[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 122 (Wednesday, July 26, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10665-S10680]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, is there a unanimous consent stipulating 
what shall happen now? I assume the pending business is still the 
Bosnia resolution, is that correct?
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo 
     applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

       Pending:
       Dole amendment No. 1801, in the nature of a substitute.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I inquire of the Chair if the first speaker 
on this has been identified in the unanimous consent?
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The first speaker was to be the Senator 
from Connecticut, Senator Dodd.
  Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Craig). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

[[Page S10666]]

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the fact that more than 3 years after the 
outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans we are debating the same issues 
that we did not resolve 3 years ago is surely proof of the failure of 
Western leaders to craft an effective policy against the expansionist 
brutality and ethnic cleansing that is going on in Bosnia, and it is 
surely proof it is a false hope to believe that aggression which is 
ignored will somehow stop on its own without the use of collective 
force.
  There is no use in blaming NATO or blaming the United Nations. We 
have to blame the leading nations of NATO and the United Nations. 
Leading nations means the United States, the French, the British, and 
our other allies that have the responsibility to lead but that have 
collectively failed.
  We have heard a lot about the failure of the United Nations and the 
failure of NATO, and, yes, there is plenty of failure there. But NATO 
and the United Nations are made up of countries, and those entities 
follow the decisions and the will of their members. So when the United 
Nations fails, it is because we or the British or the French or the 
Russians or other members of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly that make up the United Nations and will not allow it to do 
something have decided on that course of action.
  The same thing is true with NATO. NATO has failed because we and the 
British and the French and the other members of NATO will not agree on 
a course of action in the Balkans. We have failed. Collectively we have 
failed.
  There is no easy answer in Bosnia, but I am convinced that the least 
bad answer is to allow Bosnians to defend themselves. I have been 
convinced of that for a long time and nothing has changed my view. 
Quite the opposite. I am more convinced than ever that since we and 
Western Europe are not willing--no one is willing--to send in ground 
forces to defend the Bosnian Government and its people against 
aggression. The least we should do is allow them the right that every 
other government in the world has, and that is the right of self-
defense. No other state recognized by the United Nations is being 
prevented from exercising this inherent right.
  If lifting the embargo results in the United Nations leaving and if 
it results in the suspension of humanitarian relief, then at least the 
Bosnians will have been able to exercise their right to die fighting 
instead of having their hands tied by this embargo while they are being 
slaughtered.
  I find it morally repugnant that we, the nations of the world, are 
denying Bosnia that right while being unwilling collectively to come to 
the defense of Bosnia. And it is particularly repugnant in light of the 
ethnic cleansing, the rape, the forced marches which the State 
Department has acknowledged are being carried out primarily by the 
Bosnian Serbs.
  The United Nations estimates that the Bosnian Serbs have expelled, 
killed, or imprisoned over 90 percent of the 1,700,000 non-Serbs who 
before the war lived throughout the territory now held by the Bosnian 
Serbs. Now, it is not just in the name of decency that we must allow 
the Bosnians the right to fight back. In the hope of stopping Serb 
aggression before it spreads more widely, or before it involves 
neighboring countries and ultimately us in a wider, deeper conflict we 
must also allow the Bosnians the right to fight back.
  At this point allowing the Bosnians to fight back seems to me to be 
the best hope of eventually stopping Serb expansionist drives. So it is 
not just that it is morally repugnant not to allow the Bosnians to 
defend themselves. As a practical matter I do not see any other way of 
stopping Serb expansionism unless someone tries physically to stop it. 
Who is going to try to stop it? Who is there fighting the Serbs in 
their expansionist goals? And they have them. Their goals for a greater 
Serbia which can spread into the Balkans and spread into Europe can 
once again be the source of a wider war which then drags in America as 
we have been dragged in twice in this century. So no one believes that 
allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves is going to Americanize the 
war more than doing nothing. Doing nothing will also result someday in 
America being dragged into a wider conflict. The only way to prevent a 
wider conflict is to allow someone who wants to fight against Serb 
expansionism to fight. That is what the Bosnians not only are willing 
to do, but they are pleading with us that they be allowed to do.
  Bosnia has been littered by broken promises. None of us can be 
sanguine about the new threats of airstrikes that were made in the last 
few days. We look at the fine print of the London agreement and we see 
that us and our allies, NATO, and U.N. officials are still arguing 
about the dual-key approach, about who has the right to call in 
airstrikes and who has the right to veto them, and about whether or not 
the threats apply to Gorazde or whether or not they apply to all safe 
areas. We read in the morning newspaper that ``U.N. officials are now 
given the right to veto airstrikes by NATO.'' We were told last weekend 
no, they were not. NATO and the United Nations are again in disarray 
within a few days after presumably there had been an agreement. And if 
there is any principle involved in the London conference, in the London 
agreement, it was that a credible threat of airstrikes against 
strategic Serb targets in Bosnia would have at least a reasonable 
prospect of stopping an attack on Gorazde.
  Now, that is what the Secretary of Defense told us yesterday. That at 
least a credible threat would have the possible effect of deterring an 
attack on Gorazde. It is not guaranteed that threat of an airstrike 
even if it is addressed at targets in Bosnia held by the Serbs outside 
of the immediate area, that a threat, a credible threat of a strong air 
attack would deter the attack, but at least there was that possibility. 
That is what is at the heart of the London declaration. Though then the 
question comes, if it is possible that the threat of a credible 
airstrike would stop an attack on Gorazde, why would not that same 
threat stop the attack on Sarajevo? Why do we not apply the Gorazde 
rules to Sarajevo? What London did was give a green light for an attack 
on Sarajevo because what it said was the threat of a credible air 
attack is limited to Gorazde. And when I asked the Secretary of Defense 
and Secretary of State yesterday, why do we not apply that same threat 
to stop this ongoing assault and siege of the capital of a nation that 
belongs to the United Nations, I was told we hope that same decision 
will be made relative to Sarajevo in the next few days.
  Well, I hope it will be too. But I am not going to hold my breath. 
And I cannot honestly tell the people of Bosnia who have suffered for 
years that somehow or other these kinds of faltering steps, threat 
today, watered down tomorrow, threat today, not carried out tomorrow--
that this can in any way protect them. There is only one thing that 
will protect the Bosnian people from the Bosnian Serb expansion, and 
that is if they are allowed to defend themselves. It has been proven 
year after year that this is their only defense. There is no other. 
Now, we are told that this would be a bad precedent, withdrawing from 
the U.N. resolution. But this would not be the first U.N. resolution 
which has been ignored in Bosnia and ignored by us. The U.N. Security 
Council passed a resolution last September which was an effort to 
punish the Serbs for rejecting the contact group's peace plan. Now, 
that resolution, just last September, declared that all states should 
``desist from any political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian 
Serb party as long as that party has not accepted the proposed 
settlement in full.''
  The U.N. resolution says, all states should ``desist from any 
political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party as long 
as that party has not accepted the proposed settlement in full.'' 
Within 4 months we violated that resolution unilaterally. There was no 
change in that resolution. We and other European officials went to Pale 
for political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party. U.S. 
Special Envoy Charles Thomas went there despite the fact that the 
preconditions which had been set for that direct dialog had not been 
met. Now, that was a blatant disregard, unilaterally for an important 
U.N. resolution. Of course, 

[[Page S10667]]
that one was dealing with the Serbs. So I guess that one is overlooked. 
That does not count. It was a resolution very specifically regulating 
diplomatic and political and military matters. And we ignored it, 
unilaterally we ignored it. The U.S. Ambassador at that time, Victor 
Jackovich, objected to the visit and was recalled to Washington as a 
result of his statement of objection.
  This genocide in Bosnia has taken on Orwellian aspects. UNPROFOR is 
no longer a protection force. Safe havens are neither safe nor are they 
havens. The contact group of nations is not making any significant 
contact with the warring parties on a peace agreement. And peacekeepers 
are now hostages and human shields.
  Whatever else, whatever else, the United States and our allies have 
not mustered the will to defend Bosnia. And we cannot in conscience 
both enforce an embargo and tell the Bosnians that we are not going to 
defend you and we are not going to let you defend yourselves. We cannot 
in good conscience say both things at the same time. We are not going 
to defend you and we are not going to let you defend yourselves. It is 
one or the other. Morally it is one or the other, and also it is one or 
the other for very practical reasons. That is, unless there is a 
counterweight to Serb expansionism in Bosnia, it will continue. Next it 
will be Kosovo. Next it will be Croatia. Next other countries will 
become involved in stopping that expansion.
  Next, other countries will respond to the first countries getting 
involved. Next, a Balkan war spreads to Europe.
  There is no easy answer in Bosnia, and anyone who thinks that there 
is a cure is making a terrible mistake.
  Allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves has risks. The status quo 
has risks. And in judging which are the greater risks, nobody can be 
sure that their judgment is right. But year after year, I have felt 
that with all of the clash of pros and cons, there is one nugget of 
truth, and that is the right of self-defense, of that I am sure.
  I am sure that the U.N. Charter, an international law, permits every 
nation the right of self-defense. I am sure that this country has stood 
for that for as long as we have been in existence. We have stopped 
standing for that in Bosnia.
  Later on today, the Senate will reassert that fundamental belief that 
every nation has a right of self-defense, and if there is anyplace 
where that right is appropriate, it is in a place that has been the 
victim of a genocide.
  I never thought we would hear the words ``ethnic cleansing'' again in 
this century. We not only heard them, we have watched them. We have 
watched ethnic cleansing operate. We saw a picture in the paper of 
Serbian troops separating men from women and children. The men going 
that way, probably to slaughter; the women and children going this way, 
probably to rape or to other horrors. That picture reminded me of 
another picture that took place in a concentration camp about 50 years 
ago, where Gestapo agents, at the doors of the camp, separated 
families, some to their death, a few to survive.
  It is time to let the Bosnians defend themselves. It has been long 
overdue and the Senate today is going to make a statement, which I hope 
is a powerful statement that is, if we cannot stop genocide, and if we 
are unwilling to stop it, we certainly must let the victims of the 
genocide try to protect themselves from that horror.
  Madam President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I rise today in support of the 
resolution that is before the Senate, the resolution sponsored by 
Senator Dole, Senator Lieberman, and many others. I compliment them for 
this resolution. I also compliment many of my colleagues who spoke so 
eloquently on this issue yesterday.
  I was one that wanted to speak. I noticed the Presiding Officer made 
an excellent speech last night. Several other of my colleagues, Senator 
McCain and others, spoke eloquently on the need for this resolution. I 
compliment them for it.
  Madam President, my involvement in the former Yugoslavia probably 
started with a trip that I made with Senator Dole to Yugoslavia in the 
summer of 1990. I learned a lot about the former Yugoslavia and some of 
the Republics at that time. I must say my eyes were opened. I was 
shocked by some of the things I had seen, by some of the 
discrimination, and I will say hatred, by some of the leaders in 
Serbia, particularly Mr. Milosevic.
  I remember Senator Dole and others on the trip, we wanted to go into 
Kosovo. Mr. Milosevic did not want us to go. I remember there were so-
called elections in Serbia about that time. He stole the elections. But 
he did not want us to go into Kosovo because of all the problems. We 
wanted to go into Kosovo because we heard of human rights violations. 
They did not want us to find out about it.
  The people of Kosovo wanted us to go, and we initially went. We went 
because of the leadership of Senator Dole. Even the State Department 
said they did not know about this, but Senator Dole said no, we are 
going to go, and we went after hours of haggling negotiations. We 
eventually went.
  We saw thousands of people--Albanians. Kosovo is about 85 percent 
Albanian. They were really oppressed. They had been denied jobs. Their 
newspapers had been shut down. They were denied access to radios. They 
were expelled from hospitals, from universities, and other 
institutions.
  Frankly, the leaders in Serbia--and I hope you will note I am talking 
about the leaders, because not all Serbs are bad. Certainly, in my 
opinion, they have some very bad leadership. They distorted the whole 
thrust of our intentions. Our intentions were to listen to the people, 
and they tried to deny us that access.
  We did listen to many of the people in Kosovo on both sides of the 
issue. We saw mass demonstrations, thousands of people. In many cases, 
the police tried to deny them access to us.
  I will not forget that trip. I will not forget the leadership that 
Senator Dole had in trying to make sure that we were able to see the 
people in Kosovo, and also I will not forget the way that Mr. Milosevic 
had distorted our trip, distorted the press afterward, and how he had 
suppressed some of the people in Kosovo.
  It reminds me of the same trip where we were also in other countries, 
some of the Eastern European countries that were now experiencing 
democracy, and how excited they were; and then, to see this happening 
in the former Yugoslavia, and how sad that was.
  Now we see some results later. I might mention as a result of that, 
we passed an amendment. I will mention that amendment. In the fall of 
1990, that was opposed by the Bush administration, but the result of it 
was if we are going to give economic assistance to the republics in the 
former Yugoslavia, they must be showing some respect for human rights 
and democracy. Serbia did not qualify. Other Republics did qualify.
  We had a heated debate on that. We had a conference on that one issue 
that lasted for hours. We passed that amendment--so-called Nickles-Dole 
amendment. It was one of the first legislative items we had dealing 
with the former Yugoslavia that said we want to support the forces that 
are trying to get human rights, freedom, and democracy. Again, I say, 
this is back in the fall of 1990, so this is not a new issue.
  Mr. President, in thinking back a little more, and more recently, I 
remember an issue we had in the summer of 1993, where this Senator and 
others raised the prospect that we felt like this administration was 
trying to delegate too much authority to the United Nations. We had a 
vote on this floor. Actually, we had an amendment, and fought it for 2 
days on the floor, saying we did not think U.S. military combatants 
should be placed under U.N. control.
  We eventually lost that amendment. I think we made a point. Our point 
was that this administration was very intent on delegating U.S. 
military authority under the auspices of the United Nations. We stated 
then, 2 years ago, that would not work. I think the events in Bosnia, 
the events in the former Yugoslavia, have proven that to be the case. 
They have not worked. 

[[Page S10668]]

  The United Nations is not a military machine. It may be a diplomatic 
effort, but their efforts on the military front will certainly fail. 
They have failed.
  We are witnessing a real tragedy, a real tragedy, and a lack of 
leadership from the United Nations, a lack of leadership from the 
United States. A lot of mistakes have been made. We continue to see 
war-torn Bosnia suffer as a result.
  Mr. President, myself and others have met with the Prime Minister of 
Bosnia, and he said, ``Let us defend ourselves. Lift the arms embargo. 
The arms embargo that was placed in 1991 was placed on the entire 
Yugoslavia. There is not a Yugoslavia today.'' The arms embargo was not 
placed on the State of Bosnia.
  Maybe we made a mistake in recognizing the State of Bosnia. But we 
have done that. That may have been a mistake. But Bosnia is an 
independent nation. They have a right to defend themselves.
  Under the auspice of the United Nations, we said, well, we will have 
a resolution, we will designate safe areas. Those safe areas are not 
safe. The Senator from Texas pointed out last night, they are not safe.
  It is a real tragedy, a human rights tragedy, when we see today 
genocide taking place, when we see people either being slaughtered, 
raped, or separated from their families with men on one side, women on 
another, and there are other people transported out--ethnic cleansing, 
happening today, in 1995, in the so-called safe areas, where we have a 
U.N. resolution saying this will be a safe area, and it is not safe.
  Certainly, we should accede to the request of the people of Bosnia 
who say, ``At least let us protect ourselves.'' We should give them 
that opportunity. They have requested that opportunity. Some people say 
if we do that, think of the consequences. I think that is important. We 
should think of the consequences. What will happen? Who is in the best 
situation to make those determinations? I say the people of Bosnia.
  The people of Bosnia are saying they are going to ask the U.N. so-
called peacekeeping troops to leave. If they wish to do so, let us let 
them do so. If they want to have the ability to be able to protect 
themselves, certainly we should allow them to do that. Senator McCain 
said on the floor last night that there are worse things than dying. 
Certainly if a family is being separated from their loved ones, they 
ought to at least have the opportunity to be able to fight for their 
families. We are not giving them that. We have given them a false 
umbrella called the U.N. safekeeping area, safe haven, and they have 
not proven to be safe. Surely we owe it to those individuals to allow 
them to be able to protect themselves. We have not done that under this 
administration.
  As a candidate, President Clinton said he wanted to lift the embargo. 
They have made a couple of failed attempts. To me, again, that shows 
real lack of leadership. They made an attempt through the United 
Nations early in 1993 to have a multilateral lifting of the embargo. 
But it was not successful.
  What happened between this and the previous administration when we 
had a world crisis in the Persian Gulf with the Bush administration? 
They were able to pass U.N. resolutions and enforce those U.N. 
resolutions. They had teeth. They had respect, and we were successful 
in getting our allies in the United Nations--and some people who you 
would not consider our allies in the United Nations--to support those 
resolutions to expel Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis from Kuwait. We 
built up a worldwide effort and community to oppose his aggression, to 
finance the opposition to that aggression and militarily put the forces 
together to repel that aggression. We passed U.N. resolutions, and we 
enforced those resolutions.
  This administration 2 years later is not able to convince our allies 
to lift the embargo and, instead, is leading us down a road to surely 
significant U.S. military involvement, which I know has not been stated 
as the intention of this administration. Now they say, ``Well, if we 
lift the embargo, the U.N. troops are going to leave, and surely then 
it would be Americanization of the war.'' Why? Because this 
administration said we will supply 25,000 troops to get the U.N. troops 
out. So now we have U.S. ground troop involvement in Bosnia. Where did 
they come up with the 25,000 troops?
  Madam President, 2 years ago when we had this debate on the floor and 
I was arguing against delegating U.S. authority to the United Nations, 
I was quoting administration sources that said they wanted to commit 
25,000 troops to an international peacekeeping force in the former 
Yugoslavia. I argued against that. Yet, that is what this 
administration is trying to do. They said, ``Well, we have already made 
a commitment.'' Even when they made that public announcement of, ``Yes, 
we will put U.S. forces in for the withdrawal,'' a few weeks ago for 
the relocation of U.N. peacekeeping forces, where did that come from? 
They said, ``Well, we were continuing with the commitment of the Bush 
administration.'' That is not the case. That is not factual. The Bush 
administration never committed putting United States ground forces into 
the former Yugoslavia for any reason, not relocation of troops, not the 
extrication of the U.N. troops, not for any reason. They did say, 
``Yes, we might have some air support'' for protection, or cover, or 
for whatever reason, but they did not say we would be putting in ground 
troops.
  The Prime Minister of Bosnia has said, ``Why do you need 25,000 
troops?'' Almost all of the U.N. troops are on the Bosnian Government's 
land, Moslem controlled, not Serb controlled area. I think they said 30 
or 60 U.N. troops might be under the control of the Serbs. Why do we 
need 25,000 troops to get them out?
  So I want to make it perfectly clear, I support the resolution 
lifting the arms embargo. I do not support the 25,000 troops that 
President Clinton made without consulting with Congress, certainly in 
contradiction to the previous administration's commitment in 
Yugoslavia. I do not think you need 25,000 troops to get U.N. troops 
out. Those are troops. They can get out. They have the capability of 
getting out. Why make this kind of unilateral commitment, ``Well, if 
they are going to get out, we have to make a commitment to help them 
get out?'' The Bosnian Government said they are going to ask them to 
leave; they have not been a help; they have not been a positive factor 
concerning this.
  I will read a couple of quotes by the Bosnian Foreign Minister:

       I emphasize once again that we are not asking for foreign 
     troops to come to Bosnia. I emphasize once again that we are 
     only prepared to count on ourselves and no one else.

  This is July 17 of this year.
  He also said, and I quote this.

       * * * it's my assessment that you don't really need these 
     NATO troops and certainly not these U.S. troops. The reason 
     is that when these plans were drawn up, they were drawn up 
     under worst case scenarios--number one, assuming a large 
     number of U.N. and Serb controlled territory, and number two, 
     assuming that Bosnian civilians would, somehow, prevent the 
     U.N. troops from leaving.
       Well, on the first point, there are almost no U.N. troops 
     left on Serb-controlled territory. They have all withdrawn to 
     government-controlled territory; effectively, now, it is 
     government troops that are protecting them, and we are ready 
     to let them leave. As for Bosnian civilians preventing the 
     U.N. from leaving, they've seen what the U.N. has done for 
     them in Srebrenica, what it's doing for them in Zepa, what it 
     needs to do for them in Gorazde, and, frankly, what it needs 
     to do for them in Sarajevo. It's not a heck of a lot. I think 
     most of the Bosnian civilians--I think all, frankly--would be 
     glad to see the U.N. forces leave.

  That was made July 18, 1995.
  So basically the Bosnian Foreign Minister has said they are going to 
be asking the U.N. forces to leave. They have not helped. The safe 
areas have not. They are not safe. We have seen what happened in 
Srebrenica and Zepa. They are afraid of what is going to happen in 
Sarajevo. They are asking. And we have a letter on our desk that said:

       Please. I am writing to you today to once again appeal to 
     the American people and the government to lift the illegal 
     and the immoral arms embargo on our people.
       Today's vote is a vote for human life. It is a vote for 
     right against wrong. It is not about politics. It is about 
     doing the right thing.

  He basically says, ``Let us defend ourselves.'' So why have a 
commitment of 25,000 troops? He said, ``We are going to let the troops 
out.'' The troops can get out. Do we have to get their equipment out? 
We are going to risk 25,000 troops to get out U.N. equipment? I do not 
think that equipment is worth it. 

[[Page S10669]]

  What happens when some forces happen to shoot down U.S. transport 
helicopters or destroy military equipment or personnel get locked in, 
or if they capture more pilots and they hold those captive and hostage? 
What are we going to do then? We are probably going to send in more 
troops to make sure we get them out.
  In other words, the Bosnian people are not asking for United States 
forces. They are not asking that we send troops. Let us not do it. I 
think it would be a mistake. I think the administration made a mistake 
when they unilaterally said, oh, yes, we will commit 25,000 U.S. forces 
for the extrication of the U.N. forces. I think that is a mistake. And 
so I am going to be very clear that while I support the lifting of the 
arms embargo, I do not support U.S. ground forces to pull out the U.N. 
forces that were probably there by mistake in the first place.
  Madam President, let us allow the Bosnians to defend themselves. Let 
us lift this embargo. This embargo was placed on the entire country of 
Yugoslavia, not on the nation of Bosnia. Bosnia has been recognized by 
the United Nations. It has been recognized by the United States. Maybe 
that was a mistake. But that was in 1991. Surely, they have a right to 
defend themselves as a sovereign country.
  Madam President, further vacillations from this administration, which 
said in the past they are in favor of lifting the embargo but has been 
so ineffective in getting other countries to join us, is very 
regrettable. We need strong leadership in the United States, and we 
have not seen it. So it is with some regret I say that we are really 
refuting the President's policy, but it needs to be refuted.
  I think we have serious mistakes that have been made in the former 
Yugoslavia, and as a result you see a real decline of United States 
leadership, United States prestige, United States influence, not only 
in Europe but I am afraid throughout the world. As to our ability in 
the United Nations, think of where we were under both the Reagan and 
Bush administrations when we had a great deal of influence in the 
United Nations where we were the leaders, where we were the leader, and 
now to see we do not have the capability to convince the allies to lift 
the embargo I think shows a real impotence by the United States, a real 
loss of prestige and influence on our allies. I regret that. I do not 
want that to happen. I do not care who is President.
  This is a serious vote, one of the more serious votes we will have 
had in this body, and it is one that I do not relish--having 
congressional dictation of foreign policy. Many times that can be a 
mistake. But, Madam President, this administration's foreign policy has 
been a disaster. It has been a real disaster for the people of Bosnia. 
We need to change course. I think lifting the arms embargo is the first 
step.
  And again, I wish to congratulate Senator Dole and Senator Lieberman 
and others who have had the persistence to bring this forward, 
particularly Senator Dole, because, as I mentioned earlier in my 
comments, I went to the former Yugoslavia with him and I saw his 
persistence in trying to stand up for what he felt was right in helping 
the people who are really oppressed--at the time the people in Kosovo. 
I compliment him for that tenacity. And looking back, since we have 
been involved in amendments in the Chamber since 1990, this is not just 
about Presidential politics, as some people have alluded. This is much 
more important than that.
  I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I thank the Chair.
  Let me say at the outset that this is a most difficult issue. I have 
heard my colleagues over the last number of days talking about the 
Bosnian situation express I think during the remarks a degree of 
anguish. It is a policy that began to evolve prior to the arrival of 
this administration, with serious and difficult questions under the 
administration of President Bush, and this administration has obviously 
wrestled with them as well. I think in fact that my colleagues by and 
large during the expression of their remarks have also expressed a 
recognizable degree of uncertainty over which is the best course of 
action to follow.
  And so with that in mind, let me begin by saying the obvious to all 
of us. Under our Constitution, the Senate plays a unique and important 
role in the conduct of foreign policy. In exercising our 
responsibilities, we bear an individual and collective obligation--to 
do that which is in the best interests of our country. We are Senators 
of the United States and no other nation. This is our most important 
priority.
  That is not to say there may be other considerations, but they must 
always be secondary, always secondary, Madam President, to the 
interests of our country, the United States.
  It is not uncommon obviously for Members of this body to arrive at 
entirely different conclusions regarding what those best interests may 
be. That is obviously the case with the conflict in Bosnia.
  I respect deeply my colleagues who have concluded that the United 
Nations should leave Bosnia and the arms embargo be lifted, thus giving 
the beleaguered people of Bosnia the chance to defend themselves. I 
have nothing but the highest respect for them and the conclusions that 
they have drawn.
  If, however, the only consideration were whether the victims, the 
Bosnian Moslems, should be able to fight back, then I believe the 
conclusion we would reach would be a simple one.
  Unfortunately, the implications of removing U.N. forces and lifting 
the embargo could, could produce, Madam President, profound effects on 
the United States, on NATO, our most important strategic alliance, on 
other significant allies, on the nations and peoples neighboring 
Bosnia, and on the innocent people of Bosnia themselves, who have 
already suffered so much.
  Just as the original decision, no matter how lamentable in hindsight, 
to impose the embargo and introduce U.N. forces triggered certain 
events, the tragic results of which we are witnessing today, so, too, 
could the decision to lift and leave create unwelcome results tomorrow. 
No matter how much we may wish to undo the mistakes of the past 3 
years, let us not compound those mistakes by plunging into greater ones 
today.
  The stakes, Madam President, are far too high and, in my view, the 
price far too dear. The obvious guilt that some people feel over the 
bloodstained land of Bosnia should not be equated with, in my view, the 
paralysis that afflicted Western leaders in the 1930's. Remember, six 
decades ago the world literally sat idly and watched the cruel advance 
of fascism. Whatever else may have been done wrong in Bosnia, we have 
not been mere observers to Serbian genocide.
  Significant military, diplomatic, and political efforts have been 
tried to end the horror of Bosnia. It is totally wrong and profoundly 
dangerous, in my view, to our future interests to imply that Western 
leaders have once again been mere spectators to naked aggression.
  It is a legitimate criticism, however, to suggest that more thought, 
far more thought should have been given to those earlier decisions and 
the likely Serbian reaction to them. But our failure to have been 
thoughtful once on Bosnia, in my view, is no justification for making 
the same mistakes again.
  As we vie with one another to find new and more dramatic language to 
express our moral outrage over Serbian aggression, we have not even 
begun to exhaust our vocabulary. In my view, the worst is yet to come. 
For all that will be left in the pitiful land called Bosnia are two 
highly armed forces, locked in a death struggle with no regard for 
anyone who happens to be in their way, including, I fear, their own 
people.
  I know my colleagues are impatient over this issue. It has gone on 
far too long. I know that my colleagues are horrified over the 
sickening atrocities. I know, Madam President, my colleagues are 
frustrated with the pathetic failure of the status quo policy. And I 
know my colleagues want to move on to other issues that we must try to 
resolve. My concern, Madam President, is that we are about to act out 
of passion at what we are witnessing in Bosnia, rather than acting 
after 

[[Page S10670]]
careful analysis of what may be the unintended results of our 
legislative action.
  Madam President, I pose the following six questions for my colleagues 
to consider before casting their vote on this vitally important 
resolution.
  First, are we prepared to commit 20,000 to 25,000 United States 
ground forces to the Bosnian battlefield with the full knowledge, the 
full knowledge, that there are those who will seek to involve us in 
their cause?
  Second, are we prepared to witness the collapse of multilateral 
embargoes we have engineered against Iraq, Libya, and Iran, not to 
mention the added difficulty we will have in leading and fashioning 
such future efforts?
  Third, are we prepared to accept a deep and lasting fissure in the 
most vital and strategic alliance our Nation has anywhere in the world 
at the very hour, at the very hour that alliance faces uncertainty from 
Russia and the New Independent States which are staggering under the 
crippling economic, political, social, and military burdens?
  Fourth, are we prepared to accept the likely broad-based political 
hostility from the people of our two oldest and most dependable allies 
in the world?
  Fifth, do we accept the clear responsibility of our country if the 
lift-and-leave proposals in this resolution occur and the cancerous 
conflict of Bosnia spreads to the other Balkan States?
  Sixth, and lastly, Madam President, what are we prepared to propose 
if the war in Bosnia escalates and today's mind-wrenching scenes are 
paled by comparison as thousands more innocent Bosnians are raped, 
murdered, cleansed, and left destitute?
  Madam President, I do not argue that any or all of these questions 
can be answered with certainty if this resolution is adopted, but nor, 
Madam President, can those who propose this resolution argue that these 
results will never occur. The issue then must be which course poses the 
greater risk when the possible results are weighed against each other. 
The answer, I believe, is clear.
  Gnashing our teeth over the current mess in Bosnia does not justify 
placing other vital interests of our country at risk not to mention the 
risk to the very people that this resolution seeks to deliver from 
harm's way.
  Having concluded that this resolution should be rejected, Madam 
President, let me quickly add that I do not believe a continuation of 
the status quo is any more acceptable for many of the same reasons. The 
U.N. forces must be permitted in my view to fight back and fight back 
aggressively on the ground in the face of Serbian offensives. The role 
of these forces as nothing more than armed crossing guards is 
untenable. These troops are some of the best trained troops in the 
world. These troops have been trained to do one thing, Madam President. 
We ought to allow them to do it, that is, fight.
  NATO's airstrikes are also critical in my view. Alone they will not 
complete the job, but in conjunction with an aggressive effort on the 
ground these targeted airstrikes on essential military targets could, I 
think, be decisive.
  Madam President, President George Bush, to his everlasting credit, 
showed the world how future conflicts of this kind should be addressed; 
namely, by building international alliances and cooperation, no easy 
task indeed. President George Bush demonstrated in my view how 
effective the civilized world can be in handling these international 
thugs and simultaneously protecting our own vital interests.
  This is not to say, Madam President, that every situation that 
threatens U.S. interests must only be addressed through international 
measures. That would be foolish. But where international burden sharing 
can be achieved, it should be sought.
  What a great tragedy it would be if in the very first real test of 
the Bush doctrine it was the United States led by President Bush's own 
party that walked away and left our allies on their own. Can, Madam 
President, the United States, the only superpower on Earth, accept the 
burden and mantle of leadership the world anticipates from us? The 
answer to that question does not reside alone on 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue. Madam President, it resides in this Chamber on this day. It 
resides with each and every one of us who bear the obligation bestowed 
by our Constitution and constituents as U.S. Senators. That obligation, 
Mr. President, sometimes means casting a vote that is politically 
difficult but necessary to protect U.S. national interests. This is 
clearly in my view one of those moments. And I urge the rejection of 
the proposal.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator, Mr. President, remain for just a brief 
question or two?
  Mr. DODD. Certainly.
  Mr. WARNER. I listened very carefully to your rendition of the six 
questions. I am prepared to work on that. But I listened as you said 
them, and I think I got your words accurately with reference to the 
NATO forces. ``They should fight back. They are the finest troops in 
the world.''
  I agree that they are the finest troops in the world. But, Mr. 
President, roughly speaking there are only 10,000 of the rapid reaction 
force that have been brought in. They are the ones and the first ones 
that have been equipped to engage in defensive operations and offense 
if the Senator's recommendation were to be adopted.
  But my first question to you, there are roughly 10,000 French, 
British, and Dutch. My understanding is but a fourth or a third of 
those are actually in the region at this time. That is a relatively 
small force. Some have moved into the Sarajevo area. The Senator 
suggests that suddenly this force can wheel into action and adequately 
deter the overwhelming forces of the Bosnian Serbs. I find that 
unrealistic.
  Mr. DODD. Well, I presume that is a question.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. I will try and respond. Let me say I have great respect for 
my colleague from Virginia's knowledge in matters affecting NATO and 
military affairs.
  I really point out, as I said, I think the status quo is unacceptable 
and that in my view a better alternative would be to give these forces 
who are well-trained, some of the best trained in the world, the 
opportunity to respond.
  Last evening our colleague from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, spoke with 
eloquence, I believe, in describing a series of events where NATO 
forces, officers, with far fewer numbers than their Serbian aggressors 
handled the situations militarily in several instances that have not 
been widely reported but should be known by people because the 
assumption I think that is developing is that these soldiers that are 
there are cowards unwilling to fight. In fact when they have been 
placed in those situations, they have done a remarkably fine job.
  Now whether or not the balance in the equation of forces is such that 
these troops could presently handle the extensive aggression by the 
Serbians is a legitimate question. But I think it begs the issue of 
whether or not it makes more sense to try and free up that force and 
let them do the job. I happen to believe, having read the U.N. 
resolutions, that there is enough flexibility in that language that 
these forces could be far more aggressive without going back to the 
Security Council and seeking broader authority for them to act. So if 
the issue is merely getting more troops in to do the job, then it seems 
to me that would be a better course of action to follow, I say to my 
colleague, than the issue of leaving to the Bosnians the unilateral 
decision to ask these troops to leave, lifting that embargo on weapons, 
under the assumption that during that period of time that there will 
not be even a broader, wider spread of aggression than we are presently 
seeing today.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from 
Connecticut refers to the U.N. resolutions which he, who is indeed a 
very experienced and knowledgeable Member of the Senate as it relates 
to the United Nations and other matters, the Senator thinks they lend 
themselves to interpretation.
  Mr. President, I say why were not they written clearly in the first 
instance? That is one of the major problems we have here is the lack of 
clarity, the lack of understanding of who has the authority to use 
force.
  The headlines in today's paper start out with: ``NATO Gives U.N. 
Officials Veto on Airstrikes in Bosnia.'' 

[[Page S10671]]

  Is that the type of chain of command that the Senator from 
Connecticut is suggesting can resolve this conflict?
  Mr. DODD. My colleague from Virginia, Mr. President, will have no 
argument with this Senator over whether or not there have been serious 
blunders made over the last few years. I do not think necessarily we 
advance our cause by engaging in the kind of 20/20 hindsight with which 
no one is going to argue.
  I quickly state, and my colleague from Connecticut is here, who is 
one of the principal authors of this resolution, had this body and 
others followed the advice of my colleague from Connecticut several 
years ago, I suspect we would not be here today engaged in this debate. 
I am not debating that point at all.
  The points I tried to raise and, again, I believe probably a few 
other Members appreciate and understand the one particular point I 
tried to raise, and that is NATO. I do not think there has been another 
Member of this body over the past quarter of a century who has stood 
more often and fought harder to maintain the vital concern of that 
alliance.
  My fear is, and it is shared, that we may do damage to that alliance 
at the moment when it is critically important we do everything possible 
to shore up that alliance. I cannot say with certainty that will 
happen. I do not buy the rhetoric in every case of those who suggest 
this is an absolute certainty.
  But when I balance and weigh the risks between jeopardizing that 
relationship and the situation as it presently exists, I come down on 
the side of caution rather than running the risk of looking back and 
regretting deeply, in the legitimate call of doing something different 
than we are doing, placing in harm's way that most strategic alliance.
  That is not the only reason I argue, but it seems to me we have to be 
careful, no matter how disappointed and how angry and how legitimately 
upset people are over what we are watching night after night, day after 
day with the human tragedy unfolding in Bosnia.
  As tragic as all of that is, my deep concern is that in our resolve 
to answer those mistakes, we will make additional ones, in fact, fall 
prey to the same thing that occurred several years ago when we should 
have thought--I think my colleague from Connecticut yesterday in an 
eloquent set of remarks pointed out the people are well intentioned. I 
do not think he was arguing they were motivated by malevolence, but 
honestly thought, I guess, if you impose an embargo on the Bosnian 
Moslems, somehow that was going to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the 
negotiating table.
  I do not think anybody had a corrupt intent with that in particular, 
except maybe the Serbians themselves, but it did not work. We did not 
think it through carefully.
  Now the situation is different than at that particular moment. There 
is a lot more involved in the decisions we make than just the decision 
to go in or not. That is why I express that concern.
  I will be honest with my two colleagues, this is really the first 
time I have spoken on this issue, because as I said to my colleague, 
this has been gnawing at me over what steps to take. I envy those who 
months ago, except those who have worked for years on this, came to a 
snappy conclusion on this. I think most of my constituents are deeply 
concerned and confused as to what is the best course to follow.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me speak for myself. I have not come 
to a quick, snappy decision. For 2 years plus I opposed the 
distinguished majority leader and my good friend from Connecticut 
steadfastly and have taken many of the positions that the senior 
Senator from Connecticut has taken.
  Mr. DODD. No, I respect that.
  Mr. WARNER. But I have changed my view because I think we can no 
longer, as a body, as the U.S. Senate, sit by idly. We have to take the 
initiative. The drafters of the resolution which is presently before us 
have radically changed from their earlier positions to where now they 
recognize there are a certain set of triggering mechanisms that should 
bring about the action sought; namely, the very basic right of people 
to defend themselves with such arms as they may require.
  Here are today's dispatches:

       Thousands of terrified Bosnian refugees poured out of the 
     captured enclave of Zepa today.

  A safe haven which we basically demilitarized, took away the arms, 
thinking that for some reason, the Bosnian Serbs would honor the U.N. 
declaration that this was a safe haven. These people relied--relied, 
Mr. President--on what had been represented to them by the United 
Nations.
  Despite the efforts to try to get clarity of chain of command and 
control, here is today's New York Times, if I may just read a 
paragraph:

       Four days after the United States, Britain, and France 
     threatened the Bosnian Serbs with the heaviest airstrikes yet 
     if they attacked the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, NATO 
     officials said early this morning that they had agreed that 
     no large-scale bombing could start unless United Nations 
     civilian officials gave the go-ahead.

  Clearly, again, the dual key. We just continue to go along 
indecisively as a partner to this decisionmaking between the United 
Nations and NATO. It is time, Mr. President, it is time some body 
politic in this world stood up and said, ``This is the course of action 
we can take,'' and that option is now before the U.S. Senate this very 
morning. In a matter of 3 hours, we will cast a vote which I hope will 
be heard around the world as this is the policy that should be followed 
henceforth. I commend the distinguished majority leader and the junior 
Senator from Connecticut for taking this action.
  Mr. President, I thank my good friend and colleague, the senior 
Senator. We have worked together. We have traveled together on many 
issues relating to foreign affairs. While I regret he cannot at this 
point in time join, I hope that in the future there will be other 
opportunities when we can work together once again. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to make a comment in regard to 
the story in the New York Times today referred to by my friend from 
Virginia, and to talk more broadly for a moment about some of the 
understandable and very sincere statements that my senior colleague 
from Connecticut made about the impact of our actions today on our NATO 
allies.
  We have been in a historic alliance with the French and British, one 
of the great alliances of history, which successfully thwarted the 
advance of Soviet troops into Europe and beyond, and the cold war.
  Part of what is being played out here--and I do not use that verb 
lightly--in the former Yugoslavia is the extent to which this great 
alliance, NATO, remains viable, the extent to which we have common 
interests or acknowledge that we have common interests, both in 
protecting stability in Europe and in having NATO be a force for 
stability in the world, which we continue to need.
  Mr. President, the last two American administrations, the Bush 
administration, Republican, and the Clinton administration, Democratic, 
have either agreed with or gone along with our allies in Europe, 
particularly the British and the French, in their vision of what was 
happening in Yugoslavia and what they ought to do and ought not to do 
to try to stop it.
  From the beginning, there has been a group of us in Congress on a 
bipartisan basis that has disagreed with the position of the 
administrations, the Bush and Clinton administrations, and our allies 
particularly in Britain and France. As I have said before, this is a 
Democratic administration, obviously, but Senator Dole stood with me, 
and I with him and with many others of both parties during the Bush 
administration in criticizing that administration for standing by and 
letting this arms embargo continue to be imposed, particularly in 
response to the appeals of our allies of Britain and France.
  President Clinton ran for office, as we have said, critical of the 
Bush administration for its weakness in Bosnia, urging the policy of 
lifting the arms embargo and then striking from the air. He came into 
office with that policy. A lot of Members had a high sense of hope. But 
as this debate has gone on, people say if you vote for this Dole-
Lieberman proposal there will be more bloodshed, the war will be 
Americanized. 

[[Page S10672]]

  We have rebutted that and we will again. Do we not have a 
responsibility to listen to the people whose blood has been shed? What 
gives us the sense of presumptuousness, of moral paternalism, to say to 
these people who have lost 200,000 lives, that we are worried that what 
we are about to do, which they want us to do, give them the weapons to 
defend themselves, will shed more of their blood?
  That is preposterous. It is outrageous. Think how we would feel if we 
were on the other side of this tragedy, attacked, having lost a 
substantial percentage of our population, watching our families 
separated, men in this direction, women in that direction, women raped, 
men slaughtered, refugees all around, torn from our homes because of 
our religion.
  How would we feel in trying to fight back against these tanks and 
heavy artillery, with light weapons on our side, if the world not only 
stood by and watched this slaughter occurring, but it continued to 
impose an embargo that meant we could not make it a fair fight, that we 
could not stand up and fight for our families.
  Mr. President, these excuses that have been given are really, to me, 
unacceptable. The Americanization of the war--we have responded to that 
as we have gone along, too; but what remains is the fact that as we 
look at this history, we continue to impose this illegal arms embargo.
  Let me go back to the NATO allies. The allies talked Secretary 
Christopher out of the lift-and-strike position. The allies had a few 
months before, earlier in 1992, as a result of the first understanding 
of the atrocities being committed in Europe, the ITN British television 
crews going into the concentration camps--I cannot call them anything 
else. They called them ``detention camps'' at that time--emaciated 
bodies of men, clearly starving.
  Yesterday, the International Tribunal in the Hague, authorized by the 
United Nations, indicted the President of the Bosnian Serbs, Mr. 
Karadzic and his chief of staff, General Mladic. Among the elements of 
the indictment is the operation of these detention camps and 
slaughtering of people.
  Europeans at that point, very much on their own, felt pressure from 
world opinion. We, too, instead of responding with the basic and 
fundamental policy that at long last--this is 1992--give these victims, 
the Bosnians, the weapons with which to fight back. We did not do that. 
We maintained the embargo. And instead of using NATO air power to 
punish the Serbs for their aggression and genocide, what did we do? We 
sent in--we, at the urging of the Western European allies--sent in the 
United Nations on a peacekeeping mission where there was no peace, 
misusing the brave soldiers--British, French, Dutch, Bangladeshi, 
Jordanian, a whole host of countries that are there, Malaysian--sending 
them into combat without adequate weapons themselves, making a mistake 
for which we will pay for a long time, bringing the United Nations down 
because of the outrageous mission. That was the decision that was 
supported and led by our allies in Europe.
  Allies are just like members of the same family--you have 
disagreements. It is a test of the strength of the family and a test of 
the strength of this alliance as to whether we can transcend the 
disagreement and go on and be allies.
  Understand how this happened--the British and French led the drive to 
send in the United Nations to assert their own ability to deal with 
this problem in Europe. It was dealt with in a way that was ambivalent.
  ``If the sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow into 
battle?'' Remember the words of the Scripture. The sound of that 
trumpet was extremely uncertain. No one followed in the battle except 
the Serbs who saw the weakness and continued the aggression.
  The policy has continued. The strength of rejection of the policy has 
grown on a bipartisan basis here in Congress. That is what, I think, 
will be expressed later today.
  Now the latest excuse for not acting--at every step we were told, 
Senator Dole and I, ``Do not lift the arms embargo, they will seize 
hostages, U.N. personnel.'' The embargo has not been lifted, and 
hostages were seized. ``Do not lift the embargo, they will attack the 
safe havens.'' We did not lift the embargo, they attacked the safe 
havens. The latest excuse is the London communique, an agreement, an 
expression of strength by the NATO allies to use the might of NATO air 
power, a warning to the Serbs: Attack Gorazde and you will pay the 
price. As I have said here before in the last 3 or 4 days, a threat, 
not a policy to end the war, and a limited threat at that. Only going 
to one of the four so-called safe areas is sending a clear signal to 
the Serbs that the other three are open season. In fact, in the last 3 
or 4 days, that is exactly what they have done, attacked Sarajevo, 
Tuzla, and particularly, Bihac. OK, a limited threat, but at least a 
threat with regard to Gorazde.
  At least the assertion coming out of the meetings that the dual-key 
approach was over, that we no longer had to go to the United Nations, 
that NATO had finally taken control, and this great alliance was 
working, together, to stop aggression, instability in Europe, and 
genocide, once again, in this century, against a people, because of 
their religion.
  What do we find? Today is Wednesday, 5 days later. Exactly what my 
friend and colleague, Senator Warner from Virginia, has said. 
Apparently, it was not as strong a message from London. Apparently, the 
dual-key approach, where soldiers on the ground have to go to the U.N. 
politicians to get approval, and over and over, they have gone and been 
refused the right to strike back at those who are shooting at them.
  I will read from the article in today's New York Times written from 
Brussels by Craig Whitney.

       Far from doing away with the cumbersome ``dual-key'' 
     arrangement that the United States says has hampered NATO's 
     ability to protect United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, 
     the NATO allies in effect have sided with the United Nations 
     Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has been saying 
     nobody could take his key away from him.
       The allies agreed to make what one NATO official called a 
     ``strong recommendation'' to Mr. Boutros-Ghali to leave it to 
     his military field commanders on the ground in Gorazde and 
     elsewhere to decide when the time had come to start bombing 
     the Serbs if they attacked.

  Imagine this. We have gotten ourselves in a position where the 
strongest military alliance in the world today must make a plea to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations to allow this strong alliance 
to strike back at countries, at soldiers, that are not only attacking 
civilians in safe areas, but are attacking NATO soldiers.
  Continuing:

       But since Mr. Boutros-Ghali has been extremely cautious 
     about approving airstrikes in the past, what was meant to 
     sound like a roar in London 4 days ago appeared likely to 
     have been throttled down to something more like a growl by 
     the time NATO ambassadors finished grappling with it in the 
     small hours of Wednesday morning.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will look at that article, there is the 
paragraph that deserves to be noted. It says as follows:

       The main pressure to preserve a decision-making role for 
     Mr. Boutros-Ghali came from Britain and France. With nearly 
     15,000 soldiers on the ground in Bosnia who could suffer the 
     consequences if bombing and Serb reactions to it spiral out 
     of control, the countries pressed, in effect, for a series of 
     political firewalls against precipitate American action from 
     the air.

  Then the next paragraph.

       In particular, French officials deny [I repeat deny] that 
     they ever agreed last Friday in London to launch 
     automatically what the American Secretary of Defense William 
     Perry called a ``disproportionate response'' to an attack on 
     Gorazde.

  The U.S. Senate was highly influenced by the comments of the 
Secretary of Defense. I think he is a very fine and able individual. I 
do not know what the background is to this. He, along with the 
Secretary of State, were present yesterday in the Halls of the Senate. 
I met with both briefly.
  But I find it very disconcerting when our allies undercut what 
Secretary Perry thought was a decision reached last week, and he 
personally was present at that time.
  So I think that again we come back to who is going to make a decision 
in this frightful situation? I say the responsibility comes now to this 
body politic as the sole one in the world 

[[Page S10673]]
willing to step up at this time and speak decisively on this critical 
issue.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely 
right. Yesterday, I was in a meeting with the Democratic Senators which 
Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher addressed. I have the highest 
regard for both of them.
  It is clear to me--I know they are acting with the best of intentions 
and sincerity here--that the policy they took and fought so hard for 
last week in London, and it appeared that they thought was adopted, was 
clearly not what the British and the French are willing to accept. The 
paragraph that the Senator from Virginia read is exactly where I was 
going, which is to say that our allies, presumably having accepted a 
policy in London on Friday, then at the NATO Ministers' meeting in 
Brussels yesterday have undercut it and set up Mr. Boutros-Ghali as 
their instrument to frustrate that.
  I must say that I do not understand it because they do have troops on 
the ground. They are the ones who are most vulnerable if the NATO 
allies are not able to strike back against Serbian aggression. When 
will they understand that the Serbs will take the--who is smiling, who 
is laughing most at this story from Brussels? The Serbs are. The 
signals are clear. ``Do what you want with the three of the four 
remaining areas, `safe areas,' incredulously titled today. And as for 
Gorazde, don't worry too much about attacking that either eventually 
because the West does not have its act together.'' That was just a 
toothless tiger roaring, or growling, as the article in the Times today 
said, from London.
  I want to make two points about this. The first is to my colleagues 
who are going to vote in a few hours, and it is an important vote. 
Please read this article. Then I simply do not know how any colleague 
in good conscience could say that the policy emanating from the London 
communique is a reason not to vote to lift the arms embargo. This sense 
that somehow the calvary was coming and, therefore, the victims do not 
need to defend themselves is not so. It is simply not so. That is not a 
reason to sustain this illegal, immoral arms embargo.
  The second point is, and let us acknowledge it, that we continue to 
have a fundamental difference of opinion--that is, the bipartisan 
majority here in the Senate, bipartisan majority in the other body--
with our allies in Britain and France. Let us acknowledge it. We 
acknowledge it.
  I do not understand how our Western European allies, having gone 
through two world wars in Europe this century because aggression was 
not stopped early, can stand by and not see that they have an interest 
in stopping aggression here before it goes on to Kosovo, and then to 
Macedonia, which will bring in Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, 
and in the worst of all circumstances will create truly another tragic 
wider war in the Balkans. But they have apparently not reached that 
conclusion.
  Let us acknowledge here what we are saying. We disagree with our 
allies. Let us acknowledge also that that disagreement puts in doubt, 
sadly unsettlingly, the viability of this great alliance.
  I think we have to figure out a way to disagree within the family and 
still remain strong. We have to figure out a way. Looking back in 
hindsight I wish that both the Bush and Clinton administrations had 
figured out a way to lead our NATO allies to a stronger policy, the 
policy of lifting the embargo and striking from the air. I truly 
believe that if we had implemented that policy in 1992, the war would 
be over today. A settlement would have been reached because the Serbs 
finally would have been given a reason to stop their aggression.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could the Senator forbear for a moment?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. We have but a few moments left.
  The Senator from Connecticut raised a very clear point. In today's 
New York Times--and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record certain backup documents to this important colloquy.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 U.S. Department of State--Press Briefing by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
            of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, July 21, 1995

       Secretary Christopher. Good evening. On behalf of the 
     entire United States delegation, I want to thank Prime 
     Minister Major for convening today's conference and Foreign 
     Secretary Rifkind for his very skillful chairmanship.
       None of us is under any illusion about today's meeting. By 
     now we're all too aware that no conference, including this 
     one, can end the war and suffering in the former Yugoslavia. 
     What a conference of this kind can do is to focus our minds 
     on how we can best contribute to alleviating suffering and 
     achieving a negotiated settlement. This conference has served 
     as a decision-forcing event. As I told my colleagues today, 
     the entire world is watching us, waiting to see if the West 
     will answer the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous aggression.
       We face a very simple and stark choice: either the 
     international community rapidly takes firm steps to fulfill 
     its mission in Bosnia or its mission will collapse. Today we 
     have agreed on several actions which, if vigorously 
     implemented, offer a real opportunity to reassert the 
     international community's role in Bosnia.
       Let me stress the obvious: to have any chance of success 
     the decisions made today must be translated, translated 
     quickly into reality on the ground. President Clinton and the 
     United States are determined to do so. The international 
     community and the people of Bosnia simply cannot afford any 
     more empty threats. Let me briefly review what the United 
     States believes to be the central elements of today's 
     agreement.
       First, the unanimous reaffirmation that UNPROFOR will 
     remain in Bosnia. In order to do so, its ability to fulfill 
     its mandate will be strengthened. We are all painfully aware 
     of UNPROFOR's shortcomings. Nevertheless, we agree that 
     UNPROFOR's collapse in the face of Bosnian Serb aggression 
     can only lead to far greater humanitarian tragedy and 
     strategic danger in the Balkans.
       Second, and of most immediate concern. Gorazde will be 
     defended. Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice that an 
     attack against Gorazde will be met by substantial and 
     decisive air power. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili 
     can speak more fully on the military aspects of the plan, but 
     let me make just a couple of points. Any air campaign in 
     Gorazde will include significant attacks on significant 
     targets. There'll be no more pin-prick strikes. Moreover, 
     existing command and control arrangements for use of NATO air 
     power will be significantly adjusted to ensure that 
     responsiveness and unity, our purposes, are achieved. The new 
     system is a much improved system.
       Third, we will take steps to stabilize the situation in 
     Sarajevo. Its people must be fed. French and British troops 
     from the Rapid Reaction Force will take action to open and 
     secure humanitarian access routes. At the same time, we 
     agreed more broadly on the need to fullfill the United 
     Nations other mandates, including that in the other safe 
     areas. In this regard we are especially concerned about the 
     escalating Bosnian Serb attacks in Bihac.
       Fourth, we're agreed on the need to support on-going 
     efforts to address Bosnia's deep humanitarian needs, which 
     have certainly been exacerbated by the fighting in Srebrenica 
     and Zepa. We intend and we are urging others to increase our 
     contribution, especially in advance of the coming winter.
       Fifth, we reaffirmed our belief that the conflict in 
     Yugoslavia can only be resolved by a political settlement. 
     Today we received an update from the European Union's 
     representative Carl Bildt and we underscored our support for 
     this work. Tonight the Contract Group ministers will be 
     meeting with Mr. Bildt to review his political efforts. At 
     the same time, during the conference, I made clear our belief 
     that so long as the Bosnian Serb aggression continues, any 
     political process is doomed to failure. Our first step must 
     be to take action that can return an element of stability on 
     the ground. At that point we agreed that a country wide 
     ceasefire should be declared which can be used as a basis for 
     a resumption of the negotiations.
       Finally, today's participants are fully aware of the risks 
     that will accompany any effort to implement UNPROFOR's 
     mission more vigorously. The Bosnian Serbs have taken 
     hostages before and they may do so again. As part of today's 
     plan, we are urging the United Nations to take steps 
     immediately to minimize the exposure of its personnel. At
      the same time, we're determined that the taking of hostages 
     will no longer be allowed to prevent the implementation of 
     our policies. We are also resolved to hold the Bosnian 
     Serb leaders fully responsible for the safety and 
     personnel of any UN personnel that they have detained.
       Let me say again that President Clinton is committed to 
     working with our partners, all of them--especially France and 
     Britain--to see that the decisions we take today are 
     translated into reality. We do not seek to make the 
     international community a participant in the war in Bosnia, 
     but we're determined to make another, perhaps final effort to 
     fulfill the world's responsibilities in Bosnia. Today's 
     meeting was a necessary first step toward that goal. Now we 
     must act. Thank you.
       I believe that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili 
     will not have opening remarks, 

[[Page S10674]]
     but I'm sure you'll have some questions for them as well as for me.
       Question. Secretary, could you clear up a couple of things? 
     We had been told earlier by our Defense officials that this 
     ultimatum would apply to an attack on Sarajevo as well. And 
     according to Secretary Ritkind, that is not the case. It 
     would only apply, according to the Chairman's statements, to 
     an attack on Gorazde. So could you clear that up, and also 
     could you clarify French claims that there is a commitment of 
     American helicopter lift to bring in troops to Gorazde?
       Secretary Christopher. With respect to the first question, 
     the conference today focused on Gorazde because that seemed 
     to be the area of greatest immediate threat. Having attacked 
     and apparently overcome both the enclaves in Srebrenica and 
     Zepa, the next one evidently on the target list is Gorazde. 
     So we focused our primary concern on that, but at the same 
     time we were concerned about all the safe areas. Now with 
     respect to Sarajevo, the focus there was on the use of Rapid 
     Reaction Force to ensure that there will be opportunities for 
     humanitarian aid to get through. But let me emphasize this: 
     should the Bosnian Serbs launch the kind of shelling attack 
     that they have had on Srebrenica and Zepa, should they launch 
     that kind of attack on other safe areas, these procedures can 
     be promptly applied to those other areas and we stand ready 
     to take the necessary steps to do so. But today's meeting was 
     focused, as the Chairman said, primarily on Gorazde.
       With respect to the other question you asked, as the 
     Chairman's statement indicated, there was an indication on 
     the part of all the participants that the UNPROFOR troops 
     were necessary, would be resupplied, given additional 
     supplies, additional arms if necessary. If that becomes 
     necessary, that can be considered. But there is no commitment 
     on behalf of the United States, at the present time, for the 
     use of helicopters; and I might say there is also no 
     commitment by the United States with respect to ground 
     troops. Our long-standing position on that remains intact.
       Question. I am sorry. You said that there would be no more 
     pinprick attacks and there have been statements here about 
     substantial attacks, I would like to ask Secretary Perry and 
     General Shalikashvili, would these attacks go far beyond 
     Gorazde? In other words do you intend as you said on the 
     airplane to wipe out the Serbs' air defense system and give 
     you freedom in the air over Bosnia and to attack perhaps fuel 
     dumps, ammunition depots and other areas to teach them a 
     lesson?
       Secretary Perry. I don't want to describe the details of 
     the air campaign which we discussed in some detail with our 
     colleagues. But what I will say is that, first of all, it is 
     a phased plan ranging everywhere from close air support for a 
     particular tactical unit on the ground that is being 
     attacked, to a broader regional air campaign; that this would 
     be agreed to in detail, to be drawn out in detail and agreed 
     to between the air commander and the ground commander. In its 
     latter phases it involves an area considerably broader than 
     Gorazde. Would General Shalikashvili perhaps like to add to 
     that?
       General Shalikashvili. I think that you are right, that it 
     is important to understood that these are not just responses 
     against the initial provocation but an air campaign that 
     consists of a wide range of targets throughout a broad zone 
     of operations. That is a significant departure from the way 
     air power was used before.
       Question. And was it agreed that, if hostages were held, 
     that such a campaign would not be stopped by that?
       Secretary Perry. That was an issue that was discussed fully 
     and completely at the meeting. We all understood that the 
     success of a sustained air campaign depended on its being 
     sustained and therefore it could not be deterred and 
     interrupted by hostage taking if that were to occur. We 
     cannot let a policy be hostage to the taking of hostages.
       Question. Do you understand the meeting to have declined to 
     approve, at this point, the use of air power in the case 
     where some other action is taken other than an attack on 
     Gorazde? Will there have to be another meeting if some other 
     action is taken by the Bosnian Serbs in violation of UN 
     mandates?
       Secretary Christopher. David, let me say two things about 
     that. First, the meeting didn't decline to do anything. The 
     meeting was positive in character. Second, there are existing 
     authorities, as you know, for the use of air power in 
     particular circumstances. If additional authority was 
     necessary because the Bosnian Serbs took some other action, 
     we stand ready to do that; but there are broad existing 
     authorities under the UN Security Council at the present time 
     that are available to the NATO authorities. We focused on 
     Gorazde and, as both the Secretary and the General have said, 
     we made fairly specific and detailed plans for an air 
     campaign should it become necessary in
      Gorazde. I think those procedures could be translated into 
     other areas if that becomes necessary.
       Question. Bihac is under attack now, sir, and I wonder why 
     that hasn't been responded to?
       Secretary Christopher. The situation in Bihac is as it has 
     been before, not always entirely clear as to who's doing the 
     attacking and what the circumstances are. We will be watching 
     that very carefully. I think that today's meeting indicates a 
     new level of concern about the situation in Bosnia as a 
     whole. We addressed what we thought was the principal current 
     threat; we will certainly be following Bihac. As I said in my 
     statement, we are very concerned about the escalating attacks 
     there, and we are following it with great care.
       Question. What is the new message to the Serbs?
       Secretary Christopher. The new message to the Serbs is that 
     if you attack--First, the message to the Serbs is you should 
     not attack Gorazde. We are issuing a very strong, stern 
     warning to them which will be communicated in ways in 
     addition to this particular press conference or Foreign 
     Secretary Rifkind's press conference. But beyond that we are 
     saying that if you do attack, you are going to pay an 
     extremely heavy price.
       Question. What price?
       Secretary Christopher. I think that we will leave that to 
     their consideration and imagination.
       Question. Do you think they are quaking in their boots, as 
     somebody else put it earlier at another press conference?
       Secretary Christopher. If they are well advised, they will 
     not attack Gorazde because they will pay a very heavy price.
       Question. I have just been to the press conference by Mr. 
     Kozyrev and the greatest expert on air strikes in the world 
     at the moment, on civilian air strikes, namely General 
     Grachev. They said that they don't agree with any of this and 
     that they haven't been quoted properly, and they attack Mr. 
     Rifkind for not quoting them. Do the Russians have the veto 
     or not?
       Secretary Christopher. The Russians do not have a veto. 
     There is no further action by the United Nations Security 
     Council required for us to take the action that we are going 
     to take today. We are prepared to go forward with the action 
     if necessary. I
      must say that I did not hear the press conference, but 
     Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the General were present in 
     the meeting. They joined us I think in the importance of 
     UNPROFOR staying. They joined us in the significance of 
     the Bosnian Serbs not taking further action--that they 
     should not threaten Gorazde. I think that they realize 
     UNPROFOR is at stake. If Gorazde were to be taken, as the 
     Foreign Secretary said, UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia would 
     be very seriously compromised.
       But to answer your question directly, the action that we've 
     taken today and the agreements that we've reached are not 
     dependent upon Russian concurrence or any Russian vote.
       Question. You said earlier that how the countries with 
     troops on the ground would respond if hostages were taken was 
     fully discussed in the meeting. Do I understand you to mean 
     that you understand clearly that these countries would not 
     request interruption of bombings if this were to take place?
       Secretary Christopher. I can't forecast what any given 
     country would do under some hypothetical situation. But the 
     agreement of the importance of introducing a sustained air 
     campaign was made with the understanding that it had to be 
     sustained even in the face of hostage-taking. This was 
     explicitly discussed and discussed in some detail.
       Question. Secretary Perry, again on your hostage remarks. 
     Does that mean that the allies have to be prepared for the 
     possibility of losing their personnel to a NATO air strike? 
     Did the allies explicitly agree to that?
       Secretary Perry. Could you re-formulate the question? I did 
     not understand the point.
       Question. Your comment on the necessity of sustaining an 
     air campaign, even if hostages are taken: Could we interpret 
     that to mean that the allies must be prepared for the 
     possible loss of their hostages in the event air strikes are 
     authorized? Was it discussed in such explicit detail, and did 
     you get agreement on that point?
       Secretary Perry. First of all, we are not proposing to 
     conduct an air campaign. We are proposing to threaten an air 
     campaign to stop, to deter any action that the Bosnian Serbs 
     might take to attack Gorazde. We hope that will be 
     successful.
       If it is not successful, we are prepared to conduct a 
     sustained air campaign. We understand--everybody at the 
     meeting understands--there would be substantial risks in 
     doing that. The risks would be to the air crews conducting 
     the campaign, the risk would involve UN forces on the ground, 
     the risk would be even to civilians who are in the area of 
     the targets. Those are inherent risks in air campaigns. We 
     all agreed that that was
      an unattractive option, and the only reason we are going to 
     proceed with that option is because the alternatives seem 
     even more unattractive to us. The alternative of letting 
     Gorazde fall, which would drive the UNPROFOR out of 
     Bosnia, would result in a humanitarian catastrophe of 
     great proportions. Therefore, balancing risks, we believe 
     that these risks were far preferable to allowing Gorazde 
     to fall.
       Secretary Christopher. Could I add to Secretary Perry's 
     statement that we are urging the United Nations and we have 
     urged the United Nations already to minimize the exposure of 
     its personnel to limit the possibilities of hostage-taking if 
     it comes to that.
       Question. Yes, I would like to ask you if the results of 
     this meeting and met your hopes and expectations before the 
     meeting and do you think they will be sufficient to restore 
     the credibility of the United Nations mission in Bosnia?
       Secretary Christopher. Yes, I found the meeting to be a 
     successful meeting. It met my hopes and expectations, 
     especially since it was called on short notice and there was 
     the need to try to coalesce the views of many countries in a 
     very short period of time. I 

[[Page S10675]]
     think our working together with the British and French in advance to 
     the meeting, of contacting other countries in advance paved 
     the way for a successful meeting. And incidentally, at the 
     meeting today Foreign Minister Kozyrev also described it as a 
     successful meeting. If the Serbs are wise, the situation in 
     Bosnia will become stabilized and will provide the 
     opportunity for us to try to seek a peaceful negotiated 
     settlement of the matter. In a sense, the matter is in their 
     hands. If they choose to attack Gorazde, as I said, they will 
     suffer very gravely. But it would be a much wiser course for 
     them to withhold those attacks and enter into a peaceful 
     negotiation which is the only ultimate conclusion to this 
     tragic conflict.
       Question. Has it been decided to invite Canada and Italy to 
     join the contact group, both in recognition of their major 
     contributions to peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Bosnia 
     and also to put the contribution of one of the current five, 
     post-Chechnya Russia in more proportionate perspective? And 
     second, given the outspoken support of the World Jewish 
     Congress for Bosnia's Muslims, will you seek technical 
     assistance from the Israelis for an Entebbe-like operation to 
     rescue Karadzic and his mates before they commit further war 
     crimes?
       Secretary Christopher. One thing about it when you get two 
     questions, you can choose which one to answer. With respect 
     to Italy and Canada, there was no discussion about the 
     Contact Group today, but the point I would emphasize here is 
     that both Italy and Canada were very well and openly 
     represented today by the Foreign Minister, the Defense 
     Minister and the chief of their military forces. They 
     participated very actively in the discussions today. They 
     were deeply involved and they will be certainly fully 
     consulted as we move through each one of these further 
     procedures.
       Question: I'd like to ask about the dual key. Secretary 
     Rifkind was saying that he could not conceive of a situation 
     in which General Rupert Smith didn't have a final decision on 
     whether air strikes would be launched. Can you tell us how 
     far up the UN chain of command approval would have to come 
     and who talks to whom in order to approve an air strike?
       Secretary Perry. We discussed that in considerable detail 
     today, and we had at the meeting all of the relevant people. 
     I'd like to refer specifically to General Shalikashvili to 
     give you a more detailed answer to that. I am satisfied that 
     we've made substantial changes much for the better in how 
     that coordination is done. John?
       General Shalikashvili. The procedures we did discuss, as 
     Secretary Perry said, are a very qualitative step forward, 
     and they parallel proper air-ground operations procedures. In 
     such procedures, the appropriate ground commander, General 
     Rupert Smith, and the air commander must continually 
     coordinate to insure that air strikes are carried out safely, 
     but at the same time also very promptly.
       These procedures that we now have represent the second part 
     of your question: how far up does this coordination go in the 
     UNPROFOR chain. The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these 
     coordinations stops with the military commanders.
       Thank you very much.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the New York Times article clearly says 
that NATO officials said early this morning that they had agreed that 
no large-scale bombing could start unless the United Nations ``civilian 
officials'' gave the go ahead. Emphasis ``civilian officials.''
  Now I read from a press conference last Friday, July 22, of Secretary 
of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili. Referring to the last 
page:

       Question: I'd like to ask about the dual key. Secretary 
     Rifkind was saying that he could not conceive of a situation 
     in which General Rupert Smith . . .

  That is the on-scene commander for the UNPROFOR and U.N. troops--

     didn't have a final decision on whether airstrikes would be 
     launched. Can you tell us how far up the UN chain of command 
     approval would have to come and who talks to whom in order to 
     approve an air strike?

  General Shalikashvili replied:

       The procedures we did discuss, as Secretary Perry said, are 
     a very qualitative step forward, and they parallel proper 
     air-ground operations procedures. In such procedures, the 
     appropriate ground commander, General Rupert Smith, and the 
     air commander must continually coordinate to insure that air 
     strikes are carried out safely, but at the same time also 
     very promptly.
       These procedures that we now have represent the second part 
     of your question: How far up does this coordination go in the 
     UNPROFOR chain. The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these 
     coordinations stops with the military commanders.

  Let me repeat that.

       The UNPROFOR chain that is involved in these coordinations 
     stops with the military commanders.

  To me, Mr. President, I clearly get the impression that the on-scene 
military commanders, Gen. Rupert Smith and NATO Commander Admiral 
Smith, are the decisionmakers. That is in direct conflict with what is 
reported today.
  The Senate of the United States is trying to work its way through 
this complex issue. To a certain degree many, including this Senator, 
want to rely on the representations of the three principal security 
officials of the United States, Secretaries of State, Defense, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But their representation to the world in 
this press briefing to the U.S. Senate on July 22 is in direct conflict 
with the reports that we received today.
  So I come back again and again. It is now the time, and the 
obligation of this body politic to make a decision.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely 
right.
  Again, I say to my colleagues, to quote the Scriptures, ``If the 
sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow in the battle?''
  The sound of the trumpet that was sounded in London on Friday is 
extremely uncertain, and there is no reason to use that communique as 
an excuse for not voting to lift the arms embargo.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia continues to 
worsen. Every day brings additional news of Bosnian-Serb troop 
movement, resulting in more chaos, devastation and reports of 
horrendous atrocities. As one so-called safe zone after another is 
overrun, and with refugees streaming out of them, it is obvious to most 
that the Bosnian policy constructed by the United Nations, NATO and the 
American administration has failed.
  If the consequences of the U.N. failure were not so grave, many of 
the scenes we all have witnessed would have to be considered almost 
farcical. United Nations armored personnel carriers being used to ferry 
bicyclists across streets in order to avoid a handful of snipers who 
operate with near impunity--shooting not only at the U.N. personnel--
but at women, children, elderly folks. It's an outrage. Then we witness 
the spectacle of United Nations equipment being taken by the Bosnian-
Serbs as they overrun United Nations positions, and also by the Bosnian 
Moslems in desperate attempts to protect themselves against Serbian 
attacks.
  We have all witnessed these events, Mr. President--and those who 
continue to argue that negotiators require just a little more time need 
to face up to the reality of the situation. There is a deep-seated 
American belief that reasonable individuals--with time and effort--can 
solve even the most intractable of problems. Well, perhaps too many of 
our well intentioned negotiators labored for too long under the false 
impression that we were dealing with reasonable individuals in Pale and 
in Belgrade. The cycle of retaliatory violence confirms the fact that 
there is nothing remotely reasonable about the Bosnian-Serb leaders or 
their counterparts in Belgrade.
  Institutions that tried to prevent further escalation have failed to 
do so--plain and simple. This being the case, it is now time to pursue 
an alternate course of action that will not embroil United States 
ground forces in a conflict that the Bosnian Moslems can best settle on 
their own. The Serbs control 70 percent of Bosnian territory and will 
continue to advance unless the Bosnian Moslems affect a reversal of the 
balance of power through force of arms.
  While the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo may have some 
shortcomings of its own, and could be a costly endeavor, we should no 
longer actively prevent the Bosnian Moslems from defending themselves 
by trying to keep them unarmed.
  However, we should not assume that this decision will not have 
consequences. For example, depending on the sources of the weapons, we 
could be sowing seeds of future difficulties. If the Bosnian Government 
decides to access East European weapons inventories for instance, we do 
not know exactly how the Russians will react.
  Apart from sending weapons directly to the Serbs, the Russians might 
also decide to stem the flow of weapons to the Bosnians by applying 
certain forms of pressure on the East Europeans. 

[[Page S10676]]
Somehow, I have a difficult time imagining that Russia will just sit 
idly by as events unfold which are clearly detrimental to their Balkan 
allies. It is also not exactly clear what might happen in the event 
that the United States become a prime source of equipment, and gets 
involved in the training of Bosnian personnel.
  Mr. President, my decision to support this resolution is not without 
some concern about the unintended consequences of lifting the embargo. 
However, I do not see that we have much choice.
  For several years, the administration has been sending a stream of 
let's-wait-and-see signals regarding action on Bosnia. The President 
asked the majority leader to hold off on S. 21 until after the London 
conference. Well, the London conference is over and the situation 
continues to spin out of control. It should be abundantly clear to all 
that sooner or later, all of the safe-areas are threatened by the 
Bosnian-Serbs. We even have one of the top Bosnian-Serb commanders in a 
recent interview with a Belgrade newspaper stating his intention to 
take the remaining safe-areas within a few months. Coincidentally, this 
same Bosnian-Serb commander--who over- saw the trampling of 
Srebrenica--was indicted yesterday by a U.N. Criminal Tribunal for 
perpetrating war crimes.
  This time, the waiting is over, for if the embargo is not lifted 
soon, there may be no Bosnian Moslems left to arm. Ronald Reagan once 
said that ``America will support with moral and material assistance 
your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and 
win.'' By supporting this resolution today, the Senate will telegraph 
its support for those who seek to make it on their own. I urge my 
colleagues to support the Dole resolution.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the 
resolution offered by Senators Dole and Lieberman.
  For months, the situation in Bosnia has deteriorated from bad to 
worse, as have our policy options. Disappointment has given way to 
disaster--no matter how deep our common concern, it pales in the face 
of the horror and chaos of Srebrenica.
  As we witness this unfolding tragedy, it is important to keep in mind 
that it is more than the future of Bosnia that is at stake--American 
credibility and international influence are on the line. Tomorrow's 
adversaries are carefully watching Bosnia today. They are measuring the 
weight of American words--evaluating the strength of our resolve--
assessing our leadership, credibility and determination.
  And, there is little doubt over the conclusion any casual observer 
would reach--our Bosnian policy is scarred by retreat and reversal--and 
repetition of the same mistakes.
  Once again, as the Senate takes up legislation to lift the embargo 
there is a last minute appeal from the White House that the timing is 
all wrong. We are urged to give yet another policy alternative time to 
work.
  But this alternative, like the last alternative, and the options 
before that are building on the failure of UNPROFOR.
  Last week, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke commented ``To 
whatever extent Americans are involved in the air or in any other way 
in Bosnia, we will not be limited or constrained by the insane dual key 
system with the U.N. and NATO * * *. We are not going to ask the United 
Nations' permission for Americans to do anything in Bosnia.''
  I was encouraged by this refreshingly frank assessment of what has 
compromised UNPROFOR's mission and shattered all hope for a resolution 
to the crisis. You do not usually hear senior officials call years of 
policy ``insane.'' It is a rare event for anyone in this administration 
to forcefully assert unilateral American rights and interests.
  Unfortunately, no one in London listened.
  United Nations officials will still be involved in decisions about 
when and where to conduct air strikes and use force. Although Secretary 
Perry and Secretary Christopher have offered public assurances that 
this time, this decision is different, U.N. officials are already 
undermining those claims and maintaining that all final decisions on 
the use of force will continue to involve the United Nations.
  Bosnia policy is in mayhem--the effect of the meetings in London 
merely modified the mayhem. Once again, we failed to deal with the real 
problem--Serb aggression. As Prime Minister Silajdzic said, ``Another 
half measure . . . another fig leaf.''
  Marginally modifying the chain of command as agreed in London cannot 
erase or correct the United Nations and UNPROFOR's failed course. And, 
this is a well travelled course.
  Just a few short weeks ago, President Chirac visited the U.S. 
pleading for American support for the Rapid Reaction Force. He assured 
us that it would be an aggressive, combat ready unit prepared to 
intercede--to make a real difference. Field commanders would make the 
decisions, not U.N. bureaucrats hundreds of miles removed from the 
conflict.
  Chirac talked of opening a road to Sarajevo, of vigorously defending 
all the safe havens; and, he was adamant that peacekeepers would no 
longer be the sorry victims of Serb hostage taking.
  Sadly, within days, it became clear the U.N. had other ideas. Special 
Envoy Akashi immediately issued an apologetic letter, assuring the Serb 
military that the Rapid Reaction Force would only augment the existing 
UNPROFOR units. There would be no change in mission, no change in 
operational activities, no change in command. In soothing platitudes, 
Akashi directly undermined the RRF's credibility and undercut whatever 
opportunity they might have had to demonstrate success.
  Worse yet, no one from the administration challenged Akashi's 
interpretation.
  Now, we are being promised a robust air campaign, but one that will 
only protect Gorazde. Once again we have abandoned a principle we 
asserted a few short months ago. Once again, we drew a line in the 
sand, or, more appropriately, we drew a line around six safe havens. 
And now, once again, we are deserting the Bosnians in five of the six 
safe havens.
  How long before we are forced by circumstance to redefine, retreat, 
repackage the next alternative?
  It is long past time to recognize that United Nations Protection 
Force has become an expensive oxymoron--it is neither a force to be 
dealt with nor does it offer any protection. In fact, some have grimly 
joked the only thing the U.N. has successfully occupied is office 
space.
  Any doubt--any false hope--about their capability to protect 
civilians was obliterated in the savaging of Srebrenica.
  The mission has failed and it is time--it is past time--for UNPROFOR 
to leave, for the embargo to be lifted, and for the Bosnians to be 
given the chance to defend themselves.
  It is their right and our duty.
  In 1775, a young Patrick Henry stood up and talked of indulging in 
the illusions of hope, served by entreaty and supplication.
  In calling our Nation to arms, he said,

       We have done everything we could to avert the storm which 
     is now coming on. . . . Our petitions have been slighted; our 
     remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; 
     our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been 
     spurned. . . . In vain, may we indulge the fond hope of peace 
     and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If 
     we wish to be free . . . we must fight.

  The United Nations role in Bosnia is replete with petitions, 
supplications, and remonstrances--all in vain.
  Are we to deny the Bosnian Moslems the very right to self 
determination that defines the conscience of this Nation? Are we to 
refuse them freedom--repudiate their desire to secure liberty?
  We have paid a high price for failure in Bosnia--over $2 billion in 
taxpayers' dollars have supported UNPROFOR. What we have paid in 
treasure, Bosnians have paid in lives and liberty.
  Lifting the embargo will not guarantee Bosnians their freedom, but 
the United States will no longer hold the key to their shackles--the 
ball and chain that UNPROFOR has become.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the majority 
leader's resolution to lift the arms embargo. I do not make this 
decision lightly, and I have no illusions that our vote today will do 
anything to stop this 

[[Page S10677]]
conflict. In fact, we can be sure that lifting the arms embargo will 
intensify the fighting and lead to more pain and suffering. I do not 
see what other choice we have, though. The U.N. peacekeeping force has 
failed to defend the misnamed ``safe havens'' or to protect Bosnians 
from Serb aggression, and the most honorable thing we can do is allow 
the Bosnians to defend themselves.
  I will be the first to admit, Mr. President, that I did not expect 
Bosnia to become such a difficult and divisive issue for our country. 
When communism collapsed and the walls fell in 1989, I was as excited 
as anyone over the end of the cold war and the prospect of a world 
finally at peace. I expected that old ethnic and national tensions 
would flare up, but I figured that European and U.N. diplomacy and a 
few peacekeepers could handle the job, with limited U.S. involvement. 
The United States had just won a 40-year-long cold war, and we deserved 
to rest on our laurels. So when this conflict first started in 1991 
after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, like 
most Americans, I barely took notice of it. I supported the creation of 
the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in February 1992, and I did not 
argue with UNPROFOR's extension to Bosnia in June 1992, putting my 
faith in efforts to cobble together a political settlement.
  But this wound refuses to heal. Instead it festers, fed by historical 
conflicts and prejudices reaching back 500 years. I worry that this 
gangrenous conflict threatens to contaminate all of Europe.
  As this conflict continued to worsen and Bosnians continued to 
suffer, I still held out hope for reason to prevail over aggression and 
imperialism. Last July, I voted against this very same resolution to 
lift the arms embargo. I wanted to give the administration more time to 
pursue a multilateral agreement on the arms embargo, and negotiators 
more time to find an agreement the Serbs would accept.
  In the past year, the situation only got worse. This civil war cost 
the lives of several U.N. peacekeepers, and almost killed a brave 
American pilot. The Serbs continue to press their attacks, to 
ethnically cleanse by driving Bosnians out of their homes, and to kill 
civilians by shelling Bosnian safe areas. The only honorable thing to 
do is to admit that without unrestrained military commitments, U.N. 
peacekeepers cannot stop the Serbs, and let the Bosnians begin to fight 
Serbs on equal terms.
  Regardless of the final wording of this legislation, I hope we all 
accept our commitment to helping U.N. peacekeepers withdraw from 
Bosnia, if necessary, with the massive involvement of United States 
ground troops. Senator Dole set forth a set of reasonable guidelines on 
the use of U.S. forces in a withdrawal, designed to reduce risks, which 
I support. But despite the risks, it is our responsibility as a member 
of NATO to help our allies save their people stuck in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, this is not a political or partisan issue for me. I 
think our Defense Secretary, Secretary Perry, called this legislation 
the ``lift-and-pray'' option, and that is as good a description as any. 
This difficult situation has no easy solutions, and highlights our own 
difficulties in coming to grips with the realities of a post-cold-war 
world. It seems like the new world order looks a lot like old world 
disorder. As much as anybody, I want peace in Bosnia--but not a peace 
bought with the wholesale slaughter of Bosnians by Serbs.
  It is time to admit that we do not have the answers here, and to do 
the only honorable thing--let the Bosnians get weapons they need to 
fight for their homes and their lives.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise in support of this resolution to 
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.
  For several years, the United States and the United Nations have 
relied on a system of safe havens. These were protected towns: Gorazde, 
Srebrenica, and Zepa in eastern Bosnia; Sarajevo, the capital; and 
Bihac in the west. U.N. peacekeepers were to provide security for the 
people in these towns, while an overall arms embargo covered all 
participants in the war.


                       failure of present policy

  Where do we now stand today?
  The Bosnian Serbs have ignored repeated efforts on the part of 
Americans, Europeans, and Russians to achieve peace. Instead, they have 
attacked all the safe havens.
  Srebrenica has been captured, and its women and children expelled. 
Nobody knows what has become of the men of the town. The Western 
countries had given all these people a guarantee of safety.
  Zepa fell yesterday.
  Bihac is under attack.
  Sarajevo is being bombed as heavily as ever.
  And the U.N. peacekeepers have been shot at, shelled, and taken 
hostage.
  Clearly, this policy has failed. The U.N. force has proven unable to 
prevent Bosnian Serb offensives, to protect civilians, or even to 
protect its own members. The time has come to admit it and move to 
something new.


                             three choices

  No choice is a good one. But I believe we have essentially three 
options, and one is superior.
  First and foremost, we should not become involved as a combatant in 
the war. That would confront the American armed services with an 
impossible task--to impose a permanent political settlement. We would 
be likely to lose many men and women; we would certainly lose some; and 
ultimately it would be futile.
  Second, the strategy some propose of American air attacks against 
Bosnian Serb positions, is irredeemably flawed. It does not command the 
full support of our allies, and in any case history shows that air 
attacks without a coordinated ground campaign do not succeed.
  The only remaining choice is the third: to lift the arms embargo and 
let the Bosnian Government fight in defense of its country. This may 
not solve the problems of the former Yugoslavia--and I do not believe 
an outside power can solve those problems--but it has the virtue of 
justice.
  A country attacked by an outside aggressor, or by a rebellion against 
a legitimate government, has the right to defend itself as best it can. 
And its people, who have seen the West break its promise to keep them 
safe, should at least be able to fight for themselves.
  That is why I support this resolution. And I urge my colleagues to do 
the same.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, for many months I have resisted 
legislative initiatives to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against 
the Bosnian Government. But today I intend to vote differently.
  I have felt that our country should not depart from the joint 1991 
decision made with our NATO allies through the United Nations in 
enforcing an international arms embargo against what was then 
Yugoslavia. The international community took this action to prevent the 
fighting from escalating after Slovenia and Croatia withdrew from the 
Yugoslav federation.
  As we all know, the fighting has escalated nevertheless. The U.N. and 
NATO have ever since struggled to balance the safety of Bosnia 
civilians with the desire to prevent the war from spiralling or 
spreading.
  But events have taken a dramatic and tragic turn in recent weeks. 
That is why I now intend to vote for the Dole-Lieberman bill to lift 
the arms embargo after the United Nations protection forces have left.
  I recognize that United Nations forces have helped to reduce civilian 
casualties to a fraction of their prior levels. These forces have also 
carried out humanitarian operations that have saved thousands of lives.
  However, it is now evident that the U.N. peacekeeping forces cannot 
be expected to keep the peace where there is no peace. The U.N. forces, 
I believe, were sent to the region to try to provide safe havens to 
protect civilians, to open routes to supply food, medicine and 
essential supplies to the Bosnian people, and to try to keep the peace.
  But it is now clear that the Bosnian Serbs are advancing in areas 
that the Bosnian Moslems thought were safe. The Bosnian Serbs have 
marched into Srebrenica, a city that the United Nations had guaranteed 
as a safe haven for civilians. Today we here the further news that 
another so-called safe haven--Zepa--has fallen before the Bosnian 
Serbs' advance.
  Again, Bosnian civilians have been left unprotected because the U.N. 
forces are not deployed for or capable 

[[Page S10678]]
of resisting the Serbs' aggression. The fate of Srebrenica and the fall 
of Zepa make a mockery of the United Nations humanitarian mission.
  We can now see that the embargo has had the practical effect of 
leaving the Bosnian Moslems virtually defenseless in the face of 
Serbian aggression.
  I have not supported and do not support sending American ground 
troops to Bosnia to take sides in this conflict. I do not expect that 
we or our allies are prepared to send troops to the region in 
sufficient numbers to put an end to the war.
  If that is the case--and I believe it is--then I think we must end 
the arms embargo against the Bosnian Moslems, so that they can defend 
themselves.
  It is a departure for me to support ending an arms embargo anywhere, 
because I believe we ought to promote policies that slow the spread of 
arms around the world.
  However, I cannot stand by and watch the atrocities that are 
occurring in Bosnia without believing that it is somehow immoral for us 
to deny the Bosnian Moslems the ability to defend themselves, their 
families and their territory. An independent nation has the right of 
self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That is why lifting 
this embargo is not analogous to lifting the arms ban against Iraq or 
against any other aggressor.
  Let me also point out that the Dole-Lieberman bill we are debating is 
a new version. It now says that United Nations Protection Forces should 
first leave Bosnia before the embargo is lifted. This will help to 
prevent the U.N. forces from getting caught in an escalating crossfire. 
As an additional insurance against that possibility, the United States 
must be prepared to honor the President's commitment to our NATO allies 
to send United States forces to assist in evacuating NATO forces from 
Bosnia.
  Even as we take these steps, I support a renewed effort on the part 
of the United States to seek NATO's support for a multilateral lifting 
of the arms embargo against Bosnia. That would be a preferable 
approach. But in the final analysis, the United States must help the 
Bosnian Moslems get the arms to defend themselves.
  For these reasons, I intend to vote for the Dole-Lieberman bill. I 
pray that in some way a new set of policies might force the Bosnian 
Serbs to negotiate a real truce and move that region closer to a 
permanent end to its conflict.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yesterday I spoke at length about the 
situation in Bosnia. I spoke about the damage this debacle has caused 
to NATO, which has acted like a frightened child in the face of 
genocide on its borders. I said that the status quo is totally 
unacceptable. I also said that I believe our first responsibility is to 
NATO, and that NATO should be given an opportunity to redeem itself and 
act forcefully to protect the remaining safe havens in Bosnia.
  I was encouraged by the statements of the NATO leaders after last 
Friday's meeting in London, when they said that NATO would respond with 
substantial and decisive air strikes if the Serbs attack Goradze. Then 
Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher suggested that there would be 
a similar response to attacks against the other remaining safe havens, 
which I support. They also indicated that the dual-key approach, that 
has been such a disaster, would end. In the future, NATO commanders 
would decide when to strike, not U.N. bureaucrats. These assurances 
were major factors in my decision yesterday to oppose unilaterally 
lifting the embargo.
  Yesterday, I said I expected to see NATO display the kind of unity 
and power that it should have displayed from the very beginning of this 
conflict. I feared that by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, we 
would be undercutting our NATO allies and saying that we do not support 
a forceful NATO response. I believe such a decision could lead to wider 
war, greater suffering, and potentially endanger thousands of 
Americans. I believe that decisive NATO air strikes could not only turn 
the tide in favor of the Bosnian Moslems, it could also demonstrate the 
continued viability and strength of the NATO alliance.
  I was therefore very concerned by the article in today's New York 
Times, titled ``NATO Gives UN Officials Veto on Air Strikes in 
Bosnia.'' That article suggests that the fatally flawed status quo 
regarding the dual-key policy has not changed.
  Mr. President, if that article were accurate I would have had no 
choice but to reconsider my position on this issue. As I said 
yesterday, I cannot support the status quo. I needed to be convinced 
that the failed dual-key policy was no longer in effect, and that NATO 
is now fully authorized to use decisive force to deter further Serb 
atrocities.
  Because of the questions raised by that article, I prepared to 
telephone U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali earlier today. I 
wanted his assurance that future decisions about the use of NATO air 
power would be made by military commanders, not U.N. bureaucrats. 
Shortly before I was to make that call, I was informed by our mission 
to the United Nations in New York that the Secretary General had issued 
a statement which eliminated any ambiguity about dual-key. His 
statement goes even further, to address the issue of NATO action to 
protect Bihac and Sarajevo, as well as Goradze.
  It is for that reason that I ask unanimous consent that the statement 
by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali be printed in the 
Record. His statement makes clear that the status quo is no longer in 
effect. Dual-key is over. A rapid, decisive response is now NATO 
policy.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                            Press Statement

        (Attributable to a Spokesman for the Secretary-General)

       The Secretary-General and his advisers have concluded their 
     study of the letter from NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes 
     about the North Atlantic Council's decisions last night 
     relating to the use of NATO air power to deter Bosnian Serb 
     attacks on Gorazde.
       As indicated in my earlier statement today, the Secretary-
     General welcomes the commitment of the North Atlantic 
     Alliance to support the United Nations in the implementation 
     of Security Council resolutions, and looks forward to working 
     with NATO toward that end. He fully supports the decision 
     taken by the North Atlantic Council, as conveyed in 
     Secretary-General Claes' letter, and agrees with its 
     conclusion that an attack by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde 
     should be met by a firm and decisive response, including 
     through air strikes.
       On the question of the ``dual key'', the relevant Security 
     Council resolutions call for close co-ordination between the 
     United Nations and NATO on the use of NATO air power and this 
     is reflected in the NATO decision. In order to streamline 
     decision taking within the United Nations chain of command 
     when the use of air power is deemed to be necessary, the 
     Secretary-General has decided to delegate the necessary 
     authority in this respect to his military commanders in the 
     field. He has accordingly delegated authority in respect of 
     air strikes, which he has hitherto retained himself, to 
     General Bernard Janvier, the Commander of United Nations 
     Peace Forces, with immediate effect. As regards close air 
     support, which is the use of air power to defend United 
     Nations personnel, the Secretary-General's Special 
     Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, after consulting the 
     Secretary-General, has today delegated the necessary 
     authority to General Janvier, who is authorized to delegate 
     it further to the UNPROFOR Force Commander when operational 
     circumstances so require.
       The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by current 
     attacks on Sarajevo and on the Bihac pocket and notes that 
     the North Atlantic Council has asked the NATO Military 
     Authorities, in consultation with the United Nations Peace 
     Forces, to formulate proposals on the possible use of air 
     power in these situations also.
       The Secretary-General is informing the Security Council of 
     the measures that he is taking. He again expresses his 
     appreciation for the continuing close co-operation which he 
     enjoys with the Secretary-General of NATO. In furtherance of 
     co-operation between the United Nations and NATO, he has 
     today instructed the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
     Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and the Force Commander, Gen. 
     Janvier, to travel to Brussels for consultations with NATO on 
     the operational modalities for implementing last night's 
     decision of the North Atlantic Council.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, the moral and practical consequences of 
our actions in Bosnia are on a collision course.
  Every moral instinct I have tells me to lift the arms embargo of 
Bosnia. I share the anger, frustration and pain that inspired this 
amendment.
  We must finally recognize that the U.N. peacekeeping mission has 
failed. They cannot keep the peace in a land where there is no peace. 
Despite their bravery, despite their good intentions 

[[Page S10679]]
--they are not able to protect Bosnian civilians--they are not even 
able to protect themselves.
  As a Polish-American, I see what is happening in Bosnia, and I think 
of what happened to Poland in the Second World War. Polish patriots on 
horseback, armed only with swords, faced German tanks and German 
howitzers. The world watched but did nothing.
  And as Hitler exterminated the Jews, most of the world stood by. This 
passivity amounted to acquiescence.
  We are showing the acquiescence today with our meaningless U.N. 
resolutions and our empty threats.
  What is the result of our failure?
  It is mothers and children running for their lives from so called 
safe havens.
  It is the young woman who took her own life after being forced from 
her home and separated from her family.
  It is the food and medicine convoys prevented from getting to those 
in need.
  It is the Serb gunfire that is continually targeted toward civilians.
  And it is the rape and torture that has been going on for 3 years. 
This barbarism is a crime against humanity.
  It is very painful to be reminded of the inhumanity that man is 
capable of. It is a shame on all of us.
  What history does not teach us, our principles should. And there is 
no more fundamental principle than the right to self-defense. We never 
should have imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia.
  So my heart tells me to lift the embargo. I want the Serbs to pay for 
their barbarism. If we cannot or will not defend the Bosnian people--
let us stop pretending--let us lift the embargo, let us let them defend 
themselves.
  But, Mr. President, I cannot vote to take this course unless I also 
consider the consequences that we and the Bosnian people will face down 
the road.
  What happens after we lift the embargo? Most people think that the 
Bosnian people will then be able to defend themselves--and that 
Americans would stay out of the war.
  But both of these points are wrong.
  Just allowing the Bosnians to arm will not make it happen. According 
to our military leaders, it will take months to sufficiently arm and 
train the Bosnian army. In the meantime, the Bosnian people will be 
defenseless.
  The Serbs will not wait. The moment we lift the embargo, the Serbs 
will make a land grab--not just into the eastern enclaves, but also 
into central Bosnia. Their brutality could spread across all of Bosnia. 
So by lifting the embargo, we could make things a great deal worse for 
the people we so want to help.
  In addition, lifting the arms embargo will guarantee that United 
States troops will be on the ground in Bosnia. They would be in rough 
terrain, surrounded by hostile forces. Not defending the Bosnian 
people--but defending the U.N. peacekeepers as they make their retreat. 
There could be American casualties and there could be American POW's. 
And we will have done nothing to protect the Bosnian people.
  While most people in this body support lifting the embargo--how many 
support sending U.S. troops? And how many of us are willing to take 
responsibility for the carnage that could occur if we lift the embargo 
and leave the unarmed Bosnians to fend for themselves? We need to 
consider the moral consequences of our action.
  In any military action abroad, I believe that must always have clear 
criteria and objectives that answer three important questions:
  Why are we there?
  What keeps us there?
  And what gets us out?
  Without answers to these questions, we cannot send U.S. troops into 
battle. And we have no such answers in Bosnia.
  I am not saying that we should stick with the status quo. That has 
brought the Bosnians nothing but misery.
  I had hoped that in the London meetings last weekend that the allies 
would reach consensus on clear, decisive and immediate action. We did 
not go as far as we should have. We did not end, once and for all, the 
dual key policy that puts U.N. bureaucrats in control of military 
decisions.
  But NATO policy does seem to be shifting. We are at least preparing 
for more robust and meaningful retaliation for Serb aggression and for 
substantial and decisive use of NATO air power. I believe that we must 
give this new policy a chance to succeed.
  So I will oppose the Dole resolution.
  This is a heart-wrenching decision for me. As I have said, every 
instinct I have tells me to lift the embargo. But I believe that we 
should not go it alone unless we are willing to act alone--unless we 
are willing to send in our troops to save Bosnia from the carnage that 
could occur. We must look at the moral and practical consequences of 
our action.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we all agree that the crisis in Bosnia is 
a massive human tragedy. But I oppose this legislation calling for a 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, and I do so for five reasons.
  First, lifting the embargo may theoretically give the Bosnian Moslems 
a more effective means to defend themselves. But in fact, lifting the 
embargo is far more likely to put them in an even worse position--
unless the United States and other nations are able and willing to 
provide extensive amounts of arms and military training over a lengthy 
period of time, and unless these nations are also prepared to take 
whatever military action is necessary--including the use of ground 
troops--to keep the Bosnian Serbs from over-running the Moslems during 
that period.
  Second, if the U.N. forces withdraw, as seems inevitable when the 
arms embargo is lifted, the plight of innocent civilians will get much 
worse as the bloodshed escalates and the vital U.N. humanitarian 
lifeline is severed. In 1992, before the U.N. peacekeepers arrived, 
there were 130,000 civilian casualties. Last year, there were fewer 
than three thousand.
  In addition, over 1.3 million refugees and much of the civilian 
population of Sarajevo and central Bosnia--a total of 2.7 million 
people--are dependent upon the relief work of the United Nations. The 
U.N. may not have kept the peace as well as we had hoped, but it has 
saved hundreds of thousands of Bosnian lives. This lifesaving 
capability--and the maintenance of vital humanitarian supply lines--
will all be lost if we unilaterally lift the arms embargo and force the 
United Nations out of Bosnia. Without the U.N.'s humanitarian efforts, 
we will see more starvation, more loss of life and a new flood of 
refugees. The almost $500 million in food, medicine, shelter, and other 
relief supplies which U.N. agencies plan to deliver this year could 
well be denied to the innocent people of Bosnia.
  Third, the wider war that is the most likely result if this 
legislation is enacted is in no one's interest and could have 
catastrophic consequences. The last thing the people of Europe and 
America need is a wider war in the Balkans.
  Fourth, if the embargo is to be lifted, it should be done in 
cooperation with our allies, not unilaterally. Unilateral action by the 
United States will seriously undermine both the United Nations and NATO 
and will serve as a dangerous precedent for other nations to ignore 
other international mandates.
  Fifth, this legislation would make a negotiated solution even more 
difficult than it is now. Yet a negotiated solution is the only 
realistic hope for ending this tragic war instead of expanding it.
  There are no good answers on Bosnia. But the answer proposed in this 
legislation is worse than the alternative of working closely with our 
allies, as President Clinton is doing. He deserves the bipartisan 
support of Congress at this very important and very difficult time.
  Mr. CONRAD, Mr. President, I intend to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Self-Defense Act as modified by the Nunn and Cohen amendments.
  The war in Bosnia is tragic and horrible. No one can hear accounts of 
the rape, torture, and other crimes the Serbs have committed as they 
overran the so-called safe areas in Srebrenica and Zepa without being 
profoundly saddened--and outraged.
  I share with my colleagues a deep sense of frustration that the U.N. 
forces in Bosnia have been unable to put an end to these atrocities. I 
wish the many attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had been 
accepted by the Serbs. I wish our allies in Europe had been more 
willing to take the lead in countering Serbian aggression.
  But the reality is, they have not. No one is effectively defending 
the 

[[Page S10680]]
Bosnians, and they do not have the capacity to defend themselves 
because of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.
  In the past, I have opposed resolutions calling for the unilateral 
lifting of the arms embargo. I have long believed the United States 
should not get involved on the ground in Bosnia, and that it will be 
much easier to get into Bosnia that it will be to pull American forces 
out later. I have been very concerned that unilateral actions could 
lead to greater American responsibility for that outcome and greater 
U.S. involvement.
  But the amended resolution we will vote on today is different. Taken 
together, the Nunn and Cohen amendments require the United States 
before unilaterally lifting the embargo, to force a U.N. Security 
Council and, if necessary, U.N. General Assembly vote on lifting the 
embargo multilaterally. Only if both these avenues have been exhausted 
would the United States, as a last resort, act unilaterally.
  The events of the past few weeks have made it clear that we cannot 
wait indefinitely for multilateral agreement to lift the arms embargo. 
The current approach in Bosnia is not working. Under these 
circumstances, we must force the United Nations to re-evaluate the arms 
embargo. It is my strong hope that the United Nations will decide to 
lift the arms embargo multilaterally. It is immoral to continue to 
block the Bosnians from obtaining the arms they need to defend 
themselves against Serbian aggression when it is abundantly clear that 
only the Bosnians are willing to defend Bosnia against Serbian 
aggression, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. The events of the 
past few weeks demonstrate that no one else--not the United Nations, 
not the United States, and not the Europeans--will adequately defend 
the Bosnians.
  This was not an easy decision, Mr. President. There are no cheap or 
easy answers in Bosnia, and this approach involves some risks. But it 
is time to take the least risky approach: to lift the arms embargo--
multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary--so the 
Bosnians can defend themselves.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.


                amendment no. 1848 to amendment no. 1801

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my amendment is at the desk, and I call that 
amendment up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself, Mr. 
     Graham, and Mr. Robb, proposes an amendment numbered 1848 to 
     amendment No. 1801.
       On page 2, after line 18, insert the following:
       ``(4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the 
     United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany, 
     has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of 
     continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact 
     Group's proposal for Bosnia And Herzegovina, a decision in 
     the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms 
     embargo as a last report would be unavoidable.''
       On page 5, after line 12, insert the following and reletter 
     subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g) 
     respectively:
       ``(e) International Policy.--If the Government of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina submits a requests to the United Nations 
     Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or 
     the countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to 
     withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in 
     subsection (a), the President (or his representative) shall 
     immediately introduce and support in the United Nations 
     Security Council a resolution to terminate the application of 
     United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States shall 
     insist on a vote on the resolution by Security Council. The 
     resolution shall, at a minimum, provide for the termination 
     of the applicability of United Nations Security Council 
     resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no 
     later than the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will speak more to this resolution in my 
overall thoughts on the subject of the Dole-Lieberman amendment later 
this morning or shortly after noon after we meet with the President of 
South Korea.
  But this amendment, as indicated by the reading of the clerk, 
basically does two things. This amendment says, which is a fact, that 
the contact group composed of Britain, France, Germany, the United 
States, and Russia in 1994 made a statement that if the Bosnian Serbs 
did not agree to the contact group proposal, that the last resort would 
be the unavoidable lifting of the arms embargo in the U.N. Security 
Council.
  The second part of this amendment makes it clear that, without 
interfering with the Dole-Lieberman amendment's timetable, which does 
not require the lifting of the embargo until after the U.N. forces are 
removed from Bosnia, without altering that timetable on what would be 
the unilateral lift, this amendment sets up another effort. It sets up 
one final effort by the United States, having the President of the 
United States go to the Security Council and asking the Security 
Council to multilaterally, in accordance with the United Nations' and 
the Security Council's previous resolution, lift the embargo.
  I think this amendment is important. All of us know that the Security 
Council may not do that but in a month or two the situation may change. 
Some minds may change. And I would remind those countries, Britain, 
France, Germany, Russia, as well as the United States, that as part of 
the contact group, and those that are also on the Security Council, 
including Britain, France, and Russia, that this action, this 
multilateral lift that we will be seeking, if the U.N. forces withdraw, 
is in complete accord and consistent with statements that they signed 
on to as a part of the contact group in 1994.
 So it would be my hope that there would be some minds changed if the 
U.N. forces withdraw.

  Mr. President, I will make further remarks about both this amendment 
and my overall view of the Dole-Lieberman proposal before us and the 
administration policy sometime later in this debate.
  I would say, though, that I concur in what I heard my friend from 
Virginia and my friend from Connecticut just state about the reports in 
the paper this morning which indicate that there remains a dual key, 
that the United Nations is maintaining jurisdiction and that our allies 
in Great Britain and France, according to the New York Times report, 
notwithstanding the London meeting, have been proponents of retaining 
that dual key.
  That is contrary to what this Senator understood in reports from our 
administration's representatives when they returned from London. It is 
contrary to the initial reports that came out of NATO from London. And 
it points to the continuing inability of NATO to get its act together 
and of the United Nations to be able to delegate authority for military 
action, and the United Nations by all accounts is incapable of making 
those decisions.
  It also calls into question the crucial point about whether a bombing 
campaign envisions the possibility of hostage taking and whether the 
participants in the bombing campaign in response to an attack on 
Gorazde are willing to continue the required military action even if 
hostages are taken.
  Mr. President, it is absolutely essential that the NATO alliance not 
begin a strike campaign unless they are willing to hit meaningful 
targets and unless they are willing to continue that in the face of 
almost certain adversity, that is, hostage taking and perhaps even the 
killing of United Nations personnel.
  Mr. President, these remarks I will continue at a later point, but I 
did want to go on record that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator 
from Connecticut are correct, in my view, that this report this morning 
I think greatly undercuts the position we hoped had come out of the 
London conference, which was to abolish the dual key at least as far as 
Gorazde is concerned.
  I yield the floor.

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