[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 108 (Thursday, June 29, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9474-S9475]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


    IMPORTATION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS

 Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I wish to comment this morning on 
the Department of Energy's proposal to import spent nuclear fuel from 
foreign research reactors through commercial ports such as Tacoma, WA.
  Before I begin, I would like to thank DOE, and in particular Mr. 
Charles Head, for the outstanding efforts put forward by DOE to ensure 
that the citizens of Tacoma have had adequate opportunities to review 
information and make comments on DOE's proposal. The additional public 
hearing held last week was well received and well attended and the 
extension of the public comment period until July 20th is appreciated. 
DOE's efforts have not gone unnoticed.
  Mr. President, I fully appreciate the United States nuclear 
nonproliferation policies and objectives. I also understand the 
important role that removing spent nuclear fuel from the global 
marketplace plays in those policy objectives. Nonetheless, I would like 
to express my serious concerns regarding DOE's proposal. DOE's draft 
environmental impact statement on the handling of foreign spent nuclear 
fuel does not adequately assess the potential risks that alternative 
#1, the importation and interim storage of foreign spent nuclear fuel 
in the United States, could pose to the citizens of the United States, 
particularly those who reside in the port communities suggested as 
points of entry in the DEIS and those near proposed waste storage 
facilities.
  Along with my colleagues from the State of Washington, I recently 
sent a 

[[Page S 9475]]
letter to Secretary O'Leary outlining the reasons behind our concerns. 
I ask that a copy of that letter be printed in the Record. In summary, 
we raised concerns over the evaluation of the potential exposure of the 
general public to radiation, the inadequate training and equipment 
possessed by Tacoma emergency response units to deal with a radiation 
emergency, the failure to address the potential for terrorist 
activities during the importation process, and the proposal to use the 
Hanford nuclear facility as an interim storage facility. Given these 
concerns, we asked DOE to no longer consider using commercial ports 
such as Tacoma, but to limit further consideration of alternative #1 to 
military ports.
  It has recently come to my attention that alternative #2 in the DEIS, 
facilitating the management of the spent nuclear fuel overseas, may be 
a better choice. Although the DEIS presents a number of difficulties in 
implementing alternative #2, it may be more feasible than previously 
thought. There is a processing facility in Scotland that is apparently 
both able and willing to take the spent nuclear fuel and reprocess it 
into more stable, less threatening material. I want to encourage DOE to 
fully investigate this possibility. It could ensure that we meet our 
nuclear nonproliferation goals without threatening the health and 
safety of United States citizens.
  I look forward to working with DOE and the administration to ensure 
that we meet our nuclear nonproliferation objectives while 
simultaneously protecting the citizens of the United States.
  The letter follows:

                                                   U.S. Senate

                                     Washington, DC, June 8, 1995.
     Hazel O'Leary,
     Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary O'Leary. We are writing to express our 
     concerns over the alternatives proposed in the Department of 
     Energy's (DOE) Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on 
     the management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from foreign 
     research reactors. We are concerned about the proposed option 
     of importing the foreign SNF through commercial ports such as 
     Tacoma, WA.
       While the desire to encourage other nation's research 
     reactors to switch to low-enriched uranium (LEU) from highly-
     enriched uranium (HEU) is an integral component of the United 
     States overall nuclear nonproliferation policy, importing 
     foreign SNF through commercial ports may not be necessary. 
     The DOE DEIS lists two military ports among the ten possible 
     ports of entry for the SNF. We feel that DOE should limit 
     further consideration of importing SNF to these or other 
     appropriate military ports because of the considerable 
     concern amount citizens and city officials about importing 
     SNF through commercial ports.
       First, there is significant apprehension about the threats 
     to public health importing this SNF through commercial ports 
     would create. Although DOE has stated that the threats to 
     public health are not significant given the state of the 
     material and the overly cautious design of the storage casks, 
     we are not convinced that no public health threat exists. 
     There is public concern that longshoremen, sailors, and 
     average citizens could potentially become exposed to 
     significant radiation levels. Whether this risk is real or 
     only perceived is irrelevant. Importing foreign SNF through 
     commercial ports would at best threaten public confidence and 
     citizens' sense of security and at worst pose a significant 
     threat to public health.
       Second, the DEIS states: ``Primary responsibility for 
     emergency response to a foreign research reactor SNF incident 
     would reside with local authorities.''. Although the port and 
     city of Tacoma have emergency response plans for hazardous 
     materials, neither the Police and Fire Departments nor the 
     Port workers are properly equipped or trained to contend with 
     a significant radiation emergency. Properly equipping and 
     training these people would add a significant and unnecessary 
     cost to the overall proposal. In addition, it is not clear 
     that Police Officers, Fire Fighters, and port workers would 
     be willing to undergo such training, knowing that it opens 
     them up to potential future radiation exposure. In fact, port 
     workers in Tacoma may declare their unwillingness to handle 
     the material during even routine transport procedures, let 
     alone emergencies.
       Third, importing foreign SNF through commercial ports runs 
     contrary to the overall policy objective of reducing the 
     world-wide availability of HEU and other nuclear waste. If 
     lengthy, unnecessary and relatively low-security 
     transportation of SNF occurs through commercial ports, the 
     increased opportunities for theft, hijacks, and sabotage 
     could result in greater accessibility to the SNF than 
     desired. As current events have unfortunately revealed, the 
     United States is not immune to terrorism, either foreign or 
     domestic. Even if this material could not be used in the 
     making of nuclear weapons, and some of it could, the very 
     fact that it is radioactive makes it dangerous. Transporting 
     this material through commercial ports would create an 
     unnecessary threat to national security.
       These concerns present a compelling case for DOE to 
     preclude further consideration of commercial ports like 
     Tacoma, WA for the importation of foreign SNF. While removing 
     HEU and other nuclear waste from the global marketplace is an 
     essential aspect of nuclear nonproliferation, importing this 
     material through military ports may prove more reasonable 
     given the increased protection that could be provided to 
     public health and safety and national security.
       We are also concerned about the proposal to store the 
     foreign SNF at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. This idea is 
     unacceptable given the current state of affairs at that 
     facility. The current environmental problems associated with 
     the storage of nuclear waste at the Hanford site have 
     resulted in clean up costs near $50 billion. In addition, 
     current budget pressures will make it difficult for DOE to 
     meet its legally enforceable clean up schedule. Additional 
     waste management responsibilities could further hamper the 
     Department's efforts at the site.
       In summary we would appreciate DOE limiting further 
     consideration of this proposal to military ports and adequate 
     storage facilities.
       Thank you for your consideration. We look forward to your 
     response.
           Sincerely,
     Patty Murray.
     Jim McDermott.
     Norm Dicks.
     

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