[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 116 (Tuesday, July 18, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10178-S10182]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              INEFFECTUAL U.N. PROTECTION FORCES IN BOSNIA

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I too want to discuss the subject which the 
Senator from South Carolina has just addressed.
  Mr. President, I believe that the continued presence of the 
ineffectual U.N. Protection Forces in Bosnia is eroding the credibility 
of the United Nations, of NATO, and of the United States.
  I agree with the points that Senator Thurmond just made. In 
particular, I agree that the executive branch and the Congress must 
work together and reach a consensus as soon as possible. This situation 
is bad enough without the President and the Congress being in a big 
fight here. So we need to find a way to work together.
  The second point that I agree with that Senator Thurmond made is that 
now is the time for the Congress to show leadership and to make it 
clear 

[[Page S 10179]]
that the United States will assist in extracting our allies from 
Bosnia. Congress cannot duck this question.
  The third point that he made that I specifically agree with: The 
withdrawal operation must be totally under NATO command. There can be 
no ``dual-key'' arrangement. There must be robust rules of engagement. 
And the scope and the duration of the mission must be limited.
  And, finally, I think the key point he made related to what the 
United States' role must be in the withdrawal; that is, the honor and 
credibility of our Nation are essential components, not only to our 
national security, not only to Bosnia, but to deterrence throughout the 
world. That is essential. Honor and credibility are essential parts of 
national security, and of deterrence. I completely agree with the 
Senator from South Carolina on that excellent point.
  Mr. President, I will leave to another day the discussion of mistakes 
leading to the current human tragedy in Bosnia. The Bosnian-Serbs have 
overrun the U.N.-declared safe area of Srebenica, and they can take 
Zepa at any time of their choosing.
  The United Nations Security Council has passed another meaningless 
resolution calling upon Secretary General Boutros Ghali to restore 
Srebrenica to its safe area status. Of course, none of the Security 
Council members has told the beleaguered Secretary General how to 
perform that task.
  The French have declared their readiness to fight for Gorazde if the 
British will join them and if the Americans will supply tactical 
airlift. The French are clearly paving the way for their withdrawal 
from Bosnia unless there is a determined U.N. stand with British and 
American assistance.
  The British have raised serious reservations about the French 
proposals and the French approach, both publicly and privately.
  General Shalikashvili has met with his counterparts from Britain and 
France for the purpose of preparing immediate options for the national 
leaders to consider, and I assume that consideration will be made in 
the next few days.
  Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher will be meeting with their 
counterparts later this week.
  The Clinton administration is urging our allies to remain in Bosnia, 
refusing to commit United States forces on the ground, continuing to 
distance itself from any ``unjust settlement'' and pledging to help 
extract our allies from Bosnia if they withdraw.
  This week the Senate will plunge into this morass by legislating on 
Bosnia. I believe that Congress has an important role to play in 
foreign policy matters. I always have felt that. At the same time, I do 
not believe Congress as a rule should attempt to legislate the details 
of United States foreign policy. But if we do choose to legislate on 
Bosnia:
  We must not remove the President's flexibility to react to 
unpredictable situations in which American lives are at stake;
  We should not force our allies and our other U.N. forces to 
withdraw--advocating withdrawal is one thing, forcing it by legislation 
is another thing entirely. We need to distinguish between speeches and 
legislation; and
  We should not and must not avoid the hard questions which will 
inevitably flow from congressional actions. There are hard questions 
that have not yet fully been considered by either the House or the 
Senate in my view.
  Mr. President, many of our colleagues want to--I use these terms in 
shorthand--``lift and leave.'' By that I mean lift the embargo and 
leave the Bosnians to fend for themselves. The House of Representatives 
passed this type of legislation. We in the Senate debated this type 
legislation and passed it on one occasion last year.
  This school of thought seems to believe that a simple repeal of the 
American export prohibition will automatically equalize the conflict. 
It glosses over the questions of who will pay for the weapons; who will 
deliver them; how will they be delivered; and who will help train the 
Bosnian troops.
  To be fair, there are those, including the majority leader, Senator 
Dole, Senator Lieberman, Senator Biden, and others, who have advocated 
unilaterally lifting the arms embargo but who would also support the 
supply of United States equipment and United States training to Bosnian 
Government forces. But many of those whose votes are needed to pass the 
Dole-Lieberman bill are unwilling to make such a commitment, and the 
Dole-Lieberman approach leaves these questions unanswered. This is a 
large gap.
  Mr. President, another view in the Senate which heretofore has been a 
minority view--and this has been a view that I have had--is that the 
embargo should be lifted but only after U.N. forces have left Bosnia.
  There are also those in the Senate who have a third view, who agree 
with the administration that the U.N. forces should remain in Bosnia. 
In my view, this is a distinctly minority view.
  Mr. President, the overwhelming majority of the Senate in my view 
support either the lift-and-leave approach or the leave-then-lift 
alternative approach. The Dole-Lieberman proposed legislation now seems 
to have moved substantially toward the leave-then-lift approach. That 
is important. They are moving in their resolution toward the position 
of leave first, then lift the embargo. That is a key distinction, and 
that is a distinction that has separated those of us on the two sides 
of this issue in the Senate for the last 12 months.
  Mr. President, this is a very significant change in the Dole-
Lieberman proposal that has been overlooked by most people in the press 
corps, many critics of the bill, and even many supporters of the bill.
  The latest version of the Dole-Lieberman bill is a major improvement 
in my view in that it takes into account and into consideration some 
concerns of our NATO allies who have forces on the ground in Bosnia by 
delaying the implementation of the termination of the Bosnian embargo 
until the U.N. forces withdraw. That is a key difference from the 
approach that was taken in past resolutions. Additionally--and I think 
very importantly--the new Dole-Lieberman proposal puts the onus or 
responsibility on the Government of Bosnia and the troop contributing 
countries to decide if the U.N. forces should stay in Bosnia.
  It does this by terminating the embargo based on either of two 
conditions:
  Condition 1: a Bosnian Government request that the U.N. forces 
withdraw from Bosnia; or
  Condition 2: a decision by the U.N. Security Council or the UNPROFOR 
troop-contributing countries to withdraw the U.N. forces.
  As I understand the Dole-Lieberman proposal, if condition 1 is met, 
implementation of the termination of the embargo would be delayed until 
12 weeks after the Bosnian Government requests that the United Nations 
be withdrawn. If, on the other hand, condition 2 is met--that is, the 
troops of the contributing countries decide to leave without a request 
from the Bosnian Government--termination of the embargo would be 
delayed until such time as the U.N. forces have been withdrawn from 
Bosnia.
  This is in my view a much different proposal than what we have 
debated in the past. It is much different from what has passed the 
House of Representatives. It is a much more responsible approach than 
the original proposal which lifted the embargo unilaterally without 
regard for the continued U.N. troop presence in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I say all of that on the positive side of the Dole-
Lieberman amendment. The key missing ingredient, however, of the new 
Dole-Lieberman amendment is any mention of what should be obvious to 
all and what must be obvious during the debate on this proposal to 
those of us in the Senate, and I hope to the country; namely, that the 
President of the United States has publicly pledged to deploy up to 
25,000 United States troops on the ground, if necessary, in Bosnia to 
help extract the U.N. forces.
  Mr. President, Congress cannot responsibly legislate on Bosnia and 
ignore this fact. If Congress wants to prevent United States ground 
forces from assisting our allies in withdrawing from Bosnia, we should 
make that clear. If Congress wants the allies and the United Nations to 
withdraw from Bosnia and is willing to support President Clinton's 
commitment, Congress should make that clear. Congress cannot 
responsibly advocate a course of 

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action and pretend to ignore the inevitable and certain consequences of 
that action.
  If the United Nations withdraws from Bosnia, United States 
participation to assist our allies to withdraw from Bosnia would be 
required and has been publicly committed by the President of the United 
States. The Dole-Lieberman bill, at this time, is silent on this 
crucial point. If this legislation is passed as written, in my view, it 
will send a loud signal by its silence. It will send a loud signal that 
Congress is prepared to advocate a course of action but is not prepared 
to back it up.
  Over the last 3 years, we have witnessed a lowest common denominator 
approach in the United Nations, in NATO, among our allies, and in 
United States policymaking regarding Bosnia. Every policy decision on 
Bosnia seems to be reduced to what Winston Churchill, if he were with 
us today, would certainly describe as ``mush, gush, and slush.'' We see 
this in the so-called mandates of the U.N. Security Council. We see 
this in the U.N.-NATO dual key command structure. We see this in the 
statements of the members of the U.N. Security Council who have voted 
for every Security Council resolution for the last 4 years but who act 
as though the United Nations is some outer space alien of which they 
never heard.
  Mr. President, we see this in the position of many in this 
administration, in this Congress, and in the news media who for the 
last 2 years have decried any ``unjust solution'' but who have been 
unwilling to commit American resources for a just solution, and 
unwilling to admit that there never will be a just solution in Bosnia 
unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it by force.
  Mr. President, that is reality. There will never be a just solution 
in Bosnia unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to impose it 
by force.
  I hope, as the Senate debates the Dole-Lieberman bill this week, that 
we will not continue and even add to the lowest-common-denominator 
approach that has been so evident in all the Bosnia decisions by 
international and by other bodies.
  There is no good solution to the Bosnian tragedy. There is no easy 
solution. There is no solution that anyone can guarantee is going to 
work. Some approaches, in my view, are worse than others, but all have 
unwelcome consequences. The American people are entitled to understand 
the possible consequences as we debate this issue.
  What would be the consequences if the U.N. forces withdraw? NATO has 
been putting together a plan to withdraw the U.N. forces. This plan 
calls for deployment of up to 82,000 troops, some 25,000 of whom would 
be American military personnel based on the commitment of the President 
of the United States pursuant to his pledge to our NATO allies. This is 
a sizable force but, in my view, it is a necessary force, given the 
topography of Bosnia and the history of that conflict and the history 
of that region.
  This large force may be deemed by some to be a worst-case force, but 
it makes a worst case much less likely to occur. Our military leaders 
have been candid in telling us, both in testimony and in private 
discussions, that this withdrawal operation could be very dangerous. I 
think they are right. There is also a possibility, however, that the 
withdrawal could be relatively unimpeded by both sides. It could 
proceed rapidly; it could proceed effectively. No one knows or pretends 
to know how dangerous this will be, but prudence and careful planning 
are absolutely essential.
  Mr. President, we should note that the NATO plan makes no provision 
for the withdrawal of refugees. Everyone should understand that. There 
is no provision in that NATO plan for withdrawal of refugees. Our 
military commanders, in fact, concede that one of the most difficult 
aspects of a withdrawal operation will be dealing with Bosnian 
civilians. They may attempt to keep the U.N. forces and the NATO forces 
from leaving Bosnia out of fear that they will be prey to the attacking 
Serbs once the restraining presence of UNPROFOR is removed. They may do 
this regardless of what their Government may say publicly or privately.
  We also must consider what will happen to the civilian population 
once the extensive humanitarian relief effort is no longer functioning 
there. A humanitarian tragedy is likely, and we should understand that 
as we debate this serious issue.
  Both the Government of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb leaders have 
publicly stated that they would assist the U.N. forces in withdrawing 
if the United Nations makes a decision to withdraw. But NATO military 
commanders, understandably, express concern about the following 
possibilities:
  First, the sincerity and durability of these statements by leaders 
whose word in the past has been questioned; second, whether the warring 
parties will try to gain control of the tons of U.N. military equipment 
and supplies presently located in Bosnia; third, whether the Bosnian 
Serbs will be cooperative as they realize that the completion of the 
U.N. withdrawal will likely result in the lifting of the arms embargo 
on the Government of Bosnia; and fourth, the narrow and winding roads 
that make up much of Bosnia's transportation system. It will take 
little effort by a determined foe to destroy the numerous bridges and 
tunnels that are often the only ingress and egress to the numerous 
Bosnian towns and to Bosnia itself where the U.N. personnel are 
located. The Bosnian Serbs control much of the high ground around these 
roads and these towns.
  From those who continue to advocate immediate and unilateral lift of 
the embargo, an intellectually honest approach requires facing up to 
the arming and training of the Bosnian Government forces. This course 
will likely require air support, assuming the Bosnian Serbs move in for 
the kill before the arming of the Bosnian forces is complete, which 
will, at best, take several weeks or months. It also requires 
recognition that our allies will pull out of Bosnia and hold the United 
States responsible for the Bosnian tragedy which may unfold if we 
unilaterally lift the embargo before the U.N. forces are out.
  From those who advocate either immediate and unilateral lift of the 
embargo or, on the other hand, U.N. withdrawal followed by a lift of 
the arms embargo, in either event, under either course of action, 
intellectual honesty requires a congressional authorization or at least 
a congressional acknowledgment that U.S. forces will be used to help 
evacuate our NATO allies and the other U.N. forces.
  Mr. President, from those who advocate keeping the U.N. forces in 
Bosnia, intellectual honesty requires the acknowledgment that these 
forces must be beefed up, probably with considerable United States 
help; that clear authority for military decisions must be delegated by 
the United Nations to NATO and the dual-key approach must be ended; and 
that exposed U.N. personnel all over Bosnia must be brought to more 
defensible positions so they are not simply hostages for one side. Each 
of these actions moves further and further away from the humanitarian 
mission, and each of these actions moves closer toward direct 
involvement in the conflict, and all should recognize that is what 
staying the course means.
  If the embargo is lifted multilaterally after UNPROFOR departs, 
allied air support will be demanded by the Government of Bosnia. We 
already know that, those of us who have listened to them when they have 
been here or heard their public statements. They are going to demand 
that we owe them air support. That is going to be their demand.
  If the embargo is lifted unilaterally before or after the date the 
U.N. forces depart, Congress and the American people must recognize 
that this burden will fall primarily on the United States because our 
allies, if we lift the embargo unilaterally, are not going to be 
anxious to participate. In either case, there is no assurance that the 
Bosnian Government will be able to defend their territory, even with 
air support.
  Mr. President, as I have stated, there are no good solutions in 
Bosnia. I have my own views as to the approach the United Nations and 
the United States and our allies should follow in Bosnia.
  First, there should be a final intense diplomatic effort to negotiate 
an end of the conflict in Bosnia. I am under no illusion that a 
diplomatic effort will be successful. It is not likely to be 
successful, but at least it should be tried, because all the other 
alternatives have tremendous downside consequences. 

[[Page S 10181]]

  Second, the United Nations should serve notice on all parties that if 
a negotiated settlement is not reached within a specified period of 
time, the U.N. forces will be withdrawn from Bosnia. Both the Bush and 
Clinton administrations have urged our allies to commit their forces 
and to remain on the ground in Bosnia. When these forces are withdrawn, 
I believe the United States has a moral obligation to assist in their 
withdrawal. In our effort to save Bosnia, we must not destroy NATO.
  Third, once the U.N. forces have been withdrawn, the Bosnian arms 
embargo should be lifted multilaterally, if possible, unilaterally if 
that is the only course. The United States and our allies should assist 
in arming and training the Bosnian Government forces, and that is going 
to cost some money and it is going to take some time. We all need to 
understand that.
  Fourth, the allies and the contact group must devise a ``containment 
policy'' and make it clear to the government in Belgrade that it will 
be held fully responsible if this conflict spreads across other 
borders.
  Mr. President, to sum up, legislating on Bosnia is fraught with 
danger. But if we are to legislate--and it appears that we are--we must 
understand the full consequences of our legislation. We must be willing 
to go on record as supporting or disapproving the commitment that 
President Clinton has made to our allies to help them withdraw from 
Bosnia. To do otherwise would be adding more ``mush, gush, and slush.''
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator allow me about a minute and a half?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has 7\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator from Georgia, the ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee, for his appropriate and 
pertinent remarks on the situation in Bosnia. I strongly support the 
Dole-Lieberman bill and am pleased to be an original cosponsor of it.
  As the Senate begins consideration of S. 21, the Dole-Lieberman bill, 
this week, I ask that Members consider and discuss the very important 
issue of U.S. support for a United Nations withdrawal. This support, 
with the aid of NATO, requires a very close and careful consideration 
and discussion by the Members of the Senate.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am not trying to control time here, but I 
have a little time left, and I will be glad to yield to the Senator 
from Nebraska 3 minutes.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself completely with 
the remarks made by my learned and distinguished colleague from 
Georgia. I will oppose the Dole-Lieberman proposition, as I understand 
it, basically for the reasons brought forth in the carefully worded and 
well-thought-out statement made by the Senator from Georgia.
  We have to look to the future. As bad as the situation is over there 
now--and I think no one feels that they have all of the right answers--
we have to look to the future. I am afraid, Mr. President, that despite 
the good intentions of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, it clearly sows 
the seeds, which are ripe for harvest, for the beginning of the end of 
NATO.
  The situation in Bosnia today is very bad, and the pictures that are 
coming through very loud and clear on television are horrifying, 
portraying the atrocities that are being taken in that most unfortunate 
war in Europe. However, I happen to feel that we should always try and 
walk in others' shoes. I simply say that if we take action today, or 
this week, we might regret it in the future, because it sows the seeds 
for the end of NATO, which has been a force for peace since World War 
II. And then we might look back on that action and say we probably 
acted in haste, we probably acted in compassion, but we probably acted 
in a way that would not be in the long-term best interest of peace in 
Europe and probably would go a long way to disrupting the NATO alliance 
and our friends and allies in Europe that have been a part of that.
  This is a grave situation. I wish that our allies would agree to 
remove the peacekeeping forces because, seemingly, that is what both 
sides of the combatants there want. I happen to feel that the U.N. 
mission is doomed to failure under the circumstances that are present.
  Nevertheless, unless and until our allies in NATO can be convinced of 
that, I say let us proceed with caution. I have grave concerns about 
the way we are going. I do not know the answers. I simply say that 
caution is a better part of valor at this particular juncture. I thank 
my friend from Georgia, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. I will yield whatever I have left to the Senator from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. NUNN. I will yield that to the Senator from Texas, and whatever 
she does not use, I will yield back.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask unanimous consent to add 2 minutes onto the 3 
minutes I have been yielded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I appreciate the fact that several of 
my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee are talking today about 
the situation in Bosnia. It is clear that we cannot sit by and do 
nothing. We have talked about this issue for months.
  Six weeks ago, I stood right on the border of Macedonia looking into 
Serbia. I was visiting our U.S. troops who were there on an outpost 
under the auspices of the United Nations. I saw the terrain; I talked 
to our troops, both in Croatia and Macedonia; I talked to the people 
who are running the operation there; I talked to the head of the U.N. 
delegation there, Mr. Akashi.
  I think I have a feel for the situation that is there. Mr. President, 
I think we must learn from our experiences. The United Nations has a 
very valid role to play when there is a peace to keep. But, Mr. 
President, we have the best of intentions in the United Nations, but we 
have the worst of results. In fact, the United Nations is becoming an 
obstacle to solving this situation--not that they mean to be. They are 
trying. We give them the fact that they are trying.
  But, Mr. President, they cannot function. And because they are there, 
we have the effect of one side being unarmed, basically, and the other 
side being aggressive with arms. We had the Prime Minister of Bosnia 
here, and he said,

       I keep hearing people say there are two sides here. Yes, 
     one side is shooting, the other side is dying.

  Mr. President, he is right. We cannot sit by and let it happen by 
saying that we have U.N. peacekeepers sitting there on the ground and, 
therefore, one side should remain unarmed. They are being ravaged, Mr. 
President, and we must do something about it. We cannot continue to 
talk on the floor of the U.S. Senate while they are being ravaged 
across the ocean.
  So, Mr. President, I hope that our leader, Senator Dole, will bring 
up his resolution at the earliest possible moment to tell the President 
how strongly we feel that we should not get involved with this mission 
beyond what the President has said he will do to help extricate the 
U.N. peacekeepers under the auspices of NATO.
  Mr. President, we have to define that mission very carefully. That 
mission must be extraction. I do not like all the talk of, well, 
extraction also means containment of troops, it also means emergencies 
anywhere that they might occur in Bosnia. And now we are talking about 
sending helicopters there--American helicopters. Will they have 
American troops running the helicopters, flying those helicopters?
  Mr. President, there are a lot of questions, and I do not think we 
can afford to just say all of those things are acceptable for our 
American troops. I do not want American troops flying helicopters into 
Bosnia. I do not want American troops to be put forth for any emergency 
in Bosnia. That is ground combat. We are talking about potential ground 
combat.
  Mr. President, I am representing American troops and I am going to do 
everything I can to make sure that they are as safe as they can be, and 
that they are not involved in a mission which does not have the United 
States' security interest. 

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  Mr. President, that is the question here. We have gotten ourselves 
involved in Somalia through mission creep. We just let it evolve, and 
we lost Rangers--our own U.S. Army Rangers. Mr. President, we are 
looking at a potential for mission creep here if we are not very 
careful.
  So I am going to appeal to the President of the United States to 
watch for mission creep. Helicopters with American troops is mission 
creep.
 Contraction of our forces, our U.S. peacekeepers, is mission creep. 
Emergencies anywhere in Bosnia is mission creep.

  Mr. President, I hope that Senator Dole brings his resolution to the 
floor so that the President of the United States can hear: The time has 
come to lift the arms embargo and let these people have a fair fight.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from South Dakota, [Mr. Pressler], is recognized to speak for 
up to 10 minutes.

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