[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 114 (Friday, July 14, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10076-S10077]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


         ACDA ANNUAL REPORT IS INFORMATIVE, CLEAR-HEADED EFFORT

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President. Yesterday, the President transmitted to the 
Senate the annual report for 1994 of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. In addition to detailing the Agency's many activities during 
1994, the report includes a major section on the adherence by the 
United States to its arms control obligations and the compliance of 
other nations with their arms control obligations.
  This compliance report, which was provided in both classified and 
unclassified versions, is the most detailed annual compilation of arms 
control issues available to us. It has been required of the agency for 
a number of years, and it is particularly thorough and detailed in this 
year's iteration. I believe that 

[[Page S10077]]
my fellow Senators should avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain 
the report from ACDA and to review both the Agency's activities and the 
numerous arms control compliance questions addressed in the report.
  This year's unclassified report is remarkably open with regard to the 
kind of problems that we must address, and it represents a serious 
effort by ACDA Director, John Holum, and his staff to be informative 
and clear-headed in their analysis and judgments.
  Let me give you several examples of the kind of information included 
in the report:
  With regard to Russia's compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, the report says:

       Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted 
     the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from 
     President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership 
     in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued 
     involvement of ``old hands'' in trilateral BW discussions and 
     in what Russia describes as a defensive BW program.
       With regard to former Soviet biological weapons related 
     facilities, some research and production facilities are being 
     deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding 
     cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged 
     in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to 
     produce biological warfare agents. The Russian Federation's 
     1993 and 1994 BWC data declaration contained no new 
     information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and 
     misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral 
     process that began in 1992, while there has been progress 
     towards achieving the openness intended in the Joint 
     Statement, the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.


                               next steps

       The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to 
     work with the Russian leadership to ensure complete 
     termination of the illegal program and to pursue a number of 
     measures to build confidence in Russian compliance with the 
     BWC.

  With regard to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 
China, the report says:

       The United States believes that China had an offensive BW 
     program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC.


                                finding

       The United States Government believes that based on 
     available evidence, China maintained an offensive BW program 
     throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program 
     included the development, production, stockpiling or other 
     acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents. 
     China's CBM mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. 
     concerns about this program and there are strong indications 
     that China
      probably maintains its offensive program. The United States 
     Government, therefore, believes that in the years after 
     its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with 
     its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it 
     remains noncompliant with these obligations.

  The report is quite forthcoming and realistic with regard to some of 
the serious problems regarding compliance with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. For example, the report says this about the Iraqi 
situation:

       Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article 11's 
     requirement that Parties not * * * manufacture or otherwise 
     acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
     and not * * * seek or receive any assistance in the 
     manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
     devices. Iraq's construction of secret facilities, including 
     its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons 
     development and assembly, contributed to its violation of 
     Article 11. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its 
     clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article 
     111, which requires that safeguards be applied with a view to 
     preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes 
     to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
       The war and inspections have significantly set back Iraq's 
     program to develop a nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, Iraq almost 
     certainly intends to continue nuclear weapons related 
     activities and to build a nuclear weapon as soon as domestic 
     and international circumstances permit.


                                finding

       The United States Government has determined that Iraq 
     violated its Safeguards Agreement when it pursued an active 
     nuclear weapons development program and that this program 
     violated its obligations under Article 11 and 111 of the NPT. 
     The United States Government has further determined that 
     Baghdad is continuing its effort to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA 
     inspection process by withholding relevant information, and 
     to preserve as much nuclear-related technology as possible 
     for a renewed weapons effort.


                               next steps

       The United States plans to continue to support UNSCOM/IAEA 
     inspections in Iraq and the long-term monitoring of Iraq's 
     nuclear program in accordance with UNSCR 687 and 715.

  Mr. President, I have something of an ulterior motive in bringing 
this report to the Senate's attention at this time. As most of you 
know, there is a movement afoot to abolish the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and make it a part of the Department of State. I 
have opposed that effort in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I 
intend to oppose it on the floor when the relevant legislation is 
before the Senate. I am not going to make a case here for ACDA because 
I deeply believe that any Senator reading this report and getting a 
sense of the tenacity and seriousness that ACDA brings to these 
crucially important national security issues is quite likely to reach 
the judgment that the modest number of dollars necessary to keep ACDA 
as an independent agency are among the best spent dollars in the 
Federal budget.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from President 
Clinton transmitting the ACDA annual report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                        Washington, July 13, 1995.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual 
     Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
     Agency (ACDA).
       The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk, 
     Secretary of State at that time, believed the President 
     needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.
       After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in 
     early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was 
     correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy 
     requires an independent, specialized, and technically 
     competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.
       In the absence of such an agency, neither I nor any future 
     President could count on receiving independent arms control 
     advice, unfiltered by other policy considerations. A 
     President would thus at times have to make the most 
     consequential national security decisions without the benefit 
     of vigorous advocacy of the arms control point of view.
       Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of 
     single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly 
     developed capability for multilateral negotiation and 
     implementation of the most intricate arms control and 
     nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with equal 
     effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.
       The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later, 
     its most recent major success is its long-term effort 
     culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that 
     same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far 
     more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's 
     leadership and professional staff.
       I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent 
     and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and 
     nonproliferation policy.
       Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear 
     missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of 
     the other growing arms control and nonproliferation 
     challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national 
     security asset.
       In that spirit, I commend this report to you.
           Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.  

                          ____________________