[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 114 (Friday, July 14, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10076-S10077]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ACDA ANNUAL REPORT IS INFORMATIVE, CLEAR-HEADED EFFORT
Mr. PELL. Mr. President. Yesterday, the President transmitted to the
Senate the annual report for 1994 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. In addition to detailing the Agency's many activities during
1994, the report includes a major section on the adherence by the
United States to its arms control obligations and the compliance of
other nations with their arms control obligations.
This compliance report, which was provided in both classified and
unclassified versions, is the most detailed annual compilation of arms
control issues available to us. It has been required of the agency for
a number of years, and it is particularly thorough and detailed in this
year's iteration. I believe that
[[Page S10077]]
my fellow Senators should avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain
the report from ACDA and to review both the Agency's activities and the
numerous arms control compliance questions addressed in the report.
This year's unclassified report is remarkably open with regard to the
kind of problems that we must address, and it represents a serious
effort by ACDA Director, John Holum, and his staff to be informative
and clear-headed in their analysis and judgments.
Let me give you several examples of the kind of information included
in the report:
With regard to Russia's compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, the report says:
Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted
the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from
President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership
in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued
involvement of ``old hands'' in trilateral BW discussions and
in what Russia describes as a defensive BW program.
With regard to former Soviet biological weapons related
facilities, some research and production facilities are being
deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding
cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged
in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to
produce biological warfare agents. The Russian Federation's
1993 and 1994 BWC data declaration contained no new
information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and
misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral
process that began in 1992, while there has been progress
towards achieving the openness intended in the Joint
Statement, the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.
next steps
The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to
work with the Russian leadership to ensure complete
termination of the illegal program and to pursue a number of
measures to build confidence in Russian compliance with the
BWC.
With regard to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and
China, the report says:
The United States believes that China had an offensive BW
program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC.
finding
The United States Government believes that based on
available evidence, China maintained an offensive BW program
throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program
included the development, production, stockpiling or other
acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents.
China's CBM mandated declarations have not resolved U.S.
concerns about this program and there are strong indications
that China
probably maintains its offensive program. The United States
Government, therefore, believes that in the years after
its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with
its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it
remains noncompliant with these obligations.
The report is quite forthcoming and realistic with regard to some of
the serious problems regarding compliance with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. For example, the report says this about the Iraqi
situation:
Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article 11's
requirement that Parties not * * * manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not * * * seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Iraq's construction of secret facilities, including
its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons
development and assembly, contributed to its violation of
Article 11. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its
clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article
111, which requires that safeguards be applied with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The war and inspections have significantly set back Iraq's
program to develop a nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, Iraq almost
certainly intends to continue nuclear weapons related
activities and to build a nuclear weapon as soon as domestic
and international circumstances permit.
finding
The United States Government has determined that Iraq
violated its Safeguards Agreement when it pursued an active
nuclear weapons development program and that this program
violated its obligations under Article 11 and 111 of the NPT.
The United States Government has further determined that
Baghdad is continuing its effort to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA
inspection process by withholding relevant information, and
to preserve as much nuclear-related technology as possible
for a renewed weapons effort.
next steps
The United States plans to continue to support UNSCOM/IAEA
inspections in Iraq and the long-term monitoring of Iraq's
nuclear program in accordance with UNSCR 687 and 715.
Mr. President, I have something of an ulterior motive in bringing
this report to the Senate's attention at this time. As most of you
know, there is a movement afoot to abolish the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and make it a part of the Department of State. I
have opposed that effort in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I
intend to oppose it on the floor when the relevant legislation is
before the Senate. I am not going to make a case here for ACDA because
I deeply believe that any Senator reading this report and getting a
sense of the tenacity and seriousness that ACDA brings to these
crucially important national security issues is quite likely to reach
the judgment that the modest number of dollars necessary to keep ACDA
as an independent agency are among the best spent dollars in the
Federal budget.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from President
Clinton transmitting the ACDA annual report be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, July 13, 1995.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual
Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA).
The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State at that time, believed the President
needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.
After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in
early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was
correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy
requires an independent, specialized, and technically
competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.
In the absence of such an agency, neither I nor any future
President could count on receiving independent arms control
advice, unfiltered by other policy considerations. A
President would thus at times have to make the most
consequential national security decisions without the benefit
of vigorous advocacy of the arms control point of view.
Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of
single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly
developed capability for multilateral negotiation and
implementation of the most intricate arms control and
nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with equal
effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.
The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later,
its most recent major success is its long-term effort
culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that
same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far
more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's
leadership and professional staff.
I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent
and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and
nonproliferation policy.
Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear
missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of
the other growing arms control and nonproliferation
challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national
security asset.
In that spirit, I commend this report to you.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.
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