[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 122 (Wednesday, July 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10680-S10697]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES--ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY KIM YONG-
                SAM, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA


                                 Recess

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
stand in recess until the hour of 12 noon and proceed to the Hall of 
the House of Representatives for the joint meeting. 

[[Page S10681]]

  Thereupon, the Senate, at 10:44 a.m., recessed and, preceded by its 
Secretary, Kelly D. Johnston, and its Sergeant at Arms, Howard O. 
Greene, Jr., proceeded to the Hall of the House of Representatives to 
hear an address delivered by His Excellency, Kim Yong-sam, President of 
the Republic of Korea.
  (For the address delivered by the President of the Republic of Korea, 
see today's proceedings in the House of Representatives.)


                              after recess

  Whereupon, at 12 noon, the Senate, having returned to its Chamber, 
reassembled and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. 
Ashcroft).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Parliamentary inquiry.
  I think it would be helpful if the Chair would cite the order of the 
time of the votes and the pending matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending matter is S. 21, the Bosnia 
matter. There are 45 minutes to each side under control in debate, and 
circumstances with leaders on each side controlling debate. At 1:30----
  Mr. WARNER. I think it is 1:45, Mr. President.
  Will the Chair clarify the time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is controlled time until 1:30, followed 
by the two leaders who have an opportunity to speak to the issue and 
use their leader time. The amendment by the Senator from Georgia. [Mr. 
Nunn] is pending to the substitute of the majority leader.
  Mr. WARNER. Thank you. Mr. President, then, for planning purposes, 
Senators could anticipate a vote between 1:45 and 2.
  Would that be correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That, I believe, is the general time of which 
the next recorded vote should occur.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in 
morning business for no more than 10 minutes.
  Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time for that purpose?
  Mr. CRAIG. And that the time not be used by either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, would that 
time then be divided for both sides fully?
  Mr. CRAIG. I would choose it not be divided from either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the Senator's request?
  Mr. CRAIG. If there is no objection, it could be divided equally.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I have to 
consult with the distinguished majority leader. I note the presence on 
the floor of a number of Senators who wish to address the pending 
resolution.
  Might we inquire of the Senator from Idaho the time?
  Mr. CRAIG. It does not deal with this issue.
  Mr. WARNER. I realize that. The time that the Senator would want?
  Mr. CRAIG. No more than 10 minutes.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I inquire of the manager of the bill--I 
am sorry. I just walked onto the floor and did not understand what the 
allocation of time was. I know we are moving toward a vote at 1:45, 
approximately. The time is reserved for leaders. I would like to get 
some assurance that I will be able to speak on the pending question for 
up to 10 minutes or so. I do not know how that works in terms of other 
time that might be allocated. I just offer that so that the leader has 
some opportunity to make a judgment on this.
  Mr. WARNER. For the information of the Senators present, there is now 
an hour and a half of time equally divided between the majority leader 
and the Senator from Connecticut and those who wish to speak in 
opposition. I see the presence of two or three Senators I happen to 
understand will be speaking in favor, on behalf of the majority 
leader's amendment. I am perfectly willing to allocate such time within 
that 45 minutes as they desire.
  Could the Senator from Indiana indicate how much time he would like 
to have?
  Mr. COATS. I prefer more, but I will accept 10 minutes or so.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if I may indicate to the Senator from 
Virginia, I would be happy to have 5 minutes reserved for my comments.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have just been advised by the majority 
leader's staff that the majority leader is overcommitted at this time 
with respect to the time period of 45 minutes under his control. 
Therefore, I regret that I would have to interpose an objection to----
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I will yield the floor then if time has 
been allocated for this purpose.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is the first I knew about this 
allocation of time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Indiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. WARNER. Might I ask the Senator from Indiana if he could lessen 
that time if at all possible because we are overrequested.
  Mr. COATS. I will do my best.
  Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his courtesy. I 
did speak on this issue a few days ago, and I will attempt to summarize 
the statement that I have here in the interest of preserving some time 
for other Members.
  I tried to make two points. First, that it is regrettable that we are 
here not debating what the policy should be relative to Bosnia, 
fulfilling our constitutional role of advise and consent to the 
President of the United States, who is Commander in Chief and who is 
delegated and given the responsibility and authority to conduct the 
United States foreign policy, but regrettably we are here formulating 
that policy in the absence of leadership provided by the President and 
the administration in fulfilling their duties. That has been a 
continuing sad story that has permeated this entire Bosnia debate over 
the last 2\1/2\ to 3 years.
  Filling this vacuum of leadership is not something that this Senator 
relishes or even feels fully qualified to perform. Nevertheless, it 
seems that it is left to us to try to identify and define some policy 
relative to the United States involvement or lack of involvement in 
this conflict in Bosnia.
  It is true that the choices that face us as a nation in terms of 
dealing with this conflict are not easy choices. Former Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin said all choices in Bosnia are bad; some are worse. 
It is clear that we are dealing with perhaps what might be defined as 
the best of the worst in terms of choices. But a couple of facts 
confront us very, very directly today in this conflict.
  Fact No. 1 is that the current attempts at negotiating a settlement 
to the conflict in Bosnia have failed. And they have failed for a 
period now of 2\1/2\ to 3 years. There have been numerous attempts. 
There have been numerous so-called peace agreements, new peace plans. I 
met with the Bosnian Foreign Minister just a few days ago. He said, 
``We have signed 17 pieces of paper agreeing to cease-fires and 
agreeing to peace plans.'' He said that, ``We have one party in this 
conflict that holds a piece of paper and no weapon, and another party 
who holds a weapon and no piece of paper.'' He said to guess which one 
is going to prevail.
  He said, ``We will not be able to sit down at the table and begin to 
negotiate an agreement which both sides can agree to and adhere to 
until there is an equalization of the confrontation that exists between 
the two.'' Either both hold a piece of paper or both hold a piece of 
paper and a weapon, and some sort of rough stalemate exists that will 
cause both parties to have an incentive to come to the peace table. As 
the situation now exists, no peace can be achieved if one party has no 
reason to achieve a peace, no basis to achieve a peace. There is no 
reason they need to achieve a peace if they can achieve their gains 
through force.
  The second truth we face is that UNPROFOR's--the so-called protective 
force's--policy of protecting Bosnians 

[[Page S10682]]
in safe havens has failed. We daily read of the latest disaster in this 
regard.
  It is clear that UNPROFOR, for whatever reason, does not have the 
capacity, the will, or whatever, to achieve a successful implementation 
of the protection policy.
  The third basic fact, and we might as well say it and be up front 
about it, the United States is not going to intervene militarily to 
solve this and resolve this conflict. The American people do not 
support it, the Congress does not support it, the President has not 
articulated why we should do this, how it is in our vital strategic or 
national interest, how we could achieve this militarily, how long we 
would be there, what our exit strategy would be.
  None of the defined criteria that are used to justify American 
intervention have been either defined or articulated to either us or 
the American people, and it is clear that we will not commit troops to 
this conflict.
  Anyone who has studied the history of conflict in this region, anyone 
who understands to the most elementary level the nature of the 
environment in which we will be placing our troops, anyone who 
understands the complexity of this particular conflict, has to come to 
the conclusion that it would be a disaster, a mistake, to involve the 
U.S. militarily in this conflict.
  Therefore, we are left with what I believe is probably the best-worst 
option, something that I have been reluctant to endorse, but something 
I do now endorse, and that is a lifting of the embargo. I agree with 
the proposal that withdraws the U.N. protective forces first before we 
lift. I think that is important. I agree with the policy that says the 
United States should not commit to a NATO strategy that is destined to 
be a failed policy.
  But after UNPROFOR has left, and hopefully we will not need to 
fulfill the President's already-stated commitment and promise to our 
NATO allies to utilize U.S. forces to withdraw those forces, hopefully 
that will not be necessary. I will reluctantly support that, in an 
emergency situation, if there is no other way, as a commitment to NATO 
that I believe has been made and we need now to keep. Hopefully, we 
then can lift the arms embargo.
  I think we need to understand what this means. I asked the foreign 
minister, what does this mean lifting the arms embargo? What kind of 
arms do you seek? He said, ``You don't understand. We don't need 
American advisers on the ground; we don't need massive training off 
site, we are very skilled in the rudimentaries of conflict.''
  What we are dealing with here is not a Desert Storm sophisticated 
arms conflict, but something more akin to pre-World War II. He said, 
``The first thing we need are helmets.'' He said, ``Most of our deaths 
are caused by shrapnel injuries to the head because we are not allowed 
to have helmets under the arms embargo.'' It is an absurd restriction.
  Second, he said, ``We need some ammunition, small arms ammunition. We 
don't need people to show us how to use that. We have been an arms 
manufacturer in the past.''
  Third, he said, ``We need some antitank weapons so that we can deter 
the heavy tank forces that may be arrayed against us.'' He said, 
``These don't need to be sophisticated either; shoulder-held, shoulder-
fired antitank weapons would be sufficient.''
  And fourth, ``We need artillery to counter the artillery that is 
utilized by the Serbs so that we can achieve some kind of balance of 
forces.''
  So lifting the arms embargo does not mean necessarily greater U.S. 
involvement, it does not mean we need to supply the arms. These arms 
are available on the world market. It simply means we give the Bosnians 
the right to do what they had asked us to do, and that is to defend 
their own borders.
  Finally, I think we need to examine a strategy of containment that is 
in our vital national interest, not to have this spread into the areas 
of Macedonia and Kosovo. We do need to draw the line, NATO does need to 
be involved in this, but it requires U.S. leadership to accomplish it. 
U.S. leadership has been the glue that formulated NATO, it has been the 
glue that has held it together, and it is going to be the leadership 
necessary to maintain NATO as a sustainable, viable defense entity. So 
we need that leadership, and we should consult with our NATO allies 
about a containment strategy that keeps this conflict contained within 
its current area.
  So, Mr. President, that is a very abbreviated explanation of why I 
support the Dole-Lieberman effort here. I do so reluctantly. I believe 
we have no other choice.
  I thank the Senator from Virginia for the time that he has allotted 
to me.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield myself such time that I might 
require.
  I think it would be in order if we sort of recognized, went back and 
forth from those in support and those in opposition. The Senator from 
Washington came very promptly. So I suggest by way of unanimous consent 
that the Senator from Washington proceed, to be followed by Senator Kyl 
and Senator DeWine, Senator Thurmond. Of course, we can interrupt that 
order, if necessary, if others in opposition wish to speak.
  And then I also announce that we have reason to believe that Senator 
Cohen may be desirous of submitting an amendment. I hope he will advise 
the managers as to his time requirements as early as possible. I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered. The Senator from Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes in opposition.
  I do rise today in opposition to S. 21, which directs the President 
of the United States to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Like many of my colleagues, I, too, want to do 
something, anything, to stop further atrocities from occurring in 
Bosnia. The situation grows more horrid everyday. We have all said it 
in a hundred different ways: There are no good options to choose from 
when trying to determine how best to respond to the tragedies in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
  Compelling, sound, and thoughtful arguments have been made on both 
sides of this debate. In the words of one young Dutch peacekeeper just 
freed from Srebrenica: ``You wish the war would stop, but it's only a 
wish. It will be a miracle if this war ever stops.''
  He had come to that conclusion after witnessing first hand the hatred 
that has fueled this conflict for generations, a hatred so deep as to 
seem endless, passed on for centuries from parent to child.
  At home, most Americans wonder aloud why the nations of Europe have 
not been able to come together around this crisis. Knowing how pressing 
the needs are in our own country, many Americans voice frustration at 
the unending calls for one form or another of United States involvement 
in Bosnia. Many resent the United States. in the role of global 
policeman again, and still many others are horrified by the pictures 
they see of refugees, of Bosnia's senseless dead, of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide, of a young woman hanging from a tree in desperate pursuit 
of escape.
  It is this profound sense of frustration that brings us to this 
debate today. Proponents of S. 21 argue that this approach gives us the 
best of both worlds--allowing the United States to do something to 
resolve the conflict while doing nothing to further our own national 
involvement. But I believe, Mr. President, that the promises of this 
approach may well prove to be false and that the consequences of 
Senator Dole's bill are not well understood.
  It is those consequences that concern me the most. It is those 
questions that have not been answered as we go through this debate.
  Despite those who have dismissed his comments during the course of 
this debate, I agree with Secretary of Defense William Perry when he 
says that unilaterally lifting the embargo greatly risks Americanizing 
the war in the Balkans.
  Let me make it clear that I agree with those who argue that the arms 
embargo should be lifted, because it is the Bosnians' right as an 
independent nation to defend themselves. U.N. Resolution 713, agreed to 
in 1991 and imposing an arms embargo on all states formed from former 
Yugoslavia, has frozen a military imbalance in place, because Bosnian 
Serbs inherited most of the arms and troop strength from Tito's 
Yugoslavia.
  But I continue to have very strong concerns about the United States 
going 

[[Page S10683]]
it alone and lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia unilaterally--
against the better judgment of our European allies who have troops on 
the ground, and who have far more at stake than we do at this point.
  We have spent little time during this debate discussing the actual 
details of the plan before us. But it is those details that will 
determine the success or failure of this approach.
  For example, if the goal of lifting this embargo is to get arms to 
the Bosnians, how exactly will that be accomplished? Who will be 
supplying the arms? The language of the bill suggests that we can 
somehow preclude U.S. participation, but I am unclear as to how that 
can be achieved. If we act unilaterally, we may then be in a position 
of supplying not just arms, but also trainers and other U.S. military 
support personnel. Or, if we simply provide funds for the Bosnians to 
purchase arms, will we be supportive if they use United States funds to 
purchase arms from Russia--or Iran?
  How do we keep United States supplied arms from falling into the 
wrong hands? This may be a particularly difficult problem if Russian 
arms are purchased--given that Russia has remained very close to the 
Serbs during this conflict.
  More broadly, if we view the Bosnian crisis as a potential threat to 
European stability, then I believe we must approach the problem in 
concert with our European allies, despite how difficult this has been. 
They are strongly opposed to lifting the embargo, and have made it 
clear that if the United States lifts the Bosnian embargo, they will 
remove their peacekeepers. That will no doubt lead to a new wave of 
refugees in Europe. It is the Europeans who will have to deal with the 
immediate effects of any U.S. action. It will be their soldiers who are 
on the ground in Bosnia, and whose lives will be on the line.
  Other questions remain.
  Currently, the United States works with our allies to enforce the 
embargo. If we break it unilaterally, will our allies continue to try 
and enforce it, and if so, how will we deal with such conflicts?
  The Croatians, too, have lost territory to the Serbs and would like 
to reclaim it. If we lift the embargo against Bosnia, why will we not 
be asked to do the same for Croatia?
  And, if the United States acts unilaterally, this could lead some 
nations to question their commitment to other embargoes, such as the 
economic boycott of Iraq currently in place.
  Mr. President, I am not prepared today to bury the multilateralism we 
have worked so hard to develop over the last 50 years with our allies.
  And finally, if the U.N. peacekeepers are removed, the United States 
may find itself in a position of having to deploy our own troops to 
help in that evacuation. Have the American people been adequately 
prepared for the loss of life that may occur under those circumstances? 
On that question, Mr. President, I strongly believe we should take the 
matter to a vote of the House and Senate if a wider role for U.S. 
troops is requested, so that the American people are involved.
  Let me make it clear that although I do not support the resolution 
before us today, I agree that the status quo is totally unacceptable. 
The handwringing of the West has been endless. Our actions have been 
irresolute and irresponsible.
  It has been a mistake from the beginning to deploy U.N. peacekeepers 
in a situation where no peace exists. It is not the mission of U.N. 
peacekeepers to make peace. Their role is to try to keep the peace once 
a settlement to the conflict has been agreed upon. That is not the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia. In the words of the Secretary 
General, the West has delivered to the United Nations a ``mission 
impossible.''
  Scores of peacekeepers have been killed--and countless wounded. They 
have been deployed as soldiers into a war zone, but without the arms 
and means to protect even themselves.
  The peacekeepers have done their best under these horrid 
circumstances. They have saved countless thousands of lives. They have 
delivered vital humanitarian relief supplies. But they cannot be 
expected to resolve this war.
  As I said in the beginning of my statement, we have come to this 
debate out of a deep sense of frustration.
  This past weekend's ministerial level meetings in Europe produced a 
refinement of current allied strategy, but the current allied position 
remains tenuous and untested. We know that NATO's pinprick airstrikes 
are to be replaced by a NATO air campaign. We have been promised 
significant improvements in the duel-key command and control system, 
but confusion on this critical issue remains.
  Overall, the agreement between the United States and our allies is 
extremely fragile, with important questions remaining about its 
implementation. Will, for example, the plan to protect Goradze become a 
policy and extend to other U.N. safehavens if they come under attack?
  Fundamentally, is there a policy of resoluteness behind this site 
specific plan? If so, I have yet to hear it. And will the military 
officers on the ground finally be in control of military decisions, as 
opposed to the current situation where civilian U.N. officials can veto 
a military recommendation to initiate airstrikes. It is that situation 
which has led the Serbs to conclude that the West is nothing more than 
a paper tiger.
  Rightfully frustrated by what appears to be yet more allied 
indecisivness, Senators voting today in support of the unilateral 
lifting of the embargo believe their action will contribute to a 
solution in Bosnia. For the sake of the Bosnians, and for the sake of 
the entire civilian population throughout the former Yugoslavia, I hope 
that they are right, and that this action brings the conflicting 
parties closer to the peace table.
  But we have no way of knowing that will be the case.
  Let me state clearly that I oppose unilaterally lifting the embargo 
for two basic reasons: At the core, this is a European issue. Our 
European allies are on the frontline, and they do not want us to act 
unilaterally. We have 50 years of solid NATO relations at stake, and I 
have strong concerns about the United States going it alone against our 
European allies who have troops on the ground and who have more at 
stake than we do as we go into this debate.
  Second, and more important, if we do this, we have to be prepared to 
accept the consequences--we, the Senators of the U.S. Senate.
 The moment we lift the embargo, there is a strong chance the allies 
will leave and an all-out war will follow. If that is our choice, we 
will have to live with the resulting carnage. It is for those two 
reasons that I oppose this proposition before the Senate.

  Mr. President, this is a debate with endless questions and few 
answers, but in my view history will far better be served if the United 
States continues to try to forge a consensus approach to this tragic 
situation, rather than adopt a go-it-alone strategy that may well have 
the unforeseen consequence of widening the war and escalating our own 
national involvement.
  It is with a great deal of reluctance and sadness that I vote today 
in opposition to the amendment before the Senate.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield myself such time as I may require. I am informed 
at the present time there will be an objection to any request to extend 
the amount of time now elapsing between 12:20 and 1:30, at which time 
the leaders have their time reserved.
  Therefore, I ask the Senator from Arizona how much time is required?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, 5 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Could the Senator reduce it to 3?
  Mr. KYL. I will do my best.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask the Senator from Ohio [Mr. DeWine], to reduce his 
time to 3 minutes.
  The distinguished Senator from South Carolina, could we inquire as to 
the amount of time that the Senator desires?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 7 or 8 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Could I ask the Senator to reduce that amount of time? We 
are rapidly running out of time.
  Hopefully we can accommodate the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. THURMOND. Can the Senator extend it to give me 7 minutes?
  Mr. WARNER. I am told there will be an objection. Could we hopefully 
do 5 minutes?
  Mr. THURMOND. I will try.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor. 

[[Page S10684]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to strongly support the Dole-Lieberman 
resolution. It is frustrating for all because the moral imperatives 
here demand action, yet as has been noted by all of the other speakers, 
all actions are fraught with problems.
  We all agree there are no good options. We all agree that lifting the 
arms embargo is not a panacea, but it will enable the Bosnian Moslems 
to defend themselves, which is their right under article 51 of the 
United Nations charter. It may hasten the day when the Serbs cease 
their aggression.
  Ever since the United Nations extended diplomatic recognition to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, I have believed that the United Nations 
should either act to get the United Nations to lift the 1991 embargo, 
or unilaterally lift that embargo to make it easier for the Moslem 
communities to defend themselves.
  We all know that the Bosnian Serbs have an arsenal of weapons which 
they obtained largely from the Yugoslavian Army, also from Romania, the 
Soviet Union and other sources.
  In Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and with the Kurds in Iraq, the 
United States helped those defending their families and territory to 
acquire the weapons to defend themselves. This situation is no 
different, Mr. President. That is why I support lifting the arms 
embargo.
  While some negative consequences could result from lifting the arms 
embargo, it cannot be worse for the Bosnian Moslems than the death of 
200,000 civilians, perhaps thousands of women raped, 2 million people 
left homeless, and the loss of 70 percent of their territory.
  Albert Wohlsetter pointed out in an editorial entitled ``Genocide by 
Embargo,'' ``adherence to Security Council Resolution 727, even after 
the United Nations, European Community and the United States has 
recognized the independent status of the states of the former 
Yugoslavia, is a violation of article 51 of the U.N. Charter which 
acknowledges the right of self-defense.'' He says ``The United States 
should now simply declare that there is no valid embargo on the 
sovereign nations who are the victims of continuing Serbian genocide.''
  Mr. President, shortly we will be voting on two amendments which seek 
to involve the United Nations. Of course, if the United Nations could 
quickly lift the arms embargo, that would be the best result. These 
amendments should not interpose between U.S. action immediately and 
lifting of the arms embargo by the rest of the world communities any 
requirements that would delay U.S. action.
  That is why I believe we should first pass the Dole-Lieberman 
resolution which commits the United States to action, not dependent on 
what anyone else does. As former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher wrote in her recent letter to Senator Dole, ``American 
leadership is vital to bring order out of the present chaos. No country 
must be allowed to veto the action required to end the present 
catastrophe.''
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I may proceed for 
not to exceed 2 minutes on my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is important that the Senator from 
Maine be given an opportunity to propose an amendment which is in the 
nature of a second-degree amendment. I yield to him 2 minutes.


                Amendment No. 1851 to Amendment No. 1848

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, last evening I took the floor to indicate 
that my expectation was that Senator Nunn would be offering an 
amendment that essentially would require President Clinton to go to the 
United Nations. A year ago in August, Senator Nunn and then Senator 
Mitchell also sponsored legislation requiring the President to go to 
the United Nations. The President did, but he did not seek a vote.
  Under the Nunn amendment, as I understand it, he would require the 
President to seek a vote to lift the embargo on a multilateral basis. 
It is my expectation that if the President were required to do so, 
nonetheless we could anticipate that one of the members of the Security 
Council--be it Russia, be it France, be it any other member--would 
impose a veto or seek to prevent it from coming to a vote.
  My amendment to the Nunn amendment would require that in the case 
that a vote is prevented or in case a veto is lodged, that the 
President would then go to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
which has voted--the membership of that has voted on two prior 
occasions overwhelmingly--to lift the embargo.
  This would, in my judgment, meet the objections of our colleagues who 
are concerned about undermining our relationship and the United Nations 
or with NATO. This would give an opportunity for a multilateral lifting 
of the embargo and would preserve the integrity of the institution 
itself.
  I believe it would resolve the problems that many of my colleagues 
feel now, acting unilaterally. This is an opportunity for the countries 
who have voiced their support for the lifting of that embargo on a 
multilateral basis to cast their vote. I believe we would accomplish 
our objectives. I intend to support the Dole resolution. I intend to 
support the Nunn amendment, and hopefully my colleagues will also 
support it.
  Mr. President, I send to the desk my amendment in the second degree.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1851 to amendment No. 1848.

  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike the period at the end and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following: ``In the event the United Nations Security Council 
     fails to adopt the resolution to terminate the application of 
     United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of a lack of 
     unanimity of the permanent members, thereby failing to 
     exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
     international peace and security, the United States shall 
     promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General 
     Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's 
     Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.''

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I believe the Nunn amendment is 
sufficient to allow consideration of a multilateral lift of the arms 
embargo by our allies. The Nunn amendment provides the United States 
ample opportunity to consult to the greatest reasonable extent with our 
allies. As I said in my statement earlier, the time to act is now--not 
later. However, so that it can never be said that the United States did 
not allow every opportunity for the international community to support 
a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, I will support the Cohen 
second-degree amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.


                           Amendment No. 1801

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Dole-
Lieberman bill.
  Let me make very clear, however, at the outset, that I believe that 
this is a terrible way to have to make foreign policy.
  The facts are that no congressional action can substitute for 
Presidential leadership. No congressional action can substitute for 
Presidential vision. There is no substitute for a clear and coherent 
U.S. foreign policy defined, articulated, and pursued by the President.
  Congress cannot negotiate with our allies. Congress cannot open up a 
back channel. Congress cannot order airstrikes.
  Therefore, this is a resolution that I am not particularly happy to 
have to endorse. I am sure that many of my colleagues share my intense 
dislike for congressional micromanagement of foreign affairs and 
foreign policy. I do not think, Mr. President, we should make a 
practice of acting as pseudo-Secretaries of State.
  In fact, last week when the President called the majority leader and 
asked him to delay action on this resolution, I had hoped then that the 
President was going to lead. The events of last weekend and the last 
few days, as articulated by my colleague from Connecticut and my 
colleague from Virginia several hours ago, clearly shows this is not 
going to happen.
  Mr. President, Congress cannot force the President to lead, but maybe 
Congress can push him towards leading. Indeed, we must do this. The 
stakes in Bosnia are great. This conflict is more than just a civil 
war. It involves more 

[[Page S10685]]
than just the tragedies we see on TV, however horrible they are.
 It also involves the question of the future of NATO and ultimately the 
stability of Europe.

  We have to reassert U.S. leadership of NATO. We have to maintain NATO 
as a viable force. We have to prevent the spread of this conflict.
  The administration simply does not have a coherent policy to achieve 
these ends. Crossing your fingers is not a policy.
  To achieve these ends, you have to start changing the conditions on 
the ground. The bill before us outlines one way in which we could begin 
to do this.
  Clearly, though, lifting the arms embargo is a moral imperative. It 
is the right thing to do. The administration may not have a foreign 
policy yet, but until they do we should at least give the Bosnians a 
chance to defend themselves.
  The arms embargo is an unwise, outdated policy, enacted against a 
country that no longer exists. I am, however, troubled by the idea of a 
unilateral U.S. withdrawal from a collective engagement. That is why I 
intend to support the amendments of Senators Cohen and Nunn. We should 
go to the U.N. Security Council--and, if we fail there, the General 
Assembly--to make this an allied and not a purely American policy.
  Mr. President, the handwriting is on the wall for the U.N. policy in 
Bosnia. The UNPROFOR troops are coming out--they are probably coming 
out whether we pass this resolution or not.
  They are coming out for good reason. They simply have no constructive 
role to play under the rules of engagement.
  Are the UNPROFOR troops supposed to stay in Bosnia just to die? Are 
they supposed to stay there just to be captured--just to serve as a 
shield for the aggressors? No. The writing is on the wall, and they are 
coming out.
  We need the President to lead.
  The President needs to explain to the American people what America's 
goals are in Bosnia--how, specifically, he intends to achieve them--
what sacrifices the American people might have to make--and why.
  We cannot do that here on the Senate floor, but somebody has to. And 
that somebody is the President of the United States.
  On this issue, the administration is adrift. It is my hope that by 
passing this resolution, the Senate is recalling the President to his 
most important responsibility--to serve as Commander in Chief.
  Mr. President, this problem will not just disappear. The only hope 
for a more positive resolution of this tragedy will come with 
Presidential leadership.
  Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from 
South Carolina is about to address the Senate. I would like to make a 
further request for unanimous consent that the Senator from Minnesota 
[Mr. Wellstone] be granted 3 minutes following that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last week I spoke on the floor about the 
situation in Bosnia--about the U.N. safe havens being overrun by the 
Bosnian Serbs and U.N. peacekeepers being taken hostage.
  Since my statement on the floor, the United States and its allies, 
primarily Britain and France, met to discuss options. The result of 
those meetings was a stern warning that aggressive airstrikes would be 
used against the Bosnian Serbs if they try to overrun anymore U.N. safe 
havens, like Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs reaction to that ``stern 
warning'' was to fire a barrage of shells into Sarajevo killing and 
wounding civilians. Members opposing S. 21 are asking that time be 
allowed for the new directive to use aggressive airstrikes against the 
Bosnian Serbs to work. In the meantime, the U.N. General Secretary is 
sitting in New York determining exactly what the use of aggressive 
airstrikes will include. And according to the news accounts today, he 
will retain the authority to veto any NATO recommendation to use 
aggressive airstrikes. Meanwhile, Zepa fell yesterday to the Bosnian 
Serbs, and Sarajevo continues to be shelled.
  It is clear to me that the majority of Members in this body agree 
that the U.N. mission has failed--it is time for the U.N. protection 
forces to withdraw. Despite continued stern warnings and threats by the 
United Nations and NATO to use aggressive airstrikes, the Bosnian Serbs 
continue to defy the United Nations and NATO and continue to pose a 
danger to the civilians in the U.N. safe havens and the U.N. 
peacekeepers there to protect them. The time has come for the 
administration and our allies to quit wringing their hands about what 
to do in Bosnia and quit looking to the United Nations to make 
decisions on whether to use aggressive airstrikes to enforce peace in a 
country where there is no peace.
  Mr. President, as I stated last week, the United States has no 
national security interests in Bosnia. The only interests the United 
States has with regard to the situation in Bosnia is to provide 
leadership and act responsibly as a member of the United Nations 
Security Council and as a member of NATO. It is time for the United 
Nations to withdraw its forces from Bosnia and to seek agreement to 
lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. Failing an agreement by the U.N. 
Security Council to lift the embargo, the United States should 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo so that the Bosnians can defend 
themselves. It is time for the Congress to show its leadership to 
ensure that U.S. credibility as a treaty partner and NATO ally. We must 
assist, if requested, in a NATO withdrawal of the U.N. protection 
forces from Bosnia.
  I remain concerned that Members of this body did not actively engage 
in a discussion of U.S. support in a NATO withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The 
U.S. cannot stand by while our allies are in mortal danger during a 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR. As I stated last week, the damage to U.S. 
leadership, honor, prestige and credibility would be beyond 
calculation, if we do not send a clear signal now that the Congress 
will support the participation of U.S. troops in a withdrawal 
operation. It should be understood, however, that any U.S. 
participation in a U.N. withdrawal must be totally under NATO command 
and that there can be no dual key arrangement between the United 
Nations and NATO and there must be robust rules of engagement.
  The situation facing this body is not complicated, but the demand for 
us to take decisive action is clear and urgent. The Dole-Lieberman 
substitute to S. 21 allows us to take action which is well defined and 
in the best interest of our Nation. The Dole-Lieberman substitute also 
serves the best interests of our Allies, to whom we have pledged our 
support in leaving what has become an impossible mission. I urge the 
Senate to support the Dole-Lieberman substitute to S. 21 and hope that 
our Allies join in this positive course of action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to pose a further unanimous-
consent request, that from the time under the control of the 
distinguished majority leader, 4 minutes be granted to the Senator from 
Minnesota, now waiting to speak; that 3 minutes be granted to the 
Senator from Iowa; that 3 minutes be granted to the Senator from New 
Jersey [Mr. Lautenberg] who has been here; and my understanding is the 
Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan] is going to speak against the 
amendment, consequently he would take 5 minutes from the time under the 
control of the other side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, we have witnessed, over the last few 
months, especially the last 2 weeks, a sickening spectacle in Bosnia. 
Women raped for alleged sins committed by their ancestors centuries 
ago, torture, and the brutal cold-blooded murder of young Moslem men. 
Where are the Serbs taking these men, 12 years of age and older--if you 
want to call a 12-year-old a man? I have felt from the beginning we 
should be flying over, taking notes of the license plates, and making 
clear to the Serbs they will be held accountable for war crimes.
  Mr. President, this is the never again--again. These are Nazi-like 
tactics, Nazi-like actions. That is what we are witnessing.
  During the last 3 years, I have voted at various times both on the 
arms embargo and to find other ways that allies could respond to this 
aggression by the Serbs. And it does seem to me that the arms embargo 
must be lifted.
 
[[Page S10686]]

  But if we are going to be intellectually honest, we need to think 
through all of the policy implications that accompany this momentous 
decision. If the UNPROFOR forces are going to be leaving, they have to 
have safe exit, and the international community, with the United States 
included, I believe, has to make a commitment.
  What about the refugees themselves? I traveled to the former 
Yugoslavia, and I met with refugees. And I saw enough pain to last a 
lifetime. God forbid what is going to happen to them in the interim if 
U.N. forces withdraw and the Serbs just go on forward and we have more 
slaughter on top of slaughter. What is going to be our response and the 
response of the international community?
  I say to my colleagues, I think this is a moral imperative, and we 
should end this. I hope it is multinational. But we should end this 
arms embargo.
  But, please, Democrats and Republicans alike, do not think that now, 
all of a sudden, it is a level playing field. Do not make this a 
technical fix. Do not turn your gaze away from what is happening 
because we have other obligations that we must live up to. The people 
of Bosnia need our help. They deserve the right to defend themselves 
against brutal Serb aggression.
  We should vote today to send a strong signal to the administration 
and to our allies that we must move forward forcefully on Bosnia before 
the entire U.N. operation collapses and the people of Bosnia are 
overrun altogether by the Serbs.
  Mr. President, my colleagues, Senator Lieberman, ``never again'' 
should mean ``never again.'' Let us vote to send a strong signal to the 
rest of the world that we still believe in that proposition.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, regardless of which side you may be on 
in this debate, I think we can all agree on one thing. And that one 
thing we can all agree on is the lack of leadership this administration 
has displayed in this crisis. This administration under President 
Clinton has zigged and zagged and flipped and flopped more than a lost 
rabbit in an Iowa corn field.
  This administration has huffed and puffed and bluffed it's way 
through this crisis for over 2 years now. I would agree that the prior 
Bush administration also made mistakes. But, those mistakes have been 
increased and expanded under a Clinton foreign policy that no one 
understands or respects. And, that includes our allies.
  The only entity that has less respect is probably the United Nations. 
And who do we turn the responsibility over to? Of course, the Clinton 
administration has allowed the United Nations to define and control our 
policy.
  Just a few examples of the multilateral ineptitude that's taken place 
including the following:
  In November 1993, a Sarajevo schoolyard was shelled, killing 4 
children and wounding 40. The Clinton administration responded by 
saying ``We're not going to allow that city to be strangled, to be cut 
off, to be relentlessly attacked.'' What action was taken? None.
  In May 1995, 200 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage and used as 
human shields against air strikes. We heard all kinds of protests and 
threats from the Clinton administration to the NATO Secretary General. 
What action was taken? None.
  One of our planes was shot down recently thanks to the fact that the 
administration had neglected to provide missile jamming devices to our 
planes. And the pilot was hunted like an animal. Thankfully, the pilot 
was rescued. What action did we take against the aggressors? None.
  Mr. President, in stark contrast, we see the leadership of Majority 
Leader Dole. Senate Dole has consistently moved forward with efforts to 
allow the Bosnian Government to exercise its inherent right to defend 
itself. Against many odds last year, including a hostile Clinton 
administration, and an uncooperative Congress, Senator Dole forged 
ahead and made his case. Today, his case, which is the case for justice 
to the Bosnian Government, will finally win the day.
  Of course, it may only be for a day or so, since the Clinton 
administration is adamant about continuing its incompetent course of 
disaster, by threatening to veto a unilateral lifting of the embargo. 
This of course, is another sad commentary on the administration's 
failed policy.
  Mr. President, it is way beyond the time to finally act. And veto 
threats, notwithstanding, I urge my colleagues to do the right thing 
and support the Dole substitute amendment.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  I rise for the simple purpose of clarifying, to the degree that I am 
able, a point of law, a point of international practice, an American 
principle which is at issue in the first two amendments that we are 
going to consider. And I thank my friends from Virginia and Connecticut 
for allowing me this time.
  A very brief proposition, sir, but a long history behind it: Article 
24 of the charter, drafted in a time of great expectations for post-
world war that did not come to pass, states that,

       In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
     United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council 
     primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
     peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties 
     under this responsibility the Security Council act on their 
     behalf.

  Sir, this was at a time when we anticipated that the Security Council 
would have available to it armed forces from various member countries.
  The Senate provided that the President could make available specific 
military units--the 6th Fleet, the 1st Marine Division. If once we had 
agreed in the Senate and in the Congress to do this, he could 
thereafter deploy them at will.
  However, it was stated, and it was a matter of great concern in our 
delegation in San Francisco--Senator Vandenberg was most particularly 
concerned--that the powers of the Security Council would not interfere 
with the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, which 
was the basic law of nations. Senator Vandenberg said that, if this was 
not provided in the charter explicitly, a reservation would be offered 
on this floor, and he would support it, and, in the end, it was agreed 
to. Then Republican adviser John Foster Dulles, was not that 
enthusiastic, but after much debate by the delegation it became the 
position of the United States that it had to be included in the 
charter.
  Now, sir, here is the simple point, and I hope I can be heard on 
this. I speak as someone who was Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations under President Ford. I speak as someone who once served as the 
President of the Security Council.
  If we adopt the two amendments before us, we concede that in the one 
instance, the Security Council, in the other, the General Assembly, has 
the right to deny the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense. If they have to vote to agree to the exercise of that right, 
then it is not a right itself; it is simply an authority that can be 
conferred by a higher body; to wit, the Security Council or the General 
Assembly.
  I say once again, sir, this is an article of great concern to us. The 
Treaty of Chapultepec, the Western Hemisphere defense system, the 
Monroe Doctrine--all of those things were agreements which we were 
concerned might be limited by the charter, putting into question the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.
  If we ever concede, for whatever transient purposes of this moment, 
that the Security Council has the right to confer what becomes simply a 
privilege, not a right, or the General Assembly has the right to confer 
what becomes now a privilege, not a right, then we are in grossest 
ignorance and avoidance of the history of the charter and the text of 
the charter.
  Mr. President, I hope we do not make this mistake. It would be 
something that 50 years ago on this floor would have been clearly 
understood. And we have not dealt with these issues much in the last 
half century. We may have become forgetful, although the revered former 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations would remember. He was 
there.
  I point out, sir, that the right of individual or collective self-
defense is inherent. That is the language of the 

[[Page S10687]]
charter. The charter is simply a codification of rights. The right to 
self-defense being an inherent right, we cannot ever concede to the 
Security Council or to the General Assembly some authority to confer--
let the right become operational, or however you like to say it--that 
right. It ceases at that point to be a right. It becomes a privilege to 
be conferred or denied.
  I thank the Chair most specifically for his kindness and attention.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a memorandum of law be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                           Memorandum of Law


                                SUMMARY

       The history of Article 51 demonstrates that any member 
     state's obligation to defer to the Security Council in 
     refraining from engaging in individual or collective self-
     defense is conditioned on the Security Council taking 
     effective measures to restore peace and prevent aggression. 
     The record further shows that unless this point was made 
     clear in the Charter, the Senate probably would have taken a 
     reservation on this point in giving its consent to 
     ratification.


                               DISCUSSION

       According to Ruth Russell's indispensable ``A History of 
     the United Nations Charter,'' the principle of the right of 
     self defense was so unanimously agreed upon that initially 
     there was no proposal to include in the Charter an express 
     provision on this point. The bulk of the debate over the 
     issue revolved around the desire of the U.S. delegation to 
     confirm that the Security Council could not interfere with 
     the ``collective'' right of self defense within the Americas 
     under the Treaty of Chapultepec.
       The American delegation initially considered opposing any 
     express reservation on the grounds that it could only be used 
     to restrict what was ``inherent'':
       ``When the [American] delegation made its paragraph-by-
     paragraph study of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, its most 
     serious difficulties arose with . . . maintenance of peace 
     and security. The enforcement aspects of the chapter were 
     accepted without debate. The only point left unsettled was 
     whether a specific reservation of the right of self-defense 
     should be included. As this was agreed to be an inherent 
     right of sovereignty, not deniable by the projected Charter, 
     there was no controversy on the principle. The question, as 
     it had earlier confronted American officials, was whether 
     attempted definition would not defeat the very end desired by 
     making possible a restrictive interpretation of the 
     principle. The issue was left open. . . .''
       Later the U.S. delegation had ``acrimonious'' debates about 
     how to protect the right of the U.S. to engage in collective 
     self-defense in the Western Hemisphere in the face of a 
     ``Great Power'' veto. This passage is from Senator 
     Vandenberg's diary:
       ``[John Foster] Dulles argued that there is nothing in 
     Dumbarton Oaks which prohibits `self-defense' and that under 
     the Chapultepec agreement `self-defense' in the Western 
     Hemisphere is a partnership affair and that the Monroe 
     Doctrine is still part of it. I served notice on the 
     Delegation, as a matter of good faith, that if this question 
     is not specifically cleared up on the Charter, I shall expect 
     to see a Reservation on the subject in the Senate and that I 
     shall support it.''
       A subsequent U.S. delegation statement of the U.S. position 
     made it clear that states must be free to take action if the 
     Security Council is frustrated by the use of the veto: ``if 
     any one of the Great Powers with a veto in the Security 
     Council abuses its power . . . the Organization will have 
     broken down and all states would then be free to take 
     protective action.''
       When the U.S. finally proposed that there should be a 
     formal recognition of the `inherent'' right of self-defense 
     in order to protect its rights in the Western Hemisphere, the 
     official U.S. position--endorsed by President Roosevelt--was 
     explained as follows:
       ``Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing 
     aggression, and should aggression occur by any state against 
     any member state, such member state possesses the inherent 
     right to take necessary measures for self-defense.''
       Ruth Russell explains that an express reservation on this 
     point was in part necessitated because the delegation ``faced 
     a very practical problem in getting the treaty through the 
     Senate.''
       The British proposal on Article 51--which is very close to 
     the final version--makes even more clear than the final text 
     that the Security Council must act and act effectively if 
     other states are to be expected to defer to it:
       ``Nothing in this Charter should invalidate the right of 
     self-defense against armed attack, either individual or 
     collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to 
     take the necessary steps to maintain or restore international 
     peace and security.''
       Interestingly, two of the last three paragraphs in 
     Russell's 965-page history of the Charter concern the 
     inherent right of self-defense. She was writing in 1958 and 
     the ``Great Power'' veto had, of course, become very much a 
     problem:
       ``Responsible American officials assumed, it can be said 
     with more accuracy, that if the desired cooperation did not 
     materialize, a serious great-power split would probably lead 
     to another world war, with or without the United Nations. 
     Even if the Council could not guarantee the peace, they also 
     pointed out, it could make clear the record. And as the 
     Charter in no way abrogated the right of self-defense, which 
     no nation was prepared to relinquish, action against 
     aggression could still be taken outside the Organization. 
     This was always an implicit assumption of American officials, 
     although it was not made explicit until the San Francisco 
     Conference.
       ``There the right was recognized in Article 51, in both 
     national and collective terms. If, therefore, the United 
     Nations machinery for any reason could not function to 
     maintain international peace and security, national power 
     could be mobilized by the states on a regional or some other 
     joint basis. The decisive factor, in that case, would be the 
     willingness of other states to act against the recalcitrant 
     state even at the cost of war. What experience has shown is 
     that the desire to support such drastic action against 
     disliked policies and countries is never as widespread as the 
     willingness to condemn them. This was as true in the autumn 
     of 1945 as it has been under the United Nations.''

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, does the Senator from New York require 
more time?
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would only say the same thing over and over again. 
The right of self-defense--individual, collective--is inherent and in 
no way depends on the approval of the Security Council or the General 
Assembly or any other international body.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think he has very clearly stated his 
message.
  Under the current unanimous-consent request, there are 3 minutes for 
the Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. President, I yield such time as to make that 5 minutes, 2 minutes 
additional.
  To inform other Senators, that results in the expiration of the time 
under the control of the majority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Chair. I thank our colleague from 
Virginia for his graciousness in permitting me these 5 minutes. I know 
everybody is pulling at him, and I do not want to use any more time 
except to thank him for that.
  Mr. President, if any of us were fence sitting or had doubts about 
what it was that we were witnessing, I think each day that has gone by 
in recent weeks has further confirmed that we no longer can stand idly 
by, that we must take action as befits our status as an international 
leader in terms of morality and humanity, a country that supports human 
rights almost above all else. Our very Constitution is based on law. 
And when we stand by idly, which we are being forced to do by the 
cowardice of our allies, then I think we become coconspirators, whether 
we like it or not.
  Mr. President, as recently as this morning, we saw something that 
kind of confirms what the distinguished Senator from New York just 
said.
  In a report from Brussels, the New York Times writes that:

       The allies agreed to make what one NATO official called a 
     ``strong recommendation'' to Mr. Boutros-Ghali to leave it to 
     his military field commanders on the ground in Gorazde and 
     elsewhere to decide when the time has come to start bombing 
     the Serbs if they attack. But since Mr. Boutros-Ghali has 
     been extremely cautious about approval of airstrikes in the 
     past, what was meant to sound like a roar in London 4 days 
     ago appeared to have been throttled down to something more 
     like a growl by the NATO Ambassadors.

  That is the situation. But the killing does not stop. The attacks do 
not stop. The barbarism does not stop. And if one had at all any sense 
of rights, when you read the stories about what happened in Zepa and 
what happened before that in Srebrenica, where a woman was forced to 
drink the blood of her 16-year-old son after his throat was cut, 
barbarism of the most primitive and cruel fashion, we cannot stand by 
and permit that to happen.
  Mr. President, last year, we gave a deadline of November 15 for our 
allies to get themselves together so that we could move multilaterally. 
What happened? Since then hundreds, thousands more have been killed, 
thousands abused, and more territory taken by the rogue government of 
the Bosnian Serbs--total disdain for world organization, for rules, for 
humanitarian conduct among people. It is shocking to see, and we ought 
not to permit it to go on any longer.
  Now, I know, Mr. President, that we are embarking on a shaky course, 
but 

[[Page S10688]]
not to do anything is a far shakier course. And certainly coconspiring 
with the Bosnian Serbs to say that we will talk ourselves into the 
ground while you kill the Bosnian people, separating men from women, 
families, brothers from sisters, is terrible. It is terrible. And there 
is not a person here who could witness a crime like that taking place 
and not intervene at one's own peril--no one. No decent human being 
could walk by and permit that to happen.
  Mr. President, yesterday I had a conversation with the Prime Minister 
of Bosnia, and I asked him the perennial question that seems to exist 
now, and that is: Are you not afraid that larger forces will come in 
and bring even more devastation? And he said, ``Ask the 5,000 missing 
in Srebrenica whether or not they were afraid of more power coming 
against them.''
  Mr. President, he is not asking for much. He is asking for us to give 
them a chance to fight back, to untie the hands from behind their backs 
and give them the weapons necessary to defend themselves, as the 
Senator from New York so articulately stated just a couple of minutes 
ago.
  It pains me to make this kind of a decision because we are going down 
a path we are not sure about. There is one thing I am sure about. I for 
one cannot permit the killing to take place, the barbarism to continue, 
without speaking out against it in a way that has significance.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to say to my distinguished 
colleague from New Jersey that was a very powerful statement, and I 
hope it can be clearly understood and accepted by all. I certainly join 
him in his observation and very much respect his support of this 
important measure now before the Senate.
  Mr. President, it is my understanding that would consume all the time 
under the control of the majority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time under the control of the majority 
leader has been consumed.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Shelby). The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Noting the absence in the Chamber of any colleagues 
wishing to speak on the other side, I rise to say a few words with the 
understanding that as soon as or even before I see someone else who 
wishes to speak, I will yield the floor.
  Mr. President, this has been, since we began it yesterday afternoon 
at 2:15 p.m., a very important, very serious, very heartfelt debate, 
and I thank my colleagues for, no matter which side they are on, 
appreciating the seriousness of what we are doing here and for 
reflecting that seriousness in their remarks.
  I just want to say a few words in closing. Of course, Senator Dole 
will speak in leader's time a little bit later.
  No matter what any of those in opposition to the proposal that 
Senator Dole and I and others of both parties have made, no matter what 
arguments have been made--that it would cause bloodshed, it would 
Americanize the war, it would do offense to our allies, all of which 
arguments I feel we have rebutted--one thing stands out. No one has 
come to the floor of this Senate to say that the arms embargo is 
justified or should stay in place. No one has supported the arms 
embargo. Everyone who has said they will be voting against our measure 
to lift the arms embargo will do so because of their fear of what might 
happen--the war might be widened; it does not give a proper opportunity 
for the London communique, as flawed as Senator Warner and I indicated 
we believed it was earlier in the morning, or did not give time for the 
London communique to go into effect. But I have not heard anyone come 
here and justify the arms embargo, because it is unjustifiable.
  As Senator Moynihan said, in what might be called an articulation of 
a natural rights theory of international law, quite valid, to suggest 
that this is a right of self-defense that must be granted or can be 
taken away by an international body is wrong. It is conveyed as a right 
under the charter of the United Nations.
 I would say under any theory of natural rights that people have 
individually or acting collectively. Again, remember that it was 
imposed in 1991 on Yugoslavia, which no longer exists, on the premise 
that it might help stop a war from breaking out because it would keep 
weapons from pouring into that area, encouraged--in fact, requested by 
Milosevic in Belgrade. Why? Because he knew he had a monopoly of the 
weapons and munitions, supported by a well-meaning world. But what was 
its justification to support it after war broke out, and after the 
Serbs invaded Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and began to kill and remove 
from their homes hundreds of thousands of people, millions of refugees? 
This is an illegal act. It is an immoral act, and has consequences on 
the victims. And it is invalid.

  Some have said if we lift this arms embargo, what about the other 
international policies of sanctions against Iran and Iraq and Libya? Is 
any Member of the Chamber prepared to compare the behavior of Iran to 
that of the Bosnian people or Libya to Bosnia or Iraq to Bosnia? And in 
every other one of those cases, those nations violated international 
law, international norms. The Bosnians have done no such thing. And 
they have been the victims of this embargo. Just think if anyone stood 
up today, the embargo had not been in effect since 1991, and proposed 
an arms embargo on the nations in the former Yugoslavia, no one would 
support it. It is so self-evidently unfair, and unfortunately in its 
consequences brutally deadly.
  So, I take some heart from the fact that the opposition to the 
proposal that we have made to lift the arms embargo has not featured 
anyone saying that the embargo was or is justified in their feature 
arguments of what might happen if the embargo was lifted.
  Does the Senator from North Dakota wish to speak?
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me, Mr. President, if I might. I would like the ask 
the Senator from Connecticut to yield for a question.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I would be glad to.
  Mr. DORGAN. I have been enormously torn by this issue. Much of what 
the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Kansas and others 
have expressed on the floor is real anguish. There is real anguish 
about, I think, a moral problem confronting the world with respect to 
what is happening in the Balkans. I know there has been a lot of 
criticism on the floor that the current policy does not work, the 
President does not have a policy, and so on.
  Frankly, I have not heard anyone else on the floor express what 
policy they would work in the Balkans. This resolution, as I understand 
it, is a policy that simply says lift the arms embargo. That is not, of 
course, a policy to end the war. It is a policy, as the Senator from 
Connecticut describes, to try to even the odds. But to those who say 
there is no policy, I would say that I am very anxious to hear, what do 
they think will solve this problem in the Balkans?
  What is happening there is grotesque. Unspeakable horrors are being 
visited upon innocent civilians. I read yesterday of Dutch observers, 
Dutch soldiers coming back who describe what is happening. And there 
are other reports from reputable sources. What is being visited upon 
the Bosnian Moslems can only be described as a horror. And we must care 
about that and deal with it and respond to it.
  Yet I would ask the Senator this question. Here is what troubles me. 
We have not--the United States--put U.S. troops on the ground in the 
Balkans. I do not think we should. And I would not support us doing so. 
But other countries have. The British have. The French have. The 
Ukrainians have. The Dutch have. Other countries have put their troops 
on the ground in harm's way in that region.
  It troubles me at this point for us, who have not put troops on the 
ground, and I do not think we should, to say to those countries who 
have, that we do not care what you think about the proper policy in 
Bosnia. This bill tells our allies that we do not care that you believe 
the arms embargo ought to continue. We will decide unilaterally that 
the arms embargo should not continue. That is what I am torn by. That 
is what I am troubled by.
  Other countries have made a troop commitment on the ground. And they 

[[Page S10689]]
  still say they believe that we ought to act together on lifting the 
embargo. And they are not yet willing, as I understand it, to decide 
that the arms embargo ought to be lifted.
  I wonder if the Senator could respond to this general question. How 
does one look at what our allies have done, that we have not done, and 
then respond that we can unilaterally decide on an arms embargo without 
caring what their position is?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from 
North Dakota. Actually, I have watched him as he has been listening to 
this debate. I have seen, because I know him, his own struggling and 
anguish about this. And I respect the seriousness with which he has 
gone out, and the sincerity and the relevance of the questions that he 
asks now.
  Let me answer the two questions. In the first place, what is the 
policy? Who can offer a policy that will do any better than what is 
happened now? I will say to my friend, the policy that the Western 
World and the world has followed up until now, which is to send the 
United Nations into what I consider to be a mission impossible, to keep 
the peace where there was only war has not worked.
  The London communique raised some hope that it might begin to work if 
the allies can get together and use their air power to give some 
meaning to the word ``safe'' as applied to safe areas. Right now they 
are the furthest things from safe. Combined with that the very weak and 
confused U.N. presence, the continued arms embargo, that has been the 
policy up until now.
  I judge that to be a failure. It has not stopped Serbian aggression 
and not stopped the suffering of the Bosnian people and it has done 
terrible damage to the credibility of the United Nations, NATO, and 
unfortunately the United States.
  The alternative policy, the preferable policy, which is in part 
implemented by the proposal that we will vote on in awhile, is the so-
called lift-and-strike policy that in fact President Clinton adopted in 
the 1992 campaign and carried with him into 1993 and to the Presidency. 
He was frustrated in his desire to implement that lift-and-strike 
policy in the spring of 1993 when our allies in Europe refused to go 
along.
  So what we are asking in putting this proposal here is to begin to 
finally, though the hour is late and ever more difficult in Bosnia, to 
implement the lift-and-strike policy. Lifting through this action and 
striking hopefully through the broadening of the measures agreed to and 
the toughening of the measures agreed to in the London communique.
  Mr. DORGAN. If I might ask a question about that point. That suggests 
somehow that the strategy of dealing with the conflict in Bosnia is to 
rely on air power. And I tell you, I have been in meetings where Colin 
Powell, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others 
described for us how air power might be used in the Balkans. It is a 
much different circumstance than using air power in the desert, where 
folks would run their tanks out into the middle of the open desert and 
we would send airplanes over to bomb the tanks. I wonder whether the 
Senator believes that air power eventually is what is going to resolve 
the conflict in the Balkans?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. No. I agree with Senators and others who have spoken 
that air power can help but never decide the conflict. But when 
combined with the considerable Bosnian military force on the ground, 
finally fully armed, I think it is a winning combination.
  I say to my friend I note the presence on the floor of the Senator 
from Georgia. I do not want to impinge on his time. I would simply 
answer the second question raised about the troops on the ground and 
the allied nations that I hope that the U.N. mission can be fortified 
as a result of the London communique. I am doubtful based on the 
conflicting messages that have come out of late, but it does seem to me 
the lifting of the embargo does stand separately because it is an 
illegal and invalid act and it can stand alongside the continued 
presence of the U.N. troops.
  However, responding to concerns expressed, I think appropriately, by 
the Senator from Georgia and others, Senator Dole and I made a 
substantial change in the proposal to lift the arms embargo from the 
measure we introduced last year to say the embargo would not be lifted 
until the allies on the ground had the chance to exit if, in fact, they 
chose to exit.
  I will say finally, as the Senator from North Dakota considers how to 
vote, it seems to me--and I must say of all the reasons given for 
voting against our proposal, the one that has most profoundly troubled 
me is the suggestion that it would cause more bloodshed. Here I think 
we owe it to the victims, those who have shed their blood, to listen to 
them and not to make a paternalistic judgment for them about what may 
be better for them. They are the ones who have suffered.
  I close, finally, with words from a letter of Prime Minister 
Silajdzic of Bosnia, who said:

       Our people ask that we be allowed only our right to defend 
     ourselves. It is on their behalf that I appeal to the 
     American people and Government to untie our hands so that we 
     may protect ourselves. The slaughter has gone far enough. My 
     people insist that they would rather die while standing and 
     fighting than on their knees. In God's name, we ask that you 
     lift the arms embargo.

  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt my friend from 
Connecticut. I do want to get started on my remarks. I understand I 
have 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. A little under 20 minutes.


                           Amendment No. 1848

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to begin my remarks by briefly 
reviewing the history of the Bosnian debate that has taken place in the 
Senate not over the last 3 or 4 years, but over the last 12 months.
  As most Senators will recall, last July during the consideration of 
Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, the 
Senate debated two competing amendments. One, sponsored by Senators 
Dole and Lieberman, would have unilaterally lifted the arms embargo 
upon the request of the Bosnian Government. The other, sponsored by 
Senator Mitchell and me, expressed the sense of Congress that there 
should be a multilateral lift of the arms embargo.
  I know it has been pointed out, but the Dole-Lieberman amendment we 
now have before us is not a lift-first-then-leave policy; it is a 
leave-first-and-then-lift policy, and that point needs to be 
emphasized. This is not the same Dole-Lieberman amendment we had last 
year.
  The Dole-Lieberman amendment last year failed on a 50 to 50 vote, and 
the Mitchell-Nunn amendment was adopted on a vote of 52-48. Later, on 
the Department of Defense appropriations bill, another vote was taken, 
and the Dole amendment was adopted and the Mitchell-Nunn amendment was 
adopted again.
  During the House-Senate conference on the authorization bill, with 
both of these amendments on the authorization bill, the House bill had 
a unilateral lift provision that passed by a significant margin in the 
House. The Senate bill had the Mitchell-Nunn provision I already 
described. The compromise provision, worked out during conference, 
stated as general United States policy that the United States should 
exercise leadership within the international community to cause the 
Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group proposal. It also called for 
such leadership to be taken on three separate, but complementary 
tracks, as follows, and these are important as background for this vote 
today:
  First, there was an international track policy that if the Bosnian 
Serbs did not accept the contact group's peace proposal by October 15, 
1994, the President should formally introduce and support a resolution 
within the U.N. Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms embargo 
multilaterally. The provision was not mandatory because the President 
wrote to the conferees committing his administration to introduce and 
support such a resolution in the Security Council. The administration 
did as they committed they would do to the conferees, but they did not 
press the resolution to a vote because they determined that it would 
not pass.
  The second part of the provision in that authorization bill, a 
compromise between the House and Senate, was a 

[[Page S10690]]
unilateral U.S. policy track. It provided that if the U.N. Security 
Council did not lift the Bosnian arms embargo, then, first, no funds 
could be used to enforce the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government 
other than as required of all U.N. member states, and that has been the 
law since last year. We have not been enforcing the embargo according 
to the law. We have been respecting it, not enforcing it, with our 
money and with our forces.
  Second, the President shall submit a plan to and consult with the 
Congress on the manner in which U.S. Armed Forces and the forces of 
friendly states would provide training to the Bosnian army outside 
Bosnia.
  And, third, the President should submit a plan to consult with the 
Congress regarding the unilateral termination of the Bosnian arms 
embargo and the implications thereof.
  The third and final part of last year's authorization bill, which I 
think perhaps was its most relevant part to where we are now, was an 
interim policy track. It provided that if the Bosnian Serbs attacked 
any safe areas, the President should promptly, formally introduce and 
support in the U.N. Security Council a resolution that selectively 
lifts the Bosnian arms embargo in order to allow the provision of 
defensive weapons, such as antitank weapons, counter-battery radars and 
mortars, to enable the Bosnian Government to defend the safe areas.
  Mr. President, to my knowledge, the Clinton administration did not 
introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to selectively lift 
the Bosnian arms embargo when the Bosnian Serbs attacked and overran 
the safe areas just recently. I consider it unconscionable for the 
United Nations protected safe areas to be overrun, with the Bosnian 
defenders being unable to defend because they are denied defensive 
weapons, and the United Nations is unwilling or unable to defend these 
safe areas. We declared that policy last year in the authorization 
bill. We gave the President congressional instructions, short of a 
mandate, but instructions as to what should be done. It has not been 
done.
  The United States, our allies, and the United Nations have reached 
the point in Bosnia of making a fundamental change in policy or 
beginning to withdraw. A continuation of the present policy is a 
prescription for continued tragedy on the ground in Bosnia and 
continued erosion of U.N., NATO, and United States credibility in 
Europe and throughout the world.
  The Clinton administration favors the continued presence of the U.N. 
forces in Bosnia, as well as a vigorous use of NATO air power to save 
the remaining safe areas. But a number of fundamental questions about 
this strategy remain unanswered.
  First, have our NATO allies truly signed on to a substantial and 
decisive use of air power, hitting lucrative targets, if Gorazde is 
attacked?
  Second, is NATO willing to continue its air attacks as required, even 
if hostages are taken or the Serbs begin killing substantial numbers of 
U.N. personnel?
  Third, are we protecting only Gorazde or are other safe areas 
included? If not, what does the term ``U.N. safe area'' mean at this 
point in time when two have fallen and only one is clearly designated 
as being protected? Will the United Nations divide safe areas into 
three classes--fallen safe areas, about-to-fall safe areas and safe-
safe areas? It appears that is taking place.
  Fourth, does the so-called dual-key arrangement remain in effect? 
This morning's New York Times reports from Brussels that British and 
French officials in NATO really do not want the United Nations to give 
up its dual key. If accurate, this would directly contradict the 
administration's understanding and explanation of the London 
conference.
  Fifth, if NATO and the United Nations really intend vigorous 
airstrikes, why are U.N. personnel not being moved out of harm's way, 
both as a protective measure and as an indication of the dead 
seriousness of NATO's new resolve?
  Sixth, if there is an allied diplomatic strategy to go along with its 
London policy, what is it? I have not seen it.
  Will the United States continue to insist on a just settlement--I put 
those words in quotes because they have been used so many times in both 
editorials and in debate--insist on a just settlement to the conflict, 
but also remain unwilling to commit American resources for a just 
settlement and remain unwilling to admit that there will never be a 
just settlement unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to 
impose it by force?
  That question is not simply for the administration, but for many in 
Congress, for many in the news media that keep talking about a just 
settlement but never, ever, complete the logic that it requires the use 
of force to impose it. Otherwise, it is not going to happen. And the 
use of force is most likely going to have to be outside force, 
including U.S. force.
  Mr. President, these open questions make it clear to me that the 
United Nations, the NATO policy, and the U.S. Government altogether 
have no coherent strategy regarding Bosnia.
  To many Members of Congress, the Dole-Lieberman proposal is more 
attractive than the current policy, primarily because it has not yet 
been tried and tested. This proposal also is far from complete or 
coherent. It has taken on a very large and, I believe, exaggerated 
significance, both by its supporters and by its critics, and many of 
its critics continue to describe it as it was last year without 
acknowledging it has changed.
  A number of key questions are not answered or even acknowledged by 
the Dole-Lieberman proposal that we will vote on this afternoon. I will 
add quickly, that both Senators Dole and Lieberman have addressed some 
of these policies in their oral statements.
  Most of these are not in any way part of this deliberation, because 
they are not going to be voted on. It is not in the proposal.
  First, there is a large question that must be answered by the 
supporters of the Dole-Lieberman proposal, which encourages U.N. 
withdrawal--and when we vote on it today, that is what we will be 
doing. We will not mandate. We will be encouraging it. We will be 
giving an incentive.
  Are the supporters prepared to back President Clinton's public 
commitment and private commitment to assist in the U.N. withdrawal with 
U.S. ground forces, if required? We are calling for the withdrawal. The 
President has said we will help the withdrawal, if it takes place, with 
ground forces, if necessary.
  But we ignore that question. We act like it does not exist. We act 
like that is not even part of the equation, if we can simply vote on 
the part we like here--lifting--but not face the implications of the 
part we do not like; that is, U.S. ground forces committed. The Dole-
Lieberman proposal's silence on this point, I am afraid, speaks loudly 
to the world.
  Second, will the United States furnish equipment like artillery, 
tanks, and antitank weapons when the embargo is lifted? If we will not 
do it directly, will we help facilitate that delivery? Will the allies 
also lift the embargo? If they continue the embargo, will we forcibly 
break the embargo by delivering equipment? Will Russia unilaterally 
lift its embargo on Serbia, as it has said it will do over and over 
again? If that is the case, will there be a net gain for the Bosnian 
Government?
  Third, and perhaps more importantly, will the United States help 
train the Bosnian forces, or at least help facilitate the training? 
Training is needed more than equipment. Equipment is part of the 
equation, and an important part, but training is sadly lacking. It has 
to take place. Someone has to do it. When will it take place? Where 
will it take place? Who will do it? Will the United States help?
  Silence on this key set of questions is what we have, and what we 
will be voting on. Silence.
  Fourth, do the authors of the Dole-Lieberman amendment envision 
defensive or offensive equipment flowing to Bosnia, or both? 
Understandably but unfortunately, in order to secure votes for passage 
of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, it addresses these key questions--
training, supplies, equipment--it addresses these key questions only by 
silence, plus one paragraph. That is a negative paragraph on page 5, 
section 4(e) which states as follows:

       Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as 
     authorization for deployment of United States forces in the 
     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, 
     including 

[[Page S10691]]
     training, support, or delivery of military equipment.

  That is what this says. We are not going to help them with training. 
We are not going to help them with equipment. We have no authorization. 
We will not let any American forces on the ground. All of this somehow 
wondrously is supposed to take place.
  Fifth, considering the implication of this paragraph, who will 
provide close air support to protect the few remaining safe areas when 
the U.N. forces begin pulling out, as envisioned by the Dole-Lieberman 
bill? Who will have the forward air observers on the ground to 
designate targets for our aircraft if the United States conducts 
airstrikes to protect against Bosnian Serb offensives? And as the 
United Nations starts pulling out--and it will take anywhere from 7 
weeks to 22 weeks--and the Bosnian Serbs go on the offensive, and there 
are no close air observers there plugged in, with training, with NATO 
equipment, how are we going to have airstrikes that go after targets 
unless they are fixed targets? We can go after fixed targets, but what 
about the moving targets? Believe me, those on the attack will be 
moving. Will we ask for British and French to provide the protection 
while the United Nations is pulling out prior to the lifting of the 
embargo and the necessary weeks of training of the Bosnian forces?
  Again, these are unanswered questions.
  Mr. President, I feel the Senate is faced with a choice between two 
incoherent policies. In these circumstances, our Nation would be better 
off if we made impassioned speeches and avoided passing a law.
  The Dole-Lieberman amendment does not face up to the reality of the 
situation on the ground where the Bosnian Serbs occupy between 70 and 
80 percent of the territory in Bosnia and have a decided advantage in 
heavy weapons.
  Mr. President, I pointed out many flaws with the current policy and 
with the Dole-Lieberman proposal. Even with these flaws, however, in 
the legislative proposal, the Dole-Lieberman bill is much improved over 
the earlier provisions.
  It has been mischaracterized by the administration, our allies, and 
the U.S. press. Yes, it requires a unilateral lifting of the Bosnian 
arms embargo, but it does so only after the U.N. forces are withdrawn 
from Bosnia. It does not mandate that UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia. It 
places a responsibility upon the Government of Bosnia to make the 
difficult choice of requesting that the United Nations withdraw its 
forces, with all the attendant consequences, including the loss of 
humanitarian relief supplies, of such a withdrawal.
  This is not going to be an easy decision for the Bosnian Government.
  The Rapid Reaction Force, consisting of our French, British, and 
Dutch allies, has deployed to the Sarajevo area with the intention of 
countering Bosnian Serb attacks on U.N. forces there, including those 
U.N. forces who are escorting humanitarian relief convoys.
  NATO is apparently determined to conduct robust air action to counter 
the Bosnian Serbs' attack on Gorazde, a determination that will 
hopefully be extended to other safe areas, Bihac and others, if 
necessary.
  If these actions are carried out successfully, and if this bill is 
ultimately enacted into law, the Bosnian Government will be faced with 
a very difficult decision, a difficult decision that I do not believe 
we can predict with certainty.
  One choice they will have is to keep the United Nations in Bosnia, 
which means a continuation of the effort to protect the flow of 
humanitarian relief supplies to the Bosnian people and some degree of 
protection for at least the safe area of Gorazde and perhaps Sarajevo.
  The other choice the Bosnian Government will face is to have the U.N. 
forces withdrawn and have the arms embargo lifted by the United States 
after the U.N. forces are out of Bosnia, which may --I say may--result 
in their acquiring more heavy arms and equipment and may result in a 
continuation of air defense and airstrikes by the United States or some 
other nation.
  Mr. President, there have been assertions over the last week or so 
that various actions will Americanize the conflict in Bosnia. I think 
those who say that about either the current policy or the Dole-
Lieberman amendment are accurate. In my view, with either policy choice 
we are given today, there is a danger that the conflict will 
increasingly be Americanized.
  Mr. President, neither the current policy of the United Nations and 
NATO, nor the Dole-Lieberman approach, in my view, are coherent 
policies.
  The administration has worked diligently in the last few days to 
bring about change in the current policy in Bosnia. It has fallen short 
of the mark.
  Mr. President, the United States, our allies, and the United Nations 
have reached a critical juncture in Bosnia. I believe that the actions 
of UNPROFOR, particularly the actions of the Rapid Reaction Force to 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the people of 
Sarajevo, and the actions of NATO to deter or, if necessary, repel 
attacks on Gorazde, and hopefully the other remaining safe areas, will 
in the final analysis, determine the outcome of the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment. Not only the outcome as to whether it becomes law, but what 
happens if it does become law, and what the Bosnian Government does 
when the ball is in its court.
  When this bill passes, it will probably be accepted by the House of 
Representatives and sent to the President in the next few days. The 
President will undoubtedly, as he said, veto the Dole-Lieberman bill, 
and Congress will vote whether to override the President's veto.
  Mr. President, in spite of its flaws, I will vote for the Dole-
Lieberman bill today even with all of its defects, as a way of 
expressing my strong feeling on two key points: First, the current 
U.N.-NATO policy in Bosnia is a failure and, without dramatic change, 
will continue to erode the credibility of the NATO alliance and the 
United States worldwide; second, the ability of the Bosnian Serbs to 
overrun the so-called safe areas without the United Nations taking 
decisive steps to prevent that, and the commission of unlawful acts in 
capturing the safe areas and in mistreating innocent civilians by the 
thousands clearly demonstrate that the continuation of the arms embargo 
is both untenable, immoral and unjustified.
  Mr. President, this embargo should be lifted the way it was imposed--
multilaterally, and, in the final analysis, unilaterally, if absolutely 
necessary. It is my hope that the Nunn amendment, which will express 
that order of priorities, will pass when it is voted on in a few 
minutes, because it makes it clear that even though the odds are 
against the Security Council lifting the embargo multilaterally, we 
ought to at least try to get it lifted multilaterally before we do so 
unilaterally. Otherwise, we will truly meet ourselves coming back, in 
terms of our embargo on Iraq, Libya, and perhaps other places in the 
world as events unfold.
  Mr. President, I believe that, even after this bill passes and after 
it goes to the President and after it is vetoed, if it is, I believe 
that all of us--whichever side of this argument we are on or where we 
have been--need to carefully review the developments on the ground in 
Bosnia, and particularly the performance of the United Nations and NATO 
in the coming days.
  I will decide and I will cast my vote on the inevitable question of 
overriding the President's veto, based upon these events that will 
unfold.
  Mr. President, I yield back any remaining time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I certainly wish to express to my good 
friend and colleague of these many years my own appreciation for his 
supporting the underlying measure by the distinguished majority leader 
and the Senator from Connecticut. The Senator from Georgia and I have 
worked in this arena for many, many years together. I have always had a 
profound respect for his ability to get right to the heart of an issue 
and to express, irrespective of politics or partisan issues, what he 
thinks is in the best interests of the country. Again, I appreciate his 
joining here today.
  I would like to see if I could clarify one part of my colleague's 
remarks. He addressed the rapid reaction force, 

[[Page S10692]]
which today is reported to be taking positions in the Sarajevo area. If 
I understood the Senator, he felt how they carried out that mission 
might well have a very strong bearing on the future of this 
legislation.
  Mr. NUNN. That mission, as well as protecting the other safe areas as 
designated, as well as enforcing the other mandates that have thus far 
been rather ineffectively enforced; not solely that issue but including 
that issue.
  Mr. WARNER. But as I look through the press reports and other 
information that is available to the Senate, it is not clear to me the 
extent to which those rapid reaction forces augmenting the UNPROFOR 
forces in Sarajevo will be used for any mission other than protecting 
the UNPROFOR forces in the carrying out of the mission, namely of 
delivering food, medicine, and the like to that area.
  Is it the Senator's understanding that they would participate in the 
protection of the civilians if it is unrelated to the mission of 
UNPROFOR?
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I am not clear on that 
point. I do not know that there is a clear policy.
  Obviously, if you keep the road open, as those forces are pledged to 
do, that helps the humanitarian mission of getting the supplies 
through. Whether they would respond to artillery shelling of the city 
if it does not hit U.N. personnel, I do not have an answer to that. It 
seems to me, when you have a safe haven and that safe haven is being 
grossly violated, if it means anything at all it ought to be enforced. 
But I do not have the knowledge to speak to what their intention is at 
this point in time.
  Obviously, the United States does not have forces there and this 
would be a decision made by the United Nations and by our allies who 
have forces on the ground.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is my understanding, that it is 
certainly unclear at this point in time the extent to which they would 
engage in retaliating or defending or whatever word you wish to use, 
against these prolonged, continuous attacks on the Bosnian Serbs. I 
just hope the Senate, indeed others following this debate worldwide, do 
not attach too much significance to the presence of those rapid 
reaction forces until such time as we have a much clearer idea as to 
their mission and their capabilities of carrying out that mission.
  This is a relatively small number of combat arms that are being 
placed in that area by the rapid reaction forces; in comparison to the 
order of battle, after the Bosnian Serbs.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, he may be right on that. 
I think we will have to wait and see how the events unfold.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Nunn amendment 
to the Dole-Lieberman substitute to S. 21. The Nunn amendment 
recognizes that it is the Bosnian Serbs who have rejected the agreement 
reached by the contact group. The amendment also places the 
responsibility of seeking a multilateral lift of the arms embargo on 
the administration. Failing an agreement of the U.N. Security Council 
to multilaterally lift the arms embargo, the United States has no 
alternative but to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, pending a 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, we are about to vote, and I would like, 
simply, to summarize, as best I can, the situation as many of us 
understand it to be this afternoon.
  As we begin, I think there is much about which there is complete 
agreement. We all agree that the current situation is horrifying--the 
ethnic cleansing, the violence, the violation of human rights, pictures 
on television, all of which we believe we simply should not tolerate. 
We all agree that the status quo is untenable. Zepa fell yesterday, and 
there continues to be Serbian aggression in areas throughout Bosnia 
that we are simply unwilling to accept. We all agree that lifting the 
embargo is desirable. And we agree that the Bosnians ought to be able 
to defend themselves. We agree on all of those points. I do not think 
there is a Senator in the Chamber who would disagree on any of that.
  The issue before us is not a question of if we lift the embargo, but 
how. How do we lift it so we can enable the Bosnians to fight for 
themselves but protect our other vital United States interests as well? 
That is the issue.
  We have a number of specific questions relating to this embargo that 
go beyond enabling the Bosnians to help themselves, and on that issue, 
the question of how we keep in balance, in proper perspective, all of 
these various aspects of the decision. I am afraid our decisions are 
being driven as much by emotions as they are by the facts, as they are 
by the cool consideration of the consequences of lifting the embargo 
unilaterally this afternoon.
  That is understandable. We see the Serbian atrocities and we want to 
respond. We see a one-sided war spreading day by day, and by all that 
is right we want to scream, ``Enough. Enough.'' We want to be able to 
help in some way, because all too often countries have stood by while 
atrocities of this kind have been perpetrated. And we want no part of 
that.
  We are united by that outrage, by that contempt. We are united by the 
resolve to do something more. And I understand that, as does every 
Senator in the Chamber this afternoon.
  What divides us, what really divides us, is how best to transform 
resolve into action. Really, the question is, as we try to come to some 
agreement as to what our action ought to be--the question is, do we 
give NATO and the United Nations one more chance to succeed? Do we give 
them one more chance to act to stop Serb aggression before we lift the 
embargo? Or must we lift it right now, unilaterally?
  The President has made himself very clear. The President has urged us 
to give our united efforts that chance. The President has urged us to 
recognize the purpose of our alliances, to demonstrate our commitment 
to multilateral efforts. How many times have we said to the United 
Nations and to other members of the world community: We need your help. 
We need your cooperation. We need your participation?
  How many times did we send people to Britain and to France and to 
countries all over the world during the Persian Gulf war saying, ``Help 
us, this is a united effort''? How many times did we go to other 
countries and say, ``We have to put some constraints on Libya, or on 
Cuba''? And will we, at some point in the future, go to our allies and 
say, ``We need your help with North Korea, with China''?
  That is what the President is asking us to bear in mind as we make 
the decision we must this afternoon. The choice is clear. Recognizing 
our desire to lift the embargo, do we give this effort another chance, 
recognizing that progress has been made in the last few days? 
Recognizing that, at some point, time does run out, do we allow them 
the opportunity to demonstrate, with whatever resolve we can muster, 
that in the remaining weeks before winter sets in that we use all of 
the muscle, all of the force, all of the resolve that we in a united 
way can muster, or face the consequences of unilateral action which 
could lead this country to great peril and, frankly, to very disturbing 
precedents?
  A unilateral lift means in large measure unilateral responsibility. A 
unilateral lift means accelerated deployment of U.S. forces, and on 
that there can be no question. If we lift, they leave. If we lift, we 
help them leave. If we lift, we are there, and the action spreads. And 
then what? A unilateral lift means the possibility of the 
disintegration of NATO.
  What do we tell our NATO allies, that this organization, which has 
stood now for 50 years--ironically we celebrated that anniversary this 
year--what do we tell them the next time they come to us or we go to 
them? ``Well, as long as everything is going OK, as long as it is 
comfortable for us, we will join you. But, you know, if things get 
rough, if we disagree with you, we have the right to say NATO does not 
matter anymore. NATO is not going to be an alliance. We are going to 
pick and choose for ourselves whether or not and when we want to be 
involved in NATO.''
  Do we really want to send that message to our NATO allies? Do we 
really want to say NATO does not count? Do we really want to suffer the 
consequences of a disintegrated NATO 

[[Page S10693]]
with all that is going on in Europe today?
  A unilateral lift means the demise of other multilateral embargoes. 
Let there be no mistake about that either. I do not know how we tell 
our allies we still need them in the Persian Gulf, we still need them 
in Libya, and, by the way, we do not want you to send anything to Cuba. 
How do we say that with a straight face, Mr. President?
  A unilateral lift could dramatically undermine our President and this 
country's credibility. If we roll over the President this afternoon, 
then what? ``Go out there, Mr. President. We are united, Democrats and 
Republicans. We want you, as the Commander in Chief and as the 
articulator of foreign policy, to go do your thing. We are just going 
to roll over you when we decide we do not like what you are doing.''
  What kind of standing is this country going to have with all of the 
world? We have one President at a time. We have one Commander in Chief 
at a time. We have a State Department that we delegate responsibility 
to, to create foreign policy.
  A unilateral lift, Mr. President, unfortunately may not even work; 
arms may not even get through. We are talking here about 3 months 
before anything actually reaches Bosnia. That assumes that we can get 
through Croatia, that the Croatian ports will be open, that the lines 
will be available to us. It means that somehow we have all that worked 
out but our allies, after we have ignored their pleas, are going to 
agree to end the embargo and allow our supplies to get through into 
Bosnia.
  Then, what if arms are not enough? What if our allies have gone? What 
happens then, Mr. President? What happens when we find out 6, 8 months 
from now that this did not work, and our allies are gone and the 
horrific acts that we see on television right now are continuing? What 
happens then when the Bosnians come to us and say, ``We need your help; 
you have seen what we have seen on television, and we cannot tolerate 
this.''?
  Will we send troops to stop the spread of the war to Macedonia or 
Kosovo, or, God forbid, Turkey or Greece? What then? Are we still going 
to make these courageous speeches about how horrifying and difficult it 
is for the Bosnians? Will we be willing then to rush to their support?
  Mr. President, this is not a time to divorce ourselves from a united 
effort. Let us make a decision based upon what comes not only from our 
hearts but from our efforts as well. Let us vote ``no'' on this 
resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, as I understood last night we had about 15 
minutes. I would be happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Connecticut, Senator Lieberman.
  Mr. President, I have listened with great care to the distinguished 
Democratic leader, and I have a lot of respect for him. But I do not 
think the world is going to collapse if we do the right thing. That is 
what it is all about. NATO is going to collapse? Our allies are going 
to leave us? They are not going to leave us. We are the leader of the 
free world. But we have not acted like it in this instance. But we are. 
We did not act like it in the last administration--but we are--when it 
came to Bosnia.
  So I am not as troubled about the world coming apart here, now, if 
the Senate does what it should have done months and months ago, and 
maybe a couple of years ago. This is not about rolling over the 
President. This is about the Senate of the United States. It is about 
Republicans and Democrats with a shared common view--and some on each 
side, I might add.
  I believe we do not have many opportunities like this to sort of turn 
away from the historic failure and chart a new path for America. It 
does not have to do with the U.S. Senate. And I know it is a difficult 
vote for my colleagues on the other side with a President of their 
party. And I commend those who have stood up and said, ``We are going 
to do the right thing.''
  This is not politics. This is not about President Clinton or 
President Bush or anybody in the Senate. It is not the Dole amendment 
or the Lieberman amendment. This is a message from the U.S. Senate, 
supported, I might say, by dozens and dozens of groups all across 
America. And without reading all the groups, the Action Council for 
Peace in the Balkans, Americans for Saving Bosnia, America Council for 
Public Affairs, American Jewish Conference, American Muslim Council, 
American Task Force on Bosnia, and on and on it goes.
  Then the Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, represented by 
outstanding Americans, Democrats and Republicans, Morris Abrams, Frank 
Carlucci, Hodding Carter, Max Kampelman, Frank Fahrenkoph, Richard 
Burt, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and that list goes on and 
on. Albert Wohlstetter, Paul Wolfowitz, John Silber, Albert Shanker--
Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals, who I guess 
believe the people have a right to defend themselves, even if they are 
a little, tiny country with no lobbyist running around the Congress. 
They will not be affected by what we did yesterday on lobbying reform. 
They do not have any.
  We get long-distance calls, overseas calls, from the prime minister 
and the foreign minister, and they called yesterday. And as they were 
calling, they were telling us that Zepa was about to fall, and it did.
  So it seems to me that what we ought to be doing here is the very 
responsible, right thing--a nonpartisan, nonpolitical, bipartisan 
message to the world, not just to Bosnia--that if you are an 
independent nation, if you are a member of the United Nations, as the 
Senator from New York so eloquently stated yesterday, you have a right 
to self-defense. You do not have a right to American troops. You do not 
have a right to American air power. You do not have a right to American 
anything. But you have a right to self-defense. And that is what this 
debate is all about.
  We are a big country. They are a small country. And I guess it would 
be good if Bosnia would just go away. If they would just surrender, our 
problems would end for a while until somebody starts writing the 
history of this era.
  It would be a stain on the West, almost. Well, maybe not almost. It 
would recall previous stains on the West when we stood by and watched 
the genocide in World War II.
  Call it ethnic cleansing, call it anything you want. The Senator from 
Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, said we are going to abandon Bosnia. We 
are not going to abandon Bosnia. We are going to do what we have been 
told by their elected officials they want us to do, lift the arms 
embargo.
  And again, I know that things do change. But I remember in 1992, 
candidate Clinton said lift the arms embargo and have air strikes; let 
us provide some leadership, he was saying to President Bush, who was 
fairly quiet on this issue himself. Lift the arms embargo. And I 
remember going to meetings at the White House in, I think, April and 
May of 1993. It was all for that purpose. The President was for it. The 
Vice President was for it. This Senator was for it. But I must say, 
there was a mixed group there, as we do have from time to time. We get 
mixed advice. The President got mixed advice that said: Do not do it; 
do not get involved.
  This is an immoral and unjust policy that we have in effect now. They 
ought to take away the key from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, lock the door 
and throw away the key as far as he is concerned. They are not even 
certain yet; they are still debating whether or not we have the dual-
key approach, whether anything can ever be done by NATO without U.N. 
approval. I think NATO is in difficulty because nobody can find a 
mission. Without a mission, why are they there? And they are troubled 
by this. I have been there. I have talked to them. And I have heard 
them all tell us the same thing: Do not lift the arms embargo. The U.N. 
protection forces are doing the best they can.
  And they are, and they should be commended. Some have lost their 
lives. They are our friends and they are our allies. But we are the 
leader of the free world. We cannot abdicate that responsibility. We 
cannot abdicate that leadership and say, well, not this time; we want 
to pass on Bosnia. This is a 

[[Page S10694]]
European problem. So we go along with the Europeans until it fails.
  They tell all the Bosnians we are going to have these six nice safe 
havens for you. You give up your heavy equipment. You are not going to 
need it. This is safe.
  So they give up their heavy equipment. Now they have rifles to fire 
against tanks and artillery weapons. And how many safe havens is it 
going to take to get anybody's attention? How many are going to fall? 
Two already, two more in danger, Sarajevo and Bihac. How many more--
all? Four? Five? Six? And then suddenly we recognize that this must be 
a failed policy?
  We have had a lot of activity in London and Brussels. We have had a 
lot of pounding the table and demanding the Serbs do this and do that, 
and they did it. They just took another safe haven. They are scared to 
death.
  I was asked on a program last evening, and I do not mean it to sound 
like this, but I think the person asked the question, well, they are 
not killing as many people now so there must be something good coming 
out of it. And maybe the killing has been reduced as far as numbers. 
There were only 630 casualties in July, 130 killed. An average of 4 or 
5 are killed daily, 12 and 15 are wounded, and last weekend 7 children 
were killed.
  Now, does that mean we have to rush in and help everyone because we 
are the world's policeman? Absolutely not. But it seems to me--and I am 
not an expert in foreign policy--that this country ought to have a 
right through its elected leaders to say to us: It is time to go, U.N. 
protection forces. When they leave, lift the arms embargo and let us 
defend ourselves.
  It always seemed to me that was sort of a basic right, an inherent 
right that all Americans enjoyed, and all Americans would defend 
somebody else's right to defend themselves or some nation's right to 
defend itself. And suddenly it is all mixed up.
  The House, by a vote of 3 to 1, has sent the world a message. I know 
it is tough for the British, and it is tough for the French. I have 
talked to the Prime Minister, and I have talked to the President of 
France. They are our allies, and they are our friends. We have been 
their friends in tough, tough times, and we have provided the manpower 
and the money and the weapons.
  Now, there have been a lot of efforts to muddy the waters and say, 
boy, if you do this, you are going to Americanize the war.
  That is one I cannot fathom. I have talked to Senator McCain about 
it. I do not know how you Americanize the war. If you withdraw the 
protection forces and lift the arms embargo, the Democratic leader said 
as sure as that happens, there are going to be American troops there.
  Who said so? I assume the President would come to Congress. They are 
not asking us to die for Bosnia. They are asking us to give them a 
chance to defend themselves and they will do the dying for their 
country. They are not asking for American ground troops. Oh, they would 
like some air cover, but they are not even asking for that.
  The amendment before us is very important. This amendment does not 
prohibit United States assistance to Bosnia, military or financial. I 
would say, since Soviet-style weaponry is the preponderance of what the 
Bosnians use, certainly we would not be providing the bulk of the arms. 
I think we can find some consensus if we pass this resolution and if a 
veto is overridden.
  This amendment also does not prevent the United States from seeking a 
multilateral lifting of the arms embargo in the U.N. Security Council. 
I do not happen to believe that the amendment by the Senator from 
Georgia is necessary. I know he has offered it in good faith, just as 
he did offer an amendment last August in good faith, but I do not 
believe it is necessary. I do not think it detracts much from the 
resolution. It does not add much to the resolution.
  On August 10, 1994, President Clinton sent a letter to the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia which stated:

       I am writing to reaffirm my administration's support for 
     lifting the international arms embargo on Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina . . . It has been my long-held view that the arms 
     embargo has unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim 
     in this conflict, and the Security Council should act to 
     remedy this injustice.

  That was President Clinton's statement a year ago about lifting the 
arms embargo. The letter goes on to state:

       In this regard, if by October 15--

  This was last year--

     the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the contact group's 
     proposal of July 6, 1994--

  Which, I might add, the Bosnians did accept--

     it would be my intention within 2 weeks to introduce formally 
     and support a resolution at the United Nations Security 
     Council to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.
       Further, as my administration has indicated previously, if 
     the Security Council for some reason fails to pass such a 
     resolution within a reasonable time, it would be my intention 
     to consult with the Congress thereafter regarding unilateral 
     termination of the arms embargo.

  Those are all President Clinton's words.
  I believe that 9 months is more than a reasonable time, with all the 
atrocities, all the things we have witnessed, as the Democratic leader 
said. I listened to the Democratic leader last night on C-SPAN, and I 
have listened to others. I listened to the remarkable statement made by 
the Senator from Delaware last evening, Mr. Biden, and many, many 
others on both sides of the aisle. I have listened to Senator Warner 
from Virginia, who has had a different view of this issue up until now, 
and he has told us in very vivid terms why he now holds the view that a 
great majority do.
  So I just ask the question, Is the leadership to say, ``Well, we've 
got a failed policy but we have to stick to it and we should not 
persuade our allies it is a failed policy''? It might be embarrassing 
for the British to have to leave, or it might be embarrassing for the 
French to have to leave. And America is going to be blamed if they 
leave. We are being blamed right now. We are being blamed right now, 
but, as I said, we may be blamed more in the history books for what did 
not happen.
  The opposition is also saying, the Dole-Lieberman bill will 
Americanize the war--America will be alone in providing assistance to 
the Bosnians.
  Mr. President, that is simply not the case. We know that most of the 
members of the United Nations support lifting the arms embargo on 
Bosnia. Going first does not mean going it alone.
  Mr. President, finally, the opposition to Dole-Lieberman is saying 
that this bill abandons Bosnia. In my view, this is truly twisted 
logic. I believe that at this very moment the Bosnians feel abandoned. 
The issue is not how many troops are on the ground or how many planes 
are in the air, but what these troops and planes are doing. It seems to 
me that if they are doing nothing, the Bosnians feel abandoned. Let us 
face it, these forces are essentially bystanders as events in 
Srebrenica painfully demonstrated.
  If we are worried about abandoning the Bosnians, let us listen to the 
Bosnians. Ask the Bosnians if they feel abandoned by this legislation. 
The truth is, the Bosnian Government strongly supports this 
legislation. They know the price they are paying. They know the price 
they are willing to pay.
  In conclusion, I would urge my fellow colleagues to support this 
legislation. I would urge them to search their consciences. The U.S. 
Senate has the historic opportunity to make a difference. To do what is 
right. To let the Bosnians live defending themselves, rather than die 
defenseless.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from over 40 
organizations in support of this bill, along with a letter of strong 
support from Lady Margaret Thatcher be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                    July 25, 1995.
       Dear Senator: We are writing to urge you to vote YES on the 
     Dole-Lieberman bill (S.21) to end the U.S. arms embargo 
     against the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina. We also urge you to sign on as a co-sponsor of 
     the bill and to recruit your colleagues as co-sponsors.
       The war in Bosnia is now well into its fourth year. Over 
     200,000 civilians have been brutally murdered by Serbian 
     forces, tens of thousands of women raped, and almost three 
     million people have been forced to flee their homes and 
     villages. Serbian forces have been able to carry out their 
     genocidal assault on Bosnia with virtual impunity because of 
     an immoral arms embargo that denies the legitimate government 
     of Bosnia the means to exercise its inherent right to self 
     defense.
       The response of the United Nations to the aggression has 
     been to send poorly armed 

[[Page S10695]]
     peacekeepers, even though there is no peace to keep. In recent weeks, 
     Serbian forces have been allowed to overrun two of the six 
     UN-declared ``safe areas,'' and the UN mission has approached 
     total collapse. The lesson we must learn is that only the 
     Bosnian Army has the will and the manpower to defend the 
     fledgling multi-ethnic democracy and its citizens against 
     further attacks.
       It is also clear that ultra-nationalist Serbian leaders 
     have no interest in negotiating while they can accomplish 
     their military and political objectives by attacking Bosnia's 
     remaining civilian population. Until the Bosnian Army can 
     mount a credible defense on the ground, this cowardly war of 
     aggression will continue. And we must live in the knowledge 
     that, at least in part, we are responsible for tying the 
     hands of the victims.
       The organizations listed below represent a wide range of 
     religious, humanitarian, student, and citizen advocacy 
     groups. Some of the names will be familiar to you; others 
     have been formed in recent months by voters outraged by the 
     genocide and our feeble and immoral response to it. We have 
     joined together today to ask for your support for the Dole-
     Lieberman bill. The U.S. and its allies, NATO, and the UN 
     have failed to stop the aggression. Unless Congress acts--and 
     acts NOW--thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, more innocent 
     people will die and the price of eventually confronting this 
     aggression will continue to rise.
       By voting for Dole-Lieberman, you will be taking a clear 
     stand against genocide, against aggression, against 
     appeasement, and for an honorable and sustainable peace in 
     Bosnia. You will be rejecting the failed policies of European 
     countries that have facilitated more than three years of 
     genocide. You will be voting for the one policy that makes 
     moral, political, and military sense.
       Vote Yes on the Dole-Lieberman bill.
           Sincerely,
                         national organizations

       Action Council for Peace in the Balkans.
       American Committee to Save Bosnia.
       American Council for Public Affairs.
       American Jewish Congress.
       American Muslin Council.
       American Task Force for Bosnia.
       B'nai B'rith.
       Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot.
       Islamic Network.
       Muslim Public Affairs Council.
       National Association of Arab Americans.
       National Federation of Croatian Americans.
       National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.
       Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association.
       Union of American Hebrew Congregations.


                        grassroots organizations

       American Bosnian & Hercegovinian Association.
       Americans for Bosnian Orphans.
       Ann Arbor Committee for Bosnia.
       Bosnia Advocates of Metrowest.
       Bosnia Briefings.
       Bosnia Support Committee of D.C.
       Bosnia Task Force, San Diego.
       Bosnia-Hezegovinian Help Organization.
       California Coalition Against Ethnic Cleansing.
       Coalition Against Genocide.
       Coalition for Intervention Against Genocide.
       Connecticut Citizens Against Genocide.
       Free Bosnia Action Group.
       Friends of Bosnia (W. Mass).
       Friends of Bosnia, Philadelphia.
       Greenwich Coalition for Peace in Bosnia.
       Human Rights Council, USA.
       JACOB at B'Nai Jeshurun.
       Jews Against Genocide/NY Committee to Save Bosnia.
       Jews Against Genocide in Bosnia.
       New England Bosnian Relief Committee.
       New Hampshire Committee for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
       New York-Sarajevo Exchange.
       Students Against Genocide (SAGE).
       Social Action Committee/Congregation Beth El.
       Stop Ethnic Cleansing.
       U.S. Bosnia Relief.
       Women in Islam.
                                                                    ____

         Margaret, The Lady Thatcher, O.M., P.C., F.R.S., House of 
           Lords, London SW1A OPW,
                                                    July 18, 1995.
       Dear Senator Dole: I am writing to express my very strong 
     support for your attempt to have the arms embargo against 
     Bosnia lifted.
       I know that you and all members of the United States Senate 
     share my horror at the crimes against humanity now being 
     perpetrated by the Serbs in Bosnia. The UN and NATO have 
     failed to enforce the Security Council Resolutions which 
     authorized the use of force to defend the safe havens and to 
     get humanitarian assistance through. The safe havens were 
     never safe; now they are falling to Serb assault. Murder, 
     ethnic cleansing, mass rape and torture are the legacy of the 
     policy of the last three years to the people of Bosnia. It 
     has failed utterly. We owe it to the victims at last and at 
     least to have the weapons to defend themselves--since we 
     ourselves are not willing to defend them.
       The arms embargo was always morally wrong. Significantly, 
     it was imposed on the (then formally intact but fragmenting) 
     former Yugoslavia at that regime's own behest. It was then, 
     quite unjustly and possibly illegally, applied to the 
     successor states. Its effect--and, as regards the Serbs, its 
     intention--was to ensure that the proponents of a Greater 
     Serbia, who inherited the great bulk of the Yugoslav army's 
     equipment, enjoyed overwhelming military superiority in their 
     aggression. It is worth recalling that the democratically 
     elected, multi-faith and multi-ethnic Bosnian Government 
     never asked for a single UN soldier to be sent. It did ask 
     for the arms required to defend its own people against a 
     ruthless aggressor. That request was repeatedly denied, in 
     spite of the wishes of the US administration and of most 
     leading American politicians.
       There is no point now in listing the failures of military 
     policy which subsequently occurred. Suffice it to say that, 
     instead of succeeding in enforcing the mandates the UN 
     Security Council gave them, UNPROFOR became potential and 
     then actual hostages. Airpower was never seriously employed 
     either. The oft repeated arguments against lifting the arms 
     embargo--that if it occurred UN troops would be at risk, that 
     the enclaves like Srebrenica would fall, that the Serbs would 
     abandon all restraint--have all now been proved worthless. 
     For all these things have happened and the arms embargo still 
     applies.
       Two arguments are, however, still advanced by those who 
     wish to keep the arms embargo in place. Each is demonstrably 
     false.
       First, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would 
     prolong the war in Bosnia. This is, of course, a morally 
     repulsive argument; for it implies that all we should care 
     about is a quick end to the conflict without regard to the 
     justice or otherwise of its outcome. But in any case it is 
     based on the false assumption that the Serbs are bound to 
     win. Over the last year in Bosnian army has grown much 
     stronger and the Bosnian Serbs weaker. The Bosnian army has, 
     with its Croat allies, been winning back crucial territory, 
     while desertion and poor morale are badly affecting the over-
     extended Serb forces. What the Bosnian government lacks 
     however are the tanks and artillery needed to hold the 
     territory won and force the Serbs to negotiate. This lack of 
     equipment is directly the result of the arms embargo. Because 
     of it the war is being prolonged and the casualties are 
     higher. Lifting the arms embargo would thus shorten not 
     lengthen the war.
       Second, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would lead 
     to rifts within the UN Security Council and NATO. But are 
     there not rifts already? And are these themselves not the 
     result of pursuing a failed policy involving large risks to 
     outside countries' ground troops, rather than arming and 
     training the victims to repel the aggressor? American 
     leadership is vital to bring order out of the present chaos. 
     No country must be allowed to veto the action required to end 
     the present catastrophe. And if American leadership is truly 
     evident along the lines of the policy which you and your 
     colleagues are advancing I do not believe that any country 
     will actually try to obstruct it.
       The West has already waited too long. Time is now terribly 
     short. All those who care about peace and justice for the 
     tragic victims of aggression in the former Yugoslavia now 
     have their eyes fixed on the actions of the US Senate. I 
     hope, trust and pray that your initiative to have the arms 
     embargo against Bosnia lifted succeeds. It will bring new 
     hope to those who are suffering so much.
       With warm regards.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                Margaret Thatcher.

  Mr. DOLE. I will just conclude by saying this is not a partisan 
discussion. It is not a partisan debate. It is not about Democrats and 
Republicans, not about philosophy. It is not about politics. It is 
about whether some small country that has been ravaged on all sides, 
pillaged, women raped, children killed, do they have any rights in this 
world? Do they have a right to say to these big countries like France 
and Great Britain and America that it is time to go, ``Let us fight and 
die for ourselves.'' That is what this is all about. They have said our 
amendment is simple. It is simple. That is what it does.
  Maybe I missed something in my lifetime, but I have never missed the 
point that people have a right to defend themselves. And if we stand in 
their way, and if more are killed and more are raped and more little 
boys 12 years old are taken off to camps and more are hung on trees and 
more throats are cut because we imposed our will on this little 
country--``You cannot do this because we do not want you to do this.'' 
It is their country. It is their lives, their blood.
  I think it is time for a change in policy. And I hope we will have a 
resounding vote in favor of the Dole-Lieberman resolution.
  I want to congratulate and commend my friend from Connecticut for his 
tireless efforts, nonpartisan, going back--I think we worked together 
l\1/2\ years on this issue, without any disagreement, never talking 
about the political advantage. This is not about 

[[Page S10696]]
politics; it is about life or death for a little country.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). The question is on agreeing to 
the second-degree amendment by the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. 
Hollings] is absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 57, nays 41, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 329 Leg.]

                                YEAS--57

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brown
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gorton
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--41

     Ashcroft
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Smith
     Thomas

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Bennett
     Hollings
       
  So the amendment (No. 1851) was agreed to.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I move to table the motion.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Nunn 
amendment, and the yeas and nays on final passage; and if we could have 
10-minute votes on each of those.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 10-minute votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Vote on Amendment No. 1848, as Amended

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn].
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. 
Hollings] is absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 75, nays 23, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 330 Leg.]

                                YEAS--75

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bumpers
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--23

     Biden
     Brown
     Bryan
     Burns
     Byrd
     D'Amato
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Inhofe
     Mack
     McConnell
     Moynihan
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Shelby
     Smith
     Thomas

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Bennett
     Hollings
       
  So the amendment (No. 1848) was agreed to.
                       Vote On Amendment No. 1801

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on Dole amendment 
number 1801, as amended.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1801), as amended, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was 
read for the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on passage of the 
bill, as amended. On this question, the yeas and nays have been 
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. 
Hollings] is absent because of attending a funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 69, nays 29, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 331 Leg.]

                                YEAS--69

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Brown
     Bryan
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Reid
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simon
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--29

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Breaux
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Exon
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Leahy
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Pell
     Pryor
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simpson

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Bennett
     Hollings
       
  So the bill (S. 21), as amended, was passed, as follows:
                                 S. 21

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-
     Defense Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
     (Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued 
     application of an international arms embargo to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that 
     Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-
     defense under Article 51 of the United National Charter and 
     therefore is inconsistent with international law.
       (2) The United States has not formally sought multilateral 
     support for terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina through a vote on a United Nations Security 
     Council resolution since the enactment of section 1404 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
     (Public Law 103-337).
       (3) The United Nations Security Council has not taken 
     measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
     security in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the aggression 
     against that country began in April 1992.

[[Page S10697]]

       (4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the 
     United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany, 
     has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of 
     continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact 
     Group's proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision in 
     the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms 
     embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable.

     SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

       The Congress supports the efforts of the Government of the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--
       (1) to defend its people and the territory of the Republic;
       (2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and 
     territorial integrity of the Republic; and
       (3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable, and 
     sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.

     SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

       (a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United 
     States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (b), following--
       (1) receipt by the United States Government of a request 
     from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for termination 
     of the United States arms embargo and submission by the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exercise of its 
     sovereign rights as a nation, of a request to the United 
     Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
       (2) a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or 
     decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to 
     withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (b) Implementation of Termination.--The President may 
     implement termination of the United States arms embargo of 
     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to 
     subsection (a) prior to the date of completion of the 
     withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     but shall, subject to subsection (c), implement termination 
     of the embargo pursuant to that subsection no later than the 
     earlier of--
       (1) the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
       (2) the date which is 12 weeks after the date of submission 
     by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a request to 
     the United Nations Security Council for the departure of 
     UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (c) Presidential Waiver Authority.--If the President 
     determines and reports in advance to Congress that the 
     safety, security, and successful completion of the withdrawal 
     of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(2) requires more time than the 
     period provided for in that subsection, the President may 
     extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for 
     implementing termination of the United States arms embargo of 
     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up 
     to 30 days. The authority in this subsection may be exercised 
     to extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) 
     for more than one 30-day period.
       (d) Presidential Reports.--Within 7 days of the 
     commencement of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, and every 14 days thereafter, the President 
     shall report in writing to the President pro tempore of the 
     Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the 
     status and estimated date of completion of the withdrawal 
     operation. If any such report includes an estimated date of 
     completion of the withdrawal which is later than 12 weeks 
     after commencement of the withdrawal operation, the report 
     shall include the operational reasons which prevent the 
     completion of the withdrawal within 12 weeks of commencement.
       (e) International Policy.--If the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina submits a request to the United Nations Security 
     Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or the 
     countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to withdraw 
     from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (a), 
     the President (or his representative) shall immediately 
     introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council 
     a resolution to terminate the application of United Nations 
     Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina. The United States shall insist on a vote on 
     the resolution by the Security Council. The resolution shall, 
     at a minimum, provide for the termination of the 
     applicability of United Nations Security Council resolution 
     713 to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than 
     the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event the United Nations 
     Security Council fails to adopt the resolution to terminate 
     the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 
     713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of a 
     lack of unanimity of the permanent members, thereby failing 
     to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
     international peace and security, the United States shall 
     promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General 
     Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's 
     Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.
       (f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States 
     forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any 
     purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military 
     equipment.
       (g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``United States arms embargo of the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the application to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
       (A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the 
     Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 FR 33322) under the 
     heading ``Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to 
     Yugoslavia''; and
       (B) any similar policy being applied by the United States 
     Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of 
     UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to 
     which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles 
     and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and
       (2) the term ``completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the departure 
     from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially 
     all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all 
     other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a 
     reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the 
     withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the 
     United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries 
     contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not 
     include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of any country 
     providing such personnel.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wish to echo the many accolades I 
have heard paid to the distinguished majority leader for his leadership 
on this issue over a period of years. He has been unwavering in his 
determination, together with our distinguished colleague, the junior 
Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, with strong staff support 
provided by Mira Baratta, who has worked on this tirelessly now for 
years, Randy Scheunemann, Ron Marks, John Lilley, of the staff of 
Senator Lieberman, and Mrs. Ansley on my staff. Together, we have been 
able to present this in a very fair and objective and nonpartisan way.
  I wish to extend my appreciation to those staff members and the 
distinguished majority leader and the Senator from Connecticut.

                          ____________________