[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 114 (Friday, July 14, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10066-S10069]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______


                              B-2 BOMBERS

 Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am disappointed that the Senate 
Armed Services Committee did not include funding for additional B-2 
bombers in the National Defense authorization bill that was filed 
yesterday. In my view, this was a short-sighted decision, one which I 
hope can be reversed. Today, Mr. President, I want to enter into the 
Record two recent editorials and a letter, all of which, I believe, 
help Members to understand the importance of continuing the B-2 
program.
  The first editorial comment was authorized by Paul Wolfowitz, and 
appeared in the June 12 edition of the Wall Street Journal. Mr. 
Wolfowitz points out that the DOD-IDA bomber study had assumed enough 
warning time for over 500 U.S. tactical aircraft and many other assets 
to arrive before the war started. He notes, and I quote, ``Not 
surprisingly, the contribution of additional B-2's would not be cost-
effective in those hypothetical circumstances.'' Mr. Wolfowitz goes on 
posit the importance of the B-2 bomber in less favorable scenarios and 
circumstances, noting its independence from foreign bases; its value in 
possible East Asian scenarios, where neither land-based nor carrier air 
have the needed range; and its ability both to deter and to retaliate 
while placing few Americans in harm's way. After noting the advantages 
of stealth, Mr. Wolfowitz goes on to note, and I quote:

       With more than 30 wings of traditional fighter aircraft and 
     only one wing of B-2's and two wings of F-117's it could 
     hardly be said that the U.S. is overemphasizing stealthy 
     attack capability.

  The second editorial comment is by Charles Krauthammer, and is in 
today's Washington Post. Mr. Krauthammer notes that, and I quote:

       There are three simple, glaringly obvious facts about this 
     new era: (1) America is coming home; (2) America cannot 
     endure casualties; (3) America's next war will be a surprise. 
     * * *

  He goes on to note that the B-2 is not a partisan project, that today 
it is supported by,

       Seven Secretaries of Defense representing every 
     administration going back to 1969. They support it because it 
     is the perfect weapon for the post-cold war world.

  Mr. Krauthammer goes on to note that the so-called Republican cheap 
hawks, concerned about high costs, hold the future of the program in 
their hands. He notes, and I quote,

       But the dollar cost of a weapon is too narrow a calculation 
     of its utility. The more important calculation is cost in 
     American lives. The reasons are not sentimental, but 
     practical. Weapons cheap in dollars but costly in lives are, 
     in the current and coming environment, useless. A country 
     that so values the life of every Captain O'Grady is a country 
     that cannot keep blindly relying on nonstealthy aircraft over 
     enemy territory.

  My third submission, Mr. President, is a letter to me from recently 
retired Air Force Gen. Chuck Horner, who was the overall air commander 
during Operation Desert Storm. He begins by noting that his career was 
spent in operations and that in his entire career, he had never 
advocated buying any specific weapons system. Having said that, 

[[Page S10067]]
General Horner begins by saying, and I quote:

       As the former commander of Operation Desert Storm, I feel a 
     duty to put the B-2 debate in perspective, and sound a 
     warning on any recommendation to stop production of this 
     aircraft. To put it bluntly, halting this Nation's B-2 
     production capability is dangerously short-sighted, and would 
     lead ultimately to the extinction of the long-range bomber 
     force, at the very time when bombers are emerging as 
     America's most critical 21st Century military asset.

  General Horner goes on to note that the B-2 program and America's 
bomber production capability are one and the same, and that starting a 
new bomber program a few years hence would require 10 to 15 years to 
field, and cost countless billions to develop. He further notes that 
even if a new bomber were started a few years hence, most of our 
nonstealthy bombers would be obsolete. He then writes, and I quote:

       The next Desert Storm Air Commander could be sending 
     Americans into war aboard a 70-year-old bomber, an act I find 
     unconscionable.

  General Horner goes on to discuss the value of the combination of 
long-range, large-payload, precision weapons, and stealth, and 
concludes by stating, and I quote:

       It is important to understand the long-term national and 
     international security ramifications of the quantum leap in 
     military capabilities offered by the B-2. If we don't, it may 
     disappear when we need it most, and can buy it most cheaply. 
     Make no mistake about this: the B-2 is designed to extend 
     America's defense capabilities into the next century. Can we 
     afford to do less?

  Mr. President, I ask that these three items be printed in the Record. 
I commend the substance of all three of these thoughtful pieces to my 
colleagues. I yield the floor.
  The material follows:
             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1995]

                      A Bomber for Uncertain Times

                          (By Paul Wolfowitz)

       It has been nearly 30 years since Robert McNamara left the 
     Pentagon. Yet, from what has been made public about the 
     systems analysis behind the decision to halt production of 
     the B-2 bomber, one can only conclude that Mr. McNamara's 
     influence lingers.
       As Congress deliberates the question of whether to halt 
     production of the B-2 bomber, it needs to have a healthy 
     respect for the fundamental uncertainty of the world of the 
     next century.
       Just one year before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Adm. 
     William Crowe, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had 
     proposed eliminating the Persian Gulf from U.S. Military 
     planning on the grounds that the Soviet threat to the region 
     had gone away. In the end, Secretary of Defense Richard 
     Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell overruled the Joint Staff and 
     directed the military to begin planning instead for an Iraqi 
     threat to the Arabian Peninsula. Yet no one expected such a 
     threat to materialize as quickly as it did.
       In fact, none of the major threats we have faced in this 
     century were foreseen even five years before they appeared. 
     None of the smaller wars we have fought for the past 50 years 
     were foreseen clearly even one year before. Certainly no one 
     would have dreamed of suggesting in 1945 that five years 
     later we would almost be driven off the Korean Peninsula by a 
     third- or fourth-ranked military power.


                          a mcnamara technique

       In an old joke, a befuddled drunk searches for his keys 
     under the street light even though he knows he dropped them 
     somewhere else, because ``that's where the light is.'' So it 
     is with the Pentagon's decision to stop production of the B-
     2, which can deliver precise conventional weapons with great 
     accuracy at extraordinary distances, with surprise, and with 
     unprecedented safety for its crew of two pilots.
       In an apparent inability to take account of uncertainty, 
     the Defense Department justifies its decision based on a 
     systems analysis of a hypothetical future war with Iraq. 
     Systems analysis--a technique that Mr. McNamara so proudly 
     introduced to the Pentagon and which I, myself, have had many 
     occasions to use--is a powerful tool for certain limited 
     purposes but useless for others. Sometimes, like a bright 
     light in a murky room, its very power leads analysts to focus 
     on those questions that the technique can illuminate, whether 
     or not they are the right ones.
       According to congressional testimony, the Defense 
     Department analysis assumes that there would be enough 
     warning, and sufficient bases made available in the region, 
     to enable the U.S. to deploy 500 tactical aircraft before the 
     war begins and before our bases come under attack. Not 
     surprisingly, the contribution of additional B-2s would not 
     be cost-effective in those hypothetical circumstances.
       Not only are the analysts refighting the last war, but they 
     are making assumptions about warning time and the 
     availability of bases that did not apply in the Gulf five 
     years ago and may no longer be valid five years from now. 
     Worst of all, those assumptions may bear little relation to 
     the much broader range of unpredictable circumstances that 
     could confront us in a post-Cold War world--contingencies in 
     which the B-2 would be uniquely valuable:
       The B-2's exceptionally long range makes it much less 
     dependent on access to overseas bases. Even after Iraq 
     invaded Kuwait, it took the Saudis several days to decide to 
     permit American use of their bases--and they agreed only 
     because of their high level of confidence in President Bush. 
     A future president may need to act unilaterally. In fact, we 
     are more likely to get multilateral cooperation if we have 
     that ability--a paradox still poorly understood by many in 
     Washington.
       The B-2 can attack nuclear and other high-value targets. In 
     an era of nuclear proliferation, this capability appears 
     particularly important. In a letter to President Clinton, 
     seven former secretaries of defense--of both Democratic and 
     Republican administrations--urged the continuation of low-
     rate production of the B-2, calling it ``the most cost-
     effective means of rapidly projecting forces over great 
     distances,'' able ``to reach any point on earth'' within 
     hours, ``to destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a 
     single sortie,'' and do so ``without fear of interception.''
       The B-2's range would be invaluable in large regions, such 
     as East Asia, where the potential distances are far greater 
     than the effective range of conventional fighter aircraft. 
     Though it is hard at the moment to envision an Asian scenario 
     (outside of Korea) requiring long-range conventional strike 
     capability, the point is that by the time such requirements 
     become clear, it would almost certainly be too late to 
     acquire the capabilities.
       The B-2 is effective for deterrence and retaliation. Forces 
     may be used not only to defend but, for example, to punish or 
     deter acts of state terrorism against the U.S. or its 
     citizens. The B-2's range and stealth characteristics make it 
     a particularly useful instrument of deterrence.
       The B-2 can operate from secure bases. Future aggressors 
     may draw a lesson from the Gulf War and attack nearby bases 
     from the outset, perhaps even using ballistic missiles and 
     chemical weapons. In those circumstances, additional B-2 
     bombers, operating from bases beyond the reach of enemy 
     missiles or aircraft, would be far more valuable than they 
     were in the Pentagon study.
       No systems analysis can assess the value of the B-2's 
     enormous flexibility. Nor can a systems analysis assess the 
     importance of the B-2 for maintaining the U.S. lead in a 
     revolutionary new technology. Being the first country to 
     develop stealth technology does not guarantee continued 
     American leadership. In the further development of both 
     tactics and technology, of counter-measures and counter-
     counter-measures, the U.S. needs to capitalize on its lead in 
     stealth development.
       With more than 30 wings of traditional fighter aircraft and 
     only one wing of B-2s planned (in addition to two wings of 
     the shorter-range, first generation F-117s), it could hardly 
     be said that the U.S. is overemphasizing stealthy attack 
     capability.
       It is difficult to imagine any other country, having 
     developed an advanced capability like the B-2, halting 
     production after just 20 aircraft because of an unwillingness 
     to allocate 1% of its defense budget or 5% of its combat 
     aircraft budget for the next few years. It is a system that 
     excels in two dimensions that are hard or impossible to 
     evaluate in a systems analysis, but that are of central 
     importance for defense planning in the post-Cold War world: 
     flexibility to deal with a world that has become even more 
     unpredictable; and innovation to deal with the consequences 
     of revolutionary technological change.


                       congressional intervention

       Only through congressional intervention was Adm. Hyman 
     Rickover able to build the nuclear submarine program that 
     eventually became the pride of the Navy. At a later time, 
     when the military was more interested in the development of 
     manned aircraft, congressional pressure kept U.S. 
     conventional cruise missile options from being given away in 
     arms-control negotiations, thus protecting the extraordinary 
     capability for accurate long-range conventional delivery that 
     the Tomahawk cruise missile demonstrated during the Gulf War. 
     And, were it not for the intervention of Sen. Sam Nunn and 
     the House and Senate Armed Service committees, the U.S. would 
     have had only one squadron of F-117 bombers in that war, 
     rather than two.
       Let us hope that Congress intervenes again. As the seven 
     former defense secretaries said: ``It is already apparent 
     that the end of the Cold War was neither the end of history 
     nor the end of danger. We hope it will also not be the end of 
     the B-2.''
                                                                    ____

               [From the Washington Post, July 13, 1995]

                    The B-2 and The ``Cheap Hawks''

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       We hear endless blather about how new and complicated the 
     post-Cold War world is. Hence the endless confusion about 
     what weapons to build, forces to deploy, contingency to 
     anticipate. But there are three simple, glaringly obvious 
     facts about this new era:
       (1) America is coming home. The day of the overseas base is 
     over. In 1960, the United States had 90 major Air Force bases 
     overseas. Today, we have 17. Decolonization is 

[[Page S10068]]
     one reason. Newly emerging countries like the Philippines do not want 
     the kind of Big Brother domination that comes with facilities 
     like Clark Air Base and Subic Bay. The other reason has to do 
     with us: With the Soviets gone, we do not want the huge 
     expense of maintaining a far-flung global military 
     establishment.
       (2) America cannot endure casualties. It is inconceivable 
     that the United States, or any other Western country, could 
     ever again fight a war of attrition like Korea or Vietnam. 
     One reason is the CNN effect. TV brings home the reality of 
     battle with a graphic immediacy unprecedented in human 
     history. The other reason, as strategist Edward Luttwak has 
     pointed out, is demographic: Advanced industrial countries 
     have very small families, and small families are less willing 
     than the large families of the past to risk their only 
     children in combat.
       (3) America's next war will be a surprise. Nothing new 
     here. Our last one was too. Who expected Saddam to invade 
     Kuwait? And even after he did, who really expected the United 
     States to send a half-million man expeditionary force to roll 
     him back? Then again, who predicted Pearl Harbor, the 
     invasion of South Korea, the Falklands War?
       What kind of weapon, then, is needed by a country that is 
     losing its foreign basis, is allergic to casualties and will 
     have little time to mobilize for tomorrow's unexpected 
     provocation?
       Answer: A weapon that can be deployed at very long 
     distances from secure American bases, is invaluable to enemy 
     counterattack and is deployable instantly. You would want, in 
     other words, the B-2 stealth bomber.
       We have it. Yet, amazingly, Congress may be on the verge of 
     killing it. After more than $20 billion in development 
     costs--costs irrecoverable whether we build another B-2 or 
     not--the B-2 is facing a series of crucial votes in Congress 
     that could dismantle its assembly lines once and for all.
       The B-2 is not a partisan project. Its development was 
     begun under Jimmy Carter. And, as an urgent letter to 
     President Clinton makes clear, it is today supported by seven 
     secretaries of defense representing every administration 
     going back to 1969.
       They support it because it is the perfect weapon for the 
     post-Cold War world. It has a range of about 7,000 miles. It 
     can be launched instantly--no need to beg foreign dictators 
     for base rights; no need for weeks of advance warning, 
     mobilization and forward deployment of troops. And because it 
     is invisible to enemy detection, its two pilots are virtually 
     invulnerable.
       This is especially important in view of the B-2's very high 
     cost, perhaps three-quarters to a billion dollars a copy. The 
     cost is, of course, what has turned swing Republican votes--
     the so-called ``cheap hawks''--against the B-2.
       But the dollar cost of a weapon is too narrow a calculation 
     of its utility. The more important calculation is cost in 
     American lives. The reasons are not sentimental but 
     practical. Weapons cheap in dollars but costly in lives are, 
     in the current and coming environment, literally useless: We 
     will not use them. A country that so values the life of every 
     Capt. O'Grady is a country that cannot keep blindly relying 
     on non-stealthy aircraft over enemy territory.
       Stealth planes are not just invulnerable themselves. 
     Because they do not need escort, they spare the lives of the 
     pilots of the fighters and radar suppression planes that 
     ordinarily accommodate bombers. Moreover, if the B-2 is 
     killed, we are stuck with our fleet of B-52s of 1950s origin. 
     According to the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, 
     the Clinton administration assumes the United States will 
     rely on B-52s until the year 2030--when they will be 65 years 
     old.
       In the Persian Gulf War, the stealthy F-117 fighter flew 
     only 2 percent of the missions but hit 40 percent of the 
     targets. It was, in effect, about 30 times as productive as 
     non-stealthy planes. The F-117, however, has a short range 
     and thus must be deployed from forward bases. The B-2 can 
     take off from home. Moreover, the B-2 carries about eight 
     times the payload of the F-117. Which means that one B-2 can 
     strike, without escort and with impunity, as many targets as 
     vast fleets of conventional aircraft. Factor in these costs, 
     and the B-2 becomes cost-effective even in dollar terms.
       The final truth of the post-Cold War world is that someday 
     someone is going to attack some safe haven we feel compelled 
     to defend, or invade a country whose security is important to 
     us, or build an underground nuclear bomb factory that 
     threatens to kill millions of Americans. We are going to want 
     a way to attack instantly, massively and invisibly. We have 
     the weapon to do it, a weapon that no one else has and that 
     no one can stop. Except a ``cheap hawk,'' shortsighted 
     Republican Congress.
                                                                    ____

                                      Shalimar, FL, June 22, 1995.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: Earlier this month I wrote to your 
     colleagues in the House of Representatives about the need to 
     continue the B-2 program. The debate has now shifted to the 
     Senate and my concern with our future security compels me to 
     share the same thoughts with you. This is a difficult letter 
     for me to write as in more than thirty years of service in 
     the Air Force, I have always concentrated on military 
     operations, and refrained from commenting on issues such as 
     whether or not to purchase a specific aircraft. However, the 
     Pentagon recently released a study based on assumptions, 
     constraints, and methodology that can lead to the conclusion 
     that the United States can safely terminate B-2 stealth 
     bomber production at 20 aircraft. As the former Air Commander 
     of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Air Forces. I feel a duty 
     to put the B-2 debate in perspective, and sound a warning on 
     any recommendation to stop production of this aircraft. To 
     put it bluntly, halting this nation's B-2 production 
     capability is dangerously short-sighted and would lead 
     ultimately to the extinction of the long-range bomber force, 
     at the very time when bombers are emerging as America's most 
     critical 21st Century military asset.
       Since the B-2 is the only bomber in production or 
     development, and the Pentagon has no plans for a new bomber 
     program in the future, the B-2 program and America's bomber 
     production capability are one and the same. If this sole 
     remaining bomber capability is lost, replacing our aging 
     bombers will become unaffordable. Inevitably, the nation may 
     lose its manned bomber force, and the unique capabilities it 
     provides. A new bomber would take from 15-20 years to go from 
     the drawing board to the battlefield and cost tens of 
     billions of dollars just to design. With the current 
     administration balking at spending a fraction of this amount 
     on a finished, proven product, there is little likelihood of 
     a future government sinking many times that amount into a new 
     program. Even if a new program was initiated in the near 
     term, most of our existing bombers would be obsolete before 
     the first ``B-3'' entered service. The next Desert Storm Air 
     Commander could be sending Americans into war aboard a 70-
     year old bomber, an act I find unconscionable.
       In my opinion, the B-2 is now more important than ever. 
     Heavy bombers have always possessed two capabilities--long 
     range and large payload--not found in other elements of our 
     military forces. As we base more and more of our forces in 
     our homeland, the bomber's inter-continental range enables us 
     to respond immediately to regional aggression with a rapid, 
     conclusive military capability. Just as important, this 
     capability may deter aggressors even as the bombers sit on 
     the air base parking ramps in the United States. In war, the 
     large bomber payloads provide a critical punch throughout the 
     conflict--just ask General Schwarzkopf what he wanted from 
     the Air Force when he was under attack in Vietnam, or 
     whenever our ground forces faced danger during Desert Storm.
       What the B-2 adds to this equation are two revolutionary 
     capabilities not available in any other long-range bomber--
     precision and stealth. The Gulf War showed how precision 
     weapons
      delivery from stealthy platforms provides a devastating 
     military capability. The F-117 stealth fighter proved its 
     effectiveness on the first day of the war when 36 aircraft 
     flew just 2.5% of the sorties, but attacked almost 31% of 
     the targets.
       In the past, employing bombers for critical missions 
     against modern air defenses required large, costly packages 
     of air escort and defense suppression aircraft. The B-2's 
     unmatched survivability reduces the need for escorts and 
     defense suppression aircraft. As we found in the Gulf War 
     with the F-117, stealth allows the U.S. to strike any target 
     with both surprise and near impunity. Analysis of the Gulf 
     War air campaign reveals that each F-117 sortie was worth 
     approximately eight non-stealth sorties. To put B-2 
     capabilities into perspective, consider that the B-2 carries 
     eight times the precision payload of the F-117, has up to six 
     times the range, and will be able to accurately deliver its 
     weapons through clouds or smoke. What does all of this mean? 
     It means that a single B-2 can accomplish missions that 
     required dozens of non-stealthy aircraft in the past.
       Many may wonder why the Department of Defense would 
     advocate terminating the most advanced weapon system ever 
     developed. The B-2 program was cut by the Bush Administration 
     for budget-related political reasons, and some concern that 
     the program would not meet expectations. Since then, 
     delivered aircraft have demonstrated, without qualification, 
     that the B-2 is a superb weapon system--performing even 
     better than expected.
       Yet, defense spending has declined, bomber expertise has 
     been funded out of the Air Force, and people's careers have 
     been vested in other programs. Unfortunately, some in the 
     Army and Navy believe the B-2's revolutionary capability is a 
     threat to their own services' continuing relevancy. Just the 
     opposite is true, long-range, survivable bombers will 
     contribute to the effectiveness of the shorter range carrier 
     air by striking those targets which pose the greatest threat 
     to our ships. The troops on the ground have long recognized 
     the value of air support, especially the tremendous impact 
     that large bomb loads have on enemy soldiers. This was again 
     demonstrated by the B-52 strikes used to demoralize the Iraqi 
     Army. If anyone needs B-2s, it's our soldiers and sailors. 
     Some people harp on the issue of the B-2's cost. The Air 
     Force, at times, seems at odds about asking for this much 
     needed aircraft because they fear it could endanger their 
     number one priority program, the F-22. All miss the point. 
     True the B-2 has a high initial cost, but its capabilities 
     allow it to accomplish mission objectives at a lower total 
     cost than other alternatives. And keep in mind, the true cost 
     of any weapons system is how many or how few lives of our 
     service personnel are lost. The B-2 lowers the risk to our 
     men and women. The B-2 will allow us to 

[[Page S10069]]
     accept lower levels of overall military spending without compromising 
     our security.
       As we approach this year's critical defense budget 
     decisions, it is important that we understand the long-term 
     national and international security ramifications of the 
     quantum leap in military capabilities offered by the B-2. If 
     we don't, it may disappear when we need it most, and can buy 
     it most cheaply. Make no mistake about this: the B-2 is 
     designed to extend America's defense capabilities into the 
     next Century. Can we afford to do less?
           Sincerely,
                                                Charles A. Horner,
                                     General, USAF (Ret.).

  (At the request of Mr. Dole, the following statement was ordered to 
be printed in the Record.)

                          ____________________