[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 109 (Friday, June 30, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9513-S9514]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                     TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, victory was declared on Wednesday in the 
trade negotiations with Japan. But I think a lot of Americans are 
wondering ``in favor of which side?''
  A lot of Americans are wondering exactly what did the United States 
get after years of tough talk and threats?
  A closer look reveals that after 2\1/2\ years of negotiations, the 
final agreement is vague, unenforceable, non-binding--in short, it is 
virtually empty.
  Mr. President, Japanese car manufacturers apparently promised to 
increase production at their transplant operations in the United 
States. But for the most part, the promised increases may be no more 
than what was already planned. It is hard to see why the threat of a 
major trade war was necessary to persuade the Japanese to do what they 
already had announced.
  Mr. President, the U.S. negotiators claimed to have reached landmark 
agreements in the areas of auto parts and dealerships. But the Japanese 
immediately issued disclaimers, emphasizing that any commitments were 
not government commitments, carry no 

[[Page S9514]]
government backing, and are not enforceable.
  The U.S. negotiators announced an estimate of expected increases in 
sales of auto parts under the agreement. Incredibly, the Japanese 
negotiator then specifically disavowed the United States estimate. He 
said the United States estimate was shared ``neither by the minister 
himself nor by the government of Japan.''
  Mr. President, it makes one wonder, who were we negotiating with? One 
report this morning states that some Japanese officials ``expressed 
amazement that the U.S. accepted the final
 deal.''

  Is this the ``specific, measurable, concrete'' deal the President 
promised?
  If the estimated increases in parts purchases fail to occur, there 
are no consequences. If the number of dealerships does not increase, 
Japan faces no penalties. If the United States estimates in any of 
these categories do not materialize--well, the Japanese never 
acknowledged those United States estimates in the first place. And a 
joint United States-Japan statement adds the ultimate qualifier: Both 
sides agreed to recognize that ``changes in market conditions may 
affect the fulfillment of these plans.''
  Mr. President, the bottom line is that this agreement does very 
little, if anything, to address the continuing problem of market access 
in Japan. After this agreement is in place, Japan will remain the most 
closed major industrial economy in the world. Japan will remain a 
sanctuary economy with the lowest level among all industrial nations of 
import penetration across numerous industry sectors.
  This agreement does nothing to address the continuing problem of 
Japanese cartel-like behavior in their home market. It does nothing to 
address the restrictive business practices that effectively block 
United States companies from penetrating the Japanese market. And it 
does nothing to encourage, not to mention require, the Japanese 
Government to take any action against those practices.
  Mr. President, we went to the brink of a trade war with one of our 
most important trading partners and would up with vague promises that 
cannot be enforced. I hope this is not a model for future efforts to 
get tough against closed foreign markets.


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