[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 108 (Thursday, June 29, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9472-S9474]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                          SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I rise today to voice my concern over a 
disturbing trend which I see making itself manifest in certain 
government and other circles in the People's Republic of China: the 
growing view that the sole driving force in the United States' policy 
towards China is a desire on our part to weaken China and prevent its 
emergence as a player on the world stage. I have seen this view--in 
some cases bordering on the paranoid--reflected in statements from the 
Foreign Ministry, articles in the official and semi-official Chinese 
media such as a June 12 story by Wang Guang in Renmin Ribao entitled 
``Where Is the United States Taking Sino-American Relations?'', and in 
talks with some Chinese government representatives.
  This viewpoint worries me primarily because it is wrong, but it also 
concerns me because of the underlying thinking which it reflects. If 
the Chinese are sincere in their beliefs, then this view reflects a 
complete misunderstanding of us and how we as a country operate. On the 
other hand, if the view is being disseminated by conservative party 
factions as part of a xenophobic campaign designed to bolster their 
credentials during the present struggle to replace Deng Xiaoping, then 
it demonstrates a willingness on their part to baselessly poison our 
relationship for domestic political gain. Finally, it is not outside 
the realm of possibility that certain factions in the government are 
manufacturing the entire thing in an effort to place the United States 
on the defensive and wring a unilateral concession or two out of us; 
they have done it before with other countries. Under any scenario, the 
result is disturbing.
  I believe that Beijing's new view is well summed up in the Renmin 
Ribao article:

       Over the past few years, only after going through setbacks 
     and difficulties has the United States improved and developed 
     relations with China. After the disintegration of the Soviet 
     Union, one view prevailed in the United States, which 
     maintained that ``China was a counterweight to the Soviet 
     Union" during the Cold War and that it was ``no longer 
     important'' to set store by relations with China in the wake 
     of the Cold War. In September 1993, Washington came to 
     understand that ``China is a crucially important country and 
     that China's importance 

[[Page S 9473]]
     has been neglected in the preceding few years.'' The United States then 
     modified its China policy. After that, while pursuing its 
     ``total contact'' policy, the United States continued to put 
     pressure on China over a series of issues. In May 1994, 
     Washington realized that the United States' pressures was 
     hardly effective for ``a country with a population of 1.2 
     billion people,'' that ``China is a very large and very 
     important country,'' that ``its economy has the fastest 
     growth rate in the world,'' that its international status and 
     role are important, and that the United States needs to 
     maintain and develop relations with China. The United States 
     then separated the so-called human rights question from 
     China's MFN trading status. Only since then have Sino-
     American relations developed vigorously.
       During this time, however, another tendency in United 
     States-China policy grew. Following China's economic 
     development, Americans are vigorously advocating the ``China 
     threat theory.'' On 17 April, the Los Angeles Times carried 
     an article saying `` United States officials ``are beginning 
     to pay close attention to China and view it as a possible 
     long-term rival and threat to United States interests in the 
     Asia-Pacific region.'' U.S. officials have repeatedly denied 
     that the United States will isolate and contain China. 
     However, what is notable is that, while briefing the House of 
     Representatives International Relations Committee on 9 
     February, a U.S. State Department official in charge of East 
     Asian and Pacific Affairs said: China ``does not pose a 
     direct threat to us. But what is obvious is that as we look 
     over the next decades, China will become increasingly strong. 
     Therefore, we are pursuing several policies so as to curb 
     this potential threat through all possible means.

  Mr. President, let me try to dispel this conspiracy theory. First of 
all, the basic flaw in the Chinese position is that it assumes a 
monolithic China policy on our part; but anyone who actually thinks 
there could be such a thing is sorely misinformed. With a liberal 
Democrat President drifting aimlessly through the sea of foreign policy 
and a conservative and assertive Republican Congress feeling the need 
to fill the void, the probability of there being a grand unitary U.S.-
China plan is about zero. The thought of the amount of accommodations 
that would be necessary to achieve such a goal almost boggles the mind.
  The second flaw in such a position is that the disparate events which 
the Chinese draw together to form their conspiracy theory are just 
that--disparate events each with its own, mostly unrelated, causes. For 
example, the PRC views stronger U.S. interests in Taiwan, Tibet and 
Hong Kong as a concerted effort on our part to, as a Library of 
Congress senior analyst recently put it, ``keep [them] preoccupied with 
tasks of protecting China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
less able to exert influence elsewhere.'' The PRC also sees 
confirmation of this view in a recent spurt in the growth of our 
interest in these areas. The Chinese, however, completely miss both the 
real sources of our interest and the reason for the perceived 
acceleration therein.
  Principle among these three is the Taiwan issue; or, as Beijing is 
fond of calling it, the ``Taiwan card.'' With the recent decision to 
admit President Lee Teng-hui to the United States for a private visit, 
the PRC is convinced that we have embarked on a new path to upgrade our 
relationship with Taiwan at their expense. The PRC, however, must 
remember to view the decision within the overall context of our 
relationship with Taiwan. We have been close friends with Taiwan for 
over 40 years, a considerably longer period of time than with the PRC. 
Taiwan is a fellow democracy in an area not known for its commitment to 
democratic ideals, and is one of our strongest trading partners. There 
are also strong cultural ties between us; for example, many of Taiwan's 
leaders, President Lee included, have attended university in this 
country.
  Yet for years we have officially relegated Taiwan to less than 
second-class status among our friends, principally out of fear of 
offending mainland sensibilities. This treatment has included 
prohibiting its President from visiting our shores, even for a private 
visit, a position which has long been viewed by Congress and the 
American people as completely inequitable. As I have previously noted 
on several occasions, the only persons to whom we regularly deny entry 
to this country are terrorists and criminals. It was strongly felt in 
Congress, and the country as a whole, that to add President Lee to that 
list was a gratuitous insult to our friends. With the coming of a 
Republican-controlled Congress, the desire to remove that insult found 
a voice which, finally and rather sensibly, the administration heeded. 
The PRC should remember, then, to view the decision in these simple 
terms--not as a major policy shift, not as a rejection of the Three 
Communiques, not as a desire to create--in their parlance--``two 
Chinas'' or ``one China one Taiwan,'' and not as a part of some hidden 
agenda. It was, rather, a gesture of equity to a friend. Furthermore, 
the reason for the sudden acceleration in this process is not because 
of some deliberate plan, but for a more simple reason. Republicans have 
traditionally been stronger supporters of Taiwan than Democrats, and in 
November of last year took control of both Houses of Congress for the 
first time in decades. As a result, we finally found ourselves in a 
position to be able to effectuate our policies . . . thus the sudden 
spurt of activity.
  Our interest in Tibet is also one unrelated to some sinister desire 
to preoccupy Beijing; rather, it is based on our desire to see that the 
Tibetan people are not physically or culturally extinguished. Since 
Tibet was forcibly incorporated into China by the PLA, the Beijing 
Government has committed acts in that country which shock the 
conscience. Thousands of irreplaceable Buddhist temples have been 
gutted and destroyed, many hundreds of Tibetans have been arrested and 
killed, Han Chinese have been encouraged to relocate to Tibet in a 
clear effort to make the Tibetan people a minority in their own land, 
Tibetan culture has been sinocized . . . the list goes on. There is 
enough there to spark our interest, without us having to manufacture an 
issue to keep the Chinese busy. And as with Taiwan, Republican control 
of Congress is likely
 behind the increased interest. Senator Helms, the present chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations, has long been a strong and vocal champion 
of the Tibetan people, and is now in a position to be able to 
effectuate some of his desired policy changes.

  Similarly, our preoccupation with Hong Kong is not the third leg of 
some organized scheme. Rather, while our interest in Taiwan stems from 
our long friendship and our interest in Tibet stems from concern about 
human rights, as I have also noted on previous occasions our Hong Kong 
concerns are predominantly economic. Since I have already spoken at 
length about this issue both on the floor and in my subcommittee, 
suffice it to say here that we have a substantial economic stake in the 
continued viability of Hong Kong as a international financial center 
after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty after 1997. While issues 
involving that transfer are primarily bilateral ones between China and 
the United Kingdom, where decisions made by the two parties may effect 
our legitimate concerns we have a legitimate interest in speaking out 
about them. The explanation for why our interest there has grown 
recently is quite simple: 1997 is getting closer and closer, and the 
two parties are making more and more decisions about the colony's fate 
with each passing day.
  These, then, are the reasons for our strong interest in Taiwan, Tibet 
and Hong Kong, and for any recent increase in that interest. Each has 
its own set of distinct causes, and are not part of some unified plot 
to keep the Chinese sufficiently busy at home so as to prevent their 
emergence abroad.
  The Chinese have also begun to see an evil intent in the attention we 
have been paying to their trade and other economic practices. Over the 
last year we have pressed China to observe its commitments to a series 
of multilateral and bilateral obligations in areas such as intellectual 
property rights, arbitration, the WTO, and so forth. The Chinese have 
begun to see these moves as part of an attempt to keep them 
economically less powerful and influential than they would otherwise 
grow to be. Such a conclusion stretches the bounds of reason, though, 
and completely overlooks the underlying basis for our actions. China 
has insisted that it be treated as a player on the world economic 
stage. Well, Mr. President, along with the benefits such a role brings 
come certain responsibilities. Unfortunately, the PRC has made it 

[[Page S 9474]]
clear through its actions that it intends to live up to those 
responsibilities only when it feels like it. Therein lies the problem.
  Intellectual property rights became an issue not as some manufactured 
attempt to weaken China's economic expansion but because the Chinese 
were allowing, even encouraging in some cases, widescale piracy in 
contravention of a series of international and bilateral agreements. 
Chinese companies were, in effect, stealing from us to the tune of 
several billion dollars a year. Is it any wonder, then, that we showed 
an interest in the topic? As for its entry into the WTO, China's 
position on accession can best be likened to wanting to have its cake 
and eat it too. It wants to have the benefits of that international 
agreement, but will not live up to others it has signed such as the 
Convention on Arbitration. It wants to be treated as a developed 
country where such treatment suits its needs, but as a developing 
country in other areas. For example, although the Chinese Minister of 
Chemical Industry Gu Xiulian has proudly noted that China's soda ash 
production has ``leapt to the front row in the world'' and is one of 
the top three chemicals produced in China--a statement one would 
logically assume is concomitant with developed status--it has instead 
demanded developing status for this chemical industry. This would allow 
it to continue to leave in place artificially high tariffs imposed 
against United States imports of soda ash. China cannot have it both 
ways, and our calling them on this and similar attempts is simply a 
matter of equity and nothing more. It is of some interest to note at 
this juncture that if we were involved in some overall scheme to hinder 
China's economy, the President would hardly have recommended renewing 
that country's MFN status as he did this month. And, as I strongly 
suspect it will, Congress would have hardly gone along with that 
renewal.
  There are other areas where the PRC appears to see the conspiracy at 
work: the restriction on sales to that country of United States 
technology with possible military applications, calls for greater 
access to Chinese markets, statements of concern about the possibility 
of regional conflict in the Spratly Island group, et cetera; but I will 
not belabor my point lest our Chinese friends decide that I protest too 
much. Let me just state that while the paranoid can manufacture a 
conspiracy out of any given set of facts, regardless of how unrelated 
they may be, I hope that the Chinese will reflect on the issues as I 
have briefly outlined them and see that there is no unified plan to get 
them.
  It is unfortunate that Sino-American relations have taken a downturn 
over the past few weeks, and that there might be some who view that 
downturn as evidence of the so-called conspiracy in United States/China 
policy. I can assure our Chinese friends that such a downturn was not 
desired, and should not be allowed to linger. Having said that, let me 
also state emphatically that it will not behoove some isolated circles 
in the PRC to exacerbate or overreact to the present situation for 
ulterior reasons; I have seen some disturbing signs that there may be a 
growing tendency on the Chinese side for some to do just that. It may 
be thought that by placing the United States on the defensive, United 
States officials-- ``anxious to restore meaningful dialogue with China 
presumably would be expected to `prove' their intentions with some 
gestures designed to show the Chinese that their conspiratorial view of 
U.S. policy is no longer correct.'' As proof of our goodwill, the 
Chinese side might suggest a series of unilateral gestures on the part 
of the United States.
  This is not just hypothesizing on my part; I have already seen a few 
examples of it. For instance, a June 27 KYODO news agency broadcast 
reported that Zhou Shijian, deputy head of the Research Institute of 
International Trade at MOFTEC--the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation--had said in an interview that the United States 
should take three steps to sooth the PRC's rancor over the President 
Lee visit: send a special envoy to Beijing to apologize, support PRC 
membership in the WTO, and lift restrictions on technology transfers to 
China.
  Mr. President, let me note first that I--and I believe most other 
Members of Congress--would strongly oppose any move by the 
administration to make any unilateral concessions of this magnitude 
under this type of circumstance; it would set a very distasteful 
precedent. Moreover, Mr. Zhou could not have picked a less likely three 
areas in which to expect gratuitous action on our part. Let me explain.
  First, while we regret the effect of President Lee's visit on the 
United States-China relationship, and regret that it has upset the 
Chinese side, sending an envoy to apologize presupposes that the 
decision to admit Lee was wrong. It was not; and given the votes 
calling for Lee's visit in both the House and the Senate, I think one 
would be hardpressed to find more than three of the 535 Members who 
would agree that was.
  Second, we have made clear that our support for the PRC's accession 
to the WTO is dependent on China's adherence to the provisions of other 
multilateral economic agreements to which it is a party such as 
international IPR and arbitration conventions. While the PRC has made 
strides in the IPR field, its compliance in others has been less than 
satisfactory. For example, although a signatory to the international 
arbitration convention, the Chinese have steadfastly refused to honor a 
$6 million award against a Shanghai firm in favor of a United States 
company named Revpower. Until China lives up to commitments such as 
this one, I and many others do not believe that our support should be 
forthcoming, especially on a unilateral basis.
  Finally, we come to restrictions on technology transfers. These 
restrictions were put into place after the Tienanmen massacre, and are 
designed to keep technology with military applications out of the hands 
of the PLA. Although there had been some discussion here of loosening 
the restrictions, that possibility has pretty much evaporated in light 
of credible information that the Chinese have been involved in 
transfers of technological and military hardware to rogue countries 
such as Iran. Given the very real possibility that were we to resume 
some transfers China might simply transship our materials to these 
countries, I do not think that the Chinese will see a change in that 
position anytime soon.
  Mr. President, let me close by reiterating that there is no grand 
design to keep China from occupying its proper place in the world. And, 
as for the present souring in the relationship, I hope that, like the 
ripples in a pond after a stone is thrown into it, the ripples in the 
relationship will continue to grow smaller until things are once again 
smooth.


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