[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 125 (Monday, July 31, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H8007-H8010]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



[[Page H 8007]]


                      TOBACCO AND AMERICA'S YOUTH

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 
12, 1995, the gentleman from California [Mr. Waxman] is recognized for 
60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend 
my remarks and to insert extraneous material.
  I have taken out this special order to talk again about the No. 1 
threat to the health of our children--tobacco.
  A lot has happened since I spoke to this body last week. They Justice 
Department has confirmed that it will impanel a grand jury in this city 
to consider perjury charges against tobacco company CEO's. The U.S. 
attorney in New York has confirmed that he will impanel a grand jury in 
Manhattan to investigate whether tobacco companies lied to Federal 
regulators about the health effects of tobacco. And the President has 
begun to consider how best to regulate tobacco.
  Almost unnoticed amid the headlines, however, is the damage 
cigarettes have done to the health of our Nation. In the last week 
alone, over 7,000 Americans have died from lung cancer, heart disease, 
and other illnesses caused by addiction to tobacco.
  Even worse, in the last 7 days, 21,000 American children have begun 
to smoke for the first time. One-third of these children--7,000 kids--
will become lifelong nicotine addicts and eventually die from a 
tobacco-related disease.
  Clearly, the time has come for commonsense regulation to discourage 
children from smoking.
  When I appeared before this body last week, I reported on my 
investigation into the research activities of Philip Morris, the 
Nation's largest tobacco company. This investigation revealed three 
important facts.
  First, Philip Morris conducted secret research on nicotine 
pharmacology for more than a decade.
  Second, top company officials--including the Philip Morris board of 
directors and at least three separate vice presidents for research and 
development--had knowledge of the secret nicotine research program.
  Third, Philip Morris conducted research for the specific purpose of 
determining the pharmacological effects of nicotine on children and 
college students.
  One major question remained unanswered, however. Did Philip Morris 
use its secret nicotine research to design cigarettes sold to the 
American public?
  We know from the documents I released last week that Philip Morris' 
secret research program was undertaken for commercial reasons. The 
document describing the plans and objectives for the behavioral 
research laboratory in 1979, for example, stated expressly:

       The rationale for the program rests on the premise that 
     such knowledge will strengthen Philip Morris R&D capability 
     in developing new and improved smoking products.

  Philip Morris, however, has consistently maintained that it never 
commercialized this research or manipulated nicotine. A year ago, the 
Philip Morris CEO, William Campbell, testified before my subcommittee 
that ``Philip Morris does not manipulate nor independently control the 
level of nicotine in our products.''
  Last month, when the New York Times first reported on the secret 
Philip Morris research program, Philip Morris asserted that it never 
used the research results in creating products for the market.
  Today, I will present evidence that conflicts fundamentally with 
these Philip Morris statements. I will present evidence that appears to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Philip Morris manipulated the 
nicotine levels in cigarettes sold to the American public.
  My investigation of nicotine manipulation by Philip Morris has been 
hindered by two obstacles. First, Philip Morris has not cooperated with 
the investigation. Over a year ago, on June 29, 1994, I wrote Philip 
Morris to request copies of Philip Morris documents relating to 
nicotine manipulation. With minor exceptions, Philip Morris has refused 
to provide these documents.
  The second obstacle is that the Congress has apparently ceased its 
investigation of the tobacco industry. This makes it impossible for me 
to call Philip Morris witnesses before an investigative committee to 
respond to my inquiries.
  Because of these obstacles, I cannot yet provide a complete and final 
record of Philip Morris's efforts to manipulate nicotine. Nevertheless, 
what I have recently learned is so significant that I believe I must 
take the extraordinary step for reporting on it in this chamber today. 
I believe I have an obligation to the Members of this body, to the 
administration, and ultimately to the American people to tell what I 
know so that together we can move closer to the truth.
  As I did last week, I will first present a summary of my 
investigation. Then I will then read into the Record a chronology of 
excerpts from previously secret Philip Morris documents. Finally, I 
will present the documents themselves for publication in the 
Congressional Record.
               systematic manipulation in the laboratory

  The evidence of nicotine manipulation begins in the very same Philip 
Morris laboratories in Richmond, VA, that conducted the electric shock 
studies and the nicotine pharmacology research that I described last 
week. Throughout the 1970's, researchers in these laboratories engaged 
in a systematic search ``to determine optimal nicotine/tar ratios for 
cigarette acceptability in a low delivery cigarette.''
  The nicotine/tar ratio is a ratio that compares the amount of 
nicotine delivered by a cigarette with the amount of tar delivered by 
the cigarette. Officials of the tobacco industry have long maintained 
that because nicotine levels follow tar levels, there is a single, 
fixed nicotine/tar ratio in all cigarettes. For instance, Alexander 
Spears, the chief operating officer of the Lorillard Tobacco Co., 
testified before my subcommittee on March 25, 1994, that:

       We do not set nicotine levels for particular brands of 
     cigarettes. Nicotine levels follow the tar level. . . . The 
     correlation . . . is essentially perfect correlation between 
     tar and nicotine and shows that there is no manipulation of 
     nicotine.

  The objective of the Philip Morris researchers, however, was to break 
this essentially perfect correlation between nicotine and tar. Their 
goal was to determine if an increased ratio of nicotine to tar would 
make low-tar cigarettes more acceptable to the smoker.
  The first document to discuss the secret search for the optimal 
nicotine/tar ratio is a December 1970 research report. In this report, 
Philip Morris scientists stated that they were ``initiating a study of 
the effect of systematic variation of the nicotine/tar ratio upon 
smoking rate and acceptability measures.''
  In May 1974, the Philip Morris scientists described their research as 
involving the systematic manipulation of nicotine. Although Philip 
Morris CEO William Campbell testified last year that Philip Morris does 
not manipulate nicotine, the researchers stated that they were 
``systematically manipulating tar and nicotine parameters of cigarettes 
* * * to predict nicotine/tar ratios for optimal cigarette 
acceptability.''
  By November 1974, the Philip Morris scientists achieved a 
breakthrough. According to the researchers, the natural ratio of 
nicotine to tar in tobacco is 0.07--that is, 7 parts nicotine to 100 
parts tar. The researchers found that by boosting this ratio in low-tar 
cigarettes, about 40 percent to approximately 0.10--or 10 parts 
nicotine to 100 parts tar--they could produce a low-tar cigarette that 
equaled a regular-delivery cigarette in both acceptability and 
strength. In other words, the researchers found that by increasing the 
nicotine level in a low-tar
 cigarette by 40 percent while leaving the tar level unchanged, they 
could produce a stronger and more acceptable low-tar cigarette.

  By October 1975, the scientists completed a follow-up study to 
replicate their findings. This follow-up study confirmed the initial 
results. The scientists found that ``the optimum nicotine to tar ratio 
for a 10 milligram cigarette is somewhat higher than that occurring in 
smoke from the natural state of tobacco.''


                           commercialization

  There is compelling evidence that not long after completing this 
research, Philip Morris used the research findings to manipulate 
nicotine levels in cigarette brands sold to the American public.

[[Page H 8008]]

  One brand in which manipulation seems certain to have occurred is the 
regular-length Benson & Hedges cigarette. I have a chart that shows 
what happened to the nicotine/tar ratios in this cigarette between 1968 
and 1985, the first and last years for which data is available for this 
cigarette variety.
  As you can see, the nicotine/tar ratio remained essentially flat at 
0.07, the natural nicotine/tar ratio in tobacco, from 1968 to 1978. 
From 1978 to 1983, however, the ratios changed significantly. During 
this period, the nicotine/tar ratio did exactly what the Philip Morris 
researchers recommended--it increased.
  As the chart shows, the nicotine/tar ratio reaches a high of 0.2 in 
1981. By 1983, the nicotine/tar ratio in the Benson & Hedges cigarette 
is 0.11--virtually the exact level recommended by the Philip Morris 
scientists.
  These increases in the nicotine/tar ratio resulted from increases in 
the nicotine level of the Benson & Hedges cigarette. The tar level in 
the cigarette in 1983 is exactly the same as it was in 1978--but the 
nicotine level is more than 50 percent higher.
  A key question arises from these facts: Were the increases in the 
nicotine level and the nicotine/tar ratio of the Benson & Hedges 
cigarette the result of the deliberate design decisions of Philip 
Morris? Or were they the result of chance or random variation?
  To answer this question, I asked Dr. Lynn Kozlowski from Penn State 
University, one of the Nation's leading experts on low-tar cigarettes, 
to perform a statistical analysis of the changes in the nicotine/tar 
ratio of the Benson & Hedges cigarette. His analysis shows that the 
increases in the nicotine/tar ratio were not the result of chance or 
random variation. Specifically, he found the possibility that the 
elevated nicotine/tar ratios could be explained by chance or random 
variation is less than 1 in 100,000. In other words,
 the possibility is virtually zero.

  Benson & Hedges is not the only example of commercialization I found 
during my investigation. In 1981, Philip Morris introduced a new 
cigarette brand, the Merit Ultra Light. Like the Benson & Hedges 
cigarette, the Merit Ultra Light had an increased nicotine/tar ratio.
  I have a chart that shows the nicotine/tar ratio in the Merit Ultra 
Light. As the chart illustrates, the nicotine/tar ratio is 
significantly elevated from the natural ratio of 0.07. The ratio in 
this cigarette is 0.11--virtually the exact level recommended by the 
scientists.
  In summary, the evidence I will present today shows three crucial 
points.
  First, Philip Morris researchers determined that the natural 
nicotine/tar ratio in cigarettes is 0.07.
  Second, Philip Morris researchers recommended that this natural 
nicotine/tar ratio be increased to approximately 0.10 in low-tar 
cigarettes to increase acceptability and strength.
  Third, shortly after this recommendation was made, Philip Morris 
raised the nicotine/tar ratio in Benson & Hedges cigarettes to the 
recommended level of 0.10 and above and introduced a new brand, the 
Merit Ultra Light, with a similar elevated nicotine/tar ratio.
  There appears to be only one conclusion that can be drawn from this 
evidence: Philip Morris deliberately increased nicotine levels in 
commercially marketed cigarettes.
  At this point, I want to begin to read excerpts from the documents.


     chronology of philip morris research on nicotine manipulation

  December 1970.--Philip Morris researchers commence a study that 
directly involves manipulation of the nicotine/tar ratio in cigarettes. 
The study involves reducing tar levels and boosting nicotine levels by 
adding nicotine salt, a commercial form of nicotine. Specifically, the 
researchers write:

       We are initiating a study of the effect of systematic 
     variation of the nicotine/tar ratio upon smoking rate and 
     acceptability measures. Using Marlboro as a base cigarette we 
     will reduce the tar delivery incrementally by filtration and 
     increase the nicotine delivery incrementally by adding a 
     nicotine salt. All cigarettes will be smoked for several days 
     each by a panel of 150 selected volunteers.

  Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Quarterly Report of Projects 
1600 and 2302''--Dec. 31, 1970.
  September 1971.--Philip Morris researchers describe their research 
objectives for 1972. They state that their goal is ``to determine 
optimal nicotine/tar ratios for cigarette acceptability of relatively 
low delivery cigarettes.''
  The researchers also identify tobacco's natural nicotine/tar ratio, 
stating that a ratio of 0.07 is ``characteristic of a broad range of 
natural leaf.''
  Source: Memorandum on ``Plans for 1972,'' from W. Dunn et al. to P.A. 
Eichorn--Sept. 8, 1971.
  January 1972.--Philip Morris researchers report plans to conduct a 
national mail-out of cigarettes with altered nicotine/tar ratios. 
Specifically, they write:

       Low delivery cigarettes with varying tar and nicotine 
     deliveries are being made with both low nicotine tobacco and 
     with ordinary tobacco. These cigarettes will be used in 
     national mailouts to determine what combinations of tar and 
     nicotine make for optimal acceptability in a low delivery 
     cigarette.

  Source: T.R. Schori, ``Smoking and Low Delivery Cigarettes,'' in 
Consumer Psychology Monthly Report--Dec. 16, 1971, to Jan. 15, 1972.
  October 1972.--Philip Morris researchers develop a three-stage study 
for determining the optimal nicotine levels in menthol cigarettes. The 
researchers write:

       This study has a three-stage design. The first stage is 
     designed to identify those nicotine delivery levels which we 
     might reasonably wish to consider for menthol cigarettes. 
     Having identified these nicotine delivery levels, in stage 2 
     we will determine combinations of nicotine and menthol which 
     make for optimal acceptability. And then in stage 3, 
     cigarettes with these combinations of nicotine and menthol 
     will be tested against current brands of known quality and 
     sales potential.

  The researchers also describe their ongoing ``tar and nicotine 
studies.'' They state:

       We have done a number of nicotine to tar ratio studies. . . 
     . When we get successful models, we will go out to a national 
     panel in an attempt to determine combinations of tar and 
     nicotine for optimal acceptability.

  Source: P.A. Eichorn and W.L. Dunn, ``Quarterly Report--Projects 1600 
and 2302''--Oct. 5, 1972.
  November 1972.--Philip Morris researchers state that one of their 
research objectives for 1973 is to determine if ``a cigarette with a 
high nicotine/tar ratio has market potential.''
  Source: Memorandum on ``1600 Objectives for 1973''--Nov. 11, 1972.
  May 1973.--Philip Morris develops a 5-year plan for research and 
development. This plan states explicitly the nicotine/tar ratio studies 
are being conducted to develop new cigarette designs. Specifically, the 
R&D plan states:

       This program comprises a number of studies expected to 
     provide insight leading to new cigaret designs. These include 
     studies of optimum nicotine/tar ratios [and] nicotine/menthol 
     relationships.

  Source: Philip Morris, USA, ``Research and Development Five Year 
Plan, 1974-1978''--May 1973.
  October 1973.--The Director of Research at Philip Morris, Thomas 
Osdene, who subsequently became vice president for science and 
technology, circulates the company's R&D strategy for the next 5 years. 
The strategy makes it clear that manipulating the concentration of 
smoke constituents was one of the major priorities of Philip Morris's 
research efforts.
  Osdene's strategy states:

       R&D management will concentrate a large part of the 
     resources at its disposal in two major long-range new product 
     programs: a cigarette with controlled-composition mainstream 
     smoke, and a ``full-flavor'' cigaret delivering less than ten 
     milligrams of FTC tar.

  The strategy then explains that the full-flavor/low-delivery program 
requires developing new means of manipulating the relative 
concentrations of key smoke constituents. Specifically, the strategy 
states:

       This program is directed at a dramatic reduction in cigaret 
     tar level while maintaining subjective responses equal to our 
     present major brands. . . . The task requires . . . 
     developing means of increasing the relative concentration of 
     desirable constituents.

  Source: Memorandum on ``5-Year Plan,'' from T. S. Osdene to W. L. 
Dunn et al.--Oct. 29, 1973.
  May 1974.--Philip Morris researchers state that they are engaged in 
systematic manipulation of nicotine. In a monthly research report, they 
state:

       Having done a number of studies (JND-1, JND-2, TNT-3, TNT-
     4) in which we have systematically manipulated tar and 
     nicotine parameters of cigarettes, we are trying to see if we 
     can make any overall conclusion. 

[[Page H 8009]]
     Specifically, we are trying to predict nicotine/tar ratios for optimal 
     cigarette acceptability at differing tar deliveries.

  Source: T.R. Schori, ``Regression Analysis,'' in Smoker Psychology 
Monthly Report--May 9, 1974.
  November 1974.--In the 1974 annual report of research activities, 
Philip Morris scientists report a breakthrough in their efforts to 
develop ``low delivery cigarettes with increased nicotine/tar ratios.'' 
A low delivery cigarette with an increased nicotine/tar ratio of 0.12 
was found to be ``comparable to the Marlboro in terms of both 
subjective acceptability and strength.'' According to the researchers:

       Although we previously have had cigarettes in this delivery 
     range which achieved parity with Marlboro in acceptability, 
     this is the first time that such a cigarette has achieved 
     parity in both acceptability and strength.

  The researchers also described a follow-up study to determine whether 
``the high nicotine/tar ratio was the primary determinant of the 
smokers' favorable perceptions of the cigarette.'' According to the 
researchers:

       In this study we will make three 10 mg tar cigarettes with 
     N/T ratios of 0.07, .10, and .13--insuring that tar is 
     constant over cigarettes--and a Marlboro control. From this 
     test, we will be able to determine: (1) whether we can 
     reliably make full flavored cigarettes in the 10 mg range; 
     and (2) whether a relatively high N/T ratio is essential in 
     order to do so.

   Top officials at Philip Morris were informed of the results of this 
research. The 1974 annual report was approved by the Director of 
Research, Thomas Osdene and distributed to the vice president for 
Research and Development, Helmut Wakeham.
  Source: ``Behavioral Research Annual Report, Part II,'' approved by 
T.S. Osdene and distributed to H. Wakeham et al.--November 1, 1974--
reprinted in 141 Congressional Record at H7658-62--daily edition. July 
25, 1995.
  October 1975.--Philip Morris researchers report the results of the 
followup study to Helmut Wakeham, the vice president for Research and 
Development. The followup study successfully confirmed the original 
results. According to the researchers:

       This study provides evidence that the optimum nicotine to 
     tar ratio for a 10 mg tar cigarette is somewhat higher than 
     that occurring in smoke from natural state of tobacco.

  Specifically, the follow-up study involved boosting nicotine levels 
by adding a nicotine salt--nicotine citrate--to low-delivery cigarettes 
to raise the nicotine/tar ratio above the natural ratio of 0.07. These 
experimental cigarettes were then sent to a test panel of hundreds of 
smokers. The results showed:

       [T]he experimental cigarette with the moderate level of 
     nicotine addition was rated higher in acceptability than the 
     proportional reduction cigarette and equal to the Marlboro 
     control.

  Source: ``Low Delivery Cigarettes and Increased Nicotine/Tar Ratios, 
A Replications,'' approved by William L. Dunn and distributed to H. 
Wakeham et al.--Oct. 1975.
  December 1978.--Philip Morris researchers analyze the nicotine levels 
in cigarettes produced by other manufactures. They prepare a table 
listing the tar and nicotine levels and the nicotine/tar ratios of 
competitors' brands. Then they state:

       The table suggests . . . that our competitors' brands . . . 
     seem to be higher in nicotine delivery than we would 
     otherwise expect from our own experience with low delivery 
     cigarettes . . . We suspect that in some cigarettes the use 
     of high alkaloid blends may . . . be an important 
     contribution to the higher ratios.

  A high alkaloid blend refers to a blend of tobacco containing high 
concentrations alkaloids. The principal alkaloid in tobacco is 
nicotine.
  Source: Memorandum on ``Plans and Objectives--1979,'' from W.L. Dunn 
to T.S. Osdene--Dec. 6, 1978--reprinted in 141 Congressional Record at 
H7668-70--daily edition. July 25, 1995.
  February 1979.--Philip Morris researchers plan a study on the changes 
in nicotine levels detectable by smokers. This study is intended to 
address ``the recurring expression of concern about the relative 
downness of N/T ratios in PM products.''
  Source: ``Notes on Program Review Presentation 2/79.''


                              THE FTC DATA

  The documents I have just read show that during the 1970's, Philip 
Morris researchers learned that the optimum nicotine/tar ratio in low-
delievery cigarettes is approximately 0.10, compared to a natural ratio 
of 0.07. This raises a question of central relevance: Did Philip Morris 
commercialize this research? In other words, did Philip Morris design 
commercial cigarettes with an elevated nicotine/tar ratio of 0.10 or 
above?
  To answer this question, I reviewed the tar and nicotine
   data from the Federal Trade Commission for low-delivery cigarettes 
manufactured by Philip Morris. The FTC has collected tar and nicotine 
data on cigarettes since 1968. For each variety of cigarette, the FTC 
tests 100 cigarettes collected at random from 50 different geographical 
locations. The tar and nicotine numbers reported by the FTC show the 
results of this extensive testing.

  As I summarized earlier, this FTC data provides compelling evidence 
that Philip Morris commercialized its research on optimum nicotine/tar 
ratios in at least two cigarette brands.
  The first example of commercialization is the regular-length--70 
millimeter--Benson & Hedges filtered cigarette. The first year that 
data is available for this brand is 1968. At that time, the tar level 
was 21 milligrams/cigarette, the nicotine level was 1.29 milligrams/
cigarette, and the nicotine/tar ratio was 0.06.
  From 1968 to 1978, tar and nicotine levels in regular-length Benson & 
Hedges filtered cigarettes dropped significantly to 0.9 milligrams tar 
and 0.06 milligrams nicotine. Throughout this period, however, the 
nicotine/tar ratio in the cigarette remained essentially the same. In 
1978, the nicotine/tar ratio was 0.07, virtually the same level as in 
1968. My chart illustrates this point.
  This changed after 1978, due to significant increases in the nicotine 
levels in the cigarette. In 1978, the nicotine level in the Benson & 
Hedges cigarette was 0.06 milligrams. By 1981, however, the nicotine 
level had doubled to 0.12 milligrams. In 1983, the nicotine level was 
0.10 milligrams--an increase of over 60 percent from the 1978 level.
  As the nicotine level was rising, so was the nicotine/tar ratio. The 
chart again illustrates this point. The nicotine/tar ratio rose in the 
Benson & Hedges cigarette to 0.09 in 1979 and then to 0.2 in 1981. In 
1983, the ratio was 0.11--virtually the same ratio recommended by the 
Philip Morris researchers.
  In 1984 and 1985, Philip Morris reduced the nicotine/tar ratio in the 
Benson & Hedges cigarette to the original 0.07 level. Nothing is known 
about why Philip Morris took this step. It could be because Philip 
Morris found other, more subtle ways, to manipulate nicotine delivery, 
such as by increasing the pH of the cigarette smoke, or perhaps it 
simply reflects a decision to phase-out the product. In any case, 
Philip Morris apparently stopped making the regular-length Benson & 
Hedges cigarette after 1985, because no further FTC data is available.
  There are two further points that emerge from the Benson & Hedges 
data. First, the increased nicotine/tar ratios from 1978 to 1983 are 
almost certainly due to the design decisions of Philip Morris--not to 
chance or random variation. Dr. Lynn
 Kozlowski, the head of the Department of Biobehavioral Health at Penn 
State University, has reviewed the FTC data for the Benson & Hedges 
cigarette. His analysis shows the possibility that the elevated 
nicotine/tar ratios could be due to random fluctuations in tar and 
nicotine levels is virtually nonexistent--less than 1 in 100,000.

  Second, the data refute the tobacco industry's claim that higher 
nicotine/tar ratios in low-tar and ultra-low-tar cigarettes are 
unavoidable because they are a necessary consequence of filtration. The 
Benson & Hedges cigarette was an ultra-low-tar cigarette throughout the 
period from 1978 to 1985. The tar levels in the cigarette were 
consistently below or near 1 milligram during this period. Yet in three 
of these years--1978, 1984, and 1985--the cigarette had a natural 
nicotine/tar ratio of 0.07.
  This history shows that Philip Morris was capable of producing--and 
in fact did produce--an ultra-low-tar Benson & Hedges cigarette with a 
natural nicotine/tar ratio of 0.07. This plainly demonstrates that the 
much higher nicotine/tar ratios observed in the Benson & Hedges 
cigarette between 1978 

[[Page H 8010]]
and 1983 were avoidable. In other words, the high ratios recorded 
during this period must have reflected intentional design decisions of 
Philip Morris.
  The second example of commercialization involves the king-size--85 
millimeter--Merit Ultra Light. This cigarette was introduced in 1981 as 
a low-delivery cigarette. Its nicotine/tar ratio, however, was not the 
natural ratio of 0.07. Instead, like the Benson & Hedges cigarette, its 
nicotine/tar ratio was elevated. Specifically, the ratio was again 
0.11--the level recommended by the Philip Morris researchers.
  A chart again illustrates this point.


                    current evidence of manipulation

  The evidence I have reviewed appears to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Philip Morris manipulated the nicotine levels in cigarettes 
sold to the American public in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Is 
there evidence that Philip Morris continues this manipulation today?
  Recent data from the Federal Trade Commission is telling. It shows 
that the nicotine/tar ratio in the Merit Ultra Light cigarette has 
remained elevated. For instance, from 1988 through 1993, the nicotine/
tar ratio in king-size Merit Ultra Light cigarettes sold in soft packs 
was 0.10--virtually the same elevated level as in 1981. This strongly 
suggests continued manipulation in this cigarette brand by Philip 
Morris.
  There is one caveat in the recent data that should be noted. Starting 
in 1988, the FTC stopped doing its own tar and nicotine
 testing and instead began to rely on data submitted by the tobacco 
industry. The tobacco industry data is not as precise as the previous 
data. For this reason, it is possible that the actual nicotine/tar 
ratio in Merit Ultra Lights from 1988 to 1993 could deviate somewhat 
from the reported level.

  Manipulating FTC nicotine deliveries is only one of several ways to 
manipulate the amount of nicotine received by the smoker. For instance, 
the amount of nicotine absorbed by a smoker can be increased without 
changing the FTC nicotine delivery by increasing the alkalinity--or 
pH--of smoke. Alternatively, changes in filter design, such as using 
ventilation holes that are covered by a smoker's lips, can be used to 
increase nicotine intake without affecting the FTC nicotine delivery.
  I have tried to investigate whether Philip Morris uses these or other 
techniques to manipulate nicotine in cigarettes sold to the American 
public. Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, Philip Morris has not 
cooperated with this investigation. As a result, the full extent to 
which Philip Morris manipulates nicotine in its cigarettes is still 
unknown.


                               conclusion

  Today, another 3,000 children will begin to smoke. One third of these 
children will become addicted to nicotine and eventually die from lung 
cancer, heart disease, or other illness caused by smoking.
  We have it in our power to protect these children. Voluntary 
agreements with the tobacco industry will not work. The tobacco 
industry has pledged for decades to stop selling cigarettes to 
children, but it never does. In the last 3 years, despite the 
industry's pledges, the teen smoking rate actually increased by 30 
percent.
  The answer is commonsense regulation by an independent Federal 
agency--the Food and Drug Administration. We cannot trust the tobacco 
companies to determine when an advertisement is targeted at children. 
They continue to insist that Joe Camel is geared to adults. Only the 
FDA can make these determinations.
  Ultimately, the question in front of President Clinton, the Members 
of this body, and the American people is a political question--not a 
legal or factual one. We must decide whether we are going to protect 
the health of our children or the profits of the Nation's most powerful 
special interest, the tobacco companies.
  We are at a historic moment in the history of tobacco control. If we 
miss this opportunity, we will lose another generation of kids to 
nicotine addiction. I therefore call upon my colleagues to study the 
evidence I am presenting and to reject any legislative effort to block 
commonsense regulation.
  Let us show the American people--and especially the children of this 
Nation--that we will represent their interests, not the special 
interests of the tobacco companies.
  Mr. Speaker, I have brought with me the documents I read from during 
the course of this hour, as well as the analysis of Dr. Kozlowski. 
Pursuant to my earlier unanimous consent request, I am inserting these 
documents into the Record for publication.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the following documents for the Record.
  [The documents will appear in a future issue of the Record.]
  

                          ____________________