[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 119 (Friday, July 21, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10488-S10489]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                           REGULATORY REFORM

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, throughout the continuing debate on 
regulatory reform a number of things have become very clear:
  First, the vast majority of Members of the Senate want regulatory 
reform--the speeches, the floor debates, the combined totals of the 
votes for reform of one kind or another show that Democrats and 
Republicans alike want regulatory reform.
  Second, despite bipartisan refusal to accept the majority leader's 
bill, there is bipartisan support for tough regulatory reform 
legislation as shown by the 48-to 52-vote to substitute the Glenn-
Chafee bill--a bill based on the bipartisan work of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee--for the Dole-Johnston bill.
  Third, despite the majority leader's disappointment in his failure to 
gain acceptance for his proposal, there continues to be wide support 
for continuing to negotiate cooperatively to come up with a workable 
reform bill. We have made good faith efforts throughout this debate: we 
have come to the table on three different occasions with the proponents 
of the Dole-Johnston substitute; we have written lists of issues and 
have provided legislative language to address our concerns. The latest 
round of these efforts to provide our responses to some of their 
proposals was yesterday--just an hour before the third cloture vote. 
These lists were not new inventions of new problems, but a consistent, 
continuing set of concerns. Our list of concerns has narrowed as 
negotiations have progressed. We have not, as some Members have 
alleged, invented new problems merely to delay or confuse the debate.
  Fourth and finally, in the heat of this debate, in what seems to be a 
part of the desperation of a few to make the best of a bad situation, 
some unfortunate and misleading statements have been made about our 
bill. I am very disappointed, and in fact surprised, by the statements 
of Senator Roth. We worked together in the Governmental Affairs 
Committee to make his regulatory reform bill, S. 291, into a strong 
bipartisan bill that could be and indeed was supported by every member 
of the Committee--8 Republicans and 7 Democrats. Just when the Wall 
Street Journal was unfairly and inaccurately characterizing the Roth 
bill as ``a do-nothing bill'' as it did on April 27, 1995, Senator Roth 
and I were working together and agreeing that we had a tough but fair 
bill that could gain the support of the Committee and should be the 
bill that could and should pass the full Senate.
  Last week he made charges against the Glenn-Chafee bill with regard 
to risk assessment provisions, saying that we took the National Academy 
of Sciences ``minority views'' by preferring ``default assumptions to 
relevant data.'' As I pointed out on the floor, that was not correct. 
Our bill says to use default assumptions when relevant data are 
lacking. And our bill requires agencies to put out guidelines in 
refining default assumptions and replacing those assumptions with real 
data. Clearly, our bill does not give a preference to assumptions over 
data.
  Yesterday, and this is the reason I return to the floor today to set 
the record straight, he said the Glenn-Chafee bill is ``toothless''--
yes, just the word the Wall Street Journal used to attack him a few 
months ago, that it is completely different from the Roth-Glenn bill 
that came out of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and that it has a 
completely different thrust.
  It is also ironic that my colleague from Delaware now so clearly 
defends the S. 291 review process, stating on July 17 on the floor, 
``Although the original Glenn bill was similar to the Roth bill, the 
current Glenn substitute seriously differs from the Roth bill * * * 
Senator Glenn has seriously weakened the review of rules * * * The 
revised Glenn substitute lacks any firm requirement about the number of 
rules to be reviewed.'' However, in his ``Dear Colleague'' letter on 
July 11 he states, ``S. 291--and S. 1001--has substantial 
administrative difficulties. They require every major rule to be 
reviewed in a 10-year period, with a possible 5-year extension, or be 
subject to termination. * * * It would be very burdensome to review all 
existing major rules--unduly burdensome when nobody is complaining 
about many of them.'' He calls us weak for not sticking to the Roth 
bill, and then calls the Roth bill ``unduly burdensome.''
  I can understand loyalty, but I am surprised at the degree to which 
my colleague has turned away from his earlier, commendable reform 
efforts. He has now put himself in the strange position of attacking 
many of the same provisions he so enthusiastically supported just a few 
short months ago.
  Yesterday, I insisted that the Glenn-Chafee bill is based on the 
Roth-Glenn bill, S. 291, and that the Glenn-Chafee bill is largely 
identical with S. 291. In fact, the Glenn-Chafee bill differs from S. 
291 in only three major ways to match S. 1001 and a few lesser ways in 
order to match amendments to the Dole-Johnston bill. Senator Roth, on 
the other hand, said ``what we voted for in Committee was entirely 
different from what we voted for on the floor in the Glenn 
substitute.'' For the record, I would like to provide a comparison of 
the two bills, and as the Record will show, most of the sections are 
identical. To reiterate, we made three changes, and we made additional 
changes to match amendments to the Dole-Johnston bill.
  First, the Glenn-Chafee substitute, which was voted for by 48 
Senators, is a slight modification of S. 1001, which I introduced with 
Senator Chafee. S. 1001 differs from S. 291 on only three major points:
  It does not sunset rules that fail to be reviewed. Rather it 
establishes an action-enforcing mechanism that uses the rulemaking 
process.
  It does not include any narrative definitions for ``major'' rule--
such as ``adverse effects on wages''.
  It incorporates technical changes to risk assessment to track more 
closely the approach of the National Academy of Sciences and to cover 
specific programs and agencies, not just agencies.
  Second, in the weeks since introduction of S. 1001, negotiations and 
debate have resulted in common agreement on improvements, both to the 
Dole-Johnston and the Glenn-Chafee proposals. Accordingly, the final 
version of Glenn-Chafee, which again was supported by a bipartisan vote 
of 48 Senators, contains some additional changes. Most of these are 
also found in the Dole-Johnston bill, which Senator Roth now supports. 
So I find it difficult to understand how the Senator from Delaware can 
criticize these changes.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a comparison of the two 
bills be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the comparison was ordered to be printed in 
the Record; as follows:

      Section By Section Comparison of Glenn-Chafee and Roth-Glenn

       Section 1. Title.
       Section 2. Definitions--identical.
       Section 3(a). Analysis of Agency Rules.
       Subchapter II. Cost-Benefit Analysis.
       Section 621. Definitions--identical but for changes made in 
     Dole/Johnston.
       Section 622. Rulemaking cost-benefit analysis--identical 
     except for changes made in the Dole/Johnston bill; the time 
     limit for determining a major rule after publication of a 
     proposed rule; and the effective date for initial and final 
     cost-benefit analysis (does not cover rules in the pipeline).
       Sec. 623. Judicial Review--identical but for clarification 
     in 623(e).
       Sec. 624. Deadlines for Rulemaking--identical.
       Sec. 625. Agency Regulatory Review. As already noted, S. 
     1001 modified the S. 291 review process so as to not sunset 
     rules that fail to be reviewed. Rather it establishes an 
     action-enforcing mechanism that uses the rulemaking process. 
     Also struck provision 

[[Page S10489]]
     that allows the President to select rules for review and to track 
     changes made in the Dole/Johnston bill.
       Sec. 626. Public Participation and Accountability--
     identical.
       Sec. 627. Conflict of Interest Relating to Cost-Benefit 
     Analyses and Risk Assessments. Added the Pryor-Feingold floor 
     amendment also accepted as an amendment to the Dole-Johnston 
     bill.
       Subchapter III. Risk Assessment
       Sec. 631. Risk Assessment Definitions--same as the Dole-
     Johnston bill, except modification of ``screening analysis.''
       Sec. 632. Risk Assessment Applicability. Changed 
     applicability of risk assessment requirements from all 
     agencies to agencies concerned with environment, health, or 
     safety.
       Sec. 633. Risk Assessment Savings Provision--struck (2).
       Sec. 634. Principles for Risk Assessments. Incorporates 
     technical changes to risk assessment, reducing prescriptive 
     language. Also combined ``principles for risk assessments'' 
     (Roth section 635) and ``principles for risk 
     characterizations'' (Roth section 636).
       Sec. 635. Peer Review--Identical except for changes made in 
     the Dole-Johnston bill.
       Sec. 636. Risk Assessment Guidelines, Plan for Assessing 
     New Information, and Report--identical.
       Sec. 637. Research and Training in Risk Assessment--
     identical.
       Sec. 638. Risk Assessment Interagency Coordination--
     identical.
       Sec. 639. Plan for Review of Risk Assessments--identical.
       Sec. 640. Risk Assessment Judicial Review--identical.
       Sec. 640a. Risk Assessment Deadlines for Rulemaking--
     identical.
       Subchapter IV. Executive Oversight.
       Sec. 641. Executive Oversight Definition--identical.
       Sec. 642. Executive Oversight Procedures--identical.
       Sec. 643. Promulgation and Adoption of Executive Oversight 
     Procedures--identical.
       Sec. 644. Delegation of Authority for Executive Oversight--
     identical.
       Sec. 645. Public Disclosure of Information with Regard to 
     Executive Oversight--identical.
       Sec. 646. Judicial Review of Executive Oversight--
     identical.
       Sec. 3(b) Regulatory Flexibility--identical.
       Sec. 611. Judicial Review of Regulatory Flexibility Act 
     Decisions--identical.
       Sec. 3(c) Presidential Authority--identical.
       Sec. 4. Congressional Review.
       Sec. 801. Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking--
     identical.
       Sec. 5. Studies and Reports--identical.
       Sec. 6. Risk-Based Priorities--Identical but for agreed 
     upon changes made on the floor with Senator Roth and others 
     to the Dole-Johnston bill.
       Sec. 7. Regulatory Accounting--identical.
       Sec. 8. Effective Date--Added at the end ``and shall apply 
     to any agency rule for which a general notice of proposed 
     rulemaking is published on or after such date.''
     

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