[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 112 (Wednesday, July 12, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9792-S9793]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     AMERICA'S HEMOPHILIA COMMUNITY

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, tomorrow the Institute of Medicine will 
release the findings of a major investigation into how America's 
hemophilia community came to be decimated by the HIV virus.
  Even before this report is released, some of the tragic facts are 
very well 

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known. In the early 1980's, America's blood supply was contaminated by 
HIV-infected donors. Many Americans have become HIV positive by 
transfusions of the HIV-tainted blood.
  Mr. President, Americans who contract HIV through a single blood 
transfusion know they can point to the specific blood supplier and 
therefore seek redress. But this is not the case with people who suffer 
from hemophilia. Those individuals have to undergo blood treatment too 
often and receive blood products from too many sources for this 
recourse to be open to them. They simply cannot identify the blood 
supplier that is culpable.
  Mr. President, this community has been extremely hard hit by the 
spread of HIV. Mr. President, this story is one of the great tragedies 
of the last decade. It is a sad, tragic, and shocking story.
  Mr. President, today there are approximately 20,000 Americans who 
require lifelong treatment for hemophilia, a genetic condition that 
impairs the ability of blood to clot effectively. In the early 1980's, 
more than 90 percent of the Americans suffering from severe hemophilia 
were infected by the HIV virus.
  Think of it--more than 90 percent. I think everyone knows someone who 
suffers from hemophilia. Mr. President, 90 percent of those individuals 
in this entire country have been affected by HIV.
  Mr. President, people with hemophilia have to receive treatment on a 
regular basis, treatment that requires the use of blood products from 
many sources.
  The danger to this population is and was immense. Their ability to 
get health insurance and life insurance has been severely limited. They 
also have very little chance of legal redress for the tainted blood 
they have received.
  Mr. President, in America's past, a challenge of some public health 
disasters, disasters in which the Federal Government has played a 
contributing role, has, in fact, been met with a Federal response. I 
believe, Mr. President, that the U.S. Senate needs to tackle the 
question of whether the Federal Government should play a similar role 
in the crisis now taking place in America's hemophilia communities.
  The report scheduled to be released tomorrow will be very helpful, as 
we discuss this problem. It is my hope, it is my expectation, that the 
report will address three very important questions: First, did the 
Federal agencies responsible for blood safety show the appropriate 
level of diligence in screening the blood supply? Second, did the 
Federal agencies move as quickly as they should have to approve blood 
products that were potentially safer? Third, did the Federal Government 
fail to warn the hemophilia community when the government knew or 
should have known that there were legitimate concerns that the blood 
supply might not be safe?
  Said in another way, what did the government know? When did it know 
it? What did it do about it? Whom did it inform? Mr. President, if the 
answer to any of these three questions is no, it is clear to me, and I 
would hope to other Americans, that the Federal Government has not met 
its responsibility--has simply not met its responsibility in this area.
  As a result, the Federal Government would have a clear duty to 
provide some measure of relief to the people with hemophilia who have 
been infected with the HIV virus.
  Mr. President, there is reason to suspect that the answer to all 
three of these questions is, tragically, ``No.'' No to each of the 
questions.
  Beginning in 1982, an investigation by the Centers for Disease 
Control suggested that aids was being transferred by blood-borne 
agents, but the public health service of this country did not call for 
precautionary measures to protect the blood supply until March 1983.
  Mr. President, on January 4, 1983, the Centers for Disease Control 
recommended the testing of new viral inactivation methodologies--
essentially, new strategies to stop the spread of HIV virus in the 
blood supply.
  The public health service did not--I repeat, did not--act on this 
recommendation. Neither, Mr. President, did the Food and Drug 
Administration.
  Furthermore, we know that Federal agencies assured the American 
people that it was safe to go ahead and use these blood products. Now 
we know the products were, in fact, not safe.
  Mr. President, I will be examining this report that will be issued 
tomorrow with great care, as I think all Americans should.
  I believe the story this report is going to tell will not be a 
reassuring story, that the picture that this story will paint will not 
be a pretty one.
  Therefore, I expect to come back to this floor before this Senate to 
discuss appropriate steps for the Congress to take in response to this 
very great human tragedy.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  

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