[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 109 (Friday, June 30, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9571-S9573]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                             NATO EXPANSION

 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, one of the critical national 
security issues that the Senate, and indeed the Nation, is currently 
facing is the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO, which has 
been the bedrock of European peace and stability for almost 50 years, 
is in a period of transition--adjusting to the realities of the post-
cold war world. Key among the issues confronting NATO is its possible 
expansion to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, and, 
possibly, the states of the former Soviet Union.
  Last Thursday, June 22, Senator Nunn addressed this issue in a speech 
to the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic [SACLANT] conference in my State 
at Norfolk, VA. I have enormous respect for the views of Senator Nunn, 
my friend and colleague for 17 years in the Senate. We have traveled 
together extensively and jointly worked on projects such as the Nunn-
Warner Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, currently located in Washington, 
DC and Moscow.
  He is recognized around the world as an expert on national security 
issues, and in particular on issues related to NATO. While I might not 
agree with all of the points made in Senator Nunn's speech on NATO 
expansion, it is a very thoughtful contribution to this important 
international dialog. I commend it to the attention of my colleagues, 
and I ask that the text of Senator Nunn's speech be printed in the 
Record.
  The text of the speech follows:
                The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World

                         (By Senator Sam Nunn)


          1. introduction: the importance of nato enlargement

       Thank you, General Sheehan, for your kind introduction. 
     Secretary General Claes, NATO Military Committee Chairman 
     Field Marshal Vincent, distinguished NATO ambassadors, 
     distinguished military commanders, distinguished guests, I am 
     honored to be with you this morning to discuss the role of 
     NATO in the post Cold War period.
       The pivotal issue of NATO expansion deserves thorough and 
     careful consideration, because it has important 
     ramifications: for the future of NATO; for the countries of 
     central and eastern Europe; for the future of Russia and the 
     other countries of the former Soviet Union; and for the 
     future security and order throughout Europe, east and west.


                       ii. new security situation

       NATO was established primarily to protect the Western 
     democracies from an expansionist Soviet Union that seemed 
     determined to spread its influence through subversion, 
     political intimidation and the threat of military force.
       When NATO was formed in the late 1940's, Europe was faced 
     with postwar devastation and the emergence of Soviet 
     aggression and confrontation. Western consensus developed 
     around two critical concepts that were decisive in winning 
     the Cold War and in winning the peace; First, Germany and 
     Japan should not be isolated but should be integrated into 
     the community of democratic nations. Second, the western 
     democracies should pursue together a policy of containment, 
     and unite in NATO to carry out this policy.
       Integration and containment succeeded; The Berlin Wall is 
     down and Germany is united. Eastern Europe and the Baltics 
     are free at last. The Soviet Empire has disintegrated and 
     Russia is struggling to try to establish a market economy and 
     some semblance of democracy.
       For almost half a century, NATO's military strength was our 
     defensive shield against aggression by the Soviet Union, but 
     our offensive sword was our free societies, our innovative 
     and energetic peoples, our free market systems and our free 
     flow of ideas.
       With the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a heart-
     pounding, terrain-altering set of earthquakes centered in the 
     former Soviet Union and in Easter Europe. These seismic 
     events have ended an international era.
       The European security environment has changed. We have 
     moved from a world of high risk, but also high stability 
     because of the danger of escalation and balance of terror, to 
     a world of much lower risk but must less stability. In a 
     strange and even tragic sense, the world has been made safer 
     for racial, ethnic, class and religious vengeance, savagery 
     and civil war. Such tragedy has come to the people of Bosnia, 
     Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
     Georgia, Azerbaijan, and many others.
       The dust has not settled. Bosnia continues to erode NATO's 
     credibility and confidence. Yet it is clear that the overall 
     security and freedom of Europe has dramatically improved.
       The Eastern European countries, the Baltic countries, and 
     many of the countries of the former Soviet Union have become 
     fully independent, are turning westward, and are anxious to 
     become part of the European community and to join NATO as 
     full members.
       We are no longer preoccupied with the crucial Cold War 
     issue of how much warning time NATO would have in advance of 
     a massive conventional attack westward by the Warsaw Pact.
       During the Cold War, we worried about a Soviet invasion 
     deep into
      Western Europe. As Michael Mandelbaum points out, the 
     current debacle in Chechnya indicates that Russia today 
     has serious trouble invading itself.
       Today, our military planners estimate that preparation for 
     a Russian conventional military attack, even against Eastern 
     Europe, would take several years at a minimum--assuming the 
     resources could be found to rebuild the undermanned, 
     underfunded, poorly trained and poorly disciplined Russian 
     military establishment.
       Russia itself has gone from being the center of a menacing, 
     totalitarian global empire to an economically-weak, 
     psychologically-troubled country struggling to move toward 
     democracy and a market-based economy.
       A multilateral security system is forming across Europe 
     that reduces nuclear and conventional armaments and makes a 
     surprise attack by Russian conventional military forces 
     toward the West increasingly unlikely.
       I have in mind the cumulative effect of such agreements as 
     the INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty, the unilateral U.S. and 
     Soviet decisions to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in 
     Europe, the START I and pending START II Treaties, and the 
     pending Chemical Weapons Convention and Open Skies Treaty.
       These mechanisms are far from perfect, several await 
     ratification, and they require vigorous verification and full 
     implementation. Yet even at this stage, they significantly 
     enhance warning time that today is measured in years rather 
     than in days or in months.
       We are all aware of the dramatic change in the threat 
     environment in Europe resulting from these changes.
       The immediate danger is posed by violent terrorist groups; 
     by isolated rogue states, by ethnic, religious, and other 
     types of sub-national passion that can flare into vicious 
     armed conflict. The lethality of any and all of these threats 
     can be greatly magnified by the proliferation of nuclear, 
     chemical and biological weapons, as well as by the spread of 
     destabilizing conventional weapons.
       This audience is well aware that Russia currently possesses 
     over 20,000 nuclear weapons, at least 40 thousand tons of 
     chemical weapons, advanced biological warfare capabilities, 
     hundreds of tons of fissile material, huge stores of 
     conventional weapons, plus thousands of scientists and 
     technicians skilled in manufacturing weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       This is the first time in history that an empire has 
     disintegrated while possessing such enormous destructive 
     capabilities. Even if these capabilities are greatly reduced, 
     the know-how, the production capability, and the dangers of 
     proliferation will endure for many years. This is the number 
     one security threat for America, for NATO, and for the world.
       As we contemplate NATO enlargement, we must carefully 
     measure its effect on this proliferation threat.
       In the longer term, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a 
     resurgent and threatening Russia.
       Russia not only has inherited the still dangerous remnants 
     of the Soviet war machine. In addition, even in its currently 
     weakened condition, Russia possesses great potential in human 
     and material resources. By virtue of its size and strategic 
     location, Russia exerts considerable weight in Europe, Asia 
     and the Middle East. Meanwhile, Russia has inherited the 
     USSR's veto power in the UN Security Council and therefore 
     has a major voice in multilateral decision making.

[[Page S9572]]

       Russia will be a major factor, for better or worse, across 
     the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats.
       Russia can fuel regional conflicts with high technology 
     conventional weapons, along with political and other material 
     support.
       Or Russia can cooperate with us in defusing such conflicts, 
     particularly by preventing the spread of Russian weaponry to 
     irresponsible hands.
       Russia can itself emerge as a militarily aggressive power.
       Or Russia can assist us in averting new rivalry among major 
     powers that poisons the international security environment.
       Russia can pursue a confrontational course that undermines 
     security and cooperation in Europe.
       Or it can work with us to broaden and strengthen the 
     emerging system of multilateral security in Europe.
       Out of all this background come five fundamental points:
       First, preventing or curbing the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction is the most important and most difficult 
     security challenge we face.
       Second, Russia is a vast reservoir of weaponry, weapons 
     material and weapons know-how. Thousands of people in Russia 
     and throughout the former Soviet Union have the knowledge, 
     the access, and strong economic incentives to engage in 
     weapons traffic.
       Third, increased Russian isolation, paranoia or instability 
     would make this security challenge more difficult and more 
     dangerous.
       Fourth, although the West cannot control events in Russia, 
     and probably can assist political and economic reform there 
     only on the margins, as the medical doctors say, our first 
     principle should be DO NO HARM.
       Fifth, we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO 
     enlargement that we ignore the consequences it may have for 
     even more important security priorities.


      iii. problems with the current approach to nato enlargement

       It is against this background that I offer a few 
     observations on the current approach to NATO enlargement.
       NATO's announced position is that the question of 
     enlargement is not whether, but when and how. Somehow I have 
     missed any logical explanation of WHY. I cannot speak of 
     public opinion in other countries, but in America when the 
     enlargement debate focuses on issues of NATO nuclear policy, 
     NATO troop deployments, and formal NATO military 
     commitments--played against the background of repercussions 
     in Russia--somebody had better be able to explain to the 
     American people WHY, or at least WHY NOW.
       NATO was founded on a fundamental truth: the vital 
     interests of the countries of NATO were put at risk by the 
     military power and political intimidation of the Soviet 
     Union. As President Harry Truman said in his memoirs: ``The 
     [NATO] pact was a shield against aggression and against the 
     fear of aggression. . . .'' Because NATO was built on this 
     fundamental truth, and because we discussed it openly and 
     faced it truthfully with our people, the alliance endured and 
     prevailed.
       Today, we seem to be saying different things to different 
     people on the subject of NATO enlargement.
       To the Partnership for Peace countries, we are saying that 
     you are all theoretically eligible and if you meet NATO's 
     entrance criteria (as yet not fully spelled out), you will 
     move to the top of the list.
       To the Russians, we are also saying that NATO enlargement 
     is not threat-based and not aimed at you. In fact, you too 
     can eventually become a member of NATO. This raises serious 
     questions.
       Are we really going to be able to convince the East 
     Europeans that we are protecting them from their historical 
     threats, while we convince the Russians that NATO's 
     enlargement has nothing to do with Russia as a potential 
     military threat?
       Are we really going to be able to convince Ukraine and the 
     Baltic countries that they are somehow more secure when NATO 
     expands eastward but draws protective lines short of their 
     borders and places them in what the Russians are bound to 
     perceive as the ``buffer zone?''
       In short, are we trying to bridge the unbridgeable, to 
     explain the unexplainable? Are we deluding others or are we 
     deluding ourselves?
       The advantages of NATO's current course toward enlargement 
     cannot be ignored. If NATO expands in the near term to take 
     in the Visegrad countries, these countries would gain in 
     self-confidence and stability. It is possible that border 
     disputes and major ethnic conflicts presumably would be 
     settled before entry--for instance, the dispute involving the 
     Hungarian minority in Romania.
       However, the serious disadvantages must be thought through 
     carefully.
       For example, my conversations with Russian government 
     officials, members of the Russian parliament across the 
     political spectrum, and non-official Russian foreign policy 
     specialists convince me that rapid NATO enlargement will be 
     widely misunderstood in Russia and will have a serious 
     negative impact on political and economic reform in that 
     country. There are several reasons for this:
       At the moment, Russian nationalism is on the rise and 
     reformers are on the defensive. The Russian military 
     establishment and the still huge military-industrial complex 
     that undergirds it are dispirited and resentful.
       The average Russian voter has trouble making ends meet, is 
     unsure what the future may hold, but is well aware that 
     Russia has gone from being the seat of a global empire and 
     the headquarters of a military superpower to a vastly 
     weakened international status.
       Russian nationalists feed this sense of loss and 
     uncertainty by proclaiming that rapid NATO enlargement is 
     intended to take advantage of a weakened Russia and will pose 
     a grave security threat to the Russian people. Russian 
     demagogues argue that Russia must establish a new global 
     empire to counter an expansionist west. They smile with glee 
     every time NATO expansion is mentioned.
       Russian democrats do not see an immediate military threat 
     from an enlarged NATO but fear the reaction of the Russian 
     people. The democrats worry that alarmist messages, however 
     distorted, will set back democracy by increasing popular 
     tolerance for authoritarianism and renewed military spending 
     within Russia, and by isolating Russia from western 
     democracies.
       In short, if NATO enlargement stays on its current course, 
     reaction in Russia is likely to be a sense of isolation by 
     those committed to democracy and economic reform, with 
     varying degrees of paranoia, nationalism and demagoguery 
     emerging from across the current political spectrum.
       In the next few years, Russia will have neither the 
     resources nor the wherewithal to respond with a conventional 
     military build-up. If, however, the more nationalist and 
     extreme political forces gain the upper hand, by election or 
     otherwise, we are likely to see other responses that are more 
     achievable and more dangerous to European stability. For 
     example:
       While Russia would take years to mount a sustained military 
     threat to eastern Europe, it can within weeks or months exert 
     severe external and internal pressure on its immediate 
     neighbors to the west--including the Baltic countries and 
     Ukraine. This could set in motion a dangerous action-reaction 
     cycle.
       Moreover, because a conventional military response from 
     Russia in answer to NATO enlargement is infeasible, a nuclear 
     response, in the form of a higher alert status for Russia's 
     remaining strategic nuclear weapons and conceivably renewed 
     deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, is more likely. The 
     security of NATO, Russia's neighbors, and the countries of 
     eastern Europe will not be enhanced if the Russian military 
     finger moves closer to the nuclear trigger.
       By forcing the pace of NATO enlargement at a volative and 
     unpredictable moment in Russia's history, we could place 
     ourselves in the worst of all security environments: rapidly 
     declining defense budgets, broader responsibilities, and 
     heightened instability. We will also find ourselves with 
     increasingly difficult relations with the most important 
     country in the world in terms of potential for proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction.
       This is the stuff that self-fulfilling prophecies, and 
     historic tragedies, are made of.


            iv. specific recommendations for alliance policy

       Where do we go from here? I recognize that it is much 
     easier to criticize than to construct, but I do have a few 
     suggestions.
       I suggest a two-track approach to NATO enlargement.
       The first track would be evolutionary and would depend on 
     political and economic developments within the European 
     countries who aspire to full NATO membership. When a country 
     becomes eligible for European Union membership, it will also 
     be eligible to join the Western European Union and then be 
     prepared for NATO membership, subject to course to NATO 
     approval.
       This is a natural process connecting economic and security 
     interests.
       We can honestly say to Russia that this process is not 
     aimed at you.
       The second track would be threat-based. An accelerated, and 
     if necessary immediate, expansion of NATO would depend on 
     Russian behavior. We should be candid with the Russian 
     leadership, and above all honest with the Russian people, by 
     telling them frankly:
       If you respect the sovereignty of your neighbors, carry out 
     your solemn arms control commitments and other international 
     obligations, and if you continue on the path toward democracy 
     and economic reform, your neighbors will not view you as a 
     threat, and neither will NATO.
       We will watch, however, and react:
       (1) to aggressive moves against other sovereign states;
       (2) to militarily significant violations of your arms 
     control and other legally binding obligations pertinent to 
     the security of Europe;
       (3) to the emergence of a non-democratic Russian government 
     that impedes fair elections, suppresses domestic freedoms, or 
     institutes a foreign policy incompatible with the existing 
     European security system.
       These developments would be threatening to the security of 
     Europe and would require a significant NATO response, 
     including expansion eastward. We would be enlarging NATO 
     based on a real threat. We would not, however, be helping to 
     create the very threat we are trying to guard against.
       Finally, Partnership for Peace is a sound framework for 
     this two-track approach. Its role would be to prepare 
     candidate countries and NATO itself for enlargement on either 


[[Page S9573]]
     track. Programs of joint training and exercises, development of a 
     common operational doctrine, and establishment of inter-
     operable weaponry, technology and communications would 
     continue, based on more realistic contingencies. Tough issues 
     such as nuclear policy and forward stationing of NATO troops 
     would be discussed in a threat-based framework, one which we 
     hope would remain theoretical.
       As the Russian leaders and people make their important 
     choices, they should know that Russian behavior will be a key 
     and relevant factor for NATO's future. This straightforward 
     approach is also important for our citizens, who will have to 
     pay the bills and make the sacrifices required by expanded 
     NATO security commitments.
       The profound historical contrast between post-World War I 
     Germany and post-World War II Germany should tell us that 
     neo-containment of Russia is not the answer at this critical 
     historical juncture. If future developments require the 
     containment of Russia, it should be real containment, based 
     on real threats.
     

                          ____________________