[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 115 (Monday, July 17, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Page S10086]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           STATE DEPARTMENT'S REFORM IS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the majority leader announced today his 
intentions to bring S. 908, the State Department Authorization Bill, to 
the Senate floor before the August recess.
  As my colleagues are well aware, this bill proposes to reorganize the 
agencies of the executive branch charged with the conduct of America's 
foreign policy, saving needed Federal tax dollars in the process.
  Before my colleagues rush to judgment on the efforts to restructure 
the State Department, I recommend they read John Bolton's June 25 op-ed 
piece in the Washington Times, ``Quest for a Stronger Foreign Policy 
Hand.''
  Mr. President, John Bolton writes with authority on the purpose and 
past performance of the State Department because of his having served 
as Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development 
in the Reagan administration and as assistant Secretary of State in the 
Bush administration. Currently, John Bolton serves as the president of 
the National Policy Forum.
  I urge Senators to take note of John Bolton's counsel. His advice 
regarding strengthening America's foreign policy hand is both sound and 
sorely needed.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the June 25 op-ed piece 
in the Washington Times, ``Quest for a Stronger Foreign Policy Hand'', 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Times, June 25, 1995]

                Quest for a Stronger Foreign Policy Hand

                            (By John Bolton)
       The House of Representatives has just adopted sweeping 
     organizational changes in formulating American foreign 
     policy. The Clinton administration has argued that the 
     restructuring under debate--merging the Agency for 
     International Development, the U.S. Information Agency and 
     the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State 
     Department--are isolationist and unnecessary. Comparable 
     legislation is now pending in the Senate.
       Lost in the swirling and sometimes confusing arguments 
     about reorganization is the principal point: How to 
     strengthen the hand of the president in the conduct of 
     foreign policy. Constitutionally, only the president can and 
     should speak authoritatively for the United States in 
     international matters.
       The paramountcy of executive branch leadership in these 
     affairs, however, has been repeatedly compromised by 
     splitting, again and again, the president's authority among a 
     multiplicity of agencies. Each agency develops its own 
     ``mission,'' its own political constituencies, and its own 
     set of priorities, many or all of which may have little or no 
     congruence with the wishes of the sitting president. The 
     result, too often, has been interagency disagreements that 
     retard if not entirely paralyze effective decision-making and 
     policy implementation.
       Over the years, therefore, the president's has been 
     weakened, and his ability to act firmly and decisively 
     hampered. Now, in the early days of a post-Cold War era, it 
     is precisely the right time to sweep away the bureaucratic 
     remnants of the past, and the ossified ``old thinking'' they 
     have come to embody. It is simply wrong to argue that the 
     proponents of change are attempting to shift power between 
     the branches. To the contrary, the proposals are intended to 
     enhance presidential authority within his own often-unruly 
     family.
       Advocates of USIA's continued independence, for example, 
     argue that its news and other functions should remain 
     rigorously independent from the tainting touch of foreign 
     policy considerations. AID's defenders assert that providing 
     foreign economic assistance should serve as a poverty program 
     rather than a support for vital U.S. interests. ACDA's 
     champions believe that only its separateness will protect the 
     Holy Grail of arms control. In fact, the secret agenda in all 
     three cases is to insulate the sub-Cabinet agencies from 
     effective control by the secretary of state, for fear that 
     their respective missions will be ``politicized.'' In this 
     context, ``politicized'' means becoming consonant with U.S. 
     national interests, which most Americans would simply take as 
     a given, not as a problem.
       Many who wish to preserve AID's separateness, such as Vice 
     President Al Gore, do so because they support increased 
     spending on international population control and 
     environmental matters rather than fundamental economic policy 
     reforms in developing countries. The vice president's 
     preference for condoms and trees instead of markets 
     notwithstanding, these policies will receive long-term 
     political support in Congress only if they are tied to 
     enhancing demonstrable U.S. foreign policy interests.
       Changes in bureaucratic structures, however, do not require 
     or even imply changes in budget levels or program priorities. 
     Any such changes in these areas must stand or fall on their 
     own merits, independently of which department or agency 
     actually implements policies and programs. Disagreements on 
     funding and program matters can be handled through the 
     legislative amendment process, and will change over time in 
     any event. Anyone who has actually served in the federal 
     government knows that one of the few effective ways to 
     capture the bureaucracy's attention is to threaten massive 
     changes in its budget. Even so, efforts by opponents of 
     reorganization to confuse structure and policy are simply 
     obscurantist at best.
       These are the tired arguments of inside-the-Beltway turf 
     warriors. They deserve exactly as much weight as the voters 
     gave to similar arguments on the domestic front in November. 
     In fact, most breathtaking here is the opposition to reform 
     agencies created up to 35 years ago, a pace that would imply 
     roughly three bureaucratic reorganizations every century.
       Nonetheless it is the centrality of enhancing the 
     president's foreign policy authority that provides the 
     inspiring vision to the reform proposals crafted by Rep. 
     Benjamin Gilman, New York Republican, and Sens. Jesse Helms, 
     North Carolina Republican, and Mitch McConnell, Kentucky 
     Republican. Rising above the narrow political temptations 
     occasioned by the split in control between democrats in the 
     executive and Republicans in the legislative branches, they 
     have crafted reorganization plans that transcend today's 
     particular partisan wrangling. They have gained widespread 
     support--including from distinguished career Foreign Service 
     officers like former Secretary of State Larry Eagleberger. 
     These may be sweeping proposals, but they are not extreme.
       The reforms' directions, more-over, are decidedly 
     internationalist in their implications. Reorganization 
     opponents have repeatedly attempted to paint efforts to 
     achieve sound policy-making and management as isolationist, 
     but their ad hominem rhetoric is off the mark. By attempting 
     to evoke dark memories of pre-World War II policies, they 
     demonstrate that they are simply unable to appreciate why new 
     international realities require new American structures.
       It is precisely to make the United States more forceful, 
     more dynamic and more adaptable that restructuring is so 
     necessary. Thus, the real internationalists today in foreign 
     affairs follow the lead of predecessors who were also not 
     afraid of massive change in process and structure. Those 
     internationalists who were ``present at the creation'' of 
     U.S. policy and institutions in the aftermath of World War II 
     would undoubtedly be cheerleaders for the reorganizations 
     under discussion.
       How the reorganizations are actually implemented and in 
     what period of time they must be made operational are 
     subjects for reasonable debate, as is the degree of 
     flexibility the president and the secretary of state should 
     be provided in reordering the combined agencies. Important as 
     these questions may be, however, they are simply details in 
     the larger vision of Messrs. Gilman, Helms and McConnell.
       Moreover, no one should be confused that the proposals to 
     fold USIA, AID and ACDA into the Department of State are 
     preferred because of any illusion that the State Department 
     is the unique repository of superior skill or efficiency. 
     Phase two of the reorganization process should encompass a 
     major re-examination of attitudinal, press and management 
     issues within the department itself.
       To step back now from the reform proposals out of timidity 
     or indecision would be to miss an historic opportunity. Soon, 
     the House of Representatives will complete consideration of 
     the Gilman version of reorganization, where it deserves 
     overwhelming approval, followed by immediate action by the 
     Senate. What President Clinton ultimately does with the 
     legislation when it reaches him will speak volumes about 
     whether his ``reinventing government'' initiative is just one 
     more disposable promise.
     

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