[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 122 (Wednesday, July 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10699-S10701]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ELIMINATE THE DUAL KEY

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, today's New York Times reports that the 
United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, would 
``veto NATO airstrikes.'' Secretary of State Christopher has written to 
me to clarify the decisions that were made in Brussels. In his letter, 
Secretary Christopher has stated that ``the North Atlantic Council 
approved detailed planning for the use of substantial NATO airpower to 
deter or respond to Bosnian Serb attacks on the U.N. safe area of 
Gorazde. These plans include a broader range of options for commanders, 
who for the first time will have the ability to use NATO airpower 
within a wide geographic area against a variety of targets which may 
pose a threat to the safe area.'' Secretary Christopher goes on to say 
that ``Of equal importance, NATO military authorities were instructed 
to formulate plans for protecting other safe areas, particularly Bihac, 
on the basis of the new approach adopted for Gorazde . . . These steps, 
which confirm decisions taken in London, reflect unanimous Allied 
endorsement of the substantial change to the dual key previously in 
effect.''
  Reinforcing Secretary Christopher's letter, the Secretary General 
just released a statement that delegates the authority for airstrikes 
to the military commanders on the ground. In his press statement, the 
Secretary General says, ``on the question of the `dual key,' the 
relevant Security Council resolutions call for close coordination 
between the United Nations and NATO on the use of NATO air power and 
this is reflected in the NATO decision. In order to streamline 
decisions taking within the U.N. chain of command when the use of air 
power is deemed to be necessary, the Secretary General has decided to 
delegate the necessary authority in this respect to his military 
commanders in the field.'' Mr. President, this is consistent with the 
North Atlantic Council decision agreed upon last night, and is a major 
step forward.
  As a result of a meeting conducted last Friday in London and 
implemented by the North Atlantic Council of NATO last night in 
Brussels, NATO has made a decision to take new, positive action in 
Bosnia to deter and retaliate against Bosnian Serb aggression against 
at least the U.N.-designated safe areas of Gorazde and Sarajevo. 
Already, French and British troops have taken action to forcefully 
reopen the ground route for humanitarian supplies into Sarajevo. The 
NATO military command is establishing the command and control links and 
decisionmaking rules to guide NATO operations in Bosnia in fulfillment 
of the decisions so recently made. The new decisionmaking process would 
eliminate the veto that has been exercised regularly by U.N. political 
authorities, frustrating timely and strong alliance action. The 
Secretary General has agreed with this decision.
  This is an important new development, a vital change in the military 
equation. It is critical to the success of alliance military operations 
in Bosnia.
  Our NATO allies have come to this consensus partially at the behest 
of the United States, which has urged more forceful action against the 
Bosnian Serb forces. This decision to retaliate, which has been 
forcefully communicated to the Bosnian Serb military commander by a 
trio of United States, United Kingdom, and French generals, commits 
NATO to punishing and disproportionate airstrikes against any Bosnian 
Serb military facility or formation anywhere in Bosnia, including Serb 
headquarters and command and control centers, should the Bosnian Serbs 
attempt to overrun Gorazde.
  The need to make these decisions and these threats credible requires 
the elimination of the ``dual key'' to authorizing airstrikes. This 
``dual key'' process, which has required both NATO and U.N. political 
authorities to authorize airstrikes, has gutted the effectiveness of 
previous NATO airstrikes undertaken to punish the Serbs for actions 
against U.N. protection forces or Bosnian civilians. The decisionmaking 
process has been far too slow, and has been burdened with added 
requirements to notify the targets of the intended strike, to strike at 
prearranged times, and to strike at targets that do not 
disproportionately punish the Serbian forces. These restrictions are 
militarily foolish, and serve only to set up NATO forces as targets for 
Serb antiaircraft fire as they come in over preannounced targets at 
specified times. Allied air power in Bosnia has been reduced to a farce 
by the misguided political calculations of U.N. civilian officials.
  These restrictions do not pertain to the retaliation that has been 
outlined for NATO. NATO retaliatory airstrikes will be swift, 
unannounced, and directed at targets of NATO's choosing, encompassing 
any Bosnian Serb military facility or formation. These strikes will be 
disproportionate and massive, rather than the pinpricks that have been 
conducted in the past. NATO has resolved to continue, to punish the 
Serbs even if they resort again to such dastardly tactics as using U.N. 
personnel or civilians as human shields to protect their military 
facilities. Regarding military action in the face of hostage-taking, 
the presumption outlined in the NATO decision is that operations will 
go forward.
  According to the North Atlantic Council decisions last night, the 
strikes will take place when NATO and U.N. military commanders--
military commanders, not civilian authorities--determine that Serb 
preparations pose a threat to Gorazde. The chain of command stops at 
the military level, not at the political level, according to the North 
Atlantic Council decision document.
  Under the ``dual key'' process, U.N. civilians are allowed to make 
military decisions, which does not and has never made military sense. 
Once a decision has been made by civilian authorities to carry out 
airstrikes, military commanders should be, and must be, trusted to 
carry out that decision in the most effective manner, and in a manner 
that best protects their striking forces. NATO commanders must be given 
the freedom of action to make good military judgments, to strike at 
targets that pose the greatest danger to NATO, and to strike at targets 
that will inflict the greatest damage to the Serb forces.
 This is what is necessary to let the Serb forces know that this 

[[Page S10700]]
time, we mean business. Peaceniks at the United Nations cannot be 
allowed to overturn military options to the tragedy in Bosnia. New York 
should be out of the Bosnia loop.

  At the United Nations, political entanglements also entangle military 
operations. Aside from decisions being made by United Nations civilians 
with little or no military experience, opportunities exist for Bosnian 
Serb supporters to undermine the effectiveness of NATO airstrikes. I 
understand that the Russians are opposed to the NATO decision to 
undertake airstrikes against the Bosnian Serb forces, but this is 
understandable. Russia has ancient ties to the Serbs of both Serbia and 
Bosnia, ties of religion and of history. But Russia, with its vote on 
the United Nations Security Council, should not be allowed to 
jeopardize NATO decisions and NATO actions. Russia is not, at least not 
yet, a member of NATO. I respect the views of those who would 
acknowledge Russian concerns in this matter, but I venture to surmise 
that the Russians would not allow consideration of NATO's views to 
handcuff decisions made and actions taken by Russian military forces, 
regardless of the voice and veto of NATO members on the United Nations 
Security Council.
  I believe that, differences over the passage of the bill lifting the 
arms embargo aside, the Members of this body are united in opposition 
to the existing and cumbersome ``dual key'' decision-making process. It 
has been a critical element in the failure of the United Nations 
operation in Bosnia, and it has been a critical element in the failure 
of previous NATO attempts to shore up the U.N. operations in Bosnia. If 
the action taken to lift the embargo leads to the departure of the 
United Nations or our European allies from Bosnia, with all the danger 
that operation might entail, the elimination of this ``dual key'' 
becomes even more important. If the United States participates in the 
withdrawal, as President Clinton has suggested, I believe we all would 
agree that we do not want the United Nations in a position to crimp 
NATO's ability to react.
  The Secretary General's statement is an endorsement of the major 
change in the way NATO does business in Bosnia. It will permit allied 
air power to do what it is designed to do, as characterized by the 
following statement from the NATO Secretary General, which is that 
``there is a strong feeling among Allies that such operations, once 
they are launched, will not lightly be discontinued. In the face of the 
inherent strike, the Alliance is determined.''
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
pertinent materials.
  There being no objection, the materials were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                                       The Secretary of State,

                                        Washington, July 26, 1995.
     Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Byrd: Working with our NATO Allies, the United 
     States has embarked on a stronger and firmer approach to 
     preserving the UN mission in Bosnia. New command and control 
     arrangements agreed to in Brussels last night, combined with 
     British and French decisiveness in using their Rapid Reaction 
     Forces to secure routes into Sarajevo, are vivid examples of 
     our heightened resolve.
       Last night in Brussels, NATO acted resolutely to confirm 
     and implement decisions taken at last week's International 
     Meeting on Bosnia in London. After intensive review by NATO 
     military authorities, the North Atlantic Council approved 
     detailed planning for use of substantial NATO airpower to 
     deter or respond to Bosnian Serb attacks on the UN safe area 
     of Gorazde. These plans include a broader range of options 
     for commanders, who for the first time will have the ability 
     to use NATO airpower within a wide geographic area against a 
     variety of targets which may pose a threat to the safe area.
       Of equal importance, NATO military authorities were 
     instructed to formulate plans for protecting other safe 
     areas, particularly Bihac, on the basis of the new approach 
     adopted for Gorazde. Authority for the decisions taken at 
     NATO already exists under current UN Security Council 
     resolutions. NATO Secretary General Claes communicated the 
     NATO decisions to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali last 
     night.
       These steps, which confirm decisions taken in London, 
     reflect unanimous Allied endorsement of a substantial change 
     to the dual key previously in effect. This would be 
     accomplished through the anticipated new delegation of 
     authority from UN and NATO political authorities to theater 
     and field commanders, consistent with military practices.
       These new arrangements will ensure that the use of airpower 
     is substantial and decisive. They are consistent with the 
     requirements of the U.S. military and have its endorsement. 
     The Alliance recognizes that there are risks involved in use 
     of substantial airpower, but will not be deterred. In short, 
     there will be no more pinpricks.
       I hope the Administration can count on your support.
           Sincerely,
     Warren Christopher.
                                                                    ____

                [From the New York Times, July 26, 1995]

         NATO Gives U.N. Officials Veto on Airstrikes in Bosnia

                         (By Craig R. Whitney)

       Brussels, Wednesday, July 26--Four days after the United 
     States, Britain, and France threatened the Bosnian Serbs with 
     the heaviest air strikes yet if they attacked the Muslim 
     enclave of Gorazde, NATO officials said early this morning 
     that they had agreed that no large-scale bombing could start 
     unless United Nations civilian officials gave the go-ahead.
       Far from doing away with the cumbersome ``dual key'' 
     arrangement that the United States says has hampered NATO's 
     ability to protect United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, 
     the NATO allies in effect have sided with United Nations 
     Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has been saying 
     nobody could take his key away from him.
       The allies agreed to make what one NATO official called a 
     ``strong recommendation'' to Mr. Boutros-Ghali to leave it to 
     his military field commanders on the ground in Gorazde and 
     elsewhere to decide when the time had come to start bombing 
     the Serbs if they attacked.
       But since Mr. Boutros-Ghali has been extremely cautious 
     about approving air strikes in the past, what was meant to 
     sound like a roar in London four days ago appeared likely to 
     have been throttled down to something more like a growl by 
     the time NATO ambassadors finished grappling with it in the 
     small hours of Wednesday morning.
       ``It's falling apart,'' an American military officer said 
     of the previous allied indications that in the event of an 
     imminent attack on Gorazde, military leaders could decide on 
     their own to proceed with bombing of the Serbs. (Field 
     commanders already have the authority to call in close air 
     support in the midst of battle, though that power has seldom 
     been used.)
       A senior NATO diplomat said as the Brussles meeting dragged 
     on, ``What we came up with tonight has to be endorsed by 
     Boutros Boutros-Ghali.'' As for the ``dual key'' arrangement, 
     he said, ``We have to live with it.''
       The main pressure to preserve a decision-making role for 
     Mr. Boutros-Ghali came from Britain and France. With nearly 
     15,000 soldiers on the ground in Bosnia who could suffer the 
     consequences if bombing and Serb reactions to it spiral out 
     of control, the countries pressed, in effect, for a series of 
     political fire walls against precipitate American action from 
     the air.
       In particular, French officials deny that they ever agreed 
     last Friday in London to launch automatically what the 
     American Secretary of Defense William Perry called a 
     ``disproportionate response'' to an attack on Gorazde. 
     Americans had emerged from the London meeting describing an 
     agreement to sidestep the Secretary General, but apparently 
     that was exaggerated.
       The emerging decision would represent a serious setback for 
     the United States, which wanted the allies to leave all 
     decisions on bombing from now on to NATO officers and United 
     Nations military commanders on the ground in Bosnia.
       An American diplomat said, ``We're just trying to get the 
     best deal we can.''
       NATO ambassadors endorsed a detailed military plan prepared 
     by their uniformed chiefs and then planned to call on Mr. 
     Boutros-Ghali to delegate to as low a level as possible his 
     authority to approve air strikes if the Serbs attacked 
     designated ``safe areas'' in Bosnia, one participant said.
       The allies took two full days and part of a third to decide 
     what to do about Gorazde despite the fact that most of them 
     had been present in London when the problem was discussed 
     last Friday. And NATO has had authority to bomb Bosnian Serb 
     heavy weapons in Gorazde and all the other United Nations-
     designated ``safe areas'' in Bosnia since April of 1994.
       The senior United Nations commander in Bosnia, Gen. Rupert 
     Smith of Britain, has frequently reached agreement with his 
     NATO counterpart, Adm. Leighton Smith of NATO's Southern 
     Command in Naples, an American, on conducting air strikes.
       In the past, some of these have then been vetoed by Gen. 
     Bernard Janvier, the overall commander of United Nations 
     peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, but many more have 
     been disapproved by Mr. Boutros-Ghali or his civilian 
     representative there, Yasushi Akashi.
       While the plan discussed here was devised to deter a 
     Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde, NATO officials said they 
     would try to adapt it as quickly as possible for the western 
     Bosnian enclave of Bihac, where Bosnian Serbs, Croatian 
     Serbs, and renegade Muslim forces are fighting Bosnian 
     Government troops.
       Mr. Boutros-Ghali, who has insisted on retaining ultimate 
     authority over air attacks 

[[Page S10701]]
     ever since last week's tough talk in London by American officials about 
     cutting him out of the decision-making process, was to be 
     informed of the allies' latest decision by NATO Secretary-
     General Willy Klaes.
       The coldest feet here apparently belonged to Britain and 
     France. ``We have to have at least a nihil obstat from the 
     United Nations at the political level, in the most practical 
     and least obstructive way possible,'' one French official 
     explained, referring to the Vatican's expression when 
     approving a book for publication. Officials said that 
     Britain, too, was adamant about keeping the United Nations in 
     the decision-making loop as far as possible.
       But the allies said that Mr. Boutros-Ghali would need no 
     additional Security Council resolutions to authorize his 
     subordinate military commanders to approve a bombing 
     campaign. If he asked for such a resolution, Russia would 
     almost certainly veto it. The Russian Foreign Minister, 
     Andrei V. Kozyrev, refused to go along with the London threat 
     last week.
       The allies also agreed that they would have to meet again 
     before any decision to actually begin a campaign of 
     widespread air strikes against Bosnian Serb air defenses and 
     other military targets, and that Mr. Boutros-Ghali would have 
     to agree that it should go ahead, officials said.
       Mr. Boutros-Ghali attended last Friday's meeting in London, 
     where the U.S., Britain, and France promised ``substantial 
     and decisive response'' to any attack on Gorazde, but he said 
     little publicly there.
       President Jacques Chirac had described the London decisions 
     to threaten bombing as ``not entirely what we were hoping 
     for.'' He has pressed for a thousand British and French 
     troops to be dispatched to reinforce the United Nations 
     peacekeepers in Gorazde.

  Mr. BYRD. I thank again the distinguished Senator from Kansas for her 
courtesy, and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy].
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I see my colleague from California on the 
floor. I understand she would like to address the Senate.

                          ____________________