[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 119 (Friday, July 21, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1487-E1488]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E1487]]


                    ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA

                                 ______


                          HON. HARRY JOHNSTON

                               of florida

                    in the house of representatives

                          Friday, July 21, 1995
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to introduce into 
the Record our ranking member's insightful, thought-provoking analysis 
of the crisis in Bosnia.
                      Continuing Crisis in Bosnia

                          (By Lee H. Hamilton)


                            i. introduction

       It is a pleasure to be here today and a privilege to 
     address this distinguished group. The World Affairs Council 
     of Washington has long fostered a better understanding of 
     American foreign policy. It has served as an important forum 
     for considering important foreign policy issues.
       Today I want to talk about one of the toughest foreign 
     policy issues since the end of the cold war: the war in 
     Bosnia. It's at the top of the foreign policy agenda right 
     now. It has evoked more frustration than any other foreign 
     policy issue since the Vietnam war. It is an issue that will 
     not go away, much as we would like it to.
       Secretary Perry was right on the mark the other day when he 
     said, ``We are at a defining moment in this war, and the 
     actions we take in the next few weeks are going to be very 
     critical.''


                       ii. crisis in bosnia today

       Before the fall of Srebrenica, the military, diplomatic and 
     humanitarian situation in Bosnia was bleak enough. Today the 
     agony of Bosnia is almost unbearable.
       The UN peacekeeping operation, UNPROFOR, is on the verge of 
     collapse. The UN and NATO no longer appear able--or willing--
     to fulfill the pledges they made to protect safe areas and 
     establish weapons-free zones.
       On the humanitarian front--in the past, one of the few 
     achievements--aid shipments have also been blocked. There is 
     starvation in some cities and events like Srebrenica only 
     compound the humanitarian disaster.
       Diplomacy, too, is at a standstill. Neither the Bosnian 
     government nor the Bosnian Serbs seem interested in a 
     diplomatic settlement. The Contact Group--the United States, 
     Russia, Britain, France, and Germany--still has a peace plan 
     and a map on the table. But the Contact Group has not yet 
     convinced the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. Talks 
     with Serbian President Milosevic to recognize Bosnia and 
     undercut the Bosnian Serbs--in exchange for a partial lifting 
     of the embargo--are also stalled.
       The military picture is worsening. The deployment of the 
     new 10,000-strong British-French-Dutch rapid reaction force 
     to buttress UNPROFOR is a last ditch effort to prevent for 
     the collapse of that mission. UNPROFOR may decide to leave 
     soon if the fighting continues or if the remaining safe areas 
     prove indefensible.
       In short, we are on the verge of a new and dangerous phase 
     in this tragic war.
       There is a growing feeling in Congress that UNPROFOR has 
     failed and should leave Bosnia and that the arms embargo 
     should be lifted to allow the Bosnian government to defend 
     itself and to improve its position at the bargaining table.
       Members of Congress also understand that the President has 
     made a commitment to help UNPROFOR withdraw, if it comes to 
     that. All that points to U.S. involvement.
       On the other hand, I see little support, either in Congress 
     or among the American people, for a U.S. military mission in 
     Bosnia. President Clinton will have an uphill battle winning 
     support in Congress for sending troops to Bosnia for any 
     purpose.
       The question is, are there any other options?


                     iii. u.s. interests in bosnia

       The fundamental problem for U.S. policy in Bosnia is the 
     gap between what we say we want to achieve and the resources 
     we are willing to commit to this crisis.
       The Clinton Administration came into office determined to 
     address the humanitarian tragedy of Bosnia. But it soon made 
     a judgment that the United States does not have vital 
     national interests at stake in this war. I agree. Bosnia has 
     no strategic or economic significance.
       Whenever I return home to my district in Indiana, it is 
     clear that Bosnia is of no real significance to the people of 
     Indiana. It is not a place they are willing to send their 
     children to fight and to die.
       Yet, as President Clinton has emphasized, the U.S. has 
     important interests. These interests include:
       Preventing a wider war in the Balkans that could engulf our 
     NATO allies and spread instability throughout Europe.
       Stopping the slaughter of innocent civilians and securing 
     the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
       Maintaining NATO as a powerful and credible force in the 
     post cold-war world; and
       Maintaining the credibility of the United Nations and 
     strengthening its ability to respond to future crises.
       With the horrible ethnic cleansing and bombardment of 
     civilian populations there
      is an understandable desire to resond--to help victims, 
     punish aggression and stop the killing.
       But U.S. foreign policy cannot respond to every tradegy 
     around the world or attempt to right every wrong, especially 
     when the American people do not favor intervention.
       The only way to turn back Serb aggression in Bosnia is to 
     send hundreds of thousands of ground troops into combat, and 
     occupy Bosnia for many years to come. The United States has 
     never considered doing that. Neither the President nor 
     Congress, past or present, have been Bosnia as a vital 
     American interest worth that enormous risk and sacrifice.


                     iv. policy choices we have now

       I know there have never been good choices or simple 
     solutions to the war in Bosnia. We must deal within the 
     narrow options dictated by the realities on the ground, 
     domestic political pressures in the United States, and the 
     policies of our allies.
       Right now we have three basic options:
       The first option is what I call Lift, Strike and Train.
       Many in Congress believe that UNPROFOR has failed and 
     should be withdrawn and that the arms embargo should be 
     lifted.
       A bill sponsored by Senators Dole and Lieberman will come 
     up in the Senate this week. It calls for the lifting of the 
     embargo either after the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, or 12 weeks 
     after the Bosnian government asks UNPROFOR to withdraw.
       Some who support this option recognize that it commits the 
     United States to war--through training and equipping Bosnian 
     forces, and through air strikes to defend Bosnian forces 
     until they can defend themselves.
       Yet the chief sponsors of this proposal are silent on its 
     consequences. They talk about ``letting the Bosnian people 
     defend themselves.'' But they do not spell out what happens 
     next. Lifting the arms embargo is fraught with peril for the 
     United States.
       The basic fact is that if we lift the embargo, so will the 
     Russians. There will still be no level playing field in 
     Bosnia, just more weapons on each side and wider war. We run 
     the risk of getting drawn into a proxy war with Russia in the 
     Balkans, the sort of nightmare scenario we sought to avoid 
     during 40 years of the Cold War.
       Unless NATO is willing to launch air strikes to protect the 
     Bosnians, the Bosnian
      Serbs--with Serbia's help--will crush them in the time it 
     will take to train and supply Bosnian forces. If the air 
     strikes are not enough, the allies will be forced either 
     to retreat or escalate with ground forces.
       If lifting the embargo is anything more than rhetoric, the 
     sponsors have an obligation to spell out their strategy. Who 
     will supply the arms? Who will deliver them? Who will train 
     the Bosnians to use them? Who's going to pay for them? Who 
     will protect them while they are training?
       The answer to all these questions is the United States. The 
     United States will also have to feed and protect the civilian 
     population once UNPROFOR leaves.
       The Dole proposal does not address these concerns. In fact, 
     it just hands over a key U.S. foreign policy decision to the 
     Bosnian government. We tell the Bosnian government: You 
     decide. Make a request to lift the embargo, and we'll do it. 
     No discretion. No judgment. Just do it.
       In the process of lifting the embargo, the Dole proposal 
     will kill the initiative to strengthen UNPROFOR, force UN 
     peacekeepers to withdraw instead and trigger the deployment 
     of 25,000 U.S. troops to assist in that withdrawal.
       In short, the Dole proposal means direct U.S. military 
     intervention in Bosnia. That is precisely why the Bosnian 
     government supports it.
       The second option is to get UNPROFOR out and let the 
     parties fight it out.
       There is a growing sense that the UN is no longer able to 
     carry out its mission in Bosnia, and that the parties 
     themselves do not want to make peace.
       According to this view, we should set a date certain for 
     the termination of UNPROFOR--perhaps at the end of its 
     current mandate at the end of November--if there is no 
     progress on the negotiating front.
       We must understand how difficult this business of 
     withdrawal is going to be. It is not going to be a quick, 
     easy, risk-free withdrawal.
       A pullout by UNPROFOR, with or without a lifting of the 
     arms embargo, will involve U.S. troops on the ground in 
     Bosnia. In theory, they would be in Bosnia for only a matter 
     of weeks, and only to help UNPROFOR 

[[Page E1488]]
     withdraw. They would not be involved in combat. But a withdrawal 
     mission will almost certainly expose U.S. troops to hostile 
     fire. Casualties are likely.
       The withdrawal of UNPROFOR also threatens to trap U.S. 
     troops in Bosnia.
      UNPROFOR'S pullout would leave the people of Bosnia exposed 
     to humanitarian disaster. The presence of a well-armed, 
     disciplined U.S. force in the midst of that disaster would 
     lead to enormous pressure on that force to stay--to 
     protect civilians, deliver humanitarian supplies, and even 
     takes sides in the war. It will be difficult to resist 
     that pressure.
       Even if we want to leave, we may not be able to. Tens of 
     thousands of Bosnian refugees, left in dire circumstances, 
     will rush to the withdrawal forces for protection. They will 
     try to block UNPROFOR'S withdrawal.
       Remember, too, that as the UN peacekeepers leave, the 
     contending parties are likely to grab more land. We will have 
     to decide whether to use our air power and combat troops in 
     response.
       In short, there will be no such thing as an orderly 
     withdrawal from Bosnia.
       The third option is to strengthen UN peacekeeping and 
     continue negotiations.
       The proposal to strengthen UNPROFOR, stay the course, and 
     focus on moving the parties toward a negotiated settlement is 
     the least bad option. It will not provide a moral and just 
     settlement, but at least it will stop the killing. This is a 
     realistic and responsible policy.
       Keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia, beefed up by the Rapid Reaction 
     Force, at least for the next two to three months, gives 
     negotiations one last chance. We should support French and 
     British efforts to protect remaining safe havens. I have 
     doubts about an airlift using American helicopters to ferry 
     British and French troops into Gorazde. The use of more 
     aggressive air strikes against the Serbs certainly must be 
     considered.
       Maintaining the unity and cohesion in NATO must remain a 
     paramount U.S. strategic consideration. We should act 
     together with our NATO allies. I do not want Bosnia to become 
     the sole responsibility of the United States. Whatever we do 
     should be in cooperation with the Europeans and others whose 
     troops are exposed on the ground.
       There is no acceptable alternative. Any other course of 
     action would provoke the collapse of UNPROFOR, a wider war, 
     and the deployment of U.S. ground troops in the middle of a 
     dangerous war.
       For all of its obvious shortcomings UNPROFOR has produced 
     much good in Bosnia.
       UNPROFOR has kept hundreds of thousands of people alive 
     through the delivery of humanitarian aid.
       UNPROFOR has helped contain the fighting. In the first year 
     of the war, 1992, there were upwards of 100,000 casualties 
     before the deployment of UNPROFOR. This past year, the number 
     of casualties was 3000. If UNPROFOR goes, we risk rekindling 
     savagery of the magnitude that led to its deployment in the 
     first place.
       Time may be running out on this option, but we should still 
     give it more time before we pull UNPROFOR out.
       We must also do everything possible to get the peace 
     negotiations back on track.
       The only way to stop the killing and end this war is 
     through a negotiated agreement acceptable to all sides--not 
     wider war. We must continue to search for diplomatic, 
     political and economic steps that will press the parties, 
     especially the Serbs, to accept a peaceful outcome.
       We must exploit the desire of the Serbs throughout the 
     former Yugoslavia for recognition, acceptance and re-
     integration into the world community.
       To gain concessions at the negotiating table, we must use 
     as leverage Milosevic's political and economic need to end 
     the sanctions and re-enter the world community.
       We must be flexible enough in these negotiations to 
     facilitate an agreement that will reflect realities on the 
     ground--yet be fair enough to secure Bosnia as an integral 
     state, however decentralized that state may be.
       We must be realistic and flexible for one key reason: In 
     the absence of NATO ground troops--including the U.S.--the 
     Bosnian government stands to gain more territory at the peace 
     table than it can ever gain on the battlefield.


                       v. ending policy ambiguity

       I urge the Clinton Administration to adopt this third 
     option--to strengthen UN peacekeeping and press forward with 
     negotiations--and stick with it.
       Past ambiguities in U.S. policy have prolonged this war. 
     Last year, I advised our top policymakers that it was time 
     for brutal honesty on Bosnia.
       Candor and honesty would have been helpful then, and are 
     urgent now.
       We have not been straightforward with the Bosnian 
     government. They are still waiting for us to come to the 
     rescue. We must be honest with them, and with ourselves. We 
     should make it clear to the Bosnian government that it should 
     get the best deal it can, because the cavalry is not coming 
     to the rescue.
       We have been trying to please all sides. We want to support 
     the Bosnian government against Serbian aggression, we want to 
     keep U.S. troops out of Bosnia, and we want to end the war. 
     But these goals are not compatible. It is impossible to 
     achieve any one of these goals without compromising the other 
     two.
       We must choose: do we want to fuel an open-ended Balkan war 
     with uncertain outcome or do we want to work with our friends 
     and allies to stop the killing?


                             vi. conclusion

       Bosnia has been a hellish problem for this Administration, 
     and for this country. There are no heroes among the 
     policymakers, and there is plenty of blame to go around. We 
     cannot undo what has happened in this war, absent a 
     commitment of ground troops and resources that neither the 
     United States nor its allies are prepared to make.
       We need to end the war in Bosnia not only to stop the 
     senseless killing, but because a failure to end it will have 
     a continuing, corrosive impact on NATO and the United 
     Nations. We need these institutions to address future crises 
     through collective action.
       If the parties in Bosnia want to fight, we can't stop them 
     from fighting. Yet I believe we still have an opportunity to 
     end this war. There have been opportunities for peace in the 
     past that slipped away. The Contact Group plan and map are 
     still on the table. The parties' differences are not that 
     great--at least not in comparison to the costs of a looming 
     all-out war.
       We have one last chance to try to end this war before 
     UNPROFOR may be forced to withdraw. I urge the President to 
     use these few remaining weeks to clarify U.S. policy and 
     press as hard as he can for a negotiated peace settlement in 
     Bosnia--before he is called upon to send U.S. ground troops 
     to help our NATO allies leave.
     

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