[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 110 (Monday, July 10, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9626-S9628]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, news reports indicate that President Clinton
is on the verge of making a decision about normalizing relations with
Vietnam. I understand an announcement may come as soon as tomorrow.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher has recommended normalization.
Many Vietnam veterans support normalization--including a bipartisan
group of veterans in the Senate, led by the senior Senator from
Arizona, John McCain. Many oppose normalization as well. Just as the
Vietnam war divided Americans in the 1960's and 1970's, the issue of
how to finalize peace with Vietnam divides Americans today.
At the outset, let me observe that there are men and women of good
will on both sides of this issue. No one should question the motives of
advocates or opponents of normalization. We share similar goals:
Obtaining the fullest possible accounting for American prisoners of war
and missing in action; continuing the healing process in the aftermath
of our most divisive war; fostering respect for human rights and
political liberty in Vietnam.
I can recall in, I think, 1969 attending the first family gathering
of POW's and MIA's. Only about 100 people showed up. I think I may have
been the only Senator there. And I promised that group that within 3
months we would have a meeting at Constitution Hall, which seats 2,000
people, and we would fill it up. And we did. And I remember wearing the
John McCain bracelet for a couple of years back in those days when John
McCain was still a POW.
So I have had a long and I think consistent interest in the fate of
POW's and MIA's starting way back when nobody knew the difference, when
bracelets were not ordinary, nobody knew what a POW/MIA was for
certain. And so it is something that I have had an interest in for a
long, long time.
The debate over normalization is about our differences with the
Government of Vietnam, not with the Vietnamese people. The people of
Vietnam have suffered decades of war and brutal dictatorship. We hope
for a better future for the people of Vietnam--a future of democracy
and freedom, not repression and despair.
The debate over normalization is not a debate over the ends of
American policy; it is a debate over the means. The most fundamental
question is whether normalizing relations with Vietnam will further the
goals we share. In my view, now is not the time to normalize relations
with Vietnam. The historical record shows that Vietnam cooperates on
POW/MIA issues only when pressured by the United States; in the absence
of sustained pressure, there is little progress on POW/MIA concerns, or
on any other issue.
The facts are clear. Vietnam is still a one party Marxist
dictatorship. Preserving their rule is the No. 1 priority of Vietnam's
Communist Government. Many credible sources suggest Vietnam is not
providing all the
information it can on POW/MIA issues. In some cases, increased access
has only confirmed how much more Vietnam could be doing. This is not
simply my view, it is a view shared by two Asia experts--Steve Solarz,
former chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs,
and Richard Childress, National Security Council Vietnam expert from
1981 to 1989. Earlier this year, they wrote:
Vietnam could easily account for hundreds of Americans by a
combination of unilateral repatriation of remains, opening
its archives, and full cooperation on U.S. servicemen missing
in Laos.
Again, not my quote but a quote by the two gentlemen mentioned. They
conclude that,
Whatever the reasons or combination of reasons, Vietnam, in
the current environment, has made a conscious decision to
keep the POW/MIA issue alive by not resolving it.
This is a view shared by the National League of POW/MIA families
which has worked tirelessly to resolve the issue for many years. It is
also a view shared by major veterans groups, including the American
Legion, the largest
veterans group. The media have reported that the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, the second largest group is supportive of normalization. Let me
quote from VFW's official position adopted at its 1994 convention:
At some point in time but only after significant results
have been achieved through Vietnam/U.S. cooperative efforts,
we should . . . move towards normalizing diplomatic
relations.
A more recent VFW statement makes clear that normalization is not
opposed by the VFW if it leads to a fuller accounting of POW/MIA cases.
If President Clinton intends to normalize diplomatic relations with
Vietnam, he should do so only after he can clearly state that Vietnam
has done everything it reasonably can to provide the fullest possible
accounting. That is the central issue. The United States has diplomatic
relations with many countries which violate human rights, and repress
their own people. But the United States should not establish relations
with a country which withholds information about the fate of American
servicemen. As President-elect Clinton said on Veterans Day, 1992, ``I
have sent a clear message that there will be no normalization of
relations with any nation that is at all suspected of withholding any
information'' on POW/MIA cases. Let me repeat: ``suspected of
withholding any information.'' Let me repeat, ``suspected of
withholding any information'' on POW/MIA cases. I hope the standard
proposed by President-elect Clinton is the same standard used by
President Clinton.
No doubt about it, the Vietnamese Government wants normalization very
badly. Normalization is the strongest bargaining chip America has. As
such, it should only be granted when we are convinced Vietnam has done
all it can do. Vietnam has taken many steps--sites are being excavated,
and some remains have been returned. But there are also signs that
Vietnam may be willfully withholding information. Unless the President
is absolutely convinced Vietnam has done all it can to resolve the POW/
MIA issue--and is willing to say so publicly and unequivocally--it
would be a strategic, diplomatic and moral mistake to grant Vietnam the
stamp of approval from the United States.
I ask unanimous consent that the article from which I quoted earlier
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the San Diego Union-Tribune, Mar. 19, 1995]
Prisoner Issue Continues To Taint Relations
(By Richard T. Childress and Stephen J. Solarz)
Although the U.S. trade embargo with Vietnam has been
lifted and consular-level liaison offices have been opened,
relations between the United States and Vietnam are far from
normal. The major remaining bilateral obstacle, the POW/MIA
issue, is still cited by the Clinton administration as the
primary impediment to normalization.
Multiple intelligence studies from the war through today
conclude that Vietnam could easily account for hundreds of
Americans by a combination of unilateral repatriation of
remains, opening of its archives and full cooperation on U.S.
servicemen missing in Laos, 80 percent in Lao areas
controlled by the Vietnamese during the war.
While joint Vietnamese-American efforts to excavate
aircraft crash sites and otherwise ``clean up the
battlefield'' will continue to provide some accountability,
it will not be enough. What is needed is a decision by
Vietnam's ruling politburo to resolve the core POW/MIA cases,
including those Americans last known alive in the custody or
immediate vicinity of Vietnamese forces. That decision has
not been made.
Reasons offered for this have included a divided politburo,
a desire to exploit the POW/MIA issue for future financial or
political advantage, a continuing residue of hostility or
hatred toward Americans in Hanoi's ministries of interior and
defense, and a fear of embarrassment. Some also speculate
that Vietnam's leadership fears the United States will ``walk
away'' once the issue is resolved.
Whatever the reason or combination of reasons, Vietnam, in
the current environment, has made a conscious decision to
keep the POW/MIA issue alive by not resolving it.
This fundamental aspect of Vietnamese emphasis on the POW/
MIA issue has been central from the Paris negotiations in
1968-
[[Page S 9627]]
73 and through every administration since that time. Knowing it to be
the most sensitive issue to Americans of
all the other bilateral humanitarian concerns, Hanoi has
consistently used it as the lodestar for leverage over
American policy. Similarly, the compelling nature of the
issue to Americans has caused it to be central in our
dealings with Vietnam over the years.
This centrality to American policy-makers has, however,
engendered different approaches. These have varied from
concerted efforts to define the issue away and defuse it, to
confronting the issue directly in order to resolve it. Even
policy-makers who viewed the POW/MIA issue as a hindrance to
healing or normalization demonstrated its centrality by
expending much political capital in a failed attempt to prove
the contrary.
Confronting the issue directly in negotiations has been the
only demonstrable path to progress. It is, ironically, the
path desired by the Vietnamese for reasons already outlined.
When Reagan administration officials reopened the POW/MIA
dialogue with Vietnam in 1981, the politburo was delighted.
Referring to the 1978-81 freeze in U.S.-Vietnam talks,
Hanoi's negotiators remarked that they ``didn't know we still
cared.'' That was also a challenge.
While the Clinton administration has rejected linking human
rights directly to questions to normalization, that, too, is
a potential obstacle. Strong feelings for linkage exist in
some human-rights organizations, the American-Vietnamese
community, the labor movement and in Congress. Linkage may
not be desired as a matter of executive branch policy, but
initiatives are possible in the new Congress along with other
domestic pressures.
In the mid-1980s, legislation was proposed to use Vietnam's
blocked assets to pay private claims, and significant lobby
pressure was put on the Reagan administration and Congress to
liquidate the assets. This initiative was opposed by the
administration and rejected by the Congress. The objection
then was that it would interrupt humanitarian cooperation,
that official claims of the United States government would
become secondary, and that such transactions should be
negotiated in the context of normalization discussions.
Sufficient funds existed to cover the private claims, and the
United States, as the custodian of the funds, was positioned
to settle them from a position of strength and leverage.
Vietnam's near-term and long-term economic goals are
central to its leadership. High on the leadership's bilateral
list is most-favored-nation (MFN) status and eligibility for
the so-called generalized system of preferences (GSP), an
additional trade concession.
But Vietnam's primitive economy and rudimentary trade
mechanisms hamper its accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and, accordingly, limit American
flexibility on commercial issues. In addition, various legal
and regulatory obstacles stand in the way. Some of the
relevant provisions can be waived through executive action;
under certain conditions legislation may be required.
In any event, since it is Vietnam, the Clinton
administration should be reluctant to take any significant
steps without close consultation with Congress.
Despite a significant loss of American leverage after the
trade embargo was lifted, one could argue that the United
States is again positioned for
progress. This plateau allows the Clinton administration
some breathing room to hold firm; to insist on meaningful,
unilateral action by Vietnam to meet the four POW/MIA
criteria set forth by President Clinton and to advance a
Washington-Hanoi dialogue on human rights in Vietnam.
In the interim, it is in both countries' interests that
Vietnam proceed with internal economic reforms. This would
assist Vietnam in further integrating into Asia generally and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
specifically. This long-term objective was shared in some
respects throughout each American administration since the
end of the Vietnam conflict.
Such integration would also provide greater exposure of the
Vietnamese leadership to international economic and political
norms, perhaps reduce some Vietnamese paranoia and help
convince the Vietnamese that the POW/MIA issue is a ``wasting
asset'' for them that needs to be resolved. Integration would
also mesh with Vietnam's desire for greater international
acceptance. Finally, it would serve to lessen Vietnam's
perceived isolation as a potentially threatened neighbor of
an increasingly assertive China.
However, American policy-makers also need to view this from
an internal Vietnamese perspective that would expect such
integration and acceptance to relieve pressure for political
reforms and improved human rights. Vietnam has boldly
endorsed universal declarations on human rights and attempted
to join the cultural argument between Asia and the West, as
if its political system were even comparable to those
advancing the argument in Asia.
For the foreseeable future, Vietnam will have three major
objectives: continued political control under the Communist
Party, economic development that does not threaten such
control, and a sense of security in its relationship with
China.
While political change is inevitable over time, it will be
due to internal factors, and American leverage will be at the
margins. Economic reforms have spawned divisions in Vietnam's
communist party and government, as well as regional tensions
between the North and the South. Recriminations are already
evident between reformers and hard-liners, and a significant
American role in the Vietnamese economic future will be
limited.
After listening to wishful speculation about a ``new
tiger'' in Asia, spawned by young consultants, service
industries and lobby organizations with a vested interest in
lifting the embargo, American businesses are again looking at
political and economic realities they tended to ignore for
the past four years.
Press accounts of Vietnam's economic potential before and
after the lifting of the trade embargo are strikingly
different.
Overblown stories of ``the last frontier,'' ``the emerging
tiger in Asia,'' and the loss of business to foreigners were
common themes before. Now, the media is beginning to report
about corruption, unenforceability of legal codes, currency
problems, bureaucratic hurdles, arbitrary decision-making by
government officials, the paucity of infrastructure and the
reality that Vietnam, with
few exceptions, is almost a decade away from real
profitability on an American business scale.
Profits for American companies operating in Vietnam are not
likely for several more years. A lot of money is being spent
and very little is being made.
Most experienced observers of Asia's geo-politics
recognize, as well, that Vietnam is not of real strategic
relevance to the United States in the 1990s. Nonetheless,
armchair strategists, military planners, and some in Congress
continue to argue otherwise, and worry aloud accordingly.
Still, Vietnam is certainly looking for strategic solace.
Its historic fear of China is underscored today by Chinese
claims on island groups in the South China Sea, plus China's
burgeoning economic and political clout. Although elements of
Vietnam's current agenda are variously shared by ASEAN,
American military power and political commitments are not
designed to ameliorate arguments between China and Vietnam.
The United States facilitated the end of the proxy war
between China and Vietnam in Cambodia not by taking sides but
by opposing both unworthy claimants in an international and
regional context.
The reality of the economic and strategic conditions now
and in the foreseeable future does not make Vietnam central
to American policy. The Vietnamese desire for real
normalization with the United States is recognized, but the
gap is wide and will remain so despite the wishful, almost
romantic thinking of some.
Vietnam and the United States do have a unique relationship
forged through shared recent history. Both sides can regret
missed opportunities. And while the history of bilateral
negotiations is tortured, the significance of historic
antagonisms can only be muted by a credible effort to resolve
the POW/MIA issue, the only path to real healing and
normalization.
In sum, fully normalized relations between the United
States and Vietnam are not on the immediate horizon. Vietnam
will remain, in an economic and strategic sense, of little
importance to the United States. Relations could conceivably
move forward in the absence of a real economic or strategic
rationale with significant progress on POW/MIA accounting
through unilateral Vietnamese action. The longer Vietnam
delays in this regard, the more likely normalization could be
linked to human rights concerns, as well. If this occurs, it
would be supported by those who, heretofore, believed Vietnam
would be able to forge a politburo consensus and finally end
the uncertainty of America's POW/MIA families.
Normalized relations are quite logical in an ideal world.
Full normalization with Vietnam is desirable, but as a
practical matter is not possible or prudent as long as it can
be credibly maintained that Vietnam can do more to account
for missing Americans.
If the Clinton administration proceeds with the elements of
normalization as an objective, rather than an instrument to
resolve bilateral issues, domestic and congressional
opposition is likely to increase. That, in turn, would
further reduce executive branch flexibility, and create a
renewed round of recriminations as well as a new gauntlet for
future negotiators.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I came over to address another issue. I
listened to the majority leader's statement with regard to actions that
may be taken by the President in the foreseeable future.
I want to commend what I thought was an excellent presentation by my
friend and colleague, Senator Kerry, as well as Senator McCain, on this
issue on Sunday, as well as Senator Smith from New Hampshire who was
talking about this issue, I thought, in a very constructive, positive,
bipartisan way.
I think for those who are looking to try to deal with an issue of
this complexity, of this importance, Members would be wise to take a
few minutes and review their presentations. I thought there were
particularly convincing arguments to be made in favor of moving the
process forward at this time, and I thought the statements
[[Page S 9628]]
that were made by, as I mentioned, my colleagues Senator Kerry and
Senator McCain that support that change were very compelling. I thought
the observations of Senator Smith, which took a different view but,
nonetheless, were related to the subject matter, were constructive as
well.
The country will be addressing this issue in the next several days or
weeks. I think our Members would be wise to review their comments
because they are individuals who have spent a great deal of time on
this issue and, obviously, have given it a great deal of thought. The
fact that they come from different vantage points in terms of many
other different issues, both in domestic and foreign policy, and still
are as persuasive on this matter, I think really reflects some very,
very constructive and positive thinking.
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