable for 1 hour, equally 
divided between the proponent and an opponent.
                              {time}  1020

  If the minority chooses not to offer a substitute, the additional 
hour allocated for a substitute may be added to the general debate time 
by mutual agreement.
  House Resolution 204 also provides, Mr. Speaker, for one motion to 
recommit which, if including instructions, may only be offered by the 
minority leader or a designee.
  I believe that the time allocated for the discussion of S. 21 is 
sufficient and it was arrived at in a fair and judicious manner. The 
Committee on Rules originally considered providing 1 hour on the rule, 
2 hours for general debate, and 1 hour on a substitute, but at my 
suggestion, and I would like to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Solomon], the chairman, and all of the distinguished members of the 
Committee on Rules for their gracious consideration, the committee 
increased the general debate time by an additional hour to provide for 
further discussion of this critical issue.
  Mr. Speaker, the House has already spoken on the issue of lifting the 
arms embargo during consideration of H.R. 1561, the Overseas Investment 
Act. On June 8 of this year, the House voted overwhelmingly, 318 to 99 
in favor of an amendment to require the President to unilaterally lift 
the arms embargo against Bosnia upon receiving a request for assistance 
from that government.
  Mr. Speaker, the issue can wait no longer. That is why we need to act 
this week on an amendable bill that has already passed the Senate so 
that it can go straight to the President without the need for a 
conference. At this time I would like to thank the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations, as well as the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Smith], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], and other colleagues 
who have worked tirelessly to bring an end to what I believe is the 
ethically unjustifiable arms embargo on Bosnia.
  Mr. Speaker, the arms embargo on Bosnia, as the Speaker knows, was 
morally questionable from the very beginning and I believe that legally 
it was questionable from the very beginning as well.
  It was the Yugoslav regime, the regime in Belgrade, over 3 years ago 
when that country was already in an obvious process of disintegration 
that asked the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on what 
at that time was Yugoslavia. What happened consequently was that months 
afterward, when Yugoslavia broke up and the independent states of the 
former Yugoslavia achieved independence, and in fact Bosnia was 
recognized as a member nation of the United Nations, the arms embargo 
that had been applied to Yugoslavia was consequently applied to the 
independent states of the former Yugoslavia.
  Now, the objective of the aggressors in Belgrade, I believe, Mr. 
Speaker, was clear from the beginning. Inheriting the great 
overwhelming majority of the resources, of the equipment of the former 
army of Yugoslavia, the armed forces of Yugoslavia and having in mind 
the goal of the so-called greater Serbia, a Serbian empire, Mr. 
Speaker, which would include great portions of what is now the 
independent and sovereign and recognized by the international community 
state of Bosnia, the goal was, in effect, to have a situation imposed 
by the international community where the hands of the new State of 
Bosnia would be tied, where they would be in effect not capable of 
arming themselves against overwhelming superiority by the aggressor, by 
the army controlled by Belgrade, by the resources that came from the 
former Communist Yugoslavia.
  So what we have seen is really a very profound injustice, Mr. 
Speaker, that has been perpetrated upon a new, sovereign, independent 
nation that is recognized by the international community, that is a 
member of the United Nations, and yet, in violation and contravention 
directly of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it has not been allowed 
that most fundamental of the rights of any state, which is the right of 
self-defense.
  Mr. Speaker, NATO and the United Nations have failed completely to 
enforce the Security Council resolutions which authorized the use of 
force to defend the so-called safe havens and to get humanitarian 
assistance through to the people who need it in Bosnia. As Margaret 
Thatcher stated in a letter just last week to Senator Dole, the 
proponent of this very important measure in the Senate, ``The safe 
havens,'' Margaret Thatcher wrote, ``were never safe. Now they are 
actually falling to Serb assault. Murder, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, 
and torture are the legacy of the policy of the last 3 years to the 
people of Bosnia. It has failed utterly.''
  Mr. Speaker, we owe it to the victims, we owe it to the victims of 
Serb aggression at the very least to
 have them obtain at least the possibility of arming themselves, to 
defend themselves against what is without any doubt one of the most 
brutal forms of aggression that the Western World has witnessed since 
the Holocaust. If the international community is not willing to defend 
the Bosnian people, at the very least we should not prohibit them from 
defending themselves. That is the essence of the argument, of the 
extremely important argument, that the Congress will be debating today.

  Despite the fact that we have so many important measures that we have 
to discuss and debate and vote upon this week, despite the fact that 
this is probably the busiest week since we have been in Congress since 
January, we are setting aside 5 hours today to debate this issue which 
very possibly, Mr. Speaker, may be the most critical issue that Members 
of this body will have an opportunity to vote on during this session of 
Congress.
  If I may very briefly address three arguments that are used pretty 
consistently against the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.
  We will hear the argument, Mr. Speaker, that by lifting the arms 
embargo, we would be abandoning, in effect, the people of Bosnia 
because the United Nations and NATO have said that they oppose the 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States. I think 
the key there is to ask the elected Government of Bosnia what they 
think. Ask the elected Government of Bosnia, the democratic Government 
of Bosnia if they think that by the United States unilaterally lifting 
the arms embargo, they would feel abandoned, or whether they feel 
abandoned today, when the U.N. Protections Forces are there either as 
spectators or as hostages, Mr. Speaker. What kind of protection is a 
force that is actually taken hostage by the thugs 

[[Page H8078]]
and the aggressors from Belgrade and their allies within the Bosnian 
state?
  A second argument that we hear often is that we will be fragmenting, 
that we will be hurting the unity of NATO and of the U.N. Protection 
Force. I think the key there, Mr. Speaker, is the question that 
follows: How can you pursue peacekeeping, which is what specifically 
and officially the mission of the United Nations in Bosnia is, 
peacekeeping, how can you pursue peacekeeping when there is no peace? I 
think the answer to that question is self-evident. The mission of NATO 
is not possible as it is conceived, there is no peacekeeping and even 
the safe havens that were offered to the Bosnian people, here are six 
safe havens, give up your heavy arms and you will be safe even though 
safe havens now are being attacked by the Serbs and two of them have 
already fallen, Mr. Speaker. The policy of the United Nations and of 
NATO in effect, the promise to the people of Bosnia, has been but a 
farce and it is time that we admit it today.
  Third, the argument is, if we let the Bosnians arm themselves, that 
will prolong the war. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that it is inherently 
immoral to say that. That contemplates that the war will inevitably be 
won by the aggressors, that the Serbs will soon overrun all of Bosnia, 
kill all of the refugees and destroy all the targets that they are 
seeking to destroy beforehand, and that by letting the Bosnians arm 
themselves, we will be prolonging the war. That argument, I maintain, 
is inherently immoral.
  So I go back to the essential. What is the Government of Bosnia 
asking the United States to do? The Government of Bosnia is asking us 
to pass this bill today and when we pass this bill today, there will be 
no need for conference, it will go straight to the President and it 
will, I think, strengthen his hand when he deals with the Europeans 
that have imposed the policy of appeasement, have imposed the policy 
that makes Neville Chamberlain look like Rambo, Mr. Speaker, upon the 
disarmed and defenseless people of Bosnia.
  I submit that this is an extraordinarily important vote that we are 
going to take today. This is a fair rule, and I would ask that all of 
the Members not only realize the importance of the vote today but 
favorably consider and vote for the resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that House Resolution 204 is a correctly and 
fairly structured rule to provide for the thorough consideration of S. 
21, and I would urge its adoption.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the following data from the Committee on Rules 
for inclusion at this point in the Record:

  THE AMENDMENT PROCESS UNDER SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE,\1\ 103D CONGRESS V. 104TH CONGRESS 
                                              [As of July 31, 1995]                                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  103d Congress                        104th Congress           
              Rule type              ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Number of rules    Percent of total   Number of rules    Percent of total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open/Modified-open\2\...............                 46                 44                 40                 73
Modified Closed\3\..................                 49                 47                 13                 23
Closed\4\...........................                  9                  9                  2                  4
                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals:.......................                104                100                 55                100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\This table applies only to rules which provide for the original consideration of bills, joint resolutions or 
  budget resolutions and which provide for an amendment process. It does not apply to special rules which only  
  waive points of order against appropriations bills which are already privileged and are considered under an   
  open amendment process under House rules.                                                                     
\2\An open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule. A       
  modified open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule     
  subject only to an overall time limit on the amendment process and/or a requirement that the amendment be     
  preprinted in the Congressional Record.                                                                       
\3\A modified closed rule is one under which the Rules Committee limits the amendments that may be offered only 
  to those amendments designated in the special rule or the Rules Committee report to accompany it, or which    
  preclude amendments to a particular portion of a bill, even though the rest of the bill may be completely open
  to amendment.                                                                                                 
\4\A closed rule is one under which no amendments may be offered (other than amendments recommended by the      
  committee in reporting the bill).                                                                             


                          SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE, 104TH CONGRESS                         
                                              [As of July 31, 1995]                                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  H. Res. No. (Date                                                                                             
       rept.)               Rule type             Bill No.                 Subject           Disposition of rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Res. 38 (1/18/95)  O...................  H.R. 5..............  Unfunded Mandate Reform..  A: 350-71 (1/19/   
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 44 (1/24/95)  MC..................  H. Con. Res. 17.....  Social Security..........  A: 255-172 (1/25/  
                                            H.J. Res. 1.........  Balanced Budget Amdt.....   95).              
H. Res. 51 (1/31/95)  O...................  H.R. 101............  Land Transfer, Taos        A: voice vote (2/1/
                                                                   Pueblo Indians.            95).              
H. Res. 52 (1/31/95)  O...................  H.R. 400............  Land Exchange, Arctic      A: voice vote (2/1/
                                                                   Nat'l. Park and Preserve.  95).              
H. Res. 53 (1/31/95)  O...................  H.R. 440............  Land Conveyance, Butte     A: voice vote (2/1/
                                                                   County, Calif.             95).              
H. Res. 55 (2/1/95).  O...................  H.R. 2..............  Line Item Veto...........  A: voice vote (2/2/
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 60 (2/6/95).  O...................  H.R. 665............  Victim Restitution.......  A: voice vote (2/7/
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 61 (2/6/95).  O...................  H.R. 666............  Exclusionary Rule Reform.  A: voice vote (2/7/
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 63 (2/8/95).  MO..................  H.R. 667............  Violent Criminal           A: voice vote (2/9/
                                                                   Incarceration.             95).              
H. Res. 69 (2/9/95).  O...................  H.R. 668............  Criminal Alien             A: voice vote (2/10/
                                                                   Deportation.               95).              
H. Res. 79 (2/10/95)  MO..................  H.R. 728............  Law Enforcement Block      A: voice vote (2/13/
                                                                   Grants.                    95).              
H. Res. 83 (2/13/95)  MO..................  H.R. 7..............  National Security          PQ: 229-100; A: 227-
                                                                   Revitalization.            127 (2/15/95).    
H. Res. 88 (2/16/95)  MC..................  H.R. 831............  Health Insurance           PQ: 230-191; A: 229-
                                                                   Deductibility.             188 (2/21/95).    
H. Res. 91 (2/21/95)  O...................  H.R. 830............  Paperwork Reduction Act..  A: voice vote (2/22/
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 92 (2/21/95)  MC..................  H.R. 889............  Defense Supplemental.....  A: 282-144 (2/22/  
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 93 (2/22/95)  MO..................  H.R. 450............  Regulatory Transition Act  A: 252-175 (2/23/  
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 96 (2/24/95)  MO..................  H.R. 1022...........  Risk Assessment..........  A: 253-165 (2/27/  
                                                                                              95).              
H. Res. 100 (2/27/    O...................  H.R. 926............  Regulatory Reform and      A: voice vote (2/28/
 95).                                                              Relief Act.                95).              
H. Res. 101 (2/28/    MO..................  H.R. 925............  Private Property           A: 271-151 (3/2/95)
 95).                                                              Protection Act.                              
H. Res. 103 (3/3/95)  MO..................  H.R. 1058...........  Securities Litigation      ...................
                                                                   Reform.                                      
H. Res. 104 (3/3/95)  MO..................  H.R. 988............  Attorney Accountability    A: voice vote (3/6/
                                                                   Act.                       95)               
H. Res. 105 (3/6/95)  MO..................  ....................  .........................  A: 257-155 (3/7/95)
H. Res. 108 (3/7/95)  Debate..............  H.R. 956............  Product Liability Reform.  A: voice vote (3/8/
                                                                                              95)               
H. Res. 109 (3/8/95)  MC..................  ....................  .........................  PQ: 234-191 A: 247-
                                                                                              181 (3/9/95)      
H. Res. 115 (3/14/    MO..................  H.R. 1159...........  Making Emergency Supp.     A: 242-190 (3/15/  
 95).                                                              Approps..                  95)               
H. Res. 116 (3/15/    MC..................  H.J. Res. 73........  Term Limits Const. Amdt..  A: voice vote (3/28/
 95).                                                                                         95)               
H. Res. 117 (3/16/    Debate..............  H.R. 4..............  Personal Responsibility    A: voice vote (3/21/
 95).                                                              Act of 1995.               95)               
H. Res. 119 (3/21/    MC..................  ....................  .........................  A: 217-211 (3/22/  
 95).                                                                                         95)               
H. Res. 125 (4/3/95)  O...................  H.R. 1271...........  Family Privacy Protection  A: 423-1 (4/4/95)  
                                                                   Act.                                         
H. Res. 126 (4/3/95)  O...................  H.R. 660............  Older Persons Housing Act  A: voice vote (4/6/
                                                                                              95)               
H. Res. 128 (4/4/95)  MC..................  H.R. 1215...........  Contract With America Tax  A: 228-204 (4/5/95)
                                                                   Relief Act of 1995.                          
H. Res. 130 (4/5/95)  MC..................  H.R. 483............  Medicare Select Expansion   A: 253-172 (4/6/  
                                                                                              95)               
H. Res. 136 (5/1/95)  O...................  H.R. 655............  Hydrogen Future Act of     A: voice vote (5/2/
                                                                   1995.                      95)               
H. Res. 139 (5/3/95)  O...................  H.R. 1361...........  Coast Guard Auth. FY 1996  A: voice vote (5/9/
                                                                                              95)               
H. Res. 140 (5/9/95)  O...................  H.R. 961............  Clean Water Amendments...  A: 414-4 (5/10/95) 
H. Res. 144 (5/11/    O...................  H.R. 535............  Fish Hatchery--Arkansas..  A: voice vote (5/15/
 95).                                                                                         95)               
H. Res. 145 (5/11/    O...................  H.R. 584............  Fish Hatchery--Iowa......  A: voice vote (5/15/
 95).                                                                                         95)               
H. Res. 146 (5/11/    O...................  H.R. 614............  Fish Hatchery--Minnesota.  A: voice vote (5/15/
 95).                                                                                         95)               
H. Res. 149 (5/16/    MC..................  H. Con. Res. 67.....  Budget Resolution FY 1996  PQ: 252-170 A: 255-
 95).                                                                                         168 (5/17/95)     
H. Res. 155 (5/22/    MO..................  H.R. 1561...........  American Overseas          A: 233-176 (5/23/  
 95).                                                              Interests Act.             95)               
H. Res. 164 (6/8/95)  MC..................  H.R. 1530...........  Nat. Defense Auth. FY      PQ: 225-191 A: 233-
                                                                   1996.                      183 (6/13/95)     
H. Res. 167 (6/15/    O...................  H.R. 1817...........  MilCon Appropriations FY   PQ: 223-180 A: 245-
 95).                                                              1996.                      155 (6/16/95)     
H. Res. 169 (6/19/    MC..................  H.R. 1854...........  Leg. Branch Approps. FY    PQ: 232-196 A: 236-
 95).                                                              1996.                      191 (6/20/95)     
H. Res. 170 (6/20/    O...................  H.R. 1868...........  For. Ops. Approps. FY      PQ: 221-178 A: 217-
 95).                                                              1996.                      175 (6/22/95)     
H. Res. 171 (6/22/    O...................  H.R. 1905...........  Energy & Water Approps.    A: voice vote (7/12/
 95).                                                              FY 1996.                   95)               
H. Res. 173 (6/27/    C...................  H.J. Res. 79........  Flag Constitutional        PQ: 258-170 A: 271-
 95).                                                              Amendment.                 152 (6/28/95)     
H. Res. 176 (6/28/    MC..................  H.R. 1944...........  Emer. Supp. Approps......  PQ: 236-194 A: 234-
 95).                                                                                         192 (6/29/95)     
H. Res. 185 (7/11/    O...................  H.R. 1977...........  Interior Approps. FY 1996  PQ: 235-193 D: 192-
 95).                                                                                         238 (7/12/95)     
H. Res. 187 (7/12/    O...................  H.R. 1977...........  Interior Approps. FY 1996  PQ: 230-194 A: 229-
 95).                                                              #2.                        195 (7/13/95)     
H. Res. 188 (7/12/    O...................  H.R. 1976...........  Agriculture Approps. FY    PQ: 242-185 A:     
 95).                                                              1996.                      voice vote (7/18/ 
                                                                                              95)               

[[Page H8079]]
                                                                                                                
H. Res. 190 (7/17/    O...................  H.R. 2020...........  Treasury/Postal Approps.   PQ: 232-192 A:     
 95).                                                              FY 1996.                   voice vote (7/18/ 
                                                                                              95)               
H. Res. 193 (7/19/    C...................  H.J. Res. 96........  Disapproval of MFN to      A: voice vote (7/20/
 95).                                                              China.                     95)               
H. Res. 194 (7/19/    O...................  H.R. 2002...........  Transportation Approps.    PQ: 217-202 (7/21/ 
 95).                                                              FY 1996.                   95)               
H. Res. 197 (7/21/    O...................  H.R. 70.............  Exports of Alaskan Crude   A: voice vote (7/24/
 95).                                                              Oil.                       95)               
H. Res. 198 (7/21/    O...................  H.R. 2076...........  Commerce, State Approps.   A: voice vote (7/25/
 95).                                                              FY 1996.                   95)               
H. Res. 201 (7/25/    O...................  H.R. 2099...........  VA/HUD Approps. FY 1996..  A: 230-189 (7/25/  
 95).                                                                                         95)               
H. Res. 204 (7/28/    MC..................  S. 21...............  Terminating U.S. Arms      ...................
 95).                                                              Embargo on Bosnia.                           
H. Res. 205 (7/28/    O...................  H.R. 2126...........  Defense Approps. FY 1996.  A: 409-1 (7/31/95) 
 95).                                                                                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Codes: O-open rule; MO-modified open rule; MC-modified closed rule; C-closed rule; A-adoption vote; D-defeated; 
  PQ-previous question vote. Source: Notices of Action Taken, Committee on Rules, 104th Congress.               


  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the rule before us provides for consideration of what is 
clearly one of the most significant foreign policy measures that we 
will be taking up in the foreseeable future--the bill requiring the 
President and the American participation in the United Nations-imposed 
arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina could very 
well mark the beginning of our direct involvement in this tragic 
conflict.
  As the gentleman from Florida has explained, the rule provides for 3 
hours of general debate. It also makes in order one amendment in the 
nature of a substitute to be debatable for 1 hour. Should no substitute 
be offered, that hour will be available for general debate.
  Mr. Speaker, our main concern in fashioning the rule was that enough 
time be provided so that Members on both sides of the aisle have an 
adequate opportunity to offer their arguments and to hear the opinions 
and the arguments of other Members.
  We would have preferred 6 hours of debate time. Many of us felt that 
a full day of debate was necessary for a measure this momentous. We do 
hope very much that every Member who has a desire to be heard during 
this important debate is given the opportunity to speak in the 5 total 
hours of time that are provided under this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, we support the rule, although as I have just stated we 
would have preferred that some more time be available for debate.
  Mr. Speaker, it may not be necessary to restate the obvious, but 
perhaps it would be useful to do so. From the beginning, the policy 
choices for the United States and our NATO allies have been difficult, 
and each has been fraught with substantial peril. The alternatives 
available to us are probably fewer in number and less propitious today 
than they were 3 or 4 years ago.
  From the beginning, our goals have been to end the fighting and the 
barbarism throughout the former Yugoslavia; to do so, if at all 
possible, as a contributor to multilateral efforts through the aegis of 
the United Nations to end the tragedy; to act in concert with and in 
support of our European allies who in their own way have sought to take 
the lead in responding to the situation and who have contributed the 
bulk of the troops on the ground in Bosnia; and to
 avoid, if possible, the insertion of U.S. troops on the ground there.

  Needless to say, the policies undertaken by ourselves and our allies 
and the United Nations have not been entirely successful, although it 
is fair to say that our involvement together has undoubtedly lessened 
the amount of fighting and the amount of death and dislocation that 
would otherwise have occurred.
  But we have known from the beginning that this was and is a terribly 
complex and difficult problem to help solve and although each of us has 
his or her own ideas about what we might have done differently at 
various times during these past few years, most of us have hesitated to 
criticize too harshly either Mr. Bush or Mr. Clinton as they who had 
the awful and final responsibility as President to forge U.S. policy 
and quite possibly commit U.S. troops grappled with the twin 
difficulties of responding in an effective way to the problems on the 
ground while at the same time trying to remain a part of and supportive 
of the multilateral efforts of which we are a part to contain the 
conflict.
  It is precisely that concern that suggests to many of us that this 
week is not the time to take up this resolution.
  It is extremely important in the long run that we not undertake 
unilateral action that may leave us with unilateral American 
responsibility in the area, and especially at a time when, as the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] argued before the Committee on 
Rules on Friday afternoon, ``We have just reached major new decisions 
with our allies and with the United Nations that will give the United 
Nations one good last chance to more effectively carry out its mandate 
in Bosnia. We now have a different strategy and we need time to make it 
work. This is not a matter of months, but weeks.''
  As appealing as lifting the embargo is, we all know that the hoped 
for results of getting adequate additional heavy armaments to the 
Bosnian Government will take a good many months, and we all know that 
the withdrawal of U.N. troops that our taking such an action will 
precipitate is likely itself to require the insertion of U.S. troops on 
the ground while they withdraw. It would seem that the prudent policy 
just now would be to give the newly arrived at agreement between the 
United Nations and NATO to commit to a serious air campaign to halt any 
further Serb aggression and last week's U.N. agreement to simplify the 
chain of command
 to allow military commanders to make the decisions as to whether and 
when air strikes should take place an opportunity to take effect. We 
shall all be back here 1 month from now and should these new policies 
which have been agreed upon and reached amongst ourselves and our 
allies and the United Nations not be successful or carried out to our 
satisfaction, there will be time enough then for us to undertake this 
unilateral action.

  I say this, Mr. Speaker, as one who along with a good many of our 
colleagues in this body has felt strongly for some time now, in the 
case of many of us since late 1991 and early 1992, that the Serbs will 
not be deterred until finally they believe and are made to understand 
that they will suffer real damage and real pain and real casualties if 
they continue their aggression.
  Every time they believed they would suffer retaliation, they have 
hesitated, but tragically they have succeeded in calling our bluff time 
and again.
  Our argument now is that we seem to have finally a policy that will 
in fact inflict the necessary kind of damage in response to their 
continuing these outrageous assaults upon humanity. It would be foolish 
of us not to give this policy, which many of us have argued for now for 
a long time, a chance to work.
  It cannot hurt to say once more that every one of us who has taken 
the time to think seriously about and argue through the various policy 
alternatives available to us understands that each of them carries with 
it its own grave risks and that none is certain of success. It thus 
seems to many of us that the wise and sensible thing to do now is to 
take no action that might prevent the successful functioning of our 
newly arrived at policy and worse yet perhaps force us to break with 
our closest allies in our mutual attempt to solve this problem together 
and leave us with an unwanted and potentially dangerous unilateral 
responsibility for undertaking further actions without the involvement 
of others that may necessarily be required by our unilaterally lifting 
the arms embargo.
  Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned earlier, we support the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss], my distinguished colleague on the Committee on 
Rules.

[[Page H8080]]

  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and my colleague the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-Balart] for yielding me this time. I 
hope his district and mine remain safe from Hurricane Erin and all 
others remain safe from Hurricane Erin bearing down on us.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and the bill, S. 21. I am 
most grateful to the leadership of this House--and to Chairman Gilman--
for the prompt work undertaken to ensure that this House has a debate 
and a vote on the subject of the escalating atrocity that is Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. No doubt, the gruesome and abhorrent reality of death, 
destruction, and debasement of human life in Bosnia, presents enormous 
challenges as does working through the ponderous international 
machinery now is use.
  Although no one believes that resolving this terrible crisis is an 
easy task, there is at least one clear and obvious step that the United 
States should be taking, namely lifting the arms embargo and allowing 
the Government of Bosnia to exercise its right to self-defense. The 
administration seems to be arguing that it was all wisdom and that 
Congress should not participate in any resolution of this tragedy--but 
the administration has long had its chance to do the right thing on its 
own--and its policies have failed to do the job.
  I am proud that this House, following the lead of the other body, 
will demonstrate that we are not afraid to stand up for what is moral 
and what is right. We will direct the President to lift the arms 
embargo against the Bosnian Government, something we should have done 
some time ago. I am pleased that Chairman Solomon and our Rules 
Committee responded to this urgent need--even at a time when our 
committee time and time on the floor is at such a premium--and 
developed a fair rule that allows significant debate, while ensuring an 
opportunity for the minority to present an alternative of their choice. 
Support this rule and support S. 21.
                              {time}  1040

  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] who has been 
involved personally in this matter.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, let me rise first and say that I do not 
believe this is an issue of the President's policy; neither President 
Clinton nor President Bush. Frankly, I think that President Bush should 
have moved more decisively at the beginning, but let me say that I 
thought President Bush was right at the time. We both made a mistake.
  President Clinton, in 1992, spoke strongly of the strike-and-lift 
policy that he wanted to see our country pursue, but the issue is what 
we do today; What America's policy will be as set by the Congress of 
the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, President John Kennedy, in his first inaugural address 
said, ``To those people in the huts and villages of half of the globe 
struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best 
efforts to help themselves, for whatever period is required, not 
because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their 
votes, but because it is right.''
  Let me repeat that, Mr. Speaker. ``Because it is right.''
  That is what we are about today; doing what is right. Helping the 
Bosnian people break the bonds of misery. We can do this by voting to 
allow them the right, the inherent right of a nation to defend 
themselves as explicitly stated in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
  In that regard, Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule 
and legislation which would lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
  Mr. Speaker, 318 of the Members of this body voted on June 8, just a 
little short of 2 months ago, to lift the arms embargo. Since that 
vote, the so-called safe havens, of Srebrenica and Zepa, which were 
designated safe havens by the United Nations, the mightiest nations on 
the face of the earth, have been overrun by the Serb forces.
  Fighting rages around another safe haven, Bihac, and the shelling of 
Sarajevo continues. The West's response was to draw the line at 
Gorazde, allowing Serbian forces to amass at the other safe havens and 
threaten to overrun these areas as well.
  Since that June 8 vote, 24 Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, including 
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and his military chief, General Mladic, 
have been indited by the international community for war crimes, 
including that of genocide. This is not a personal opinion; this is not 
an opinion of our Government or other governments; this is an opinion 
of the U.N. tribunal. We are dealing with international felons and war 
criminals.
  This body should not retreat from that overwhelming vote on June 8. 
Some Members say it was an easy vote for them, but now this measure is 
real. It is a free-standing piece of legislation. To retreat from the 
House's overwhelming support to lift the embargo would send yet another 
signal to the Serbs that the United States has drawn another line in 
the sand, dared the Serbs to cross it, and then ourselves fallen back 
to a new position.
  It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that what we are encountering is similar 
to a scene dating back to the 1930's when yet another dictator sought 
to carve up a neighboring country in the name of ethnic unity. It 
occurred in Munich in 1938. It was called, rightly, ``appeasement.''
  At the outset of the crisis in Czechoslovakia, one European leader 
remarked, ``How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be 
digging trenches and tying gas masks here because of a quarrel in a 
faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.''
  All of us learned the lessons of the neglect and negligence at that 
time. The result was called a Holocaust and, Mr. Speaker, it tragically 
is happening today in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The Bosnians do not want our soldiers. Prime Minister Silajdzic said 
in a letter, ``Throughout this conflict we have never asked for 
American or foreign ground troops to fight for us. We do not need them. 
We have both the manpower and the will to fight for ourselves.''
  Mr. Speaker, let this body show the Bosnian people that we too have 
the will to do what is morally and ethically right and allow them to 
defend themselves.
  Mr. Speaker, using another quote, ``For two centuries,'' one of our 
Presidents said, ``America has served the world as an inspiring example 
of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle 
to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a 
rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans 
know that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also [know] 
why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans. We have a 
unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom,'' he said. ``And 
when we do, freedom works.''
  That was President George Bush in his State of the Union Address in 
January 1991.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, this body has a unique and compelling 
responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. Let us give the Bosnian 
people the opportunity to pursue their freedom from their aggressors. I 
would hope that my colleagues would vote for this rule. Vote for S. 21. 
It will be a vote for the right of an internationally recognized 
sovereign Nation to defend itself.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me read from a letter to Haris 
Silajdzic, The democratically elected prime minister of Bosnia. He says 
this in a letter dated yesterday: ``Since before the very first attacks 
on our population more than 3 years ago, we have been prepared to fight 
to defend ourselves. Tragically, the arms embargo against our country 
has ensured that this conflict be a slaughter rather than a war.''
  ``The Arms Embargo,'' he goes on to say, ``must be terminated and a 
balance of power be effected on the ground. Only then,'' he says, 
``will the genocidal spiral end.'' He closes with this, Mr. Speaker. 
``On behalf of our people, I appeal to the American Government, the 
American people, and their elected representatives to untie our hands 
and to prove, once again, why America is the leader of the democratic 
world. In the name of morality, lift the arms embargo. Sincerely, Haris 
Silajdzic, Prime Minister'' of the democratic, internationally 
recognized, sovereign nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[[Page H8081]]

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations and one of the great leaders of this Congress who 
continuously proves precisely that it is the American people who are 
the moral leaders of the world.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Diaz-Balart] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] and the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] for their strong supporting 
statements on behalf of this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule on S. 21 which 
will allow the House, for the third time in 14 months, to debate the 
critical issue of terminating the unjust arms embargo that has been 
imposed, with our Government's support, on the Government and people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The position of the House is clear--we had a 
vote on this question in early June where an amendment to our State 
Department and foreign assistance authorization directing the President 
to terminate the arms embargo was adopted by an impressive, 
overwhelming 3-to-1 ratio.
  However, the measure which we will consider today, S. 21 under this 
rule, will upon approval, go directly to the President's desk for his 
approval or his veto. This measure will allow the Congress as a whole 
to speak clearly, without ambiguity of our distaste, and our revulsion 
for the maintenance of an unjust, immoral, and entirely misguided arms 
embargo which has penalized the victims of aggression and prolonged a 
conflict which the international community has been powerless to bring 
to an end.
  The legislation introduced and adopted in the Senate by Majority 
Leader Dole is a responsible measure--it allows the Government of 
Bosnia to choose between having the U.N. peacekeepers remain or having 
the embargo terminated by the United States. It avoids the charge that 
we who support lifting the embargo would precipitate a withdrawal of 
the United Nations from Bosnia, because it explicitly says that the 
embargo will be lifted only after the Bosnian Government has formally 
requested the United Nations to depart. Moreover, it provides 
flexibility to the President to the degree that the safety of UNPROFOR 
troops or our own forces that may be involved in assisting a 
withdrawal.
  This rule is a fair one. It provides for a counterproposal to be 
considered if one is offered by any Members opposing termination of the 
embargo. Most importantly, this rule provides for an ample allotment of 
time--3 hours, for our Members to speak out and fully consider this 
issue. Having been involved with the question of this embargo for 3 
years as both ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee during 
the previous Congress, and as chairman of our International Relations 
Committee, I have become fully aware of the tremendous level of outrage 
and frustration which most of our Members share because of the 
continuing humiliation of the United Nations and our own Government, 
and the ongoing victimization of the Bosnian people. Today, we will 
have an opportunity to fully examine this proposal and its implications 
for the Bosnian people.
  Accordingly, I urge our Members to support this rule and bring this 
urgently required measure to the floor.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, there have been few situations in modern 
history that have been as cruel and unjust as this, when people who 
could have changed it chose not to. The United Nations designated six 
areas in Bosnia that were to be safe enclaves. In fact, when people 
came into those enclaves, they were disarmed. We agreed to that.
  We are the principal financial contributor to the United Nations. We 
contribute more than any other country. We have been contributing 
almost a third of all the money that supports the United Nations. So it 
was our word, as well as the U.N.'s word, that these people would be 
safe.
  Nine out of ten of them were unarmed. In fact, those who had arms had 
only small arms that were of no use against heavy artilleries that the 
Serbs have had in their possession and have used for the last 3 years.
  Mr. Speaker, it is a cruel irony, in fact, that the arms embargo was 
never intended to apply to Bosnia. It was intended to apply to those 
States within Yugoslavia that had as many heavy arms as they wanted to 
use; Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia. They all had access to arms, but 
we knew Bosnia did not, and yet we imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia as 
well. When it became clear it was only effectively applying to Bosnia, 
we would not lift it. Now, for 3 years we have stood by as tens of 
thousands of people have been slaughtered.
  We have almost 2 million refugees floating around Europe that have 
been displaced. About 40,000 women have been raped. That is a large 
number, but it has been a tactic of this war; to rape women, defile 
them, to shame the family, to break the spirit of the Bosnian people, 
partly because they are Moslems, partly because it is a multiethnic 
secular democracy, and that, of course, is a threat to any dictator 
like Mr. Milosevic who is a hard-line, old-line Communist.
  And so we set up six enclaves. Now, in the last few weeks, we have 
let those enclaves be overrun. In the process of overrunning them, 
hundreds of women have been raped, hundreds of people have been 
viciously tortured, thousands of people have been massacred.
  Let me just put a little flesh and blood on what this means, what 
some of these numbers represent. Mr. Speaker, the following is from the 
July 31, 1995, edition of Newsweek magazine:

       This past week at a crossroads in the mountains outside 
     Srebreica, Sabaheta Bacirovic saw 500 men on their knees. 
     They were Bosnian Moslem prisoners. Their arms were tied 
     behind their heads and their Serbian captors forced them to 
     march by shuffling along on their knees. The Serbs taunted 
     Mrs. Bacirovic and the women traveling with her. They were 
     all driven out of Serbrenica when the Moslem enclave fell on 
     July 11. ``These are your husbands,'' she recalled them 
     saying. ``There is your army. We will kill them all.''

  Mr. Speaker, they can kill them, because they are unarmed, because we 
have insisted upon this arms embargo. Mrs. Bacirovic realized that her 
husband was not among them. He had already been executed. Other women 
who walked this trail of tears out of Srebrenica saw heaps of dead men, 
their throats slit, piled up beside the roads; 9 out of 10 of them were 
unarmed. They were shot at and shelled by the Serbs every step of the 
way, broken into segments. When the stragglers caught up, they saw 
piles of corpses with their throats slit.
  Mr. Speaker, 9,000 men were killed as a result of the Serb's 
overtaking this enclave. This death march was the worst massacre in 
Europe since the Nazi era. Trickery led some of them to their deaths. 
The Serbs had white tanks that were made to look like U.N. vehicles. 
They had ``U.N.'' painted on them, and with bullhorns they urged the 
Bosnian to come out of the mountains and surrender.
  One of the Bosnian Moslems said, ``We knew it was really the Serbs.'' 
Mr. Alija Omerovic watched as some of his companions walked down and 
tried to surrender and were shot down by the armored car's machine gun.
  Some of the victims were mutilated, often with noses and ears cut 
off. A company commander was found, Enver Alaspahic, lying on a path. 
This is the company commander. His face had been cut open to the bone 
in the shape of an Orthodox cross. He begged the scout to kill him. The 
scout said he could not do it and left him there.
  Many of the atrocities have been committed by the black-clad members 
of the Serbian Volunteer Guard. These are followers of a thug known as 
Arkan. A woman whose husband and brother were among the missing 
marchers said she saw Serbs in black bandanas pull a pair of 12-year-
old twin boys off a refugee bus. This is a U.N. refugee bus that we 
finance, we are responsible for. They slit their throats, slit the 
throats of the two twins, as their mother tried vainly to trade her 
life for theirs.
                              {time}  1100

  Later the mother tied herself to a tree limb and hanged 

[[Page H8082]]

 herself. We saw that on TV. People at the time said they did not know 
why she had hanged herself. They have now found out. And who would not?
  These are the kinds of atrocities that are occurring. While it is 
awkward and makes us uncomfortable to talk about them, they are real, 
they are happening today, and we are complicit in their happening 
unless we act.
  General Arkan has a long history. He had eight convictions by 
Interpol, murders, and yet he was armed by the Serbs in Serbia. He 
rounded up the worst, most vicious thugs that they could find, sent 
them into Bosnian villages, told them, ``You can go into these homes, 
you can shoot the men, you can rape the women. I will not go into what 
they did to the women, but it boggles the imagination that people could 
be so vicious and inhuman. They threw these families out of their 
homes, took all the possessions that they could, and went through 
village after village, ethnically cleansing these villages. That was 
the policy, and it has worked. It never should have worked at this time 
in the 20th century, when the United States has the military power, has 
the moral power to prevent this kind of slaughter, this kind of ethnic 
genocide. We committed ourselves to do that, not just when we erected 
the Holocaust Memorial, but when we learned of the slaughter of 6 
million Jews because they were Jews, and now we see the slaughter of 
over 200,000 Moslems because they are Moslems. Most of them are 
innocent civilians. It never, never should have happened.
  Let me just quote the last point that the gentleman from Maryland 
[Mr. Hoyer] made. This is a quote from Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, 
who just today sent us a letter, all of us, addressed specifically to 
the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] and the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Hoyer]. It says:

       On behalf of our people, I appeal to the American 
     Government, the American people, and their elected 
     representatives to untie our hands and to prove once again 
     why America is the leader of the democratic world. In the 
     name of morality, lift the arms embargo.

  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], a tireless fighter for human rights throughout 
the world and a member of the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Few, if any, issues are more important and more urgent than the 
legislation that is addressed in this rule. The purpose of this 
legislation is to give the Bosnian Moslems one last chance to defend 
themselves and save their country from the Serb onslaught.
  Under this rule, the Senate-passed measure would be brought up for an 
up-or-down vote. This means that we can send this bill directly to the 
President tonight. So, for those of us who want fast action, we can do 
that by passing this legislation, today.
  Mr. Speaker, Bosnia is on the ropes. Its army is being pushed back. 
Its population is undergoing terrific hardships, death and destruction, 
as we have been told here this morning during this debate.
  The civil war in Bosnia has now entered its fifth year. More than 
200,000 people have been killed; 2 million more are refugees, driven 
from their homes.
  The Bosnian Moslems have taken the worst of it even though their army 
is twice the size of the Bosnian Serbs'. The Bosnian Army has some 
150,000
 soldiers while the Bosnian Serb forces are about 60,000 strong. Why, 
then, are the Moslems losing this war to a smaller army?

  Certainly, part of the answer is the military leadership on the part 
of the Bosnian Army. But the Serbs make up for their smaller army with 
much better equipment. What has caused this difference? It is the 
embargo which has prevented the Bosnian Army from obtaining the heavy 
weapons that are essential if the Moslems are to have a chance to turn 
back the Serbs.
  The original purpose of the arms embargo was to stop the fighting, 
like putting out a fire by cutting off the oxygen. But it has not 
worked out that way.
  In reality, the embarge has shifted the course of the conflict 
against the Moslems. By maintaining the embargo, we have been a silent 
partner in the Serbian aggression. The result is that the Serbs now 
control 70 percent of Bosnia.
  The embargo should have ended last year when the House first voted to 
lift the embargo. It should have ended months ago when the House voted 
a second time to free Bosnia from its shackles. Now, before it is too 
late, the House must act and the President must sign this bill into 
law.
  Mr. Speaker, the first step is for the House to adopt this rule, to 
vote for the rule and for this bill. Let us at least give the Bosnians 
a fighting chance. This bill will accomplish that goal.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Hefner].
  (Mr. HEFNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Speaker, what I would like to do at this time is 
raise a question to anybody who would wish to answer the question. I 
have listened very closely to the debate today.
  It is not going to be hard to vote to lift the embargo. That is going 
to be a very popular vote, to vote to lift the embargo, very popular.
  Now, the next step is what if the United Nations forces, if the 
Bosnian Government says, ``We want you to leave. We have lifted the 
embargo, we want you to leave, you have got to get out,'' we have 
already committed, the President has committed and some of the leaders 
on the Republican side have committed that we would commit 25,000 
troops or more to help these people leave the conflict area. The next 
vote is not going to be that easy, because you are going to have to 
vote for authorization to authorize us to send 25,000 American troops 
to that part of the world for a conflict that I do not think that the 
American people are going to support putting Americans on the ground 
and in harm's way in this event.
  And I would just like to ask why, if you are going to lift this, 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo, why is it not part of the 
legislation that you tell the whole picture, that you go through the 
whole scenario, that you are going to eventually have 25,000 or more 
American troops committed to the conflict?
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HEFNER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I think it is important, No. 1 to concentrate on 
legislation before us today. I want to be specific with regard to the 
last section of the bill which reads:

       Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as authorizing 
     for deployment of United States forces in the territory of 
     Bosnia for any purpose, including training, support or 
     delivery of military equipment.

  Now, that is important to realize that is in this bill. The gentleman 
brings up other possibilities in the future.
  Mr. HEFNER. Reclaiming my time, that is the easy vote. That is the 
easy vote, that we are not going to have anybody go in with the 
equipment that we send in. We are not going to have anybody go and show 
them how to use the equipment. It is easy to make that vote. But once 
you do this, you are going to have to have some commitment from 
somebody; if we supply the armaments to them, you cannot just send it 
in. It is going to take a month or longer. You cannot just send 
equipment in and say, ``Here it is guys.'' They have no experience. 
Somebody is going to have to take this responsibility. That is going to 
be a tough vote to make in this House, to vote to authorize American 
troops to go in as advisers or as help to get the United Nations forces 
out. That has not even been talked about in this legislation. It has 
not even been mentioned.
  You can make the votes to unilaterally lift the embargo. You can make 
the votes to the last part of your bill that says no Americans can be 
involved in any capacity.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. They are not authorized at this point.
  Mr. HEFNER. Then where do you go from there?
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. If the gentleman will yield, the gentleman brings up 
some possibilities with regard to the future and points to this vote 
being an easy vote. I do not think it is an easy vote to say that the 
world community, in fact, has acted immorally for over 3 years. That is 
not an easy vote.

[[Page H8083]]

  There is a lot of speculation that we can engage in with regard to 
the future. But what is true is the world has acted immorally, and we 
are solving that problem with this vote.
  Mr. HEFNER. This is not speculation. It is going to be a fact.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Rohrabacher], a distinguished member of the 
Committee on International Relations, who is a genuine freedom fighter 
for the best causes throughout the world and has been throughout his 
political career.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I have been in Washington, DC, since 
1980, when I came here with Ronald Reagan as a member of his White 
House staff, and I can tell you we did not end the cold war by being 
afraid to act. Every time Ronald Reagan tried to do anything, he was 
told, ``You cannot do this, because there are going to be serious 
repercussions.'' We would still be in the middle of the cold war if we 
took that kind of advice.
  The fact is Ronald Reagan stated, and he saw very clearly, that the 
problems we confronted are not so complex but that they are difficult 
and we must make difficult decisions if problems are to be solved.
  In the Balkans, the fundamentals are clear. What the world is 
witnessing is, No. 1, a Serbian land grab; No. 2, Serbian aggression; 
and Serbian genocide, ethnic cleansing of their neighbors. Villages are 
being destroyed in Croatia and Bosnia.
  Are there Croatian and Bosnian tanks in Serbia? Is there Croatian 
artillery or Bosnian artillery in Serbia? Are there Bosnian or Croatian 
airplanes in Serbia?
  The fundamentals are clear. What we are facing is Serbian aggression 
and genocide against their neighbors. We must determine, as the Western 
powers and as the leading Western power, what to do about it, and do 
not let anybody say there are no non-Serbians in Serbia. In Kosovo, we 
are going to find if we let this genocide go on in Bosnia, there are 
hundreds of thousands of Muslims in Serbia who then will face genocide 
if we do not face up to this murderous regime right now.
  Serbian crimes and culpability are clear. Yet U.S. policy has been an 
arms embargo on both sides.
  Denying arms to an unarmed victim, denying the right to defend 
oneself is immoral on the face of it. It has encouraged the murder and 
aggression that we see taking place in the Balkans.
  We have heard the answer is basically letting the victims defend 
themselves. I believe that is the central part of the answer. No. 1, 
let these people defend themselves by giving them the means to do so. 
Let us not watch a ``Schindler's List'' movie 20 or 30 years from now 
of unarmed civilians being herded, unable to defend themselves, to 
their slaughter.
  Yes, we hear, ``Oh, you cannot do anything unless you are willing to 
put U.S. ground troops on the ground.'' That is absolutely ridiculous. 
That is saying we cannot do anything unless we do everything.
  Is it our policy that victims should be kept defenseless? This has 
encouraged attacks. If we do not believe in putting U.S. ground troops 
on the ground, what should our policy be? Again, lifting the embargo.
  No. 2, we have the airpower, the airpower needed to deter the Serbian 
aggression and the Serbian genocide. I am not talking about using that 
airpower against little emplacements in Bosnia. The answer is lift the 
embargo, bomb Serbia, bomb Serbia. This will not cost innocent civilian 
lives in Serbia. We can destroy their military capability. We can bomb 
Serbia. They will get the message without killing any of their innocent 
civilians. We can destroy their military capacity.
  No. 3, we should take Mr. Milosevic into custody and try him for his 
war crimes. Those things are within our capacity. We need not commit 
50,000 U.S. troops on the ground.
  We must stand for the moral position. We must stand up for what 
America is supposed to stand for, freedom and against aggression, or 
there is no hope in the world; there is no hope for the Bosnian people 
or anyone else.

                              {time}  1115

  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to the 
distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha], the ranking 
member of the Subcommittee on National Security.
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate what the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher] just said about the Reagan administration 
and the support. Many of us Democrats supported the Reagan 
administration's foreign policy, and we felt very strongly about it, 
and there were very few of us. I supported President Bush very strongly 
when he went into Saudi Arabia and when he defeated the Iraqis in the 
desert. This policy, though, of lifting the embargo looks like to me we 
are inviting a defeat, we are inviting a Dien Bien Phu, in the United 
States. If we lift the embargo, what we are saying to our allies is, 
``You're going to have to get out because they have said they are going 
to get out.'' We have committed ourselves to send in 25,000 American 
troops on the ground to get to help them out.
  Now I was just 2 weeks ago over in Split, in Split, a very inadequate 
port facility that takes one ship a day, that takes one C-5 at a time. 
The roads from Split to Sarajevo are very narrow with 10-ton bridges. 
None of the heavy equipment could get through this very narrow winding 
road. The military situation in the wintertime is impossible. Air power 
is not near as effective.
  So we are inviting a defeat. We are inviting, we are saying, ``All 
right; we're going to lift the embargo, and the results of that are the 
French and British pull out, the United States is going to deploy 
troops into Bosnia to withdraw and actually face a defeat.'' So the 
vote we are casting is actually to defeat the U.S. forces or to defeat 
the United Nations.
  The policy change that has been made is a key factor here. The 
President has said, well, the dual authority for bombing is gone. We 
now have military-to-military to be able to using bombing in order to 
reinforce the people on the ground. That is important. This a key. We 
no longer are going to be concerned about it; we are no longer going to 
stop fighting because of hostages. That is obviously an important 
change in policy. In the United States, we will use massive air power 
in order to stop the Serb aggression around the enclaves, and 
negotiation is going forward.
  For us to lift the embargo sends exactly the wrong signal. There is 
no worse signal we could send because the French and the British would 
immediately withdraw, and I say to the Members of Congress, ``This vote 
is actually participating in voting for the authorization of going to 
war because it will be essential that we go in to help rescue the 
French and British. They are on the ground, and we have committed 
ourself. The American President has committed our prestige and the 
power of the United States to help the British and the French 
withdraw.''
  And the physical conditions of just getting in; let us talk about 
just getting into Sarajevo and how long it will take. It took us 40 
days to get a light helicopter division into Saudi Arabia with the most 
modern port facilities, the most modern airport facilities in the 
world. Here we have inadequate port facilities, with mountainous roads, 
with impossible terrain, within 40 to 60 days of having all kinds of 
bad weather.
  Now I participated in the fighting in Vietnam. I was wounded twice. I 
know the advantage of closed air support. I know the advantage of 
having air support when in a tactical situation. That did not win the 
war. We had 450,000 American troops on the ground, and that did not win 
the war.
  If we were to withdraw the troops from Bosnia, and try to lift the 
embargo, and try to force-feed the Bosnian troops--we tried to train 
the Vietnamese, we tried for years to train the Vietnamese. They do not 
have the long-term training of officers. It takes 10 years to train a 
staff sergeant, takes 15 years to train an officer in the American 
military, 20 years to train a battalion commander, and we are saying in 
a few weeks we can train the Bosnians to use heavy equipment. We can 
train them to use individual pieces of equipment, but we cannot train 
them to use a coordinated attack. We had trouble with our guard units, 
training them in 60 days, and they were already well trained, and many 
of them experienced in Vietnam.

[[Page H8084]]

  So we are asking for a disaster, and I support this rule, but I ask 
the Members of Congress to think very seriously and to vote against 
this lifting the embargo because it will be disastrous to American 
foreign policy.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Duncan). The time of the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Beilenson] has now expired.
  The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-Balart] has 5\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. King].
  Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-
Balart] for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, this is an historic moment in the history of the House 
of Representatives, and it is important to keep our mind and our eye on 
the key issue, and the key issue is the right to a sovereign nation to 
defend itself, and it raises the issue of what we are to do in the 
post-cold war era. Is the United States going to continue to be an 
accomplice to a policy which deprives victims of the right to defend 
themselves?
  Speakers have raised the issue today, is this going to involve the 
United States? The fact is the United States is already involved. It is 
involved in a conspiracy to deny the most basic rights to the people of 
Bosnia.
  And what are we talking about? We are talking about aggression by the 
Serbs against the Bosnians. We are talking about mass rape against the 
people of Bosnia. We are talking about ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
This is ``Schindler's List'' of the 1990's, and what is the response of 
the Western World? Our response has been to look the other way, and 
worse than looking the other way, to put an embargo on those that want 
to defend themselves.
  I was in Bosnia several years ago with the gentlewoman from New York 
[Ms. Molinari], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Paxon], and the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel]. I saw firsthand the atrocities 
being carried out against the innocent people of Bosnia, and we, as 
Americans, have a moral obligation to step forward and lift this 
embargo. There is no moral, or diplomatic, or military justification to 
continue this unjust embargo upon the people of Bosnia.
  Along with the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] and the gentleman 
from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] last week we met with the Prime Minister of 
Bosnia. Here is a man; all he is asking for for his people is not for 
American troops. He is asking for the right to defend himself, the most 
basic right, and if we do not have the courage today to cast the vote, 
and, by the way, I disagree that this is an easy vote. There is no easy 
vote when we are talking about war and peace. This is a very, very 
serious vote, and, if we have to cast votes in the future, they will be 
even more serious, but the fact is we cannot stand idly by while 
aggression goes unchecked.
  The Prime Minister of Bosnia, all he is asking for is the weapons to 
defend himself, to defend his people. That is a moral right that they 
have, and we, as signatories to the U.N. Charter, have to agree with 
that right.
  So I urge adoption of the rule and the bill, and I again stress to my 
colleagues what an historic moment this is to the House of 
Representatives.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to 
the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, tireless fighter for 
human rights and an inspiration for freedom fighters throughout the 
world.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] is 
recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me, and I strongly support this fair rule and the bill that it 
brings to the floor. I commend the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-
Balart], an outstanding fighter for human rights, along with the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Hoyer], and others.
  Mr. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wilson], 
another great American.
  Mr. WILSON. Would the gentleman agree with me that I am certain this 
amendment is going to pass and pass overwhelmingly, but would the 
gentleman agree with me that we also should pay some attention to the 
plight of Croatia, who also is a victim of aggression?
  Mr. SOLOMON. Absolutely. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wilson] is 
correct.
  My colleagues, let me just say this. As my colleagues know, the idea 
before us today is to lift the embargo. To those who legitimately argue 
against this idea, I would just ask them what is the better idea, 
because continuing the embargo is continuing genocide for helpless 
Bosnian people, and we cannot be a part of that.
  As my colleagues know, American foreign policy under all Presidents, 
be they Republican or Democrat, has always been to support, and 
encourage, and, yes, defend democracy around the world against outside 
military aggression. It is argued that this is not outside military 
aggression, and we cannot interfere with internal strife, as bad as it 
may seem.
  But what can we do? What we can do is lift the embargo, an embargo 
that's implementation has been one-sided.
  As my colleagues know, we have been giving the former Soviet Union, 
Russia, U.S. tax dollars. They in turn are giving Russian rubles, 
Russian dollars, to Serbia. They are giving equipment to Serbia, who in 
turn are giving it to the Bosnian Serbs, who are perpetrating this 
genocide on those poor, helpless people. It is all one way. We are 
enforcing the sanctions on the official democratic Government of 
Bosnia, yet on the other side the oil tankers roll down the Danube 
giving oil to Serbia, which in turn is putting it into the Bosnian 
Serbs. That is genocide, my colleagues. The answer is to lift this 
embargo and let the Bosnian people defend themselves.
  Someone said they are not going to know how to use this equipment. 
These people know better than my colleagues and I how to use that 
equipment. We give them the ability to defend themselves, and the 
genocide will stop, and we ought to be helping them do that, and I urge 
support of the rule and the bill that it brings to the floor.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I 
yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on 
the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 204 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the Senate bill, S. 
21.

                              {time}  1127


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the Senate 
bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to 
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Mr. Bonilla in the 
chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  The text of S. 21 is as follows:
                                 S. 21

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-
     Defense Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
     (Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued 
     application of an international arms embargo to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that 
     Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-
     defense under Article 51 of the United National Charter and 
     therefore is inconsistent with international law.
       (2) The United States has not formally sought multilateral 
     support for terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina through a vote on a United Nations Security 
     Council resolution since the enactment of section 1404 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
     (Public Law 103-337).

[[Page H8085]]

       (3) The United Nations Security Council has not taken 
     measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
     security in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the aggression 
     against that country began in April 1992.
       (4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the 
     United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany, 
     has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of 
     continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact 
     Group's proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision in 
     the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms 
     embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable.

     SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

       The Congress supports the efforts of the Government of the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--
       (1) to defend its people and the territory of the Republic;
       (2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and 
     territorial integrity of the Republic; and
       (3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable, and 
     sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.

     SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

       (a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United 
     States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (b), following--
       (1) receipt by the United States Government of a request 
     from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for termination 
     of the United States arms embargo and submission by the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exercise of its 
     sovereign rights as a nation, of a request to the United 
     Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
       (2) a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or 
     decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to 
     withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (b) Implementation of Termination.--The President may 
     implement termination of the United States arms embargo of 
     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to 
     subsection (a) prior to the date of completion of the 
     withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     but shall, subject to subsection (c), implement termination 
     of the embargo pursuant to that subsection no later than the 
     earlier of--
       (1) the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
       (2) the date which is 12 weeks after the date of submission 
     by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a request to 
     the United Nations Security Council for the departure of 
     UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (c) Presidential Waiver Authority.--If the President 
     determines and reports in advance to Congress that the 
     safety, security, and successful completion of the withdrawal 
     of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(2) requires more time than the 
     period provided for in that subsection, the President may 
     extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for 
     implementing termination of the United States arms embargo of 
     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up 
     to 30 days. The authority in this subsection may be exercised 
     to extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) 
     for more than one 30-day period.
       (d) Presidential Reports.--Within 7 days of the 
     commencement of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, and every 14 days thereafter, the President 
     shall report in writing to the President pro tempore of the 
     Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the 
     status and estimated date of completion of the withdrawal 
     operation. If any such report includes an estimated date of 
     completion of the withdrawal which is later than 12 weeks 
     after commencement of the withdrawal operation, the report 
     shall include the operational reasons which prevent the 
     completion of the withdrawal within 12 weeks of commencement.
       (e) International Policy.--If the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina submits a request to the United Nations Security 
     Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or the 
     countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to withdraw 
     from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (a), 
     the President (or his representative) shall immediately 
     introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council 
     a resolution to terminate the application of United Nations 
     Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina. The United States shall insist on a vote on 
     the resolution by the Security Council. The resolution shall, 
     at a minimum, provide for the termination of the 
     applicability of United Nations Security Council resolution 
     713 to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than 
     the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event the United Nations 
     Security Council fails to adopt the resolution to terminate 
     the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 
     713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of a 
     lack of unanimity of the permanent members, thereby failing 
     to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
     international peace and security, the United States shall 
     promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General 
     Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's 
     Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.
       (f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States 
     forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any 
     purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military 
     equipment.
       (g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``United States arms embargo of the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the application to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
       (A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the 
     Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 FR 33322) under the 
     heading ``Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to 
     Yugoslavia''; and
       (B) any similar policy being applied by the United States 
     Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of 
     UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to 
     which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles 
     and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and
       (2) the term ``completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the departure 
     from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially 
     all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all 
     other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a 
     reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the 
     withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the 
     United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries 
     contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not 
     include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of any country 
     providing such personnel.

  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will each be 
recognized for 1\1/2\ hours.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, this year is the 
50th anniversary of the United Nations. The President himself went to 
San Francisco for the celebrations marking the signing of the charter.
  Article 51 of that charter gives every member nation the right of 
self-defense against armed attack.
  S. 21, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995--is designed 
to enable the sovereign State of Bosnia--a member in good standing of 
the United Nations--to defend itself against armed attack from its 
immediate neighbor.
  It establishes a procedure that resolves the concerns of many who 
have argued that unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would have 
disastrous results.
  Opponents contend that U.S. termination would Americanize the 
conflict--first because the U.N. Protection Force--UNPROFOR--would pull 
out, requiring the President to make good his commitment to provide up 
to 25,000 American troops to assist in their withdrawal.
  Second, it is argued that because the Bosnian Government would seek 
the heavy weapons they need from the United States, Americans would 
have to provide the necessary training.
  Opponents also have said that long before Bosnia could obtain the 
weapons and training it needs, the Serbs would launch an all-out 
attack. The result would be even greater destruction than we have seen 
so far--with more ethnic cleansing, more rapes, murders, and other 
atrocities against unarmed civilians.
  Some opponents also have argued that by unilaterally lifting the arms 
embargo, we would put at risk other embargoes that our Nation 
supports--such as those against Iraq and Iran.
  However, the embargoes against Iraq and Iran are designed to punish 
those nations for aggressive actions--while the arms embargo against 
Bosnia punishes the victim.
  S. 21 contains important conditions that obviate many of those 
arguments. First, in order for the United States to terminate the arms 
embargo, the bill requires action by Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council, 
or countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR.
  The Bosnian Government must first call upon the U.N. Security Council 
to withdraw UNPROFOR, or the Council--or countries contributing to 
UNPROFOR--such as Britain and France--must decide to withdraw the 
force.

[[Page H8086]]

  Second, after the Bosnian Government requests the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR the President can wait up to 12 weeks before terminating the 
arms embargo.
  Further, the President can extend the waiting period for up to 30 
days if he determines that a safe, secure, and successful withdrawal 
will require more than 12 weeks. These extensions can be continued 
until the withdrawal of UNPROFOR has been completed.
  Two years ago, on June 29, 1993, the Bosnian Ambassador to the United 
Nations called upon the security Council to terminate the arms embargo. 
That request obviously has not been granted.
  This legislation links termination of the arms embargo to withdrawal 
of UNPROFOR, and places the decision to request that withdrawal upon 
those most directly affected by the consequences of that decision--the 
Bosnian Government.
  If the Bosnian Government calls for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the 
United Nations will have no choice but to comply--despite the 
possibility of greater fighting and the implementation of some very 
serious commitments that many may prefer not to implement.
  S. 21 has nothing to do with Americanizing the war. A request by the 
Bosnian Government for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would activate the 
President's promise to assist in that withdrawal even if S. 21 is 
defeated.
  Mr. Chairman, the policies of our Government have carried us into a 
political cul-de-sac. Those policies have not been working and they are 
no longer sustainable.
  It is time to end the charade of the past 3 years. Not only has it 
demeaned and diminished the authority of the United Nations, it has 
eroded the credibility of our Western allies.
  Mr. Chairman, there are times when the hinge of history turns on a 
decision. The failure of the League of Nations to act against the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia--the failure to challenge Hitler when he 
marched into the Sudentenland. We all know the consequences that flowed 
from those failures to confront aggression.
  Similarly, this is one of those critical decisions.
  History will judge our actions--and the judgement of history will be 
harsh if we do not enable Bosnia to act as a sovereign state and a 
full-fledged member of the United Nations.
  Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support S. 21.

                              {time}  1130

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.


                            I. Introduction

  I rise in opposition to the Dole-Lieberman bill. I know where the 
votes are on this issue. Yet I believe it is important to look at the 
other side of this issue before we vote.


               II. Status quo in Bosnia is not acceptable

  We all agree that present policy has not worked. It is clear that we 
cannot accept the status quo.
  The U.N. peacekeeping operation [UNPROFOR] and NATO were unable to 
fulfill pledges to protect safe areas in Bosnia.
  Diplomacy is stalled. The delivery of much humanitarian aid is still 
blocked.
  The killings continue. The number of refugees grow. NATO, the U.N., 
and U.S. efforts to stop this war have not worked.
  In short, there is a growing feeling that UNPROFOR has failed and 
should leave Bosnia, and that the arms embargo should be lifted to 
allow the Bosnian Government to defend itself.
  Many who support lifting the embargo do so because they believe that 
the situation in Bosnia cannot get worse, and that lifting the embargo 
is the only alternative.
  I think my colleagues are wrong on both counts: First, the situation 
in Bosnia can get worse, if we lift the embargo unilaterally; second, 
there is an alternative to lifting the embargo.


                 III. A New strategy has been developed

  The situation in Bosnia is not the same today as it was on June 8, 
when the House last voted on lifting the embargo.
  We have agreed upon a new and much tougher, more unified strategy 
with our NATO allies and the UN:
  We now have NATO agreement on the policy of a massive air campaign to 
halt Bosnian Serb aggression.
  We have told the Bosnian Serbs that if they attack Gorazde, we will 
respond with an air campaign of disproportionate force. Today, NATO is 
meeting to expand that commitment to include the U.N.-declared safe 
area of the town of Bihac.
  We also have U.N. agreement on a simplified chain of command. U.N. 
military commanders on the ground in Bosnia, together with NATO air 
commanders, will make the decision on when and where an air campaign 
takes place. This is the way our military wants it--this is standard 
military practice.
  There will be no more pinprick airstrikes.
  There will be expanded military targets.
  There will be no more dual-key control.
  There will be no more decisions delayed because they must go through 
New York.
  We now have a 10,000 man Rapid Reaction Force to protect UNPROFOR and 
make it more effective.
  British and French troops in the Rapid Reaction Force are in combat 
fatigues, not blue helmets. They are much more aggressive and 
independent of the U.N. chain of command. They have suppressed Serb 
artillery around Sarajevo. They are prepared to do more in their 
successful effort to keep the Mt. Igman aid route into Sarajevo open.
  Will this new strategy work? We want it to work. We think it is 
working but we do not know if it will work. We will work in a matter of 
weeks.
  What can this new approach accomplish? The administration's new 
strategy will not solve all the problems in Bosnia. It will not roll 
back Serb aggression. It will not end the war in a matter of weeks.
  But it will deter more Serb attacks on some of the safe areas, it 
will give more time to search for a negotiated solution, and it will 
keep the United States out
 of the war.

  We should give this new, more assertive strategy time to work.


                 iv. what's wrong with unilateral lift

  This new strategy, while imperfect, is far superior to the option we 
are voting on today, a unilateral lifting of the embargo.

                   A. Consequences of unilateral lift

  Lifting the arms embargo unilaterally will have dire consequences on 
the ground in Yugoslavia:
  UNPROFOR will withdraw, that is a certainty.
  For all the complaints about UNPROFOR, it has helped feed over 2 
million people for nearly 3 years, including the entire city of 
Sarjevo--which remains completely dependent on humanitarian assistance.
  The U.N. has helped to protect civilians. Casualties were 130,000 in 
1992 before UNPROFOR arrived, and declined dramatically to 2,500 in 
1994.
  Once UNPROFOR leaves, the war will intensify. The killing and human 
misery will increase; before the Bosnians get heavy arms, the Serbs 
will step up their attacks; and right in the middle of this escalating 
conflict, up to 25,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Bosnia to help 
UNPROFOR withdraw. That is a commitment the United States must fulfill.
  Prime Minister Major and President Chirac have made clear that 
UNPROFOR will leave Bosnia if we lift the arms embargo unilaterally. 
President Clinton has made clear that United States troops will go into 
Bosnia to help UNPROFOR leave.
  Make no mistake: Lifting the embargo means United States troops on 
the ground, in Bosnia.
  Once United States troops are in Bosnia to help the U.N. withdraw, 
there will be enormous pressure to stay--to fill the humanitarian 
vaccum left by UNPROFOR.
  Who will feed 2 million Bosnians each day, once UNPROFOR leaves?
  Who will protect Bosnian civilians, once a Serb assault begins?
  How can U.S. troops leave, under the glare of world attention?
  We say now that the mission of U.S. forces will be limited in time 
and scope. But United States troops could be in Bosnia for a very long 
time.

[[Page H8087]]

  Unilateral life means unilateral responsibility. By acting alone in 
Bosnia, we will Americanize the war.
  Lifting the embargo will not change the outcome of this war.
  The Bosnians have a better army today, but more armor and artillery 
is not enough. They need better leadership, training, tactics, command, 
control, communications, and intelligence. They need airpower. They 
need a modern army--the U.S. Army--if they are to win this war.
  Lifting the embargo will damage U.S. interests at the U.N.
  It will undermine the authority of the U.N. Security Council. While 
other nations must honor multilateral sanctions, the United States is 
saying it can pick and choose those that apply to us.
  If the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo on Bosnia, others 
may feel free to break existing U.N. sanctions on Iraq and Libya. 
Russia may feel free to break sanctions on Serbia.

                     Article 51/self defense issue

  It has been argued that the U.N. embargo should be lifted because it 
violates Bosnia's right to self-defense. We all agree that the Bosnians 
have a right to self-defense.
  On a practical level, the Bosnians are getting weapons from other 
countries and using those weapons to defend themselves.
  But the legal argument--that an international arms embargo violates 
Bosnia's self-defense rights under Article 51 of the U.N. Chapter--is 
just plain wrong.
  Article 51 says that member states' rights to ``individual or 
collective self-defense'' must not ``affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council'' to take ``such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.''
  That means that rights of self-defense or collective defense cannot 
contradict existing U.N. Security Council enforcement actions.
  In the judgment of the Security Council, the international arms 
embargo was the best means to ensure peace and security in the former 
Yugoslavia. That remains the judgment of the Security Council.

                B. Loss of control by the United States

  Lifting the embargo unilaterally also mean the United States loses 
control of its foreign policy.
  We complain a lot in this institution about handing over decisions to 
the U.N. Yet this bill hands over to a foreign government a crucial 
foreign policy decision that will result directly in the deployment of 
thousands of U.S. troops in the middle of a war zone.
  This bill says that the President shall lift the embargo if the 
Bosnians ask UNPROFOR to leave. In my view, that's an incentive to the 
Bosnians to ask UNPROFOR to leave.
  Under the terms of this bill we are simply telling the Bosnian 
Government: You decide. Make a request to lift the embargo, and we'll 
do it. No discretion. No judgment. Just do it.

        C. Unilateral lift does not confront the hard questions

  A vote to lift unilaterally the embargo leaves all the tough 
questions unanswered: Who will supply the arms? Who will deliver them? 
Who's going to pay for them?
 Who will train the Bosnians to use them? Who will protect the Bosnians 
while they are training?

  Proponents of a unilateral lift don't answer these questions. They 
offer promises without resources--without authorization or 
appropriation.
  One of the mistakes of this war is that the international community 
has promised more than it delivers. This bill continues that practice--
it compounds the felony.
  The key problem for United States policy in Bosnia has been the gap 
between what we say we want to achieve, and the resources we are 
willing to commit.
  But we know who will be called on to provide these resources: The 
United States.

          D. Unilateral lift presents constitutional problems

  Voting for a unilateral lifting of the embargo creates serious 
constitutional problems for American foreign policy. If we adopt this 
bill we create a profound ambiguity in American policy.
  Under the Constitution, the President is the chief architect of 
American foreign policy. Congress can advise the President on foreign 
policy, but Congress cannot implement or conduct foreign policy. 
Congress must declare war, but Congress cannot be the Commander-in-
Chief.
  This bill infringes on both those Presidential powers:
  At a time when the President is moving in one direction--negotiating 
with our closest allies to strengthen the U.N. mission and trying to 
end this war--this bill moves in exactly the opposite direction--
pulling the plug on the U.N. mission and fanning further war.
  At a time when the Commander-in-Chief wants to keep United States 
troops out of Bosnia, Congress is acting on a measure that will mean 
United States troops going in.
  If the President and Congress move in such opposite directions, it 
diminishes our stature in the world, it profoundly weakens our 
leadership, and it damages our system of separation of powers. It will 
tear U.S. foreign policy apart.

                    E. Bad timing of unilateral lift
  Finally, voting today to life the embargo unilaterally is bad timing. 
We have simply not given the new strategy time to work.


                             v. conclusion

  I know my colleagues are frustrated about the tragedy in Bosnia. I am 
frustrated. I am not going to argue that the present policy will lead 
to a wonderful outcome. It is to late for a wonderful outcome.
  I want to say to my colleagues that this is not a free vote today. 
Maybe the vote in June was free vote, not this one. I think the 
standard that every Member of this House should apply in voting on this 
bill is to ask himself or herself, what should the policy of the United 
States Government be with respect to Bosnia?
  Put aside the politics. Put aside all else. Focus on what the policy 
ought to be, and cast your vote on the basis that your vote will 
control American policy.
  I understand that my colleagues want to do something about the horror 
of Bosnia. We do not know what else to do, so we vote to lift the 
embargo.
  But what we are proposing to do today will only make a bad situation 
worse.
  I do not believe my colleagues are willing to send United States 
troops to Bosnia. I do not believe the American people are willing to 
do so either. That is simply too high a price.
  Yet that is the consequence of lifting the embargo, in my view.
  What is our alternative? What can we achieve at a price we are 
willing to pay?
  Instead of concentrating on a military solution, we should 
concentrate on a political solution that brings all parties to the 
table for face-to-face negotiations--including the Bosnian Serbs.
  If we support the administration's new strategy, we will be choosing 
a course that offers modest but realistic gains:
  It reduces the risk of a wider war, and may reduce the killing.
  It gives the negotiations another chance.
  It will allow us to continue to contain the conflict.
  It avoids further damage to NATO, and to the U.N. that would follow a 
pullout by UNPROFOR.
  It will keep humanitarian aid flowing to Bosnia.
  It will keep United States troops out of Bosnia.
  I urge my colleagues to defeat this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes of my 90 minutes 
provided for general debate to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] 
and I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Hoyer be permitted to yield 
portions of that time to other Members.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my friend and the chairman 
of the committee for his generous yielding of time.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes and 30 seconds to the very 
distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] who has been 
one of the most outspoken leaders on behalf of freedom in the 
international community.

[[Page H8088]]

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his 
leadership on this issue throughout the months.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution. In a perfect 
world, the strong would defend the weak. In the world in which we live, 
the weak must sometimes defend themselves.
  It is this basic truth of our time that brings us to this judgment 
today.
  The people of Bosnia have made to the world a simple question 
eloquent in its simplicity, a plea that has been heard many times by 
many people in different lands.
  Mr. Chairman, they seek to survive. They simply seek for their nation 
to exist. For 4 years the world has answered that plea with resolutions 
and international forums, negotiations by the world's premier diplomats 
and peacekeepers from throughout the globe. They were all well-
intentioned. Each was brave, and each was intent and each was 
unsuccessful.
  Every nation is grateful to all the diplomats who tried, acknowledges 
the time, the sacrifice of every soldier who risked their lives. It is 
to the eternal credit of the British and the French and the Dutch 
forces who tried to do so much, but we achieve nothing by ignoring the 
simple truth that they failed.
  The evidence mounts with every rape, every murder, each 
disappearance, the pillage of each new village. The simple truth is 
that the international forces were always too weak to defend Bosnia. 
But the embargo was always too strong to permit Bosnia to defend 
itself.
  Serbia, under the provisions of this resolution, will have 12 weeks 
to consider the implications of United Nations withdrawal or face the 
wrath of an international community, a community intent on justice on 
the battlefield that has eluded it at the negotiating table for so many 
years. It is not a perfect answer, but it is an answer when all other 
answers have failed.
  Our opponents argue that lifting the embargo will Americanize the 
war. I argue that keeping the embargo will Americanize the genocide.
  Our opponents argue that lifting the embargo will have America stand 
alone; I argue that if America alone will stand for the right of a poor 
and weak people to defend themselves, then America has never stood in 
better company.
  Our opponents argue that Europe has the right to lead; I argue that 
Europe has had years to lead. Now it is time for America to lead again.
  Mr. Chairman, in these last few months, our children have seen the 
specter on flickering television screens of the times of our fathers, 
liberating concentration camps and ending a genocide. Each Member today 
must ask whether they will exchange that memory for a time in which our 
children will remember a genocide in our generation and the flickering 
pictures of Americans not as liberators but standing guard as a 
defenseless people were prevented from getting the arms to defend 
themselves by our own forces.
  What the world was unwilling to do for the victims of the Holocaust, 
what the United Nations has been unwilling to do for Bosnia, we have no 
right to prevent the people of Bosnia from doing for themselves. There 
is no human right more fundamental than the right of self-defense. The 
international community has no greater obligation in this crisis than 
to distinguish between the victims and the aggressors.
  This resolution does both.
  Mr. Chairman, in every church and synagogue throughout this land for 
a generation our people in a single prayer have made a simple pledge: 
never again. Simply because the institutions of peace have failed, 
there is no reason to abandon that pledge or that prayer. Keep the 
promise. Lift the embargo, pass the resolution. Never again.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Roth], the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee on 
International Economic Policy and Trade.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of our committee for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I have to agree today with the speakers who have spoken 
here before. As I interpret their remarks, they are saying that the 
issue before us today is really a moral question: ``By what right does 
the United States prevent Bosnia from defending itself?'' Every nation, 
every people has the ultimate right to defend their land, their homes, 
their families from aggression.
  Instead of stopping this war, this embargo has simply shifted the 
balance toward the Serbs and against the Moslems. It can be argued that 
by keeping this stranglehold on Bosnia, we have been the silent 
partners in the Serbs' aggression. Oh, the United States has promised 
over and over that we would save Bosnia. But 200,000 deaths later and 
some 2 million refugees later, the United States has done nothing to 
save Bosnia.
  The United Nations has been useless. NATO has been impotent, and we 
have collaborated with the Western European Powers in the slow 
strangulation of Bosnia. Why else does a Serb force of only 60,000 
conquer a far larger Bosnian army of 150,000?

                              {time}  1200

  It is the embargo that has been the crucial difference. Without the 
heavy machinery of war, tanks, artillery, anti-tank weapons, missiles, 
and mortars, the Bosnian Army is doomed. For 4 years we have held the 
Bosnians' arms and hands behind their back while the Serbs beat the 
Moslems to death. For 4 years we have denied Bosnia the fundamental 
right of all nations: The right to defend themselves.
  Our embargo, I think it can be argued, has been an immoral act. It is 
time for us in this 11th hour to rectify this grave error and give 
Bosnia one last chance to save itself. ``Do not do it,'' the opponents 
of this bill will say, ``it will just widen the war.'' Mr. Chairman, 
the course of the war is out of our hands. The Bosnian Serbs have taken 
the measure of the United Nations and taken the measure of NATO and 
have dismissed those forces as impotent, as forces that they do not 
have to contend with, so they are acting with impunity in Bosnia. The 
Serbs will march until they either conquer Bosnia or until we lift the 
embargo.
  The essential fact is this: The ethnic cleansing will continue unless 
we lift this embargo. The Serb war crimes will go on until Bosnia is 
allowed to defend itself. The opponents of this measure will say that 
we will use air strikes to stop the Serbs. Consider what General 
Horner, one of our best Air Force generals, said recently about the 
Balkans. He said, ``I would find it very difficult to design a military 
strategy to be successful.''
  Air strikes will not stop the Serbs. Consider what happened when one 
American pilot was shot down. It took us some 5 days to retrieve him. 
It took a massive rescue effort to get him back. Well, the Serbs have 
hundreds, perhaps a thousand surface-to-air missiles. How many 
casualties will we suffer in a vain attempt to rescue Bosnia? I, for 
one, do not want to tell one American family that their son or daughter 
died in Bosnia.
  Let us do what is right. Now, at long last, let us do what we should 
have done a long time ago: End this embargo and allow Bosnia to defend 
itself.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].
  (Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, first let me say the sincerity of those 
on the other side of the issue is to be commended. There are no easy 
answers on the Bosnia issue, but lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia 
makes it America's war. We are taking the wrong step at the wrong time. 
We are pouring fuel to the fire, and we might cause an explosion.
  Let us not make this vote the opening primary vote of the 
Presidential campaign, either. This is the time when we should rally 
behind the President, the Commander in Chief, his military advisers, 
the Joint Chiefs, all of whom do not want to lift the embargo. This 
morning they made a case to a number of Members of Congress with very 
strong convictions. Unilaterally lifting the embargo means unilateral 
responsibility, an Americanization of this war; possibly, yes, another 
Vietnam situation, as much as we hate to admit it.
  Let us also remember what the American people want. Poll after poll 

[[Page H8089]]
  shows the American people do not want to get involved in Bosnia. They 
do not want to put American troops there. They are leery about getting 
involved in an air war, even for defensive reasons. They are leery of 
the United Nations, they are leery of NATO. Let us support the 
President in his efforts to not Americanize this war.
  Worse, Mr. Chairman, if this unilateral lifting passes, it would send 
a terrible message around the world that the United States is divided; 
that the President is going in one direction and the Congress is going 
in a totally different direction. We recognize that the votes are not 
there. We recognize that perhaps the best we can achieve is 150, 160 
votes, so that a veto of the President can be sustained. He will veto 
this initiative if it passes.
  Let us not make matters worse. Bosnia is an enormously difficult 
situation. No administration is flawless in its execution of policy 
toward Bosnia, but the fact is there may be no real solution to this 
problem. There may be killings and more savagery continuing, and little 
that we can do; but let us not exhaust diplomatic means, diplomacy, one 
last effort at trying to resolve the problem before we pour enormous 
fuel to the fire.
  What happens if we lift this embargo? UNPROFOR leaves, and guess who 
has to protect them? American troops. No question about it, it would be 
our responsibility. What happens to the enclaves? They will be put in 
jeopardy. Tuzla, Srebrenica, possibly they can be defended, but what 
about Gorazde? What about Bihac? What about Croat and Serb, engaging in 
more tanks, thousands of Serbian troops massing at the border, 
jeopardizing the alliance? What happens to NATO? What will NATO's role 
be if all of a sudden we say, ``We are shifting and we are lifting the 
embargo, we are going to act unilaterally, we are going to act on our 
own, we are not going to act jointly''? What about the 25,000 American 
troops that we are going to put at risk?
  What happens if this war spreads to Kosovo, to Romania, to Greece, 
through the Balkans? What happens to sanctions? Russia is about to end 
sanctions on the Serbs, their Parliament. What about the sanctions on 
Iraq and Iran? How can we justifiably say that we will always uphold 
embargoes and sanctions?
  There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia, but unilaterally 
lifting this embargo has very serious consequences, and the time has 
come to let the executive branch, those that are on the ground, our 
diplomats, our military leaders, let them make the decisions without a 
totally different signal from us here in Congress. We will move on to 
the next vote and the next issue, but they have to live with it. This 
is the executive branch's responsibility. Let us rally around the 
President the way we did on the gulf war, recognizing that our goal 
here may be 150 votes.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on lifting the embargo.
  Mr. Chairman, a unilateral lift of the arms embargo by Congress would 
undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and 
could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the 
possible Americanization of the conflict.
  There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally 
lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences.
  Both Britain and France have said they will withdraw their forces 
from Bosnia if the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo. This 
will lead to the collapse of the UNPROFOR.
  The United States will have to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
troops. involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission.
  A unilateral lift by the United States drives our European allies out 
of Bosnia and pulls the United States in.
  The United States is working intensively with our allies on concrete 
measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a 
significant difference in Bosnia.
  UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation 
that feeds and helps keep alive over 2 million people in Bosnia. The 
number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were 
before UNPROFOR arrived.
  UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to 
peace. The administration is now working to implement the agreement 
reached last Friday in London to threaten substantial and decisive use 
of NATO air power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Goradze and to strengthen 
protection of Sarajevo using the rapid reaction force.
  These actions lay the foundation for stronger measures to protect the 
other safe areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this 
delicate moment will undermine those efforts.
  It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more--
absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming 
a stronger role in this critical moment.
  The House must face the consequences of a U.S. action that forces 
UNPROFOR departure:
  The United States would be part of a costly NATO operation to 
withdraw UNPROFOR;
  There will be an intensification of fighting in Bosnia as it is 
unlikely the Bosnian Serbs will stand by waiting until the Bosnian 
Government is armed; under assault, the Bosnian Government will look to 
the United States for more military support to fill the immediate void.
  This could cost up to $3 billion in arms, require some 25,000 U.S. 
troops, and immerse the United States in training and logistics 
operations for the foreseeable future.
  Intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkins with 
far-reaching implications for regional peace.
  UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, 
negotiated solution.
  Unilateral lift means responsibility. It does not show leadership, it 
shows that the United States cannot get others to follow its frustrated 
actions.
  We should not rush this action for political gain. The nightmare in 
Bosnia should not worsen in the name of political posturing for the 
upcoming Presidential elections in this country.
  To abandon our NATO allies in their own backyard for political 
posturing is a dangerous precedent with grave consequences.
  The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should 
not damage it in a futile attempt to find an easy fix to the Balkan 
conflict.
  While the majority of Americans are opposed to United States ground 
troops in Bosnia because it is a European conflict, Congress is willing 
to overlook the concerns of our European allies who have the most to 
lose in an escalated conflict.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record a letter from President 
Clinton to the majority leader, and an article appearing in Newsweek 
August 7, 1995, also written by the President.
  The material referred to follows:
                                              The White House,

                                        Washington, July 27, 1995.
     Hon. Richard A. Gephardt,
     Democratic Leader,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: I am writing to express my strong 
     opposition to Congressional efforts to unilaterally lift the 
     Bosnia arms embargo. While I fully understand the frustration 
     that supporters of unilateral lift feel, I nonetheless am 
     firmly convinced that in passing legislation that would 
     require a unilateral lift Congress would undermine efforts to 
     achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to 
     an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible 
     Americanization of the conflict.
       There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. 
     Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious 
     consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that 
     a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which 
     would place their troops in greater danger, will result in 
     their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its 
     collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, 
     would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist 
     in the withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a 
     difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral 
     lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and 
     pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined 
     mission.
       I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached 
     a crossroads. We are working intensively with our allies on 
     concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to 
     continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia, as it 
     has--for all its deficiencies--over the past three years. Let 
     us not forget that UNPROFOR has been critical to an 
     unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps 
     keep alive over two million people in Bosnia, until recently, 
     the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what 
     they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of central Bosnia is 
     at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation is holding. 
     UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these significant 
     results.
       Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear 
     that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to 
     contribute to peace. We should be determined to make every 
     effort to provide, with our allies, for more robust and 
     meaningful UNPROFOR action. We are now working to implement 
     the agreement reached last Friday in
      London to threaten substantial and decisive use of NATO air 
     power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde and to 
     strengthen protection of Sarajevo using the Rapid Reaction 
     Force. These actions lay the foundation for stronger 
     measures to protect the other safe areas. Congressional 
     passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will 
     undermine those 

[[Page H8090]]
     efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not 
     more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves 
     of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a 
     stronger role at this critical moment.
       It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. 
     action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, we immediately 
     would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw 
     UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, there 
     will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is 
     unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the 
     Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the 
     Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air 
     support and if that fails, more active military support. At 
     that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as 
     a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill 
     the void--in military support, humanitarian aid and in 
     response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will 
     risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching 
     implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's 
     withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated 
     solution for the foreseeable future.
       In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. 
     We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by 
     ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO 
     Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should 
     not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the 
     Balkan conflict.
       Veto any resolution or bill that may require the United 
     States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a 
     bad situation worse. I ask that you not support any 
     Congressional efforts to require a unilateral lift of the 
     Bosnian arms embargo.
           Sincerely,
     Bill Clinton.
                                                                    ____

                     [From Newsweek, Aug. 7, 1995]

                  The Risk of `Americanizing' the War

                         (By President Clinton)

       Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is the 
     wrong step at the wrong time. Let me explain why I believe so 
     strongly that this is the case.
       Without question, the current situation in Bosnia is 
     unacceptable. The recent assault by Bosnian Serbs on the 
     Muslim enclaves in Srebrenica and Zepa, and the brutality and 
     atrocities that have accompanied it, are intolerable. The 
     inability of the United Nations mission in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) 
     to protect centers it has declared as ``safe areas'' 
     undermines the U.N., NATO and Western values in general. 
     UNPROFOR clearly has reached a crossroads. The issue is not 
     whether to act, but how.
       There are three basic alternatives. One is to undertake a 
     massive commitment by NATO, including U.S. ground forces, for 
     the purpose of decisively affecting the outcome of the war. 
     From the beginning of my presidency, I have refused to cross 
     that line, and I will continue to do so. I cannot justify 
     committing American ground troops to Bosnia except for the 
     limited purpose of acting within NATO to protect our allies 
     if they withdraw or to help enforce a genuine peace 
     agreement.
       The second alternative, born of intense frustration with 
     the current situation and embraced by many in the Congress, 
     is for the United States, by itself, to violate the 
     international arms embargo in order to better enable the 
     Bosnians to fight for themselves. It is powerfully appealing, 
     but it is not that simple. It has real and serious 
     consequences for the United States.
       First, our allies have made clear that unilateral U.S. 
     action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their 
     troops in greater danger, will result in their immediate 
     withdrawal from Bosnia. As the leader of NATO, the United 
     States would have an obligation under those circumstances to 
     assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops 
     in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, the 
     unilateral lift immediately drives our European allies out of 
     Bosnia and pulls America in, even if for a temporary and 
     defined mission.
       Second, after that operation is completed, there will be an 
     intensification of the fighting. It is unlikely that the 
     Bosnian Serbs would stand idly by waiting for the Bosnian 
     government to be armed by others. The United States, having 
     broken with our NATO allies as a result of the unilateral 
     lift, will be expected to fill the void--in military support 
     and humanitarian aid. If lifting the embargo leads to more 
     Serbian military gains, would we watch Sarajevo fall, or 
     would we be compelled to act--this time by ourselves?
       Third, intensified fighting risks a wider conflict in the 
     Balkans, with far-reaching implications for Europe and the 
     world. We have worked hard to contain the conflict with 
     Bosnia--so far, successfully.
      If the fighting spreads, the fact that our unilateral action 
     had triggered the escalation would compel us to deal with 
     the consequences.
       Finally, the U.N.'s withdrawal will set back prospects for 
     a negotiated peace for the foreseeable future--the only hope 
     for a genuine end to the conflict.
       In short, unilateral lift means unilateral American 
     responsibility.
       We must recognize that there is no risk-free option in 
     Bosnia. But I believe the wiser course--the path I have been 
     pursuing intensively with our allies over these past days--is 
     to strengthen the U.N.'s ability and willingness to protect 
     Bosnian safe areas against Serb aggression: to enable 
     UNPROFOR to make a real difference in Bosnia as it has, for 
     all its deficiencies, over the past three years. Let us not 
     forget that UNPROFOR has carried out an unprecedented 
     humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over 
     two million people in Bosnia; that, until recently, the 
     number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what it 
     was before the U.N. arrived; that much of central Bosnia is 
     at peace; and that where UNPROFOR has agreed to make the 
     commitment to use NATO power, as it did to stop the brutal 
     Serb shelling of Sarajevo in February 1994, it has worked 
     dramatically as long as that threat remained credible.
       For UNPROFOR to play this role now, it must become a 
     genuine force for peace in Bosnia once again. Serious steps 
     have been taken over the past several days. The British and 
     French, with our support, are deploying a Reaction Force to 
     open land routes to Sarajevo and strengthen UNPROFOR's 
     ability to carry out its mission. Meeting in London in recent 
     days, our allies, mindful of the risks, agreed to respond to 
     an attack on the remaining eastern enclave of Gorazde with 
     substantial and decisive air power. We are working to extend 
     that commitment to the other safe areas.
       To make good that agreement, NATO has fundamentally altered 
     the way in which such air strikes will be conducted, 
     empowering military commanders to respond to a broad range of 
     targets rather than the ``pinprick'' responses of the past. 
     And U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali last week delegated 
     the authority for the use of air strikes to the military 
     commanders in the field, where it belongs.
       NATO air power will not end the fighting in Bosnia, but, at 
     best, it can deter aggression; at least, it will increase its 
     price; and in the process, it will enhance the chances of a 
     diplomatic settlement.
       We must make this final effort to strengthen UNPROFOR's 
     ability to save lives in Bosnia and create the conditions for 
     a negotiated peace. Congressional passage of unilateral life 
     legislation at this decisive moment will undermine the 
     effort. It will provide our allies with the rationale for 
     absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia. Ultimately, 
     it will Americanize the conflict.

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, exactly 20 years ago today President Gerald Ford and 
other leaders of the 33 European countries and Canada gathered in 
Helsinki, Finland, for the solemn signing of the Helsinki Final Act of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. In 
two decades since this historic gathering, the Helsinki Accords have 
helped guide relations between the participating states from the dark 
days of the cold war to the dawning of democracy in the countries of 
East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.
  Mr. Chairman, the commemoration of today's anniversary is 
overshadowed by the dark ongoing tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of 
the newest members to join the OSCE. It is fitting that the House 
consider S. 21 legislation to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia today.
  At no point over these past 20 years, Mr. Chairman, have the 
principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act been under greater 
attack than in the ongoing war of aggression and genocide in Bosnia. 
Over the course of the past 3 years, virtually each and every one of 
these principles have been violated by the Serb militants in Bosnia and 
neighboring Croat, with devastating consequences for the people of 
these two countries. Tens of thousands of women and girls raped, 
hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians killed in cold blood, 
millions driven from their homes through a policy of ethnic cleansing; 
concentration camps, wanton aggression, and genocide in the heart of 
Europe 50 years after the victory over Nazi Germany. Promises of never 
again ring curiously hollow in the face of genocidal practices and 
policy pursued by those bent on the destruction of the multiethnic 
state in Bosnia.
  The crisis in Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, has unmasked a crisis of 
leadership at the White House and in the West in general, characterized 
by confusion, contradiction, and ultimately, acquiescence. While no one 
wants to be blamed for the bleeding of Bosnia, Mr. Speaker, no one is 
willing to intervene in order to stop it. For 3 years the international 
community has pursued a diplomatic process which has consumed 
considerable time and effort, even as Bosnia and her people have been 
consumed by armed aggression and genocide.
  Left unchecked, Mr. Chairman, this crisis of leadership will only 
further erode institutions, vital institutions 

[[Page H8091]]
like the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE, with 
direct political and economic consequences for the United States.
  Mr. Chairman, the international community has stood by as well-armed 
Serb militants, under the leadership of indicted war criminals Karadzic 
and Mladic have pursued their genocide policies, bent on the 
destruction of Bosnia and the creation of a greater Serbia.
  At the same time the government of the sovereign, independent, and 
recognized state of Bosnia has been prevented from attaining the means 
to defend itself and its people through its continued imposition of an 
arms embargo which virtually guarantees a victory to the Serb 
militants. At this point, further negotiations with war criminals like 
Mladic and the others can only yield results at the further expense of 
Bosnia. Appeasement by the West has only raised the stakes for a final 
settlement, even as the Serb militants pursue their aims on the ground.
  Herding Moslems and Croats into shrinking numbers of ethnic ghettoes 
is not the answer. If the international community has been unwilling to 
provide for the collective defense of Bosnia within its internationally 
recognized borders, on what basis can we be expected to defend even a 
truncated Bosnia, as recently suggested by Charles Krauthammer in his 
op-ed?
  Let me just quote this: ``While the administration goes back and 
forth, more lives are being lost and the situation grows more desperate 
by the day.'' These words are not mine, Mr. Chairman, but an 
observation made by then candidate Bill Clinton in October 1992, in the 
early months of a war which has now stretched for over 3 years. For 30 
months President Clinton has vacillated as even more lives have been 
lost and the situation has grown even more desperate on the ground.
  The United States has backed a diplomatic process which has led to a 
dead end. We have to be honest and face that. No amount of tinkering is 
going to resuscitate the failed U.N. mission in Bosnia. The so-called 
rapid reaction force agreed to nearly 2 months ago was supposed to be 
the last great hope for UNPROFOR. So much for rapid reaction, Mr. 
Chairman. The force has turned into a farce as militant Serb forces 
moved against the enclaves in Srebrenica and Zepa, two U.N. protected 
areas, and they have done so with impunity. The fate of another 
enclave, Bihac, is very much in doubt as Serbs from Croatia have joined 
their Bosnian Serbian brethren in a military assault which continues, 
despite the promises to repel Croatian Serbs and to pull back from the 
area. A spokesman for the U.N. peacekeeping battalion in the Bihac 
pocket says there were no signs of a general withdrawal, and Serb 
military tanks and artillery that power the advances were going ahead.
  Mr. Chairman, just let me conclude very, very briefly. Prime minister 
Silajdzic has said over and over again, ``We do not need American 
troops there, but what we do need is the ability to defend ourselves.'' 
That is what they need the ability to do.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of S. 21, legislation passed 
in the Senate which would lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina upon a request from the Bosnian Government to the United 
States requesting a lift and a request from Bosnia to the United 
Nations requesting the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. An actual lift would 
take place, under this bill, 12 weeks from the date of the request to 
the United Nations. It also includes a provision extending that time 
frame in the event that such a withdrawal would require more time to 
complete.
  Mr. Chairman, exactly 20 years ago today President Gerald Ford and 
the leaders of 33 European countries and Canada gathered in Helsinki, 
Finland for the solemn signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. As a 
member, and now as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have 
witnessed first hand, the positive impact of the OSCE in helping to 
shape developments in Europe. In the two decades since this historic 
gathering, the Helsinki Accords have helped guide relations between the 
participating states from the dark days of the cold war through the 
dawning of democracy in the countries of East Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.
  Mr. Chairman, the commemoration of today's anniversary is 
overshadowed by the ongoing tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of 
the newer members to join the OSCE. It is fitting that the House 
consider S. 21, legislation to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia today, 
Mr. Chairman, for at no point over these past 20 years have the 
principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act been under greater 
attack than in the ongoing war of aggression and genocide in Bosnia. 
Over the course of the past 3 years, virtually each and every one of 
these principles has been violated by Serb militants in Bosnia and 
neighboring Croatia with devastating consequences for the people of 
these two countries.
  Tens of thousands of women and girls raped. Hundreds of thousands of 
innocent civilians killed in cold blood. Millions driven from their 
homes through a policy of ethnic cleansing. Wanton aggression and 
genocide in the heart of Europe 50 years after the victory over Nazi 
Germany. Promises of never again ringing curiously hollow in the face 
of genocidal practices and policies pursued by those bent on the 
destruction of the multiethnic state of Bosnia.
  The crisis in Bosnia has unmasked a crisis of leadership in the West 
characterized by confusion, contradiction, and ultimately acquiescence. 
While no one wants to be blamed for the bleeding of Bosnia, Mr. 
Chairman, no one is willing to intervene in order to stop it. For 3 
years, the international community has pursued a diplomatic process 
which has consumed considerable time and effort even as Bosnia and her 
people have been consumed by armed aggression and genocide. Whenever a 
new crisis has arisen, the response of the
 international community has been to convene yet another conference, 
issue another statement, or adopt a new resolution. So many words, so 
little action. Pursuit of policies largely intended to preserve the 
status quo have led to a dead end. With the passage of time, the policy 
options in Bosnia have been reduced. In fact, there are no easy options 
to pursue. This stark reality has only exacerbated the crisis in 
leadership over Bosnia.

  Left unchecked, Mr. Chairman, this crisis of leadership will only 
further erode vital institutions like the United Nations, NATO, the 
European Union, and the OSCE with direct political and economic 
consequences for the United States.
  Mr. Chairman, the international community has stood by as well-armed 
Serb militants, under the leadership of indicted war criminals Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, have pursued their genocidal policies bent 
on the destruction of Bosnia as a multiethnic state and the creation of 
a greater Serbia. At the same time, the government of the sovereign, 
independent, and recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
prevented from obtaining the means to defend itself and its people 
through the continued imposition of an arms embargo which has virtually 
guaranteed victory by the Serbs given their superiority in heavy 
weapons. The message is clear--might makes right.
  There is nothing to suggest that the militant Serbs, who have been 
allowed to wage their war of aggression and genocide in Bosnia with 
impunity, will be satisfied with anything less than the complete 
annihilation of that country. Their appetites whetted, what is to 
prevent them from moving against Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, or others 
in the region? If the militant Serbs were interested in striking a 
deal, they would have signed onto the contact group proposal presented 
over a year ago, accepted by Sarajevo, and repeatedly rejected by Pale.
  At this point, further negotiations with war criminals like Karadzic 
and Mladic or their benefactor in Belgrade, Slobodan Milosevic, can 
only yield results at the further expense of Bosnia. Appeasement by the 
West has only raised the stakes for a final settlement even as the 
militant Serbs pursue their aims on the ground.
  Herding Moslems and Croats into a shrinking number of ethnic ghettos 
is not the answer. If the international community has been unwilling to 
provide for the collective defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its 
internationally recognized borders, on what basis can it be expected to 
defend even a truncated Bosnia as suggested in a recent opinion piece 
by Charles Krauthammer.
  ``While the administration goes back and forth, more lives are being 
lost and the situation grows more desperate by the day.'' These words 
are not mine, Mr. Chairman, but an observation made by then-candidate 
Bill Clinton in October 1992 in the early months of a war which has now 
stretched over 3 years. For 30 months now President Bill Clinton has 
vacillated as even more lives have been lost and the situation has 
grown even more desperate. The United States has backed a diplomatic 
process which has led to a dead end. Mr. Chairman, no amount of 
tinkering is going to resuscitate the failed U.N. mission in Bosnia.
  Time and time again the administration has asserted that it was 
backing the one last chance to sustain the U.N. effort in Bosnia. It 
was the contact group proposal--that's been gathering dust on the table 
for over a year as the Bosnian Serbs have continued to wage 

[[Page H8092]]
their war of aggression and genocide on innocent civilians in so-called 
safe havens and elsewhere in Bosnia.
  The so-called rapid reaction force agreed to nearly 2 months ago was 
suppose to be the last great hope for UNPROFOR. Well so much for rapid 
reaction. Mr. Chairman, the force has turned into more of a farce as 
militant Serb forces moved against the enclaves Srebrenica and Zepa two 
U.N. protected areas with impunity.
  The fate of another enclave, Bihac, is very much in doubt as Serbs 
from Croatia have joined forces with their Bosnian brethren in a 
military assault which continues despite promises by rebel Croatian 
Serbs to pull back from the area. A spokesman for the U.N. peacekeeping 
battalion in the Bihac pocket said there were no signs of a general 
withdrawal and Serb artillery and tanks that powered advances almost to 
the heart of the pocket had not budged. So much for promises.
  At the end of last week, President Clinton, referring to NATO plans 
for aggressive bombing of Serb positions if they move on Gorazde or if 
other safe havens are imperiled, said, ``This is the last chance for 
UNPROFOR to survive.'' Well the robust bombing many, including myself, 
had hoped for has yet to materialize despite the latest attacks on 
Bihac. A spokesman in Brussels said last Thursday that NATO officials 
were ready to meet at a moment's notice to discuss plans for Bihac and 
Sarajevo. Mr. Chairman, attempts to fix UNPROFOR will only consume more 
precious time as the militant Serbs continue, with impunity, their 
campaign of aggression and genocide.
  Mr. Chairman, time and time again we are told that plans are being 
worked out and that it will take a couple of more planning sessions 
before everything is in place. By the time most of this planning has 
been completed, the plans have been overtaken by events on the ground. 
And the cycle goes on and on and on.
  President Clinton said the other day that he has decided ``we're 
either going to do what we said we're going to do with the U.N. or 
we're going to do something else.'' Mr. Chairman, this pretty much sums 
up the Clinton administration's failed Bosnia policy if it has one to 
begin with. Faced with the worst humanitarian crisis to strike Europe 
since the end of World War II, the Clinton administration has 
vacillated and equivocated time and time again. A crisis of leadership 
in a country which, until recently, was viewed, with pride, as the 
leader of the free world.
  Mr. Chairman, as the prime sponsor of H.R. 1172, I rise today to urge 
my colleagues to vote, as they did in overwhelming numbers and on a 
bipartisan basis on June 8, to lift the illegal, immoral, and inhuman 
embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the past, the Congress 
has sent mixed messages to the administration over policy toward 
Bosnia. I believe it is imperative that the Congress--House and 
Senate--speak with a single voice in support of Bosnia's inherent and 
sovereign right to self-defense. The June 8 House vote of 318 to 99
 confirmed that there is growing support on both sides of the aisle for 
ending this embargo once and for all.

  In the 7 weeks since the House vote the situation on the ground in 
Bosnia has gone from bad to worse. The safe havens of Srebrenica and 
Zepa have fallen. Militant Serbs continue their savage armed attacks on 
Bihac. Sarajevo is subjected to sporadic shelling. These and other 
developments underscore the urgency of lifting the arms embargo without 
further delay. Time is of the essence.
  While I would have preferred an immediate lifting of the embargo as 
envisioned in my bill, I am convinced that the Congress reach a 
consensus on the embargo sooner rather than later. The bill before us 
represents that consensus.
   Mr. Chairman, through inaction the United States and the 
international community have, in fact, become accomplices to genocide.
  I urge my colleagues to heed the message contained in the letter of 
resignation of the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the 
former Yugoslavia, former Polish Prime Minister Maziowieski, dated July 
27, 1995: ``We are dealing with the struggle of a state, a member of 
the United Nations, for its survival and multi-ethnic character, and 
with the endeavor to protect principles on international order. One 
cannot speak about the protection of human rights with credibility when 
one is confronted with the lack of consistency and courage displayed by 
the international community and its leaders. The reality of the human 
rights situation today is illustrated by the tragedy of the people of 
Srebrenica and Zepa.''
  He continues: ``The very stability of international order and the 
principle of civilization is at stake over the question of Bosnia. I am 
not convinced that the turning point hoped for will happen and cannot 
continue to participate in the pretense of the protection of human 
rights.''
   Mr. Chairman, it is time to stand by our principles.
   Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have asked us for one thing--the right to 
defend themselves and their country. Enough is enough. Mr. Chairman, it 
is time to put an end to the equivocation and vacillation which have 
characterized United States policy toward Bosnia. I urge my colleagues 
to uphold Bosnia's fundamental right to self-defense by voting to lift 
the arms embargo.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Combest], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this resolution. I have 
consistently opposed the lifting of the arms embargo in Bosnia, and I 
continue to maintain that consistency. I do not question the motives of 
those who strongly support this action. I respect their position, and I 
think it is a way to speak out against the atrocities that are 
occurring.
  However, this is not a free vote. Some people have said that a vote 
in favor of this resolution would be a condemnation of the 
administration's failed policy, and I would have to admit that that 
makes it very tempting, but I think it is much more than that. Mr. 
Chairman, I would hope that if this policy becomes the law of the land 
that I am wrong, because if I am not wrong, it is going to mean that 
there have been Americans that have died in Bonsia.
  If the proponents succeed and if the policy that is outlined becomes 
reality, supporters of this resolution had better be ready to support 
the engagement of American troops. I think it is important that these 
questions must be answered: Who provides the arms? How long does it 
take to put the arms in place? How long does it take to adequately 
train the Moslems? What happens to the Americans that are training and 
delivering those arms? Do we expect the Serbs to stand idly by? What do 
the Russians do about providing arms to the Serbs?
                              {time}  1215

  Mr. Chairman, there are too many unanswered questions, even before we 
consider the possibility of engaging Americans on the soil in Bosnia. 
All of the questions must be answered and all of the contingencies must 
be contemplated and the alternatives must be planned.
  Mr. Chairman, several years ago, we voted to authorize the use of 
force and military action in the Persian Gulf, and I did not, as any 
Member of this body, take that lightly or as an unconcerned bystander. 
At that time I had a son who wore a marine uniform to work every day 
and there was a great probability that he would wind up in the gulf, 
and yet I think the action that was taken that day was right. I 
supported it. It was right then, and I think it is right now. But I 
think that today is a substantially different question. Where is the 
American interest?
  Mr. Chairman, I would not vote to send my son to Bosnia, and I will 
not vote to send yours.
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would say that I would not worry about 
any message we may be sending to the rest of the world, as the previous 
speaker alluded to. Unfortunately, the administration has confused the 
rest of the world for so long with threats and promises never carried 
out, or changed their mind from day-to-day.
  Mr. Chairman, in the past I have not supported this resolution. I 
have not supported the resolution primarily because it was a unilateral 
effort and I did not think we should be in that kind of position, since 
we did not have the troops on the ground and other countries did. 
However, this resolution is different in that this resolution only 
takes effect as the U.N. forces leave or if the Bosnian Government 
indicates in writing that they want the U.N. forces out. Therefore, we 
have a totally different picture.
  So I will support this resolution. I do not stand here indicating 
that it is a great answer to a very serious problem. I know that what 
we have done in the past has not been effective and has caused millions 
to flee, other slaughtered. So it is our next best hope. But I will 
support the resolution since it is not unilateral in that the forces on 
the ground will already have gone, or they 

[[Page H8093]]
will be asked to leave by the Bosnian Government.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. Reed].
  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this bill.
  Today, the House of Representatives considers legislation to lift the 
arms embargo governing Bosnia. This proposal is a product of months of 
frustration and outrage as the killing goes on in Bosnia, as we witness 
scenes of calculated cruelty which we thought had been banished with 
the defeat of the Nazi tyranny 50 years ago, and as we observe the 
western powers and the United Nations fitfully grapple with the 
violence that has engulfed the former Yugoslavia.
  But, frustration and outrage, as sincerely and keenly felt as they 
may be, should not be the rationale or measure of our policies. Rather, 
we must look to the consequences of our actions; the consequences for 
ourselves as well as for the people of the former Yugoslavia.
  By lifting this embargo, we will guarantee only one thing: The level 
of violence in the former Yugoslavia will increase. Passage of this 
proposal will initiate a powerful and compelling dynamic among the 
combatants. For the Bosnian Serbs, the logic is quite clear; strike as 
quickly as you can with as much force as you can muster before the 
Bosnian Government can increase its military capabilities. For the 
Bosnian Government, the logic is equally clear; do not negotiate, 
continue to resist, and prepare through local offensives for the time 
when a reequipped Bosnian Army can mount a general offensive to reclaim 
territory lost to the Serbs.
  By lifting the embargo, we will precipitate the withdrawal of the 
U.N. mission and terminate the commitment of our European allies to 
maintain their troops in the former Yugoslavia. Having visited U.N. 
forces in the former Yugoslavia, I am acutely aware of their 
organizational shortcomings and, just as importantly, the lack of a 
clear and consistent policy objective to focus the use of military 
power. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR, for all its shortcomings, has limited 
the violence in Bosnia and prevented the expansion of violence into 
other regions of the former Yugoslavia.
  That is the conclusion of Gen. John R. Galvin, former NATO commander, 
one of the most distinguished military leaders of our generation and 
now the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University. In testimony before Congress in June, General Galvin stated 
that a ``key aspect for an understanding of the situation in Bosnia is 
our concept of the value of UNPROFOR. * * * They deserve more credit 
than we have been willing to give them.'' He went on to add in regard 
to UNPROFOR ``their multinational troops have given the world 
outstanding service. Moreover, any conceivable solution to the conflict 
will require some kind of international presence. We should keep the 
U.N. forces in Bosnia and not take action that would confound their 
efforts.''
  Lifting the arms embargo will accelerate the departure of UNPROFOR 
for several reasons. First, intensified fighting will further threaten 
the very survival of UNPROFOR forces which are scattered throughout the 
former Yugoslavia and are not organized for sustained and determined 
combat operations. Second, and arguably most critically, it will give 
our allies and the United Nations the political justification to cut 
their losses and withdraw. No longer would they be accused of 
abandoning their mission. Rather they could point to the unilateral 
action of the United States in frustrating the strategy of the world 
community.
  And as we consider this measure today, we should be acutely aware 
that the departure of the United Nations will trigger our announced 
policy of committing U.S. ground forces to assist in the evacuation of 
our allies. As such, if this proposal passes, we are taking a step 
closer to the introduction of American forces into the killing fields 
of the former
 Yugoslavia. Ironically then, today's vote may draw us into the battle 
and not, as some may argue, give us an easy way to remain aloof from 
the struggle.

  Lifting the arms embargo will not provide the Bosnian Government with 
the timely and decisive edge that it needs to counter the Bosnian 
Serbs. Individual weapons already are in plentiful supply in Bosnia. 
What is lacking are crew-served weapons such as artillery and tanks. 
The simple presence of these weapons is not sufficient for their 
effective use. Extensive training must be undertaken on many levels. On 
the technical level, crews must train to obtain basic proficiency. On 
the tactical level, units must be trained to integrate these weapons 
into effective combined arms teams. All of this takes time as well as 
outside expertise.
  Without training and external support, these arms are ineffective. 
Thus, today's vote is more about symbolism than practical and timely 
assistance to the Bosnian Government.
  Although lifting the arms embargo may assuage the sensibilities of 
the proponents, it will not resolve the conflict in Bosnia. Moreover, 
the escalation of combat resulting from this policy could spill over 
into other parts of the former Yugoslavia; particularly if other ethnic 
groups claim that they should be the beneficiaries of this policy of 
unrestricted access to the international arms bazaar.
  There are no easy solutions to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. 
Lifting the arms embargo is easy, but it will not resolve this crisis. 
Indeed, there is the very real possibility that it will escalate the 
fighting, precipitate the withdrawal of international forces, expand 
the fighting to other regions and draw United States ground forces into 
the deadly morass of Bosnia.
  What should we do? In the words of Gen. John Galvin ``stay with 
peacekeeping * * * recognize that a crisis such as this can be long and 
difficult * * * hold to our purpose [and] remember that permanent peace 
can come only if the combatants will it so.'' I urge rejection of this 
bill.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Gilman was allowed to speak out of order.)


                 In Memoriam: Thomas E. ``Doc'' Morgan

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my request is to inform my 
colleagues of the death of the former distinguished chairman of our 
House International Relations Committee, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, Thomas E. Morgan.
  ``Doc'' Morgan--as he was affectionately known to all of us--died 
peacefully yesterday afternoon in Fredericktown, PA. He was 88. ``Doc'' 
Morgan was first elected to this House in 1944, and retired on January 
2, 1977, after 32 years of distinguished service.
  He assumed the chairmanship of our House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
as it was then known, in 1959, and served as our able chairman for 17 
years. He was a friend and a mentor to all who knew him.
  Funeral services will be held Friday at 2 p.m. at the Methodist 
Church in Fredericktown. Flowers may be sent in care of the Greenlee 
Funeral Home, Fredericktown, PA. 15333.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the chairman of 
the committee making this announcement for the benefit of Members. It 
was my privilege, of course, to serve under Chairman Morgan. My 
recollection is he served as chairman of the committee, then the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, longer than any other person has ever 
done so.
  Mr. Chairman, our former colleague practiced medicine throughout his 
tenure in the Congress. He was very close to his constituents. He 
served any number of Presidents, I really do not know how many. He was 
a close confidant and adviser of several. He reflected great credit 
upon this institution, and all of us appreciate very much the 
contributions of his remarkable life and extend to his family our 
deepest sympathy. He was in all respects a most remarkable man.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for his 
remarks, and I would like to note that there will be a special order in 
memory of ``Doc'' Morgan at a later date.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would take the liberty at this time to thank 
the gentleman for advising this body of this tragic news.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  Mr. GEKAS. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I come to the decision that has to be made here with of 
course 

[[Page H8094]]
the age-old-mixed emotions. In the community which I serve in my home 
area, there are fellow Americans who have direct blood and emotional 
ties to the very area which we are considering here today as the focal 
point of this resolution. I have Americans of Serbian contact, of 
Slovenian blood, of Croatian allegiance, of Macedonian heritage, of 
Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat extraction.
  Mr. Chairman, what am I to do? They have strong feelings about what 
is happening. No matter what I do or how I vote, I will be perceived by 
one segment or another as taking sides. I can do nothing less than try 
to do the best I can in the situation we find ourselves; keeping their 
ideas and opinions in mind, of course, but then, rising above that and 
doing the best I can to try to help the American position, the U.S. 
Government position, in that morass that we find ourselves.
  Mr. Chairman, I will support this resolution, because I have answered 
one question that I posed to myself in this fashion. The question: What 
good did the placement of the embargo do in 1991? What is the result of 
the embargo that was forced on these parties in 1991? The answer is 
easy to come by. Rapes, killings, expansion of the war, attacks, safe 
haven victims, nonsafe haven victims, war of words, no resolution to 
the problem, continued bloodshed. We can do no worse than to lift that 
embargo and begin to help the President form a foreign policy in that 
region that will help all.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Gibbons].
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, let me say that I regret hearing the news about the 
death of Dr. Morgan. I was privileged to work with him and serve with 
him here, and he was a man of good common sense, and I feel that if he 
had been here today, he would be right where Mr. Hamilton is, warning 
us not to get involved any deeper in their situation.

                              {time}  1230

  Let me say everything I have to say is premised upon the fact that I 
feel terribly sorry for the Bosnians involved in this conflict. It was 
obvious that we were going to be on their side, despite the religious 
differences, because we want to keep peace in that area and we want to 
protect people's rights in that area. Had the Bosnians been winning, we 
would be here defending the Serbs, but that is not the case.
  The resolution is a feel-good, pass-the-buck resolution. It will 
allow us to go home and say we did something, despite the fact that it 
may not have been very rational; and we have got an answer for the 
people who stop us on the street, but it is not the right answer.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been through about five of these in my career 
here in Congress. Some of them have been not quite this serious, but 
they are all about the same. Every time there is any injustice done 
around the world, our good instincts urge us to go out there and get 
involved in it. But this is not America's war, this is not the United 
States' war, and we should not get involved in it.
  I want to make it very, very clear that if the
   President calls upon us to send troops, American troops, to this war 
zone, I will not support it. If we are called upon to appropriate money 
for the arms or any participation in this war, I will not support it.

  Mr. Chairman, anyone who is the least bit familiar with the history 
of this sad part of the world knows that this conflict has been going 
on for eons. These poor people who are involved in it now were born 
into this mess, and I feel terribly sorry for them. But there is no 
practical way we can help them.
  If we repeal the arms embargo unilaterally, as we do here, we will 
immediately give the Russians the excuse to supply arms to the opposing 
side. They are far closer to the conflict; they can transport their 
arms immediately to the areas, and the impact to the combatants is that 
the Serbs will have a lot more arms and more quickly and be able to do 
more damage to the Bosnians.
  Second, are we going to pay for the arms that the Bosnians purchase? 
I do not know who else would pay for them; obviously, we are going to 
have to.
  Third, what are we going to do when we Americanize this war? Are we 
going to then be prevailed upon to send ground forces into Bosnia, send 
more air forces into Bosnia? What are we going to do if this war 
expands, as it perhaps will do, as we add more fuel to the fire by 
supplying arms?
  I do not think America is ready for it. We have a humanitarian 
interest in this area, certainly, but we have no great national 
interest in this area, and it has been my experience that Americans do 
not get involved well or stay long where we do not have a great 
national interest involved.
  I hope that Members will take this vote very seriously, will realize 
that as well intended as they are, that this is just a feel-good, pass-
the-buck type of resolution. It will not put an end to this war; it 
will cause those forces that are there now under the U.N. command to 
pull out. The pillaging will go on, and before any effective 
intervention can be made by any side, the war will have come to an even 
worse conclusion than it may under any other set of circumstances.
   Mr. Chairman, this is not a wise resolution. It is humanitarianly 
motivated, but it will cause great suffering for the people who are on 
the ground there, and it will be something that we must pay a higher 
and higher price for as we go along.
  Vote ``no'' on this resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Traficant].
  (Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, we were not elected to Western Union to 
send messages; we are elected to the Congress of the United States.
  I support the bill. Current policy is a failure. Bosnian Moslems are 
being exterminated. Safe havens do not exist. They are, in fact, 
shooting galleries. U.N. peacekeepers are being held as human-hostage 
shields, allowing the aggressors to brutalize the victims.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues, how can we sit idly by and not 
even allow those brutalized victims to defend themselves, protect their 
homes, their wives, and their children?
  As far as getting involved in this, do we honestly believe that these 
Katzenjammer Cops who are over there are going to keep anybody out?
  Mr. Chairman, I support this bill, but let me say this: This is in 
Europe's backyard. Europe has got to respond. We are not the policeman 
for the world, but all free people should at least help those victims 
to defend themselves and protect their families. If we cannot do that, 
then freedom means very little to the Congress of the United States 
anymore.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Peterson].
  Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, we are looking for a solution. 
We are looking for the solution to the indiscriminate killing that has 
occurred in Bosnia over the last several years.
  For a moment, I thought lifting the embargo would be a solution. 
Maybe a few years ago, we would have made a difference. I do not think 
so now.
  Mr. Chairman, my major consideration comes from what happens when we 
do so. My major consideration is that we immediately place our allies' 
troops, our allies who have troops in Bosnia on the ground, in deep 
jeopardy.
  U.S. forces would immediately be withdrawn, and that has been well-
known. The United States would become responsible for the introduction 
of troops to assist in that withdrawal. If we agree to assist in 
supplying arms, then we must assume the responsibility for training the 
personnel in the use of those arms.
  There is a major cost fiscally, a major cost potentially in lives, 
for this action. I am not convinced we have exercised all the options 
that we have in the prospect of dealing with this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, our strength lies in the use of air power. At the same 
time, we do not want to take sides. I am convinced that the conflict 
has a solution only in negotiation and not on the battlefield. I say, 
freeze in place everything throughout the country on both sides with no 
military movement anywhere in Bosnia, period. 

[[Page H8095]]

  With air power, we can enforce this proclamation. Whoever, either 
side, becomes the target in the movement, we will force both sides to 
the table. We will bring about a negotiated settlement as we try to 
take away from the military solution and move into a diplomatic 
solution.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Florida yield?
  Mr. PETERSON of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the gentleman's conclusion.
   Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. Maloney].
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
resolution.
  It pains me to vote against my President on a foreign policy issue, 
but I support the lifting of the arms embargo of Bosnia.
   Mr. Chairman, we cannot wait even one more day before the United 
States changes its policy on the Balkans and takes active steps to stop 
the bloodshed and to halt the slaughter of innocents.
  What the world has witnessed in Bosnia is quasi-genocide, mass rape, 
and the denial of the Bosnian people to defend themselves against 
aggressive assaults.
  The U.N. policy has been a dismal failure.
  Safe areas are not safe.
  Weapon-free zones are filled with weapons.
  No-fly zones are filled with planes.
  And whatever humanitarian aid reaches the Bosnians does so at the 
sufferance of the Serbs.
  Lifting the arms embargo will not lead to wider U.S. involvement.
  Allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves is the only credible way 
to bring the fighting to an end.
  Without the lift, Serb atrocities will continue and the war will go 
on.
  And if we do not act now, we risk a much broader war involving the 
entire Balkans region. This tragic outcome would enhance the prospects 
of wider U.S. involvement.
  Therefore, we have both a strategic and a moral obligation to lift 
the embargo, and to do it right away.
  Mr. Chairman, I will never forget what Elie Wiesel said at the 
dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, just 1 mile from this 
Chamber.
  He turned to the President and said, ``Something--anything--must be 
done to stop the bloodshed. It will not stop unless we stop it.''
  Stop the slaughter.
  Support the amendment.
  Lift the embargo.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. King], a member of the House Committee on International 
Relations.
  Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I particularly thank the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman] for the tremendous leadership he has shown on this 
key issue, both as chairman of the committee and as a Member of this 
body.
  Mr. Chairman, I think there are certain points that should be made 
very clear at the outset. First of all, this is not a partisan issue; 
it is not a Democrat or Republican issue. It is a human issue, a moral 
issue, and it is an issue behind which all men and women of goodwill 
must rally to resist the aggression of the Serbs.
  Second, there is no moral equivalency in this war. This is not a case 
of two nations who just happen to be fighting each other, any more than 
there was any moral equivalency between Nazi Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. We are talking about the democratically elected 
government in Bosnia being attacked by the brutal dictatorship in 
Serbia.
  For those Members who say the United States should not get involved, 
the tragic fact is we are involved and, whether we admit it, we are 
involved on the side of the Serbs, because we are embargoing the 
weapons that are going to the victims. As long as we continue to allow 
that embargo to exist, then we stand with the Serbs.
  Mr. Chairman, there are other foreign policy ramifications, apart 
from the moral issue here. If the aggression is allowed to go 
undeterred by the Serbs, we are going to provide greater instability in 
that region. This can be an encouragement to Russia to move on its 
former republics, when it sees that the Western World stays silent in 
the face of such aggression.
  Also, what kind of a message are we sending to the Moslem world? We 
have denounced genocide for the past 50 years. We realized that the 
world stood by and did nothing during World War II and we have said, 
``Never again will we allow genocide to be carried out.'' Yet, there is 
genocide being carried out today against the Moslems and we are doing 
nothing about it.
  Apart from the moral ramifications, what does that do to our foreign 
policy posture in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt? We can go 
through all the Moslem, Arab countries and see what that has done to 
damage our reputation.
  In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I call for strong support of this bill. 
We have no choice. It is a moral imperative.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Parker].
  (Mr. PARKER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman, there comes a time in everyone's life when 
he or she must choose between two very bad choices. For me, this vote 
today is one of those times. For the last several years I have 
supported lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. I have made public 
statements to that effect and have criticized the foreign policy 
leadership of the Bush and Clinton administrations on this issue.
  But today, I will vote against this resolution. I no longer support 
lifting the embargo. Lifting the embargo will not make the slaughter in 
Bosnia go away. It will not right the wrong choices of the past. Bosnia 
is a tragedy and a failure for the entire world.
  This decision I have arrived at is not so much based on a meticulous, 
intellectual analysis of foreign policy. It is based on a deep-seated, 
gut-wrenching feeling that I, as a man, would live to regret a decision 
to the contrary.
  That's not to say that I have not given much thought to the matter 
and engaged in long and heated debates. I have. But I am absolutely 
convinced that the situation in Bosnia can get worse, far worse than it 
already is.
  The war can broaden throughout the region. Lifting the embargo now 
will lead to a withdrawal by the United Nations. The Europeans will 
wash their hands and when the war escalates into a larger Balkan 
explosion, the United States will be drawn in.
  That is the bottom line for me. I believe that a unilateral lifting 
of the embargo now--too late in my view--will lead to the use of 
American troops in the region and I am totally opposed to that course 
of action. I cannot accept the loss of a single American soldier in 
this insanity and that is the outcome that I believe I would have to 
live with if I voted for this resolution.
  I do not have the answer for Bosnia nor, it seems, does anyone else. 
I wish I had the solution to the ongoing genocide and horror of this 
war's innocent victims. I don't. What I do have is an unyielding 
determination to fight against including American sons and daughters, 
and mothers and fathers in this suffering.
  But let there be no misunderstanding. I can count votes and I believe 
this resolution is likely to pass. If it does, and if the promised veto 
is overridden, I will accept the commitment that we then acquire and 
will support whatever is necessary to honor that commitment. I believe 
that commitment will be the use of U.S. Armed Forces. But I, at least, 
will not regret that I failed to do all in my power to avoid that 
coming disaster.
                              {time}  1245

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Wolf], who has been a leader in the issue of lifting the 
arms embargo against Bosnia.
  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  I want to pay tribute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and 
the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] for their leadership on this 
issue.
  Before I speak, I want to say that there are good and decent people 
on both sides of the issue, and it is a difficult issue, and I am 
speaking for myself. I thank God, and I know that if the French had not 
needed us at Yorktown, we may not have been an independent nation. I 
will tell you, the British ought to thank God for the fact 

[[Page H8096]]
that Americans went to their rescue in World War II. So we talk about 
aid and what will make the difference. History ha been changed by 
people assisting other people.
  I have visited Bosnia three times. The first time I went there, I was 
with the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith], who is not here. We 
were in Vukovar just 2 weeks before Vukovar fell. When we went down in 
the cellars of Vukovar, the people there said, ``America? What will 
America do? Will America get involved?'' We did not get involved. We 
now see the reports, hundreds were killed; in fact, 204 people were 
taken out of the Vukovar hospital and killed by the Serbs and put in a 
mass grave.
  So we did not learn much of a lesson. We went on and maintained the 
embargo.
  The second time I went to Bosnia, I visited a Serb-run prisoner-of-
war camp. If you cannot see this picture, just go back and remember 
what ``Schindler's List'' was like, because this is what ``Schindler's 
List'' was like. The Moslem men would go like this, they would walk 
around, they would not look you in the eye. I went in a place, and I 
hollered, ``I am an American Congressman from America.'' They lit up 
like that. You could see they thought maybe finally somebody cares.
  Well, nothing more happened, and the embargo continued.
  The third time I went, I went to East Mostar, and this young lady, 
who is probably maybe dead now, had nothing whereby they were being 
attacked over and over first by the Serbs and then by the Crouts. We 
continued, we continued the arms embargo.
  Now, the geopolitic things are being talked about. Let us bring it 
down to where you and I and all of us are. It says, in the Golden Rule, 
it says, ``Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.''
 It does not say, ``Do unto others as you would not have them do to 
you.'' It says, ``Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.''

  Try to put yourself in this case. I am going to take one narrow 
slice. When we had the CSCE hearings, they said, the witnesses came and 
said there had been 20,000-some rapes in a country of less than 5 
million people. Let me read you the testimony from that one day, the 
expert said. He said:

       Most of the rapes occurred in detention facilities or in 
     custodial settings. Most of them occurred on a mass basis, 
     not only in terms of the repeated number of rapes against the 
     victim, but also the number of victims.

  In other words, the victims were rounded up.
  I will give you three examples in the town of Foca. There were three 
places where this occurred: the partisan hall where the women were 
brought in and raped and kept, and it was sort of a turning point where 
people would be brought in and out and raped and brought in and out and 
raped and brought in and out. In another place where women were kept 
for the satisfaction on rotation on a 15-day basis for soldiers coming 
in from the field, and I can identify with that one, because the people 
outside at risk, there was a little house there where women, young 
girls ranging in age from 11 to 17, were kept from 8 to 10 months, 8 to 
10 months in this house. They were all daughters of prominent persons 
in the cities, and they were ultimately ransomed.

       I interviewed,

he said,

       a 14-year-old or a 15-year-old who had been raped 
     repeatedly for 8 to 10 months, consistently by their guards. 
     I have seen an 11-year-old in a fetal position in a 
     psychiatric hospital in Sarajevo having given birth to a 
     child but having completely lost her mind.

  As fathers, forget the Congressmen and the Congresswomen, as fathers 
and as mothers, imagine you had to sit back and watch your wife raped 
in front of you, imagine that you watched your daughters raped in front 
of you, imagine that your sister is involved or, if you are woman, 
imagine that your daughter has been taken away, pulled out of your arms 
and taken away and is in a house in a village down the street, and you 
know the soldiers go in there day in and day out and your little 
daughter is in there.
  Talk about the geopolitical things. Forget it. Talk about what you 
would do if you were a father, and I say, God willing, if you were a 
father and if you were a mother, you would want the arms to defend 
yourself. But more important than defending your country, but to defend 
your mom and your wife or your daughter or your sister. That is what we 
are talking about.
  The Moslems have come to us and said over and over they do not want 
American troops. Do not hide behind this. There are no American troops 
involved.
  They have told us over and over. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Hoyer] has been there. They do not want American troops. So we are not 
voting on American troops.
  Second, under the U.N. Charter, they have the right to defend 
themselves. They have the right to defend themselves. That is all they 
want to do.
  No American troops. We are not voting on American troops. We are 
voting to lift the arms embargo.
  So enough of this Bosnian nation, but so these Moslem fathers and 
sons and mothers and daughters can defend something that is so 
important that, if each of us were in that situation, we would want to 
do.
  I strongly urge an ``aye'' vote to lift the embargo.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Callahan].
  (Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, in 1991, most all of us who are speaking here today 
stood in this very well to talk about whether or not we were going to 
involve ourselves in the Persian Gulf war, whether or not we were going 
to send our troops to Kuwait to defend the freedoms this country stands 
for. The President of the United States called, George Bush, and he 
urged us to support what the administration was doing. The Vice 
President, Dan Quayle, called, and Colin Powell called, and Jim Baker 
called, and we had a tremendous debate, one of the healthiest debates 
that ever took place on the floor of this House, over one thing, 
whether or not we were going to go along with our commander in chief of 
these United States and let him exercise his constitutional prerogative 
of international affairs.
  Today is no different. It was the hardest vote I have made since I 
have been in the Congress because I had to vote ``yes'' or ``no'' as to 
whether or not to involve people from my own district, placing their 
lives on the front liens of that encounter. And we won.
  Today we have a new commander in chief, Bill Clinton. I did not vote 
for President Clinton, but he is our commander in chief, and the 
Constitution very clearly gives the responsibility of foreign affairs 
to the President of the United States. We have a new Vice President, 
and we have a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all of 
these people who have been selected by the President to run our 
international affairs have come to us and pleaded with us to let them 
handle international policy.
  The statements by the previous speaker from Virginia are most 
compassionate statements. I could not agree with them more. No one in 
this House, no one, likes the atrocities that are taking place. No one 
of us will ever tolerate such atrocities, whatever section of the world 
it is in.
  Incidentally, it is taking place in other sections of the world. Why 
are we not here saying, ``Let's bomb, let's do something in Rwanda?'' 
Look at the horrible things that are taking place there, and I do not 
see a single one of you coming and saying, ``Let us do something about 
Rwanda''
  If we in this Congress are going to take over the responsibility of 
foreign affairs from the administrative branch of government, well, 
then, let us vote on that. Let's change the Constitution and do that.
  Are we going to tell our NATO allies that no longer does the 
President and the Secretary of State have the authority to enter into 
agreements with NATO forces? Are we going to say that just because the 
President thinks it is right and the French Government thinks it is 
right and the British Government thinks it is right and the Dutch 
Government thinks it is right, are we going to say we know more about 
the intricacies of this problem than they?

[[Page H8097]]

  We ought to leave to the President of the United States his 
constitutional authority. This question is not over the atrocities.
  Certainly, the Bosnian Moslems know that those of us in this 
Congress, 100 percent of those of us in this Congress, believe that 
they are being mis-treated by, the Serbians, and that this is wrong, 
and we want to correct that. That is why we are here. That is why we 
are there.
  Are we going to tell our NATO allies, ``All right, fellows, you are 
on your own. We are going to lift the embargo,'' The Russian duma has 
already passed
 a resolution saying if the United States votes to lift the embargo for 
the Moslems, then they are going to lift it for the other side.

  The arms embargo is not just on the Bosnian Moslem side. It is for 
the entire region. We are going to escalate the war, and we have 25,000 
allies there that we are going to have to get out of there.
  No matter which way you look at it, it is going to have to involve 
American troops.
  Let me say to you today that the issue is not on whether or not the 
Serbians are mistreating the Bosnians, because every evidence I have 
seen indicates that they are. But, in my opinion, we ought to recognize 
that the President and the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO and our Ambassador to the United Nations 
are all pleading with us to let them handle this international affair, 
to let them work with our allies, hopefully to gain some peaceful 
solution.
  I have conveyed to the President, which all of you should do, the 
direction that I think he should take. But for us to pass this 
resolution and for us to tell the world that our President, that our 
Chief of Staff, that our Secretary of State have no real authority, 
that the Congress is going to over-ride them, I think we are making a 
tremendous mistake.
  I would like to urge that the resolution be withdrawn, and if not, 
then I would like to urge you to vote against it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Barrett].
  Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of S. 
21, a bill that would lift the arms embargo that has been imposed on 
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the last 4 years.
  Unfortunately, the pursuit of peace has been met by turned backs and 
the guns of cruelty, inhumanity, and butchery. It should be apparent to 
everyone that neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Bonsian Moslems are 
prepared for, or desire peace.
  But, we must not fool ourselves, that passing this bill will absolve 
Congress, and our military, from further action in this troubled 
region. The President has already committed up to 26,000 U.S. ground 
forces to help speed the departure of U.N. peacekeepers. And, while we 
all may have differing opinions about the President's commitment, it is 
right and proper that we aid our allies as the our policy changes. We 
would expect nothing less if our roles were reversed.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support S. 21, and help close 
the book on a failed arms embargo policy that, has done nothing but 
continue the suffering of Bosnian Moslems.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Hastings] for yielding this time to me.
  Bosnia is a profound tragedy, a political, a moral, a military, a 
human tragedy. The brutality and depravity of Serbian aggression not 
only murders innocent Bosnian civilians, it defies the ability of words 
to express our outrage and disgust.
  A vote to lift the embargo may look like a good way to register the 
moral outrage that we all feel. But sound national security policy 
requires a careful examination of the consequences, if we were to lift 
the embargo--and I do not believe we should.
  Specifically, there are at least four unintended consequences that we 
have to face up to if we take the step of unilaterally lifting the 
embargo:
  First, it would lead to a decision by UNPROFOR to depart Bosnia and 
so lead to the very dangerous involvement of United States ground 
troops to extract the international force. Britain and France have 
already made it clear what they would do. We have an obligation, which 
we have already acknowledged, to help with the withdrawal that would 
necessarily put U.S. forces at real risk.
  Second and perhaps most problematic, lifting the embargo would almost 
inevitably lead to an expansion of the conflict. I do not believe Serb 
nationalists are going to be satisfied merely with territorial gains in 
Bosnia. And if the conflict spreads to other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, then Greece, Turkey, other regional powers are likely to 
get involved. And if that happens, the entire European security 
structure that has functioned so well for so many years is really 
likely to become at risk also.
  Third and even more serious is the probability of the Americanization 
of the conflict. If we are left with the moral responsibility for 
arming and training the Bosnian Army, having broken policy with our 
NATO allies, it seems to me very likely that the United States ends up 
alone trying to fill the void in terms of military support and 
humanitarian aid.
  Finally, our unilateral action could jeopardize cooperative efforts 
against rogue states now and in the future. Under the legal constraints 
of the U.N. Charter, this embargo cannot properly be lifted without the 
approval of the Security Council. If we violate our legal obligation to 
adhere to that embargo, we will undermine the credibility of other 
multilateral embargo efforts in the future, such as that that we want 
to see maintained against Iraq.
  What can we do? Sadly there are not a lot of good alternatives. But 
we can act, and we should act, to strengthen the U.N.'s ability and 
willingness to protect the remaining safe areas against Serb 
aggression. There have been improvements made in the recent weeks to 
make increased and, I hope, more effective use of air power in the 
event of any attack against the enclave of Gorazde. And I want to see 
that extended to other areas that ought to receive strong NATO support 
as well.
  By increasing the price of aggression I believe our power can enhance 
the chances of diplomatic settlement. But a congressional vote now to 
go it alone and lift the embargo will provide our allies with a 
rationale for withdrawal. It will tend to Americanize the conflict at a 
time when the American people do not have a sense of a significant 
American interest there. And I am afraid it would ultimately result not 
in an improvement to this awful, awful situation, but to a further 
disintegration, further humanitarian calamity, and further outrages at 
the hands of the Bosnian Serbs.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Paxon].
  Mr. PAXON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution 
and commend the sponsors for their leadership.
  My colleagues, many Members of this House and I know many American 
citizens have traveled to Israel and to Jerusalem where they have had 
the chance to visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum, and in that very 
moving museum there is a specially moving place that is the Children's 
Memorial. It is a memorial to several million children who died at the 
hands of the Nazis. When one stands in that room, that dark room, they 
can hear the voices of those children saying, ``Never again. Never 
again stand by while a modern-day Hitler carries out another genocidal 
campaign.''
  For those of us who have heard those voices and for the millions and 
millions of Americans who have already been to our own Holocaust Museum 
at the foot of this hill, today is a day of important historical note 
because, my colleagues, the modern-day Hitlers are at it, and it is not 
far away and far removed from our lives. It is on CNN every single day 
and every single night. They are not faceless people. Their names are 
Milosevic and Karadzic and others who we see
 on the television who are running the rape 

[[Page H8098]]
camps and the torture camps and committing the violence that the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] just a few minutes ago so 
graphically described. The genocide is called ethic cleansing, but it 
is nothing more, nothing less, than the action of the Serbs designed to 
wipe from the face of the Earth the Bosnian Moslems.

  Now through our arms embargo I am embarrassed to say we have been 
party to this outrage through two administrations and through several 
Congresses. We have tied the Bosnians' hands while the Serb aggressors 
have had free rein to rape, and to brutalize, to tear apart families 
that will never be joined together again, and to murder innocent men, 
women, and children whose only crime is that they have a Moslem name.
  Two years ago the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Molinari], the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. King], the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Engel], and I went to Bosnia, and they said to us at the time, ``Don't 
send your troops here. We don't want young American men and women 
fighting our battle.'' All they asked then, and all they ask today, is 
to unchain their hands, to give them the weapons to defend their 
children, and their lives, and their husbands, and their neighbors, and 
their people. That is a certain way to insure that American troops do 
not end up there, as I believe they will if we do not take this action 
today.
  As I indicated, I feel very strongly that two administrations have 
mishandled the Bosnian tragedy. It is not Bill Clinton alone. George 
Bush was in the White House also. I disagreed with George Bush, as I do 
with Bill Clinton, but the time for disagreement is over. The time for 
action is here today. Let us not be here months from now or years from 
now looking back and saying, ``We didn't try, we didn't take this 
stand.'' Let us support the resolution.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar], one of the most senior Members 
of this body.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Hoyer] for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, last year I voted against unilateral lifting of the 
sanctions. I have changed my mind. The administration's best efforts 
have not been supported by the international community, the killing 
continues, the balance of power continues to shift to the numerically 
larger and stronger Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Moslems do not have the 
equipment they need to defend themselves, their families, and their 
land. If the international community, the United Nations and NATO, are 
not willing to launch sustained, massive air strikes with overwhelming 
force against the Bosnian Serb Army to deter the aggression, then the 
allies must in fairness lift the embargo and allow the Bosnians to 
defend themselves.
  I have no illusions about the consequences. There will be increased 
security risks for the UNPROFOR peacekeepers. It may be necessary to 
introduce United States troops directly into Bosnia to help withdraw 
the peacekeepers. More arms in the country will mean more killing, a 
widening of the conflict, and prolonging the war. But, in the current 
circumstances, the war does continue under international auspices, and 
that is what my conscience cannot condone. If we are not willing to 
risk American lives in Bosnia--and we should not; if we are not willing 
or able to seal the arms and economic embargo against the Bosnian Serbs 
and their ``greater Serbia'' patrons, then we should remove the 
shackles from the Bosnian Moslems, who seek only to defend their 
homeland and their families and pass this resolution.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Sisisky].
  Mr. SISISKY. A strange dilemma happened this weekend. It seems 
everywhere I went, I thought they would be, people would be, talking 
about the appropriation bills that we had last week, but they were not. 
They were talking about Bosnia. They have watched television. They do 
not know an awful lot about it. But they do ask the question: What is 
the American interest there? Why should we be there? I tell them 
basically that we are there because of the carnage and we do not want 
to expand on the European continent.
  I will be very honest with my colleagues. I was not in favor of the 
embargo. I think it is wrong. But we have the embargo now, and I am 
opposed to the unilateral lifting of the embargo.
  A lot of people say, ``Well, what is the United Nations doing? 
UNPROFOR is not doing anything.'' I would remind them that in 1992 
there were 130,000 deaths in Bosnia; in 1994, there were 3,000 deaths, 
as best that we could calculate. Still too many, much too many. There 
are rapes going on there. There are children being killed. All of us 
know that.
  Yes, I have been to Yad Vashem, and it is easy to bring that up, 
never again, but America is not turning its back on Bosnia. We have 
forces in the Adriatic, we have forces in Italy, and we are ready to do 
what we need to do under the auspices of the United Nations and NATO.
  My colleagues, the rapid reaction forces are there now. The Europeans 
have finally got into the act. But if we unilaterally lift this 
embargo, I believe that the Europeans will pull out and we will have to 
have 25,000 troops just to protect the withdrawal. But even more than 
that, if the Europeans pull out and the United Nations pulls out, there 
is no food coming in, we lift the embargo, who is going to train them? 
Who is going to train the command and control and how to use 
sophisticated arms? American soldiers.
  I am not willing to do that yet. I am willing to let the United 
Nations, and NATO, and the Europeans try their hand now.
  All I can say is we are at a crossroads, things may break. Nobody 
knows what the right answer is. But I can tell my colleagues in my 
opinion, and I hope I am right, it is wrong to unilaterally lift the 
embargo, and I would hope that the members would vote against the 
resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
  (Mr. RAMSTAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
                              {time}  1315

  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of lifting the unjust and 
unconscionable arms embargo on Bosnia. For too long now the world has 
heard of countless atrocities from the war in Bosnia: Women 
systematically raped and tortured, men forcibly separated from their 
unarmed families and gunned down without being able to defend 
themselves, all in the name of ethnic cleansing, all during the arms 
embargo.
  Mr. Chairman, let us call a spade a spade. Let us call ethnic 
cleansing by its real name: Genocide. The key question we must answer 
today with our vote, each and every one of us here in this body, is 
this: How much longer can we sit by and force the Bosnian Moslems to 
defend themselves from genocide with one arm tied behind their backs?
  The people of Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, are at a breaking point. This 
vote today will show them that the United States will not turn its back 
on genocide. Let us not turn our backs on people who have the right to 
defend themselves, let us not turn our backs on the Bosnian Moslems. I 
urge a ``yes'' vote to lift the arms embargo.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 5 
minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], 
ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I rise today in opposition 
to the bill, S. 21, the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act 
of 1995. I urge my colleagues to resist the temptation that there 
exists such an easy solution to end the killing and the suffering in 
that region of the world.
  Mr. Chairman, one of my colleagues quoted President Bush's statement 
that we have a unique opportunity and responsibility to do the hard 
work of freedom. While I agree with that sentiment, lifting the embargo 
is the easy work, and I believe the wrong choice. Seeking a successful 
termination of 

[[Page H8099]]
the conflict, an end to the violence and a resolution of the underlying 
dispute is indeed the hard work that should engage our attention.
  Mr. Chairman, understand the probable consequences of lifting the 
embargo. First, we would see an immediate escalation of the fighting as 
the Bosnian Serb forces seek to win as much territory on the ground 
before the Bosnian Government forces can be armed and trained to use 
those arms.
  Second, it would take, Mr. Chairman, 6 months to 1 year before the 
Bosnian Government will be capable of fielding and employing these new 
weapons. During this period, the Bosnian people will be at an even 
greater risk of attack and genocidal victimization.
  Third, the United States would take a final and unambiguous 
commitment toward one side of this conflict, with all of the moral 
implications that arise from making such commitments.
  Fourth, we will cause a rupture between ourselves and our NATO 
allies.
  Fifth, we eliminate the moral authority with which the United States 
presses the case for embargo against Serbia and for other places such 
as North Korea and Iraq.
  Mr. Chairman, understand the possible consequences of lifting the 
embargo. First, the United States will find itself pulled directly into 
the conflict because it will be compelled to shoulder the moral 
responsibility to defend the Bosnian people during the period of 
transition before the weapons are fielded. Can we simply stand by and 
allow people to die in the tens of thousands? I believe not.
  Second, the war, in this gentleman's opinion, Mr. Chairman, will 
surely widen, possibly spread into other republics emerging from the 
former Yugoslavia, possibly sparking conflict between Greece and 
Turkey, drawing Russia into the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs 
or their Belgrade allies.
  Mr. Chairman, these would be the awful consequences of taking the 
easy course in response to the list of horrors that have been offered 
up on the floor of Congress today. Unless those supporting the lifting 
of the embargo are prepared to have the United States shoulder the 
defense responsibilities for civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
the period when they would be armed, I would also argue that it would 
not be the moral choice.
  Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to offer a critique to those who would 
seek, and I would believe in good faith, to end the civilian anguish of 
offering military equipment to the Bosnian Government through a lifting 
of the embargo. What other path exists to end these horrors? How do we 
successfully undertake the hard work on behalf of freedom and morality? 
Without revisiting the long list of diplomatic mistakes that have 
occurred since Yugoslavia began to dissolve, let me describe the other 
path that exists to secure peace to end the genocide and punish those 
responsible for international law violations.
  First, Mr. Chairman, we should seek an immediate cease-fire and 
reconfirm to all parties that the primary mission of the U.N. forces in 
Bosnia are to secure the safety of civilians and not take sides in the 
conflict.
  Second, the U.N. force should be made sizable enough and capable 
enough to discharge their mission to prevent ethnic cleansing and to 
ensure that humanitarian relief arises. This will require an urgent re-
examination of decisions to intervene in a manner that appears to 
violate the first rule of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance: 
Take no sides; make no enemies.
  The no fly zone enforcement and one-sided close air support campaigns 
have, in this gentleman's opinion, violated such a norm, and, thus, 
compromised the mission and led to attacks on the safe areas.
  Third, we should continue to press vigorously for a continuation of 
the war crimes tribunals to deal with the genocide that has occurred in 
Bosnia rather than to escalate the violence.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that the manner in which the 
former Yugoslavia dissolved in the first place generated this conflict 
because it failed to properly manage the conflicting claims for new 
nationhood. In order to end the war that has resulted from this 
miscalculation, we must seize upon possibilities that do exist for a 
realistic resolution of the underlying claims and which would create a 
viable and defendable Bosnian nation.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to reject the proposed easy work 
that lifting the embargo represents and thereby avoid its disastrous 
consequences. Let us do the morally based hard work for freedom and 
morality. I urge my colleagues to reject the bill before the body at 
this time, and I thank my colleague for his generosity.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bentsen], one of our most valuable Members.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of lifting the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and allowing the people of Bosnia to defend themselves 
against aggression and genocide.
  There is an old saying I'm sure we've all heard: ``Fool me once, 
shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.'' The United Nations has been 
shamed more than twice in Bosnia as we've hidden an unworkable policy 
while the Serbs slaughtered, raped, and tortured more than 200,000 
Bosnian people. Today we in the United States can end the shame and 
begin to lead by lifting the arms embargo.
  Those who oppose this legislation argue that lifting the embargo 
would end the United Nations peacekeeping mission and increase American 
involvement in the Bosnian war.
  But the sad truth is the U.N. mission has failed and unfortunately, 
the United States is involved in Bosnia, not with troops on the ground, 
but through our international credibility and our moral authority which 
are at stake. The best way to preserve that credibility and authority 
is to show leadership, and the best way to show leadership is by 
lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.
  We will hear many arguments that we should give other approaches a 
chance to work. Give the latest ultimatum time to work. Give the United 
Nations one final chance.
  These are the same excuses we have heard time and time again. These 
excuses have utterly failed to stop Serbian aggression and ethnic 
cleansing. All they have done is severely eroded our credibility and 
that of our allies.
  So it is time to end the excuses and lift the embargo. The right 
policy is to allow the Bosnian people to defend themselves against this 
modern holocaust. There are those who would argue that lifting the 
embargo will result in unnecessary bloodshed, death, and escalation of 
hostilities, but if you talk to the Bosnian people they will tell you 
that the war cannot become any worse.
  I recently met with a Bosnian refugee living in Houston. Her name is 
Jasmina Pasic and she ran a school in the basement of her bombed-out 
apartment building for 2 years during the siege of Sarajevo. She was 
finally forced to flee and is now separated from her family.
  Jasmina dreams of returning home. ``In five years maybe I can see 
it,'' she says, ``but I don't know if it will be in the war or we will 
have freedom.'' Today, I will vote to lift the embargo because I 
believe it will help Jasmina Pasic and her fellow Bosnians fight back 
to attain that freedom and defend themselves against this grotesque 
human tragedy which calls into question the moral compass of the entire 
world.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher], a member of the Committee 
on International Relations.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
motion to end the embargo against the victims of Serbian aggression.
  During this debate it has been very clear by all who have 
participated that Serbia is clearly the aggressor. They are criminals. 
They are engaged in criminal activity. The victims are the Croatians 
and Bosnians, and we are talking about what to do about it.
  Mr. Chairman, I would submit for the Record a letter from Margaret 
Thatcher, who says, and I quote, ``We owe it to the victims at last and 
at least to have the weapons to defend themselves since we ourselves 
are not willing to defend them. The arms embargo was always morally 
wrong.''
  Mr. Chairman, I would submit this entire letter from Margaret 
Thatcher to Senator Dole for the Record. 

[[Page H8100]]

  Lifting the arms embargo, Mr. Chairman, means less violence, not 
more. Let us get that straight. We have been talking about this all day 
now. What does it mean to lift the arms embargo? There will be less 
violence in that part of the world if we lift the arms embargo. Like 
all bullies and all aggressors and all criminals, the Serbs have been 
more aggressive as a result of the weakness of their victim. If those 
villagers could have defended themselves against tanks, there would 
have been fewer attacks made against those villages. The ethnic 
cleansing would not have taken place had those people, had the victims 
had the technology, the weapons to defend themselves.
  Mr. Chairman, what happened was the criminals have had to pay no 
price for their crime against the victims. The criminal regime in 
Serbia has paid no price, and this has been going on for 4 years. 
Therein lies the solution.
  No. 1, let the victims defend themselves. Let them have the weapons 
to defend themselves. No. 2, make the criminal regime of Mr. Milosevic 
and Serbia pay the price for the murder, rape and mayhem unleashed by 
Serbia against its neighbors in Croatia and Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, how do we make Serbia pay a price and deter aggression? 
Naysayers claim either we must do everything, send U.S. troops and put 
them on the ground, or do nothing and just let this go on and on and 
on, not even lift the embargo so people can defend themselves. All the 
questions have to be answered before we can even let someone defend 
themselves.
  Think about it, Mr. and Mrs. America. Someone next door is being 
raped and murdered. A neighbor is being raped and murdered, but you 
have to answer all the questions before you can help your neighbor, 
throw your neighbor a gun or a stick to defend his family. No, you 
don't have to wait to answer all the questions, you know what is right 
and wrong.
  It is time for us to side with the victim and make sure that that 
victim can defend himself and his family. America is going to be a 
major force in the world if we have the courage to act and to be bold. 
That does not mean we have to be reckless and take chances.
  In this post-cold-war war world, we will face challenges of evil 
people. They might not be like the Soviet Union, a massive evil force, 
but we had the courage to stand against the Soviet Union, and that is 
why it crumbled. That is why we were able to save the world a holocaust 
of a world war three because we were bold and we were strong.
  At the very least, the Milosevices of the world, this little 
pigsqueak gangster in Serbia, who is murdering innocent people in his 
neighboring countries, should know there will be a price to pay. At the 
very least, a minuscule use of American air power against Serbia, not 
against Bosnia, no, not in the neighboring countries but in Serbia, 
would convince the Milosevic regime to leave their neighbors alone. In 
fact, the Melosevic regime, just like communism in the Soviet Union, 
would likely crumble before a minuscule use of American power.
  Mr. Chairman, let us be bold. Let us permit those who are victims to 
stand up and defend themselves, and let us make sure the world knows 
that America has the courage to lead the world in the post-cold-war 
era.
  The letter previously referred to is as follows:

         Margaret, The Lady Thatcher, O.M., P.C., F.R.S., House of 
           Lords,
                                            London, July 18, 1995.
       Dear Senator Dole: I am writing to express my very strong 
     support for your attempt to have the arms embargo against 
     Bosnia lifted.
       I know that you and all members of the United States Senate 
     share my horror at the crimes against humanity now being 
     perpetrated by the Serbs in Bosnia. The U.N. and NATO have 
     failed to enforce the Security Council Resolutions which 
     authorized the use of force to defend the safe havens and to 
     get humanitarian assistance through. The safe havens were 
     never safe; now they are falling to Serb assault. Murder, 
     ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and torture are the legacy of 
     the policy of the last three years to the people of Bosnia. 
     It has failed utterly. We owe it to the victims at last and 
     at least to have the weapons to defend themselves--since we 
     ourselves are not willing to defend them.
       The arms embargo was always morally wrong. Significantly, 
     it was imposed on the (then formally intact but fragmenting) 
     former Yugoslavia at that regime's own behest. It was then, 
     quite unjustly and possibly illegally, applied to the 
     successor states. Its effect--and, as regards the Serbs, its 
     intention--was to ensure that the proponents of a Greater 
     Serbia, who inherited the great bulk of the Yugoslav army's 
     equipment, enjoyed overwhelming military superiority in their 
     aggression. It is worth recalling that the democratically 
     elected, multi-faith and multi-ethnic Bosnian Government 
     never asked for a single U.N. soldier to be sent. It did ask 
     for the arms required to defend its own people against a 
     ruthless aggressor. That request was repeatedly denied, in 
     spite of the wishes of the U.S. administration and of most 
     leading American politicians.
       There is no point now in listing the failures of military 
     policy which subsequently occurred. Suffice it to say that, 
     instead of succeeding in enforcing the mandates the U.N. 
     Security Council gave them, UNPROFOR became potential and 
     then actual hostages. Airpower was never seriously employed 
     either. The oft repeated arguments against lifting the arms 
     embargo--that if it occurred U.N. troops would be at risk, 
     that the enclaves like Srebrenica would fall, that the Serbs 
     would abandon all restraint--have all now been proved 
     worthless. For all these things have happened and the arms 
     embargo still applies.
       Two arguments are, however, still advanced by those who 
     wish to keep the arms embargo in place. Each is demonstrably 
     false.
       First, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would 
     prolong the war in Bosnia. This is, of course, a morally 
     repulsive argument; for it implies that all we should care 
     about is a quick end to the conflict without regard to the 
     justice or otherwise of its outcome. But in any case it is 
     based on the false assumption that the Serbs are bound to 
     win. Over the last year the Bosnian army has grown much 
     stronger and the Bosnian Serbs weaker. The Bosnian army has, 
     with its Croat allies, been winning back crucial territory, 
     while desertion and poor morale are badly affecting the over-
     extended Serb forces. What the Bosnian government lacks 
     however are the tanks and artillery needed to hold the 
     territory won and force the Serbs to negotiate. This lack of 
     equipment is directly the result of the arms embargo. Because 
     of it the war is being prolonged and the casualties are 
     higher. Lifting the arms embargo would thus shorten not 
     lengthen the war.
       Second, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would lead 
     to rifts within the U.N. Security Council and NATO. But are 
     there not rifts already? And are these themselves not the 
     result of pursuing a failed policy involving large risks to 
     outside countries' ground troops, rather than arming and 
     training the victims to repel the aggressor? American 
     leadership is vital to bring order out of the present chaos. 
     No country must be allowed to veto the action required to end 
     the present catastrophe. And if American leadership is truly 
     evident along the lines of the policy which you and your 
     colleagues are advancing I do not believe that any country 
     will actually try to obstruct it.
       The West has already waited too long. Time is now terribly 
     short. All those who care about peace and justice for the 
     tragic victims of aggression in the former Yugoslavia now 
     have their eyes fixed on the actions of the U.S. Senate. I 
     hope, trust and pray that your initiative to have the arms 
     embargo against Bosnia lifted succeeds. It will bring new 
     hope to those who are suffering so much.
       With warm regards.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                Margaret Thatcher.

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston], the chairman of the 
Committee on Appropriations.
  (Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I think my friend from Indiana for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to this resolution and 
to urge its defeat. While in the past I have spoken for and even voted 
for the lifting of the arms embargo, I have reappraised my position, 
and I have decided that to do so would be a terrible mistake.
  Granted that the current situation is intolerable, and that the 
approach taken by our allies in Europe by way of the United Nations 
must change, and must change drastically, this unilateral step by the 
United States would bear consequences so far removed from reason and 
common sense, that on proper reflection, it could be one of the worst 
steps we could take.
  Mr. Chairman, I want there to be no mistake in my position. If I 
thought this resolution would bring peace to Bosnia, if I thought this 
resolution would allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves and 
thwart Serbian aggression, if I thought this resolution would bring a 
measure of social justice to Bosnia I would support it. Unfortunately 
it does none of these things. 

[[Page H8101]]

  Adoption of this resolution will simply mean the end of the U.N. 
mission in Bosnia. It will signal to our NATO allies, especially the 
French and the British troops on the ground that we do not care if they 
withdraw. It will put those troops at risk. It will put hundreds of 
thousands of refugees at grave risk, and it would damage the NATO 
alliance beyond repair.
  Moreover, it would most certainly lead to the very commitment of U.S. 
troops to a European war that the sponsors of the resolution probably 
wish to avoid.
  Why? Because UNPROFOR troops are already on the ground and scattered 
about Bosnia, many in wholly indefensible enclaves surrounded by 
Bosnian Serbs.
  When they begin to pull out, the Bosnian Serbs will move in to take 
their place, and the Bosnian Moslems will become entirely vulnerable 
and defenseless. Will they allow the U.N. to abandon them? I doubt it. 
So UNPROFOR could very well find its forces exposed to attack by both 
Serbs and Moslems, with little opportunity to defend their own troops.
  Thus, U.S. troops will be called on to help evacuate them, not just 
with air cover, but with ground support--with lots of American lives.
  Mr. Chairman, I remain second to no one in my belief that the Bosnian 
Moslems should be allowed to defend themselves. But will that happen? 
Will the United States then sell arms to the Bosnians? Will we put 
troops in the ground to train them with our weapons? Will the Bosnians 
have an adequate command and control structure? Will their officer 
corps be capable of technical and tactical competence? Will they be 
given intelligence capability?
  Will they have a fair chance against the Bosnian Serbs? If so, will 
the neighboring Serbians stay out of the fight? Will the Russians, the 
Turks, the Greeks? What if the fight spills into Macedonia, or Kosovo, 
or Albania? Is this the first step of another world war?
  We are reaping the multiple effects of a failed policy. The Vance-
Owen plan to force ethnic groups into enclaves or cantons was a total 
catastrophe. It has left us with pictures of places like Srebernica and 
Zepa and Gorazde where Serbian thugs backed by Russian military might 
are given license to murder, rape, and ethnically cleanse. The 
President says he is drawing the line on Gorazde. But what does that 
mean? Will massive U.S. air power do what diplomacy has failed to so 
save the lives of innocent women and children in Gorazde? I doubt it.
  What is the end game for Bosnia? Can the Bosnian Moslems be 
consolidated into an area where a cease-fire can hold and a military 
position be staked out to give them some security? That may be the only 
solution but we can't get there under this resolution, or under the 
Clinton plan.
  Mr. Chairman, again, what is the end game in Bosnia? We are 
considering this resolution today because men and women of good will on 
both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol cannot stand the 
spectacle of the worst foreign policy debacle in the past decade. This 
resolution represents something, and the status quo is unacceptable. 
Unfortunately, after the arms begin to flow and after the massive air 
strikes the President wants, we still don't know the end game. There is 
none. Only more suffering.
  I do not have a good answer for Bosnia, but I do not think this 
resolution is the answer. I do think it is important to keep our NATO 
alliance together. I think it is critical to address the refugee 
problem. I think it is necessary to bring about a cease-fire. I think 
it is vital we keep a NATO military presence in Bosnia. I do not see 
those things happening if we pass this resolution today. So I regret I 
must oppose it in the hope that we can do better later.
  And I believe we can, if the Bosnian Moslems can and will centralize 
in a simple, clearly defined, and cohesive portion of Bosnia which 
becomes a defensible, predominantly Moslem region.
                              {time}  1330

  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Wisconsin [Mr. Gunderson].
  (Mr. GUNDERSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, we cannot today dictate the moral 
compass of civilized society, and we cannot today dictate the moral 
compass of even the United Nations or our NATO allies. But I think 
today we will determine the limits beyond which the American people can 
no longer tolerate business as usual in Bosnia.
  I call upon my colleagues in this Congress to take a good look at the 
reality, the stark reality before us. Over 200,000 people have been 
killed; over 20,000 have been raped, over 4,000 children have been 
displaced and await some kind of placement; and over 2.75 million 
people have already been driven from their homes and their personal 
belongings stolen.
  I am reminded of those words of Pastor Martin Niemoller shortly after 
World War II when he wrote,

       First they came for the communists; I was not a communist, 
     so I did not object. Then they came for the Jews; I was not a 
     Jew, so I did not object. Then they came for the trade 
     unionists; I was not a trade unionist, so I did not object. 
     Then they came for the Catholics; I was not a Catholic, so I 
     did not object. Then they came for me, and there was no one 
     left to object.

  I am not Bosnian, and I am not Moslem. But, Mr. Chairman, I am 
appalled by how we have failed to learn the lesson of history and how 
we stand by to watch the rape, the murder, and the pillage of a people. 
We say nothing and we do nothing, and we let history dictate its 
results.
  Ideally I would suggest that the Western world would be moved to 
simply go in and impose a peace where there is no peace and to impose 
civilization where there is none. But if we are unwilling to do today 
what we were willing to do in 1991, then let us at least be willing to 
let them defend themselves.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, the German chancellor of the last century, 
Bismarck, once remarked that the Balkans are not worth the bones of one 
Pomeranian grenadier.
  I say to you today that the Balkans are not worth the life of one 
American soldier. We are on the brink, Mr. Chairman, of a major 
international mistake. To those that would support this resolution, I 
say you do not know what you do. Oh, how simple it sounds. Level the 
playing field, let them fight back. But we should look, in the light of 
history, into the consequences of what lifting this embargo would be.
  First and foremost, it would be a death knell for many Bosnian 
Moslems, because the Serbs will intensify their attack before any 
training and any additional weapons can reach them.
  Second, the UNPROFOR forces will come out. They will leave, and they 
will ask and receive help by the American forces. Of this I will speak 
a bit later.
  Third, the United States will be asked to fill the void, first to 
train, then to supply, and when that fails, to fight. Those who look at 
more recent history see that there is a great parallel to this and our 
tragedy
 in Vietnam, and it could be all that all over again.

  Fourth, outside forces will enter the conflict. Russia has already 
stated that should we enter the conflict on one side, they will on 
behalf of the Serbs. What about the other Moslem countries in the area, 
the other orthodox countries in the area? We will have the tinderbox 
once again that started the First World War.
  Fifth, it destroys any prospects for a negotiated settlement. We have 
been trying. As a matter of fact, it seems that the Serbs, of all 
people, are willing to talk and negotiate, and we find that the Moslems 
have been less prone to do the negotiating.
  Sixth, it will cause a strain with our allies. The United Kingdom and 
France have soldiers there on the ground. It will cause us a great deal 
of trouble with them.
  Last, it will irreparably harm NATO.
  For all of these things and all of these reasons, we should not lift 
this embargo. Further, it will Americanize the conflict in one of two 
ways: Either to fill the void of which I spoke, to help with supplies, 
to train, logistics, and, sadly, to fight; or it will Americanize it 

[[Page H8102]]
by helping UNPROFOR withdraw, for which our President has already 
pledged some 25,000.
  To withdraw this UNPROFOR force will not be easy. We look at the 
tunnels, the narrow roads, the dangerous situation in which we find the 
various UNPROFOR forces today, and our country has pledged 25,000 of a 
110,000 force to withdraw them. We will have serious problems in 
getting that job done.
  Heed the remarks of Bismarck. Heed our words today when we speak 
about not getting involved. This is really a vote as to whether to get 
America involved in this conflict or not. History tells us that this 
part of the world has repeated itself and repeated itself by finding 
the inhabitants at each others' throat for centuries. We will not 
change that.
  The best thing we can hope for is a negotiated settlement. We have 
been trying. We should give it one last chance, for if we do not, we 
will find ourselves in an Americanized conflict for which we did not 
ask. The consequences of lifting this embargo would be disastrous for 
them and for our country.
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Bosnian Self-Defense 
Act. We ought to pass this resolution. You know, Mr. Chairman, we are 
not just in the often referred to global marketplace. We are also part 
of a global community, and in such a community, as with the old 
playground, leaders have to step up to resist aggression and resist 
bullies.
  It is time that we confront the realities. It is time that we 
confront the realities. It is not enough to play ``what if.'' ``What 
if'' is an excuse for inaction. It is not enough to try to figure out 
the end game. We do not know the end game. We never will. What we have 
to do is confront the realities.
  The realities are these: People are being slaughtered on one side, 
the Moslem side; women are being raped on one side, the Moslem side; 
our so-called safe-havens are being overrun on a daily basis. They have 
become a cruel joke.
  It is time for us to respond. The Moslems deserve an opportunity. 
They have the right in fact to defend themselves. Through the exercise 
of this right, we can create consequences for aggression. The reason 
this war has gone on so long and gone so badly is because there have 
been no consequences.
                              {time}  1345

  The Bosnians have become emboldened. If the Moslems have weaponry to 
defend themselves, they can create consequences and create pain that 
will give the Bosnians pause in their aggression.
  The great concern seems to be whether we will Americanize this war. I 
do not think so. The U.N. forces will ultimately have to come out. Our 
allies are not going to stay indefinitely and watch their people be 
used as human shields. So, as the President has indicated, we will have 
a responsibility as leaders in the global community to help extricate 
these U.N. forces.
  But that need not mean that we will have a complete expansion of the 
war and a complete Americanization. On the contrary, it will signal 
Americans to stand up for the victims, to take its true and appropriate 
place as a world leader and respond to this crisis by enabling people 
who are the victims of rape and murder to defend themselves.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Davis].
  Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution. 
America should be a world leader, not the world waffler and follower 
that we have been in this crisis. We waited and allowed the U.N. safe 
havens to operate, but they have failed. We have stood by watching 
while tens of thousands of innocent Bosnians Moslems have been raped, 
bombed, and murdered
  The arms embargo is a very noble-sounding phrase, but the arms 
embargo hurts only one side, the Bosnian Moslems. The Serbs have plenty 
of firepower and the remnants of the Yugoslavian armed forces. The arms 
embargo simply means that the Bosnian Moslems will be unable to defend 
themselves, and the Serbs have plenty of firepower.
  Last week I was visited by two members of the Bosnian Parliament. 
When I asked what this country could do to halt the ongoing atrocities 
in Bosnia, they replied they do not want U.S. troops. They do not want 
this country's intervention. They only want us to help the lifting of 
the arms embargo so they can defend themselves against these 
atrocities.
  That is the least we can do as a world leader. Let us adopt this 
resolution and end the current failed policies.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Knollenberg].
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for 
yielding time to me. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to S. 21. I too 
have watched the news reports of the worsening situation for the 
Bosnian people. But unilaterally lifting the arms embargo will not end 
this conflict. This legislation can only lead to the total collapse of 
humanitarian efforts in Bosnia and likely will result in an escalation 
of the fighting.
  I remind this body that we do not have troops on the ground--nor 
should we--and it is our allies in NATO who will pay the price if the 
United States violates our own embargo. And as you know, our allies 
have said that if the United States acts unilaterally they will 
withdraw from UNPROFOR. President Clinton has stated his belief that 
the United States is obligated to assist that withdrawal. I do not want 
to see our troops dragged into this conflict.
  Earlier this year this Congress voted to lift the embargo. Why hasn't 
it been lifted? Because the countries who are there say lifting it 
would jeopardize their mission of humanitarian relief.
  Our allies do not want this lifted. Are you willing to sacrifice the 
lives of their soldiers over their objections? Or can you say, with any 
credibility, that lifting this embargo will not affect the U.N. and 
NATO operations in Bosnia.
  No one can say that the United Nations and NATO have been successful 
in Bosnia. It is to our shame that these organizations have failed to 
protect so many people. But this action we take today will not rectify 
past mistakes. And it will not bring peace to this region.
  Lifting the embargo will bring more weapons into the region. It will 
isolate us further from our NATO allies. It will antagonize Russia who 
already has threatened to aid the Serbs if the embargo is lifted. It 
will slide us further down the slippery slope we now are precariously 
balanced on.
  Mr. Chairman, this legislation will force the President to act 
unilaterally to lift the embargo against his will and against the will 
of our allies. It will make the Bosnian conflict our responsibility, it 
will severely damage the NATO alliance, and it will make the conflict 
in Bosnia worse not better. This is the wrong policy at the wrong time. 
Vote ``no.''
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde], a distinguished member of our House Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, there are all kinds of peace. There is the 
peace of the jail and the peace of the graveyard. You can have peace in 
Bosnia, kill all the Moslems, and they cannot fight anymore. Next to 
that, just keep them disarmed while everybody else brims with 
armaments.
  Freedom has to be defended. Genocide, its modern incarnation, ethnic 
cleansing, must be resisted if we are to retain our membership in the 
human race. Does the United States have any interest in faraway Balkin 
Bosnia? I would say yes. The moral imperative is resistance to 
genocide.
  The slaughter in Bosnia has uncovered the inadequacy of the United 
Nations and NATO, for that matter, to deal with wars of ethnic 
nationalism, wars of states within states rather than between states. 
But please remember, Bosnia was recognized formally as a sovereign 
nation by the United States, by the European community on April 7, 
1992, and by the United Nations on May 22, 1992. The U.N. charter 
guarantees the right of self-defense. So lifting the embargo is merely 
implementing the elementary 

[[Page H8103]]
rights of people in sovereign nations, and it ought to prove that 
aggression is not without cost.
  This is not the time or the place to discuss the incredibly 
complicated problems of peace in the Balkans. I agree with everybody 
who has pointed out the incredibly difficult, shattering problems that 
we have trying to adjust borders and peace. It is incredibly difficult. 
But before we get to that problem, we ought to understand genocide 
cannot be tolerated. We cannot remain indifferent to it.
  In this century there have been three major genocides, not counting 
Rwanda, Burundi, the Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and all of the ongoing 
tribal killings that are going on. But the Armenians in 1915, the Jews 
in World War II in the Holocaust, and the Moslems in Bosnia today, are 
three genocides. We stand and avert our eyes because we have no 
interest there.
  When the Holocaust Museum was dedicated by the President, he stood 
there, and I am sure he meant it, he said two words: never again. What 
did he mean, never again? Never again will the Jews be killed in 
Germany in 1940? Or does he mean never again will we permit holocausts 
against ethnic groups because somebody does not agree with their 
religion or their color or their way of living?
  Never again. Let us put some flesh on those words and start by 
lifting the embargo.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly], one of the leaders on our 
side of the aisle.
  Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, everyone in this Chamber is moved by the 
suffering we have seen in Bosnia. Everyone in this Chamber is disturbed 
by the frightening historical echoes of previous episodes of carnage in 
Europe. Yet not one person in this Chamber has come up with a 
completely satisfying answer. Three years ago the United States imposed 
an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. It is evident that the 
embargo has little or no effect on the Serbian aggressors. Obviously 
that is for one reason: because they inherited the arms of the former 
Yugoslvian military. Has this policy worked? It is clear to me that it 
has not.
  For 3 years we have stood by a policy that has permitted the loss of 
70 percent of the Bosnian land which has ended in tremendous suffering 
to get this land. After 3 years, I do not believe this policy, if 
continued, can accomplish anything further. So what do we do? If we had 
a clearly preferable solution, one that guaranteed success, I know 
every Member of this House would support it wholeheartedly. But there 
is no policy, no clear best course. We only know now what did not and 
does not work.
  Our choice today is to continue down a path that has already resulted 
in so much suffering or to embark on a new path. For me the choice is 
clear. The choice now is in front of us, that we must, we have to look 
to a different way. We have to take a new course.
  I will vote to lift the embargo today. I think it is up to us in this 
Chamber to try something new to spare those people we are worrying 
about here today.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support 
this resolution lifting the embargo. And in coming up with my reasoning 
in terms of my decision, I sought the support and input of that one 
person who perhaps is the most well-versed American in terms of what 
our policy should be. John Jordan is a volunteer firefighter from Rhode 
Island.
  As my good friend, the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. Hoyer], on the 
other side knows, John Jordan went over to Sarajevo 3 years ago as a 
volunteer to work with the Sarajevo fire brigade, to establish 
emergency response service for the people in that country, be they 
Serbs, Muslims, Croats, whatever they might be. John Jordan has been 
there every day for the last 3 years.
  I called John Jordan on the phone, as I caught him on the way back to 
Sarajevo today. He said, ``Curt, we have to lift the arms embargo.''
  Two years ago he brought Kenan Slinic over here, a 31-year-old fire 
chief from Sarajevo who was protecting the lives of the people in 
Sarajevo. Kenan Slinic met with the Vice President; he met with us at 
our dinner and spoke to us. He pleaded with us, I have his original 
notes from his speech, his handwritten notes, he pleaded with us to 
allow his people to defend themselves 2 years ago. Because he spoke 
out, when he went back to his homeland, he was shot in the back of the 
head and killed and his six-year-old child today does not have a 
father.
  Mr. Chairman, this has gone on too long. The policy is not working. 
We have to create a level playing field.
  John Jordan also said to me, ``Curt, you have got to provide some 
support to bring your relief workers out.'' I agree with that. He said, 
``We have got to provide support until the arms can reach the 
appropriate groups inside of the afflicted area.'' I agree with that.
  Mr. Chairman, in the end we have to lift the embargo to give these 
people a chance, to give them the opportunity to defend themselves.
  We have heard story after story about the atrocities occurring in 
that country. I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support 
the resolution in honor of those people who have suffered so much.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Lewis].
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply troubled and 
anguished by what is happening in Bosnia.
  We all share the pain and the suffering. We have seen the horror. 
Women are raped, children are brutalized, and young men are taken away 
to an uncertain fate--often death.
  These people of Bosnia are part of the family of humankind. When they 
bleed, we bleed. When they suffer, we suffer. When they are slaughtered 
and killed, something dies in all of us.
  What is happening in this part of the world is an affront to all 
humanity. We--as the community of nations--cannot, and we must not, 
stand by in the face of this carnage.
  I--like everyone else--have watched in anguish as the United Nations 
failed to defend the safe areas in Bosnia.
  But I know that the British and French have troops in Bosnia. Lifting 
the embargo is not so simple or clear. We will send troops to help 
remove the U.N. forces if we lift the arms embargo.
  How many of us are prepared to send American troops--our young men 
and women--to Bosnia to fight in this conflict?
  A vote for this resolution is a vote to send American troops into 
Bosnia. Every member of this body must know this. This vote is not a 
free vote. This vote has consequences.
  The question is not whether to stop the violence. We all want to stop 
the violence. The question is how to stop the violence. Will 
unilaterally lifting the embargo bring peace to this region? Or will it 
spread the conflict and increase the toll of death and
 destruction?

  We must strengthen our resolve to defend innocent men, women, and 
children. But we cannot act alone.
  We must give this fresh plan a chance. The U.N. must allow NATO to 
defend the safe areas.
  Mr. Chairman, we all are frustrated. All of humanity is crying out 
for a solution to this conflict. This vote is our attempt to act, to do 
something.
  But we must not move this way. We must strengthen our U.N. mission. 
If it does not work, then later we may have to act on our own.
  American willingness to work with the community of nations is at 
stake. Our allies have troops on the ground--they are in harm's way.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand here with a heavy heart--I want to do what is 
right. I want to end the genocide.
  I have thought long and hard about this vote. I have searched my soul 
and conscience, and I have concluded now is not the time to 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo. It will not help stop the killing. 
It will not end the bloodshed.
  We must urge the United Nations to stop the violence--to stop the 
Serbian aggression. We must protect the innocent people of Bosnia. We 
must protect the safe areas.
  Now is not the time to get lost in a sea of despair. With our allies, 
we have 

[[Page H8104]]
taken a stand against Serbian aggression. Now we must be strong in that 
stand. Mr. Chairman, I will oppose this resolution.
                              {time}  1400

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sam Johnson.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the United Nations and NATO 
do not work. That is what the problem is. Once again we are facing the 
same arguments we have heard for over 2 years now, that the United 
Nations and its military command is serving some purpose to the 
thousands of people who are dying or suffering every day in Bosnia, 
some purpose. Most importantly, we will find ourselves again face to 
face with America's worst kept secret: That is, the utter failure of 
our administration to define why the United States and our troops 
should be involved in a U.N. peacekeeping operation in a place where we 
have no national interest and where there is no peace to keep.
  These same mistakes have been made before, and they cost us American 
lives. It happened 2 years ago in Somalia under U.N. command, with no 
defined mission and no defined purpose. The so-called humanitarian 
mission that first brought us to Somalia ended up costing us lives, 
like that of Sgt. James Joyce, our Army ranger who died on October 3, 
1993. His father, Lt. Col. Larry Joyce, who was my constituent, 
testified before this House as to how dangerous it was for the United 
States to think that we could solve the world's problems, and how 
irresponsible of us it was to use our troops as bargaining chips in the 
international peacekeeping game.
  President Clinton is making the same mistake again. He is using 
United States military troops as a bargaining chip in a game where the 
United States is not even a player, just like Somalia. How disappointed 
Larry Joyce must be today. Instead of knowing that his testimony and 
his son's death is making a difference, he is being forced to sit by 
and watch this country make the same tragic mistakes again, endangering 
America's stature, and more importantly, the lives of American 
soldiers. I urge my colleagues to end the arms embargo and vote in 
favor of this resolution.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Meek].
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose the effort 
to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, there is a horrible tragedy happening in Bosnia. I, 
along with everyone else, wants that tragedy to come to an end. But Mr. 
Chairman, lifting the arms embargo will not end the tragedy, it will 
only force the United States to become an active participant.
  Arms, it is argued, will allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend 
themselves. But Mr. Chairman, what else will arms shipments do? How 
about end the U.N. humanitarian mission which helps feed Sarajevo? How 
about trigger the exit of NATO from the conflict? How about signal the 
entry of Serbia into the Bosnian war?
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, the most important result of lifting the arms 
embargo will be the entry of the United States into the war. We will be 
obligated by treaty to help our allies pull out. And we will be 
obligated by morality to protect the Bosnian Moslems until they can 
defend themselves. I strongly favor the end of the war in Bosnia, Mr. 
Chairman, but what price are we willing to pay to lift this embargo?
  Mr. Chairman, what is happening in Bosnia is a horrible tragedy. But 
Mr. Chairman, acting unilaterally to end the arms embargo in Bosnia 
will only leave the United States holding the bag. Unilaterally. I urge 
a ``no'' vote on the bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Salmon], a member or our committee.
  Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chairman, there are no easy answers in Bosnia, no 
quick fixes. But I believe we must lift the embargo--now.
  The Bosnians want to defend themselves against rape, murder, and 
ethnic cleansing. But let's face it: the fundamental right of self-
defense is meaningless without the opportunity to procure weapons. The 
Bosnians deserve the same chance to defend themselves that the people 
of Afghanistan had in their fight against Soviet terror.
  The current policy of the United States is to be an active accomplice 
in the strangulation of the Bosnian people.
  And we are doing great damage to the vitality of NATO and the 
credibility of the United States. The debacle of Bosnia sends a clear 
message to the tyrants around the world--the United States can be 
bullied, and will not even stand up against genocide.
  No tyrant will ever negotiate a settlement when he can get everything 
he wants by force.
  If we continue to be paralyzed by weakness, countless American troops 
may be needed in the future to counter the aggressive actions of 
tyrants who conclude that America's weakness in Bosnia is the post-
gulf-war reality of the United States.
  Let us do what is right, and begin the restoration of America's 
foreign policy. Lift the embargo.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, it gives me a great deal of pleasure to 
yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], the 
minority leader of the House of Representatives and a leader on this 
floor.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, who has been so 
instrumental and who has shown extraordinary leadership on this issue, 
for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, there are no easy answers in Bosnia today.
  But how many more atrocities do we have to witness.
  How many more children do we have to see killed before we act in 
Bosnia?
  Are 200,000 dead Bosnians enough?
  Are 16,000 murdered children enough?
  Are 2 million homeless refugees enough?
  That's what we've let happen the past 3 years.
  And today, once again, there are those who say that lifting the arms 
embargo will involve America in this war. But let's be honest, Mr. 
Chairman, we're already involved in this war.
  By keeping this embargo in place for so long--not only have we denied 
the Bosnian people the weapons they need to defend themselves--we have 
helped tilt the balance of the war in favor of Serbian aggression.
  Mr. Chairman, there can be no more excuses.
  It's time to lift this embargo once and for all.
  Over the past 3 years, we have seen two dozen ceasefires come and go.
  We have seen the peace process start and stall.
  We have watched the Serbs break agreement after agreement.
  And the one constant through it all has been the absolute 
unwillingness of the West to take the steps necessary to do what needs 
to be done.
  The greatest sin, Mr. Chairman, isn't that we simply turned our 
backs.
  The greatest sin in Bosnia is that time and time again, we have 
raised the hopes of the Bosnian people that the cavalry was on its way. 
And time and time again, we have not delivered.
  Mr. Chairman, the people of Bosnia deserve better than this.
  If we are not going to stop the slaughter, if we are not going to 
defend the people of Bosnia, then we have no right to continue to deny 
them the right to defend themselves.
  By lifting this embargo today, we will extend to Bosnia the right 
which is guaranteed to every other sovereign nation under the U.N. 
charter--the simple right to defend themselves.
  There are those who say that lifting this embargo will disrupt the 
peace process.
  To them, I say: what peace process?
  Just 2 months ago on this floor we heard the same tired arguments.
  And in the past 2 months, we have seen nearly 50,000 people driven 
from their homes.
  We have seen innocent women and children herded into trucks.
  We've heard stories of young men being hung from trees and thousands 
of young women being raped.
  Fifty years after the world said ``never again'' we are sitting back 
and watching mass genocide happen again.
  Mr. Chairman, lifting the embargo won't weaken the peace process, it 
will strengthen it.
  The reason peace talks have failed the past 3 years is because the 
Serbs have no reason to negotiate.

[[Page H8105]]

  They face no real opposition on the battlefield, so they have no 
incentive to stay at the negotiating table.
  Only when the Serbs are certain that the Bosnians can defend 
themselves will they realize that further aggression will get them 
nowhere.
  And only then will we have a real chance for peace in Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, 200 years of American leadership have led up to this 
moment. And we can't turn our backs any longer.
  It's time to help the Bosnian people help themselves.
  It's time to lift the arms embargo.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. Roemer].
  (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, as medical students learn to become 
doctors, as they learn about healing, as they learn about hope, as they 
learn about improving the course of humanity, they learn very, very 
early about the Hippocratic oath: First do no harm.
  Mr. Chairman, it is sad to say at this point neither side of this 
debate can claim no harm, at this point. Current policy has not been 
successful. The ethnic cleansing going on is a travesty. There are no 
good solutions at this point. As war is bloody and chaotic, so, at 
times, is peace. We may have to settle for a bad peace, a bloody peace, 
and a messy map, but lifting this embargo threatens even a bad peace or 
a bloody peace.
  What does this resolution do to stop the killing? It will probably 
increase the killing, sending arms to 1.2 million Moslems fighting 
against over 9,000,000 Serbs. Will it prevent the war from spreading? 
Certainly not. It will probably exacerbate that war. Will we have a 
Christian-Moslem war on our hands? Maybe. Do we do permanent damage to 
our allies? Probably, yes.
  War, as it has been said, is merely an extension of politics, by 
other means. This resolution is an extension of politics, and although 
it is well-intended, I think it is responding in a simple way to a very 
complicated problem. Robert Caplan wrote a book called ``Balkan 
Ghosts,'' a journey through history. This book traces the origins of 
this conflict. It goes back beyond 1939 and World War II. It goes back 
beyond our revolution in 1776, and even centuries beyond the signing of 
the Magna Carta.
  We are not going to solve this war with a resolution to send more 
arms into a very messy and bloody war. Let us continue to try to work, 
although it will be difficult, for probably a messy and bloody peace.
                              {time}  1415

  Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, we are not going to solve this war by doing nothing. 
Where is the door to hell on the planet right now? The door to hell 
resides in this bad peace in Bosnia. What has caused the 200,000 deaths 
in Bosnia? What has caused the 3 million refugees? What has caused the 
continuing nightmare of rape and mayhem? What has caused evil to 
prosper in Bosnia?
  Dogma, ignorance, arrogance, apathy, the Nation's community who have 
had a sense of deliberate deafness to suffering. Are we as a nation 
becoming a nation of tortured ghosts because we do not know what to do? 
What has caused this evil to prosper, this door to hell to remain open 
in Bosnia for good men like us to do nothing? The Bosnians are far 
better off defending themselves than relying upon platitudes and 
international bureaucrats.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the 
gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor].
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, one of my colleagues, the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], just made the statement that we 
have somehow led the Bosnian Serbs to believe that the cavalry is on 
the way. Well, I might feel a little bit better about the outcome of 
this vote if I knew that the cavalry was going to be led by the likes 
of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], and some other people who are very anxious to get 
America involved in a war where we do not belong.
  Mr. Chairman, our national interests are not at stake. NATO is not 
under attack. Yes, people are dying. People are dying all over the 
world as we speak. I do not think it is America's business to be the 
world's policeman. People say, if we just lift the embargo, somehow the 
war will go away. Who is kidding who? That is like pouring gasoline on 
a fire.
  According to Collin Powell when he spoke before the Committee on 
Armed Services back when he still was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, he said there was a 10-year supply of weapons in the former 
Yugoslavia. You see, Tito was paranoid. He didn't know whether it was a 
Warsaw Pact or NATO that was
 going to attack him, so he prepared for either.

  Folks, this fight has been going on at least since the 1200's. It has 
been a blood feud, and to sum up Canadian General McKenzie who was in 
charge of the general command just a few years ago when he came before 
the Committee on Armed Services, he summed up his remarks by saying, we 
have three serial killers. One has killed 15, one has killed 10, and 
one has killed 5, and he does not see the rationale of jumping in on 
the side of the one who has only killed 5.
  Mr. Chairman, if you lift the embargo, who do we sell to? Are we 
going to sell to the Serbs? Are we going to sell to the Croatians? No 
you want to sell to the Moslems. You want to pick sides. When you pick 
sides, that means you have to train people, and when they invariably 
lose, that means the decision will have to be made in this body, do we 
go rush to the rescue, as Mr. Bonior said? Not with my kids. Not with 
kids from south Mississippi, not with kids named Widener and Nickase 
and Bond who have no reason to die in what was Yugoslavia.
  People, we are wasting 8 days on hearings on something that took 
place over 2 years ago in Waco, TX. You are not even willing to give a 
half a day's consideration to sending American kids to die in a part of 
the country most people could not point to on the map. Please, for 
God's sakes, think about what you are doing before we have hearings 4 
years from now wondering what went wrong in Bosnia. Please oppose this 
resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
  (Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of S. 21, 
legislation to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.
  I have previously supported the embargo, but recent events in Bosnia 
and improvements in this legislation persuade me that this measure 
deserves support.
  The whole premise of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia was to 
allow the United Nations to intervene and prevent hostilities against 
civilians. Six safe areas were established in Bosnia to shield 
civilians from Bosnian Serb aggression.
  While these populations were subjected to periodic hostilities, they 
were still safer than if exposed to open warfare and Serbian ethnic 
cleansing. The United Nations, whether through moral suasion or 
military force, was supposed to protect these individuals.
  But the United Nation's inability to protect Srebrenica and Zepa or 
prevent the massive human rights violations that followed were nothing 
but disastrous.
  The President's plan for Bosnia is deeply flawed. This bill provides 
of the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Bosnia prior to the lifting of 
the embargo and will finally enable the Bosnian Government to defend 
its citizenry. It deserves our support.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Olver], who has been one of the 
strongest outspoken advocates of bringing peace to this troubled area 
of the world.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 4 
minutes.
  (Mr. OLVER was asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. OLVER. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, it is time to do the right thing in Bosnia. From the 
first 

[[Page H8106]]
day of this war, Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia and the 
last Communist dictator in Europe, has orchestrated the actions of the 
Serb minority in Bosnia. He has armed them, he supplied them with all 
of the weapons of a modern army, the tanks, the heavy artillery and the 
missiles, while Bosnia, a U.N. member, has been embargoed.
  Three years ago Milosevic told General Mladic, the military commander 
of the Bosnian Serbs who has recently been indicted by the United 
Nations as a war criminal, for the deliberate slaughter of civilian 
populations, for the use of mass rape of women as a tool of terror, for 
the detainment of killing of male Bosnians between the ages of 16 and 
65 in Srebrenica, Milosevic told Mladic to destroy Sarajevo, the 
capital of Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, we recently saw General Mladic strutting through the 
streets of Zepa after the U.N. safe haven was overrun with the United 
Nations doing absolutely nothing. Mladic said he intends to take Bihac, 
then Gorazde, then Sarajevo by winter, and ``eliminate the Bosnian 
Moslems as a people from the Earth''.
  The goal from the first day of this war has been the territorial 
expansion of Seriba by whatever means would eliminate the Bosnian 
Moslems as a people from this Earth. No amount of wishful thinking 
about being reasonable or making nice to Milosevic will change that 
policy. The United Nations had made it absolutely clear, at least to 
Milosevic, that the United Nations will not stop him, so it is time to 
allow the Bosnians to defend themselves.
  Mr. Chairman, there is something obscene about the adherence to a 
failed policy long after that failure has been proven again and again 
and again and again, any many more times again. There is something 
obscene about the tortured self-righteous defense of an arms embargo on 
only one side of the Bosnian conflict. The hand-wringers say the 
Bosnian Government cannot be allowed to defend its people from genocide 
because it would offend the Serbs.
  Mr. Chairman, there is something obscene about declaring that a whole 
people cannot be allowed the weapons to defend itself against genocide, 
and there is something monstrously obscene about the cowardice of the 
international community refusing to protect the
 safe havens that they themselves established. Srebrenica and Zepa and 
the others that are to come from the indiscriminate slaughter of males 
of all ages, the mass rape of women, the bombardment of fleeing 
civilian refugees, there is something overwhelmingly obscene about 
genocide in all its forms.

  It was obscene, and overwhelmingly so, in the 1930's and 1940's. It 
led to the near extermination of Jews in Europe and to the death of 
many more millions of Poles and other Slavic people from Eastern 
Europe.
  Mr. Chairman, yesterday, a coalition of 27 human rights and religious 
and medical groups called for stepped up United States and 
international action to stop the slaughter of Bosnian civilians. These 
are not warlike organizations. The American Nurses Association, the 
Human Rights Watch, Anti-Defamation League, Refugees International, 
Physicians for Human Rights, American Arab Antidiscrimination League, 
the American Jewish Committee, World Vision. Quite the opposite. These 
are organizations that are devoted to peace and toward a just peace. 
They know that if Bosnia is not allowed to protect itself and the 
United Nations refuses to stop the Serb minority from its stated goal 
of ``elimination of the Bosnian Moslems as a people from the Earth,'' 
then we will see in full color on CNN and all our other media the 
ethnic cleansing, the bombardment, the rape, and the slaughter of 
innocent people and the male populations of Bihac and Gorazde and 
Sarajevo repeated again.
  Mr. Chairman, it is time to allow the Bosnians to obtain the weapons 
of defense. This war will stop when the Serbs know the world will not 
tolerate genocide. It is time to do the right thing in Bosnia; it is 
time to lift the arms embargo.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Baker].
  Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Chairman, this is a very healthy debate 
to have go on here today, but the resolution that we have before us is 
based on flawed premises. The premise is that there is not enough guns 
and that one side has more guns than another. It also has the premise 
that only one side are the bad guys, that this must be a one-way war. 
Just the other day we read in the newspaper where Croatia attacked an 
unarmed Serbian town and forced 15,000 people out of the town after 
shelling that town which was not defended by Serbian troops.
  Mr. Chairman, this is not a one-way war. There is no shortage of 
arms. Yes, the Middle East are, through Croatia, arming the Bosnian 
Moslems. Yes, Russia is arming the Bosnian Serbs. Yes, even Germany is 
arming the Croatians in Bosnia. There is not a shortage of arms. There 
is not a one-side-is-all-bad attitude, and every other side is good. 
This war has been going on for 500 years since the Turks deposited the 
Moslems in the middle of this part of Europe. Now we are being asked to 
get in there and say, give them more arms, let us get involved. This 
controversy needs a new map.
  Mr. Chairman, our State Department backed the recognition of Bosnia. 
What was wrong with that? Well, the map put little Croatian communities 
in the middle of Serbian territory, Serbian communities in the middle 
of Croatian territories, and Moslem territories, they were all mixed. 
In fact, 30 percent of Sarajevo was communities that were Serbian.
  Mr. Chairman, suppose they came to you and said, Washington, DC is 
going to be under Moslem control, Maryland is going to be Catholic, and 
all of you in Virginia are going to be Orthodox. People would be forced 
to move unless they wanted to live under these constraints.
  Mr. Chairman, the only way is to force people to the bargaining 
table. This is no resolution. This is an extension of war. There is no 
request that the Bosnian Moslems go to the bargaining table. We just 
ask for more arms.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BAKER of California. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I would point out that in Sarajevo, the 
populations lived together very peacefully. It was extrinsic forces 
that changed that.
  Mr. BAKER of California. They lived peacefully until we recognized 
the false state of Bosnia Moslems who then took in people who did not 
want to live under them and vice versa.
  Mr. Chairman, vote ``no'' on this resolution. Let us do something to 
restore peace.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte].
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the lifting of the arms 
embargo to allow defenseless people in Bosnia to defend themselves. 
They do not have to fight tanks with rifles.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Indiana calls this a bloody peace 
that we see in Bosnia--200,000 lives slaughtered is a bloody peace? Mr. 
Chairman, a bloody peace is no peace.
  Patrick Henry, 220 years ago in Virginia said, gentlemen may cry 
peace, peace when there is no peace in the famous speech that he cited 
calling for this country to rise up against Great Britain. The people 
of Bosnia seek a situation in which they should have the right to 
defend themselves against far worse atrocities, killings, torturing, 
rapes, imprisonment in internment camps, expulsion from their lands, 
creation of refugees, of thousands and thousands of people.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] says that 
the United States cannot be the world's policeman, and he is right. So 
why are we participating in policing Bosnia by enforcing an arms 
embargo that prohibits people from having the opportunity to defend 
their own lives, their own families?

                              {time}  1430

  That is what this is about. This does not involve putting U.S. troops 
into the situation. It simply involves allowing people to defend 
themselves.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge support for this bill.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, I commend the 

[[Page H8107]]
  gentleman for his excellent point that he just made. Right.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina [Mr. Hefner].
  (Mr. HEFNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to approach this from a little 
different perspective. As the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha], 
former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said this morning when 
we debated the rule, these are some easy votes if we are looking for 
some votes that we want to make and we can put a press release out and 
say ``I voted to lift the embargo to let the people defend 
themselves.''
  Mr. Chairman, it makes us feel real good, but there are going to be 
some tough votes that are going to come later if we implement lifting 
this embargo. What is going to happen is, we are going to lift the 
embargo and the President is probably going to veto the bill. If we do 
not override the veto, it goes through and becomes law and then the 
next step comes.
  They are going to ask for some arms; it is going to come for the 
United States. We are going to be bringing these arms in, and somebody 
has got to accompany them to teach these people how to use these 
sophisticated weapons. Both Republicans and Democrats have said, if we 
need to extract the U.N. forces from this area, that they are willing 
to put 25,000 American troops on the ground to support extracting these 
people from this area.
  Mr. Chairman, that is where the tough vote is going to come, because 
many Members have said, we are not going to enter into this unless 
Congress authorizes putting American troops on the ground in Bosnia. 
That is what it comes down to; that is when the tough vote comes.
  Mr. Chairman, I just wonder where the people that are so eager to 
lift this embargo, where they are going to be when the argument is on 
this floor when we are being asked to send 25,000, or more, American 
troops to Bosnia to help extract the U.N. forces from Bosnia. There 
will not be a sufficient number of votes to allow that. We are going to 
find ourselves in an absolutely intolerable situation.
  This is a feel-good vote, and I do not know of one single American, I 
do not know of one Member in this House that does not deplore the 
actions that are taking place in this part of the world today. But, to 
me, to do this is absolutely the wrong way to go.
  Mr. Chairman, there have been some changes in policy that have been 
made that are going to put the decisionmaking policy into the military. 
If it takes strategic bombing and heavy bombing, let us give it a shot. 
Sooner or later, Members who are advocating lifting this embargo are 
going to be called on to come to this House floor and called on to make 
the vote to put American troops on the ground in Bosnia.
  Make no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman, this vote today is 
Americanizing the war in Bosnia. Make no mistake about it. Remember 
that when the vote comes to put American troops in harm's way in Bosnia 
where our national interest is not at stake.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
New York [Ms. Molinari], the distinguished vice chairman of our 
Republican conference and a long-standing member of the Bosnia Task 
Force.
  Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a letter sent to a 
Senator from President Clinton. It states:

       If by October 15, the Bosnia Serbs have not accepted the 
     Contact Group's proposal of July 6, it would be my intention 
     within 2 weeks to introduce formally and support a resolution 
     at the U.N. Security Council to terminate the arms embargo. 
     Further, if the Security Council fails to pass such a 
     resolution, it would be my intention to consult with Congress 
     thereafter regarding unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.

  This letter was in response to congressional attempts to end the arms 
embargo. The letter is dated August 10, 1994.
  An entire year has gone by since this administration signaled its 
intentions to get serious, if only we give them a little more time.
  So we agreed and we gave them a year: a year more of bombings, a year 
more of bloodshed, another year of children being viciously taken from 
their parents, another year of women being raped and men being 
tortured.
  Mr. Chairman, we are all watching.
  As if the tragic act of doing nothing in the face of this barbarism 
is not enough, we have heightened our complicity by insisting that the 
Bosnians ``do nothing'' as well:
  Fathers forced at knife point to rape their daughters. Do nothing.
  Concentration camp victims forced to drink their own urine to stall 
dehydration. Do nothing.
  Mothers forced to watch their babies beheaded in front of them. Do 
nothing.
  Watch as family and friends get blown away. Do nothing.
  Here we are today face to face with our failure. No more delays.
  The Serbians have not stopped in their quest for blood. The United 
Nations cannot save a town, a life, or a hope.
  Genocide is our problem, and convenient dismissal of catastrophic 
human tragedy will be on all of our epitaphs just as it was 50 years 
ago when Neville Chamberlain chose to dismiss Nazi aggression with 
words that have been ringing in our ears since then:
  ``How horrible,'' he said, ``How incredible it is that we should be 
digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a 
faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.''
  His words sound very similar to the speeches we have heard here 
today.
  It was tragic then; it is tragic now. The time has come to end the 
arms embargo, and I thank the gentleman on both sides of the aisle for 
their leadership in forcing this tragedy, once and for all, to end. 
This is our date with destiny.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. 
Molinari] for her leadership and her strong statement.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my friend, the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, the time has come for us to be resolute, 
and for us to act.
  As the leader of the free world, the United States of America must no 
longer stand by idly as accomplices to a carefully planned and savagely 
executed genocide by Serbian war criminals. We must act now to allow 
the Bosnian people to assert their right to self-determination and 
their right to self-defense.
  The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a member of the United 
Nations. As a U.N. member Bosnia has an inherent and internationally 
recognized right to defend itself against armed aggression.
  Let us not deny the Bosnian people the right to fight their own 
fight.
  The United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] no longer protects 
anyone. It is no longer a force for the protection of the innocent, but 
an object for our pity. The U.N. safe havens are no longer safe but 
sitting targets for more brutality. How much more blood will we allow 
to stain our hands?
  Let us not deny the Bosnian Government the right to protect their 
defenseless women and children. That is all that we propose here 
today--nothing more and nothing less.
  But this is not only about Bosnia's defense. This is about America's 
pursuit of her national interests.
  International peace and stability is most certainly in America's 
national interests. The Balkan crisis has threatened the viability and 
the stability of the international system. Who would have predicted 
that just a few years after its historic victory in the cold war, the 
credibility of NATO would be threatened as it is? Well, it need not be 
that way.
  Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former National Security Adviser to President 
Carter, could not have put it better when he wrote recently:

       The character of the international order is also at stake. 
     A world unable to make the distinction between victims and 
     aggressors, and especially a world unwilling to act on that 
     distinction, is a world in which the United Nations becomes 
     an object of derision--on the part not only of the aggressors 
     but of all free peoples. World peace will be the ultimate 
     casualty in Bosnia.

  Let us enter the new millennium with the confidence of victory in the 
cold war and the Persian Gulf; with the moral authority that 
distinguishes between the victims and the aggressors--not with the 
insecurity of inaction in the Balkans. Let us enter a new millennium 
where world peace is the ultimate victor.

[[Page H8108]]

  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, last month I was fortunate enough to 
have dinner with Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, John Sununu and ``Cap'' 
Weinberger, and everybody was in agreement the one way to expand the 
war in this part of the world is to get the major powers involved and 
also to increase the arms in those areas.
  Mr. Chairman, none of us want the atrocities to continue. But if we 
look at the solution logically, increasing arms into an area is not 
going to help us to a peaceful solution; it is going to expand it and 
in my opinion, and many others' opinion, it is going to increase the 
length of time before we could ever go in and stop it.
  Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues would just think logically, by 
increasing arms is it going to stop the war? No, it is not. It is going 
to encourage it. More will die on all sides if we put in weapons. And 
we do not just put in a weapon and ask them to pick it up, especially 
high-technology weapons. We have to put in those 25,000 U.S. troops. 
When we do that, we are going to lose a lot of those U.S. troops.
  We expanded arms in Vietnam; 55,000 Americans died. That was not a 
good solution and, Mr. Chairman, I say this is not a solution either.
  If we put in those arms, it is going to encourage. Why do my 
colleagues think that Greece and Russia support the BSA? Because, 
first, they were allies in World War II and, second, because of the 
orthodox religion. But if my colleagues will take a look at history, it 
was the Croatians that fought with Nazi Germany and they ethnically 
cleansed millions and millions of Serbs. Where were we then?
  My idea is not to focus on the atrocities, as the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] said, but on a solution. Mr. Chairman, putting 
arms in that area is not focusing on the solution.
  I recently attended an event where over 400 allied pilots gave homage 
to the Serbs for getting them out in World War II. Misinformation 
damages the solution. For example, the press reported that when Captain 
O'Grady was picked up, he was shot at by the Serbs. He was not. He was 
not shot at until he was over Croatia by the Croatians.
  Mr. Chairman, that is immaterial. If we focus on who shot who, and 
who commits the most raids, and we dump arms into that area, Mr. 
Chairman, we are inviting pain. If we get involved, the things that the 
Republican Party has stood for, balanced budget amendment and Medicare 
solutions, if my colleagues want to get us involved, we can kiss it all 
good-bye. It is gone. It is history.
  Mr. Chairman, once the fighting starts over there, try and get out. 
We could not even get out of Somalia without running with our tail 
between our legs.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask for a ``no'' vote on this resolution.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Pallone].
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in favor of S. 21, the Bosnia 
Self-Defense Act. The recent collapse of the two so-called U.N. 
designated safe areas indicate that the U.N. mission is falling apart. 
It is clear the United Nations is not capable of protecting the Bosnian 
Moslems and is denying them the right to adequately protect themselves.
  Since its inception, the arms embargo has provided the Serbs who 
inherited the weapons of the former Yugoslavia with a decisive 
advantage in this war and the arms advantage as facilitated Serbian 
terror campaigns which have included ethnic cleansing, systematic mass 
rape, and executions. What is occurring in Bosnia is a campaign of 
terror by the Serbs that closely resembles the Nazi atrocities of World 
War II.
  Mr. Chairman, the tide may be turning in the war in Bosnia. There are 
signs that the Moslems may be able to take back the lands captured by 
the Serbs and ultimately lift the stranglehold on their capital, 
Sarajevo.

                              {time}  1445

  With a new infusion of arms, the Bosnian Moslems may be able to take 
the upper hand in the war for the first time. Let us give the Bosnian 
Moslems a chance in this war by passing this bill.
  Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio].
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to S. 21, 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.
  Mr. Chairman, I know that all of us share a commitment to bring a 
peaceful end to the tragedy in Bosnia, but we remain divided over one 
important question. Should we go forward, against the advice of our 
military commanders and unilaterally lift the embargo prohibiting the 
export of arms to the Bosnian Government?
  The difficulty we face arises out of a complex set of circumstances, 
principally the lack of any easy, clear-cut alternatives, and the 
likelihood that such a decision will thrust the United States deeper 
into a war not of our own making, and permanently damage the NATO 
alliance.
  While we bear a moral obligation and a global responsibility to seek 
a solution to this crisis, we have sought to strike a delicate 
balance--retain our commitment to multilateral peace-keeping operations 
while making every effort to guarantee the safety of the Bosnian 
people.
  Until recent days, we could pursue these two goals in tandem.
  But as two UN-declared safe-havens have fallen to Bosnian-Serb 
troops, we have rightly reexamined our decision to participate in this 
world-wide arms embargo, and we have begun to reassess the role of the 
U.N. peacekeeping force, giving command authority over to NATO.
  The U.N. coalition has been less than successful, and conditions in 
Bosnia have continued to deteriorate.
  But as we begin to look at alternative solutions--particularly one 
dependent on a heavily armed Bosnian military force--we should consider 
three things:
  First, the likelihood that a unilateral decision to rescind the arms 
embargo will bring an immediate end to current peacekeeping operations. 
Our United Nations allies--principally Britain and France--have stated 
that unilateral United States action will compel them to withdraw 
troops they have placed under United Nations command in Bosnia.
  Hundreds of thousands of Bosnians will be immediately and adversely 
affected if U.N. forces are forced to abandon what has been--largely--a 
humanitarian mission. Both injured civilians and refuges have come to 
depend on U.N. troops for humanitarian relief. In addition, 
humanitarian organizations that rely on U.N. forces to maintain a 
minimum level of safety and security would find it difficult if not 
impossible to continue their work.
  Second, unilateral termination of the arms embargo will put a severe 
strain on our relationship with NATO allies and Russia.
  While we have an obligation to assert a preeminent moral position on 
the world stage, we cannot and must not embark on approach that does 
nothing more than Americanize this conflict and leave us isolated.
  Finally, the immediate and indisputable effect of this policy change 
will be an escalation of terror as Serbian troops advance on previously 
safe-havens. If arms shipments to Bosnian forces increase--as they are 
certain to do if we vote to reject the embargo--there is a real 
possibility that United States ground troops will slowly, but surely, 
be drawn into this conflict, as technical advisors or direct 
combatants.
  Our engagement is likely to come in two phases. Initially, the United 
States is obligated to assist in the evacuation of U.N. forces--an 
operation, that despite its clear purpose, exposes our troops to 
considerable risk. We will face a second, more considerable risk as the 
Bosnian military, under heavy assault from Bosnian-Serb troops, look to 
United States to provide arms, air support, and active military 
support.
  The United States cannot afford to back into this conflict. Driven by 
public outrage, and without having clearly defined the parameters for 
our involvement, we run this risk.
  The United States should only consider rejecting the arms embargo--as 
the administration has suggested--as part of a multilateral agreement.
  While avoiding irreparable damage to the NATO coalition, we would be 
in a 

[[Page H8109]]
position to reassess the U.N.'s role, and, possibly, develop a viable, 
international solution--one that does not require the United States to 
assume unilateral responsibility.
  While this policy remains an option, the administration is in the 
midst of negotiations intended to strengthen the U.N.'s hand--a 
strategy that reflects a more sensible alternative to an outright 
rejection of the arms embargo. I urge my colleagues to consider this 
strategy, and reject S. 21.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute 20 seconds to the gentleman 
from Michigan [Mr. Levin].
  (Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I do think we have to consider who shot whom 
and who is raping whom. In a word, we have to step up to Serbian 
aggression.
  While there is a clear difference of opinion in our Nation let me ask 
this: Would the Bosnian Serbs prefer this resolution pass or fail, that 
the arms embargo be lifted or continued? I suggest that they will deem 
a positive vote today as another indication of determination to stop 
Serbian aggression.
  Any course does carry a risk. Past policies have risked continued 
aggression and mass murder, and they have paid the consequences. It is 
time, indeed long overdue, to try a new course. I support this 
resolution.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman makes a critically 
important point. The point the gentleman just made was that the message 
the Serbs would take from this was that the Congress and America were 
determined to stop further Serb aggression. I think the gentleman is 
absolutely correct, which is why I am so strongly in support of a 
``yes'' vote on S. 21.
  I thank the gentleman for his statement.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Clement].
  Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, this debate is about a father's right to 
protect his family, a brother's right to protect his siblings, and the 
preservation of a race and a heritage.
  We have all seen the horrible scenes of starving men in camps which 
harkened memories of World War II concentration camps. We know about 
the rape, robbery, destruction, and mass genocide.
  Ethnic cleansing has become commonplace in everyday conversation. 
Ethnic cleansing: what a sanitary term. Perhaps it is the hope that 
such a term will make the events in the former
 Yugoslavia a little more bearable--a little more tidy. But, in reality 
it is anything but tidy. Ethnic cleansing is the systematic destruction 
of a people, a culture, real live human beings like you and me.

  The United Nations arrived as the knight in shining armor; the 
defender of the innocent and persecuted. They issued edicts and ground 
rules and promised to protect and defend the innocent victims.
  Well, we are still waiting. This mission has the world's premier 
military hardware and the best trained soldiers at its disposal, yet 
time and time again innocent people are tortured, murdered, and abused 
while U.N. forces sit idle.
  The U.N. Secretary-General has reduced UNPROFOR to a role of finger 
pointing. The U.N. has lost all credibility. Renegades and criminals 
masquerading as soldiers have managed to hold the world at bay for 
months.
  I understand that this is a delicate situation and that things are 
easier said than done, but you have to make an effort. You can't win if 
you don't join the game. Superior force ceases to be a deterrent if 
there is a demonstrated reluctance to use it. The Serbs have no fear 
because U.N. reprisals have been too seldom and too restrained.
  The U.N. has clearly demonstrated that it is willing to talk the talk 
but reluctant to walk the walk. Unfortunately, the Bosnians don't have 
such luxuries.
  It is bad enough that the Secretary-General of the U.N. continues to 
sit on his hands and leave the so-called safe zones vulnerable. But to 
make matters worse, the Secretary-General continues to keep the 
Bosnians' hands tied behind their back.
  The Bosnians have a right to defend themselves. If the U.N. is not 
going to defend the Bosnians--and there is no reason to believe they 
will--then the very least we can do is to lift the arms embargo.
  Two safe havens have fallen since our last vote on the House floor 
and there is no reason to believe that other safe zones will not follow 
in the near future. How much longer will we wait? How many more people 
will have to suffer? How many more men and women will be widowed? How 
many more children will be orphaned?
  Lift the arms embargo. Give the Bosnians a fighting chance.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Emerson) having assumed the chair, Mr. Bonilla, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (S. 21) to 
terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had come to no resolution thereon.

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