[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 116 (Tuesday, July 18, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10251-S10253]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______


                     U.N. RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I learned in reading a newspaper about 
Canada's 

[[Page S 10252]]
leadership in providing a study on methods of improvement of the U.N. 
rapid reaction capability.
  As many of my colleagues in the Senate know, I have had concerns in 
this area for some time.
  I wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andre Ouellet, and he sent me 
a letter, which I ask unanimous consent to insert at the end of this 
statement.
  Among other things, he enclosed a background paper, that I also 
request be inserted at the end of my statement, because it provides 
practical insights into our situation.
  It is interesting that the background paper mentions Rwanda. Senator 
Jeffords and I had the experience of calling a Canadian general, 
General Daullaire, who was in charge of the small U.N. force in Rwanda 
when things first started getting difficult. This was in May 1994.
  General Daullaire told us that if he could get 5,000-8,000 troops 
there quickly, the situation in Rwanda could be stabilized.
  Senator Jeffords and I immediately dispatched a message to the State 
Department and to the White House.
  Nothing of significance happened until October, when the United 
Nations Security Council authorized action; then the French, to their 
great credit, immediately sent 2,000 troops to provide a little 
stability, but the United Nations was slow to act.
  We went through a similar situation in Somalia.
  Bosnia presents another example of action that is much too slow.
  My colleagues know that I have introduced legislation that would 
authorize up to 3,000 American volunteers among our armed forces to be 
available on short notice, if the Security Council acts, and the 
President of the United States approves. I assume other nations would 
be willing to volunteer a similar, relatively small force.
  If the Secretary General of the United Nations had such power at his 
disposal when authorized by the Security Council, we would not have had 
some of the difficulties that now threaten our world. And the great 
threat to the world today is instability.
  After the Security Council acted in Somalia, it took 6 weeks to get 
500 Pakistani troops to Mogadishu, and when I visited Somalia and found 
the desperate situation and called the Secretary General about it, he 
told me that the additional 3,000 troops then authorized would be sent 
by ship. When I urged that they be sent by plane and that an additional 
10,000 troops be sent, he said that our government--the U.S. 
government--charges so much to send troops by plane that they could not 
afford it.
  I will not go into the rest of the background, but it illustrates the 
wisdom of the Canadian leadership.
  I commend Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Andre Ouellet for their leadership.
  And I hope the United States will be an enthusiastic partner and not 
be a nation that is dragging its feet on this issue.
  I urge my colleagues to read the background paper from the Canadian 
Government. I ask that it be printed in the Record.
  The material follows:
                                  Minister of Foreign Affairs,

                                     Ottawa, Canada, June 8, 1995.
     Hon. Paul Simon,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Simon: Thank you for your letter of February 
     6, 1995, regarding the Canadian study to improve the United 
     Nations (UN) rapid reaction capability. Your words of support 
     for our efforts are appreciated.
       As you are aware, Canada has made UN reform a foreign 
     policy priority. A key element of our position is to ensure 
     that the UN operates with greater efficiency and 
     effectiveness. The Government is committed to the active, 
     continued and effective engagement of the Canadian Forces in 
     international peacekeeping operations.
       The aim of the Canadian study is to make practical 
     proposals to enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability in 
     the field of peace operations. My officials are consulting 
     extensively with other interested states to ensure the widest 
     possible support for our initiative. The findings of the 
     study are scheduled to be tabled at the 50th anniversary of 
     the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1995.
       For further details of the Canadian study, you may wish to 
     consult the enclosed copies of recent press releases and of 
     my address to the International Conference on Improving the 
     UN's Rapid Reaction Capability.
       Once again, thank you for bringing your views to my 
     attention.
           Yours sincerely,
     Andre Ouellet.
                                                                    ____


     Improving the UN's Rapid Reaction Capability: A Canadian Study


                              introduction

       At the UN General Assembly in September 1994, Foreign 
     Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet proposed a concrete step 
     toward the goal of enhancing the UN's responsiveness in the 
     field of peace operations. In committing Canada to making a 
     direct contribution to this end, Mr. Ouellet said:
       ``The experience of the last few years leads us to believe 
     that we need to explore even more innovative options than 
     those considered to date. Recent peacekeeping missions have 
     shown that the traditional approach no longer applies. As we 
     have seen in Rwanda, rapid deployment of intervention forces 
     is essential.
       ``In light of the situation, the Government of Canada has 
     decided to conduct an in-depth review of the short-, medium- 
     and long-term options available to use to strengthen the UN's 
     rapid response capability in times of crisis. Among these 
     options, we feel that the time has come to study the 
     possibility, over the long term, of creating a permanent UN 
     military force. We will ask the world's leading experts for 
     their input and will inform all member states of the results 
     of the study.''
       The Government of Canada has now begun this extensive 
     study.


                                context

       The rapid increase in the size, scope and number of peace 
     operations since the end of the Cold War reflects both the 
     ongoing transformation of the international system and the 
     new expectation that the United Nations can and should play a 
     pivotal role in the emerging global order. There have been 
     both startling successes and troublesome failures among the 
     over 21 new missions launched since 1988. However, no firm 
     consensus has developed regarding how and why UN peace 
     operations succeed, or on when the UN should avoid engagement 
     in a given situation that is not yet amenable to an effective 
     peace mission.
       Certainly, there have been many recent improvements in how 
     the UN undertakes peace operations. These range from greater 
     political understanding of the mechanism itself in member 
     state capitals, to enhancement of the means available to the 
     Secretary-General in
      the Secretariat, to a growing sophistication 
     organizationally and operationally at the level of field 
     missions. Many member states remain actively engaged in 
     promoting these improvements and in working incrementally 
     on the full spectrum of peacekeeping issues.
       One particular, seemingly intractable issue that to some 
     extent reflects the broader problems outlined above, is that 
     of responsiveness. A review of several missions over the past 
     five years clearly indicates that a more rapid, coherent 
     response to an emerging crisis could have had a much more 
     dramatic impact on the evolving situation than that which 
     actually occurred. The example of Rwanda illustrates the 
     problem in bold relief. Despite various unco-ordinated 
     indications that a crisis was imminent, even a minimal 
     response had to await the onset of crisis. At this point, the 
     detailed planning and mounting of the operation were 
     excruciatingly slow, with deployment of troops taking place 
     months after they were officially committed.
       Improving the UN's rapid reaction capability is not a new 
     theme. The first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, raised the 
     subject as early as 1948. Considerable attention was devoted 
     to this issue as early as 1957 in the aftermath of the 
     successful deployment of UNEF I in the Sinai. The Special 
     Committee on Peacekeeping (Committee of 34) has also devoted 
     considerable energy to the concept in the intervening years. 
     Today, this topic is again near the top of the peacekeeping 
     agenda, with a particular focus on the idea of a UN force as 
     one means to achieve this end.
       The resurgence of the theme of enhanced responsiveness 
     reflects a number of recent developments in the international 
     arena. With the end of the Cold War, there is no obvious 
     reason why the UN cannot react more quickly to crisis. The 
     absence of bipolar confrontation, and consequent minimal 
     recourse to the veto on the part of permanent members of the 
     Security Council, as well as the apparent end to rigidly 
     defined spheres of influence, suggest that improved Great 
     Power comity should lead to more effective and efficient 
     international co-operation. At the same time, human rights 
     and humanitarian concerns, once held hostage to the Cold War, 
     have surfaced in a compelling way. This has led to a shift in 
     political and strategic calculations from a strict emphasis 
     on order to a more subtle one, in which the idea of justice 
     enjoys priority. Finally, global media coverage continues to 
     generate domestic and international pressure to act quickly, 
     albeit on a selective basis.
       These factors pose challenges to the international 
     community. Equally, they offer opportunities to act 
     constructively in developing the necessary instruments to 
     deal quickly and effectively with genuine threats to 
     international peace and security.
                               objective

       The aim of the study is to make practical proposals to 
     enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability in the field of 
     peace operations.


                                 scope

       The Canadian study will analyze the problem of rapid 
     reaction capability from the perspective of the UN system as 
     a whole. The 

[[Page S 10253]]
     functions that need to be performed at the political, strategic, 
     operational and tactical levels will be identified. A key 
     component of this analysis will be a clear description of the 
     crucial interrelationships among these levels, based on the 
     premise that deficiencies and inadequacies in any one sphere 
     directly influence success or failure throughout the system. 
     For example, the ready availability of an operational element 
     remains dependent upon both the generation of political will, 
     and adequate ongoing strategic planning and direction for its 
     effectiveness.
       The focus of the study will be at the operational and 
     tactical levels. The greatest challenges lie here, given the 
     virtually complete ad hoc nature of mounting today's peace 
     operations and the slow, inefficient assembly of disparate 
     tactical units in the theatre of operations. Even given 
     adequate warning and the existence of strategic plans to 
     react, there is a virtual vacuum at the operational level in 
     the UN system. At present, there is no standing headquarters 
     that is capable of organizing, integrating and directing 
     forces based on common doctrine and standards.
       In keeping with the requirement to make practical 
     recommendations that respond to today's needs, as well as the 
     achievement of potential advances in the future, the study 
     will develop proposals for the short, medium and long terms. 
     In this context, the study of the concept of a UN standing 
     force will involve both its feasibility and modus operandi 
     once established over the long term, as well as the 
     relationship between short- and medium-term projects and 
     their possible cumulative contributions to its ultimate 
     creation.
       Finally, the study will look at the impact of a standing 
     force on the activities of regional organizations and their 
     capabilities in this area. Regional actors and organizations 
     should have a high motivation to react quickly to emerging 
     crises in their own regions. Similarly, in some important 
     respects at least, they should be inherently more capable of 
     moving quickly into a theatre of operations. The comparative 
     advantages of operating at a global or regional level will be 
     addressed, and proposals will be developed to achieve a 
     balanced effort in accordance with
      the intent of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and along the 
     lines recently advocated by Secretary-General Boutros 
     Boutros-Ghali.


                               structure

       The study will be guided by a steering group of senior 
     officials and military officers, co-chaired by the Department 
     of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department 
     of National Defense. The steering group will oversee the 
     study and commission supporting technical studies as 
     appropriate.
       In order to provide the broadest possible international 
     input into the study, an international consultative group is 
     being established. This group, drawn from well-known and 
     accomplished diplomats, government officials, soldiers and 
     academics, will review the work in progress and exchange 
     views as the study proceeds. Three conferences will also be 
     organized under the aegis of the study, to which various 
     member states, non-governmental authorities and specialists 
     will be invited. The first two conferences will draw 
     primarily on Canadian experts, and will focus on the 
     operational/technical and the strategic/political levels, 
     respectively. The third conference will be international in 
     scope, and will be organized around a meeting of the 
     international consultative group in April 1995. The results 
     of all of these conferences will be incorporated into the 
     final report.
       Throughout the study process, Canada will consult on a 
     bilateral basis with member states interested in monitoring 
     the progress of and exchanging views on the study. Canada 
     would also hope to collaborate with other member states 
     pursuing similar or complementary ideas.
       A key consultative partner during the study will be the UN 
     Secretariat. The steering group will keep the Secretary-
     General informed of the progress of the study, seek his views 
     as appropriate, and invite relevant Secretariat officials to 
     the conferences.


                                content

       The study is intended to focus on enhancing the UN's rapid 
     reaction capability. It is not a study on how to improve UN 
     peacekeeping generally. Nonetheless, these two themes have 
     much in common that must be taken into account in the overall 
     context of the study. Therefore, the study will review past 
     experience relevant to the aim of this project, including a 
     review of major concepts and initiatives that represent 
     significant milestones on the road to the present. Particular 
     attention will be paid to developments since the end of the 
     Cold War. Furthermore, the study will be guided by the 
     orientation and concepts articulated
      by the Secretary-General in An Agenda for Peace. Due regard 
     will be accorded to non-military aspects of peace 
     operations, such as prevention diplomacy, the political 
     component of all such operations and peacebuilding. 
     Peacekeeping will be treated in its broadest context.
       The study will focus on the specific issue of improved 
     responsiveness, given the structure and nature of 
     contemporary peacekeeping. This will take account of the 
     interrelationships among the political, strategic, 
     operational and tactical components of any peace operation, 
     as well as the relevance for rapid reaction of the 
     integration of political, humanitarian, police and military 
     elements, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
     Similarly, the study will address the question of command and 
     control systems and their contribution to an improved rapid 
     reaction capability. The conditions under which nations are 
     willing to make their resources available to the UN are 
     crucial to their political commitment and readiness to act. 
     Paramount among these concerns is the nature and competence 
     of command and control structures and relationships. The role 
     of the Security Council in mobilizing political support and 
     providing ongoing guidance is essential.
       The study will elaborate the component elements of a rapid 
     reaction capability in a generic sense. This section of the 
     study will address the requirement for, and provision of, 
     among other things, early warning, integrated planning 
     capability, command and control systems, logistics capability 
     and doctrine/standards/interoperability. An important element 
     will be the nature of standing forces, options for their 
     development and a discussion of their potential utility.
       Having established the basis for rapid reaction, the study 
     will address in concrete terms what can be done to achieve 
     this capability. The study will outline proposals that 
     logically fit into one of the three time frames envisaged. 
     The implications of a given proposal at one of the four 
     levels (political, strategic, operational and tactical) for 
     the remaining levels will be explored. For example, the 
     establishment of regional stocks in two or more locations has 
     direct implications for how these stocks will be allocated 
     and co-ordinated at the strategic level in New York.
       In many cases, short-term proposals will suggest additional 
     measures that might logically follow in the medium and long 
     terms. For example, virtually all proposals for the medium 
     and long term imply an increased capability in the UN 
     Secretariat to cope with additional responsibilities. 
     Therefore, reform and enhancement of the UN Secretariat, a 
     necessary stand-alone requirement to enhance the UN's rapid 
     reaction capability, will also cumulatively establish the 
     necessary strategic apparatus to handle a series of 
     additional medium- and long-term improvements.
       Any plan to operate a standing force presupposes 
     adjustments at the political, strategic and tactical levels, 
     which in many cases must be put in place on an incremental 
     basis, starting as soon as possible.
       The study will arrive at recommendations and conclusions 
     regarding the desirability and feasibility of implementing a 
     variety of potential measures. It will also make observations 
     and recommendations as to their associated costs.
       The study will be submitted to the membership of the UN at 
     the General Assembly in September 1995, and presented to the 
     Secretary-General for his consideration.
     

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