[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 117 (Wednesday, July 19, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10300-S10303]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, thank you for the recognition.
  We are back on the Bosnia debate. In one sense, this debate should 
not be necessary. In the normal course of events, the President is the 
one who holds the duty to provide direction in these matters. I have 
long believed that our foreign policy ought to be directed by the chief 
executive officer and ratified by the Congress--the Senate--but not 
formulated.
 But the situation is far from normal in this instance.

  Our action today on this Bosnia resolution is required by a somewhat 
unusual, maybe unprecedented failure of leadership on a very important 
issue. The credibility of our Nation and the existence of NATO are at 
risk. But it seems that the administration moves from crisis to crisis 
in Bosnia without a clear definition of what our policy is or ought to 
be. We have alternated between indifference and almost panic, operating 
without purpose and often seemingly without principle.
  Over 2 years ago, as the policy of ``safe havens'' was being defined, 
I came to this floor expressing a concern and a question. ``A police 
action,'' I said, ``protecting safe havens, will probably stop some 
short-term suffering, but it will answer few long-term questions. After 
we purchase a temporary peace for fleeing refugees, what is our 
eventual goal?'' I asked. ``On this question,'' I then said, ``this 
administration is silent.''
  Now it is 2 years later and that eventual goal is still unclear, and 
that silence has become a source of considerable embarrassment. For, 2 
years later, little has changed. The situation is worse.
  We have maintained, during that period of time, a one-sided arms 
embargo against Bosnia which has only served to reinforce the 
advantages enjoyed by the Serb aggressors.
  We have placed critical command decisions in the hands of 
international bureaucrats who have not brought any military experience, 
political insight, or even moral courage to their position.
  We have made a series of threats against Serbian forces that proved 
hollow, empty, undermining our credibility with both friends and foes 
alike around the world.
  And we have repeatedly misled Bosnian leaders, first opposing and 
then supporting various initiatives, leaving the Bosnian Vice President 
to conclude ``We are going to die of these initiatives.''
  Mistake has followed failure in an unending downward spiral as each 
safe area became progressively unsafe.
  ``I don't remember a time,'' says one expert, ``when there was so 
much scorn for American foreign policy.'' Former British Secretary 
David Owen comments, ``To the day I go to my grave, I will not 
understand the policy.''
  The result has been an American retreat into a purely reactive mode. 
Our only role, it seems, is to respond to European proposals and 
initiatives. The only clear objectives of this administration seem to 
be to appease our allies and avoid political blame.
  Now the administration is reduced to floating another French 
proposal, which repeats every error of the past. It calls on us to 
place more troops into indefensible positions. It demands that we risk 
American lives to prove our loyalty to a failed NATO policy. And once 
again, it has no diplomatic or military end game. It continues an 
aimless and endless commitment.
  The President of France says the use of American helicopters and 
airmen is necessary ``to place the Americans squarely in front of their 
responsibilities.'' The effect would be to place our troops squarely in 
front of bullets as a symbolic commitment to a strategy which no one 
expects to succeed. It is hard to imagine a policy more destructive to 
American interests or more likely to lead to pointless loss of life.
  The central problem here is pretty clear. The ``safe haven'' approach 
has not worked. But even more than that, it could not have worked, even 
with less United Nations interference, even with more military 
commitment, because the safe havens were chosen for a humanitarian, not 
a military mission. Thus, the deployment of forces on the ground and 
the equipment they were given was matched for this humanitarian 
purpose, not for a military purpose. The troops were lightly armed and 
they were heavily restricted.
  But now we are being asked to expand that mission to a combat role 
from militarily indefensible and irrational positions. Each of these 
areas is a Moslem outpost in a sea of Serbian hostility. We are being 
asked to man and defend six exposed and vulnerable enclaves, apparently 
for an indefinite future.
  If all this sounds somewhat familiar, it should, because it is a 
policy that acts as though our experience in Somalia never happened; as 
though the deaths of those Rangers never took place. We attempted to 
expand that humanitarian effort into a military operation without 
holding military positions, without adopting military strategies, and 
without setting military goals. And under these circumstances, 
peacekeeping became bloodletting and nothing lasting was accomplished.
  Mr. President, we are accustomed to saying all options in Bosnia are 
bad, which has been used as an excuse for choosing those options which 
are worse. It is increasingly clear to me that only one approach is 
justified.
  Our goal should be the creation of a viable Bosnian state with 
defensible borders and the military equipment to uphold them. This goal 
will never be reached while the embargo remains in force.
  I believe we are led to this goal by two very direct American 
interests.
  First is our strategic interest in the containment of this crisis. 
The worst possible result here would be for the fighting to extend 
beyond Bosnia, to spread to Macedonia, Kosovo, and beyond. That would 
bring in other NATO allies and could result in a situation that would 
be far more difficult in the future than even what we face today. It 
seems to me the best way to make that result difficult and hopefully 
impossible is to have a viable Bosnian state in the region to provide a 
check against Serb aggression.
  Second, I suggest we have a moral interest and that moral interest is 
an eventual peace agreement between the parties in Bosnia. History 
offers no example of fruitful diplomacy or lasting peace between 
warring nations where the stronger power has a continued interest in 
conflict. Therefore, trying to 

[[Page S 10301]]
bring both sides into some parity of power will bring them to the 
table.
  All along, my problem with removing U.N. forces and lifting the 
embargo has been the safety of the safe havens. Establishing 
indefensible regions and calling them ``safe havens'' was a mistake in 
the first place, but that is the course we took and now those safe 
havens exist.
  The President himself, at the beginning, predicted that these areas 
would become ``shooting galleries.'' But they were adopted anyway, at 
European insistence, because America offered no alternative.
  When one top Clinton official was asked why the President accepted 
this proposal he responded: ``They''--meaning the Europeans--``showed 
up in town with a plan and he had no choice.''
  But the status of the safe havens has been the most difficult 
obstacle to changing the Bosnian policy. What would happen to these 
people, to whom we offered the temporary illusion of safety, when the 
United Nations left? But that dilemma, tragically, is quickly coming to 
an end. Precisely because these isolated areas only existed at the whim 
of Bosnian Serbs, they are now endangered. An indefinite commitment to 
safe havens is not, I suggest, a real option.
  Mr. President, I suggest a new Bosnian policy embody four principles.
  The first principle, there must be a timetable for withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR, the U.N. Protective Force. British and French troops in 
Bosnia are now the primary obstacle to any sensible policy in the 
region. Whenever anyone suggests some responsible action, like lifting 
the embargo, we are told that this is impossible because UNPROFOR 
forces, which are primarily British and French and some other nations--
those forces would be endangered. In fact every single member of 
UNPROFOR is now a virtual hostage, preventing a reasonable reassessment 
of our goals.
  One commentator has said, ``The U.N. might as well have deployed 
women and children.'' UNPROFOR has proven its inability to achieve its 
stated purpose and now stands as an impediment to a viable alternative 
policy.
  The second principle I suggest is that U.S. troops should not be used 
to symbolize our commitment to a failed NATO strategy. We are told that 
the deployment of American troops is necessary rather than risk further 
divisions in the Atlantic alliance. But this does nothing to rebuild 
the reputation of NATO, to join it in a policy that is doomed to fail. 
In fact, to advance down this path will further undermine NATO's 
fragile credibility. The United States should not accept either the 
deployment of American forces to defend the safe havens, or the use of 
10,000 American ground troops to help extract French and British 
forces.
  The Europeans have proposed this commitment to cement American 
involvement, not because they are militarily incapable of performing 
this mission themselves. If we do, however, reach an emergency in which 
the only means of rescuing the French and British involves a United 
States role, then I suppose that is part of our duty as an ally, and we 
ought to have the capability of responding.
  In addition, I am not opposed to using American communications, 
logistic support, and transport to help evacuate UNPROFOR. But this is 
entirely different than sending American infantry and Marines into the 
Bosnian quagmire as a show of political solidarity for a failed policy.
  The third principle that I would advocate is that after UNPROFOR have 
been evacuated we should lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. It is 
certainly preferable that this be done with the cooperation of our 
allies. But if it cannot be done with their cooperation, I believe that 
we should take this action unilaterally, as the Dole-Lieberman 
resolution directs.
  The effect of our current policy has been to deny the legitimate and 
inherent right of Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves. It has also 
prevented the creation of meaningful borders that could contain Serb 
aggression in the region. Maintaining the embargo is a violation of 
both our moral commitments and our direct national interests.
  In the short term, lifting the embargo may cause the fight to 
intensify. But this is a risk the Bosnians themselves seem eager to 
accept. Even under a crippling embargo, the Bosnians have fought with 
courage and tenacity. They show increasing organization and capability, 
and the Bosnian Serbs themselves are overextended and plagued by 
desertions. All the Bosnian Moslems lack are the heavy arms to match 
the Serbs. Once some balance or parity is achieved, and both sides have 
a reason to negotiate, the United States should be aggressive in 
mediating some solution.
  I am not suggesting that this is a policy without risks. It does 
carry risks. But there is good reason to believe that Bosnian Moslem 
resistance will not collapse if UNPROFOR leaves. It is the Bosnian 
Moslems themselves that assert they are prepared to assume their 
responsibilities.
  I cannot forget the personal plea of the Vice President of Bosnia 
when he testified before the Armed Services Committee: ``We repeat over 
and over again: we are not asking you for your troops to fight for us 
on the ground. That is our job and our task. But please do not combine 
any more big words with small deeds. God will not forgive you if you do 
nothing. Doing nothing creates a tragedy in Bosnia everyday.''
  I suggest that the fourth principle underlying our policy is that 
America must provide a serious strategy to contain the carnage in the 
Balkans. The flashpoints of future conflict are Macedonia and Kosovo. 
Here is where NATO has a compelling interest in building and fortifying 
a barrier against aggression.
  Currently, in these regions, we do not have a deterrent, only a 
tripwire under ineffective U.N. control. NATO should assume full 
control of this operation, not as a confused humanitarian effort, but 
as a serious military commitment.
  This, in general, is the approach adopted by the Dole-Lieberman bill. 
I believe the time has come for the Senate to support a strong measure 
and fill a vacuum of leadership that exists.
  Some will argue that this proposal will weaken NATO. Let me be clear: 
the health of NATO is essential to American interests. This historic 
comment is a continuing necessity. But this alliance was successful 
because its leadership has in the past been unquestioned. And that 
leadership was effectively provided, throughout the cold war, by 
America.
  There is nothing more likely to destroy NATO than for America to 
retreat from that leadership and abdicate its role. But that is exactly 
what this administration has allowed to happen. European leaders have 
attempted to fill that vacuum, but have not succeeded.
  In David Rieff's new book on Bosnia, he concludes: ``The story of 
Bosnian defeat is the story of Western European and North American 
disgrace. What has taken place in Bosnia has revealed the bankruptcy of 
every European security institution, from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
and exposed the fact that nowhere in these great structures was there 
either intellectual preparedness or moral fortitude for dealing with 
the crises of the post-cold-war world.''
  President Chirac commented yesterday, ``There is no leader of the 
Atlantic Alliance.'' That is unfortunately, tragically true. It is a 
disaster for Bosnia, for Europe and for the world.
  We will not reassert American authority by following European and 
U.N. officials further into this policy that has not worked. The best 
way to restore national integrity, I suggest, is by providing it with a 
strategy that will work. And the best way to preserve NATO is by 
leading it once again.
  Mr. President, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that lifting 
of the embargo is a policy option that we should adopt. It is clear 
that we will not--or should not, hopefully will not--place U.S. troops 
in an indefensible military situation to achieve an objective that has 
yet to be defined, in a military manner that has yet to be defined, 
with an end purpose that has yet to be defined.
  Therefore, I believe we should heed their request, and since we will 
not do that, and since the UNPROFOR forces are ineffective in terms of 
providing the protection that they promised the Bosnian Moslems, I 
believe it is time that we assert those principles that I 

[[Page S 10302]]
outlined--that we lift the embargo, and that we heed their request to 
allow them to defend their sovereign state.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is the Senate discussing the pending 
resolution to lift the embargo?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the pending business.
  Mr. BYRD. And there is no time under control?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time under control.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
                   united states policy toward bosnia

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this is a difficult debate, and a debate 
that could significantly affect the situation in Bosnia. The 
legislation we are considering, to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, is, 
on the surface, appealing. It appeals to our instincts to do something 
to redress the plight of the Bosnian civilian population without 
getting too personally involved. It appeals to our instincts to ``level 
the playing field,'' and support the underdog.
  Representatives of the Bosnian Government have reinforced the 
appealing character of this legislation. They have visited with me and 
with other Senators, and they have assured us that if they only had 
arms to match the aggressor Serbs, they could secure a safe, ethnically 
diverse, and democratic Bosnian state without the further help of the 
United Nations or other Western help, although help would be welcome.
  But there is a less appealing side to this legislation, a side that 
troubles me. This is, as some have noted, an incomplete piece of 
legislation. There are many unanswered questions raised by this 
resolution. It is these missing answers that so trouble me.
  First, and perhaps most troubling, is that this legislation pushes 
the United States out in front of allies, out in front, and gets the 
Congress out in front of the President. There is a meeting of NATO 
allies scheduled to take place in London this Friday, 2 days from 
today, to finalize a unified NATO plan for Bosnia. While earlier 
meetings have failed to reach a consensus view, it is clear that the 
pressure is on to agree on a unified plan of action. Passage of this 
bill in advance of that meeting narrows the options for the United 
States and for our allies. It pushes us out on an untraveled path of 
unilateral action and leaves our allies to deal with the consequences. 
We have resisted taking this path for 2 years, and have honored our 
NATO allies' concerns for the safety of their personnel on the ground 
in Bosnia.
  I cannot understand why this debate cannot wait until after the 
meeting Why the hurry? The meeting will take place Friday. Why can we 
not wait until next week to consider this bill?
  It was at the urging of his officer corps and Senators who were in 
that officer corps that thrust Pompey into the fatal decision not to 
wait and delay attacking Caesar at Pharsala. Pompey controlled the 
Adriatic with his 500 large warships and his many more small ships. He 
controlled the lines of transport. It was just a matter of waiting, to 
let Caesar's army starve to death. But the officer corps wanted action. 
And so Pompey made the fatal decision to act quickly, and he was 
defeated at the battle of Pharsalus in 48 B.C.
  It was that same impetuosity, that same desire to rush matters that 
brought about the defeat of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi in 42 B.C. 
Brutus and Cassius had squared off against Octavian and Antony. Brutus 
faced Octavian's wing and defeated it. Cassius, who was in control of 
the left wing, faced Antony and lost. That was the first battle of 
Philippi. Then came the second battle, in which, again, the Roman 
general, Marcus Junius Brutus, had the advantages had he waited. But 
his soldiers taunted him and urged him to fight sooner rather than 
later. Brutus did so and lost.
  So why the hurry? What is the rush? The situation in Bosnia is 
desperate, but rash action on our part may make it all the more 
desperate, and may only serve to add withdrawal forces to the numbers 
of Bosnian civilians facing crisis situations.
  This bill also puts U.S. policy partially in the hands of a foreign 
government. A request by the Bosnian Government would trigger the 
lifting of the American role in the arms embargo. This disturbs me. 
U.S. foreign policy should be directed by the President working with 
the Congress. U.S. foreign policy should be developed within concert 
with our allies. Its direction and timing should never be deposited in 
the hands of any foreign government. Never should we allow the actions 
of a foreign government automatically to trigger a military action on 
our part.
  Yesterday morning, the distinguished ranking member on the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Nunn, identified another of the missing 
elements in this bill. That is, that unilateral U.S. action to lift the 
arms embargo in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions brings 
with it the high probability, if not the virtual certainty, that the 
U.N. forces would withdraw from Bosnia. Indeed, the Bosnian Government 
may request the withdrawal of the U.N. forces. That is their right. But 
either of these actions would most certainly trigger a commitment by 
President Clinton to deploy some 25,000 U.S. troops to participate in 
the extraction of the U.N. forces. Well, I believe that Congress should 
wait for a Presidential decision and a NATO decision to actually commit 
troops before actively authorizing such an operation. But I agree that 
we should not ignore this logical consequence of the action that may be 
taken today or tomorrow, whenever we vote on this measure. But we must 
also consider the consequences of such actions.
  There are those who have assured us that the risks to U.S. and NATO 
forces of a U.N. withdrawal may be overstated; that most U.N. forces 
are deployed on Bosnian Government-held territory; and that Bosnian 
Government forces would not hinder the withdrawal. Therefore, the full 
80,000-plus NATO extraction force may not be necessary and the risks of 
casualties may be reduced. This may all be true--I am not an expert in 
military planning. I have no personal knowledge of the conditions on 
the ground in Bosnia. I deplore what I see and what I read and what I 
hear. But I am hesitant to accept such reassurances when the U.S. 
Department of Defense continues to support a robust operations plan 
designed to deter attacks and reduce casualties. And I am concerned by 
the lack of discussion regarding the situation facing the Bosnian 
civilian refugees affected by a U.N. withdrawal. What efforts will such 
refugees make to retain or to retaliate against U.N. peacekeepers in 
the event of a withdrawal? Will the refugees be left in the former safe 
areas or will they withdraw along with the peacekeepers to Bosnian 
Government-controlled territory? This resolution ignores the reality of 
withdrawal by ignoring such questions.
  Another missing element in this debate concerns the funds required to 
pay for the U.S. share of a NATO withdrawal of U.N. forces. At a time 
when we are making many very difficult choices required to meet the 
budget resolution goals and reduce the deficit, we must address the 
approximately $1 billion bill for U.S. participation in a withdrawal. 
Let us not forget that. There will be a bill to pay. I am not arguing 
that we should not lift the embargo because it would prove too 
expensive. I simply note that the passage of this bill would lead to 
costs eventually to the United States, and that we must address these 
costs up front.
  This bill is not a simple and appealing low-cost solution to the ugly 
situation in Bosnia. It carries with it consequences, and those 
consequences carry a price in both lives and treasure, and the future 
of our alliances with other nations. If the United States pursues a 
solo course in Bosnia, and chooses to unilaterally abrogate an 
international arms embargo against Bosnia, what authority can we muster 
to argue for the maintenance of other sanctions or embargos against 
other countries? One compelling example is the case of the sanctions 
against Iraq. For 4 years, our allies have stayed the course with us to 
maintain sanctions against Iraq. These sanctions have proven to be the 
critical tool in pushing a very recalcitrant Iraqi Government to 
disclose and dismantle their industrial infrastructure for the research 
and production of weapons of mass destruction. Without the sanctions, 
the Iraqi biological weapons production complex would not have been 
revealed, and 

[[Page S 10303]]
Southwest Asia and the rest of the world would remain at the mercy of 
Iraqi-produced anthrax and botulinum bombs. Many of our allies, 
including prominent members of the coalition in Bosnia, would like to 
lift the sanctions against Iraq. They want to restore lucrative--
lucrative--trade ties with Baghdad, but they have bowed to our 
compelling interest in maintaining the sanctions, just as we have 
supported their desires to maintain the arms embargo against Bosnia in 
order to protect allied personnel on the ground. Our unilateral action 
on Bosnia would provide our allies with the excuse to deny United 
States requests concerning Iraq, at a time when the U.N. inspectors 
there are very close to resolving the few, but critical, remaining 
issues concerning Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programs.
  Finally, I would note that the appealing message trumpeted by this 
bill and by the Bosnian Government representatives is somewhat 
disingenuous. It is designed to appeal to our sympathies and to our 
desire to help, but a lifting of the arms embargo also appeals to our 
desire not to put Americans in harm's way. Members have argued that 
U.S. support of the arms embargo has already ``Americanized'' the 
conflict. This is not true. The United States, has with other nations, 
supported a U.N. Security Council resolution to limit arms. Our allies 
with troops on the ground have reinforced the consensus on maintaining 
the embargo. If that causes the conflict to be ``Americanized,'' then 
it also makes it
 ``Britishized'' and ``Frenchified,'' and ``Spanishized.'' The act of 
unilaterally lifting the embargo, pushing our allies out of Bosnia, and 
leaving the Bosnian Government to look to the United States for 
support--that unilateral act is what risks ``Americanizing'' the 
conflict.

  The Bosnian Government representatives have identified three 
priorities, which also trouble me. First, they seek a lifting of the 
arms embargo. Although this bill does not promise any U.S. arms or 
assistance, it is clearly desired and perhaps even expected. The 
legislative history of United States policy on Bosnia has linked--
linked--the lifting of the arms embargo with the provision of up to 
$200 million in training and assistance, and with the provision of 
excess United States military equipment at no cost. Do not be surprised 
to see actions to extend this assistance in the authorization and 
appropriations bills later this year, even though no promises are made 
in this bill before us. Additionally, remember that this imperfect arms 
embargo also affects the Serbs. If we lift the embargo and supply arms 
to the Bosnian Government, it will not occur in a vacuum. The Serbs 
will also receive arms from their friends and sympathizers. As the 
conflict heats up and more nations get involved, are we going to be 
able to easily walk away?
  Second, the Bosnian Government desires a continuation of the NATO 
``no-fly'' zone over Bosnia. Because the Bosnian Government has no air 
forces while the Serbs do, it seems reasonable to prevent the Bosnian 
Serb forces from exploiting their advantage in the air, and allow both 
sides to fight on a level playing field on the ground. The Bosnian 
Government suggests that this role can be continued by NATO at low 
risk, despite the shoot-down of American pilot Scott O'Grady, and the 
losses of other NATO aircraft in the past.
  Finally, the Bosnian Government's third priority is NATO airstrikes 
against Serb forces and ammunition dumps. This is not a level playing 
field. This is a desire for a playing field tilted in favor of the 
Bosnian Government. The Bosnian Government wants NATO to intervene to 
keep the Serbs out of the air, and then use NATO air superiority to 
attack Serb forces and installations. While the victimization of the 
Bosnian Moslem civilian population may merit this kind of support, it 
is exactly the kind of action that leads to greater NATO or United 
States participation in the conflict. That is where the rub comes. 
These unheralded priorities disguise the slippery slope of escalating 
U.S. involvement down which we might slide, and with this resolution we 
may be pouring more oil on that slick hillside.
  These priorities, and the language in the bill, make it clear that 
United States policy, which up until now has been one of neutrality and 
conflict containment, will tend to tilt to partisan support of the 
Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Moslem side in the conflict. I do 
not think we want to tilt either way. With the adoption of this 
resolution, we will move toward picking a side--picking a side--in this 
conflict, and thereby irrevocably tie United States to Bosnia and to 
the fate and abilities of the Bosnian Government.
  And so I urge my colleagues will consider carefully the downside of 
this legislation before they cast their votes. This bill is not a 
simple solution to a complex and guilt-laden problem. We must 
understand the consequences of our actions. I for one do not relish the 
possibility of emotional speeches of support for the Bosnian victims of 
this tragic conflict being replaced by emotional speeches decrying the 
lives of American pilots and soldiers lost in a civil war that everyone 
acknowledges is not in the vital national security interests of the 
United States.
  Mr. President, I shall vote against the pending bill.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to proceed in morning business for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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