[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 121 (Tuesday, July 25, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10649-S10652]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me make a few comments tonight--I 
have waited to allow other Senators to be heard--and I intend again to 
speak briefly tomorrow prior to the vote, but I wish to take some time 
this evening to express my personal position with regard to this issue 
and explain why I will be voting as I will tomorrow afternoon.
  We are again, as others have indicated, in a crisis in Bosnia. Just 
today, as was reported several hours ago, in open violation of the 
United Nations mandates, the Bosnian Serbs have seized another safe 
area, Zepa, under the protection of UNPROFOR, the United Nations 
protection forces.
  This despicable act of aggression by the Bosnian Serbs is now being 
followed by a brutal wave of ethnic cleansing that is forcing thousands 
of Bosnian women and children and elderly to flee for their lives. 
United Nations peacekeepers now find themselves under attack in a land 
where there is little peace to keep.
  This is not the first time the Senate has debated whether to 
terminate the arms embargo in Bosnia. In the 103d Congress, the Senate 
voted on the matter seven different times.
  Less than a year ago, on August 11, 1994, the Senate adopted two 
competing amendments to the fiscal year 1995 Department of Defense 
appropriations bill. The first of those amendments was offered by 
Senators Dole and Lieberman. It set a deadline of November 15 of last 
year for the President to break with our NATO allies and unilaterally 
end the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. It passed by a vote of 
58 to 42.
  The second amendment, offered by Senators Mitchell and Nunn, proposed 
a different scenario for lifting the arms embargo. It said first that 
if the Bosnian Serbs refused to accept a peace plan developed by the 
five-member contact group by October 15, 1994, then the United States 
would introduce and support a resolution in the United Nations to end 
the embargo completely.
  Second, the Nunn-Mitchell amendment said that if the United Nations 
failed to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia by November 15 of 1994, 
and if the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the peace plan developed 
by the contact group, then no Department of Defense funds could be used 
to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia. In addition, the President 
would be required to submit a plan to equip and train the Bosnian armed 
forces and consult with Congress regarding that specific plan.
  The Nunn-Mitchell language was included in the 1995 defense 
appropriations bill and signed into law on October 5 of last year.
  The administration has been unable, unfortunately, to convince the 
United Nations Security Council to lift the arms embargo 
multilaterally. But in keeping with the congressional mandate, the 
United States last November ceased participation in the enforcement of 
the arms embargo against the 

[[Page S 10650]]
Bosnian Government. The administration also prepared and briefed the 
Congress on a plan to equip and train Bosnian armed forces. That is the 
historical context for the debate we are now experiencing here on the 
Senate floor.
  Today, as this Senate once again debates whether to lift the arms 
embargo against Bosnia, the credibility of UNPROFOR as peacekeepers has 
seriously eroded. What has not eroded is the overwhelming desire by the 
American people to see the bloodshed in Bosnia ended without committing 
United States ground troops to the Bosnian conflict.
  Yet, the Dole-Lieberman amendment would make this all the more likely 
by requiring the President to unilaterally lift the arms embargo 
against Bosnia. This amendment will place United States ground troops 
in peril by intensifying the conflict at the time when United States 
troops were assisting our NATO allies in the difficult and dangerous 
mission of withdrawing their scattered forces from Bosnia.
  Mr. President, today I received a letter from the President 
explaining his reasons for strongly opposing S. 21, which he believes 
``could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the 
possible Americanization of the conflict itself.''
  I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks and urge all of my colleagues to 
consider carefully the President's concerns as we debate this 
legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. DASCHLE. In contrast to those concerns, some of the sponsors of 
this amendment believe that by lifting the arms embargo, we can avoid 
the awful possibility of sending United States ground forces to Bosnia 
or we will let the Bosnians fight their own war. But it is not that 
simple, and we know that. We have a responsibility in this Senate to 
speak honestly to the American people, to tell them the potential 
consequences of lifting the arms embargo at this time and in this 
manner.
  The Dole-Lieberman amendment requires the amendment to lift the 
embargo upon completion of the withdrawal of the United Nations 
protection forces or 12 weeks after the Bosnian Government requests the 
withdrawal of U.N. troops.
  While the President may extend the deadline for lifting the embargo 
for up to 30 days, if he determines and reports in advance that the 
safety, security and successful completion of the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR requires more time, the fundamental problem remains the same. 
Under this resolution, America's military and diplomatic policy in the 
Balkans conflict will be determined not by the President and not by the 
Congress, but by the actions of the Bosnian Government. Let me restate 
that, Mr. President, because it is so critical to an appreciation of 
what this vote is all about. America's military and diplomatic policy 
in the Balkans will be determined not by the President, not by the 
Congress, but by the actions of the Bosnian Government.
  What is not addressed in the bill is what happens when the U.N. 
forces, including substantial forces of our NATO allies, begin to 
withdraw from Bosnia. What happens? As we all know, the President has 
promised our NATO allies that the United States will provide up to 
25,000 ground combat and logistic troops to assist in the safe 
evacuation of the U.N. peacekeepers from Bosnia. It could very well 
mean that we will be forced to send U.S. troops into a situation of 
heightened conflict that would risk American lives.
  There is no question that the long nightmare in Bosnia must end. 
There is no question that the United States must play a role in 
resolving the nightmare. But let us be fully cognizant of what is truly 
at stake. Let us not pretend that there is an easy way out, because 
there is not. There should be no confusion in the minds of any of my 
colleagues regarding what a vote for this bill actually means. What it 
means is that the President of the United States, the Commander in 
Chief of our Armed Forces, will be required by law to act in response 
to actions taken by a foreign government, the Government of Bosnia.
  It means, by design, by this legislation itself, not only are we 
responding for the first time to a foreign government, required to 
respond in a way that may not be in our best interest, but we will have 
to ignore our closest allies and unilaterally lift the embargo to do 
so. It means this Nation will very likely be forced to assume sole 
responsibility for arming and training the Bosnian army. That is what 
this means.
  And it means almost certainly--it means almost certainly--that in all 
of this, U.S. troops will die. This is a very slippery and treacherous 
slope we would embark on with the passage of this bill. And I would 
remind my colleagues that, if we enact it, we have got to be prepared 
to face the almost certain consequence of U.S. involvement of U.S. 
ground troops in Bosnia sometime very soon.
  No one can read the accounts of ethnic cleansing, no one can look at 
those images of terrified refugees trudging a trail of tears from one 
Bosnian city to another in search of safety and not be horrified. I 
understand the arguments of those who say we cannot stand by and allow 
genocide to occur unchecked and unchallenged. I understand those 
arguments and agree with the moral concerns of those who advance them. 
But let us be clear, forcing U.N. protection forces to withdraw from 
Bosnia, which is the most likely effect of the bill, can only increase, 
not decrease, the horrifying acts of genocide in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, what happens then? What happens when the U.N. forces 
are gone? What happens when NATO forces are gone? What happens when we 
continue to see night after night on the televisions across this land 
that genocide, the horrific acts that we have seen so far, and there is 
no one there to protect them? What will we do? Do we continue to say it 
is unacceptable and we will keep sending arms? And then watch this 
spread to Kosovo and Macedonia and other parts of this region? Is that 
what we are allowed to do?
  What happens? We are left with the untenable choice after all our 
allies have washed their hands of this situation to accept one of two 
things: either to accept the horrific acts that we will continue to 
see, Serbians rolling over the Bosnians, with or without additional 
arms; or some unilateral insertion of American troops to stop this from 
spreading and to stop the holocaust that we see already. That is the 
untenable choice we are going to be given if our allies leave.
  The very best case scenario, Mr. President, assumes that it will take 
2 to 3 months to arm and train the Bosnian army. That scenario also 
assumes the arms will actually reach the Bosnian army and that they 
will not be captured by Bosnian Serbs and that the Croatian Government 
will allow all of the arms to be transported through their ports and 
across their land. That is what we are assuming, that somehow the 
Croatian Government will say, ``OK. We will subject ourselves to 
whatever may come, all of the repercussions that may come with opening 
our ports to the Bosnians so that the Bosnians can ship tanks and heavy 
weaponry through our ports, through our land, to fight the Serbs.'' How 
many people really believe that is what is going to happen?
  Mr. President, to suggest that the Bosnian Serbs will simply wait 
patiently and peacefully to decide what the Croatian Government is 
going to do, to decide whether or not the Bosnian army is being armed, 
seems to me to be very naive. We are talking about a regime that shells 
unarmed women and children as they wait in line in safe areas to 
collect their daily ration of water, a regime that is committed to 
ethnic cleansing. Should we really believe that this regime will hold 
its fire while the U.S. troops are training the Bosnian army to defend 
its own people? Can we, without endangering U.S. or allied troops, 
counter their fire? We know the answers. I have grave doubts.
  The likelihood is that the Bosnian Government will escalate its 
campaign of genocide, will overrun the remaining safe areas quickly 
while it still has the ability to do so with little resistance. And it 
is entirely possible that this escalation could occur while U.S. troops 
are on the ground in Bosnia.
  Then what? Those who would vote for this bill must also be concerned 
about 

[[Page S 10651]]
the very real possibility that withdrawing U.N. troops from Bosnia now 
and unilateral lifting of the embargo will greatly increase the risk 
that the war in Bosnia will spread. While the United States may have no 
direct national security interest in Bosnia itself, we certainly would 
have security interests at risk in fighting that would go south to the 
region in Kosovo, in Macedonia, where 500 U.S. troops are now stationed 
and involve our NATO allies of Greece and Turkey.
  I believe that every Member of this Senate is deeply concerned about 
the tragic events that are taking place in Bosnia. And I believe that 
every Member of this Senate would like to see an end to the fighting 
that has left thousands of innocent people dead, millions of people 
displaced, torn from their homes, torn from their families. And I do 
not believe there is any disagreement about the goal we all share: to 
end the aggression and the atrocities born in the Bosnian conflict. The 
only disagreement is over how we can best achieve that goal. And the 
question is again before the Senate, should the United States on our 
own, against the wishes of our allies, end the arms embargo,
 or should we continue to act in concert with our allies and the United 
Nations to end the arms embargo? Considering this question, let us 
remember that Bosnia is not the only Nation in which the United States 
is engaged in a multinational effort to impose sanctions or take other 
collective measures. There is a collective action to impose sanctions 
against Iraq, against Cuba, against Libya, and it may become necessary 
to impose sanctions against others to control the spread of nuclear 
weapons, or for other reasons. All of these collective efforts are of 
great importance to this country.

  Mr. President, if we unilaterally terminate the arms embargo, then 
what is to prevent our allies from doing the same on collective actions 
with which they disagree? What do we tell them? What standing do we 
have to suggest to them that they must comply but we will not?
  We cannot have it both ways. We cannot expect our allies to support 
us on collective actions that suit us if we refuse to support other 
collective actions that may make us uncomfortable.
  Senator Exon and others have raised important questions about the 
consequences that lifting the arms embargo could have on NATO. Fifty 
years ago this summer, the NATO alliance freed Europe, freed the world 
actually, from the great evil of Nazism. And for nearly 50 years, until 
the start of the Serbian aggression 40 months ago, NATO has kept peace 
in all of Europe. The NATO alliance was essentially there to end the 
cold war, and now it is essential to the continued stability of both 
Europe, as well as the United States.
  Our NATO allies are imploring us not to lift the arms embargo 
unilaterally while they have troops in Bosnia. They are imploring us to 
stand with them as they continue to seek a negotiated settlement 
against the odds, recognizing the difficulty, knowing there are no easy 
answers, appealing to us to help them as they have helped us.
  What will happen if NATO chooses at some point in the future to 
ignore us? What will happen to NATO if we ignore the urgent pleas of 
our allies now? Those are questions we must all ask ourselves, Mr. 
President, before we cast this crucial vote tomorrow.
  The end of the cold war and the resurgence of ethnic conflict and 
nationalism have created flashpoints all over this world. As the only 
remaining superpower, the United States is going to be asked again and 
again to send troops to resolve conflicts. Maybe these conflicts will 
have long histories and maybe they will be intractable, but we will be 
asked and, in some cases, we will commit, and as we make those 
decisions, we, by ourselves, must recognize that we cannot solve every 
problem in the world. We are going to need the help of our allies in 
dealing with these problems, and the only way we can deal with them 
without resorting to unilateral action is in those difficult times, as 
we see right now, we recognize the implications of breaking out from 
multilateral efforts and taking upon ourselves the responsibilities 
that come with the actions that we are now contemplating.
  I understand and, frankly, I empathize with the motivations of my 
colleagues who have introduced and supported this bill. The carnage in 
Bosnia cries out for decisive action to end the suffering of helpless 
men, women and children who daily are abused, killed by Bosnian Serb 
gunmen. But we must not, we must not allow our frustration over the 
failure to reach a settlement of the Bosnian crisis to force us into 
actions that will only worsen the situation. We must not lose sight of 
the fact that breaking with our allies carries with it the risk of 
long-term consequences, and we must not pretend we are decreasing the 
chances that U.S. ground troops will be sent to fight in Bosnia when, 
in fact, the very opposite is likely to happen.
  So as we debate this proposal, let us consider carefully what is in 
our Nation's best interest, in the best interest of the Bosnian people 
now and in the future. Let us recognize that this is an issue beyond 
Bosnia, in spite of our outrage, in spite of our frustration, in spite 
of our desire to respond in some way. We must also recognize the 
commitments, the long-term ramification and the extraordinary nature of 
the decision that we will be making tomorrow afternoon.
  Mr. President, we will have more time to talk about this tomorrow. I 
certainly hope that we will not allow our decision to be made by 
emotion, rather by objective calculation of what is best for the 
effort, what is best for our long-term alliances, what is best for this 
country, what is best for the men and women we will be called upon to 
send to Bosnia should this situation worsen and should the need for 
U.S. forces be more evident as the weeks and months unfold.
  Mr. President, I now yield the floor.
                               Exhibit 1


                                               The White House

                                        Washington, July 25, 1995.
     Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
     Democratic Leader,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: I am writing to express my strong 
     opposition to S. 21, the ``Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-
     Defense Act of 1995''. While I fully understand the 
     frustration that the bill's supporters feel, I nonetheless am 
     firmly convinced that in passing this legislation Congress 
     would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in 
     Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, 
     including the possible Americanization of the conflict.
       There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. 
     Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious 
     consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that 
     a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which 
     would place their troops in greater danger, will result in 
     their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its 
     collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, 
     would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist 
     in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a 
     difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral 
     lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and 
     pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined 
     mission.
       I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached 
     a crossroads. As you know, we are working intensively with 
     our allies on concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and 
     enable it to continue to make a significant difference in 
     Bosnia, as it has--for all its deficiencies--over the past 
     three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has been 
     critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that 
     feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia; 
     until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a 
     fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of 
     central Bosnia is at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation 
     is holding. UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these 
     significant results.
       Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear 
     that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to 
     contribute to peace. I am determined to make every effort to 
     provide, with our allies, for more robust and meaningful 
     UNPROFOR action. We are now working to implement the 
     agreement reached last Friday in London to threaten 
     substantial and decisive use of NATO air power if the Bosnian 
     Serbs attack Gorazde and to strengthen protection of Sarajevo 
     using the Rapid Reaction Force. These actions lay the 
     foundation for stronger measures to protect the other safe 
     areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this 
     delicate moment will undermine those efforts. It will provide 
     our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will 
     provide the pretext for absolving themselves of 
     responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger 
     role at this critical moment.
       It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. 
     action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, as I have 
     noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO 
     operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation 
     is 

[[Page S 10652]]
     complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. 
     It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until 
     the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the 
     Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air 
     support and if that fails, more active military support. At 
     that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as 
     a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill 
     the void--in military support, humanitarian aid and in 
     response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will 
     risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching 
     implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's 
     withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated 
     solution for the foreseeable future.
       In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. 
     We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by 
     ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO 
     Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should 
     not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the 
     Balkan conflict.
       I am prepared to veto any resolution or bill that may 
     require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms 
     embargo. It will make a bad situation worse. I ask that you 
     not support the pending legislation, S. 21.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.
     

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