[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 108 (Thursday, June 29, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9471-S9472]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                  DISMANTLING THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT

 Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I have been a longtime advocate of 
streamlining government and making it more effective to address the 
challenges of the global economy and information age as we move into 
the 21st century. While I have focused on these issues for many years 
as chairman and former ranking Republican of the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, I have never witnessed as great an interest in this critical 
issue than I have this Congress. I welcome this interest because I 
believe it offers great opportunity to achieve major and overdue 
structural reform of the executive branch. We can and will achieve the 
goal of smaller, better, and less costly government.
  Most recently, attention has centered on eliminating the Commerce 
Department. It is endorsed as part of the budget resolution. The 
proposal introduced recently by Senator Abraham, the majority leader, 
and others provides a specific plan on how to dismantle the Department.
  I have long endorsed the idea of dismantling the Commerce Department 
in the context of elevating, streamlining, and reconfiguring major 
trade functions in the executive branch. It is very difficult to defend 
the status quo as it exists today at the Commerce Department, and I 
believe the initiatives that have been introduced are an important step 
toward the establishment of a government that is structured to deal 
effectively with the challenges of tomorrow, not yesterday.
  I have worked on organizational issues for many years and I realize 
how difficult it is to bring about needed and constructive change. Turf 
usually overwhelms the process, whether it is in the administration or 
Congress, and the private sector is often either unexcited about the 
issue, or they don't want to upset those with whom they have to work in 
the current structure. So it is not surprising that the recent 
legislation is controversial and that the trade provisions have 
engendered the greatest amount of concern. I, too, have concerns about 
certain provisions.
  I would like to turn briefly to some of the trade concerns that have 
been raised in the initial debate on this issue so far. First, I firmly 
believe a vast majority of us agree on the vital importance of trade to 
this Nation and recognize that our Government plays a crucial role in 
this area. This role includes performing key functions as negotiating 
agreements to open markets, enforcing and implementing trade 
agreements, administering trade laws and facilitating exports.
  For many years now, I have called for significant reform of executive 
branch trade functions and the case for reform has never been stronger 
than today. Uniting major trade responsibilities under the clear 
leadership of one person and establishing a more effective trade voice 
for our Nation is the direction in which we should head. It is time to 
recognize that much of the Commerce Department's trade activities are 
integrally involved with those of the USTR. There is no clear dividing 
line between them, except for the divided lines of authority. This has 
caused, and continues to cause, wasteful duplication of effort, 
confusion as to who is in charge, serious turf battles, and divide-and-
conquer tactics by our trading partners. It is time that they become 
part of the same team with one coach in charge.
  I have heard some disturbing accounts of how our trading partners 
take advantage of our
 divided trade leadership. For example, I've been told of instances 
where the lead trade negotiator from one of our fiercest trading 
partners would play the USTR and Commerce trade negotiators off one 
another by telling one that the other was willing to agree to something 
that the other would not agree to.

  Ambassador Kantor's recent testimony before a House Appropriations 
subcommittee demonstrates the blurred nature of responsibilities 
between the International Trade Administration [ITA] and the USTR. He 
stated that the USTR's three top priorities are to ensure that the 
Uruguay round agreements are implemented fairly, to enforce trade 
agreements, and to expand trade to new markets that offer the greatest 
potential for increased exports of American products. That sounds a lot 
like what much of the ITA is doing.
  I have an extremely high regard for the dedicated and talented staff 
at the USTR, but it is unrealistic to expect that they can continue to 
manage effectively a trade agenda that is ever more demanding and 
complex, under the current structure of divided trade leadership and 
responsibility. The fact 

[[Page S 9472]]
that there are some 40 detailees at the USTR--about 25 percent of its 
current size--is indicative of the burdens the current structure is 
working under. Furthermore, it is my understanding that two major 
components of ITA--the international Economic Policy and Trade 
development offices spend about one-half of their time on trade 
negotiations and policy development.
  While we need to maintain a coordinating function on trade that 
allows for input from different parts of our government that may be 
impacted by a particular trade matter, the USTR relies mostly heavily 
on ITA for negotiating support and backup. Even Commerce's main export 
promotion entity, the U.S. And Foreign Commercial Service, is actively 
supporting the USTR. For example, it plays an important role in the 
USTR's annual National Trade Estimates Report. There is logic behind 
bringing Commerce and USTR trade functions together under one cabinet-
level voice.
  I would like to comment briefly on some of the concerns that have 
been raised with respect to merging these functions. One major concern 
is related to moving import Administration functions to the USTR 
because of possible trade-offs that might be made between trade 
negotiations and administration of our trade laws. I would simply make 
two points in this regard. The first point is that the administration 
of antidumping and countervailing duty laws is a quasi-judicial process 
and must be implemented strictly according to law. The second point is 
that these functions are already part of a department that has trade 
advocacy as one of its primary function, something which one could 
argue would exert more pressure for trade-offs than would negotiations. 
It is my understanding that Commerce's Office of Import Administration 
is kept separate from other trade functions and that is how it should 
remain under any single trade structure. At the same time, we should 
recognize that, while the administration of these laws must be isolated 
from other primary trade functions, these issues are in fact part of 
trade negotiations--they were a major issue in the WTO and are an 
active part of past and current free trade talks.
  Other strong concerns have been raised about the USTR's role as an 
honest broker and interagency coordinator. While I appreciate some of 
the concerns that have been raised, and I agree that there must be an 
honest broker in the White House at the highest levels on major trade 
decisions, it is not the USTR that seems to be performing that role. As 
far as I can tell, every President has created his own small White 
House office to broker controversial trade
 decisions. Ambassador Kantor has himself testified that of the three 
tiers of the interagency coordinating mechanism, and I quote, ``(a)t 
the highest level is the National Economic Council (NEC).'' At the 
lower levels, there is no reason why the USTR or a single cabinet trade 
structure should not perform the lower level interagency process that 
exists.

  Things have dramatically changed since the USTR, then the STR, was 
created in 1962. We are no longer simply negotiating occasional GATT 
rounds of tariff talks. While we have made some organizational changes 
along the way, they have been relatively limited in scope, and the last 
time we made any significant change was in 1979. Since then, our trade 
negotiating agenda has taken center stage and has grown tremendously. 
The issues are much broader and more complex than ever before, and the 
implementation of trade agreements has also grown enormously in 
significance. Our Government's foreign commercial presence is often on 
the front lines in discovering trade problems that might need to be 
negotiated or are related to lack of implementation of certain 
agreements. Our current institutional structure that divides these and 
other major trade functions among separate entities is not, I would 
argue, in our national trade interest.
  It is in our national trade interest to restructure trade functions 
in a way that builds on and improves the best features that exist. We 
want to preserve the lean and mean negotiating structure of the USTR 
and to also ensure that there is an effective interagency and private 
sector advisory process that allows for legitimate input from other 
agencies and voices as needed. But our negotiators should have the 
necessary support structure in place to achieve ambitious negotiating 
objectives. We also should be implementing and administering trade 
agreements and trade programs in one house. There is not a whole lot of 
sense, for example, to the USTR administering the GSP program, while 
Commerce implements major bilateral trade agreements such as the 
semiconductor agreement.
  The specific business concerns that have been raised about the trade 
provisions of the Commerce Dismantling Act must be examined very 
closely, and the Committee on Governmental Affairs will be holding 
hearings on these and other aspects of the bill after the July recess. 
I share some of the concerns that have been raised, including those 
relating to the international economic policy and trade development 
functions of the Commerce Department. I also believe greater 
consolidation should be accomplished. A cabinet level trade structure 
should include, for example, the Commerce Department's existing export 
control functions.
  Mr. President, citizens are demanding a government that works better, 
as well as costs less. An integrated trade structure within our 
Government will not only work better for our citizens, but it will also 
achieve efficiencies, synergies and cost savings.
  In closing, I would just to like to say that there is a window of 
opportunity here to reflect in a comprehensive way about how we should 
be organized to address the many trade challenges ahead of us. I hope 
we can prevent jurisdictional concerns from becoming the driving force 
in this debate, and that we move it instead in a positive and 
constructive direction. I look forward to working with my colleagues to 
achieve the best trade structure for our country, one which will 
promote an effective national trade agenda for the 21st 
century.


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