[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 116 (Tuesday, July 18, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10231-S10239]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo 
     applicable to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me take this opportunity to thank 
the Senator from Mississippi and the Democratic leader for their help 
on resolving the issue.
  I did not want to offer the sense-of-the-Senate resolution during the 
core of the debate on the substance of the bill. I do think it is 
relevant to this bill. I want to thank them for their cooperation.
  Mr. LOTT. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I should like to take this occasion to 
speak strongly in favor of S. 21, the majority leader's resolution on 
Bosnia.
  Mr. President, we have now, for more than 3 years, watched--and I use 
that word advisedly ``watched''--the ongoing tragedy of Bosnia. The 
aggressions, the rapes, the cold-blooded murders, the ethnic cleansing, 
which has accompanied the dismemberment of a nation, recognized as a 
nation, and a member of the United Nations.
  We have an administration which has constantly threatened action, and 
every bit as constantly walked away from that action when its bluff was 
called.
  We have a U.N. protective force which has protected no one but the 
aggressors. A force dispatched to Bosnia to provide some kind of safety 
for the victims of aggression has shown itself unable to do so time 
after time and place after place. Whether around Sarajevo, whether in 
the isolated areas of refuge, whether in the northwest part of the 
country--its fate has been the same.
  Its fate has either been to protect the Bosnian Serb aggressors 
against any kind of military action on the part of the United Nations, 
no matter how modest and ineffective by its very presence and by the 
ease with which the Bosnian Serbs can take the U.N. personnel as 
hostage; or alternatively, as was the case just 10 days ago, as an 
entity which disarmed the defenders of these enclaves and then provided 
absolutely no defense or support for essentially unarmed victims who 
now, themselves, are the latest example of the victims of the Serbs' 
ethnic cleansing.
  Mr. President, the former President of the United States, George 
Bush, was wrong in enforcing an arms embargo against the Bosnians. 
President Clinton has repeated that and has been wrong to enforce that 
arms embargo against the Bosnians.
  As recently as lunch time today, the caucuses of both parties 
listened to the same tired presentation from the Secretary of State, 
and in this case from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that 
we have heard for this entire 3 years. That somehow or another to do 
something, change our policy, to allow those who wish to defend 
themselves to do so, would lead to some even worse disaster, the taking 
of more hostages among the U.N. forces, to more deaths and ethnic 
displacement on the part of the Bosnians.
  Yet, the use of this excuse, Mr. President, has resulted in 3 years 
of violence and displacement and ethnic cleansing and an end to the 
belief of the United Nations to act effectively in connection with a 
catastrophe of this sort, and undercutting of the ability of NATO, and 
most significantly, a lack of belief in the United States of America.
  Mr. President, it is simply time to end that bankrupt policy. The 
proposal that the majority leader has brought to the Senate ends the 
embargo on one of two conditions:
 a decision by the United Nations or by the countries supplying troops 
to the United Nations in Bosnia to withdraw; or a request from the 
legal Government of Bosnia that the United States lift the arms embargo 
and a notification to the U.N. Security Council that it has requested 
that those forces leave.

  Mr. President, that is putting the ultimate fate of the Republic of 
Bosnia squarely in the hands of its own elected 

[[Page S 10232]]
Government, which is exactly where it should be. There is a very real 
possibility that if the troops of that Government can obtain arms even 
remotely equivalent to those possessed by the aggressors, that they can 
defend their independence and recover some of the country wrongfully 
lost to them. And it is way past time, way past time that we allow that 
decision to be made by the people who have been the victims of this 
aggression for 3 long years.
  The U.N. protective force is not protecting anyone, including itself. 
It should be gone. Our arms embargo punishes no one except for the 
victims of aggression. It is simply time that it be brought to a close. 
The partial and midlevel threats that are being made by this 
administration will risk the loss of American lives but will not, under 
any circumstances, change the situation on the ground. What could be 
more clear, Mr. President, than the proposition that we should not risk 
the lives of our own men and women in uniform unless their goal is 
important to the United States and has some definite and worthy policy 
to be defended?
  Nothing that we have heard from the administration about its plans 
meets those simple tests. If we are willing to do nothing to end this 
aggression ourselves, we at least should no longer be complicit to its 
continued success. We should be willing to allow the victims to defend 
themselves. We should end the arms embargo. We should encourage the 
present forces from the United Nations to leave. We should arm the 
Bosnians. And I am convinced, under those circumstances, their chances 
of regaining the semblance of a country and reaching a peace through 
some kind of strength will be greatly enhanced.
  There is no perfect solution to this catastrophe. But the solution of 
allowing the victims to defend themselves, to fight for their own 
freedom, is the least bad of all the solutions before us. And I am 
profoundly convinced it is the only moral answer to this question.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The majority leader.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Washington for his 
statement and for his support.
  Mr. President, I am pleased to be joined by the distinguished Senator 
from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, and a long list of bipartisan 
cosponsors as we again try to lift the illegal and unjust arms embargo 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The legislation we are bringing up today is 
a modified version of the bill we introduced in January of this year. 
S. 21 is the number. This bill lifts the United States arms embargo 
after the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
  Before we start to discuss this legislation I want to make clear: 
This debate is not just about Bosnia. This is not just about a small 
European country under attack. This debate is about American leadership 
and American principles, about NATO strength and credibility, about our 
place in history.
  It was just about a year ago that the Senate last voted to lift the 
arms embargo on Bosnia. That vote was 58-42. However, in conference a 
compromise was worked out by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, 
Senator Nunn, and the administration's representative Chuck Redman. It 
urged the President to introduce a resolution to lift the arms embargo 
in the U.N. Security Council if the Bosnian Serbs did not sign the July 
1994 contact group plan by October 15. The compromise language also 
provided that if the Serbs did not sign the plan by November 15, the 
United States would cease enforcing the arms embargo. Finally, the 
compromise urged that in the event of Bosnian Serb
 attacks on U.N. safe areas, the President introduce and support a 
resolution in the Security Council to provide the Bosnians with 
defensive weapons to defend these areas.

  Now it is a year later. The Bosnian Serbs have still not signed the 
July 1994 contact group peace plan; the administration has still not 
taken up a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms 
embargo; and the Bosnian Serbs are about to run over another U.N. safe 
haven--the second in 2 weeks.
  Mr. President, the administration argued last year that lifting the 
arms embargo would lead to the fall of the three safe havens in the 
east. The first of these three enclaves has fallen under U.N. watch--
with NATO planes overhead. Today NATO planes are buzzing above Zepa, 
which is about to fall.
  Mr. President, all this has occurred in the absence of lifting the 
arms embargo. Indeed, it has occurred because the arms embargo is 
preventing the only people willing to fight to defend the Bosnian 
people from being able to do so--and that is the Bosnians themselves; 
not the U.N. forces, but the Bosnian Government Forces--Moslems, 
Croats, and Serbs are willing to die to defend their families, their 
homes, and their multi-ethnic country.
  Last year the administration also made the argument that lifting the 
arms embargo immediately would endanger allied forces. In this modified 
Dole-Lieberman legislation we are not lifting the United States embargo 
until after those countries contributing to UNPROFOR who want to leave, 
have
 left.

  The administration has also claimed that lifting the embargo would 
Americanize the war. This is the most difficult argument to understand. 
The Clinton administration has pledged 25,000 American troops for 
Bosnia if there is peace. The Clinton administration has pledged 25,000 
American troops for Bosnia if there is withdrawal. And the Clinton 
administration is considering escalating the American involvement for 
transport and close air support of UNPROFOR forces. Let us not forget, 
and American Air Force pilot, Scott O'Grady, was recently shot down. In 
light of such commitments, it is hard to take administration arguments 
over Americanization seriously. As the Prime Minister of Bosnia said, 
lifting the arms embargo will not Americanize the war, it will 
Bosnianize the war--by putting the future of Bosnia back in Bosnian 
hands, where it should have been for the last couple of years or more.
  A more recent concern raised by some is that the withdrawal may take 
more than 12 weeks. In that regard, this legislation includes a 
renewable Presidential waiver providing for an additional 30 days 
should additional time be necessary for the safety and successful 
completion of the withdrawal operation.
  As I mentioned earlier, each time the Senate has taken up this 
legislation we have been told by the administration that this is not 
the right time. We have waited. The Bosnians have waited--and they have 
died.
  The bottom line is that the approach pursued by the administration, 
like that of the Bush administration, is a total failure. The question 
is whether or not we will continue to contribute U.S. dollars, 
prestige, and credibility to this catastrophe or change course.
  Mr. President, there are no perfect options. There are no easy 
answers. We now know what has not worked--relying on the U.N. forces to 
protect the Bosnians. It seems to me that we owe it to the Bosnians and 
our own American principles of justice and fairness to let the Bosnians 
defend themselves, and I believe the American people understand this 
and will support it.
  Let me make it clear, as I attempted to do earlier today, we are not 
talking about more American involvement. We are not talking about 
American ground troops. We are talking about lifting the arms embargo--
maybe helping to train Bosnians, maybe helping to supply weapons, but 
that could be done in safe areas. And if they secure Russian weapons, 
which they are already familiar with, there will be very little 
training necessary.
  Also keep in mind that in many cases the Bosnians surrendered the 
only heavy weapons they had because they were going to be in safe 
havens. As I suggested, one of the safe havens has been overrun, and 
another about to be overrun, and the third, Gorazde, is in peril.
  I also want to make it clear, because I think there is always a 
tendency for some to say: Oh, this is politics, this is Bob Dole, 
Republican, because we have a Democratic President, the record will 
reflect that during the Bush administration I think the same two 
Senators raised this question. We were critical of the Bush 
administration. I remember talking to Ambassador Zimmerman time after 
time. I remember calling him and discussing it with him when he was in 
Yugoslavia, because we were told then that if we did not do something--
and I am not talking again about military force; I am talking 

[[Page S 10233]]
about sending a word of caution to Mr. Milosevic, the leader of the 
Serbs, the President of Serbia--this is precisely what would happen.
  So this is not a Dole resolution. This is not a Lieberman resolution. 
This is an action by the Senate, Republicans and Democrats, such as the 
two of us, Mr. Helms, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Biden, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. McCain, 
Mr. Feingold, Mr. Warner, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. 
Stevens, Mr. Cochran, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Mack, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. 
Packwood, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Specter, and others, so there is strong, 
broad bipartisan support.
  It is not a conservative matter. It is not a liberal matter. It is a 
moral issue of whether we will again in this century witness ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, call it what you will, and do nothing. In this 
case, all we need to do, as we were reminded again by the Bosnian 
Foreign Minister today, is to lift the arms embargo. As he said, ``We 
are willing to die for our country.'' They are not asking us to do 
that, not asking anybody else to do that. And I know the British do not 
want to lift the arms embargo. I know President Chirac, the new French 
President, has other ideas. The British and French cannot seem to get 
together.
  I know the Secretary of State told the Democrat policy luncheon today 
this is not the time, timing is terrible. Well, that is always the 
case. It is never the time. It seems to me just the opposite. This is a 
perfect time. It would seem to me the administration would want us to 
pass this resolution. It has to go to conference, has to be worked out. 
It is going to take quite a while--10 days, 30 days, who knows--before 
it comes back and before it becomes law. And then the President could 
tell the French and the British that the options are fewer and fewer as 
far as America is concerned and our involvement is concerned.
  So I really hope that we can complete action on this resolution 
tomorrow. I know the White House will want to try to dissuade some from 
voting for the resolution. That is certainly a right they have. But I 
would also suggest this is precisely the very same action the President 
advocated when he first came to the White House--even before he came to 
the White House--lift the arms embargo. He also was supporting air 
strikes.
  So it is not that we have figured out some way to be on the other 
side of President Clinton and have brought this issue to the floor to 
embarrass the President. We are precisely where the President was 
before he was elected President, as a candidate, and where he was after 
he was elected. And I recall a meeting in the White House in the spring 
of 1993 where Democrats and Republicans came together and we talked 
about lifting the arms embargo and air strikes.
  That has been a long, long time. I do not know how many thousands of 
people have suffered, how many thousands have died, how many murdered 
and raped, how many children have gone without food because we did 
nothing. And then we said, well, this is a European problem; let the 
Europeans handle it. And then we had the U.N. Protection Forces.
  Again, I commend the courage and bravery of every one of those young 
men, and maybe women in some cases, from all the different countries 
who are there as U.N. Protection Forces. They are there with good 
intent. Unfortunately, their good intent has turned into in effect 
being a buffer for the Serbs. Now the U.N. Protection Forces have found 
they cannot protect themselves, and they cannot protect the people in 
the safe havens, and they cannot protect the refugees. In fact, if you 
watched television the other night, they had a barbed wire entanglement 
separating the U.N. forces from the refugees so they would not come 
together.
  It seems to me that it is pretty clear. My own view is the British do 
not want to be humiliated by withdrawing. I have talked to John Major 
in his office. He is very persuasive. Somehow he believes if we just 
continue to stay there, this is going to end. And with a new French 
President, he is being a bit more aggressive. He thinks they ought to 
do something. So now he wants us to become involved with helicopter 
gunships and other ways we transport French and other U.N. Protection 
Forces into the area.
  In my view, that would be a mistake, but that may be debated. There 
may be an amendment to do that before we complete action on the bill.
  Finally, it just seems to me it is the right thing to do. It was a 
year ago. It was before that. The House passed this--not the same 
legislation--by a vote of 318 to 99, over 3 to 1. I hope we have at 
least 70 votes or more in the Senate; bipartisan votes, nonpartisan, 
whatever you like.
  I believe we have made progress because we have been cautious. We 
have respected the timing, and we have delayed from time to time to see 
if they could not complete negotiation, they could not reach some 
agreement. But I believe now is the time for us to proceed and to send 
a signal to the Serbs and, yes, to the British, to the French, but more 
particularly the Bosnians, that somebody in America, in this case the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, understands their concerns, 
and we are willing to support their request that an independent nation, 
a member of the United Nations, has the right of self-defense as 
spelled out in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
  That is all this is about. It is not complicated. You can raise all 
the horror stories. You can give us all the scenarios that might 
happen. We were told by the foreign minister today there will be no 
effort by the Moslems to stop the U.N. Protection Forces from leaving. 
We were also told that there are only 30 U.N. personnel in Serb 
occupied areas, so it should not take 25,000 American troops to help 
extricate members of the U.N. Protection Forces.
  So as we begin the debate, I again commend my colleagues. I hope that 
the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, who I know maybe supports 
us in his heart, would find it in his heart to support us all the way 
because he is a very important Member of this body, and I know he 
feels, as some, maybe he has some reservations, but this is, as he 
certainly knows, not a partisan effort on behalf of the majority leader 
in this instance.


                           Amendment No. 1801

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk in the 
nature of a substitute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], for himself, Mr. Helms, 
     Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Biden, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. McCain, Mr. 
     Feingold, Mr. Warner, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. 
     Stevens, Mr. Cochran, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Mack, Mr. 
     Coverdell, Mr. Packwood, Mr. Murkowski, and Mr. Specter, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 1801.

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Bosnia and Herzegovia Self-
     Defense Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
     (Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued 
     application of an international arms embargo to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that 
     Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-
     defense under Article 51 of the United National Charter and 
     therefore is inconsistent with international law.
       (2) The United States has not formally sought multilateral 
     support for terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina through a vote on a United Nations Security 
     Council resolution since the enactment of section 1404 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
     (Public Law 103-337).
       (3) The United Nations Security Council has not taken 
     measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
     security in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the aggression 
     against that country began in April 1992.

     SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

       The Congress supports the efforts of the Government of the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--
       (1) to defend its people and the territory of the Republic;
       (2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and 
     territorial integrity of the Republic; and
       (3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable, and 
     sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.
     
[[Page S 10234]]


     SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

       (a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United 
     States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (b), following--
       (1) receipt by the United States Government of a request 
     from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for termination 
     of the United States arms embargo and submission by the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exercise of its 
     sovereign rights as a nation, of a request to the United 
     Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
       (2) a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or 
     decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to 
     withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (b) Implementation of Termination.--The President may 
     implement termination of the United States arms embargo of 
     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to 
     subsection (a) prior to the date of completion of the 
     withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel
      from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but shall, subject to 
     subsection (c), implement termination of the embargo 
     pursuant to that subsection no later than the earlier of--
       (1) the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
       (2) the date which is 12 weeks after the date of submission 
     by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a request to 
     the United Nations Security Council for the departure of 
     UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (c) Presidential Waiver Authority.--If the President 
     determines and reports in advance to Congress that the 
     safety, security, and successful completion of the withdrawal 
     of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(2) requires more time than the 
     period provided for in that subsection, the President may 
     extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for 
     implementing termination of the United States arms embargo of 
     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up 
     to 30 days. The authority in this subsection may be exercised 
     to extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) 
     for more than one 30-day period.
       (d) Presidential Reports.--Within 7 days of the 
     commencement of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, and every 14 days thereafter, the President 
     shall report in writing to the President pro tempore of the 
     Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the 
     status and estimated date of completion of the withdrawal 
     operation. If any such report includes an estimated date of 
     completion of the withdrawal which is later than 12 weeks 
     after commencement of the withdrawal operation, the report 
     shall include the operational reasons which prevent the 
     completion of the withdrawal within 12 weeks of commencement.
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States 
     forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any 
     purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military 
     equipment.
       (f) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``United States arms embargo of the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the application to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
       (A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the 
     Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 FR 33322) under the 
     heading ``Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to 
     Yugoslavia''; and
       (B) any similar policy being applied by the United States 
     Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of 
     UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to 
     which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles 
     and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and
       (2) the term ``completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR 
     personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the departure 
     from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially 
     all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all 
     other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a 
     reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the 
     withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the 
     United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries 
     contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not 
     include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of any country 
     providing such personnel.
                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that a 
legislative fellow in my office, Mr. Ronald A. Marks, be allowed on the 
Senate floor for the duration of the Senate action on S. 21, the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his kind 
words.
  Mr. President, once again, the Senate is debating legislation to lift 
the arms embargo against Bosnia-Hercegovina. Since the Senate first 
took up this issue in January 1994, I have voted against every attempt 
to force the United States to lift the embargo unilaterally. I must say 
that I now find this would be an extremely difficult vote to cast.
  The fall of a U.N. protected safe haven--and the impending fall of a 
second--is a dreadful human tragedy. The terrible images of tens of 
thousands of Moslem refugees fleeing Serb aggression make us want to 
find a quick and easy solution to the crisis, but I am afraid there are 
no easy answers. A Senate vote to lift the arms embargo unilaterally 
may seem cost-free, but I believe there are serious downsides that 
could actually make the situation worse.
  The legislation before us says that the lifting of the embargo shall 
occur after UNPROFOR personnel have withdrawn or 12 weeks after the 
Bosnian Government asks U.N. troops to leave, whichever comes first. We 
should be honest about what we are debating here. This bill, if passed, 
will actually trigger a U.N. withdrawal from Bosnia. I would remind my 
colleagues that the United States has committed to helping our allies 
withdraw from Bosnia as part of a NATO effort. So, in essence, by 
passing this bill, we are precipitating the commitment of up to 25,000 
United States troops to Bosnia to help with that withdrawal.
  It is indeed time for our President, along with our U.N. and NATO 
allies to consider the future of the United Nations in Bosnia. They 
know that if the United Nations were to pull out altogether, many areas 
of Bosnia which are now stable and well supplied due to the U.N. 
presence would likely face a humanitarian disaster. This is 
particularly true in central Bosnia where the U.N. presence has 
fostered a peaceful federation between the Bosnian Croats and Moslems, 
who until February 1994, had been engaged in a fierce war. The 
President and our NATO allies must balance that potential catastrophe 
against the current tragedy which has led many to call for a complete 
U.N. pullout.
  As we speak, the administration and our allies are grappling with 
that difficult issue. General Shalikashvili met with his counterparts 
in London regarding this matter this past weekend; British Foreign 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind is in Washington today to discuss this issue; 
and later this week, Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry will 
travel to London for negotiations with their European counterparts.
  Clearly, I would have hoped we would wait to know the results of 
these important meetings and await our President's recommendation on 
the future of UNPROFOR and the role of the United States before 
embarking on this debate. I believe that Europe bears the brunt of the 
burden for dealing with the Bosnia crisis. Indeed the Europeans 
acknowledge this fact and are contributing the bulk of the troops to 
the U.N. effort. We have no troops on the ground, and that is as it 
should be. The U.S. Senate, therefore should not take unilateral action 
that would actually precipitate a U.N. withdrawal. In the end, a 
decision may have to be made to withdraw U.N. troops, but I do not 
believe the Senate should make that decision.
  I would add that the Bosnian Government, if it wished, could ask the 
United Nations to leave at any time. But it has not done so. Yet this 
bill would put the U.S. Senate on record as endorsing, indeed hastening 
a withdrawal.
  A unilateral lifting of the arms embargo after U.N. troops are 
withdrawn will inevitably be perceived as the beginning of a United 
States decision to go it alone in Bosnia. It is naive to think we can 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo, and then walk away. We instead 
would assume responsibility for Bosnia not only in terms of our moral 
obligation, but in practical terms as well. If we lift the
 embargo, who will supply the weapons? How will weapons be delivered? 
Who will train the Bosnians in using the weapons? The proponents of 
this bill will argue that it places no obligations on the United 
States, but everyone knows the Bosnian Government will look to us.

[[Page S 10235]]


  Lifting the embargo without international support would increase 
American responsibility for the outcome of the conflict. Delivering 
weapons to Bosnia would likely require sending in United States 
personnel. Granted, this legislation states that nothing should be 
construed as authorizing the deployment of United States forces to 
Bosnia-Hercegovina for any purpose. But I want to emphasize that this 
would be a U.S. decision to dismantle the embargo. I do not see how we 
can lift the embargo on our own without sending in the personnel and 
without providing the wherewithal to carry out the policy.
  A unilateral lifting of the embargo--be it now or after U.N. troops 
are withdrawn--would put the United States in the position of 
abrogating a U.N. Security Council resolution, and in essence, breaking 
international law. The embargo is in place as a result of a binding 
U.N. Security Council resolution and can only be abrogated by a 
subsequent U.N. Security Council action. A unilateral lifting of the 
arms embargo would set a dangerous precedent. Other countries could 
choose to ignore Security Council resolutions that we consider 
important--such as the embargo against Iraq and sanctions against Libya 
and Serbia.
  In April, the Washington Post reported that Iran was engaging in 
embargo-busting by supplying plane loads of weapons and military 
supplies to Bosnian Government forces. If the United States were to 
lift the embargo unilaterally, we would joint Iran in embargo busting. 
I would ask my colleagues: Do you want to be in that company? Is Iran a 
responsible player in the international community?
  The answer, of course, is no. If the United States were to break the 
embargo on its own, we would destroy our credibility as a trustworthy 
leader in international affairs. A unilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo would undoubtedly strain our relations with our NATO allies and 
undermine our standing in other international negotiations completely 
unrelated to the Bosnian tragedy.
  After U.N. troops are safely withdrawn, lifting the embargo 
multilaterally may indeed be the best course of action. If and when 
UNPROFOR does withdraw, I believe we should make sure we know where our 
allies stand on lifting the embargo. Whether or not to lift the embargo 
should be a multilateral decision. We should not go it alone.
  I acknowledge that I see merit in some of the arguments of the 
amendment's proponents. This is a difficult problem that cuts across 
partisan lines and that slices to the heart of issues related to U.S. 
influence and power abroad. We all want to do something in response to 
the terrible pictures of the old people being wheeled out of eastern 
Bosnia in wheelbarrows or the frightful sight of the 20-year-old 
Bosnian hanging from a tree. I am just not convinced, however that 
voting for this bill will alleviate that suffering. Indeed, I am afraid 
that we might make matters worse.
  We are, as public servants, called upon to exercise our best judgment 
on this very difficult issue and this is what I intend to do.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the chair.
  Mr. President, first I would like to request unanimous consent that 
Frederic S. Baron, a Pearson Fellow in my office, be permitted floor 
privileges for the duration of the debate on S. 21?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I am honored to join with the distinguished majority 
leader, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], and many others in both 
parties in introducing this substitute, S. 21.
  I do want to indicate at the outset, though, this has been a 
frustrating path that we have walked together. It has been an honor to 
walk it with Senator Dole and to say that this is a path we have walked 
together in the interest of a strong policy in Bosnia and a fair 
policy, which is to say one that will arm the Bosnians who have been 
deprived of their right of self-defense by international action, in 
which we have participated. This effort, together with Senator Dole and 
others, has been done, as he said a few moments ago, on a totally 
bipartisan, which is to say, nonpartisan, basis, which is the way in 
which American foreign policy has been at its finest hours.
  I specifically point out that Senator Dole and I began this effort 
during the previous Republican administration of President Bush, 
expressing our frustration and opposition to the failure of leadership 
and the continued imposition of the arms embargo.
  Mr. President, we have been here before. By my calculation, we have 
been here at least seven times before. Each time, excuses are given why 
this is the wrong time to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian 
Government. Explanations are given about what the consequences might 
be, let alone why the whole idea of lifting the embargo is wrong.
  We have continued to believe that the heart of any equitable policy 
in the former Yugoslavia is to allow both sides to be able to defend 
themselves. History divided the former Yugoslavia in such a way that 
only one side, namely, Serbia and its clients, its agents in Croatia 
and in Bosnia, were left with the warmaking capacity of the former 
Yugoslavia. Bosnia was left with nothing.
  This denial of this fundamental right of self-defense, which each of 
us can feel in a personal sense, certainly, as we watch the horrors, 
the atrocities that have gone on once again in Bosnia in the last 
couple of weeks and see families divided--mothers separated from 
children, husbands from wives, see women taken off without explanation 
with God knows what being done to them, men being herded away, young 
men, men of military age being herded away. These are the human 
horrific results of this policy.
  People have argued against the idea of raising the arms embargo each 
time we have brought it to this floor, arguing more against it than for 
an alternative policy. Today we come back, as Senator Dole has said, 
not saying that this is the perfect policy, not saying that any policy 
in a complicated situation is perfect or guaranteed to succeed, but 
saying with clarity that the current policy has been a terrible 
failure, has brought suffering and pain and death to the people of 
Bosnia. But more than that, it has victimized, along with the people of 
Bosnia, the world's best hopes for order and morality--the United 
States, NATO, and the United Nations, each suffering significant, deep 
damage to our credibility, to our status, to our legitimacy in the 
world.
  When the voices and institutions and nations of strength and 
authority fail to act or act with ambivalence in a way that sends a 
message of weakness and outlaws continue to be aggressors, then the 
results are obvious, and you do not have to be a Ph.D. in diplomacy to 
understand this. If outlaws are marauding in a city in our country and 
forces of law do not stop them, they will keep marauding until they 
reach each one of us. And that, in essence, I fear, is what has 
happened over the last 3 years of inaction by the world communities in 
Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I have a point of view which I feel very strongly 
about what Bosnia was before this conflict and what has brought us to 
this point. I have spoken of it before on this floor, and I will just 
speak to it briefly today.
  There are those who like to dismiss or diminish the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia and, in some sense, thereby to wash our hands of any 
responsibility, remove us from any involvement on the basis of this 
allegation: ``These people have been fighting for centuries.'' There is 
a hint here that these people are somehow slightly less than human. 
``They continue to fight; why should we get involved?''
  There are two realities. One is that civilizations, cultural and 
religious, have met in the Balkans. That is the history over the 
centuries, and there have been conflicts. But the reality is that, in 
Bosnia particularly, a strong and healthy multiethnic culture and 
nationality developed.
  Somebody said to me, in Sarajevo before this terrible war, it was 
thought to be offensive for one person to ask another in Sarajevo what 
their ethnic origin was: Are you a Moslem? Are you a Serb? Are you a 
Croat? No, they were 

[[Page S 10236]]
Bosnians. This was a great, flourishing multiethnic culture.
  Second, there is a clear course that I see as I look at the history 
of this region over the last 6 or 7 years, and that is of an 
intentional, concerted effort through aggression by Serbians operating 
out of Belgrade under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic to create a 
greater Serbia.
  Since 1988, beginning with the takeover of the political machinery in 
Montenegro and Vojvodina, the illegal suppression of the legal 
Government of Kosova, which has a large Albanian majority, suppressed, 
continuing to be victims of harassment and abuse and worse. That 
occurred in 1989.
  Then the mobilization of nationalist feelings in Serbian public 
polls;
  The slow-moving constitutional coup against the Federal Presidency;
  The Serbian economic blockade against Croatia and Slovenia in late 
1990;
  The theft by Serbia that year of billions of dinars from the Federal 
budget, destroying the Federal economic reform program;
  And then the incitement and arming by Serbia out of Belgrade of Serb 
minorities in Croatia and Bosnia during 1990 and 1991.
  That is how we got to where we are. This is no accident. This is no 
continuation of centuries and centuries of constant fighting. This is a 
decision made in Belgrade by a leader and a group around him to incite 
nationalism, to destroy the multicultural, multiethnic society in 
Bosnia and to take advantage of the instability that existed after the 
cold war to create a greater Serbia.
  What about the embargo that we are debating? Where did that come 
from? Mr. President, this is not, as some may think, an act of 
international law. It is an act of policy created and adopted by the 
Security Council of the United Nations.
  The resolution introduced creating an arms embargo, No. 713, was 
considered by the Security Council at Belgrade's request. Why? Well, I 
believe it is obvious. Because the forces in Belgrade knew that they 
had the monopoly and the warmaking capacity, the arms factories, and 
the weapons that had already been constructed of the former Yugoslavia. 
Applying an arms embargo put their enemies, the targets of their 
aggression, at a profound disadvantage.
  So at Belgrade's request, in September 1991, the United Nations 
Security Council adopted this arms embargo, later to be carried out by 
the member nations, including our own--in this case, by an Executive 
order issued by President Bush. The world satisfied itself that this 
was a means to limit the conflict in the former Yugoslavia by stopping 
the flow of arms. What innocence. What naivete.
  In April 1992, Bosnia was recognized as a new state, independent and 
separate from Yugoslavia. And on May 22, 1992, it was admitted as a 
member state to the United Nations. Yet, still the embargo that had 
been applied on the former Yugoslavia, despite the glaring conflict 
between this application and Bosnia's right of self defense under 
international law, was applied to Bosnia. That is how we got on the 
road to where we are now.
  In 1992, international television crews gained access to what I could 
only describe as concentration camps that were being operated by the 
Serbs, where they were herding Moslems into the camps. We witnessed the 
emaciated bodies, and we saw evidence of this incredible phrase--
``ethnic cleansing.'' There were 200,000 killed in this war. A couple 
of million refugees. The world rolls up in horror at the sight of these 
figures in the concentration camps and the stories of systematic rape--
rape as an instrument of war. Serbs were coming into towns not only 
clearing them out of the Moslems, but grabbing women and raping them, 
and taking men off to the camps, or slaughtering them on sight.
  The world cried out for a response. The Western nations were not 
prepared to really stand up to the aggression. So what did we do? We 
sent in the United Nations--which was not good, ultimately, for the 
people of Bosnia, not good for the United Nations--presumably to 
perform a humanitarian role. But little by little, that mission crept, 
to enforce the denied flight zone, enforce and protect the safe havens, 
sending these brave soldiers wearing the blue helmets of the United 
Nations in to keep a peace that never was, and putting them into combat 
positions without the weapons with which to defend themselves.
  I heard the other day--and I have not had a chance to check this, but 
I believe it--that more soldiers wearing U.N. uniforms have been killed 
in Bosnia than in the gulf war. They are heroes. We sent them 
effectively on a mission impossible. Several times, confronting the 
failure of this policy, the increasing way in which the U.N. troops 
began to be not only an excuse for Western inaction in the face of 
Serbian aggression, but began to be a cover for Serbian aggression 
within Bosnia. Every time we would come here in the early years in this 
effort to lift the embargo, people would say: You cannot do it. If we 
lift the embargo, the Serbs will seize the U.N. personnel as hostages.
  Well, we have not lifted the embargo, and the Serbs have seized U.N. 
personnel as hostages, and the killing of the Moslems in Bosnia 
continues.
  Mr. President, when we came to the floor January 27, 1994, we passed 
a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling on the President to terminate 
the arms embargo. That measure passed 87 to 9. It was only a sense of 
the Senate. But the Senate spoke. The world sat idly by, the arms 
embargo was not lifted, and the people of Bosnia continued to be--using 
that dreadfully sanitized term--ethnically cleansed, which is to say 
ripped from their homes, raped, and murdered.
  In May 1994, the Senate again considered, and this time passed, two 
measures. One was a measure that I cosponsored with Senator Dole, 
requiring the United States to unilaterally terminate the arms embargo 
upon the request of the Bosnian Government. That passed 50 to 49. On 
that day--I suppose in a way that only the Senate of the United States 
could do--we also passed an amendment offered by Senator Nunn and the 
previous majority leader, Senator Mitchell, requiring the President to 
solicit a multilateral lift of the embargo and to consult with Congress 
if that did not occur. Again, the Senate spoke. The world sat idly by, 
the arms embargo was not lifted, and the people of Bosnia were 
ethnically cleansed, ripped from their homes, raped, and murdered.
  Again, in July and August 1994, the Senate addressed the issue of 
lifting the arms embargo, voted and passed measures calling for its 
termination. This time the votes rose. The last of these votes was 58 
to 42, passing an amendment offered by Senator Dole and myself to the 
defense appropriations bill, which called for the lifting of the 
embargo no later than November 15, 1994. On each of those occasions, 
the Senate spoke. The world sat idly by, the arms embargo was not 
lifted, and the people of Bosnia were ethnically cleansed, ripped from 
their homes, raped, and murdered.
  Here we are. It is July 1995. One of the other arguments that was 
made to us in these many debates I have just described is that if we 
lifted the arms embargo, the Serbs would seize the safe havens, 
particularly in the east of Bosnia. Well, we have not lifted the arms 
embargo and, as we know, the Serbs have seized the safe havens--at a 
dreadful human cost for the Bosnians.
  Srebrenica has fallen. Zepa is under siege now. Failure of our policy 
could not be clearer. It is time, finally, to act. Again, as in 1992 
when the concentration camps were discovered, the world is aroused by 
these painful sights of human suffering from Bosnia. This is the moment 
for us, finally, to act--to act against aggression, against immorality, 
to give the people of this country--the victims--the weapons with which 
to defend themselves.
  Mr. President, the Bosnians have been the greatest victims of the 
current policy that the West has followed for the last 3\1/2\ years, a 
policy of irresoluteness, at best, a policy of weakness, at worst.
  But the Bosnians are not the only victims. We have suffered, as well. 
When aggression is met by ambivalence, and aggression is met by no 
response--which has been the case throughout the war in Bosnia--
ultimately, we are all going to suffer. We saw it happen just a short 
while ago directly to America, when Captain O'Grady's F-16 was shot 
down. 

[[Page S 10237]]

  I have gone over this event in some detail with the folks at the 
Pentagon just to make clear that I understood exactly what happened. 
Here is what I have learned. We know that the Serbs in Bosnia were able 
to pick up the F-16 flying over Bosnia on an integrated radar air 
defense system that has installations in Bosnia, controlled by the 
Bosnian Serbs, but goes back to Belgrade and Serbia, as well. But what 
is most infuriating about this is that it is clear to those who are in 
a position to know that when the Serbian air defense system sighted 
Captain O'Grady's F-16, they knew it was an American F-16. This may not 
be known to those who are not involved, and Members of the Chamber, and 
those who may be watching this debate, but this is a sophisticated air 
defense system which can look at this plane and determine that it is an 
American F-16.
 And not just that. It was able to determine--the Serbs on the ground--
that this F-16 was not flying an aggressive flight mission. It was not 
out to drop weapons, bombs, on Serbian targets, as has happened all too 
infrequently in this conflict. But that this plane was on a 
nonaggressive patrol mission, part of Operation Deny Flight, to keep 
Serb planes on the ground, not in the air.

  Seeing it was an American plane, knowing it was on a nonaggressive 
mission, the Bosnian Serbs intentionally shot it down. It is only by 
the grace of God and by the depth of his own extraordinary courage that 
Captain O'Grady is alive today.
  Understand the outrageous arrogance, the disrespect for law, the 
disrespect for the greatest power in the world, the United States, that 
they showed. These Bosnian Serbs shot down our plane.
  What have they paid for that aggression? Nothing. What does that 
invite? It invites them to attack and overrun a safe haven. Meanwhile 
Bosnian Army weapons are being held in a U.N. compound. U.N. Dutch 
soldiers--courageous, effectively unarmed--light arms is all they had. 
Then the Serbs followed with atrocities against the civilian 
population.
  So we have suffered. We have suffered in the United States. We will 
continue to suffer, as will the rule of law and the rule of morality, 
if we stand by and allow this aggression of the Serbs to go unresponded 
to. Mr. President, that is what this S. 21 proposal is all about.
  In 1992, President Clinton supported a policy of lifting the arms 
embargo and striking from the air. In 1993, Secretary Christopher, in 
the spring of that year, May I believe, went to Europe to advocate this 
policy. Apparently, our allies and Britain and France argued against 
it. That was the end of it.
  I honestly believe if we implemented that policy at that point and 
employed NATO air power, which we could have done against the Serbs 
with minimal risk to NATO and American personnel, this war would have 
been over and there would have been a reasonable peace that both sides 
could have accepted. That is history. It has not happened.
  But now, though the hour is late in Bosnia and the situation ever 
more difficult and complicated, there is no opportunity to get the 
warring parties to the peace table, unless the Serbs pay some price for 
their aggression.
  It seems to me that our last hope here, our last best hope, is to 
lift the arms embargo, give the Bosnians the weapons with which to 
defend themselves, their families, their country, and use NATO air 
power to strike at Serbian targets. I would not rule anything out.
  Let the Serbs worry about where and when we will strike. In Bosnia 
against Serbian targets or in Serbia, which continues to arm, equip, 
and actually send Serbian regular soldiers into Bosnia alongside the 
Bosnian Serbs.
  There is strong evidence that in the fall of Srebrenica there were 
special forces from the Serbian Army, the so-called Serbian Army 
fighting side by side with the Bosnian Serbs.
  This is our last best hope, not just for the people of Bosnia who 
paid a terrible price, but for the rule of law and order in Europe and 
throughout the world.
  It is the last best hope for NATO to show that in a situation that is 
complicated and yet where aggression is clear, it will act outside the 
context of the Soviet-American cold war conflict; that there is still 
meaning to NATO in this great alliance.
  It is the last best hope for the United Nations to restore some 
measure of credibility to itself as an instrument of hope to victims of 
aggression and oppression throughout the world.
  Mr. President, there will be an extended debate tomorrow, I am sure, 
on this amendment. I hope and pray that what we will have is the 
resounding bipartisan majority, the overwhelming majority that Senator 
Dole referred to earlier.
  Of itself, this is an event that occurs here on the floor of the 
Senate, far removed from the suffering on the ground in Bosnia, unable 
effectively to immediately, even it is passed overwhelmingly, bring 
assistance to the Bosnians, but it will bring them hope.
  More than that, I hope that it will combine with what is happening on 
the ground, which is to say the failure of the U.N. mission, to either 
lead to a more aggressive use of air power by NATO, as Secretary Perry 
has spoken of, hopefully, encouragingly to me, in the last 3 or 4 days. 
If not, then the withdrawal of the U.N. forces, the arming of the 
Bosnians, and the continued use of NATO air power.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair for his patience. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, when we see a photograph of a young woman 
who has hanged herself in a forest in Bosnia, because she prefers death 
to the kind of violations which the Bosnian Serbs are inflicting on 
young women like herself who are Bosnian Moslems; and where we see 
confirmed reports where the Bosnian Serbs walk into safe havens and 
root out 11-year-old children who are males, and slit their throats and 
pile them in heaps; and when we see documents filed by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia where the 
indictments read--horrifying prose--about torture and sexual 
mutilation, in which a prisoner is forced to ``bite off the prisoner's 
testicle,'' resulting in his death; as horrible as these events are to 
recite, they are minuscule compared to the horror of what is going on 
in Bosnia today, and the acts of savagery, brutality, and atrocities 
being committed by the Bosnian Serbs on the Bosnian Moslems.
  The words ``ethnic cleansing'' hardly begin to describe what is going 
on in that atrocious situation.
  Meanwhile, the democracies of the world, the West, have permitted 
this atrocious situation to continue. I believe that the time has long 
passed when there has to be a change in United States policy on how we 
deal with Bosnia. The time has long passed when there has to be a 
change in NATO policy on how we deal with Bosnia.
 And the time has long passed when there has to be a change in U.N. 
policy, on how we deal with Bosnia.

  I believe that the resolution offered tonight is a minimal step 
forward to try to implement a new policy which is urgently required. It 
is a minimal step to lift the arms embargo, to let the Bosnian Moslems 
defend themselves, as they have every right to do under article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter.
  Action by the Senate, by the Congress, by the Government of the 
United States--depending upon what happens here in the House, the 
President's reaction, the veto, a possible override or perhaps the 
impetus of a strong statement by the U.S. Senate--will cause a marked 
change in U.S. policy and what has to be U.S. leadership. There has 
been a vacuum in U.S. leadership and I think that is conceded on all 
sides. It is not a political matter. Republicans were critical of 
President Bush for the arms embargo. The Senator from Connecticut, 
Senator Lieberman, has been critical of the President, of his own 
party. Senator Kerrey, of Nebraska, who is vice chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, a committee which I chair, has been critical of 
his own President and is quoted, ``The President's leadership has been 
awful. He campaigned criticizing President George Bush for not doing 
enough and 

[[Page S 10238]]
implied that we were going to take the side of the Bosnian Moslems.''
  I ask unanimous consent that this newsclip be printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. So we are not talking about a matter that is political. 
The reality is that our President is inexperienced and inattentive and 
indecisive and ineffective. It is time that leadership came from the 
United States Senate, as this body had to start the leadership to get 
the United States forces out of Somalia when we passed a resolution 
cutting off the funds, as we have the authority to do under our 
appropriations power.
  I submit that leadership by the U.S. Senate may well have the effect 
of profoundly changing, not only U.S. policy but NATO policy and U.N. 
policy as well. U.N. peacekeepers have had a ``Mission Impossible'' in 
Bosnia, because there is no peace to keep. I submit the U.N. 
peacekeepers ought to be withdrawn. That is indispensable before the 
arms embargo is lifted, so that the UN peacekeepers are out of harm's 
way.
  That would then put us in a position to have an option of massive 
bombing. There are arguments both ways, as to whether the bombing would 
be sufficient. There is a substantial basis for saying if the bombing 
were sufficiently intense and if the Bosnian Moslems were armed, that a 
balance of power could be restored there. We subjected Baghdad to 
relentless bombing during the gulf war, for months in advance of the 
invasion.
  A question is raised as to whether there ought to be consideration to 
retaliating against the cities of the Bosnian Serbs. I am not prepared 
to answer that question. That issue has been raised, as to whether the 
doctrine of proportionality makes any sense when the only reaction to 
the attacks of the Bosnian Serbs is a proportional counterattack. That 
leaves them to call the shots at every turn, because, under the 
doctrine of proportionality, which has been adopted by the United 
Nations, the Bosnian Serbs are not at risk. And there is a real 
question as to whether that policy ought to be abandoned.
  Then you have the dual key issue, where every decision has to be 
approved by the United Nations and NATO. There is very strong reason to 
believe that the decisions ought not to be made by the United Nations 
from their record up to the present time. You have the courageous 
leadership of the French President, Chirac, who says he is prepared to 
act and he is prepared to take some forceful steps. He asks for support 
from the United States, with helicopters, for some air cover. I am not 
sure whether that is a wise course, but that is a request which ought 
to be considered.
  I am opposed to United States participation in a ground war in 
Bosnia. I do not think we should lend U.S. troops to any such effort. 
But in terms of air strikes, which are not entirely without risk as we 
know--one pilot, Captain O'Grady, was downed there--helicopters may or 
may not be committed. There are also risks involved. But it is 
something which ought to be considered.
  I believe, Mr. President, if we have forceful leadership coming from 
the United States--and when I say ``Mr. President,'' those who may be 
watching on C-SPAN2 should know that is our formal way of addressing 
the Presiding Officer of this body, not the President of the United 
States--but, if the Senate takes a forceful stand, that could have an 
impact on leading President Clinton to change his position and it may 
well be with leadership which comes out of the U.S. Senate that we will 
change the policy of President Clinton and together we can change the 
policy of NATO. We can change the policy of the United Nations. We can 
change the policy of France and Britain, if we undertake what French 
President Chirac has wanted to accomplish.
  Mr. President, when we see the genocide and the atrocities that are 
going on in Bosnia, we really wonder about America's response in 
another era. I recall vividly my father recounting his experiences as 
an American doughboy in the American Expeditionary Force in France in 
World War I. My father came to this country from Russia to escape the 
czar's heel. He was not willing to go to Siberia to fight for the czar. 
But he was ready, willing, able, and really anxious to go to France to 
fight for America, as he put it, as I remember hearing him talk about 
it growing up, ``to make the world safe for democracy.'' I know my 
brother and brother-in-law served in World War II against the scourge 
of the Nazis and the Japanese after the attack on Pearl Harbor. And I 
served stateside during the Korean war.
  We have a different attitude today, Mr. President, in the United 
States, as to the extent we are willing to stand up for honor and for 
values and to stop the kind of atrocities which are going on in Bosnia. 
But I do believe that the entire policy of the Clinton administration 
needs reevaluation from top to bottom, and the resolution which is 
pending right now, to lift the arms embargo, is a step in the right 
direction. I hope that this will start a debate in the United States 
Senate so that we can consider the very serious questions which are in 
issue here,
 and we can consider the values of the United States, which we so 
proudly proclaim, and consider acting upon those values and supporting 
them when we see the kind of atrocities which are going on in Bosnia. 
And we know the values articulated by the NATO alliance, and we know 
the values articulated by the United Nations. And it is time we put 
some action behind those words.

  The first step on the action is a step to unilaterally lift the arms 
embargo. If we move ahead with consultation--and it will take some 
time--and there is a real question as to whether there would be 
sufficient votes to pass the resolution and a greater question as to 
whether there would be sufficient votes to override a Presidential 
veto, perhaps we will find that we can change the policy of the United 
Nations and that we will end up acting in concert with France, Great 
Britain, and the other NATO powers.
  But there is a very important issue, Mr. President, which we cannot 
duck any longer. I am glad to see the resolution offered because I 
think it is time we took a look at what is going on in Bosnia and look 
in the mirror to see how we feel about the kinds of values we 
articulate and the kinds of actions we are prepared to back up.
  It is a matter which cries out for leadership. But it is a very 
difficult matter because of the obvious reluctance and reticence of 
anyone to see ground troops deployed in Bosnia or to see any casualties 
inflicted on American fighting men and women. But these are issues 
which need to be considered. And the American people need to know what 
is going on there so there can be a public reaction to the kinds of 
atrocities which are going on--where young women are hanging themselves 
rather than to be subjected to the atrocities of the Bosnian Serbs and 
lads taken out in great numbers and having their throats slit 
apparently so that they will not grow into another generation to pose 
some theoretical problem for the Serbs; to have the ethnic cleansing, 
and to have an entire genocide of an entire people.
  So I support the pending resolution.
                               Exhibit 1

                    Kerrey Criticizes the President

                          (By David C. Beeder)

       Washington.--Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., accused President 
     Clinton Tuesday of a lack of leadership in Bosnia's civil 
     war.
       ``The president's leadership has been awful,'' Kerrey said 
     in an interview. ``He campaigned criticizing (President 
     George) Bush for not doing enough and implied we were going 
     to take the side of the Bosnian Muslims.'' Since then, Kerrey 
     said, Clinton has been ``sending a message that's pretty 
     strong that the cavalry is coming up over the hill.''
       In a press conference later, Kerrey said Senate Majority 
     Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., ``is closer to being right'' with 
     his plan to disregard a U.N. arms embargo that has 
     handicapped the Bosnian government.
       Kerrey said he could support such a plan if it required 
     other countries' approval and if it first called for 
     withdrawal of all U.N. peacekeepers.
       At the same time, Kerrey said, the United States must be 
     ``careful not to respond emotionally to scenes of violence 
     and atrocities'' against one side or the other in the civil 
     war, saying the conflict did not consist of ``a single issue 
     where the Muslims are right and the Serbs are wrong.''
       Kerrey's fellow Nebraska senator, Democrat J.J. Exon, urged 
     caution in responding to events in Bosnia.

[[Page S 10239]]

       ``With all the atrocities that are taking place over there, 
     there is a tendency to come unglued,'' he said.
       Exon said he was concerned about a request that the United 
     States send helicopters into combat zones to deliver U.N. 
     reinforcement troops.
       ``The more people they put in there the more difficult it 
     will be to extricate them,'' Exon said, noting that Clinton 
     has pledged to send U.S. ground troops to help if the U.N. 
     decides it must withdraw from Bosnia.
       Exon said he has always opposed sending U.S. ground troops.

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