[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 120 (Monday, July 24, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1501-E1502]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                      TURKEY AS A STRATEGIC ASSET

                                 ______


                           HON. ED WHITFIELD

                              of kentucky

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, July 24, 1995
  Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' 
attention a recent op-ed piece which appeared in the Washington Times 
and which I believe deserves attention.
  Alexander Haig writes from the point of view of both a former 
Secretary of State and NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe. I hope my colleagues will take time to read this valuable piece 
and carefully consider its message.

[[Page E1502]]


               [From the Washington Times, June 25, 1995]

                Undervaluation of a key strategic asset

       Years ago, a Turkish general was quoted as saying that the 
     trouble with being allied to the Americans was that you never 
     knew when they would stab themselves in the back. This half-
     serious observation expressed the U.S.-Turkish relationship 
     well. It was solid overall but subject to inexplicable 
     actions, often on Washington's part, that simply negated 
     America's own self-interest.
       That is in fact what we are doing once again today. 
     American aid to Turkey has been steadily reduced. Much of it 
     is no longer grant aid at all but loans that since 1994 have 
     been financed at market interest rates. For 1995, even this 
     package has been subjected to restriction, including attempts 
     to tie it to Cyprus, various human rights issues and Turkey's 
     relationship with Armenia.
       The generally punitive approach of these amendments reflect 
     American politics at their worst--totally bereft of any 
     consideration of our own strategic interests. A familiar 
     complaint about our relationship with Turkey is that it 
     should be re-examined in light of the end of the Cold War. 
     The implication, of course, is to devalue the alliance as no 
     longer so necessary in the absence of a Soviet threat.
       The alliance should be re-examined but the critics will be 
     disappointed. A strong U.S.-Turkish partnership remains 
     fundamental to American interests.
       First, Turkey's geographical position puts it in a bad 
     neighborhood that is still vital to U.S. security. This was 
     illustrated dramatically by the Persian Gulf war. There 
     should be no doubt that without Turkey's help in closing 
     Iraq's pipelines, allowing use of North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization air bases and general political support we could 
     not have defeated Saddam Hussein. Turkey was and is 
     fundamental to an anti-Saddam coalition.
       Second, the outcome of the war, as we know, was not to 
     create a new Gulf security order, much less a new world 
     order. Instead we have seen four years of broken-back warfare 
     against Saddam's regime. For this Turkey has paid a very 
     large economic price exacted through disrupted trade and oil 
     flows. The consequences for the Kurdish-populated regions of 
     Turkey and Iraq have been even more troublesome. Operation 
     Provide Comfort, run from Turkey, has averted the worst for 
     the northern Kurds but not established security or peace. 
     Instead the PKK, an authentic terrorist movement helped by 
     such human rights activists as the Assad regime in Syria, 
     among others, has found save haven in northern Iraq. Turkey's 
     recent military incursion was intended to settle this issue 
     or at least to diminish the problem. But whatever the outcome 
     this is indisputable: The failure of American policy to 
     settle with Saddam has been borne very heavily by Turkey.
       To this trouble must be added another. The newly 
     independent states of the former Soviet-run Central Asia see 
     new economic and political relationships with such countries 
     as Turkey and Iran as the best route to secure their future. 
     The oil and gas of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan must flow 
     through these countries or be controlled again by Russian 
     hands on the tap.
       Whatever the potential today the Caucasus is torn by war, 
     the Chechnya slaughter; the Russian-manipulated civil war in 
     Georgia; and the Russian-influenced contest between Armenia 
     and Azerbijan.
       Seen from Ankara, the once-promising prospect of a less 
     dangerous Central Asia has dissolved into bloodshed and a 
     revival of Russian ambitions. The Turks must view with great 
     alarm, and so should we, the idea that the Russians will be 
     allowed to station large forces there in violation of the 
     conventional arms-reduction treaty (CFE) about to come into 
     force. It is inexplicable that at the recent Moscow summit 
     President Clinton supported revisions in these force levels 
     in the name of stability; in virtually every instance, 
     Russian military action has made things worse not better.
       Finally, there is the frightening consequence of continued 
     mismanagement of the Bosnian crises by the United Nations and 
     NATO, and especially the U.S. failure to act clearheadedly in 
     this crisis, which risks the continuation of essential 
     secular leadership in Ankara. A worst case outcome of Bosnia 
     could well broaden the conflict in a way that might result in 
     Turkey's involvement, with unforeseeable consequences for 
     Western interests.
       Against this geopolitical backdrop, the paragons of human 
     rights have railed against Turkey's democracy--and Prime 
     Minister Tansu Cillar has admitted that Turkish democracy is 
     a less-than-perfect mechanism with plenty of rough edges.
       We must all be alarmed at the growth of anti-Western 
     sentiment disguised as a return to Islam. In Turkey, as in 
     many other countries, the end of the Cold War has given rise 
     to a struggle for national identity. But whose side shall we 
     take? That of the less-than-perfect democrats or that of the 
     authentic anti-democrats?
       At this critical juncture, those who support cuts in 
     assistance or in support for Turkey are willfully blind to 
     U.S. strategic interests. The Turks are a hardy people; they 
     will survive as best they can. But this is not the time for 
     America to stab its own interests in the back. The stakes are 
     too high.
       In the absence of an effective U.S.-Turkish partnership, 
     the entire U.S. position in the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
     East will be the biggest loser. The winners will be neither 
     pro-Western nor those interested in human rights. It is high 
     time that we recovered from strategic amnesia.
     

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