[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 119 (Friday, July 21, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10506-S10507]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 BOSNIA

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President,
   2 days ago, President Clinton called me to ask that 

[[Page S10507]]
  I delay the vote on the Dole-Lieberman legislation until after the 
London meeting, which ended just a short while ago.

  I agreed to the President's request. Unfortunately, the London 
meeting was a disappointment--another dazzling display of ducking the 
problem. Instead of clarity and decisiveness, once again we have 
ambiguity and a lowest common denominator approach.
  Instead of dumping the dual key it has been modified. Instead of 
responding to the fall of Zepa and Srebrenica, these two eastern 
enclaves have been written off. Most egregiously, the London meeting 
reaffirmed the current failed U.N. operation.
  In the wake of the fall of Zepa, it is hard for me to imagine that 
anyone still believes that the U.N. mission is viable in Bosnia--that 
what we are witnessing is anything but a colossal, collective 
catastrophe.
  Yesterday, the Bosnian Presidency building was shelled while the 
European envoy, Carl Bildt, was meeting with the Bosnian President. If 
attacks on Sarajevo continue, what will be the West's response? Another 
meeting. According to Secretary Christopher, the focus of U.N. efforts 
will be to open access to the city for humanitarian aid. Yes; the 
Bosnian people need food. They also need protection.
  The London meeting
   reportedly produced a decision to defend Gorazde through a 
substantial response--after a serious warning is given to the Serbs. 
Gorazde is already under attack. How much further do the Bosnian Serbs 
have to go before the warning is triggered?

  The Serbs are becoming more aggressive and more defiant by the hour. 
The London meeting made it clear there would be no immediate or 
decisive response except more meetings.
  In effect, what the Clinton administration and European leaders are 
doing is trying to manage the conflict--to limit the war's consequences 
without providing a solution. Or, as the Bosnian Prime Minister said, 
without dealing with the real problem--which is Belgrade-sponsored 
aggression.
  Western leaders in London also called for a cease-fire and more 
negotiations. It has been 1 year since the Bosnian Government signed 
the so-called contact group's plan. Why should the Serbs sign now after 
yet another display of fecklessness?
  It is crystal clear that the London meeting did not produce a 
solution. It did not result in a policy.
  I believe that the Senate will not be fooled by administration spin 
doctors who will no doubt announce great results
 from the London meeting.

  I believe that there is a substantial majority in favor of the Dole-
Lieberman legislation and that the disappointing outcome of the London 
meeting will only serve to strengthen that support.
  Once again, I want to emphasize that the Dole-Lieberman legislation 
lifts the U.S. arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws. It seems to me 
that this point is being deliberately ignored and intentionally 
obfuscated by those allied and administration officials who claim that 
the Dole-Lieberman legislation if passed will be responsible for a U.N. 
pull-out. This does not take effect until they are out, so we will not 
be responsible for a pull-out.
  No doubt this is a political tactic designed to find excuses for what 
is the inevitable end of the U.N. mission in Bosnia. It may not be 
today, may not be tomorrow, but this will end as a consequence of its 
own failed policy. If only administration and allied officials would 
spend as much time designing a new policy as they do designing new 
excuses for their inability to develop an effective and principled 
policy. The bottom line is that passage of the Dole-Lieberman bill may 
be an excuse for U.N. withdrawal, but it will not be a cause.
  The dire administration predictions of humanitarian disaster have 
come true--but not because of lifting the arms embargo, but because of 
a lack of
 American leadership and a willingness to go along with failure in the 
name of consensus. Despite the paternalistic assertions made by 
administration officials that they have the best interests of the 
Bosnians at heart, the present approach is not humanitarian, it is 
inhumane. First, the Bosnians were corralled into giant refugee camps, 
then disarmed, and then left unprotected.

  With respect to the assertion that this legislation would give the 
Bosnian President the right to send 25,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia I 
would make three points: First, the commitment to send 25,000 U.S. 
troops to Bosnia for either a withdrawal or to police a settlement is a 
commitment that was made by President Clinton--and not pursuant to any 
request by the Bosnian Government or the result of any congressional 
action. Second, the days of colonialism are over. The Bosnian 
Government is a sovereign government and has the right to tell the 
British, French, Dutch, and other forces if and when it wants them to 
leave. Third, President Clinton has yet to make his case to the 
Congress that 25,000 troops are needed for such a withdrawal. Let us 
not forget that the Dutch troops in Srebrenica negotiated their 
departure with the Serbs--they were not rescued by U.S. marines.
  Let me also indicate, as I was told by the foreign minister just a 
few days ago, he said there were about only 30 U.N. personnel in 
Serbian-held territory. Somebody said that figure is much higher, maybe 
500, maybe 600; but, again, it would not take 25,000 American troops to 
rescue 30 or 500 or 1,000 U.N. personnel.
  We have been assured by the Moslems that they would in no way 
interfere with the withdrawal.
  Finally, I would like to say that a belated NATO response to the 
brutal Serb onslaught in the Eastern enclaves is not a substitute for a 
policy. The U.N. operation is a failure. That is a fact. And no amount 
of reshuffling will change that fact.
  Neither Bandaids, nor reconstructive surgery will save the U.N. 
operation in Bosnia. Lifting the arms embargo and letting the Bosnians 
defend themselves is the only policy option which has any hope of 
saving them--and saving United States credibility.
  I might point out, the New York Times--which has been struggling with 
this issue editorially, as many have on the floor, today, and maybe 
that will be referred to by my colleague from Connecticut--said rather 
flatly, it is time to lift the embargo. It is time to lift the arms 
embargo. If we do not want to Americanize what is happening there, and 
we want to give this independent nation a right to defend itself, then 
the course is clear. Lift the arms embargo after withdrawing the U.N. 
forces, and then we believe we can supply the Muslims with weapons. 
They can be trained in safe places with no hazard, by anybody in the 
United States or any United States force who might be involved in any 
weapons or training or whatever.
  We believe this is not the best solution. There are not any good 
solutions. It gives an independent nation a right to defend itself and 
gives the people in that nation a right to defend themselves. In my 
view, sooner or later, it will happen.
  Maybe not this week. Maybe not next week. Maybe not next month. But 
winter is coming very soon in that part of the world, and I believe 
before that happens, U.N. forces will be withdrawn or on the way out. 
Then, perhaps, the Bosnians will have an opportunity to do what they 
wanted to do for some time.
  I do not mean to dismiss the humanitarian aid that has been provided. 
It has been helpful in some cases, but unintentionally, the U.N. 
protection forces have become a barrier, which unintentionally has been 
a help to the Serb aggressors, and not to the poor people who are 
trapped in the enclaves.
  So far, one has fallen. Another is about to fall. Clearly, everyone 
is in danger.


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